WAR on the SHORT WAVE
Harold N. Graves, Jr.
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WAR ON THE SHORT WAVE

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WAR ON THE SHORT WAVE

by

HAROLD N. GRAVES, JR.

WITH TWELVE ILLUSTRATIONS

THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
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INCREASE IN SHORT WAVE POWER

GERMANY
- 1930 (4 Kilowatts)
- 1935 (85 Kilowatts)
- 1940 (280 Kilowatts*)

ITALY
- 1930 (?)
- 1935 (25 Kilowatts)
- 1940 (350 Kilowatts)

FRANCE
- 1930 (None)
- 1935 (10 Kilowatts)
- 1940 (123 Kilowatts)

GREAT BRITAIN
- 1930 (7 Kilowatts)
- 1935 (32 Kilowatts)
- 1940 (240 Kilowatts*)

* Estimates
+ One transmitter of unknown power
I. Round the World on the Air Waves

Gunpowder, it is said, was first used for holiday firecrackers. Radio in its early days operated mainly to give men pleasure. Both have been turned to use in war, and nations have made broadcasting into the ally of the bomb.

In London, General de Gaulle, leader of free Frenchmen, has taken to the microphone to urge his countrymen to join him in restoring French freedom. Italian broadcasters have suggested that English workers sabotage British war industry. Englishmen have urged Germans and Italians to get rid of Hitler and Mussolini; and Germans have told Britons that they should remove Prime Minister Churchill from office.

On the other side of the world, there are more combatants, and there is also another war—or an extension of the same war. Daily programs are transmitted from Australia. From Radio Saigon in French Indo-China, news and talks are broadcast in French and English. Engaged in a vast struggle with Japan, China transmits news and talks to her potential friends throughout the world. Japanese programs are radiated from Tokyo and Hsinking, capital of the puppet empire of Manchoukuo.

THE "FOURTH FRONT"

An American radio commentator has suggested that broadcasting be recognized as the "fourth front" of the war—a new field of conflict in addition to the economic, the diplomatic and the military struggles which make up modern war. Actually, propaganda has nearly always accompanied wars, and it is propaganda that is the real fourth front. But radio has extended this battlefield over distances never before possible, and has made the present conflict the wordiest war in history.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), for example, broadcasts some 200,000 words a day in two dozen languages to audiences outside of Britain. In five days, it broadcasts as
many words as there are in the Bible, or as many words as there are in all the works of Shakespeare.

International broadcasts from nations at war, of course, are not directed to enemy countries alone, or to countries under enemy control. There are two other types of broadcasts: (1) to allies, and (2) to neutrals or non-belligerents. The British Broadcasting Corporation transmits programs nearly twenty-four hours a day for England’s allies in the British Empire. Among neutrals, few nations or groups, however small, have been ignored. Berlin stations, for example, broadcast in Gaelic—more as a fillip to Irish national sentiment than for the enlightenment of the very few Irishmen who understand this ancient tongue. Italian stations broadcast regularly in Esperanto.

**WOOING THE UNITED STATES**

Naturally, however, the biggest and richest neutrals have received the most attention. As the most powerful non-belligerent, the U. S. early in 1941 was served with three and a half hours of broadcasts a day by the Rome radio, with six and a half by the BBC, and with nearly eleven by the German radio. As crisis mounted in the Far East, Japan increased her North American service to four and a half hours a day.

In addition, listeners in the United States are well situated to hear many broadcasts which either are not actually intended for this country, or which are simply sent to the United States at the same time as they are transmitted to the audiences for which they were composed. For example, many German newscasts to England are sent simultaneously to the U. S.

A number of listening posts have been established by American radio companies, newspapers and universities to study and get news from these international broadcasts. If he were equipped with the facilities of these posts, a single listener could hear an impressive number and variety of foreign broad-
casts in a day—although he might not be able to understand them all. Let us take him through an imaginary listening day.

**NINE O'CLOCK**
At nine A.M., Eastern Standard Time, business offices in America are beginning to fill up, and at home there is household work to be done. In Asia, the Near East and parts of Africa, however, the day is over, and it is here that international broadcasters are concentrating their efforts. At this hour, our imaginary listener could hear a station in London, England, broadcasting news in English. Fifteen minutes later, he might listen to a German station broadcasting news in Spanish to Spain, where it is early afternoon.

Throughout the morning, there would be a varied choice of programs: Japan broadcasting to Australia in English; Germany in German and Afrikaans to South Africa and in English to England; Britain in English to her Empire, in French to France and Belgium, in German to Germany, and so on.

**THE NOON BILL OF FARE**
Then comes time for lunch in America—and for supper in Europe. Our listener might choose to relax and listen for an hour to a program, mostly musical, broadcast to North America by a station in Rome. But the major transmissions for European and Near Eastern audiences are now beginning. After one o'clock, the listener could hear the BBC broadcasting news not only in English, but in German, French, Czech, Italian and other languages as well. During the same time, Rome stations could be heard in broadcasts to England, France, Germany, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Greece, Turkey, Arabia and Egypt. Berlin would be audible in transmissions to England, France and Africa.

Late in the afternoon, favored by darkness which gives radio impulses greater range, a number of low-powered stations
would become audible. At four o’clock, our listener could hear Radio Algiers broadcasting from French Algeria to France; the so-called “New British Broadcasting Station” broadcasting in English from a transmitter believed to be in Germany, and a “German Freedom Station,” which broadcasts in German from a transmitter believed to be in the British Isles.

**EVENING PROGRAMS ON THE SHORT WAVE**

At five o’clock, New York time, it is getting on toward midnight in London. In the Americas, radio sets are just beginning to be turned on for the duration of the evening. At this minute, our hypothetical listener could hear the Rome radio broadcasting news in Spanish for Latin America, or the German radio broadcasting German folk music for listeners in North America. A few minutes later, the BBC broadcasts its first program for listeners in Canada and the United States. The major transmissions for New World listeners are now under way.

From five until eight, Rome broadcasts principally in Spanish, Portuguese and Italian for listeners in South America. From eight until 10:45, it transmits programs in English and Italian for audiences in the United States.

Berlin has two simultaneous transmissions to the Western Hemisphere: one for North America, another for Latin America. For the southern audience, its broadcasts are announced in Spanish and German from five until nine, and in Spanish, Portuguese and German until midnight or after. For listeners in the United States, it broadcasts programs in English and German from five in the afternoon until one o’clock in the morning.

The BBC broadcasts for North American listeners from 5:20 until nearly midnight, and, like the German radio, broadcasts other programs for Latin-American listeners at the same time. Meanwhile, other stations are contributing to American radio fare. There is news in Slovak from Slovakia at six o’clock,
news in English from the Soviet Union at seven o'clock, and more news from Tokyo at eight. Ankara (Turkey), Budapest (Hungary), and Bucharest (Rumania) can also be heard during the evening—to say nothing of stations broadcasting northward from Mexico, Cuba, Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and other nations which lie below the Rio Grande.

Finally, an hour after midnight, the transmissions for America are over. The great radio beams are switched back to Asia, once more to begin their vast circle around the world.

II. The Story of International Broadcasting

By this time, our listener has learned at least one important fact: that nearly every country, large or small, has stations which radiate international broadcasts. This has become almost as much a mark of nationhood as the maintenance of armies and the right to conclude treaties.

Radio, in the great variety and on the tremendous scale that we know it now, was invented by no one man. Guglielmo Marconi, a young Italian, discovered a way to transmit radio impulses from antennae in 1896. These impulses, however, could carry only one sound, and they were used for the dot-and-dash signals of radio telegraphy.

Between 1902 and 1904, a number of scientists, including Dr. Reginald Fessenden of the United States Weather Bureau, found out how to transmit waves which could carry notes of varying pitch, thus opening to radio the whole field of speech and music, and making possible a new kind of transmission—radio telephony.

The first such transmissions for the public were broadcast from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Chelmsford, England, in 1920. Transmissions of this kind, since they were meant for any one who could hear them, became known as "broadcasting."
From America and England, broadcasting spread throughout the world. In the next decade, important new technical developments took place. Long-wave transmitters were largely supplanted by medium-wave transmitters, sending out radio waves from about 1,500 feet to a mile in length and capable of being heard over greater distances than long waves.

SHOOTING SOUND WAVES

Medium-wave stations, such as our own local stations, transmit impulses horizontally, like a man firing a pistol. In the nineteen-twenties, broadcasters experimented with a new procedure. After the manner of a man firing a howitzer, they shot impulses which bounced back to earth from the shells of electrified atmosphere (ionosphere) which envelop our planet.

Just as big guns outshoot rifles, so short waves, because of their high line of flight, outdistance medium waves. Medium waves are used in international broadcasting for audiences which are not too distant, as for example in broadcasts from Germany to England. Short waves are employed for longer transmissions; every program heard by our imaginary listener in the United States, for instance, was sent out by a short-wave transmitter.

GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Most international broadcasting stations are under close government control. In the Soviet Union, of course, all radio stations are owned by the government. The same is true of Germany. The British Broadcasting Corporation and the Ente Italiano per le Audizione Radiofoniche (usually called the EIAR or the Italian Broadcasting Corporation) receive government subsidies, and are subject to official censorship.

So it is that international broadcasting almost invariably reflects official policy in foreign affairs. We may see this illustrated if we glance at a short history of these broadcasts.
OFFICIAL POLICIES ON THE AIR

One of the first countries to radiate international broadcasts regularly was the Soviet Union. During the last days of the First World War, Soviet stations sent out revolutionary and Communist messages in code, addressed to "All, all, all"—an indication of the fact that Communism was a doctrine of world revolution.

The next country to enter the field was France, which during her Colonial Exposition in 1931 began to broadcast programs to her Empire—speaking, however, only French and the languages which were spoken in French colonies. France was interested in keeping the loyalty of her overseas colonies, and in maintaining the status quo, or state of things as they were. The same was true of the BBC, which in 1932 began its Empire Service, speaking only in English.

With very different purposes in mind, Germany entered the lists in 1933, only a month after Hitler came to power. One
purpose was to promote trade, so that many talks were given about the excellence of German workmanship and the quality of German goods. Another purpose was to establish a unity of thought among Germans all over the world. Even broadcasts to the United States urged German-Americans to "remember the Fatherland."

The most important purpose, however, was to assist in the expansion of German power. German programs were broadcast in 1933 for the purpose of inciting revolution in Austria and thus making that country an easy prey for the Reich. Radio broadcasts were extensively used in 1935 to persuade inhabitants of the Saar, separated from Germany by the Versailles treaty, that they should vote to join the Reich again; and radio was used to prepare the stage for every succeeding German expansion. Meanwhile, in 1936, France had begun an aggressive foreign-language program, broadcasting in German, ostensibly for the benefit of Alsatians who spoke German, but actually for Germans themselves.

Italy became active in 1935, using radio for much the same purpose as the Germans. Particular effort was made, for example, to instil in the large Italian population of South America the ideas of Fascism. In 1937, Italian broadcasts in Arabic to Palestine and the Near East were of such a revolutionary character that Britain protested. The Anglo-Italian accord of 1938 provided, among other things, that Italy would cease to try to undermine British power by propaganda.

"NATION SHALL SPEAK PEACE UNTO NATION"

It should not be forgotten, however, that radio also was used for peace. Men had high hopes for its efforts in this direction. The motto of the BBC, for example, once was: "Nation shall speak peace unto nation." Broadcasts had been radiated from Switzerland to further the work of the League of Nations. In a single year, European broadcasters had exchanged more than
1,500 programs to acquaint their listeners with the achievements and customs of peoples in neighboring nations. But these efforts were doomed to failure.

The world was sick, and radio developments were only one symptom of the illness. In 1930, Italy and France had failed to agree on the limitation of naval armament, and a race in naval tonnage began in that year. At almost the same time, there began a race in radio armament which could be explained only partly by the fact that radio was new and still expanding.

POWER PILED ON POWER
The number of broadcasting stations increased slowly, but power, making them audible over longer distances, was quickly piled on power. In 1929, European long- and medium-wave stations had a total power of 420 kilowatts; five years later, the figure had been multiplied by more than 10—amounting to 4,500 kilowatts. In 1938, it stood at an estimated 8,000 kilowatts.

Short-wave stations also entered a period of phenomenal growth. In 1930, there were only about 20 short-wave broadcasting transmitters in Europe. Their combined power was not much over 100 kilowatts—less than the combined power of three large American domestic stations. By 1935, the number of transmitters had only increased to 28, but their power had increased to 300 kilowatts.

After the Ethiopian war and the beginning of conflict in Spain, the pace of building grew swifter and swifter. By the spring of 1940, there were no fewer than 58 short-wave broadcasting transmitters in Europe, and their combined power was nearly 1,500 kilowatts.

TRAFFIC REGULATIONS
To prevent chaos from developing, broadcasting nations had long since parceled out non-interfering wave lengths among themselves. Conferences on this subject were held at Washing-
ton in 1927, at Madrid, Spain, in 1932, and at Cairo, Egypt, in 1938. In the next year, an international radio conference sat for seven weeks at Montreux, Switzerland, and governmental representatives of 31 nations agreed to a new distribution of broadcasting channels.

The agreement never was carried out, however: war intervened. But the broadcasters adhered to the old wave lengths, each one fearing to jump into new channels lest a mad scramble should result. While armies marched and nations crumbled, space on the air was too precious for any one to risk a breakdown of the radio system.

AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR
Radio is now used by all belligerents as an instrument of war—that is to say, as an instrument of politics in its most extreme form. Something like this function is fulfilled periodically by our own radio stations—except that we do hear both sides. In the closing days of American political campaigns, radio becomes less and less a medium of entertainment, and more and more an instrument for persuasion. The dance bands and the comedians take second place. Speaker after speaker comes on the air to advocate one idea and ridicule another, to support the party candidates and to attack the opposition.

So it is, on a vastly grander scale, with international broadcasts from belligerent nations. Radio is used to persuade the listener in an enemy land that his country will be beaten in the end, and that he might as well stop doing his bit in the war effort. It is used to persuade neutral listeners that their country should help the broadcasting nation—or, at least, not do anything which will conflict with its interests. It is used to persuade the citizens of allied nations that they should strive and fight all the harder for the common cause.
III. Weapons in the Radio Armory

Just as an army may use tanks, airplanes, artillery and infantry in an assault on a single position, radio has several different "weapons" which are brought into play at different times and for different purposes. There are six major types of broadcast in common use. They contain: (1) music, (2) news, (3) talks and commentaries, (4) dialogues and discussions between two or more people, (5) "documentaries" or "reportages" which bring actual events and real-life people to the microphone, as in the case of broadcasts of American football games and sidewalk interviews, and (6) dramatizations, or plays.

MUSIC
Since it is the function of international broadcasts to persuade rather than to entertain, music is of less importance in international than in local broadcasts. Music occupies about 60 per cent of the time of local American stations, and talking of one kind or another occupies 40 per cent. In international broadcasting, the proportions are approximately reversed. Speech usually occupies three-fifths of the time, music only two-fifths.

NEWS
Not only Americans, but people all over the world, are eager to get news, and the international broadcasters cater to this taste. They give as much time to news as to all other spoken programs combined.

But since the international broadcaster is interested in persuading rather than informing, his news is not always true, or complete. At the time of the Pan American Conference of July 1940, in Havana, German stations told audiences in Latin America that an epidemic was sweeping Puerto Rico. There actually was no epidemic; but from this item and others like it, our southern neighbors were supposed to conclude that the
United States could not even manage its own affairs properly, and thus that what its representatives might suggest at the Conference was not particularly important.

Belligerent nations, moreover, usually broadcast only news items which will place them in a favorable light or the enemy in an unfavorable light. In the summer of 1940, while heavy losses were being inflicted on Britain's merchant fleet, the BBC reported these losses on only a few occasions. The sinking of individual ships, for the most part, was mentioned only when brutal conduct could be charged to the enemy, as in the case of the sinking of two child-refugee ships in September.

**DOCUMENTARIES AND DRAMATIZATIONS**

News is used to give the listener his *basic impression* of how important developments are shaping. Documentaries and dramatizations serve to make this impression more real. For example, during the first days of the Battle of Britain, in July 1940, when the Air Ministry in London announced that the Royal Air Force was inflicting heavy losses on German squadrons and forcing them to turn tail, an actual recording of an air battle was broadcast. It contained the sound of machine-gun fire and bombs, together with the remarks of a commentator who described the downing of a Messerschmitt plane and the retreat of a German air squadron across the Channel.

**TALKS AND COMMENTARIES**

Talks, dialogues and commentaries are used to give news and the war situation particular significance for a particular audience. Rome and Berlin stations, for example, regularly present talks designed chiefly to interest women, while London gives a weekly talk for American church-goers.

These are small groups, but larger groups—frequently the whole nation—are appealed to in talks. Thus, in order to alienate sympathy from Britain, Berlin commentators have
reminded Irishmen of the long battle they had to fight for their independence against England, South Africans of how Britain conquered them in the Boer War, and Americans of British war debts which are still unpaid.

**IV. The Tragedy of Paris-Mondial**

To appreciate how these various broadcasts are used, let us turn to the dramatic and tragic story of Paris-Mondial. Now in German-occupied France, this was once the French government short-wave station. Using the greeting, “Hello, America!” it used to broadcast to the United States six and a half hours a day.

Paris-Mondial had begun broadcasting to the world in November, 1937. Its first regular service to the United States was begun in the spring of 1938, when Germany’s occupation of Austria cast a dark shadow on the future of Europe.

**IGNORING THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL**

During the first winter of the war, neither the French government nor Paris-Mondial seemed to be aware of the terrible things the future might hold. Out of every 100 programs broadcast to America by Paris-Mondial, 38 were musical, consisting of string quartets and folk melodies. Another 24 were programs of news and comment in English; 21 were news and comment in French or Spanish—which most Americans do not understand; and 17 were “cultural” talks and features, designed particularly for women and for students of art, economics and literature.

**CHANGING THE TUNE**

In April 1940, Germany invaded Norway and Denmark and scored an unexpected success. French programs were altered. News and comment, meant to persuade American listeners to
hate Germany and to have confidence in France, now took first place, occupying 34 programs out of every 100. Only 32 programs were music, and the music itself became persuasive; military marches, suggesting French unity and determination, began to be played. “Cultural” features remained as before, but the number of non-English programs dropped to 15.

In May, Germany invaded the Low Countries. With the enemy at the gates, there was a period of great confusion at Paris-Mondial. As order emerged from chaos, a new formula became apparent. The French stations completely eliminated non-English and non-war features. Music was as martial as before, but appeared only incidentally as an introduction to various programs. Documentaries designed to bring the war home to Americans received new emphasis. On June 3, for example, recordings were played so that Americans could hear the sound of bombs falling on Paris.

THE CRY FOR HELP
News and comment were now not only engaged in the mission of inspiring confidence in France and hate for Germany, but in asking America for help as well. As early as May 26, for example, a news announcer hinted: “Were the aeroplanes ordered by the Allies in America to arrive in sufficient numbers quickly enough, the situation would be modified in a very few days.” On June 3, Professor André Morize, formerly of Harvard University, spoke in more urgent tones. He told his American listeners that if they wanted to help, “Then it should be soon, soon!” On June 16, when Paris-Mondial had fled to Bordeaux, a climax was reached. Between bursts of military music, the members of Paris-Mondial’s staff appeared before the microphone to repeat the phrase: “Give us airplanes, cannons, tanks!” At the end, Paris-Mondial’s programs were almost without exception news and talks—begging for aid which could not possibly come in time.
THE NAZIS TAKE OVER

After the surrender of France, Paris-Mondial passed into German control. By the terms of the Armistice, international broadcasting from France was forbidden. A new German station, “Y,” began to use one of the French short-wave transmitters.

The contrast between Paris-Mondial and the German radio is the same as that between the France and the Germany of 1940. It is the contrast between defeat and victory, between a halfhearted and an “all out” effort in the war, between the easy-going, individualistic culture of France and the regimented, purposeful propaganda of the Nazi regime.

V. The Nazis Tell the World

From the moment when Hitler had come to power, Germany had been preparing a formidable international broadcasting system. Broadcasts to the Western Hemisphere, for example, had begun on April 1, 1933. At least as early as the fall of 1938, the German radio was attempting to influence public opinion all over the world in directions which would be most favorable for Germany should war break out.

ADMONISHING THE FRENCH

Germany’s broadcasts to France emanated from stations along the Rhine and in other parts of Western Germany: Radios Stuttgart, Frankfort, Cologne and Saarbrücken. For the most part, their delivery was entrusted to two native Frenchmen: Paul Ferdonnet and André Obrecht, whom their loyal countrymen dubbed the “traitors of Stuttgart.”

In 1939, German broadcasts to France were anti-Semitic, anti-plutocratic, anti-British, and to some degree anti-French. Certain government leaders were singled out as Jews, or as
"I'm not peeling your potatoes. The German wireless says I am a prisoner in Stuttgart."
—From Le Canard Enchainé, Paris, January 1940.

"tools of British diplomacy." It was alleged that so-called "plutocrats" held an excessive portion of French wealth.

The purpose of the broadcasts was to arouse unrest and discontent in France which would make the national defense program and the conduct of foreign policy indecisive and ineffective. As crisis brewed over the Free City of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, in the summer of 1939, the radio "traitors" tried to convince their countrymen that the city was "not worth fighting for."

DIVIDING FRANCE FROM BRITAIN

When war was declared, Ferdonnet and Obrecht redoubled their efforts to breed hatred and mistrust in France for Britain. They protested that the Führer had no enmity for France, but was really fighting only against England. For months, both the "traitors" insisted that while French soldiers stood guard on
the Maginot Line, the British "Tommies" were having a good time in Paris. Obrecht coined a slogan to convince Frenchmen that England was not contributing fully to the Allied war effort: "The British will provide the machines; the French will provide the breasts."

When the Blitzkrieg struck, the German stations sprayed discouragement and defeatism into France. As the Allied armies of Holland and Belgium crumbled, and as German motorized units penetrated France itself, German broadcasts began incessantly blasting against French morale.

Finally, they reached a terrifying crescendo. The "traitors" shouted: "The Maginot Line has ceased to exist! Force your government to make peace or drive it out! Cease fire. Hoist the white flag! And insist on the immediate conclusion of peace with Germany! . . . Act quickly. Time presses. The existence of your nation, the existence of every one of you, is at stake!"

AFTER THE ARMISTICE

After the Armistice was concluded, Frenchmen still had no peace. German broadcasts sought to demoralize the French people by filling them with a sense of crushing shame. The people of France, it was said, richly deserved their fate.

A French announcer of Radio Paris, now German-controlled, blamed the war on the "mischievous diplomacy" of the French Foreign Office, and went on to tell his countrymen that their own selfishness had helped precipitate the country's ruin. "Where was our solidarity?" he asked.

The leaders of France were assailed. "The crime must be avenged," a German broadcaster thundered. "Why must the parliamentary clock get out of order as soon as the hour of truth has struck? Why do its fingers never point to the hour of justice and the hour of punishment?" In the final collapse, when the French Parliament abolished the republican Constitution of France, and the new government arrested ex-Pre-
mier Daladier and other French statesmen, the German radio played its part. But the Germans were not satisfied. "All are responsible," came the new cry.

CULTIVATING COOPERATION WITH THE "NEW ORDER"
While it tried in this way to keep native leadership from developing in France, the German radio sought at the same time to reconcile the French people to Nazi domination. The military occupation of their soil was excused on the ground that it imposed only a few trivial regulations, although in fact it entailed harsh servitude. The German Labor Corps, it was pointed out, was "working hard at gathering in the harvest in the north of France" for the French.

Whereas, before the Armistice, German broadcasts had attempted to make the French quarrel among themselves, there was now a new emphasis on unity—German-controlled unity. Radio Paris urged its listeners to emulate the "German" virtues of hard work and sobriety. Workers were told to forget class hatreds. The defeated were told to work for "collaboration instead of revenge."

Lest the spectacle of British resistance arouse hope and opposition in France, German broadcasts continued their anti-British outpourings. "Never," intoned one announcer of Radio Paris, "will the Continent find its natural equilibrium, its true life, its entire productive force, until English resistance is entirely eliminated. England has always used Europe for non-European designs. This time, the British island people will be cleared out of the Continent once and for all."

There was no chance, the Paris radio kept repeating, for Britain to avoid defeat. Daily, Nazi-controlled stations informed the French that "the food situation in England is disastrous.... The people of England are being asked to feed on the grass of the meadows like cows.... Britain's plan for coal production has gone bankrupt.... British aviators avoid combat with the
Germans and escape whenever they can... Britain can be completely annihilated by plane bombardment... The people of England live in terror.” The Nazis, moreover, blamed the British blockade for the food shortages from which the French were suffering. Thus in France, the war was still carried on by radio—that radio which first was an instrument of persuasion, then of terror, and finally of totalitarian domination.

But Germany’s voices did not go unchallenged. From across the Channel, the BBC broadcast to Frenchmen, urging them to hold “the inner fort” and promising them eventual victory. Despite the severe penalties instituted for listening to these broadcasts, it has been reported that the BBC was popular in France. General de Gaulle, leader of “free Frenchmen,” frequently broadcast from London, and urged his countrymen to resist the Germans. Radio Algiers, in French Algeria, still gave Frenchmen unbiased and impartial news.
ASSAULT ON BRITAIN

"Nazis Trying to Swing Britons from Churchill by Campaign on Radios." On the front pages of American newspapers, this and similar headlines told readers in the summer of 1940 that another carefully planned German radio offensive had reached its climax.

ENTER LORD HAW HAW

Germany began broadcasting to Britain in English in 1938. The German accents of the announcing staff of the Hamburg radio had one effect: they made English listeners laugh. But on April 10, 1939, an authentic British voice spoke over the Hamburg wave length. It said: "To some, I may seem a traitor—but hear me out."

That was the beginning of the broadcaster known as Lord Haw Haw. At first he, too, tickled England's funny bone. In the words of one reporter, Haw Haw and his colleagues not only read news and commentaries, but "produced short burlesque skits, depicting the Englishman as a conceited, pompous, overbearing fellow...staged short plays, describing the joys of life in Berlin...studied the most successful music hall jokes, gave them a new topical twist, and convulsed the British every night." A British columnist gave Haw Haw his name and made it a byword. By the spring of 1940, it was estimated that half the radio sets in Britain were tuned in to hear his curious, metallic voice at least once a day.

STIRRING UP DISCONTENT

For months, while the German Army girded for battle, Haw Haw prepared too. Following the classic technique which Hitler and the National Socialist Party had used in their conquest of Germany, he nourished discontent. He tried to set class against class; he tried to set the people against their government and the "international Jewish capitalism" which, he
asserted, dominated its policy. When war was declared, Haw Haw interpreted it as a final, desperate move of England's upper classes to preserve their position of dominance at home.

Haw Haw charged the British Government and the so-called "plutocrats" with an appalling list of abuses. For family breadwinners, he traced the rise in the price of food and other commodities. For the religious, he traced the fall in church attendance, which somehow was made to appear the fault of the government. For liberals, he praised the trade unions as "the only organized body" of popular opinion opposing the government. For the cautious middle class, he attacked—not profits, which the middle class liked as well as anybody—but the "enormous profits" of the "plutocrats." For the poor, he condemned "niggardly" government pensions.

THREE-THIRDS OF A NATION

For all the underprivileged, real or imaginary, Haw Haw sketched a picture of England: It was inhabited by three kinds of people, those "who have more than enough, those who have enough and those who have less than they need." The first lived only to make profits, the second lived in unreasonable luxury, and as for the third, according to Haw Haw, "Their sole reason for existence is to keep the machine of international finance in action by working for low wages or being unemployed, as the circumstances dictate."

To give this picture a realistic flavor, Haw Haw and a fellow-announcer presented a series of comic dialogues between a fictitious German named "Schmidt" and a fictitious Englishman named "Smith," played by Haw Haw himself.

profits, and "Sir Jasper Murgatroyd," a Foreign Office official who, it was hinted, had helped to plot "Britain's war" against Germany.

The England that Englishmen knew—or thought they knew—said Haw Haw, was an illusion. Should a listener mentally object that for all its faults, England was self-governed, he had only to wait a little while, and Haw Haw would surely refer to "the financial tyranny that they call democracy." The fact that Britain had followed a policy of peace also was easy to explain: "You were defeated long ago in the so-called peace. It was then that your rights were trampled on and the means of a decent, happy existence denied to millions of you."

SOWING DOUBT
At the very least, the English might have thought their country was strong enough to win the war. Haw Haw did not often talk about who would win, since he did not want Britons to become so alarmed about their armed forces that they would increase their war effort. He did suggest that difficulties might lie ahead.

Haw Haw's interest in British affairs he explained by Germany's own, purportedly idealistic, attitude: "She believes that a happy and contented people—whether in England or elsewhere—make better neighbors than a nation ruled by a gang of plutocrats whose main activity is a ceaseless meddling in international affairs."

Haw Haw gave Englishmen an answer to the problems he posed. England's immediate objective, he frequently suggested, should be peace—but only in order to achieve internal reform. For example, he promised that "once the working men of Britain summon the resolution to demand social justice and call for the peace in which alone it can be obtained, they can, if they act with sufficient energy, exercise a formidable influence."
HAW HAW QUICKENS HIS TEMPO

That was the first part of Haw Haw’s campaign to undermine British fighting spirit. It was ended abruptly by the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. Haw Haw now became the apostle of fear and panic. Suddenly, he began to talk of the German armed forces and their awesome strength. A new staccato note of threat appeared in his broadcasts. He said, “The war has been carried even further away from Germany and is approaching nearer to England.” Waging his assault far ahead of the German Army, when Churchill became Prime Minister, Haw Haw predicted the dismal end: “The new Ministry begins to write the last chapter of England’s decline and fall.”

As the German Army marched into Norway, then into the Low Countries, Haw Haw’s usually polite voice climbed to a shout. Haw Haw’s listeners perhaps began to see what he wanted: not social justice or even peace, but surrender on German terms. “You stand alone,” he told them. “Your strategic position is hopeless! You are on a sinking ship! Englishmen, we have no doubt as to your courage and bravery, but isn’t it better to be sensible as well?”

BROWBEATING THE BRITISH

As France tottered and finally fell, Haw Haw was like a prize fighter, cuffing a punching bag from side to side. He began to tell his audience in one talk that surrender was the only way to avoid destruction—only to say in the next hourly talk or on the next day that it was too late to surrender. At first indirectly, then more plainly and more frequently, he began to preach a new, more specific solution: removal of England’s political leaders from office.

“Since the official voice of England asks not for peace but for destruction,” he said, “it is destruction that we must provide. . . . You must suffer the consequences prepared for you
by the men who are going to leave you to your fate.” Such was the stage which, during a period of fifteen months, Haw Haw set for a climactic event in the German propaganda campaign against British morale.

This was the address delivered by Hitler before the Reichstag on July 19, 1940—the official and perhaps final appeal “to reason and common sense in Great Britain.” It was at this time, when Haw Haw began to repeat the Führer’s threats of doom, that the German radio made the headlines in America.

**THE BRITISH COLD-SHOULDER HIS LORDSHIP**

Meanwhile, a curious thing had happened. Britons had stopped listening to Haw Haw.

Actually, there had been two Haw Haws. The first, whose identity apparently was never established, was replaced near the end of 1939 by William Joyce. He was born in New York of Irish parents, but went to England at a tender age. He was educated at London University, was a propagandist for Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Fascist party and finally founded his own National Socialist League. On the eve of war, he left Britain to go to Germany.

At least three factors had combined to bring about the eclipse of “his lordship.” First, he was less funny and entertaining than he had been at first. Second, the war had become too serious for Britons to listen to a man who, after all, was an agent of the enemy. Third, the British public had confidence in the new Churchill government, and was not willing to hear it slandered.

**BUT HE KEEPS UP THE BARRAGE**

Nevertheless, Haw Haw continued to broadcast. Throughout the second fall and winter and into the second spring of the war, he kept on preaching dissension and defeatism. The German Navy and Air Force, he said, had sunk millions of tons
of British shipping and "caused a serious dislocation in the necessary supplies of raw materials on the way to England.... An economic expert broadcasts from London a very depressing account of the financial situation.... The [British] capacity to
produce meats and raise poultry will be diminished to an extent which will be felt for years.... The defeat of Britain is proceeding according to plan.... How far it may be possible to bludgeon the [British] workers into acquiescence.... remains to be seen."

With the spread of the conflict to the Balkans, in April 1941, the German radio redoubled its assault on Britain. Before the Greek campaign was well begun, the German station in Paris announced that British troops were evacuating. The phrase, "a new Dunkerque," with all its dread associations, was used, although in fact the size of the British force in Greece made its evacuation a problem more strictly comparable with the evacuation from Norway than with that from Dunkerque.

THE NAZIS BROADCAST TO THE U. S.

With U. S. listeners, the Nazi story is different, but the tactics are similar. Comparable to the wide attention that Haw Haw received in the British press was the news of German broadcasts headlined in American newspapers early in 1941. A Berlin announcer had told listeners in this country that if they would cable the German Propaganda Ministry their suggestions for improving German broadcasts to the United States, all messages up to 25 words would be paid for by the German government. Thousands of messages, some of them highly uncomplimentary to the Nazis, were sent "collect" to Berlin.

Actually not interested in American suggestions, the Propaganda Ministry had pulled a tremendously successful publicity stunt to draw American attention to the Berlin radio's North American service. With an intensification of German sea warfare approaching, it was a strategic moment to attract new listeners to the microphone so that they, too, could be subjected to the propaganda of defeatism and doubt.

On April 1, 1933, the Reich had begun regular short-wave broadcasts to the United States, gradually increasing the length
of its transmissions until, in 1939, broadcasts for American listeners amounted to nine and a half hours a day. One month before Germany invaded Poland, the time was increased to nearly eleven hours, and this schedule was maintained throughout the first year and a half of the war.

Since there is a relatively large population of German origin in the United States, the Berlin stations speak in German as well as in English. The latter, however, is the predominant language. There are five news broadcasts a day in English and four in German. There may be as many as eight daily talks and feature programs in English, but there are only two in German. For the rest, according to a Berlin speaker's description, the German radio's programs contain "a choice assortment of broadcasting viands, sparkling musical champagne and other tasty delicacies."

**AMERICAN ANNOUNCERS IN BERLIN**

The German radio's broadcasters to France are French, some of its broadcasters to England are English, and a number of its broadcasters to this country are American. Chief of them is Fred W. Kaltenbach, a native of Iowa and the son of a German immigrant to this country. He had gone to Berlin in 1936 to take a graduate degree at Berlin university, and was broadcasting to America before the war started.

In the winter of 1939-40, Kaltenbach was joined by Edward Delaney, alias E. D. Ward. A former press agent for traveling theatrical companies and an author of tawdry fiction, Ward returned to America from Europe on a ship which picked up some of the survivors of the torpedoed Athenia, and went to Germany soon afterward. A third commentator with an American background is Dr. Otto Koischwitz. On leave from his job as instructor in a college in New York City, he was in Denmark when war broke out. After he had resigned his position in New York, he, too, found his way to Berlin.
TO KEEP THE U. S. NEUTRAL

At the outbreak of war, the German radio received a specific assignment. Its mission was to prevent a recurrence of 1917, when the United States had entered the World War with men and materials which had contributed to the defeat of the German armies and the complete collapse of German morale. Not only was the German radio to prevent the United States from entering the war formally, but also to stop aid to the Allies.

When war came, the German radio had its arguments ready. Germany had not started the war. Germany had not begun the blockade. She could not be held responsible for the counter-blockade, by magnetic mine, submarine and airplane, which followed. Nor was she interfering with American mail or “plundering” American commerce. All these crimes could be laid at the door of Britain. Specific clashes of American and British interests were illustrated by examples of Anglo-American friction dating back to 1812 and 1776.

SMEARING THE ALLIES

Britain’s major concern, the Berlin trio suggested, was to drag America into war. Kaltenbach remarked, “The American people are to be led to believe that England and France are the last hopes of democracy, and that Germany is seeking to beat them only because they are democratic. Stuff and nonsense!” When Germany delivered her attack in the spring of 1940, the charge was presented more and more frequently. What the Allies really wanted, according to E. D. Ward, was that “the guns to be shipped [from America] have with each one a man in Uncle Sam’s uniform.” Kaltenbach asked, “What has England ever done to deserve American help?” Another time he declared, “England is standing on her last legs. She stands all alone in Europe, and there is nothing the United States can do to stave off her defeat at the hands of Germany. And why should she want to?”
succeeded. The Berlin radio, for the most part, now has fallen back on older ideas in its descriptions of Germany. The Reich is presented as a land of culture and good music, whose leaders at the moment are “fighting the same fight for Germany which George Washington fought for America.” A new program series begun in the spring of 1941 traces the contributions made to American development by patriots of German birth.

At the same time, other programs suggest that Germany is a country not to be challenged lightly. “Hot Shots from the Front,” a series which gives vivid descriptions of the performance of the German armed forces, has warned American listeners that “the claws of the German Eagle are sharp.”

THE WELL OF PERSUASION RUNS DRY

At first, Berlin speakers professed to be highly pleased with America’s attitude toward the war, and by flattery and encouragement sought to prolong it. “Above all,” remarked a news announcer during the period of ‘phony’ war, “we cannot help congratulating the American people on their steadfast, neutral attitude…. America is neutral…. She wants to stay neutral.”

At the time of the Republican Convention, in June 1940, ex-President Hoover was commended for his opinion that America should stay out of war. After Henry Ford had decided not to manufacture airplane engines for Britain, E. D. Ward exclaimed, “Would that there were more Fords in America!” Before he became better known for his views on aid to Britain, Wendell Willkie was praised as a man of “common sense.” But as Americans became more and more insistent on help for England, this well of persuasion, too, ran dry.

Once the least important remarks in German broadcasts, criticisms of America and Americans began to flow freely from Berlin after the attack on the Low Countries. Their evident purpose was to cause dissension in the United States which, it was hoped, would choke the stream of aid to Britain.
THE NAZIS BEGIN CRITICIZING THE U. S.

American newspapers originally bore the brunt of the attack. They were charged with being dupes of British propagandists, they were accused of cooperating actively with the British. When France fell and Britain's need grew more desperate, the German radio began to emphasize anti-Semitic arguments—German propaganda's classic weapon for reducing a nation to indecisive disunity—declaring that Britain was ruled by Jews, and that Jews headed America's pro-intervention group.

Finally, when the American people showed a willingness to give their government a free hand in its policy of all-out

SHIFTING EMPHASIS IN NAZI BROADCASTS TO U.S.

Based on average number of passages per day containing above types of reference heard at the Princeton Listening Center.
aid to Britain, criticism was heaped directly on Washington officials, in an effort to lessen public confidence in them. Disparaging remarks, which once had been applied vaguely to “politicians,” were now shifted to “the Administration,” the Attorney General, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and at last to the President himself.

WATER OFF A DUCK’S BACK?
This campaign continued apace. Secretary Morgenthau was accused of juggling figures to justify indirect financial aid to Britain. The President was accused of being the ally of “plutocrats” and the representatives of big business interests. His speeches were attacked—particularly in German-language programs—as “a chain of falsehoods.” His sponsorship of aid-to-Britain legislation was said to arise from a desire to attack Europe and to “destroy the New Order.”

But there is as yet no evidence that Germany has won more than a small audience for her radio broadcasts to this country, and no evidence that even those who listen are much influenced by what they hear.

GERMAN BROADCASTS TO LATIN AMERICA
Because each of their populations speaks a fairly uniform language and has a common history, it has been relatively simple for the German radio to arrange its broadcasts for England, France and the United States. In the case of Latin America, however, the Berlin broadcasters have faced a more difficult problem.

South of the Rio Grande lie twenty republics, each with its own history and its own problems; so that the number of arguments which may “strike home” in German broadcasts radiated to them all at the same time is relatively limited. There is a large German population in South America which must be
served with German-language programs. This procedure de-
tracts from the time which could be spent in broadcasting to
the native population. There are two other languages which
are spoken—Spanish and Portuguese—and these vary in accent
from locality to locality, so that no one accent is acceptable
to them all. Furthermore, there are less than 3,000,000 radio
receiving sets in the whole of Latin America; and many of
these are not capable of getting short-wave programs from
Europe. The Nazis have partially offset this drawback, how-
ever, by presenting gift radios to clubs and other establish-
ments where people might come together to listen.

WARNINGS AGAINST THE INIQUITY OF BRITAIN
All in all, the German short-wave service for Latin America
is quite as elaborate as that for North America. Here again,
native speakers play their part—a “Don Fernando Torres,” for
example, and another commentator known simply as “Don
Juan.” Once more, the principal effort has been to convince
Latin Americans of Britain’s iniquity, to make them think that
Britain is doomed to defeat, and to persuade them that their
future lies in collaboration with Germany.

Apparently, however, no very special treatment was given
Latin-American listeners until the Battle of France was nearly
over. Then they, too, were repeatedly assured that Germany
had no designs on them. In the belief that the attitude of the
mother countries would influence the twenty republics, exten-
sive quotations approving German action were given from the
Spanish and Portuguese press.

CHALLENGING THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY
As the attitude of the United States became more and more
positive in favor of aid to Britain, Nazi efforts to stimulate
hostility and contempt for the United States increased, in order
to prevent Latin America from following its northern neigh-
bor's example. The Berlin radio alleged that United States loans were being made to South American governments simply for the purpose of driving them into debt. The sale of American ships to other countries for use in trade with Britain was pictured as a deliberate measure to cripple South American commerce.

After passage of the Conscription Act, Berlin speakers declared that two-thirds of American draftees had been rejected by the army because they were undernourished. President Roosevelt, pictured in broadcasts to North America as the ally of "plutocrats," was said in broadcasts to South America to have copied his "advanced social program" from the Nazis. His "imperialist ambitions" were said to extend to the whole Western Hemisphere, and his aid-to-Britain program was called a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Since Germany wished to exert a leading influence in this part of the world, Central American nations were warned not to "continue a policy of answering to all North American wishes with an anxious, 'Yes, sir.'"

**NAZI BROADCASTING OBJECTIVES**

By this time, we can plainly see several principles of German radio propaganda and of German propaganda in general. We can state them briefly:

The aim of Nazi broadcasts is to paralyze action which will hurt Germany, and to encourage action and thought which may help Germany.

German broadcasts have to a considerable extent been designed for the consumption of relatively uneducated and uninformed people. Only such people, for example, would believe that "Englishmen are eating grass." Many programs have been directed, however, toward agents in foreign countries, so that they might carry on propaganda work in the same vein.

German speakers are at first friendly to their audience, in
an effort to win its trust and confidence. The arguments used by the Berlin broadcasters make it seem that the audience’s welfare is being considered above everything else. Thus, America was urged to be friendly with Germany not because the Reich needed friends, but because the United States could gain trade thereby.

In times of mounting crisis, the German radio seeks to exaggerate danger and fear. Haw Haw, for example, told the British that their position was “hopeless” as early as May 1940.

Continually, the German broadcasts try to divide the opposition of the Reich into small pieces, on the principle that in disunity there is weakness. In broadcasts to the United States, France and Britain, efforts were made to make these countries hate each other, and in each country, the German speakers tried to divide the people from the government, and classes and groups from one another.

SAFEGUARDS AGAINST PROPAGANDA

Despite the elaborate way in which these principles have been coordinated and applied, and despite the awe in which German propaganda is sometimes held, we may still doubt that German persuasion is always effective. Nazi propaganda has scored its greatest apparent successes when accompanied by force, as in the case of France. It has gained some following, observers tell us, in areas where ignorance is widespread—as in parts of the Near East. It has been able to reach a wide public where economic inducements can be offered—as in the case of Latin America, where a number of stations rebroadcast German programs primarily because the service is free. In other words, we may suspect that a country untouched by or able to withstand German force, with a high level of education and with adequate press and radio services of its own, would be proof against German propaganda. Safeguards, too, against German propaganda—or any unfriendly propaganda, for that matter—
are relatively stable social conditions and widespread confidence in national leaders and national policy. Some of these factors prevented German ideas from damaging Britain's war effort after the advent of the Churchill government, and similar ones have made it difficult for Nazi propaganda to make any impression on the United States.

VI. The Axis Junior Partner

In radio as in other kinds of warfare, Italy has been the junior partner of the Axis. The relationship was well illustrated early in 1940, when the Berlin radio, experiencing poor reception in North America, sent to Rome recordings of talks which were dutifully broadcast to the United States by Italian transmitters.

SITTING ON THE SIDELINES

From the outbreak of the war until the time when Italy entered it, Italian broadcasts to America had a curious history. Only on the subject of the Russo-Finnish war were Italian broadcasts violently outspoken. Soviet officials were alleged to be "cowards and sewer rats." Russia's conduct was energetically assailed: "Through the strange processes of a diseased mind, the Soviets now consider themselves free from the universally respected convention which holds that even in the most bitter war the wounded in hospitals and trains...should be respected. They attribute this new license for the return of savagery to the fact that they no longer belong to the League of Nations, as if the elemental rights of humanity had been an invention of that body...The magnitude of the Russian defeat...is such as to make even the control of the long-suffering Russian population difficult. The secret police are at work, however, and the customary system of wholesale arrests,
torture, shootings and general terror are sure to restore that measure of order and silence which are the earmarks of the Communist civilization."

Otherwise, Radio Rome's demeanor was calm. Political talks were avoided completely. News broadcasts were an expression of Italy's attitude rather than an attempt to sway the attitude of listeners. During the winter of 1939-40, they were so impartial as to bring from an American broadcasting official the statement that they were as unbiased as the broadcasts of his own company. One apparent reason was that Italian broadcasters were left in doubt as to their country's course.
Nevertheless, there were a few signs of the position that Italy was to take. At an early date, for example, Italian-language news broadcasts to North America contained only the German war reports, although English-language newscasts contained those of both Germany and the Allies. Furthermore, on the rare occasions when opinion was quoted, as contrasted to the straight reporting of news, this opinion favored Germany.

In March 1940, a British embargo on German coal shipments to Italy went into effect. At home, the Italian press raged, but Italian transatlantic broadcasts remained quite calm; it was not yet time to expose Rome's pro-German attitude frankly to the public gaze. In April, the news of overwhelming German successes in Scandinavia reached Rome. There was a slight but sharp change in Italian news broadcasts. Whereas before they had favored the Allies slightly, they now began to favor Germany by a narrow but distinct margin.

From then on, Italian broadcasts became more and more revealing. A commentary was added to Rome's transatlantic service. The story of Italy's steady drift to war was told by the Italian radio itself:

-May 19—"Count Ciano....today made the following speech: "Italy has not restrained herself nor can she restrain herself from the events in Europe, in which Italy must and will have her say."

-May 28—"During the past twenty-four hours, there is positive indication that Italy is firmly resolved to have her legitimate claims honored....A certain sense of hostility is commencing to manifest itself among all nations who have claims to lodge with the Allies."

-May 29—"The actors in this war scene cannot remain forever the same."

-June 3—"To counter Italy's attitude, the Allies have pointed to the possibility of American intervention. Italy can throw
her whole weight in immediately, while it will be a long time before the Americans can commence to give active aid to the Allies.”

June 4—“Italy remains perfectly tranquil on the eve of her entry into the war.”

June 10—“The war to break the shackles which have been chaining Italy for centuries has begun.”

RADIO ROME SEeks TO SWay THE U. S.

Italian broadcasts to the United States now began energetic attempts to influence American opinion. They quickly fell into a pattern like the German programs, with the chief emphasis on defeatism.

Dissatisfaction, grumbling and hardship on Britain’s home front were reported, while references were made to disturbances and disunity in nearly every part of the Empire. After the Franco-German Armistice and the beginning of R. A. F. bombing forays over Europe, the Italian radio seldom reported the activity of British armed forces unless it could be asserted plausibly that these forces had met with a reversal.

Shortly before Italy attacked Greece in October 1940, the Rome radio tried to apply still heavier pressure to American opinion. The North American service was expanded to two and a half hours. The number of daily news broadcasts was doubled from two to four, and new nightly talks, two in Italian and two in English, were regularly scheduled.

EVENTS CONTRADICT ITALIAN PROPAGANDA

The Italian Broadcasting Corporation, however, had chosen an awkward moment to expand its program for the United States. Rome’s announcers wrestled less and less successfully with catastrophe. Surprising Greek victories, said the Rome broadcasters, were merely “proof of the aggressive intentions” which that country had harbored against Italy.
When the Italians had taken the British fort of Sidi Barrani in September, Radio Rome had acclaimed it as a great victory. When the British recaptured it at the beginning of the counter-offensive launched by the Army of the Nile, the Rome announcers called it “a miserable victory.” The British had won the fort, they said, “But what of it?”

**FROM HALT TO LAME**

As the British added victory to victory in North Africa, Italian broadcasts went from halt to completely lame. Many scheduled Italian talks were not broadcast at all, since from the Italian point of view there was nothing much to talk about. With suitable broadcasting material scarce, the Rome radio began to broadcast to its British listeners talks which were written for the so-called “North American Hour.”

Faced by hard and uncomfortable facts, the Rome radio sought compensation in the world of ideas and fancy. German successes were reported, not as German successes, but as “Axis victories.” The whole world, said Italian stations, was about to join the struggle against “Anglo-Saxon” and “Anglo-American” domination.

**THE STRANGE CASE OF EZRA POUND**

Ezra Pound, an American poet who for many years has lived in Italy, was enlisted to serve the Italian radio in January 1941, and to apply, in a small way, the techniques we already have seen employed by the Berlin stations. In his broadcasts to the United States, he appealed to malcontents at both ends of America’s economic scale—to workers who might feel underprivileged, and to employers who might feel that the rights of labor should be restricted. He spoke of Italian trade unions, which in implied contrast to American labor organizations, “really mean something”—despite the fact that for more than fifteen years they have been organs of the Fascist government.
and have been denied the right to strike. He spoke of Italian economic progress under Fascism—an example, he said, which the United States would do well to follow.

At the same time, Pound tried to arouse a vague unrest and anxiety in his listeners. He suggested that Americans wanted to kill Italians. Speaking as an American, he asked, "Are we a
nation? What is a nation?” Or, he said, “I am worried no end, and I wouldn’t be talking now if I were not worried. . . . What worries me is a drift to control [of America] by irresponsible committees.” He suggested, at the very time that the Senate was engaged in its long deliberation over the lease-lend bill, that the United States was about to “break up Congress and chuck the Constitution.” His, too, was a world of fanciful ideas.

VII. The Soviet Enigma

No survey of short-wave broadcasting can ignore the role of that enigmatic non-belligerent, the Soviet Union. But to American listeners the Moscow radio remains almost as inscrutable as Stalin himself. In order to reach America, transmissions from the Soviet Union must pass over magnetic currents in the earth which disrupt radio impulses; so that American listeners have caught only comparatively rare messages from the U. S. S. R.

In the early months of the war, Radio Center, Moscow, used a device familiar in Axis propaganda: it maintained that Russia’s attack on Finland was a war of defense against aggression. But even after the Russo-Finnish peace, Moscow stations in their broadcasts to the world played down the war in the West. If there were any friendship in Germany for Russia, there did not seem to be any in the Soviet for the Reich. Moscow broadcasters spoke frequently of Chinese victories over Japanese forces, seldom of Germany’s victories over Britain and France. Like German broadcasts, Soviet programs attempted to discredit Allied war aims and to sow the seed of dissension and revolt in Allied countries—but apparently more in order to achieve proletarian, Communist revolutions than to aid German victory.
VIII. The BBC Takes up the Cudgels

The last duelist to be considered in radio's war of words is the British Broadcasting Corporation. This is not a private company; but it is not exactly a government agency either. It has its own board of directors; but it derives its revenue from a tax which British radio owners pay to the government, and it is subject to censorship by the Ministry of Information. In peacetime, it has represented the point of view of the Cabinet in power. In wartime, although its speakers are still allowed considerable freedom and initiative, it is even more of a public than a private agency.

As we have seen, the BBC began to broadcast to the British Empire, in English only, in 1932. Spurred to new activity by Axis broadcasts, it began transmitting programs in Arabic to the Middle East and in Spanish and Portuguese to Latin America in 1938.

TRADING BLOW FOR BLOW

When war came in 1939, the BBC traded the German radio blow for blow in broadcasts across the Channel. For the most part restrained and factually correct in its broadcasts for English-speaking listeners, it was less meticulous in its broadcasts to Germany. German ships which actually were only damaged by British naval units were sunk in the BBC's news for Germany. The effect of early Royal Air Force bombing raids on German territory was similarly magnified.

Haw Haw's aim was to crack British morale, and the BBC's aim was to stir dissension and revolt in Germany. Its German-language staff was composed partly of Englishmen, partly of German exiles. They broadcast special talks to Bavaria and Austria, traditionally Catholic and anti-Prussian. They told German listeners that their savings were being squandered on the Nazi war machine.

They told German workers that National Socialism was not
socialism at all. Rather, it was a means "to lower the German standard of living—although the German worker finds it hard to imagine such a thing." Had Goebbels, they asked, told his countrymen about his castle, his country house, his fifty-room mansion in Berlin? "Your money," they informed Germans, "has been spent on the riotous living of the Nazi leaders, but the German people has only become poorer....Hitler himself has said that the German people is a herd of cattle."

**HARSH WORDS FLY**

Another thing that Hitler had said was that German propaganda would have met its match when "poison gas is fought with poison gas." The BBC adopted this weapon in its description of German leaders who had been prominent in the earlier days of Nazi rowdiness. In sending sardonic birthday greetings to Julius Streicher, the Jew-baiter of Franconia, the BBC remarked, "Decent Englishmen and Germans feel a need to rinse out their mouths at the mere mention of the name of this debauchee." Though this comment was not without foundation in fact, it was couched—like all BBC programs for the Reich—in much more violent language than was used in London’s English-language transmissions. Broadcasting to Germany, the BBC used the German radio’s own linguistic weapons.

**RADIO COUNTER-OFFENSIVE**

When Germany began its offensive against France, the BBC began a counter-offensive by radio. On the day that German armies marched into the Low Countries, the BBC voiced its first outright plea for revolt. During the weeks that followed, the German people were told to "rise, for the hour of action has come! You will be sorry if you let it pass!"

Threats and terror were used against the German armed offensive. German listeners were told, "The fight will go on until the Allies have won a total victory, and the more time
passes before this victory is won, the more terrible will be the retaliation against you millions of Germans who permitted a criminal government to use you as willing instruments.”

**THE APPEAL FOR GERMAN REVOLUTION**

After the fall of France and the Low Countries, the BBC redoubled rather than slackened its efforts to sap German fight-

**THE SHORT-WAVE BEAMS OF THE B.B.C.**

![Diagram of short-wave beams covering various regions of the world. Darker areas are those not served by any beam. But listeners in these areas, though not directly on the beam, can hear some transmissions.]
ing spirit. Revolution became an incessant theme. Fresh appeals were made: "Be patient, don't give in.... You are strong.... We trust you, German workers, German soldiers, German women, to apply rightly the power which lies in your hands." Germans, the BBC declares, will rise in "a revolution which will liberate the people.... When it comes, Nazism will go. There will be an end to espionage, to torture and hunger wages. The unpaid extra working hours will come to an end, and the Ministry of Propaganda will perish."

Not only Germans, but the peoples of occupied countries, the BBC tells its listeners in the Reich, will rebel against Nazi domination: "In Norway, in Poland—everywhere there are Germans—there is strong resistance to the Germans. .... There are deeds of sabotage in factories vital for the Germans, railroad accidents. Strikes occur all over German-occupied Europe. .... Important for the outcome of the war... are the riots in Holland, the striking of university students and factory workers and even the police. .... These courageous men, fighting for the freedom of their people, are the pioneers of the new, free Europe."

Germany, say the London speakers, will never win, since she has to compete not only with the armed forces of Britain but also with the tremendous industrial production of the United States. Germany, it is repeated again and again, is making the same mistake as in 1916, when she left America out of her calculations. Early in 1940, a London speaker told Germans: "America will soon enter the war." A year later it was ominously remarked that "unpleasant surprises have come from that direction before."

MORE WATER OFF A DUCK'S BACK?
For all their efforts to stir the German people to revolt, the influence of BBC broadcasts in Germany is questionable. Listening to foreign programs of any kind within the Reich is
a crime punishable in some cases by death. But Nazi efforts to disrupt BBC programs indicate that somebody fears the possible effect of the London broadcasts. Since July 1940, London

AN ENGLISHMAN MOCKS AT THE BBC

“This is the British Broadcasting Corporation, in its Overseas Service. Ladies and Gentlemen—a gramophone record!”
—From *Punch*, London, October 1939.

transmissions in French and other European languages have been periodically interfered with, and are now being steadily “jammed” with artificial static probably of Axis origin.

THE BBC DEALS CAUTIOUSLY WITH THE U. S.
The BBC tried to beat Germany at her own game in broadcasts to the Reich; but London transmissions to America
employed no such obvious tactics at the beginning of the war. No distinction was made for listeners in the United States. The repetitious broadcasts of the Empire Service were beamed first to one section of the Empire and then to another, and the United States appeared to hear the programs only because it was next door to Canada.

In the BBC’s tradition of seeking to elevate rather than to cater to popular taste, a parade of distinguished authorities passed before the microphones of the Overseas Service. Oxford University professors discussed the niceties of international law and the significance of economic warfare. Retired army officers spoke about the Buddhist priesthood and the marriage customs of Nepalese royalty. Various aspects of British life were discussed by members of parliament and other spokesmen who were experts in their fields, but dull speakers.

WATCHDOGS OF BRITAIN’S DIGNITY

As a matter of policy, the BBC was more jealous of Britain’s reputation than the official censors. American press dispatches from London frequently carried overtones of doubt or difficulty which did not filter through the microphones of Broadcasting House. The propaganda of optimism was the stock in trade of the London stations.

Along with a large section of the British and American press, the BBC reported the Norwegian campaign through rose-colored glasses. On May 2, the BBC announced that some German units had made a retreat of “more than 50 miles.” On the next day, the British evacuation of Norway began.

NEW SITUATIONS CALL FOR NEW MEASURES

During the Battles of France and Flanders, more heroic measures were clearly required. On May 28, 1940, the BBC took a step unprecedented in its history. It inaugurated a thrice-weekly (now daily) talk entitled, “Britain Speaks,” designed
for listeners in the United States. By progressive stages, it grew into a "North American Transmission" consisting of six and a half hours of broadcasts a day to the United States and Canada.

Canadian announcers were employed to broadcast in American style. News bulletins, which had been half-an-hour in length, were reduced to fifteen minutes. The experts for the most part were discarded in favor of a staff of commentators whose business, in one guise or another, was the handling of words. The following list is representative, and contains names familiar to many Americans: Vernon Bartlett, Member of Parliament and journalist, J. B. Priestley, novelist, George Slocombe, journalist, and Leslie Howard, screen actor.

Virtually the first words spoken by Bartlett on the first broadcast of "Britain Speaks" were designed to answer an inevitable question and to put Americans at their ease: "Of course I'm a propagandist! Who isn't? Passionately, I want my ideas—our ideas—of freedom and justice to survive."

**BOOSTING BRITAIN'S CAUSE**

As a group, the BBC commentators have employed methods the exact opposite of those favored by their rivals in Berlin. They directed their talks chiefly to an audience of relatively good education—an audience which may help shape the opinions of the community. From the point of view of the German speakers, it was enough to keep America standing still. The BBC speakers, on the other hand, sought to persuade Americans to move forward toward ever-increasing aid for Britain. They strove to arouse in their listeners emotions and feelings almost precisely the opposite of those which Berlin tried to excite.

Thus London speakers consistently tried to arouse confidence in the ultimate triumph of Britain's cause. News programs were so cast as to include evidences of British strength:
the activities of the armed forces, the subscriptions to war loans and contributions to Spitfire funds, and the arrival of arms and supplies from overseas.

British commentators emphasized particularly the assertion
British propaganda that British morale was unflinching. "There is something in our nature," Priestley declared, "that will not allow us to be beaten." An army major told how he sat in the restaurant of a railroad station during a bombing: "I found a window seat next to an old lady who had reached the coffee stage and had taken out her knitting. A minute or two after, just after I sat down, up came the howl of the banshee air-raid warning. . . . What happened? Nothing. Nobody bothered. . . . The old lady, spectacles on nose, was she interrupted? Not she. Did she drop a stitch? Not on your life."

London also implied that there was to be no more "muddling through" in Britain. "A miraculous change has taken place," according to one speaker. Priestley showed an awareness of problems which lay ahead when he declared: "It's no secret that we shall have to cut down our scale of living." Britain's old order, English com-
mentators declared, was passing. "At last," said Sir Hugh Walpole, the novelist, "I think that we are... becoming the kind of democracy that we ought always to have been. ... Class differences are breaking down everywhere, and for good."

"AMERICA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE"

One obvious reason why Americans have espoused aid to Britain is that they believe that American interests are at stake. London speakers naturally tried to add to this feeling of common interest. In material matters, they said, England's men and women are "a first line of defense for the other side of the Atlantic."

Beyond this, Americans and Englishmen were said to have ideals in common. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, urged "that the great American nation consider and recognize that the fight we wage today is as much a fight for the preservation of their national inheritance and for all the sacrifices evoked by such men as Jefferson and Lincoln as it is a fight for the preservation of England's green and pleasant land." In making this plea, it is fair to add, the First Lord was following a lead given by our own Administration officials.

Leslie Howard was one of several prominent figures to advocate "Union Now" of the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations. "Maybe it's no accident," said Ronald Cross, Minister of Shipping, "that in every country where English is the nation's language you find people enjoying self-government under democratic institutions." In the next breath he added: "With our own resources and with American supplies, we can see our way to the end."

Americans who dissented from these points of view were sharply dealt with by the BBC. Colonel Lindbergh, Senator Nye, and even the late Senator Pittman, among others, were roundly criticized for being isolationist or "defeatist." "Good God!" Priestley once exploded, "all this patter about non-
belligerence is like sitting down and doing crossword puzzles in front of a pack of ravening wolves!"

Above all, the BBC has tried to give its American listeners a sense of the war’s actuality, of the fact that it involves flesh-and-blood people. Dramatizations have taken American listeners to wartime Germany—where, according to the BBC play, there was grumbling about a food shortage—have allowed them to ear-witness the opening and decapping of a magnetic mine still in the water, and have allowed them to fly in a British bomber over Berlin. BBC observers with recording units have visited battlefronts and brought back the story in sound, and, again by recordings, have given Americans ear-impressions of what an evening in an air-raid shelter is like.

Commentaries have been salted with hundreds of anecdotes which have further served to make the war seem real to American non-participants. In the midst of London’s worst air-raids, one speaker paused to report the story of a London shopkeeper whose establishment had been bombed and its window partly boarded up. He put up a sign: “Owing to that there ‘Itler, my window’s getting littler.”

TELLING AMERICANS HOW THEY CAN HELP
While they have tried to make American listeners feel that the war is real, that it is part of America’s business, and that victory will come in the end, it has been the final point of BBC broadcasts to tell Americans things that Britain would like them to do. According to Air Marshal Joubert, the sending of pilots to help the Royal Air Force would be welcome. According to one speaker, cargo ships would be appreciated, and according to several more, more destroyers would be a strategic addition to the Royal Navy. Sir Hugh Dalton, Minister for Blockade, would like to have American businessmen boycott firms in neutral countries which do business with the Axis.
IX. What Is the Radio Weapon Worth?

Such were some of the ways in which the major belligerents used international broadcasts during the first twenty months of this war. Radio efforts were spectacular. Millions of dollars were spent and billions of words were catapulted into the air. Yet broadcasting produced no victories and caused no revolutions. Why?

For one thing, international broadcasting was a relatively new weapon, still in the experimental stage. Broadcasting nations had either failed to understand or had been unable to overcome some of the limitations of radio in particular, and of propaganda in general.

THE LIMITATIONS OF RADIO

Psychologists have pointed out that radio cannot effectively distribute detailed information or elaborate theory. The simplicity it demands of the broadcaster is no handicap to its power of persuasion. Effective slogans are more likely than elaborate theorizing to inspire mass action. But Paris-Mondial and the BBC before the fall of France ignored the need for simplicity; their talks were too detailed and complex.

The platform speaker can afford, and may even gain effect by, a rambling delivery. But the radio speaker must organize his material logically and compactly. In its broadcasts to the United States, the Berlin radio conspicuously failed to heed this commandment.

Radio waves travel with the speed of light; they can girdle the earth seven times in a second. Radio has the great advantage of speed over all kinds of mass communication. Yet the broadcasters of Europe, slowed by censorship, failed to utilize its swiftness. In broadcasts to the United States this was a particularly great shortcoming; European news broadcasts to this country usually were hours behind our own local broadcasts.
ITS POTENTIAL POWER

What, then, can radio do? To the propagandist, it offers great advantages. The voice was the first means by which human beings communicated with each other. It is still the most subtle, most used and probably the most persuasive of all communications. Radio provides a way to put the human voice into world politics and to use it in attempts to influence whole peoples and nations. Perhaps one of the most significant developments in radio is the opportunity it provides for the leaders of nations to address the whole world in person. Though language barriers restrict this development to some extent, the fact that Americans, for instance, can listen to Churchill and Englishmen to Roosevelt is, in the opinion of some observers, more effective in drawing the two nations into closer understanding than all the BBC routine short-wave programs put together. And it is thought that this use of the radio will continue long after the war has come to an end.

Under ordinary circumstances, listeners cannot hear programs twice, and they have no time to make considered judgments of what radio voices may tell them. Willy-nilly, hearers may be influenced by untruths, by fallacious reasoning, by emotions.

Radio, better than print and the platform speaker, and better even than the stage or the motion picture, can create an illusion of reality. Under the influence of such an illusion, listeners may be tricked into accepting the false or the ridiculous. Radio's power in this respect is astonishing; in 1938, a million Americans were disturbed or frightened by a radio broadcast which seemed to them to indicate that the United States was being invaded by strange and apparently invincible creatures from Mars. In its dying days, Paris-Mondial tried to utilize this asset of radio; the BBC, with documentaries and dramatizations, constantly takes advantage of it.

War increases the potential importance of radio. During
war emergencies, even the most democratic nation adopts cer-
tain measures designed to promote unity of thought and
action. News and letters from abroad are censored; all alien
thoughts and undesirable news are excluded as much as possible.
Even neutral nations have a "directed" news policy.

But radio may pass over frontiers and through censorship.
Artificial interference and restrictions on listening may not pre-
vent its message from reaching some hearers, who may pass on
enemy arguments and thus become a propagandist "Fifth
Column." To those who can use it skilfully, radio offers advan-
tages to be found in no other method of communication.

PROPAGANDA IN GENERAL
In regard to propaganda in general, most experts agree that it
must appeal to the aspirations, hopes, fears and prejudices of
the people who are being propagandized. A leader attempting
to persuade his own people may have a natural knowledge of
what these elements are.

But war thrusts propaganda beyond national frontiers and
increases the difficulties of adapting it to the psychological
make-up of the people who are to be persuaded. Some ob-
servers, for example, have criticized BBC broadcasts to Ger-
many for their lack of tact; no German, however anti-Nazi,
can enjoy hearing Germans being represented as brutes and
ogres. Similarly, American listeners probably do not relish
being called superstitious, gullible, and hysterical by the com-
mentators of Berlin.

When propaganda runs headlong against events—as Berlin
broadcasts ran against the lease-lend bill, and as BBC German-
language programs ran against German victories in the Low
Countries and France—it is likely to be powerless. If it is too
extreme, it is likely to be useless—particularly by radio, since
the listener can effectively parry this weapon of war simply by
turning a knob.

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Finally, propaganda cannot create new worlds in a day or even a year. Allied propaganda in 1914-18 scored an apparent success only after four years of war. Then it was effective, if at all, because the German armies were beaten and the German people starving. Perhaps none of the belligerent peoples are yet in a frame of mind to be influenced by foreign propaganda. There will undoubtedly come a time, however, when one side or another will become receptive to alien persuasion. Radio, new and strange weapon of war, may yet produce its revolution and win its victory.

"SO FAR AND YET SO NEAR"

From the *Daily Express*, London, October 1938.
A NOTE ON HEADLINE BOOKS

War on the Short Wave is one of the Foreign Policy Association's headline books. The object of the series is to provide sufficient unbiased background information to enable readers to reach intelligent and independent conclusions on the important international problems of the day.

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The author, Harold N. Graves, Jr., is now a member of the staff of the Federal Communications Commission. He was until recently Director of the Listening Center, and previously had been associated with the foreign affairs departments of two national news magazines. He wishes to extend his acknowledgments not only to the Center, but also to the Public Opinion Quarterly of Princeton University, which granted him permission to adapt several articles he had contributed to its past issues for use in this publication.
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