

LAW  
OF  
MASS  
COMMUNICATIONS

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FREEDOM AND CONTROL  
OF  
PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA

HAROLD L. NELSON  
DWIGHT L. TEETER, JR.

**LAW**  
**OF**  
**MASS COMMUNICATIONS**

**FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT**  
**AND BROADCAST MEDIA**

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**THIRD EDITION**

Mineola, New York  
The Foundation Press, Inc.  
1978

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*Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 78-59147*

FOR ANN AND TISH

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## PREFACE

The hyperactive world of mass media law guarantees authors of the undergraduate journalist text something to write about at short intervals. It also guarantees them the humbling understanding that there is much they will not write about because they can't. There is too much happening; the flood is too great to let their wit tell economically that which reasonably can fit between covers to occupy an academic term. There are too many court cases (see the bulging new looseleaf service, *Media Law Reporter*, made indispensable in its one year of life); too many federal bills (98 in Congress affecting news work in mid-1977, reports the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press); too many states passing or revising sunshine acts, FOI acts, privacy acts, as Missouri's Freedom of Information Center reminds us with its invaluable periodic reports; too many private and public persons "out there" who, for whatever reasons, march to the decade's fervent and unmuffled drumbeat of "Litigate!" and seek the six or seven-figure judgment in libel suits that multiply in number—and, the journalist's nagging worry is, in success under *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*

The guarantees of the perfervid pace of legal change do not run out with the assurance of employment for textbook authors. They include, for readers, the promise of a fresh, unremitting flow of engrossing stories: In the fact situations of law cases which uncover the personal worlds of those with true or fancied injury to reputation, to privacy or copyright. In the head-butt of journalist and sequestering public-record-keeper. In the dramatic refusal of the reporter or editor to do a judge's bidding of "Speak!" or "Be silent!" In the realization—for those who will attend to history—that no journalistic rule has less safely been allowed to slumber than "vigilance," and what has happened in our past has lapsed but come again in different dress, Milton's censor of the backward collar reincarnated in the CIA trench-coat.

Seldom historians, journalists are, rather, the world's greatest presentists. Many of them innocent of what has gone before them in the ancient struggle for freedom of the press, they have based a tardy institutionalizing of vigilance on current alarm over current problems in press freedom. Gradually since World War II, they have created surveillance and action arms within their professional societies and established the Reporters' Com-

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mittee for Freedom of the Press, to join such veteran First Amendment champions as the long-established American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Committee.

This book is permeated by its authors' reliance on history, stemming from history's services in helping us think realistically about the present and steadying us in today's and future fights in freedom and control. If freedom is our first value, and zeal in its cause indispensable, history's evidence can provide equally indispensable steel. History's tutoring can give balance that shields us from excesses of despair and elation over freedom's current state, and lend the poise and equanimity that modify the shrillness of zeal and shouted aphorisms.

The sobering statistics reported in *Press Censorship Newsletter*, about apparently increasing, nationwide press control, can chill the heart. As gag orders spread like grass fires through the courts, presentists inveigh, and historians might well join them. Yet against what do we weigh these lists of, say, 75 prior restraint actions over a few months' time? When courtroom closures against reporters present us with a sweeping, new phase of prior restraint, would not journalists' imprecations benefit from a knowledge of history in addition to gut feelings of revulsion? History, at least, could rescue us from the illusion that prior restraint is now reborn after an absence of 200 years and more; could inform us that prior restraint has never disappeared from our national life long enough to warrant pronouncing it dead. Might we not be stronger by arguing and acting from fact?

Might we not benefit in the same exercises from comparisons of the odious "prior restraint" with the equally repugnant "sedition" actions which were embedded for decades in prosecutions called (no doubt as euphemism) criminal libel? For most of half a century, 100 criminal libel actions per decade reached the nation's appeals courts, and no one knows how many convictions in local courts were never appealed and so never counted. And now, for nearly half a century, they've nearly disappeared. Their demise represents a respectable advance in freedom. Could knowledge of this flow and ebb in control steady us, protect us from the counsels of panic and despair in dealing with today's strengthened censors?

Are journalists' assaults on secrecy in government, on contempt actions, on obscenity prosecutions, the better off where they march uninformed about the past? Is the past deliberately

## PREFACE

curtained in the hope of hiding evidence that might damage freedom's present cause? Might knowledge of the past give us a better base from which to argue freedom for today? And if, indeed, some pieces of evidence of the past do not fit our present case for freedom, would journalists argue we are better off for not knowing them?

Everything in our national history suggests that, as free press and speech go, they go obstructed, less at some times, more at others; never "absolute" in fact, and the concept "absolute" qualified even by the late Justice Hugo Black as to time and place and manner. Unwilling though they are to charge history with the burden of forecasting, the authors yet find no sign that the absolutists will be rewarded with the reaching of their goal. Society's need for the intransigent absolutists seems plain, nonetheless: They drive the more circumspect toward the narrowest ground that reason will permit control of speech and press to rest on; toward sounder thought and fuller logic in stating legal boundaries for expression; toward clarifying an ethic that will compete with the appeal of the absolutists' "total freedom"; toward "fighting like tigers," as journalists are adjured to do, to drive back and cage censorial acts and impulses in law and society.

This edition, like its predecessors, would have suffered much without the assistance of a large number of individuals, firms and institutions. Copyright holders who have generously allowed us to quote materials from their works include (in alphabetical order by author):

American Bar Association, Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, Court Procedure to Accommodate Rights of Fair Trial and Free Press.

Earl W. Kintner, "Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising," 64 *Michigan Law Review* 1280-1281 (May, 1966).

*The Louisville Courier-Journal and Times*, "Guidelines for Advertising Acceptance." Special thanks are due to Mr. Donald B. Towles, Vice President.

The National Association of Broadcasters, The Television Code, Nineteenth Edition, June, 1976. Special thanks are due to Claire Biondi Jarvis, editor of the NAB Code News.

*The New York Times*, "Standards of Advertising Acceptability," November, 1975. Special thanks are due to Robert P. Smith of the Advertising Acceptability Department.

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Colleagues in the study of communications law who generously helped us include Professors David A. Anderson, School of Law, and Kent R. Middleton, Department of Journalism, The University of Texas at Austin; and Professors James Hoyt and Mary Ann Yodelis Smith and graduate students Dorothy Bowles and Arthur Perez, all of the University of Wisconsin—Madison. Others include Prof. John T. Hamner, Hall School of Journalism, Troy State University, acknowledgement of whose kindly corrections is long overdue; Prof. Michael Petrick of the University of Maryland College of Journalism; and Prof. Steven J. Simmons. Professors Maurice D. Leon and Roy Mersky, Librarians, respectively, of the Schools of Law at Texas and Wisconsin, were unfailing in their interest and aid.

Finally, we thank those, most indispensable of all, who spend the season known as “revision time” in lockstep with the authors—our wives, Ann S. Nelson and Letitia Thoreson Teeter.

Chapters 1, 3 through 5, 9, 10, 12 and 13 were written by Nelson, as well as Chapter 2 with a strong assist from Teeter; Chapters 6 through 8, 11, and 14 through 16 were written by Teeter.

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May, 1978



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# LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS

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## Part I

### PRINCIPLES AND DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

#### Chapter 1

#### FREEDOM AND CONTROL

**Sec.**

1. The Worth of Freedom.
2. The Constitutional Guarantees.
3. Legal Boundaries for Speech and Press.
4. Control by Three Government Branches.

A major test of a nation's freedom is the degree of liberty its people have in speaking, writing, and publishing. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century thought in much of Western Europe and America turned to faith in man's reason as the safest basis for government. And if man was rational, indeed, he needed access to a maximum flow of information and opinion as a basis for making decisions. Leaders of Enlightenment thought considered freedom of speech and press indispensable to the life of a public capable of self-government. In addition, it was widely considered that this freedom was essential to the individual's own development and realization, a "natural right" to which every man had claim in exploiting his faculties.

Even the age of faith in pure reason and natural rights, however, stopped short of granting men perfect freedom in all that they did or said. Men turned over to government the powers and rights which it needed in order to protect them in the enjoyment of their rights, in Lockean theory. Furthermore, though the outer boundaries of the freedoms enjoyed might be few and indistinct, some boundaries existed. To the mid-Twentieth Century, which grants at most that man possesses some elements of reason in his complex makeup, and which is skeptical indeed about the existence of "natural rights," boundaries continue to exist.



The hand of authority rests lightly on speech and press at some places and times, heavily at others. But its presence is felt everywhere, including the nations of the western world which generally consider themselves the most freedom-loving of all. Some degree of legal control over expression has been sought or permitted by the freest societies through history; for although the values of free speech and press may be considered paramount and be exalted, there are circumstances where other values may take priority and win in a conflict over rights. The individual's right to his good reputation limits verbal attacks through the penalties of the civil libel law; society's interest in morality denies legal protection to the obscene; a host of laws regulating business, industry, and trade applies fully to the commercial press and broadcasting.

### SEC. 1. THE WORTH OF FREEDOM

**Major values underlying free speech and press are society's need for maximum flow of information and opinion, and the individual's right to fulfillment.**

It is not always easy to separate society's need and the individual's right as the two grounds for freedom of expression. If the individual's right is thoroughly protected, the social good in confrontation of ideas presumably follows. John Locke, often called the philosophical father of the American Revolution, in the Seventeenth Century argued the individual's rights—the "natural right" of every person to life, liberty, and property. His ideological descendants included speech and press as one of these liberties, equally applicable to all men in all times and situations, they held.<sup>1</sup>

Almost half a century earlier, John Milton's seminal *Areopagitica* went straighter to the social good as the justification for expression. Arguing against pre-publication censorship in 1644, he cast his case in the religious context, and said that religious truth—so ubiquitously sought or asserted in that century when wars still were fought over whose god should prevail—was so essential to the fate of mankind that authority should open up the arena for debate. Truth was the only safe basis for a society's life, he said:<sup>2</sup>

And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?

<sup>1</sup> John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, ed. Thomas P. Peardon (N.Y., 1952); Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953).

<sup>2</sup> John Milton, *Areopagitica* (Chicago, 1953). See Thomas I. Emerson, *The System of Freedom of Expression* (New York: Random House, 1970), Chap. 1, for discussion of social and individual goods. Also Vincent Blasi, *The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory*, 1977 *Am.Bar Foundation Res.J.* 523.

There are men who would rather talk than live, no doubt, and without the protection of their individual right to do so, life would be empty to them. Human beings are fulfilled in many ways, and for many none is more important than making their views known and felt. To be allowed to express is central to the right to use one's faculties and to develop his personality—one way of defining liberty. There are many who would deny that this freedom, or any other, constitutes a "natural right" as defined by the Enlightenment.<sup>3</sup> But that it is real, important to human dignity, and worthy of far-reaching protection under law is widely agreed upon by societies of the West.

The social good has been more compelling to the Twentieth Century as a basis for freedom and control of expression than has natural right. Society's stake in free speech and press is plain in the structure and functioning of a self-governing people: Only through a "clash of ideas in the open marketplace" can working truths be arrived at; the widest diversity of opinion and information must course through the channels of debate and discussion in arriving at solutions to problems and sound public policy. If Milton found freer debate essential to religious "truth," modern man finds the confrontation of one idea with another, one set of facts with others, essential to all kinds of "truth," in social relations, politics, economics or art.

The individual and the society benefit alike, of course, in the rationale of the western world's practice of open debate. Whether the goal is sound public policy, the news media's serving as an external check on government, human beings' fulfillment of their potentialities, maintaining the kind of community where people do not need to live in suspicion and distrust of each other, or the fulfilling of the "duty of the thinker to his thought," free expression is held as crucial.

Jurists and lawyers alike have based their cases for freedom on both the social and the individual good. Barrister Francis L. Holt, whose early Nineteenth-Century work on libel was one of the English texts heavily relied on by American law, put primary emphasis on freedom of the press as one of the "rights of nature \* \* \* that is to say, of the free exercise of our faculties"; but at the same time saw the common good in England's "system of liberty, equally remote from feudal anarchy, and monarchical despotism" as being "the fruit of a free press."<sup>4</sup>

Twentieth-Century jurists speak similarly. Justice Hugo Black of the United States Supreme Court pointed out in *Braden v. U. S.* that

<sup>3</sup> Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), 2d ed., Ch. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Francis L. Holt, *The Law of Libel \* \* \** in the Law of England, ed. Anthony Bleecker (New York, 1818), quoted in H. L. Nelson, *Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court* (New York, 1967), pp. 19-20.

"There are grim reminders all around this world that the distance between individual liberty and firing squads is not always as far as it seems."<sup>5</sup> And in *Bridges v. California*, he wrote of society's stake: contempt of court citations for newspaper comment about a trial in progress, he warned, "produce their restrictive results at the precise time when public interest in the matters discussed would naturally be at its height."<sup>6</sup>

Yet to suggest that the worth of freedom to the individual and the society goes unchallenged, even in western democracies, is misleading. In any society, some hate and fear the expression of ideas contrary to their own. Is it permissible or proper to allow newspapers to attack my religion? To permit a socialist newspaper to publish in times of threat from "alien ideologies"? Even today, after almost two centuries in which the First Amendment to the Constitution has proclaimed free speech and press as a central American value, some Americans answer "no."<sup>7</sup>

One doubt expressed about free speech is that, for all its supposed power to bring about understanding and agreement, it really accomplishes little. Widespread discussion, freely engaged in, may in this view lead to no settlement of issues. Even scholars and social scientists, supposedly trained in coming to conclusions on the basis of evidence, find it hard to get agreement among themselves. And as for men in general, the argument continues, they are not really disposed to engage in the difficult process of hammering out serious issues, for they find mental effort the most onerous of work.<sup>8</sup>

There is also the position that true "liberation" of societies cannot come about as long as toleration of aggression in national policies is practiced, or if racial, religious, or class hatred may be propounded. Some ideas and policies must be forbidden in this view, for to permit them free rein is to tolerate conditions that perpetuate servitude and unhappiness.<sup>9</sup>

The right to challenge or denounce the principle and worth of free expression is itself, of course, a rough measure of the extent of freedom in a society. " \* \* \* [M]an can seem to be free in any society, no matter how authoritarian, as long as he accepts the

<sup>5</sup> 365 U.S. 431, 445-446, 81 S.Ct. 584, 593 (1961).

<sup>6</sup> 314 U.S. 252, 268, 62 S.Ct. 190, 196 (1941).

<sup>7</sup> Charles E. Swanson, "Midcity Daily: What the People Think a Newspaper Should Be," 26 *Journalism Quarterly* 173 (June 1949); Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion 1935-1946* (Princeton, 1941), pp. 244-245.

<sup>8</sup> Frank Knight, *Ethics of Competition and Other Essays* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935), pp. 302, 304, 353.

<sup>9</sup> Robert P. Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston, 1965), pp. 87-ff.

postulates of the society, but he can only *be* free in a society that is willing to allow its basic postulates to be questioned.”<sup>10</sup>

Protection, for the dissenters who challenge the worth of free expression as for those who cherish it, forms its front line in the organic law of the United States. The Federal and State constitutions unanimously give free expression a position of prime value.

## SEC. 2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

**Federal and State Constitutions unanimously guarantee freedom of expression; most State Constitutions declare that citizens are responsible for the abuse of the right.**

The Americans who wrote and in 1791 adopted the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution served a theme in Anglo-American liberty that had surged to recurrent apogee. They wrought in the line of Englishmen who forced the Magna Charta from King John in 1215, dared to sign the Petition of Right in 1628, passed the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679 and the Bill of Rights in 1689, and in 1776 broke the bands connecting them with motherland by adopting the Declaration of Independence. The first provision in the 1791 Bill of Rights provided freedom of speech and press, and this First Amendment to the Constitution has since been the basic legal framework for protecting liberty of expression in the United States:<sup>11</sup>

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

They did not say precisely what they meant by “freedom of speech and press”—an ill-defined and much-debated concept in England and America at the time. But while the best evidence indicates that they were not thinking of a much broader freedom than that provided in their erstwhile motherland, they stated a broad principle in firmly protective terms, and left it to future generations to interpret.<sup>12</sup>

As the states adopted their own constitutions, each included a provision for freedom of expression. A few made spare, unelaborated statements such as that of Massachusetts: “The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. The right of free speech shall not be abridged.”<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> John B. Wolfe, in Wilbur Schramm, *Responsibility in Mass Communication* (New York, 1957), 106.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1.

<sup>12</sup> Leonard Levy, *Legacy of Suppression* (Cambridge, 1960) pp. 308–309.

<sup>13</sup> Constitution of Massachusetts, Part I, Art. XVI.

Many states, deeply aware of dangers in the old doctrine of seditious libel which governments had used to silence their critics, added further provisions. They denied to their governments the use of two legal instruments that they considered especially hateful. One was based on the Eighteenth Century reasoning that statements critical of government were only aggravated if they were true. On this basis, the English common law had ruled that the accused was not to be permitted to try to defend himself by pleading that his offensive words were true.

The second instrument barred to government was the practice of giving judges, rather than juries, the power to decide whether the particular criticism of government amounted to a crime—was libelous. Juries in seditious libel cases had been restricted to deciding whether the accused had, indeed, printed the illegal statement—to deciding “the fact” of printing, but not “the law.” The overwhelming majority of state constitutions came to bar these instruments to government’s use. New York, an early one, did so first with a law of 1805, and later placed the principles in its Constitution:<sup>14</sup>

Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.

Denying governments the use of these instruments implied that speech and press might be limited in some ways—although not these. The freedoms were not “absolutes.” This was recognized by most states’ constitutions. Nearly all agreed that freedom of expression could be “abused,” although they did not say what “abuse” meant. Typically, the sentence in the state constitution that started with the guarantee of free expression, ended with the qualification, as in Pennsylvania’s: “The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”<sup>15</sup>

As the Federal Constitution’s First Amendment left the “freedom of speech and press” to future interpretation, the state constitutions left “abuse” of free speech and press to future interpretation. The principle resembled that expressed by Sir William Blackstone, presti-

<sup>14</sup> Constitution of New York, Art. 1, § 8.

<sup>15</sup> Constitution of Pennsylvania, Art. 1, § 7.

gious English legal authority whose famous *Commentaries*, published in 1765–1769, influenced American law heavily. He had said:<sup>16</sup>

The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no *previous* restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.

America was to part company with Blackstone not on the principle that “abuse” was possible, but on what would be considered “improper, mischievous or illegal \* \* \*.” His ideas of sedition and contempt of court, for example, although they at times enjoyed strong and active lives in the United States, ultimately were widely rejected.

Each state’s power to define what it considered abuse of free expression long went unchallenged by the Federal courts. But in 1925, the United States Supreme Court changed this situation. It said that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected freedom of speech and press from invasion by the states. The amendment, which became effective in 1868, declares that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law \* \* \*.”<sup>17</sup> The “liberty” was not, until *Gitlow v. New York*, interpreted to include liberty of speech and press, and state courts’ rulings on expression before that decision were allowed to stand without review by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the *Gitlow* decision, however, the Court said:<sup>18</sup>

\* \* \* we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and “liberties” protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.

Thereafter, states’ punishment of expression that they considered abuse of freedom was subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Fourteenth Amendment took its place with the First as a major protection for expression.

One other amendment to the Federal Constitution applies to expression. This is the Fifth Amendment, which bars the Federal government from certain acts against expression in language similar

<sup>16</sup> 4 Blackstone Commentaries 151, 152.

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14.

<sup>18</sup> 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 630 (1925).

to that of the Fourteenth: "No person \* \* \* shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."<sup>19</sup>

While the last part guarantees the liberty to speak or write, the first protects the right to silence, not only in criminal cases but also, by extension, in such encounters with government as appearances before committees of Congress. It is protection for a witness against self-incrimination. Its origins lie in the revulsion against the practice of forcing men to testify against themselves. The practice was commonplace until the Seventeenth Century in England. With it was associated torture to wring confessions from the accused. "Freeborn John" Lilburne, one of the most contentious figures in the history of England's freedoms, won the day for the right "not to accuse oneself" in 1641. Whipped and pilloried because he refused to take an oath before the Star Chamber to answer questions truly about his alleged importing of seditious and heretical books, he petitioned Parliament for redress. Parliament declared the sentence "illegal and against the liberty of the subject," and voted him indemnity of 3,000 pounds.<sup>20</sup>

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the state constitutions hold at bay government's acts against the freedoms of speech and press. Yet the two amendments concede that persons may be deprived of liberty through due process of law. The state constitutions widely agree that the right of free expression can be abused. While the First Amendment contains no such specific limiting phrase, the courts have held consistently that even its sweeping command against suppression does not promise an "absolute" freedom of expression. The Constitutional imperatives, libertarian in spirit and voice, yet provide certain boundaries to speech and press.

### SEC. 3. LEGAL BOUNDARIES FOR SPEECH AND PRESS

**Although a few voices have urged an "absolute" freedom for speech and press, legislatures and courts have limited the freedom through various formulations.**

Even in stating that "Congress shall make no law \* \* \* abridging freedom of speech, or of the press \* \* \*," the First Amendment draws no exact, ruler-straight line between the permissible and the punishable. American theorists, courts, legislators, and laymen have stated the boundaries of expression in various ways. If a scale could be made with "freedom" at one end and "restraint" at the other, most American spokesmen would be found well toward the "liberty" pole. Yet while clustering in that sector, they would

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5.

<sup>20</sup> Erwin N. Griswold, *The Fifth Amendment Today* (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 3, 4.

insist on various ways of describing their positions. Of all American spokesmen, the late Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black most flatly stated the position for the right of unlimited expression, for interpreting the First Amendment as an "absolute" command forbidding any restraint on speech and press:<sup>21</sup>

It is my belief that there *are* "absolutes" in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by men who knew what words meant and meant their prohibitions to be "absolutes."

\* \* \*

I believe when our Founding Fathers \* \* \* wrote this [First] Amendment they \* \* \* knew what history was behind them and they wanted to ordain in this country that Congress \* \* \* should not tell the people what religion they should have or what they should believe or say or publish, and that is about it. It [the First Amendment] says "no law," and that is what I believe it means.

\* \* \*

I have no doubt myself that the provision, as written and adopted, intended that there should be no libel or defamation law in the United States. \* \* \*

\* \* \*

I do not hesitate \* \* \* as to what should be and what I hope will sometime be the constitutional doctrine that just as it was not intended to authorize damage suits for mere words \* \* \* as far as the Federal Government is concerned, the same rule should apply to the states.

The late philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, speaking of the realm of political affairs only, urged a similar absolute freedom of expression for all citizens of the United States. Speaking at a time when fear of domestic Communism was at its height in the nation and tendencies to curb Communists' freedom were strong, Meiklejohn declared:<sup>22</sup>

The first amendment seems to me a very uncompromising statement. It admits of no exceptions. It tells us that the Congress, and by implication, all other agencies of the Government are denied any authority whatever to limit the political freedom of the citizens of the United States. It declares that with respect to political discussion, political advocacy, political planning, our citizens are sovereign, and the Congress is their subordinate agent \* \* \* men, as

<sup>21</sup> Anon., Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": a Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 548 (1962).

<sup>22</sup> Alexander Meiklejohn, Testimony of Nov. 14, 1955, U.S. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Sub-Committee on Constitutional Rights, "Security and Constitutional Rights," pp. 14-15.



they endeavor to meet the public responsibilities of citizenship in a free society, are in a vital sense \* \* \* beyond the reach of legislative control.

But the "absolute freedom" position, theoretically appealing to some, has not found official acceptance or support. Three centuries ago, John Milton's extraordinary plea for expanded freedom yet drew the line when it came to those whose religion and morals he could not accept; and though religious toleration has long since dissolved the religious barriers he supported, the case for freedom in England and America ever since has been qualified in various ways as men have tried to state principles, rules, and aphorisms that would confine or enlarge the boundaries of legal control.

William Blackstone's Eighteenth-Century formula was adhered to for long periods of time in England and America: government shall lay no restraint on writers *in advance* of publication, but may punish them *after* publication of anything that violates the law. Sweeping in its restrictions as it was, his rule has long since disappeared as a guide in American courts, although in the early Twentieth Century, the United States Supreme Court quoted it with approval.<sup>23</sup>

An old dividing-line that rolls easily off the tongue but has little operational content is stated as this: "Liberty is not the same as licentiousness." It is impossible to say where one begins and the other leaves off.

In the law of criminal defamation of individuals, the rule was laid down in state after state that the defendant could not have protection from punishment unless he could prove that his words were the truth, and spoken with "good motives and for justifiable ends."

The intent of the writer—justifiable or malicious—was and is used as a gauge for testing the degree of culpability of one accused of defamation. The "tendency" of words to cause a breach of the peace, or to undermine government, or thwart the process of justice in the courts, was for centuries a judgment to be made by the courts in deciding whether words were criminal.

One formula which some have recommended is that freedom of speech and press should be denied only to those who would deny it to others. The principle was urged by some Americans in the mid-Twentieth Century years when domestic Communists were identified as those who demanded free speech but presumably would crush it if they came to power.<sup>24</sup>

Do the demands of freedom give First-Amendment protection to advertising? Is the salesman's "pitch" to be given the same protec-

<sup>23</sup> *Patterson v. State of Colo. ex rel. Attorney General*, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558 (1907).

<sup>24</sup> Max Eastman, *Freedom Must Defend Itself*, in H. M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel, *Basic Issues of American Democracy* (New York, 1948), pp. 89-92.

tion afforded the aggrieved citizen who seeks political or social change, or the candidate for office who assails the incumbent?<sup>25</sup> Is there a freedom *not* to speak when government demands testimony?<sup>26</sup>

Two famous formulations of Supreme Court justices attempt to state broad rules that may be applied to many situations. One is the test that was laid out by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.—the clear and present danger test. First articulated in *Schenck v. U. S.* in 1919,<sup>27</sup> the rule was an attempt, in part, to afford much greater freedom than the old “tendency” rule. Under it, before words can be punished it must be shown that they present a “clear and present danger,” rather than merely a tendency, to bring about a serious evil.

The second, propounded in the 1930’s by various justices, speaks for a “preferred position” for First-Amendment freedoms of speech and press. The reasoning assumes that these are the paramount freedoms among all, the “indispensable condition of liberty.” Therefore, where a law on its face restricts these freedoms, the Court should not grant it the normal presumption that laws reaching the Court for its scrutiny are valid. The government must prove that the law under question is constitutional, and that the speech or print under challenge by the prosecution endangers a major social interest.<sup>28</sup>

For radio and television broadcasting, legal formulas and principles are based considerably upon the limited capacity of the air waves—the nature of the physical universe—for establishing areas of freedom and control. The air waves belong to the public, not to broadcasters, and can carry only a restricted number of voices. Deciding who will be given access to frequencies, and under what conditions, was assigned to government by the Federal Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934. The Federal Communications Commission licenses broadcasters, choosing one rather than another, deciding whether a station will be re-licensed each three years, and occasionally rescinding a license. It is specifically denied powers of censorship by the Communications Act. Thus while First Amendment protection is provided for broadcast as well as for printed communication, special conditions for broadcasting qualify the right in special ways.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Bigelow v. Virginia*, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222 (1975).

<sup>26</sup> *U. S. v. Rumley*, 345 U.S. 1, 73 S.Ct. 543 (1953); *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943).

<sup>27</sup> 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919).

<sup>28</sup> *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943); *Thomas v. Collins*, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315 (1945).

<sup>29</sup> Walter B. Emery, *Broadcasting and Government* (East Lansing, Mich., 1961) Ch. 3.

A major formulation by Thomas I. Emerson, one of the nation's foremost First Amendment scholars, is stated this way: "The central idea of a system of freedom of expression is that a fundamental distinction must be drawn between conduct which consists of 'expression' and conduct which consists of 'action.' 'Expression' must be freely allowed and encouraged. 'Action' can be controlled

\* \* \* " 30

Salient and current in the mid-1970s was a view articulated most fully by Jerome A. Barron:<sup>31</sup> In an age of mass communication, the members of the public must have access to the columns and airwaves of the mass media if their voices are to be heard. Barron elaborated the position that for many decades the high cost of ownership of media had barred countless voices from a part in the "marketplace of ideas." The media—giant in size and cost; relatively few in number and owned by largely like-minded entrepreneurs devoted to the economic and political *status quo*; and possessed of the power to deny the citizen the right to have his message communicated widely—are themselves, in this view, a crucial barrier to diversity of opinion and fact in the marketplace. And diversity is one of the central features sought under the liberal view of free expression. "At the very minimum," Barron wrote, "the creation of two remedies is essential—(1) a nondiscriminatory right to purchase editorial advertisements in daily newspapers, and (2) a right of reply for public figures and public officers defamed in newspapers."<sup>32</sup>

A decision by the Supreme Court of Florida in mid-1973 told newspapers that a right of public access to their columns existed under a Florida statute. In *Tornillo v. Miami Herald*,<sup>33</sup> the Florida Court declared the statute constitutional in requiring newspapers which criticized political candidates, in news or editorial columns, to print the candidates' replies. The Herald had refused to print a reply by Pat L. Tornillo, Jr., to an editorial critical of him in his unsuccessful race for the Florida Legislature in 1972. Thus a state supreme court upheld a right of reply in print media similar to the right granted under the equal opportunities and fairness doctrines to persons attacked by broadcast media and cable (see Chap. 13). The First Amendment, said the Florida Court, "is not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of us all," and it added:<sup>34</sup>

The right of the public to know all sides of a controversy and from such information to be able to make an enlight-

<sup>30</sup> Emerson, p. 17.

<sup>31</sup> Access to the Press—a New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1641 (1967).

<sup>32</sup> Jerome A. Barron, *Freedom of the Press for Whom?* (Bloomington, Ind., 1973), p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> 287 So.2d 78 (Fla.1973).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

ened choice is being jeopardized by the growing concentration of the ownership of the mass media into fewer and fewer hands, resulting ultimately in a form of private ownership.

The *Miami Herald* appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court reversed the Florida court.<sup>35</sup> It reviewed in outline the dangers of concentration of media ownership, cross-channel ownership, chains, syndicates and the focusing in the hands of a few, the power to inform and influence public opinion. However valid the arguments are that these phenomena threaten the free marketplace of ideas, the Court said, governmental coercion of remedies such as right of reply “at once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment.” Beginning with *Associated Press v. U. S.*<sup>36</sup> in 1945 and running through other decisions since, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for a unanimous Court:<sup>37</sup>

\* \* \* the Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction or requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise print. The clear implication has been that any such compulsion to publish that which “‘reason’ tells them should not be published” is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.

While Tornillo argued that the Florida statute did not prevent the *Miami Herald* from printing anything it wished, that missed the core question:

Compelling editors or publishers to publish that which “‘reason’ tells them should not be published” is what is at issue in this case. The Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant from publishing specified matter.

The Florida statute, the Court said, penalizes on the basis of the content of a newspaper: The penalty is increased cost of production, and taking up space that could go to other material the paper may have preferred to print. Infinite expansion of its size to accommodate replies that a statute might require is not to be expected of a newspaper.

But cost aside, the Florida statute failed “to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of

<sup>35</sup> *Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831 (1974).

<sup>36</sup> 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945).

<sup>37</sup> *Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831 (1974). All quotes are from Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion at 2838–2840.

editors.” This function—choosing content, determining size of the paper, treatment of public issues—may be fair or unfair, said Justice Burger, but “It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”

The decision developed no reasoning as to why newspapers were exempt but broadcasting was not, from the requirements of furnishing the opportunity to reply. Once again, as in other circumstances previously, the First Amendment’s shield proved stronger for printed journalism than for broadcast.

#### SEC. 4. CONTROL BY THREE GOVERNMENT BRANCHES

**Pre-publication censorship and licensing of printed media have ceased, but continue in application to other media in special circumstances; all branches of government have powers of control after publication.**

For 200 years, English printers presented their copy to church or state authorities before setting it in type. The censor approved, disapproved, or modified the manuscript according to his notions of what was legal and moral. As a further safeguard to the protection of the state or religion against attack, printers were licensed in order that government could more easily check on their orthodoxy and obedience.<sup>38</sup> This was control of expression in its classic forms: licensing and censorship in advance of publication. It persisted in oppressive and cumbersome form through the Sixteenth and Seventh Centuries in England, and until the 1720’s in the American colonies, and in various ways, has reappeared in the Twentieth Century.

In a special application, licensing by government administrative agency applies to all broadcasters. Frequencies for access to the public ear, as we have seen, are limited in number. After years of intolerable overcrowding of desirable wave-bands, switching at will from one frequency to another by many stations, and conditions that could only be acknowledged as chaotic, the Federal Radio Act of 1927 provided that government would choose among applicants, licensing the chosen. Censorship, however, was specifically prohibited by the same Act.

While the censor and licenser were ejected from the realm of printing in the United States more than two centuries ago, the state retained the procedure of prosecution in the courts for criminal words. On the theory that the state had the right to preserve itself, the crime of seditious libel—illegal verbal attack on government—

<sup>38</sup> Fredrick S. Siebert, *Freedom of the Press in England, 1476–1776* (Urbana: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1952), Chaps. 2, 12.

was recognized in the late Eighteenth Century and again in the Twentieth. The Christian religion was protected by blasphemy statutes. Breach of the peace was punishable under the criminal libel law, and so was defamation. The moral order is the "social good" presumably protected by the threat of punishment under the obscenity statutes. Where there is a clear and present danger that criticism of the courts or comment on a pending case will harm the process of justice, an action for criminal contempt of court may be brought.

It is the court action, of course, by which most control of speech and press ultimately takes place, and in addition to actions for criminal words, civil actions are many in which one citizen's use of words brings him into conflict with another citizen's rights. To preserve his reputation, the citizen may bring a suit for libel or slander against a newspaper or broadcasting station that has defamed him. Or he may sue for violation of copyright and seek an injunction against further violation, or for invasion of privacy.

Major actions in the courts have confronted all mass media charged with attempts to monopolize or restrain trade, under the anti-trust laws. State laws provide for prosecution for fraudulent or unfair advertising practices. All commercial media of communication are subject to economic regulation, and general laws apply as much to the mass media, as to any business: labor laws, tax laws, health and safety ordinances, contracts, workmen's compensation—these and many others are in full effect for the newspaper as for the merchant.

Along with criminal and civil actions in the courts, legal restraint is applied by way of administrative agencies and the executive branch, most notably the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Post Office. We have already seen the FCC's power to license, to discontinue a license, or refuse renewal. The FTC monitors and investigates complaints about advertising, and when it finds evidence in advertising of unfair trade practices or fraudulence, may order a halt or bring an action in the courts. The Post Office Department regulates the format of printed communications that are to be mailed, rejects material that advertises lotteries, and on some occasions interrupts delivery of periodicals or other printed material.

Congress and the state legislatures, of course, are the main source of the laws which the courts, executive branch, and administrative agencies interpret or apply. The common law, established by judges in England through centuries of making and following precedent and adopted in many aspects by the American courts, also continues to furnish rules and principles in such fields as libel and slander, but more and more is replaced by legislative statutes. The legislative branch, it should be added, has a little-used direct control of the

press at its disposal—the power to cite for contempt, for example when a newsman refuses to answer questions put to him by a congressional investigating committee.

Every branch of the government, at all levels, contributes thus to legal control of the mass media, but at the same time, each branch may contribute to freedom of expression. The courts and administrative agencies issue decisions that protect and uphold free speech and press, as well as decisions that limit it. Legislative acts may provide punishment for criminal words, but they also state protections which bar prosecutions. All branches of government deny public access to certain kinds of information, but federal and state laws, as well as court decisions, declare that public policy demands that secrecy be the exception, not the rule. Law facilitates expression as well as restraining it.

## Chapter 2

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

#### Sec.

5. Seventeenth Century England.
6. Eighteenth Century America.
7. War Power, Contempt of Court, and Criminal Libel.
8. Sedition in the Twentieth Century.
9. Prior Restraint.

The delicate balance between control and freedom of expression under the law has been most violently disrupted, over the centuries, when government has sought to arm or protect itself against attack by the press. Libertarians have viewed struggles for freedom of expression as crucial when government, acting in its own interest, has been the press' adversary. This is not to minimize struggles over control stemming from sources other than government's acting in its own behalf. Major battles have involved civil suits for damages brought by citizens against the media. Major contests have settled principles of freedom and control where government has taken the part of the public against the press, as in prosecutions of the media for monopolizing and restraint of trade. To view the clash between freedom and control in its most basic and often most dramatic form, however, is to examine the head-on confrontation when government believes itself threatened by the press and acts to bring it in check. Elemental aspects of the growth of political liberty are accentuated in this collision. The historical context develops the story best.

#### SEC. 5. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

**John Milton's thought and contentious martyrs' action helped unshackle printing; insistent printers' economic demands were the main factor in the death of licensing and censorship.**

Stephen Daye, the first American colonial printer, pulled his first impressions from a hand press while the authoritarianism of divine right monarchy was still strong in the mother country. The year was 1638, the place was Harvard College, and the work was "The Freeman's Oath," approved for printing by the theocracy of Massachusetts Bay colony which had no more concept of freedom of the press than did Charles I who ruled in London. Yet by the time the first colonial newspaper appeared some 65 years later, major battles and major ideas had intruded upon the intricate network of press control in England, and the tiny group of American printers which began to grow in number after 1700 owed much to their brothers of



the press and to contentious speakers across the Atlantic. Advance toward freedom of the press, unthinkable in Seventeenth-Century America, had occurred in England and had saved the Eighteenth-Century colonial printers some of the hard work and pain of breaking free of authority.

The ingenious system of control established in the Sixteenth Century by the Tudor monarchs, Henry VIII and Elizabeth I, and perpetuated by the Stuart kings of the Seventeenth Century, had largely disappeared by the close of England's Glorious Revolution of 1689. Gone was the Stationers Company policing of the printers of England, first required by Elizabeth in return for economic protection, monopolies, and privileges for this printing guild's members. The arbitrary Courts of the Star Chamber and the High Commission had died amid rejoicing. Torture for criminal offenses, officially at least, was over. Weakened and about to collapse was the system of licensing and censorship in advance of publication; the demands of business-oriented printers for release from its strictures, and the impossibility of managing the surveillance as the number of printers and the reading needs of the public grew, had more to do with the death of the system than did the high principle of Milton's *Areopagitica*. Licensing and censorship in England died in 1695 when the House of Commons refused to renew the law for it.<sup>1</sup>

There was much left in the art and craft of government to overcome before a broad liberty would be accomplished. Criminal prosecutions for sedition would thrive through the next century and beyond. Control of newspapers and magazines through taxes would be tried repeatedly by Queen Anne and her successors. Parliament would punish speakers and printers for contempt of its august stature, and would continue to refuse access to newsmen seeking to report it. Yet this robust and oppressive body of restrictive instruments, available to the law for keeping printers in line, was hardly the equal of its predecessors. American colonial printers and newsmen would face all these remaining controls, and also, for a time, the persistence in the colonial setting of some of those that England had shed. They would also be spared many of the grim restrictions of absolute monarchy.

A detailed account of the advance toward the relative freedom of the Eighteenth Century in England is beyond the scope of this work. But some Seventeenth Century English names, some ideas and drifts in government and society, must be accounted for. America took her law and her ideas of government largely from England.

The base of national authority was broadened somewhat when Parliament asserted its supremacy over the power residing in the

<sup>1</sup> Fredrick S. Siebert, *Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776* (Urbana: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1952). This is the fullest and best-ordered treatment of the instruments of control. See especially parts 2 and 4.

individual monarch, with the Glorious Revolution and its Bill of Rights. William and Mary came to the throne of England in a position subordinate to Parliament; their predecessors for two centuries had acknowledged themselves subordinate only to God. Representing a few people who elected them, members of the Commons had some responsibility to a constituency, even though universal suffrage was centuries away. The Commons, thus, held new power and responsibility in relation to a segment of the public that chose it.<sup>2</sup> This may be seen as a step on the way to the ascendancy of the public in a self-governing society. A century or more later, the constituency—the public—would hold the position of ascendancy. The relationship may be seen in terms of a people's right of expression as well as in their power to elect and remove their officials:<sup>3</sup>

Two different views may be taken of the relation between rulers and their subjects. If the ruler is regarded as the superior of the subject, as being by the nature of his position presumably wise and good, the rightful ruler and guide of the whole population, it must necessarily follow that it is wrong to censure him openly; that even if he is mistaken his mistakes should be pointed out with the utmost respect, and that whether mistaken or not no censure should be cast upon him likely or designed to diminish his authority.

If on the other hand the ruler is regarded as the agent and servant, and the subject as the wise and good master who is obliged to delegate his power to the so-called ruler because being a multitude he cannot use it himself, it is obvious that this sentiment must be reversed. Every member of the public who censures the ruler for the time being exercises in his own person the right which belongs to the whole of which he forms a part.

He is finding fault with his servant. If others think differently they can take the other side of the dispute, and the utmost that can happen is that the servant will be dismissed and another put in his place, or perhaps that the arrangements of the household will be modified.

The new structure of government, then, implied that behind the supremacy of Parliament lay at least a segment of the public, empowered to choose new governors in the Commons if it wished. And thorny, difficult men had been pressing throughout the Seventeenth Century—and indeed before—for recognition that members

<sup>2</sup> T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *English Constitutional History* (London: Street & Maxwell, Limited, 1929), 9th ed. by A. L. Poole, pp. 594–599.

<sup>3</sup> Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, *History of the Criminal Law of England* (London: Macmillan, 1883), II, p. 299.

of the public ought to have this kind of power as well as its necessary concomitant, freedom of expression. It was part of the widespread re-casting of thought in the Western world that came to be known as the Enlightenment and the age of faith in man's reason.

John Milton's matchless prose is a starting point in the thinking of Seventeenth Century England about increased freedom of expression. Others of his time, less known today, sought a wider freedom than he; others never violated that which they advocated as he did in accepting a position as a censor of the printed word. Others' actions were more important than his arguments in bringing the death of censorship in 1695.<sup>4</sup> Yet Milton's *Areopagitica*, written in 1644, was to serve as a standard and banner for centuries to come in England's and America's annals of free expression.

Milton wrote just after Charles I had been driven from his throne in England's Civil War. He wanted a divorce, and had written a tract that he hoped would lead to authority's relaxing of the strict legal barriers forbidding it. Under deep official disapproval for publishing it without license, Milton addressed to Parliament a plea for unlicensed printing, the *Areopagitica*. Wide in its sweep, it argued that licensing was unworkable, was an indignity to those engaged in it, and was socially undesirable because of its strictures on the spread of truth. Let falsehood grapple with truth, he argued: "Who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?"<sup>5</sup>

Milton's position on any scale measuring freedom today would be far from liberal. His argument was made within the framework of religious freedom; he was a Puritan, and religion was a central issue in the nation's Civil War. He would not tolerate Catholicism in his argument for freedom of expression. Nor would he permit atheism to have the freedom he sought. Yet viewed in the light of his time, his work was a clear advance over the prevailing authoritarianism of the Stuarts and over that of Parliament as well. Licensing, of course, was perpetuated through the life of the Long Parliament and Cromwell's reign, and lasted with short interruption from the Stuart Restoration of 1660 to 1695.

While Milton pleaded, others in England defied authority in their insistence on speaking. Most of them sectarians of Protestant stripe, their troubles stemmed from their intransigence in attacking the Romanism of which they suspected the Stuart kings and in propagating their own faiths. The law of seditious libel, the law of treason, and the procedures of the arbitrary Court of the Star Chamber were used against them, and some suffered maiming and torture.

<sup>4</sup> Siebert, pp. 195-197, 260-263; Leonard Levy, *Legacy of Suppression* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 93-105.

<sup>5</sup> John Milton, *Areopagitica* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949), p. 58.

William Prynne's book, *Histrio-Mastix*, propounded a strict Puritanism in behavior: he execrated such pastimes of people as dancing, play-going, hunting, Christmas-keeping and dressing up the house with green-ivy, and public festivals. He was brought before the Star Chamber on charges of seditious libel, his attack on government being inferred from Prynne's writing, shortly after the Queen had taken part in a pastoral play at Somerset House, that lewd women and whores were accustomed to act in plays. He was fined £10,000 and given life imprisonment, in addition to being pilloried, and having his ears cropped off.<sup>6</sup> During the year 1637, two other men, Dr. John Bastwick and Henry Burton, were handled similarly by the Star Chamber for their attacks on the Pope. Mob demonstrations against authority followed a public sentencing; Prynne was released by the Long Parliament on the ground that his trial had been illegal, after the abolition in 1641 of the Court of the Star Chamber.<sup>7</sup>

Treason in England had been defined by law since 1352, in Edward III's time. It included "compassing" or imagining the king's death, levying war against the king or giving aid and comfort to his enemies. Writing was included as part of compassing the king's death, and in 1663 at the session of Old Bailey, printer Twyn was indicted and tried for this crime by printing a book called *A Treatise on the Execution of Justice*. The book held to the view that the ruler is accountable to the people, and that the people may take up arms against a king and his family and put the king to death if he refuses accountability. John Twyn did not write the book, but he refused to say who did. The court's vengeance and the law's brutality were in the pronouncement of sentence:<sup>8</sup>

[T]he country have found you guilty; therefore the judgment of the court is, and the court doth award, "that you be led back to the place from whence you came and from thence to be drawn upon an hurdle to the place of execution; and there you shall be hanged by the neck, and being alive, shall be cut down, and your privy-members shall be cut off, your entrails shall be taken out of your body, and you living, the same to be burnt before your eyes; your head to be cut off, your body to be divided into four quarters and your head and quarters to be disposed of at the pleasure of the king's majesty. And the Lord have mercy upon your soul."

Thirty years later, William Anderton printed books that were called treasonable in their intent to incite rebellion and the return to the

<sup>6</sup> 3 Howell's State Trials 561 (1632-3).

<sup>7</sup> Siebert, pp. 123-125.

<sup>8</sup> 6 Howell's State Trials 513 (1663).

throne of James II. Anderton refused to name the author, and was hanged in 1693.<sup>9</sup>

Martyrs to the principle of free expression had their impact and spokesmen for a new philosophy such as Milton and John Locke had theirs. Yet it was the independent printing and book-selling trade itself, according to the scholar Fredrick S. Siebert, that forced the end of licensing and censorship. Economic goals and profit were the central interest of the growing numbers of these tradesmen in the late Seventeenth Century; hedged and bound by the Regulation of Printing Act, cut out of the privileges still granted guild printers of the Stationers Company, they sought relief from Parliament. Unsuccessful in 1692, they continued pressing, and with help from people of power including philosopher John Locke, won their way in 1695. The House of Commons, offering a long list of reasons for its refusal to renew the Printing Act, focused on the restraint of the trades as the main factor, saying nothing about the principles of freedom of the press.<sup>10</sup> The classic instrument for press control was dead in England.

## SEC. 6. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA

**Colonial assemblies' control of the press persisted after governors' and courts' control was neutralized; in spite of the adoption of the First Amendment to the Constitution by the new nation, prosecutions for seditious libel rose again under the Alien and Sedition Acts.**

American colonial printers never had to contend with the searches and seizures of a Stationers Company empowered with police functions. The courts they faced were scarcely the sinister and threatening bodies that the Courts of the Star Chamber and the High Commission were in the homeland. The punishments they received for illegal printing were far short of mutilation, life imprisonment, or hanging. Yet the first newspaper printers had to contend with licensing and censorship as a remnant of the English system, for some 30 years after the Commons rejected its renewal in 1695.

Newsman Benjamin Harris of Boston managed in 1690 to print his single, famous issue of *Publick Occurrences, Both Foreign and Domestick* without the authorities stopping him. But the licensing power of the Massachusetts Bay authorities prevented another issue, and it was not until 1704 that there was a second attempt at a newspaper. This, by John Campbell also of Boston, was licensed, subsidized, sterilized, and blessed by the colonial government, and Campbell never offended. Governors licensed by order of their monarch in England, who was supreme in colonial affairs, and not

<sup>9</sup> 12 Howell's State Trials 1246 (1693).

<sup>10</sup> Siebert, pp. 260-263.

until the 1720's did they yield the power in the face of reality: There had been no Regulation of Printing Act in England for about 30 years, and there was no power in the monarch to enforce the observance of licensing.<sup>11</sup> Barring Ben Harris, it was the first bold newspaperman in the colonies, James Franklin, who defied the demand that he submit to licensing. Though this printer of the *New England Courant* was made to suffer twice in jail for his belittling of authority, licensing had to be acknowledged dead after his release in 1723. The direct power over print held by the Governor and his Council was neutralized.<sup>12</sup>

Next in order to face the challenge of a contentious printer was the power of the courts to try for seditious libel, the crime of criticizing government. This instrument for control had advanced to major proportions in England in the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Centuries. At least four colonial Americans faced sedition actions for printed words before the most celebrated criminal trial in the colonial period occurred in 1735. This was the trial of John Peter Zenger, printer of the *New York Weekly Journal* whose work was given much to the cause of undermining Governor William Cosby. Courage was the ingredient that Zenger brought to the attack; he had neither the schooling nor the knowledge to launch and sustain the political assault planned and executed by James Alexander of the powerful Lewis Morris faction which opposed the grasping and autocratic Cosby.<sup>13</sup> What Zenger had to fear was going to jail for the attacks that labeled Cosby a tyrant and oppressor of the colony.

And to jail Zenger went in late 1734, under an information filed by the governor's attorney general after fruitless efforts to get a grand jury to indict the printer. For eight months he awaited trial for seditious libel, while Alexander managed to keep the Journal printing and the campaign against Cosby simmering. And Alexander, disbarred by Chief Justice De Lancey (a Cosby appointee), turned to lawyer Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia as the best man to plead Zenger's case.

The original "Philadelphia lawyer," Hamilton had built a reputation as the ablest attorney in the colonies. The dignity of age, his utter confidence, and his bold advocacy that the court discard old patterns of thinking about sedition came to bear in an irresistible way with jurors already sympathetic to Zenger's cause. The law of sedition had long held that the defendant was not to be permitted to plead that his offending words against government were true; the

<sup>11</sup> Clyde A. Duniway, *The Development of Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ.Press, 1906), pp. 104-105.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Stanley Katz (ed.), *A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ.Press, 1963), pp. 2-9.

truth, it was held, only aggravated the offense, for it was more likely than falsehood to cause the target to seek violent revenge and breach the community's peace. Furthermore, the law had given the jury only a minor role in a sedition trial: its job was to decide whether the accused had, indeed, printed the words; it was up to the court to decide whether they were illegal words.

Jockeying with De Lancey, Hamilton urged the jury to recognize truth as a defense for Zenger, and argued that the jury should decide "the law"—the libelousness of the words—as well as the fact of printing. Blocked by the judge from pursuing these points far, he shifted his tactic and went to the importance of permitting men to criticize their governments:<sup>14</sup>

Men who injure and oppress the people under their administration provoke them to cry out and complain, and then make that very complaint the foundation for new oppressions and prosecutions. I wish I could say there were no instances of this kind. But to conclude, the question before the Court and you, gentlemen of the jury, is not of small or private concern; it is not the cause of a poor printer, nor of New York alone, which you are trying. No! it may, in its consequences, affect every freeman that lives under a British government, on the main of America. It is the best cause; it is the cause of liberty; and I make no doubt but your upright conduct, this day, will not only entitle you to the love and esteem of your fellow citizens, but every man who prefers freedom to a life of slavery, will bless and honor you as men who have baffled the attempts of tyranny; and by an impartial and uncorrupt verdict, have laid a noble foundation for securing to ourselves, our posterity, and our neighbors, that to which nature and the laws of our country have given us a right—the liberty—both of exposing and opposing arbitrary power in these parts of the world at least, by speaking and writing truth.

Hamilton ended his plea in an emotion-charged courtroom; De Lancey delivered a confusing charge to the jury, which retired to deliberate; and in a short time the jury emerged with the "not guilty" verdict. There were celebrations in the streets that night; there were printings and re-printings of the Hamilton plea for years to come, more even in England than in the colonies; and the court trial for seditious libel was finished for the colonial period as an instrument for control of the press. Not for 40 years or more would it be used again in America.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>15</sup> Harold L. Nelson, *Seditious Libel in Colonial America*, 3 *Am. Journ. of Legal History* 160 (1959).

It was the elected Assembly, or lower house of the colonial legislature, that was the most successful and most active force in official control of Eighteenth Century colonial printers. Jealous of its powers under the view that it was Parliament in miniature, and unwilling to have its acts criticized, this agency of government disciplined printer after printer. Even as it emerged as the main check on the powers of the Crown's governors, even as it showed itself as the seat of government support for the movement for independence, the Assembly demonstrated its aversion to popular criticism. Its instrument for control was the citation for contempt ("breach of privilege"), and it haled a long line of printers before it for their "seditious" attacks on its performance. The legislative contempt citation was a legislative sedition action.

Levy has demonstrated the relative power and activity of the Assemblies in respect to the press. Up and down the seaboard, printer after printer was brought to the legislative bar, there to be forced to kneel and beg the pardon of the stern law-makers, swear that he meant no harm by his writings, and accept rebuke or imprisonment. James Franklin's irony put him in jail; he had speculated that the Massachusetts government might get around to outfitting a ship to pursue a pirate "sometime this month, wind and weather permitting." New Yorkers James Parker and William Weyman were jailed for an article on the poverty of Orange and Ulster counties; the Assembly construed it as a reflection upon their stewardship. These were only a few actions among many, and they continued to the eve of the Revolutionary War in some colonies.<sup>16</sup>

The great article of faith that heads America's commitment to free expression was written in 1791 by men who had not yet thought through all that "free speech and press" implies. The founders stated in the First Amendment to the Constitution that "Congress shall make no law \* \* \* abridging freedom of speech, or of the press \* \* \*." while still arguing over precisely what they meant by the words. Behind them lay the great pamphleteering and newspapering that had done much to bring the colonists to revolt against the Mother country; the founders were convinced that the printed word had been indispensable in bringing down the most powerful nation on earth. Yet the axioms of centuries were with them; it still seemed to many that no government could stand if it could not at some point punish its critics, and their new government was meant to last. Some words surely were illegal. Not, perhaps, in the realm of religion, where James Madison, among others, argued an unlimited freedom to speak and write; but could sedition be given such scope? It was the party of Thomas Jefferson that gave an answer, in the debates and sequel of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798-1800.

<sup>16</sup> Levy, pp. 20-63.



The Acts were written at a time of high public and official alarm. With France and England in conflict through the 1790's, America had been pulled by both toward war. The Republicans—Jefferson's party—had favored France, while the Federalists sided with England. Angered at Jay's Treaty of 1794 with England, which she felt placed America on the side of her enemy, France had undertaken the raiding of American shipping. America's envoys, sent to France to negotiate a settlement, were faced with a demand for an American war loan to France, and a bribe of a quarter-million dollars. This unofficial demand as a price for negotiations was revealed to Americans as the famous "X, Y, Z Affair." Now most of America was incensed; President John Adams called for war preparation, which his Federalist Congress set about furnishing in 1797.<sup>17</sup>

The Republicans, though suffering heavy political losses in the nation's war fever, did not abandon their support of France. Stigmatized in the refusal to do so, associated by the Federalists with the recent French Revolution and its Terror, and beleaguered on all sides for their continued opposition to Britain, the Republicans were in deep trouble. And in this context, the Federalist Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts as measures to control opposition to America's war policy and to the Federalist majority party.

It was the Sedition Act that struck most lethally at opposition and at the Republicans. The Act made it a crime to publish or utter false, scandalous, and malicious criticism of the President, Congress, or the government with the intent to defame them or bring them into disrepute.<sup>18</sup>

Fourteen indictments were brought under the Act, all against Republican newspapermen and publicists, and all 14 resulted in convictions.<sup>19</sup> The first action put Rep. Matthew Lyon in jail for four months and cost him a fine of \$1,000. He had implied that under President Adams, the Executive Branch showed "an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice," and that the public welfare was "swallowed up in a continual grasp for power." Anthony Haswell, Republican editor of the (Bennington) *Vermont Gazette*, came to Lyon's defense while the latter was in prison. He wrote that Lyon was held by "the oppressive hand of usurped power," and said that the federal marshal who held him had subjected him to indignities that might be expected of a "hard-hearted savage." Haswell's fine was \$200 and his term in federal prison two months.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> James M. Smith, *Freedom's Fetters* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1956), Chap. 2. This is the leading work on the Alien and Sedition Acts.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Chap. 6.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

<sup>20</sup> Each trial is treated in Smith, Chaps. 11–17.

Its back to the wall under the attempt of the Federalists to proscribe it as a party of disloyalty and subversion, the Republican Party put forth spokesmen who declared that the idea of sedition was odious to a self-governing society, and denied that the federal government had any kind of power over the press. The Acts, they said, were unconstitutional in making it a crime to criticize the President and government. No matter that the Acts permitted the defenses for which Andrew Hamilton had argued in defending Zenger: truth was of little use in defending opinions (how prove the truth of an opinion?); and jury power to find the law could be circumvented by judges in various ways. A people, they argued, cannot call itself free unless it is superior to its government, unless it can have unrestricted right of discussion. No natural right of the individual, they contended in the Lockean framework, can be more important than free expression. They rested their case on their belief in reason as the central characteristic of men, and on the people's position of ascendancy over government.<sup>21</sup> The radical Thomas Cooper, friend of Joseph Priestley, dissected one by one the arguments for permitting a sedition power in government.<sup>22</sup> Calmly and systematically, lawyer Tunis Wortman worked out philosophical ground for freedom in the fullest statement of the group.<sup>23</sup> Madison, St. George Tucker, and others drove home the arguments.

The unpopularity of the Alien and Sedition Acts and outrage at the prosecutions of Republican printers helped defeat the Federalist Party and President John Adams in 1800. President Jefferson was committed to letting the Acts lapse, and they died in early 1801. The nation would see no federal peacetime sedition act again for 140 years. Furthermore, the alternative route of using the common law as a basis for federal sedition actions was closed to the government only a few years later. The Supreme Court ruled in cases of 1812 and 1816 that federal courts had been given no authority over common-law crimes by the Constitution, and that whatever question

<sup>21</sup> Levy, Chap. 6. See Walter Berns, *The First Amendment and the Future of American Democracy* (Basic Books, 1976), pp. 89–119, for his view that the Jeffersonians had no objection to a sedition power in state governments.

<sup>22</sup> *Political Essays* (Phila.: Printed for R. Campbell, 1800), pp. 71–88.

<sup>23</sup> *Treatise Concerning Political Enquiry, and the Liberty of the Press* (New York: Printed by George Forman, 1800).

there had been about the matter had been settled by public opposition to such jurisdiction.<sup>24</sup>

## SEC. 7. WAR POWER, CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND CRIMINAL LIBEL

**The federal government in the Nineteenth Century controlled its critics under martial law during the Civil War; states used criminal libel and contempt of court actions into the mid-Twentieth Century.**

The fear and hatred of French revolutionary doctrine had been real factors in the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. Different fears, different hatreds led to suppressive laws in the South about a generation later, when states began passing laws to silence Abolitionists. The anti-slavery drive, coupled with incidents such as Nat Turner's slave rebellion, caused paroxysms of Southern fear that their "peculiar institution" and the shape of society and government would be subverted and destroyed. Laws were passed making it a crime to advocate the abolition of slavery or to argue that owners "have no property" in slaves, and denying abolitionist literature access to the mails.<sup>25</sup> The suppression of anti-slavery argument became almost total in most of the South by 1850.

When the Civil War came, the crisis in the North was accentuated by the anti-war, anti-Lincoln "Copperhead" press.<sup>26</sup> Savage attacks on government from major newspapers of general circulation became commonplace. Persistent demands to stop fighting, violent language denouncing the North's war aims, and hammering assaults on Lincoln went on month after month. Angry citizens mobbed Copperhead papers of the North time after time. Federal conspiracy laws were passed. Grand juries urged prosecution or suppression of newspapers. But the legal suppressions that took place were accomplished under martial law and under the President's extraordinary wartime powers.<sup>27</sup>

General Ambrose E. Burnside, Commanding General of the Department of the Ohio, issued General Order No. 38, warning Copperheads. Clement L. Vallandigham, a leading Copperhead newspaper owner, kept up his anti-war theme in the *Dayton (O.) Empire*. He was arrested, tried by the military, and sentenced to prison. Presi-

<sup>24</sup> U. S. v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32 (1812); U. S. v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheaton) 415 (1816).

<sup>25</sup> Three Virginia laws passed between 1832 and 1848 are in Nelson, *Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court*, pp. 173-178.

<sup>26</sup> The best account of the Copperheads is Frank Klement, *The Copperheads in the Middle West* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960).

<sup>27</sup> *American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events* (D. Appleton and Company, 1867), I, pp. 328-330; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 36-37, 146.

dent Lincoln intervened and changed the sentence to banishment behind the Confederate lines.<sup>28</sup> Later in 1863, Burnside issued General Order No. 84, directing the suppression of the *Chicago Times*. Lincoln immediately stopped the Burnside action:<sup>29</sup>

War Department, Washington, June 1, 1863

Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside,  
Commanding Department of the Ohio.

General \* \* \* the President has been informed that you have suppressed the publication or circulation of the *Chicago Times* in your department. He directs me to say that in his judgment it would be better for you to take an early occasion to revoke that order. The irritation produced by such acts is in his opinion likely to do more harm than the publication would do. The Government approves of your motives and desires to give you cordial and efficient support. But while military movements are left to your judgment, upon administrative questions such as the arrest of civilians and the suppression of newspapers not requiring immediate action the President desires to be previously consulted.

Edwin M. Stanton,  
Secretary of War.

In 1864, the immense forbearance of Lincoln in regard to the Copperheads was finally stretched beyond limit. The *New York World* and the *New York Journal of Commerce*, anti-administration newspapers both, published the text of a presumed presidential proclamation announcing a new draft of 400,000 men for the war. It was a bogus document; the two newspapers were the victims of a hoax. But the government had no knowledge that the newspapers had been victimized, and it knew that such news at this stage of the war would cause intense opposition, probably riots and violence. Lincoln ordered the arrest of the editors and proprietors of the two newspapers, and the occupation by the military of their offices. The manager and operators of the Independent Telegraph Co. in New York also were arrested and their office seized. The arrests were made May 18; by May 20 reporter Joseph Howard of the *New York Times* was identified as the perpetrator of the hoax and the *World* and *Journal of Commerce* men were released. Howard confessed that he had "planted" the fake proclamation in the hope of profiting from the stock market reaction to the announcement.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Edwin Emery, *The Press and America* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 292-293.

<sup>29</sup> War of the Rebellion, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series 2, Vol. 5, pp. 723-724.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, Series 3, Vol. 4, pp. 386-395.

Besides the Sedition Act and extraordinary military powers in wartime, the federal government possessed in its early years another potential control over criticism of its officials. This was the power of judges to punish their critics for contempt of court. There was no question that judges were masters over all that occurred in their courtrooms, and might cite, try, and convict those who interfered with the administration of justice in the presence of the court. But it was less clear that a newspaper attack on a judge, especially one delivered while the case under attack was pending, might warrant a criminal contempt citation. Did such out-of-court attack actually interfere with justice? English precedent was weak for punishment of an out-of-court ("constructive") contempt.

Before 1800, a few state-court cases had brought home to newspapermen the danger of attacking judges. Soon after 1800, both Pennsylvania and New York passed laws curbing their judges' contempt power over printed criticism. In 1831, Congress followed suit. The impetus for its action came from a determined attorney, Luke Lawless, who sought for four years the impeachment of Federal Judge James H. Peck. With deep financial interests in questionable claims of speculators to lands once part of Spain's Upper Louisiana, Lawless had attacked Peck in newspaper articles for the judge's decision placing the claims in doubt. He delineated at length "some of the principal errors" of Peck's decision. The judge cited him for contempt, tried him, and punished him by suspending him from practice for eighteen months. Lawless asked Congress to impeach Peck, and though it took years to accomplish the impeachment, he succeeded. Almost endless debate in the Senate aired every phase of the subject of punishment for constructive contempt. Its resemblance to sedition actions, in the eyes of many of the senators, was striking. Finally the Senate voted, exonerating Peck by the narrowest of margins.<sup>31</sup>

But Congress wanted no more punishment of the press for criticism of federal judges. Only a month after the impeachment, it passed an act which said that federal judges might punish only for that misbehavior which took place "in the presence of the \* \* \* courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."<sup>32</sup>

Many states' judges were far less ready to permit criticism. The main line of cases from the mid-Nineteenth Century until 1941 found judges asserting their "immemorial power" to cite and try for newspaper criticism that took place far from their courtrooms, as

<sup>31</sup> Arthur J. Stansbury, *Report of the Trial of James H. Peck* (Boston: Hilliard, Gray and Company, 1833).

<sup>32</sup> 4 U.S. Statutes 487.

well as for misbehavior in the courtroom.<sup>33</sup> They were upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in two early Twentieth-Century cases, *Patterson v. State of Colorado ex rel. Attorney General*, and *Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U. S.*<sup>34</sup> But in 1941, the Supreme Court looked afresh at the judicial contempt power. It ruled in *Bridges v. State of California*<sup>35</sup> that words must present more than a “tendency” to obstruct justice before there may be a contempt citation; they must present, rather, a clear and present danger to justice. Since then, contempt convictions for news media’s comment have been rare.

If it was in the states, then, that the contempt power over the press was developed and wielded, it was also in the states that sedition actions persisted after the federal government vacated the field in 1801. The Jeffersonians had in varying degree accepted this power when held by the states.<sup>36</sup> Supposedly, citizens could control their local, state affairs and check tendencies toward oppression within that sphere much more easily than they could check a remote, centralized national government. Under the common law and under statutes, the new states provided that libel could be a crime whether it was aimed at plain citizens or government men. That the laws went under the name “criminal libel” laws instead of under the rubric of the hated “seditious libel” made them no less effective as tools for prosecution of those who attacked officials.

The states drew up safeguards against some of the harshest features of the old English law of libel. The principles that Andrew Hamilton pleaded for in defending Zenger, and that the Alien and Sedition Acts had provided, emerged as important ones early in the Nineteenth Century as states embarked upon prosecutions. Truth was established as a defense in criminal libel actions, and juries were permitted to find the law under growing numbers of state constitutions and statutes as the century progressed. A celebrated early case in New York encouraged the spread. It stemmed from a paragraph reprinted by Federalist editor Harry Crosswell from the *New York Evening Post* attacking President Thomas Jefferson:<sup>37</sup>

Jefferson paid Callender [a Republican editor] for calling Washington a traitor, a robber, and a perjurer; for calling Adams a hoary-headed old incendiary, and for most grossly slandering the private characters of men who he well knew to be virtuous.

<sup>33</sup> Walter Nelles and Carol Weiss King, *Contempt by Publication in the United States*, 28 Col.Law R. 401–431, 525–562 (1928).

<sup>34</sup> Respectively, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct. 556 (1907), and 247 U.S. 402, 38 S.Ct. 560 (1918).

<sup>35</sup> 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941).

<sup>36</sup> Levy, pp. 264–267; Berns, pp. 89–119.

<sup>37</sup> *People v. Crosswell*, 3 Johnson’s Cases 337 (N.Y.1804).

The great Federalist leader, Alexander Hamilton, took up Crosswell's case in 1804 after he had been convicted of criminal libel in a jury trial in which he had not been permitted to show the truth of his charge. Hamilton argued that "the liberty of the press consists of the right to publish with impunity truth with good motives for justifiable ends though reflecting on government, magistracy, or individuals." This, of course, made the intent of the publisher crucial. He also urged that the jury be allowed to find both the law and the facts of the case. He lost, the appeals court being evenly divided; but the result was so repugnant to people and lawmakers that the New York Legislature in 1805 passed a law embracing the principles that Hamilton urged.

In the states' adoption of Hamilton's formula (a few, indeed, made truth a defense no matter what the motives of the writer) there was an implied rejection of an ancient justification for punishing libel as a crime against the state. The old reasoning was that the truer the disparaging words, the more likely the insulted person to seek revenge and resort to violence, breaching the peace. If the words were false, the logic ran, they could be demonstrated as such, and the defamed would be more easily mollified. Thus the legal aphorism of the Eighteenth Century: "the greater the truth, the greater the libel."

But once admit truth to a protected position in the law, once make it public policy that the public needs to know the truth, and the aphorism crumbles. As states accepted truth as a defense in libel actions, they in effect undermined breach of the peace as an excuse for punishing libel. Few statutes or constitutions retained the possibility of breach of the peace as a basis for criminality in libel.<sup>38</sup>

Criminal libel actions were few through most of the Nineteenth Century. They surged in number in the 1880's and held at some 100 reported cases per decade for 30 years or more before going into a sharp decline after World War I. Not all, by any means, were brought for defamation of public officials in the pattern of seditious libel actions.<sup>39</sup> But criticism of police, governors, mayors, judges, prosecutors, sheriffs, and other government officials was the charge in scores of criminal libel cases.

Of all of them, the most famous by all odds was that stemming from the abortive attempt of President Theodore Roosevelt to punish the *New York World* and the *Indianapolis News* for charging deep corruption in the nation's purchase of the title to the Panama Canal from France. Enraged especially by the *World* and its publisher, Joseph Pulitzer, President Roosevelt delivered a special

<sup>38</sup> See below, Chap. 3.

<sup>39</sup> John D. Stevens, et al., *Criminal Libel as Seditious Libel*, 43 *Journalism Quar.* 110 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, *The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation*, 34 *Texas L.Rev.* 984 (1956).

message to Congress. He charged that Pulitzer was responsible for libeling the United States Government, individuals in the government, and the "good name of the American people." He called it "criminal libel," but his angry words carried all the implications of sedition. He said of the articles and editorials:<sup>40</sup>

In form, they are in part libels upon individuals \* \* \*. But they are in fact wholly, and in form partly, a libel upon the United States Government. I do not believe we should concern ourselves with the particular individuals who wrote the lying and libelous editorials \* \* \* or articles in the news columns. The real offender is Mr. Joseph Pulitzer, editor and proprietor of the World. While the criminal offense of which Mr. Pulitzer has been guilty is in form a libel upon individuals, the great injury done is in blackening the good name of the American people \* \* \*. He should be prosecuted for libel by the governmental authorities \* \* \*. The Attorney-General has under consideration the form in which the proceedings against Mr. Pulitzer shall be brought \* \* \*.

For the charges brought against Pulitzer in federal court in New York, the indictment was quashed on grounds that the federal government did not have jurisdiction. The action was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Charges against the *Indianapolis News*, also pushing the attack on the Panama Canal purchase, were brought before Judge A. B. Anderson who decided the case on its merits. The government sought to have News officials sent to Washington for trial. Judge Anderson said he had deep doubts that the newspaper articles were libelous, and thought they might be privileged as well as non-libelous. But it was on other grounds that he refused to send journalists to Washington for trial. He said that the Sixth Amendment governed, in guaranteeing trial in the state or district where the alleged crime was committed:<sup>41</sup>

To my mind that man has read the history of our institutions to little purpose who does not look with grave apprehension upon the possibility of the success of a proceeding such as this. If the history of liberty means anything, if constitutional guaranties are worth anything, this proceeding must fail.

If the prosecuting officers have the authority to select the tribunal, if there be more than one tribunal to select from, if the government has that power, and can drag citizens from distant states to the capital of the nation, there to be tried, then, as Judge Cooley says, this is a strange result of a revolution where one of the grievances

<sup>40</sup> House of Rep. Docs., 60 Cong., 2 Sess., § 1213 (Dec. 15, 1908), pp. 3-5.

<sup>41</sup> U. S. v. Smith, 173 F. 227 (D.C. Ind. 1909).



complained of was the assertion of the right to send parties abroad for trial.

The defendants will be discharged.

There is no indication that the failure of Roosevelt's action deterred lesser officials in state and municipal governments from bringing libel actions for words critical of them; the decline in number of criminal libel cases did not begin until a decade later. And even the low incidence of cases that held after World War I was checked in 1964, when *Garrison v. State of Louisiana*<sup>42</sup> was decided by the United States Supreme Court.

Prosecuting attorney Jim Garrison of Orleans Parish, Louisiana, had attacked judges of the state for inattention to their judicial duties and laziness. He was charged and convicted of criminally libeling them. His case reached the Supreme Court, and there the prosecution for criminal libel was subjected to a new malice rule stated by the Court only a few months earlier in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*.<sup>43</sup> Criticism of public officials in their public acts, the Court said, is protected by the Constitution unless the prosecution can show that the criticism was made with malice. And it defined malice as knowledge by the publisher that the defamatory words were false, or reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. Diverse and slippery definitions of malice of legal antiquity, and technical rules under which convictions had been gotten for generations, were reduced to harmlessness in criminal libel. Garrison's conviction was reversed.

## SEC. 8. SEDITION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

**The urging of radical economic and political change, opposition to World War I, and the advocacy of violent overthrow of government were proscribed as criminal under sedition legislation of the Twentieth Century.**

While seditious libel traveled under the disguise of criminal libel through the Nineteenth and into the mid-Twentieth Century, it also emerged uncloaked early in the 1900's. Actions to punish verbal attacks on the form of government, on laws, and on government's conduct, found new life at the federal level some 100 years after they had been discredited by the Alien and Sedition Act prosecutions of 1798-1800. The actions focused on a new radicalism, flourishing in the poverty and sweat-shop conditions of industrial cities and in the lumber and mining camps of the West. Whether seeking an improved life for the deprived, driving for power, or fostering revolution, socialists, anarchists, and syndicalists advocated drastic

<sup>42</sup> 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964). See below, Chap. 9.

<sup>43</sup> 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).

change in the economic and political system. Laws and criminal prosecutions rose to check their words.<sup>44</sup>

In the aftermath of the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901, the states of New York, New Jersey and Wisconsin passed laws against anarchists' advocating the destruction of existing government. Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1903, barring from the country those who believed in or advocated the overthrow of the United States government by violence. Industrial turbulence, the growth of the Industrial Workers of the World, the surge of right- and left-wing socialism, contributed to alarm in the nation. And as the varied voices of drastic reform and radical change rose loud in the land, the coming of World War I increased their stridency: This, they insisted, was a "Capitalists' war," fostered and furthered for industrial profit. By 1918, national alarm was increased by the victory of revolutionary communism in Russia.<sup>45</sup>

World War I brought a wave of legislation across the states to make criminal the advocacy of violent overthrow of government. Yet it was the federal government's Espionage Act of 1917 and its amendment of 1918 to include sedition that put most muscle into prosecution for criminal words. Foremost among proscribed and prosecuted statements were those that were construed to cause insubordination or disloyalty in the armed forces, or to obstruct enlistment or recruiting.<sup>46</sup> Some 1,900 persons were prosecuted for speech, and possibly 100 newspapers and periodicals were barred from the mails.<sup>47</sup> Polemics in pamphlet form, as well as books, also were the cause of prosecutions.

The best-known of the Socialist newspapers prosecuted under the Espionage Act were the *New York Call*, the *Masses*, also of New York, and the *Milwaukee Leader*. In the last of these, editor Victor Berger had denounced the war, the United States government, and munitions makers. Postmaster General Albert Burleson considered this the kind of opposition to the war forbidden by the Espionage Act, and excluded it from the mails as the Act provided. Further, he said, the repeated attacks on the war effort in the *Leader* were evidence that it would continue doing the same in the future, and on these grounds, the *Leader's* second-class mail permit should be revoked. He was upheld in his revocation of the permit by the

<sup>44</sup> William Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters, Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ.Press, 1963).

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*; H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917-1918* (Madison: Univ. of Wis.Press, 1957).

<sup>46</sup> 40 U.S. Statutes 217. For state laws, see Chafee, pp. 575-597.

<sup>47</sup> Chafee, p. 52.

United States Supreme Court, and the Leader was thus denied the low-rate mailing privilege from 1917 until after the war.<sup>48</sup>

Pamphleteers of the left were convicted under the Espionage Act and under state anarchy and sedition acts. The famous case of *Schenck v. U. S.*, in which Schenck was prosecuted for polemics that actually went to the matter of resisting the draft, brought Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' articulation of the famous clear and present danger test:<sup>49</sup>

We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it was done \* \* \*. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured \* \* \*.

The new test did not free Schenck, nor was it to be used by Supreme Court majorities in support of free expression for two decades to come. Its plain implications, however, were that old tests were too restrictive for the demands of freedom under the First Amendment. As elaborated and developed in subsequent opinions by Holmes and Justice Brandeis against restrictive interpretations of free expression,<sup>50</sup> the test helped force the Court to think through the meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and served as a rallying-point for libertarians for decades to come.

Another milestone in the Supreme Court's consideration of sedition cases was reached in a post-war case, *Gitlow v. People of New York*.<sup>51</sup> Here the 1902 New York statute on anarchy was invoked against the publication of the "Left Wing Manifesto" in a radical paper called *Revolutionary Age*. It advocated and forecast mass struggle, mass strikes, and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie after a long revolutionary period. Convicted, business manager Benjamin Gitlow appealed to the Supreme Court. It upheld his conviction under an old test of criminality in words—whether the words have a tendency to imperil or subvert government.

<sup>48</sup> U. S. ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Bursleson, 255 U.S. 407, 41 S.Ct. 352 (1921).

<sup>49</sup> 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919).

<sup>50</sup> Notably *Abrams v. U. S.*, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S.Ct. 17 (1919); *Gilbert v. State of Minn.*, 254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920); *Gitlow v. People of State of New York*, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925); *Whitney v. People of State of Cal.*, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927).

<sup>51</sup> 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).

But even as it upheld conviction, the Court wrote a single short paragraph accepting a principle long sought by libertarians: It said that the Fourteenth Amendment's barrier to states' depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law protected liberty of speech and press against invasion by the states. Heretofore, the Supreme Court had tightly restricted the scope of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; it had left it up to each state to say what liberty of speech and press was. Henceforth, the Supreme Court would review state laws and decisions on free expressions, under the Gitlow case pronouncement that read:<sup>52</sup>

[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.

Although Gitlow went to jail, his case had brought acceptance of a principle of high importance. The confining interpretation of free expression fostered in many states over many decades now would be brought to the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court.

Immediately after World War I, the thrust of revolutionary communism had spurred the Attorney General of the United States to urge the passage of a federal peacetime sedition act. His call for such a peacetime measure (the Espionage Act of 1917 had applied only to war) brought concerted opposition; the move was stopped although widespread deportation of Russians and other aliens for their ideas and words was accomplished. But 20 years later, similar fears engendered with the coming of World War II and the activity of domestic communists brought success for a similar bill. This was the Alien Registration Act of 1940, known as the Smith Act for Rep. Howard W. Smith of Virginia who introduced it.<sup>53</sup> For the first time since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, America had a federal peacetime sedition law. The heart of its provisions, under Section 2, made it a crime to advocate forcible or violent overthrow of government, or to publish or distribute material advocating violence with the intent to overthrow government.

Upon the mass media of general circulation, the Act was to have little or no impact; they advocated the *status quo*, not radical change or revolution. But for speakers, teachers, and pamphleteers of the Communist Party, the Smith Act came to mean a great deal. Fewer than 20 persons had been punished under the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798–1801; it is estimated that approximately 100 persons were fined or imprisoned under the Smith Act between 1940

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 630 (1925).

<sup>53</sup> 54 U.S. Statutes 670.

and 1960.<sup>54</sup> In a real sense, however, the Smith Act was less suppressive than its ancestor: The Alien and Sedition Acts had punished criticism of government officials, an everyday exercise of the press, but the Smith Act limited the ban to advocating violent overthrow.

The government made its first move in 1943. Leaders of a revolutionary splinter, the Socialist Workers Party which followed Russia's banished Trotsky, were the target. They were brought to trial in Minneapolis and convicted for the advocacy of violent overthrow in their printed polemics. The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court refused to review the case.<sup>55</sup>

But the Communist Party was much more the target of government prosecution than the little group of Trotskyites. In the context of the cold war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. following World War II, almost 10 years of prosecution took place. The first case, *Dennis v. United States*, brought major figures in the Communist Party to trial and convicted 11 of them.<sup>56</sup> The charges were that they had reconstituted the American Communist Party in 1945, and conspired to advocate violent overthrow of the government.

For almost nine months the trial went on in federal district court under Judge Harold Medina. The nation was fascinated and bored in turn as the defense introduced complex legal challenges to the trial and the prosecution introduced exhibit after exhibit. Newspapers, pamphlets, and books were employed as evidence of the defendants' intent, from the *Daily Worker* to *The Communist Manifesto*. Scores of pages were read into the record, as the government sought to show conspiracy by publishing and circulating the literature of revolutionary force. Judge Medina followed the doctrine of the *Gitlow* case in instructing the jury that advocacy or teaching of violent overthrow of the government was not illegal if it were only "abstract doctrine." What the law forbade was teaching or advocating "action" to overthrow the government.<sup>57</sup> The jury found that the 11 did, indeed, conspire to advocate forcible overthrow. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction and the case was accepted for review by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The justices wrote five opinions, three opinions concurring in conviction and two dissenting. Chief Justice Vinson wrote the opinion that carried the most names (three besides his). He said

<sup>54</sup> Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *The Blessings of Liberty* (Phila., N.Y.: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1954), p. 22.

<sup>55</sup> *Dunne v. U. S.*, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943).

<sup>56</sup> 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951).

<sup>57</sup> *U. S. v. Foster*, 80 F.Supp. 479 (D.C.N.Y.1949). Upon appeal, this case became *U. S. v. Dennis et al.*, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).

that free expression is not an unlimited or unqualified right, and that "the societal value of speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations."<sup>58</sup> But a conviction for violation of a statute limiting speech, he said, must rest on the showing that the words created a "clear and present danger" that a crime would be attempted or accomplished. Thus he went to the famous Holmes rule first expressed in the Schenck case in 1919, and interpreted it as follows:<sup>59</sup>

In this case we are squarely presented with the application of the "clear and present danger" test, and must decide what that phrase imports. We first note that many of the cases in which this Court has reversed convictions by use of this or similar tests have been based on the fact that the interest which the State was attempting to protect was too insubstantial to warrant restriction of speech \* \* \*. Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the ultimate value of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, it must follow that no subordinate value can be protected. If, then, this interest may be protected, the literal problem which is presented is what has been meant by the use of the phrase "clear and present danger" of the utterances bringing about the evil within the power of Congress to punish. Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the *putsch* is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required \* \*. Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. The damage which such attempts create both physically and politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt.

Having thus rejected the position that likelihood of success in committing the criminal act is the criterion for restricting speech, Chief Justice Vinson adopted the statement of the Court of Appeals in interpreting the clear and present danger test. Chief Judge

<sup>58</sup> *Dennis v. U. S.*, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951).

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 508-509.

Hand had written: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."<sup>60</sup> Vinson was arguing that the danger need not be immediate when the interest (here, self-preservation of government) is important enough.

Deep disagreement in the Court over thus limiting the scope of free expression appeared in the dissents of Justices Black and Douglas. The latter could see no clear and present danger to the government and state in the words and papers of the 11 Communists. Neither as a political force nor as a disciplined corps of poised saboteurs did Justice Douglas see them as a threat:<sup>61</sup>

Communists in this country have never made a respectable or serious showing in any election \* \* \*. Communism has been so thoroughly exposed in this country that it has been crippled as a political force. Free speech has destroyed it as an effective political party. It is inconceivable that those who went up and down this country preaching the doctrine of revolution which petitioners espouse would have any success.

\* \* \*

How it can be said that there is a clear and present danger that this advocacy will succeed is, therefore, a mystery. Some nations less resilient than the United States, where illiteracy is high and where democratic traditions are only budding, might have to take drastic steps and jail these men for merely speaking their creed. But in America they are miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold. The fact that their ideas are abhorrent does not make them powerful.

\* \* \*

\* \* \* Free speech—the glory of our system of government—should not be sacrificed on anything less than plain and objective proof of danger that the evil advocated is imminent.

Through most of the 1950's, cases under the Smith Act continued to move through the courts. But with the decision in *Yates v. United States* in 1957, prosecutions dwindled and died out. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of 14 Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act. Its decision turned in large part on the difference between teaching the need for violent overthrow

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 510.

<sup>61</sup> *Dennis v. U. S.*, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951).

as an abstract theory or doctrine, and teaching it as a spur to action. The Court said:<sup>62</sup>

We are \* \* \* faced with the question whether the Smith Act prohibits advocacy and teaching or forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end, so long as such advocacy or teaching is engaged in with evil intent. We hold that it does not.

The distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action is one that has been consistently recognized in the opinions of this Court \* \* \* .

\* \* \*

\* \* \* The legislative history of the Smith Act and related bills shows beyond all question that Congress was aware of the distinction between the advocacy or teaching of abstract doctrine and the advocacy or teaching of action, and that it did not intend to disregard it. The statute was aimed at the advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the Government, and not of principles divorced from action.

Since the trial court had not required the jury which found the defendants guilty to make the distinction, the conviction was reversed. There was no reference to the famous clear and present danger doctrine, nor have court majorities used it in any sedition case since *Dennis*, where it was so variously interpreted by the five opinions that its usefulness was eroded.

The Warren Court—so called for Chief Justice Earl Warren who had been appointed in 1953—had grown less and less willing to uphold convictions under the Smith Act, and with the *Yates* decision, charges against many other defendants in pending cases were dismissed in lower courts. The Smith Act soon lapsed into disuse, and in the Criminal Code reform act of 1977, for action by Congress in 1978, it was finally scheduled for repeal.<sup>63</sup>

*Yates* had found that the trial judge's instructions had allowed conviction for mere advocacy without reference to its tendency to bring about forcible action, and overturned the convictions. In 1969, the Supreme Court was presented with the appeal of a Ku Klux Klan leader who had been convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for advocating the duty or necessity of crime, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism to accomplish political reform. The leader, Brandenburg, had been televised as he made a

<sup>62</sup> *Yates v. U. S.*, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064 (1957).

<sup>63</sup> For other controls on news media embraced by the Act (S.1437), see Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, *News Media Alert*, Aug. 1977, pp. 4-5.



speech in which he said the Klan was “not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.” He added that “We are marching on Congress \* \* \* four hundred thousand strong.”

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Citing precedent since *Dennis*, it said:<sup>64</sup>

These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. \* \* \* A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

## SEC. 9. PRIOR RESTRAINT

**Restraint of expression in advance of publication or distribution, through licensing or permit requirements, deletions, or prohibitions and injunctions, emerged in new forms in the Twentieth Century.**

In one of the most famous and influential First Amendment decisions by the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote that “it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication.”<sup>65</sup> Journalists and libertarians have long counted the term and the concept “previous restraint” as the most despised in the annals of control of publication. The somewhat slippery term refers, in common usage, to the practice common to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries of requiring printers to get permission or license from government to publish, and the actual censoring by authority of parts or all of a piece of writing, with punishment for violation.<sup>65a</sup> The power in government to approve who might publish, or to order non-publication or a halt to publication, under threat of punishment, had a long and oppressive history; and revolutionary America’s leaders and printers considered that whatever freedom of the press meant, it

<sup>64</sup> *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827 (1969).

<sup>65</sup> *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).

<sup>65a</sup> While restraint in advance of publication or distribution plainly inheres in the context of laws’ merely providing punishment after the fact of publishing (as in obscenity, criminal libel, and contempt), because of the chilling effect in publishers’ knowing that punishment could result, that is not the consideration here.

meant an end to prior restraint.<sup>66</sup> If the press were to act as a check on government and as a means of aiding the spread of all kinds of knowledge and opinion in a self-governing society, government could not count suppression as one of its instruments of power. Society's chief weapon against the institution which possessed the power of guns and police was words.

Strong as the conviction was, certain exceptions appeared in the Nineteenth Century. The South employed the weapon regularly in its attempts to shield its "peculiar institution" of slavery before the Civil War, its postmasters as a matter of course refusing to deliver the publications of northern anti-slavery societies. During the Civil War, northern generals occasionally closed down the newspapers of "Copperhead" publishers, and President Lincoln himself ordered the closing of newspapers on one occasion. Heavy restrictions on the publishing and distribution of the materials of sex arose in the last quarter of the century, and prior restraint was part of the control. Postal and customs officials' employment of the instrument in peace and war, to control that which was considered obscene or seditious, was vigorous and frequent through the first third of the Twentieth Century, modifying later.<sup>67</sup>

And the arena of prior restraint was to grow in the Twentieth Century. Sanctioned most thoroughly—and presumably ordained by the limited number of frequencies available—is the licensing by government of all broadcasters to prevent the overcrowding of the airwaves (Chap. 13). Equally sanctioned by law, if not observed in practice, is the power of the Federal Trade Commission to issue cease and desist orders and injunctions against advertising which restrains trade or is false and deceptive, and to require advertisers to correct misrepresentations.<sup>68</sup>

Verbal attacks on business or property (trade libel, Chap. 3) were long halted under the law through injunctions,<sup>69</sup> although a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court<sup>70</sup> apparently destroys this prior restraint at least where the publisher's aim is to coerce a change in business practices. Harassment of a man and wife by his former lover who repeatedly vilified and castigated the man with insults and threats has been enjoined.<sup>71</sup> Copyright law (Chap. 7) provides for injunctions to prevent or restrain illegal use of copy-

<sup>66</sup> Levy, Ch. 5.

<sup>67</sup> Nelson, Parts 4–6.

<sup>68</sup> Glen O. Robinson and Ernest Gellhorn, *The Administrative Process* (St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1974), pp. 501–21; Anon., *The FTC's Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of Food and Drugs*, 75 *Mich.L.Rev.* 745 (March 1977).

<sup>69</sup> Charles R. Herpick, *Temporary Injunctions in Libel Cases*, 25 *Baylor L.Rev.* 527 (1973).

<sup>70</sup> *Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe*, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575 (1971).

<sup>71</sup> *Hunt v. Hudgins*, 168 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.Civ.App.1943).

righted materials.<sup>72</sup> A book detailing psychiatric case histories has been enjoined under an action claiming violation of right to privacy, even though the book contained no names of persons treated.<sup>73</sup> Various states have permitted the abatement of movies and books under public nuisance statutes where the materials shown or sold have been found obscene, and the principle of censorship ordinances for screening of movies before public showing has been approved.<sup>74</sup>

In the 1970s, a striking extension of prior restraint burst out of courts across the nation as they attempted to forbid news media's publishing accounts of parts or all of the record in trials and hearings (Chap. 8). No phase of prior restraint has proved more alarming to news media than this, although few aspects of the use of the instrument have escaped a drumfire of attack from media, commentators on the law, social critics and others.

Subsequent chapters will detail major episodes in several aspects of prior restraint. In this chapter, the special concern goes to the state's claims to suppress, on its own behalf, attacks on government personnel and words alleged to constitute danger to national security.

Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' majority opinion in *Near v. Minnesota*, a case of 1931, establishes groundwork that may be seen as a watershed which turned United States Supreme Court majorities in the direction of expanded press freedom.<sup>75</sup>

That decision grew out of scruffy origins. Howard Guilford and J. M. Near were publishing partners in producing *The Saturday Press*, a Minneapolis "smear sheet" which charged that gangsters were in control of Minneapolis gambling, bootlegging and racketeering, and that the city law enforcement and government agencies and officers were derelict in their duties. It vilified Jews and Catholics. And it published the articles that eventually required the Supreme Court of the United States to make one of its most notable descriptions of the extent of freedom of the press in America.

Publication of *The Saturday Press* was halted when a Minnesota statute authorizing prior restraint of "nuisance" or "undesirable" publications was invoked. That statute declared that any person publishing a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical" could be found guilty of creating a

<sup>72</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 502, 503. *Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.*, 378 F.Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.1974); *Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly*, 346 F.Supp. 376 (D.C.Conn.1972).

<sup>73</sup> *Roe v. Doe*, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560, 42 A.D.2d 559 (1973).

<sup>74</sup> Pamela Chappelle, *Can an Adult Theater or Bookstore Be Abated as a Public Nuisance in California?* 10 U.San Francisco L.Rev. 115, 128 (Summer 1975); *Times Film Corp. v. Chicago*, 365 U.S. 43, 81 S.Ct. 391 (1961).

<sup>75</sup> *Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson*, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). Harold L. Nelson, "Prior Restraint Outlawed: Action Essential to Press," *The Michigan Journalist*, Oct. 21, 1968, p. 10.

nuisance and could be enjoined from future wrongdoing.<sup>76</sup> Near and Guilford were indeed brought into court after a temporary injunction ordered cessation of all activity by their paper. After the hearing, the injunction was made permanent by a judge, but with the provision that *The Saturday Press* could resume publication if the publishers could persuade the court that they would run a newspaper without objectionable content described in the Minnesota “gag law” statute.<sup>77</sup>

Near and Guilford appealed to the Supreme Court, which found in their favor by the margin of five votes to four. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes noted the importance of this case: “This statute, for the suppression as a public nuisance of a newspaper or periodical, is unusual, if not unique, and raises questions of grave importance transcending the local interests involved in the particular action.”<sup>78</sup> Hughes, relying on the *Gitlow* decision discussed in the preceding section of this chapter, declared:<sup>79</sup>

It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.

\* \* \*

If we cut through mere details of procedure, the operation and effect of the statute in substance is that public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business publishing scandalous and defamatory matter—in particular that the matter consists of charges against public officers of official dereliction—and, unless the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are published for good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or periodical is suppressed and further publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is the essence of censorship.

Hughes then turned to history-as-precedent to answer the question of whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication was consistent with the concept of liberty of the press, declaring here that the chief purpose of the constitutional guaranty is to prevent previous restraints.

<sup>76</sup> Chapter 285, Minn. Sess. Laws 1925, in Mason’s Minn. Stats., 1927, Secs. 10123–1 to 10123–3.

<sup>77</sup> *Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson*, 283 U.S. 697, 702–707, 51 S.Ct. 625, 628 (1931).

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 707.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 707, 713.

He embarked upon a two-fold modification of the old English authority, Blackstone. Blackstone would have had *no prior restraint*, period. The Chief Justice, however, conceded that such a prohibition against all prior restraint might be "stated too broadly," and said that "\* \* \* the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited." In a few exceptional cases, limitation of the principle of "no prior restraint" could be recognized:<sup>80</sup>

No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not "protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force."

Although Blackstone's "no prior restraint" was thus modified, another aspect of Blackstone was liberalized. Blackstone had approved punishing the publication of criticisms of government or government officials. But Hughes said that the press had a right—and perhaps even a duty—to discuss and debate the character and conduct of public officers.<sup>81</sup>

While reckless assaults upon public men, and efforts to bring obloquy upon those who are endeavoring faithfully to discharge official duties, exert a baleful influence and deserve the severest condemnation in public opinion, it cannot be said that this abuse is greater, and it is believed to be less, than that which characterized the period in which our institutions took shape. Meanwhile, the administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities.

The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 716.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 719-720.

Despite the four dissenting votes, *Near v. Minnesota* has stood since 1931 as one of the most important decisions of the Supreme Court. *Near* was the first case involving newspapers in which the Court applied the provisions of the First Amendment against states through the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.<sup>82</sup> And it was to serve as important precedent for protecting the press against government's demands for suppression.

It was 40 years before the press again collided with government bent on protecting its own interests and functions through prior restraint. On June 30, 1971, the United States Supreme Court cleared the confrontation with a decision hailed by many news media with such headlines as "VICTORY FOR THE PRESS" and "The Press Wins and the Presses Roll."<sup>83</sup> These triumphant headlines were tied to the "Pentagon Papers" case. Early in 1971, *New York Times* reporter Neil Sheehan was given photocopies of a 47-volume study of the United States involvement in Vietnam titled *History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy*. On Sunday, June 13, 1971, the *New York Times*—after a team of reporters had worked with the documents for three months—published a story headlined: "Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U. S. Involvement." Within 48 hours after publication, Attorney General John Mitchell sent a telegram to the Times, urging that no more articles based on the documents be published, charging that the series would bring about "irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United States."<sup>84</sup> The Times chose to ignore Attorney General Mitchell's plea, and columnist James Reston angrily wrote: "For the first time in the history of the Republic, the Attorney General of the United States has tried to suppress documents he hasn't read about a war that hasn't been declared."<sup>85</sup>

After the Times' refusal to stop the series of articles, the Department of Justice asked U. S. District Court Judge Murray I. Gurfein to halt publication of the stories. Judge Gurfein, who was serving his first day as a federal judge, issued a temporary injunction on June 15, putting a stop to Times' publication of the articles. But silencing the Times did not halt all publication of the "Pentagon Papers." *The Washington Post*—and a number of other major journals—also weighed in with excerpts from the secret report. The

<sup>82</sup> William A. Hachten, *The Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press: Decisions and Dissents* (Ames, Ia.: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1968), p. 43.

<sup>83</sup> Newsweek, Time, July 12, 1971.

<sup>84</sup> Don R. Pember, "The Pentagon Papers Decision: More Questions Than Answers," *Journalism Quarterly* 48:3 (Autumn, 1971) p. 404; *New York Times*, June 15, 1971, p. 1.

<sup>85</sup> *New York Times*, June 16, 1971, p. 1.

Justice Department likewise applied for—and was granted—a temporary restraining order against *The Washington Post*.<sup>86</sup>

After two weeks of uncertainty, the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States cleared the papers for publication. *New York Times* Managing Editor A. M. Rosenthal was jubilant: “This is a joyous day for the press—and for American society.” *Time* added, “Certainly the Justice Department was slapped down in its efforts to ask the courts to enjoin newspapers, and will not likely take that route again.<sup>87</sup> Despite such optimism, some observers within the press were disturbed by the outcome of the “*Pentagon Papers*” case:

1. For what may be the first time in American history, federal court injunctions imposed prior restraint upon American newspapers, and for two weeks the story was interdicted, by court order.
2. The 6–3 decision was by no means a ringing affirmation of First Amendment rights or of “the public’s right to know.” Where government conduct of a war was concerned, the Court was by no means as positive in denouncing prior restraint as it had been six weeks earlier in *Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe*,<sup>88</sup> where an injunction against a group’s pamphleteering to coerce a man to change his business practice was ruled unconstitutional prior restraint. The Court’s *per curiam* statement, agreed to by six justices, said merely that the government has a heavy burden of proof in prior restraint cases, and that the government has not “met that burden.”
3. In addition, three of the concurring opinions which agreed that the injunctions should be lifted from the *Times* and from the *Washington Post* nevertheless expressed severe doubts about supporting the press.

The Court’s decision was short and to the point. It refused to leave in effect the injunctions which the Justice Department had secured against the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, and quoted *Bantam Books v. Sullivan*:<sup>89</sup>

“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” *Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan*, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631 \* \* \* (1963); see also *Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson*, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 \* \* \* (1931).

<sup>86</sup> For a clear account of the cases’ journeys through the courts, see Pember, pp. 404–405.

<sup>87</sup> *Time*, July 12, 1971, p. 10.

<sup>88</sup> 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575 (1971).

<sup>89</sup> *New York Times Co. v. U. S.*, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140 (1971).

The Government “thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.” *Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe*, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1578 (1971).

With those words, a six-member majority of the Court ruled that the government had not shown sufficient reason to impose prior restraint. However, only three members of the six-justice majority in the case—Justices Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, and William J. Brennan, Jr.—could be called willing supporters of the press. Black and Douglas were the only Justices who gave unequivocal support to the *Times* and to the *Post*. Both expressed abhorrence for prior restraint, with Douglas saying:<sup>90</sup>

Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion are vital to our national health. On public questions there should be “uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate.” *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 269–270, 84 S.Ct. 710 \* \* \* (1964).

\* \* \*

The stays in these cases that have been in effect for more than a week constitute a flouting of the principles of the First Amendment as interpreted in *Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson*.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., although not subscribing to the Black-Douglas absolutist position, nevertheless gave wide latitude to the press. Brennan declared that prior restraint was permissible in only a “single, extremely narrow” class of cases, as when the nation was at war or when troop movements might be endangered. He added that even if it could be assumed that disclosure of massive movements of United States weapons might touch off a nuclear holocaust, the Government had not presented (or even alleged) that publication of the Pentagon Papers would cause such an event. Brennan concluded:<sup>91</sup>

\* \* \* therefore, every restraint issued in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First Amendment—and none the less so because the restraint was justified as necessary to examine the claim more thoroughly. Unless and until the Government has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction may issue.

Justices Byron White and Potter Stewart also joined in the judgment of the Court, but with reluctance. Justice Stewart (with whom White concurred) wrote that effective international diplomacy and national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 724.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 727.

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Stewart said he was convinced that the Executive branch of government was correct in attempting to suppress publication of some of the documents. He added, however, that he joined with the Court's majority because he could not say "that disclosure of any of them [the "Pentagon Papers"] will surely result in direct, immediate, or irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."<sup>92</sup>

Justice White (with whom Stewart concurred) was Blackstonian in his discussion of the kinds of post-publication punishment which could be applied to the press.<sup>93</sup>

If any of the material here at issue is of this nature [that is, falls within certain sections of the Espionage Act of 1917], the newspapers are presumably now on full notice of the position of the United States and must face the consequences if they publish. I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions under these sections on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior restraint.

Justice Marshall's concurring opinion concentrated upon separation of powers considerations. Marshall argued that Congress had twice (in 1971 and 1957) rejected proposed legislation that would have given the President, in time of war (or threat of war), the authority to "directly prohibit by proclamation the publication of information relating to national defense that might be useful to the enemy."<sup>94</sup> Marshall declared that it would be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers for the Court to use its contempt power to prevent behavior that Congress had specifically declined to prohibit.

In dissent, Justice Harlan bemoaned the lack of time available to give issues in the case proper consideration, and listed seven issues imbedded in the case which he considered to be of grave constitutional significance. "With all respect," Justice Harlan wrote, "I consider that the Court has been almost irresponsibly feverish in dealing with these cases."<sup>95</sup>

Beyond that, Harlan expressed concern that the Court was violating the principles of federalism when the judiciary overrode the executive department's determination that the secret papers should not be published. He said he could find no evidence that the executive department had been given "even the deference owing to an administrative agency, much less that owing a co-equal branch of the Government."<sup>96</sup> Justice Harlan added that he could not believe

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 730.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 735-738.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 746.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 753.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 758.

that the doctrine of prohibiting prior restraints “reaches to the point of preventing courts from maintaining the *status quo* long enough to act responsibly in matters of such national importance as those involved here.”<sup>97</sup>

Mr. Justice Blackmun also complained about the haste involved in the case: Two federal district courts, two United States Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States were forced into “hurried decision of profound constitutional issues on inadequately developed and largely assumed facts \* \* \*.”<sup>98</sup> Expressing fear that the case might result in great harm to the nation, Justice Blackmun added this shrill indictment of the press:<sup>99</sup>

If, however, damage has been done, and if, with the Court’s action today, these newspapers proceed to publish the critical documents and there results therefrom “the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate,” to which list I might add the factors of prolongation of the war and of further delay in the freeing of United States prisoners, then the Nation’s people will know where the responsibility for these sad consequences rests.

Journalist and scholar Herbert Brucker has said that a basic question raised by the *Pentagon Papers* case is this: “Who owns the news? Does news belong to the American people, or to government?” He argued that government attempts to keep hold of power by suppressing information. Brucker added that the unsuccessful prosecution during 1973 of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo, Jr. for their role in revealing the *Pentagon Papers* was a political case, not a legal case. Ellsberg and Russo were charged with theft, conspiracy, and espionage, with the government claiming that publication of the papers had endangered national security. Not so, said Brucker: the *Pentagon Papers* were historical facts to which the public is entitled, and government was simply trying to keep facts from the public; hence the effort to punish Ellsberg and Russo for revealing embarrassing information.<sup>1</sup>

It should be recognized that no new legal course was charted by the *Pentagon Papers* case. After a delay of two weeks—a prior restraint imposed by lower federal courts at the insistence of the Department of Justice—the Supreme Court allowed the press to

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 759.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 760.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 763. Blackmun was quoting the dissent of Judge Wilkey in the *Pentagon Papers* case involving the *Washington Post* in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 446 F.2d 1327 (1971).

<sup>1</sup> Herbert Brucker, “Who Owns the News?”, speech at Carnahan House Freedom of Information Seminar, University of Kentucky, April 13, 1973.

resume publication of the documents. By a 6 to 3 margin, the Supreme Court adhered to *Near v. Minnesota*, that classic case which forbade prior restraint except in time of war, or when the materials involved were obscene, or when there was incitement to violence or to the overthrow of the Government.

*New York Times Co. v. United States* was a hastily tried case, one in which the lawyers literally had to work through the night to prepare their briefs. As Pember has noted, the defense attorneys wished to win the case, not to make constitutional law. As a result, they "played safe," conceding that on occasion, in certain circumstances, prior restraint was constitutionally permissible. The case then became a squabble over whether or not the publication of the papers was a sufficient threat to national security to allow the imposition of prior restraint.<sup>2</sup>

The *Pentagon Papers* case underlines an important truth, that no freedom is ever won, once and for all. Consider this statement:

Some people may think that leaders of the free press would perhaps accomplish more if their claims of constitutional right were less expansive. I do not agree with this. I say it is their duty to fight like tigers right down the line and not give an inch. This is the way our freedoms have been preserved in the past, and it is the way they will be preserved in the future.

No editor, publisher, or reporter said that. The quotation is from a statement by U. S. Senior Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit Harold R. Medina. Judge Medina's words emphasize an obvious but necessary history lesson. Each freedom has to be rewon by each succeeding generation. And sometimes, as is apparently true during the latter third of the Twentieth Century, freedom has to be fought for again and again within one generation.

The early summer of 1974, three years after *Pentagon Papers*, saw an unprecedented publishing event. Alfred A. Knopf published a book which belongs on the shelf of every journalist as a signal that the Seventeenth Century censor has descendants today: *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* by Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks. This book contained many blank spaces with the word (DELETED). These deletions were the direct result of successful Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) efforts.

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney and Legal Director Melvin L. Wulf has said<sup>3</sup> that on April 18, 1972, Marchetti

<sup>2</sup> Pember, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Melvin L. Wulf, Introduction to Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), pp. ix-x-xxvi.

became “the first American writer to be served with an official censorship order issued by a court of the United States.” The order told him he must not disclose information about intelligence activities, intelligence sources and methods, or intelligence information.

Government attorneys representing the CIA claimed they were not enjoining the press: “‘We are merely enforcing a contract between Marchetti and the CIA. This is not a First Amendment case, it’s just a contract action.’”<sup>4</sup> The contract referred to was a secrecy agreement signed by Marchetti when he joined the CIA in 1955. In that agreement, he promised not to divulge any classified information, unless he had specific written permission from the director of the CIA or his official representative.<sup>5</sup>

In 1969, Marchetti resigned from the CIA. He subsequently published a novel and a magazine article critical of the activities and policies of that organization. Marchetti also submitted a book outline to the Alfred A. Knopf publishing house.<sup>6</sup> Learning of this, Department of Justice attorneys acting in behalf of the CIA sought an injunction to enforce the secrecy agreement. Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued a temporary restraining order on April 18, 1972,<sup>7</sup> and the injunction was made permanent May 19 after a secret trial from which the public was excluded and in which the testimony of government witnesses was classified.<sup>8</sup> The district court further ordered that Marchetti must submit all writings about the CIA or intelligence work to the Agency’s director for prior “approval”—or censorship, to avoid euphemism.<sup>9</sup>

On appeal, Marchetti won only one concession before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., writing for a three-judge court, limited the CIA to deleting only classified information.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, the Court of Appeals said that the CIA must rule upon materials within 30 days after Marchetti had submitted them for scrutiny. It was ruled that Marchetti would have the right to judicial review of any CIA refusals to approve portions of the manuscript. But such review had to be started by Marchetti, with the burden of proof upon him

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

<sup>5</sup> *United States v. Victor L. Marchetti*, 466 F.2d 1309, 1312 (4th Cir. 1972), Notes 1 and 2; David E. Rosenbau, “Judge Bars Book by Ex-C.I.A. Agent,” *New York Times*, April 19, 1972, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir. 1972).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1311; Wulf, p. ix; *New York Times*, loc. cit.

<sup>8</sup> 466 F.2d 1309, 1312 (4th Cir. 1972); Wulf, p. xxi.

<sup>9</sup> Wulf, p. xx.

<sup>10</sup> 466 F.2d 1309, 1317–1318 (4th Cir. 1972).

to prove that the material involved was not classified or was already public knowledge.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, on December 11, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear Marchetti's case. Three Justices—Potter Stewart, William O. Douglas, and William J. Brennan, Jr.—noted that they wished to grant certiorari, but the fourth vote needed was not forthcoming.<sup>12</sup>

Marchetti was unable to do so much as to discuss his manuscript with his editors at Knopf: The injunction forbade the publisher to see his writings before the CIA censors could have a go at them. However, Marchetti and co-author John Marks completed the book manuscript near the end of August 1973.<sup>13</sup>

Thirty days later, the authors received a letter from the CIA, detailing 339 deletions which Attorney Wulf said amounted to 15 to 20 per cent of the book's 517-page typewritten manuscript.<sup>14</sup> Wulf later wrote:<sup>15</sup>

I won't soon forget that September evening when Marchetti, Marks and I sat in the ACLU office for several hours literally cutting out the deleted parts of the manuscript so that we could deliver the remains to Knopf. It was the Devil's work we did that day.

The authors, Attorney Wulf, and publisher Alfred A. Knopf went to court to challenge the CIA censorship. By trial time, the CIA had reduced the number of deletions from 339 to 168.<sup>16</sup> The persistence of Marchetti, Marks, Wulf, and Knopf finally won a partial victory. District Court Judge Albert A. Bryan ruled that the CIA had been unable, for the most part, to prove that the information it had excised was classified material. Of the 168 passages in contention, Bryan held that only 27 were classified.<sup>17</sup>

In a subsequent legal action appeals court Judge Haynsworth said:<sup>18</sup>

We decline to modify our previous holding that the First Amendment is no bar against an injunction forbidding the disclosure of classifiable information within the guidelines

<sup>11</sup> 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972); Wulf, xxi; Les Ledbetter, "Appeals Court Supports C.I.A. In Blocking Article by Ex-Aide," *New York Times*, Sept. 18, 1972, p. 23.

<sup>12</sup> 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 553 (1972).

<sup>13</sup> 466 F.2d 1309, 1311 (4th Cir. 1972); Wulf, p. xxv.

<sup>14</sup> Wulf, *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*; George Gent, "Knopf Sues Over C.I.A. Censorship of Book," *New York Times*, Oct. 31, 1973, p. 36.

<sup>17</sup> Wulf, p. xxiv.

<sup>18</sup> *Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby*, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975).

of the Executive Orders when (1) the classified information was acquired, during the course of his employment, by an employee of a United States agency or department in which such information is handled and (2) its disclosure would violate a solemn agreement made by the employee at the commencement of his employment. With respect to such information, by his execution of the secrecy agreement and his entry into the confidential employment relationship, he effectively relinquished his First Amendment rights.

Attorney Wulf, despite his revulsion at having performed “the Devil’s work,” found some redeeming features of the decision. It allowed almost all of the book to be published, he said, and it “desanctifies the CIA,” as well as discarding “the magical authority that has always accompanied government incantations of ‘national security’.”<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Wulf, p. xxiv.

Part II  
RIGHTS IN CONFLICT WITH FREE  
EXPRESSION

A. FREE EXPRESSION AND CITIZENS' RIGHTS

Chapter 3

DEFAMATION: LIBEL AND SLANDER

Sec.

10. Defamation Defined.
11. Libel.
12. Libelous Words Classified.
13. The Form of the Libel.
14. Broadcast Defamation: Slander and Libel.
15. Extrinsic Circumstances, Libel Per Se, and Libel Per Quod.
16. Innocent Intent.
17. Libel to Property.
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SEC. 10. DEFAMATION DEFINED

**Defamation is communication which exposes a person to hatred, ridicule, or contempt, lowers him in the esteem of his fellows, causes him to be shunned, or injures him in his business or calling. Its categories are libel—broadly, printed or written material; and slander—broadly, spoken words.**

The legal hazard that lurks most unfailingly in reporters' and editors' employment of words and pictures lies in the damage that these basic "tools of the trade" may do to the reputations of individuals in the news. The damage is defamation—libel or slander. The law classifies defamation as a tort, a civil wrong other than breach of contract for which the legal remedy is a court action for damages.<sup>1</sup> Under various circumstances, one citizen may recover money from another who harms his reputation with the symbols of communication.

A great new protection against defamation judgments opened for the mass media in the decision in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* in 1964. Here for the first time, the United States Supreme Court ruled where public officials in their public work are involved, the First Amendment clears a broad path for expression through the

<sup>1</sup> William Prosser, *Law of Torts* (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1964) 3rd ed., p. 2.

thickets and jungles of centuries-old libel law. The court said that "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. \* \* \*"<sup>2</sup> prevents recovery for libel in words about the public acts of public officials unless actual malice is present. Later, courts required that the same actual malice be proved not only by public officials but also by "public figures"—persons who possessed notoriety through achievement, or through seeking and winning public attention.

Broad new shield for newsmen that these decisions are, it is not the case that the threat of defamation suits by public officials and figures is dead except for the expense and trouble involved in hiring lawyers to defend against a defamation suit that is sure to be won by the news medium if taken to a high enough court. Libel judgments continue to be won by public officials and figures, with courts finding various circumstances where the *Times v. Sullivan* rule does not protect media.<sup>3</sup> And for persons whom the courts judge "private," barriers to their successful suits are lower. Such persons need prove only "negligence" by the publisher, instead of the more stringent "actual malice".

The *Times v. Sullivan* decision cut through the confusion of centuries of development in the law of libel and slander. Defamation traced a tortuous course through the medieval and early modern courts of England. Feudal and then ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over the offense before it moved haltingly into the common law courts. The Court of the Star Chamber took part during the first half of the Seventeenth Century, until it was dissolved during the Civil War, by punishing libel of political figures as a crime in its arbitrary, sometimes secret, and widely hated procedures. Difficulties arose when printing became common, for some distinction seemed important to separate damage done by the spoken word, which was fleeting, from damage by the printed word, which might be permanent and much more widely diffused than speech. Rules resulted which, if once appropriate, have long since become anachronisms that persist into the age of television and communication satellites. The law of defamation carries much of its tangled past with it today.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).

<sup>3</sup> For the view that "the libel laws have almost been repealed," see Donald M. Gillmor, "The Residual Rights of Reputation and Privacy," *The Future of Press Freedom* (Racine, Wis., Johnson Foundation, May 1972), p. 25; Frederick C. Coonradt, "The Courts Have All But Repealed the Libel Laws," *Center Report*, Dec. 1971, p. 26. For cases in which liability has been found since *New York Times v. Sullivan*, see Chap. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Prosser, pp. 754, 769; John Kelly, *Criminal Libel and Free Speech*, 6 *Kans.L. Rev.* 295 (1958); Anon., *Developments in the Law, Defamation*, 69 *Harv.L.Rev.* 875 (1956).



The most-used definition of defamation is that it is a statement about an individual which exposes him to "hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or which causes him to be shunned, or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his office, profession or trade."<sup>5</sup> While that definition takes in a wide reach of words, it is nevertheless probably too narrow. Courts have recognized mental anguish and personal humiliation as the basis of libel; Prosser points out that words which would cause most people to sympathize with the target have been held defamatory, such as an imputation of poverty, or the statement that a woman has been raped.<sup>6</sup> If a person is lowered in the estimation or respect of the community, he is not necessarily hated, held in contempt, or shunned.

To have definitions such as the above is by no means always to be able to predict what will be held defamatory. The legal axiom which says that "every definition in the law is dangerous" most certainly applies to defamation. Whether words are defamatory depends, in part, on the temper of the times and current public opinion; "words harmless in one age, in one community, may be highly damaging to reputation at another time or \* \* \* place."<sup>7</sup> While it was probably not defamation to falsely call one a Communist in the 1930s, since then it has been.<sup>8</sup> In the North it is not defamatory to call a white person a Negro, but southern courts long recognized the social prejudices of centuries and considered it defamation.<sup>9</sup>

Anyone who is living may be defamed, and so may a corporation or partnership where its business standing or practices are impugned. A voluntary association organized for purposes not connected with profit or the self-interest of the organizers has been defamed.<sup>10</sup> However, it is not possible for one to be defamed through an insult or slur upon someone close to him, such as a

<sup>5</sup> Sir Hugh Fraser, *Libel and Slander* (London: 1936), 7th ed., p. 3; *Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.*, 499 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1974).

<sup>6</sup> *Time, Inc. v. Firestone*, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976); Prosser, p. 756.

<sup>7</sup> *Mencher v. Chesley*, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947).

<sup>8</sup> *Spanel v. Pegler*, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); *Levy v. Gelber*, 175 Misc. 746, 22 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1941).

<sup>9</sup> *Natchez Times Pub. Co. v. Dunigan*, 221 Miss. 320, 72 So.2d 681 (1954); *Strauder v. State of West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).

<sup>10</sup> *Americans for Democratic Action v. Meade*, 72 Pa.D. & C. 306 (1951); *New York Society for the Suppression of Vice v. MacFadden Publications*, 129 Misc. 408, 221 N.Y.S. 563 (1927), affirmed 222 App.Div. 739, 226 N.Y.S. 870 (1928); *Mullins v. Brando*, 13 Cal.App.3d 409, 91 Cal.Rptr. 796 (1970).

member of his family.<sup>11</sup> Nor can a dead person be defamed,<sup>12</sup> nor in most circumstances a group.

A person does not need to be lowered in the esteem of an entire community, or even of a majority, to be defamed. "It is enough that the communication tend to prejudice him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of them \* \* \*."<sup>13</sup>

In the division of defamation into libel and slander, the mass media of communication are much more concerned with libel, which was originally printed defamation. Slander, largely spoken defamation, arises as a problem in some cases involving broadcast media, and will be treated there.

## SEC. 11. LIBEL

**Libel is defamation by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other form of communication which has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.**

Libel took form in England as a crime, presided over by the Court of the Star Chamber which sought to curb the political attacks on authority that were increasing with the growth of printing.<sup>14</sup> It soon was embraced in the civil law, however, and was distinguished from the older civil offense of spoken defamation—slander—on the grounds that the printed word was potentially more damaging than the spoken. Print, of course, could be spread much further than speech, and in a shorter time; furthermore, print was a permanent form of expression whereas speech was evanescent. Print's greater capacity for harm brought courts to hold that libel deserved fuller redress than speech, and rules of law more favorable to the defamed person than did slander.

It has long been recognized, however, that writing and printing are not the only carriers of potential libel. In the celebrated case of *People v. Crosswell* of 1804, pictures and signs were included in the definition of libel.<sup>15</sup> With the coming of motion pictures, it was held

<sup>11</sup> *Gonzales v. Times-Herald Printing Co.*, 513 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1974); *Wildstein v. New York Post Corp.*, 40 Misc.2d 586, 243 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1963); *Security Sales Agency v. A. S. Abell Co.*, 205 F. 941 (D.C.Md.1913); But "daughter of a murderer" has been held libelous: *Van Wiginton v. Pulitzer Pub. Co.*, 218 F. 795 (1914).

<sup>12</sup> *McBeth v. United Press International, Inc.*, 505 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1974).

<sup>13</sup> American Law Institute, *Restatement of the Law of Torts*, III (St. Paul, 1938), p. 141; *Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.*, 48 N.J.Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61, 71 (1958).

<sup>14</sup> Kelly, *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> 3 Johns. Cases 337 (N.Y.1804).

that they could be libelous.<sup>16</sup> As for broadcasting, courts are divided as to whether this should be treated as slander because it was speech rather than print, or as libel because its capacity for spreading defamation to huge audiences deserved the heavier penalties and stricter rules that libel provided.<sup>17</sup>

One definition of civil libel attempts to take into account varying forms of communication that have specially great possibilities for harm to reputations. The American Law Institute defines libel as publication of defamatory matter "by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other form of communication which has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words."<sup>18</sup> Imprecise though this remains, it does attempt to establish a logical basis on which to account for damage by Twentieth Century means of mass communication in determining what is libel. It also apparently embraces defamation outside the concern of the mass media, such as by effigies or statues, or by open and obvious "shadowing" of an individual.<sup>19</sup>

It should be remembered that civil libel is an offense against an individual or person or a specific entity such as a corporation, partnership, or certain voluntary organizations. There must be identification of the individual or entity. Large groups such as businessmen in general, or labor, or a political party, or the legal profession, or an ethnic group of a large city, cannot sue for libel,<sup>20</sup> although under some circumstances the crime of "group libel" has been recognized (see below, Chap. 9).

When, however, a charge is levied against a small group, each member may be considered by the law to be libeled, and the individuals may bring separate suits even though no one has been named or singled out. It is by no means clear what the upper limit of a "small group" that warrants such treatment is; twenty-five has been suggested.<sup>21</sup> Courts have held that each member of a jury can be defamed,<sup>22</sup> or all four officers of a labor union,<sup>23</sup> or all salesmen in

<sup>16</sup> *Youssouppoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures*, 51 L.Q.Rev. 281, 99 A.L.R. 864 (1934); *Kelly v. Loew's*, 76 F.Supp. 473 (D.C.Mass.1948).

<sup>17</sup> *Haley, A. G., The Law on Radio Programs*, 5 *George Wash.L.Rev.* 157, 183 (1937).

<sup>18</sup> *Restatement of Torts*, p. 159.

<sup>19</sup> *Schultz v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co.*, 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913); *Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.*, 21 Md.App. 517, 321 A.2d 182 (1974).

<sup>20</sup> *Exner v. Am. Medical Assn.*, 12 Wash.App. 215, 529 P.2d 863, 867 (1974); *Webb v. Sessions*, 531 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.Civ.App.1975).

<sup>21</sup> *Prosser*, p. 768; *Schutzman & Schutzman v. News Syndicate Co.*, 60 Misc.2d 827, 304 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1969).

<sup>22</sup> *Byers v. Martin*, 2 Colo. 605 (1875).

<sup>23</sup> *DeWitte v. Kearney & Trecker Corp.*, 265 Wis. 132, 60 N.W.2d 748 (1953).

a force of 25 employed by a department store.<sup>24</sup>

## SEC. 12. LIBELOUS WORDS CLASSIFIED

**Five categories or kinds of words may be identified in organizing the field of libel. Libel may also be classified according to libel *per se*, or words defamatory on their face; and libel *per quod*, or words defamatory when facts extrinsic to the story make them damaging.**

Danger signals to help journalists avoid libel can be raised by grouping the kinds of statements and the circumstances which have brought suits into classes. Five of these are identified here in helping clarify that which can bring hatred, ridicule, contempt, loss of esteem, humiliation, or damage in one's trade or profession.

### **Damage to the Esteem or Social Standing in Which One is Held.**

Of the various ways in which a person may be lowered in the estimation in which he is held, none has brought as many libel suits as a false charge of crime. The news media cover the police and crime beat daily; the persistent possibility of a mistake in names and addresses is never absent. And the courts hold everywhere that it is libel to charge one erroneously with a crime. It is easy to get a libel case based on such a charge into court, even though it may have become harder to win it under Court doctrine of the 1960s and 1970s.

Thus to print falsely that one has been arrested for larceny,<sup>25</sup> or that a person is held in jail on a forgery charge,<sup>26</sup> or to say incorrectly that one has illicitly sold or distributed narcotics,<sup>27</sup> is libelous on its face. To say without legal excuse that one has committed arson,<sup>28</sup> bigamy,<sup>29</sup> perjury,<sup>30</sup> or murder<sup>31</sup> is libelous.

<sup>24</sup> Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (D.C.N.Y.1952).

<sup>25</sup> Thomas v. Bowen, 29 Or. 258, 45 P. 768 (1896); Porter v. News & Courier Co., 237 S.C. 102, 115 S.E.2d 656 (1960); Aku v. Lewis, 52 Hawaii 366, 477 P.2d 162 (1970).

<sup>26</sup> Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Givens, 67 F.2d 62 (10th Cir. 1933); Barnett v. Schumacher, 453 S.W.2d 934 (Mo.1970).

<sup>27</sup> Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., 251 So.2d 405 (La.App.1971).

<sup>28</sup> McAuliffe v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 29 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup., 1941).

<sup>29</sup> Taylor v. Tribune Pub. Co., 67 Fla. 361, 65 So. 3 (1914); Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co., 63 Wash.2d 763, 388 P.2d 976 (1964).

<sup>30</sup> Milan v. Long, 78 W.Va. 102, 88 S.E. 618 (1916); Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1962).

<sup>31</sup> Shiell v. Metropolis Co., 102 Fla. 794, 136 So. 537 (1931); Frechette v. Special Magazines, 285 A.D. 174, 136 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1954).

There is no substitute as a protection against libel suits for the ancient admonition to the reporter: "Accuracy always."<sup>32</sup> Failure to check one more source of information before writing a story based upon a plausible source has brought many libel suits.

The *Saturday Evening Post* published a story titled "They Call Me Tiger Lil" in its Oct. 26, 1963 issue. The subject was Lillian Reis Corabi, a Philadelphia night club owner and entertainer. The article connected her in various ways with murder and theft, quoting a police captain as saying she and others were responsible for a death by dynamite, and in other ways connecting her with burglary and an apparent drowning. The *Post* argued that the words complained of were not defamatory, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the trial judge in his finding some 18 paragraphs of the article "capable of defamatory meaning." It defined defamation as that which "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community \* \* \*".<sup>33</sup> The court's decision thus found the elements of libel present in the story, although it agreed with the lower court that because of a grossly excessive award of damages by the jury—\$250,000 in compensatory and \$500,000 in punitive damages—<sup>34</sup> there should be a new trial.

Nor was the *Post* successful in arguing that libel was not present in a story on Mafia activities on Grand Bahama Island, in which it carried a photo of a group of people including Holmes, a tourist. The photo caption referred to "High-Rollers at the Monte Carlo club," and said that the club's casino grossed \$20 million a year with a third "skimmed off for American Mafia 'families'." Holmes, the focal point of the picture and a man in no way connected with Mafia, sued for libel. The *Post*, saying the story was not defamatory, moved for a judgment on the pleadings; but the court held that a jury case was called for and that a jury might find libel.<sup>35</sup>

The Supreme Court of Hawaii found defamation in statements by a television sportscaster about Earle E. Aku, who launched a fund-raising television show to raise money for the Kaneohe Bantams Football Team of the Hawaii Pop Warner League. Tickets were sold by phone solicitation, the callers mentioning Earle Aku by name as he had organized the team and coached it for four years. Soon after the solicitations began, the newsroom of station KGMB-TV received two phone calls from listeners who had long known radio personality Hal Lewis as "Aku," from his much-used pseudonym "J. Akuhead Pupule." They asked whether Aku were, indeed support-

<sup>32</sup> For a classic mixup in names: *Francis v. Lake Charles American Press*, 262 La. 875, 265 So.2d 206 (1972).

<sup>33</sup> *Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co.*, 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971).

<sup>34</sup> *Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co.*, 437 Pa. 143, 262 A.2d 665, 670 (1970).

<sup>35</sup> *Holmes v. Curtis Pub. Co.*, 303 F.Supp. 522 (D.C.S.C.1969).

ing the benefit program. A sportscaster for the station went on the air later in the day, and according to Earle E. Aku, said that "There is a man of ill-repute who is posing as Aku, raising funds for a football team. This is a fraud, and not true, so watch out." Afterward, some would-be ticket purchasers returned their tickets and others failed to remit payments.

Earle E. Aku sued the station and Lewis for defamation. The trial court gave a summary judgment to the defendants, but the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed, saying that the case should have gone to a trial. It said that the alleged statements were defamatory, and upon a trial they might be found unprotected.<sup>36</sup>

The news story which states incorrectly that a person has been *convicted* of a crime may be more dangerous than the one which wrongly suggests or states that he is *accused* of crime. But whatever the difference, the latter can cause libel suits, as we have seen above in the *Corabi* and *Aku* cases, the one suggesting that Lillian Corabi was associated with major crimes and the other that Earle E. Aku had perpetrated fraud.

Not every suggestion of liability, however, has resulted in judgment against the defending news medium. This story, for example, was held by the court to contain nothing defamatory and capable of meaning that a fire was of incendiary origin and set by the owner of the burned building:<sup>37</sup>

### THRICE BURNED

#### The Daniels & Cornell Block Again Visited by Fire—Damage Largely by Water, and Estimated at \$70,000, Covered by Insurance

At 10:15 o'clock last night R. A. Reid, of the printer's firm of J. A. & R. A. Reid, while working at his desk on the top floor of the tall Daniels & Cornell Building on Customhouse street, discovered smoke and flame issuing from the composing room in the rear of the office \* \* \*. The fiery element completely invaded the entire fifth floor, which was all occupied by the Messrs. Reid, who claim complete loss from fire and water. They were insured for \$55,000 \* \* \*. The fire is the third to have occurred in this building in the past thirteen years \* \* \*. Every fire in this building has started on the upper floor, and twice in Reid's printing establishment.

<sup>36</sup> *Aku v. Lewis*, 52 Hawaii 366, 477 P.2d 162 (1970).

<sup>37</sup> *Reid v. Providence Journal Co.*, 20 R.I. 120, 37 A. 637 (1897).

Sometimes but not always involving crime are words imputing to women sexual acts outside prevailing moral codes, or that falsely state that a woman has been raped. Esteem and social standing, it is plain, are at stake. Courts everywhere regard written or printed statements charging without foundation that a woman is immoral as actionable libel. The charge of indiscretion need not be pronounced; any statement fairly imputing immoral conduct is actionable.<sup>38</sup>

Pat Montandon, author of *How To Be a Party Girl*, was to discuss her book on the Pat Michaels "Discussion" show. *TV Guide* received the show producer's advance release, which said that Montandon and a masked, anonymous prostitute would discuss "From Party-Girl to Call-Girl?" and "How far can the 'party-girl' go until she becomes a 'call-girl'." *TV Guide* ineptly edited the release, deleting reference to the prostitute and publishing this: "10:30 Pat Michaels—*Discussion* 'From Party Girl to Call Girl.' Scheduled guest: TV Personality Pat Montandon and author of 'How to Be a Party Girl'." Montandon sued for libel and won \$150,000 in damages. On appeal, the court noted that *TV Guide* editors had testified that they did not believe the average reader would interpret the program note in the magazine as relating Montandon to a call girl or labeling her as a call girl. The appeals court said that that testimony "flies in the face of reason" and upheld the libel judgment.<sup>39</sup>

On the other hand, a woman who posed in the nude for a film maker but later got his agreement not to show the film, was unsuccessful in a libel action following his breaking of the agreement. She charged that his showing of the film to people who knew her caused her shame, disgrace and embarrassment. But the court said that "a film strip which includes a scene of plaintiff posing in the nude does not necessarily impute unchastity", and that it was not libel *per se*.<sup>40</sup>

Esteem and social standing can be lowered in the eyes of others by statements concerning race and political belief, as well as by those grouped under crime and under sexual immorality in the preceding pages. To take political belief first, the salient cases since the late 1940's have largely involved false charges of "Communist" or "Red" or some variant of these words indicating that one subscribes to a generally hated political doctrine. But before these, a line of cases since the 1890's produced libel convictions against those who had anathematized others as anarchists, socialists, or fascists.

<sup>38</sup> Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166 (1971); Wildstein v. New York Post Corp., 40 Misc.2d 586, 243 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1963); Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 50 Times L.R. 581, 99 A.L.R. 864 (1934).

<sup>39</sup> Montandon v. Triangle Pubs., Inc., 45 Cal.App.3d 938, 120 Cal.Rptr. 186 (1975).

<sup>40</sup> McGraw v. Watkins, 49 A.D.2d 958, 373 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1975).

In the days of Emma Goldman and Big Bill Haywood, it was laid down by the courts that to call one "anarchist" falsely was libelous;<sup>41</sup> when socialism protested capitalism and America's involvement in World War I, "red-tinted agitator" and "Socialist" were words for which a wronged citizen could recover;<sup>42</sup> in the revulsion against Nazi Germany and Japan during World War II, false accusations of "Fascist" and "pro-Jap" brought libel judgments.<sup>43</sup>

Magazines, columnists, newspapers, and corporations have paid for carelessness indulged in by charging others as "Communist" or "representative for the Communist Party." The "basis for reproach is a belief that such political affiliations constitute a threat to our institutions \* \* \*"<sup>44</sup>

The decisions holding false charges of communism as libelous largely began as America and the USSR entered the "cold war" period following World War II. One of the early cases stemmed from an article in the *Reader's Digest*, in which the author charged that the Political Action Committee of his union had hired Sidney S. Grant, "who but recently was a legislative representative for the Massachusetts Communist Party." Grant sued for libel, saying that the article was false. The magazine was unable to convince the court that "representative for the Communist Party" was not in the same category as a flat charge of "Communist," and Grant won the suit.<sup>45</sup>

In the famous case of *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*,<sup>46</sup> the trial court found that the publication of the John Birch Society had libeled Chicago Attorney Elmer Gertz in charging falsely that he was a "Leninist," a "Communist-frontier," and a member of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy." In another case, where one organization called another "communist dominated" and failed to prove the charge in court, \$25,000 was awarded to the plaintiff organization.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Cerveney v. Chicago Daily News Co.*, 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 692 (1891); *Wilkes v. Shields*, 62 Minn. 426, 64 N.W. 921 (1895).

<sup>42</sup> *Wells v. Times Printing Co.*, 77 Wash. 171, 137 P. 457 (1913); *Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co.*, 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919).

<sup>43</sup> *Hartley v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.*, 134 N.J.L. 217, 46 A.2d 777 (1946); *Hryhorijiv v. Winchell*, 180 Misc. 574, 45 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1943).

<sup>44</sup> Anon., "Supplement," 171 A.L.R. 709, 712 (1947).

<sup>45</sup> *Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n*, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945). And see *Wright v. Farm Journal*, 158 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947); *Spanel v. Pegler*, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); *MacLeod v. Tribune Pub. Co.*, 52 Cal.2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959).

<sup>46</sup> 306 F.Supp. 310 (N.D.Ill.1969).

<sup>47</sup> *Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farmers Union Service Corp.*, 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952). See also *Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp.*, 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975).



Not every insinuation that a person is less than American, however, is libelous, as ruled in *McAuliffe v. Local Union No. 3*.<sup>48</sup> It is hard to draw a line, and the line has moved from decade to decade according to the currently feared political doctrine.

Where the courts hold an incorrect racial identification as libelous in America, the word at issue usually is "Negro" and the locale is below the Mason-Dixon line. The slur on Negroes inherent in a decision which says a white man can recover for being identified as a Negro has been no barrier to these decisions. At least as far back as 1791 and as recently as 1957, cases in the South have asserted inferiority in the Negro race, and judgments have been upheld in which whites called Negro have been awarded damages.<sup>49</sup>

Under the heading "Negro News" and a picture of a Negro soldier, the *Anderson (S.C.) Daily Mail* printed an item saying that the son of a Mrs. Bowen had been transferred to a government hospital. Mrs. Bowen brought a libel suit, saying she had been named in the story as the mother, and that she was white. The newspaper asked the trial court for a directed verdict, arguing that it was not libel on its face to call a white person a Negro. The trial court gave the newspaper the verdict, Mrs. Bowen appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the verdict. It cited a line of South Carolina cases going back to 1791, and said:<sup>50</sup>

The earlier cases were decided at a time when slavery existed, and since then great changes have taken place in the legal and political status of the colored race. However, there is still to be considered the social distinction existing between the races, since libel may be based upon social status.

\* \* \*

Although to publish in a newspaper of a white woman that she is a Negro imputes no mental, moral or physical fault for which she may justly be held accountable to public opinion, yet in view of the social habits and customs deep-rooted in this State, such publication is calculated to affect her standing in society and to injure her in the estimation of her friends and acquaintances.

Finally, there are many words among those lowering esteem or social standing that defy classifying. Appellations that may be

<sup>48</sup> 29 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup.1941); *McGaw v. Webster*, 79 N.M. 104, 440 P.2d 296 (1968); "pro-Castro," *Menendez v. Key West Newspaper Corp.*, 293 So.2d 751 (Fla.App.1974).

<sup>49</sup> *Eden v. Legare*, 1 Bay 171 (1791); *Strauder v. W. Va.*, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); *Jones v. R. L. Polk & Co.*, 190 Ala. 243, 67 So. 577 (1915).

<sup>50</sup> *Bowen v. Independent Pub. Co.*, 230 S.C. 509, 512-513, 96 S.E.2d 564, 565-566 (1957); *Natchez Times Pub. Co. v. Dunigan*, 221 Miss. 320, 72 So.2d 681 (1954).

common enough in the excited conversation of neighborhood gossips can turn to actionable libel when reduced to print or writing. It is actionable on its face to print and publish that one is “a liar,”<sup>51</sup> “a skunk,”<sup>52</sup> or “a scandalmonger”;<sup>53</sup> “a drunkard,”<sup>54</sup> “a hypocrite,”<sup>55</sup> or “a hog”;<sup>56</sup> or to call one heartless and neglectful of his family.<sup>57</sup> Name-calling where private citizens are concerned is occasionally the kind of news that makes a lively paragraph, but the alert as well as the responsible reporter recognizes it for what it is and takes it or leaves it on better grounds than its titillation value.

### Damage Through Ridicule.

It is fruitless to try to draw too narrow a line between words that ridicule and those treated previously, that lower esteem and social standing. That which ridicules may at times have the effect of damaging social standing. Yet that which attempts to satirize, or which makes an individual appear uncommonly foolish, or makes fun of misfortune has a quality distinct enough to serve as its own warning signal.

Ridicule must be more than a simple joke at another’s expense, for life cannot be so grim that the thin-skinned, the solemn, and the self-important may demand to go entirely unharmed. But when the good-humored barb penetrates too deeply or carries too sharp a sting, or when a picture can be easily interpreted in a deeply derogatory manner, ridicule amounting to actionable libel may have occurred.

Mary and Letitia Megarry objected to the repeated parking of a car in violation of parking rules near their business. They wrote a note and placed it on the car, saying that they’d call the matter to the attention of the police unless the practice were stopped. James Norton, the owner of the car, hung a sign in public view saying “Nuts to You—You Old Witch.” The Megarrys sued for \$5,000, and on appeal their suit was upheld.<sup>58</sup> The court said that the sign “was intended to subject appellants to contempt and ridicule,” and that the words could not fairly be read to have an innocent interpretation. This was libel.

<sup>51</sup> *Paxton v. Woodward*, 31 Mont. 195, 78 P. 215 (1904); *Smith v. Lyons*, 142 La. 975, 77 So. 896 (1918); contra, *Bennett v. Transamerican Press*, 298 F.Supp. 1013 (D.C.Iowa 1969); *Calloway v. Central Charge Service*, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 440 F.2d 287 (1971).

<sup>52</sup> *Massuere v. Dickens*, 70 Wis. 83, 35 N.W. 349 (1887).

<sup>53</sup> *Patton v. Cruce*, 72 Ark. 421, 81 S.W. 380 (1904).

<sup>54</sup> *Giles v. State*, 6 Ga. 276 (1848); cf. *Smith v. Fielden*, 205 Tenn. 313, 326 S.W.2d 476 (1959).

<sup>55</sup> *Overstreet v. New Nonpareil Co.*, 184 Iowa 485, 167 N.W. 669 (1918).

<sup>56</sup> *Solverson v. Peterson*, 64 Wis. 198, 25 N.W. 14 (1885).

<sup>57</sup> *Brown v. Du Frey*, 1 N.Y.2d 649, 151 N.Y.S.2d 649, 134 N.E.2d 469 (1956).

<sup>58</sup> *Megarry v. Norton*, 137 Cal.App.2d 581, 290 P.2d 571 (1955).

To sensationalize the poverty of a former gentlewoman so as to bring her into ridicule and contempt,<sup>59</sup> or to make a joke out of the desertion of a bride on her wedding day<sup>60</sup> have been held libelous.

Yet there is room for satire, burlesque and exaggeration. The columnist Jimmy Breslin of the former *New York Herald Tribune* has a fine talent for satire, and a libel suit based on his account of barkeep Hyman Cohen's encounter with murder was not successful. Cohen was a witness to the murder of one Munos at the Vivere Lounge in New York City, and fearing for his life if he talked to authorities about the killers, he denied for a time that the murder had happened at the Lounge or that he had witnessed it. He also fled the city. Breslin's column about Cohen was written after he had interviewed police, the district attorney and Cohen's employer, and had read about and inspected the scene of the murder. The column began:

Among New Yorkers out of town for the week end, and out of town for a lot of week ends to come if he has his way, is Mr. Hyman Cohen, of the Bronx. His friends say that he went to the Catskills for the rest of the summer, but there is a feeling that the Catskills are not quite far enough away for Hy at present.

"The last time I saw Hy he asked me about the Italian Alps," a detective was saying the other night.

Hy is a man who once liked this city very much. Particularly, he liked the part of the city they make television shows about. Gunmen, action guys; they were Hy's idea of people. Then a couple of weeks ago, this little corner of life in our town grew too big for Hy to handle. He had a change of heart. A heart 'attack' might be a better word for it. And he left town thoroughly disillusioned.

Hy is a bartender, and it all started a couple of summers ago when he worked at a hotel in the Catskills and found himself pouring drinks for some underworld notables. He never really got over this. When the summer ended, Hy came back to New York and he was no longer Hy Cohen of the Bronx. He was Hy Cohen of the Rackets. He wore a big, snap-brim extortionist's hat, white on white shirts and a white tie. And when he would talk, especially if there were only a few people at the bar and they all could listen, Hy would begin talking about all the tough guys he knew. This was Hy's field.

<sup>59</sup> *Moffatt v. Cauldwell*, 3 Hun. 26, 5 Thomp. & C. 256 (N.Y.1874). But "poverty" and "unemployment" have been held not actionable words: *Sousa v. Davenport*, — Mass.App. —, 323 N.E.2d 910 (1975).

<sup>60</sup> *Kirman v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n*, 99 App.Div. 367, 91 N.Y.S. 193 (1904).

The court held that though the article was not literally true in every detail, "it presented a fair sketch of a confident talkative bartender who was reduced to speechlessness, self-effacement and flight by gangsters \* \* \*." <sup>61</sup> It explained why it was not libelous: <sup>62</sup>

With sardonic humor Breslin described Cohen's frantic flight to avoid the murderous gangsters as well as to escape the police who were hot on the killer's trail. The humor was not funny, except on the surface. Murder and terror are \* \* \* the subjects of satire which superficially conceals a tragic or a solemn happening. Our courts have held that mere exaggeration, irony or wit does not make a writing libelous unless the article would be libelous without the exaggeration, irony or wit.

While a living man whose obituary has mistakenly been printed may feel annoyed and injured, and may attract unusual attention and perhaps a rough joke or two as he walks into his office the next morning, he has not been libeled. As one court said, death "is looked for in the history of every man," and where there is notice of a death that has not occurred, "Prematurity is the sole peculiarity." <sup>63</sup>

### Damage Through Words Imputing Disease or Mental Illness.

The law has long held that diseases which may be termed "loathsome, infectious, or contagious" may be libelous when falsely attributed to an individual. That which is "loathsome" may change with time and changing mores, of course, but venereal disease, the plague, leprosy, and small pox seem to fit this description. Anyone alleged to be presently suffering from any of these diseases is likely to be shunned by his fellows. And if the disease carries the stigma of immorality, such as venereal disease or alcoholism or addiction, it may be libelous to say of a person that he formerly had it, although he has since been cured.

To charge without legal excuse that one has leprosy was held libelous in *Lewis v. Hayes*; <sup>64</sup> the imputation of venereal disease was held libelous in *King v. Pillsbury*. As for an incorrect assignment of mental impairment or of mental illness to a person, it is libel on its

<sup>61</sup> *Cohen v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc.*, 63 Misc.2d 87, 310 N.Y.S.2d 709, 725 (1970).

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 724. See also *Sellers v. Time, Inc.*, 299 F.Supp. 582 (D.C.Pa.1969); *Fram v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh*, 380 F.Supp. 1314 (D.C.Pa.1974).

<sup>63</sup> *Cohen v. New York Times Co.*, 153 App.Div. 242, 138 N.Y.S. 206 (1912); *Cardiff v. Brooklyn Eagle, Inc.*, 190 Misc. 730, 75 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1948).

<sup>64</sup> 165 Cal. 527, 132 P. 1022 (1913); *King v. Pillsbury*, 115 Me. 528, 99 A. 513 (1918); *Sally v. Brown*, 220 Ky. 576, 295 S.W. 890 (1927).

face.<sup>65</sup> The magazine *Fact* published in its September-October issue of 1964, an article billed as "The Unconscious of a Conservative: A Special Issue on the Mind of Barry Goldwater." Goldwater was the Republican Party's candidate for president and a senator from Arizona at the time. He was portrayed in one of two articles as "paranoid," his attacks on other politicians stemming from a conviction that "everybody hates him, and it is better to attack them first." A *Fact* poll of psychiatrists, asked to judge whether Goldwater was psychologically fit to serve as president, also was reported on. A jury found libel and awarded Goldwater \$1.00 in compensatory damages and \$75,000 in punitive damages.<sup>66</sup>

### Damaging One in His Trade, Occupation, or Profession.

So long as one follows a legal calling, he has a claim not to be traduced unfairly in the performance of it. The possibilities are rich for damaging one through words that impugn his honesty, skill, fitness, ethical standards, or financial capacity in his chosen work, whether it be banking or basket-weaving. Observe some of the possibilities: that a University was a "degree mill";<sup>67</sup> that a contractor engaged in unethical trade;<sup>68</sup> that a clergyman was "an interloper, a meddler, a spreader of distrust";<sup>69</sup> that a schoolmaster kept girls after school so that he could court them;<sup>70</sup> that a jockey rode horses unfairly and dishonestly;<sup>71</sup> that an attorney was incompetent;<sup>72</sup> that a corporation director embezzled.<sup>73</sup>

By no means every statement to which a businessman, tradesman or professional takes exception, however, is libelous. Thus Frederick D. Washington, a church bishop, sued the *New York Daily News* and columnist Robert Sylvester for his printed statement that Washington had attended a nightclub performance at which a choir member of his church sang. The bishop argued that his church did not approve of its spiritual leaders' attending nightclubs, and that he had been damaged. The court said the account was not, on its face, an attack on the plaintiff's integrity, and called the item a "warm human interest story" in which there was general interest. This

<sup>65</sup> *Cowper v. Vannier*, 20 Ill.App.2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (1959); *Kenney v. Hatfield*, 351 Mich. 498, 88 N.W.2d 535 (1958).

<sup>66</sup> *Goldwater v. Ginzburg*, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969).

<sup>67</sup> *Laurence University v. State*, 68 Misc.2d 408, 326 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1971). Reversed on grounds that State official's words were absolutely privileged, 41 A.D.2d 463, 344 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1973).

<sup>68</sup> *Greenbelt Co-op Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler*, 253 Md. 324, 252 A.2d 755 (1969), reversed on other grounds, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537 (1970).

<sup>69</sup> *Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co.*, 195 Mich. 283, 161 N.W. 979 (1917).

<sup>70</sup> *Spears v. McCoy*, 155 Ky. 1, 159 S.W. 610 (1913).

<sup>71</sup> *Wood v. Earl of Durham*, 21 Q.B. 501 (1888).

<sup>72</sup> *Hahn v. Andrello*, 44 A.D.2d 501, 355 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1974).

<sup>73</sup> *Weenig v. Wood*, — Ind.App. —, 349 N.E.2d 235 (1976).

was not libel on its face, and the court upheld dismissal of Bishop Washington's complaint.<sup>74</sup>

Nor did David Brown convince the court that there was libel in a pamphlet that opposed his attempt to get a zoning change from the City Council of Knoxville, Tenn. The pamphlet attacked a change that would have permitted Brown to build apartments in a residential district, and asked the question: "Have the 'Skids Been Greased' at City Council?" Brown sued for libel, arguing that the question suggested he had bribed the City Council and that it had accepted the bribe. But the court held that the question was clearly unambiguous and did not suggest bribery in its reasonable and obvious meaning; but rather, that pressure in the form of political influence had been brought to bear on certain Council members to expedite matters. This was not libel. Had the pamphlet said that "palms are greased at the City Council," that would have been libel on its face and actionable.<sup>75</sup>

A margin of protection also exists in the occasional finding by a court that mistakenly attributing a single instance of clumsiness or error to a professional man is not enough to damage him. Rather, such cases have held, there must be a suggestion of more general incompetency or lack of quality before a libel charge will hold. One court said:<sup>76</sup>

To charge a professional man with negligence or unskillfulness in the management or treatment of an individual case, is no more than to impute to him the mistakes and errors incident to fallible human nature. The most eminent and skillful physician or surgeon may mistake the symptoms of a particular case without detracting from his general professional skill or learning. To say of him, therefore, that he was mistaken in that case would not be calculated to impair the confidence of the community in his general professional competency.

The "single instance" rule, however, does nothing to protect printed material that assigns questionable ethics or business practices to a person. The *Bristow Record* carried a story saying that L. M. Nichols had sold a building. While he owned it, the Record said,

Nichols used the building for the purpose of attempting to destroy the value of the Record-Citizen publishing plant after he had sold that plant and collected the money from the sale.

<sup>74</sup> *Washington v. New York News*, 37 A.D.2d 557, 322 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1971).

<sup>75</sup> *Brown v. Newman*, 224 Tenn. 297, 454 S.W.2d 120 (1970). An official who resigned from a "financially troubled bank" was not libeled: *Bordoni v. New York Times Co.*, 400 F.Supp. 1223 (D.C.N.Y.1975).

<sup>76</sup> *Blende v. Hearst Publications*, 200 Wash. 426, 93 P.2d 733 (1939); *November v. Time, Inc.*, 13 N.Y.2d 175, 244 N.Y.S.2d 309, 194 N.E.2d 126 (1963); *Holder Const. Co. v. Ed Smith & Sons, Inc.*, 124 Ga.App. 89, 182 S.E.2d 919 (1971).

However, he later discovered that \* \* \* business firms in the city \* \* \* did not enjoy doing business with organizations that openly operate with shady ethics. In recent years his publishing activities have been maintained on a sneak basis.

Nichols sued for libel, and though he lost his case at trial, he won it on appeal. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma said that an article accusing one of "shady ethics" and of operating on a "sneak basis" tends "to deprive that person of public confidence, and tends to injure him in his occupation."<sup>77</sup>

### **Damage to a Corporation's Integrity, Credit, or Ability to Carry on Business.**

Finally, it is possible to damage the reputation of a corporation or partnership by defamation that reflects on the conduct, management, or financial condition of the corporation.<sup>78</sup> To say falsely that a company is in shaky financial condition, or that it cannot pay its debts, would be libelous, as would the imputation that it has engaged in dishonest practices. While a corporation is an entity quite different from the individuals that head it or staff it, there is no doubt that it has a reputation, an "image" to protect.

Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop, Inc., advertised in two community newspapers that it would offer a free roll of film for every roll brought to it for developing and printing. The next day its business competitor, Cal R. Pane, advertised in one of the same newspapers, in part as follows:

USE COMMON SENSE \* \* \*

You Get NOTHING for NOTHING!

WE WILL NOT!

1. Inflate the prices of your developing to give you a new roll free!
2. Print the blurred negatives to inflate the price of your snapshots!

Cosgrove brought a suit for libel, alleging that Pane's advertisement was by implication a response to its advertisements to give free film, and implied that Cosgrove was dishonest in business practices and inflated its prices. The trial court said that the words of Pane's advertisement were not libelous in themselves, and found

<sup>77</sup> Nichols v. Bristow Pub. Co., 330 P.2d 1044 (Okla.1957).

<sup>78</sup> Dupont Engineering Co. v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 13 F.2d 186 (D.C. Tenn.1925); Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp., 325 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1963); Golden Palace, Inc. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 386 F.Supp. 107 (D.D.C.1974).

for Pane. Cosgrove appealed and the appeals court reversed the judgment, saying that Cosgrove did indeed have a cause of action. The words, it said, were libelous on their face. Any language which "unequivocally, maliciously, and falsely imputes to an individual or corporation want of integrity in the conduct of his or its business is actionable," it held.

In arriving at this decision, the appeals court made a point important in many cases: that identification of the defamed need not be by name—as indeed it was not in this case. "The fact that the plaintiff is not specifically named in the advertisement is not controlling. A party need not be specifically named, if pointed to by description or circumstances tending to identify him," it ruled.<sup>79</sup>

### SEC. 13. THE FORM OF THE LIBEL

**Damage may be caused by any part of the medium's content, including headlines, pictures and advertisements.**

Whatever is printed is printed at the peril of the publisher. A picture may be as libelous as words; a headline, in some states, may be libelous even though modified or negated by the story that follows; libelous copy in an advertisement leaves the publisher liable along with the merchant or advertising agency that furnished it.

A 1956 decision explains how headlines and closing "tag-lines" of a news story can be libelous (even though in this case the newspaper defended itself successfully). One story in a series published by the *Las Vegas Sun* brought a libel suit because of its headline and closing tag-line advertising the next article in the series. The headline read "Babies for Sale. Franklin Black Market Trade of Child Told." The tag-line promoting the story to appear the next day read "Tomorrow—Blackmail by Franklin." The body of the story told factually the way in which attorney Franklin had obtained a mother's release of her child for adoption. Franklin sued for libel and won. But the *Sun* appealed, claiming among other things that the trial judge had erred in instructing the jury that the words were libelous. The *Sun* said that the language was ambiguous, and susceptible of more than one interpretation.

But the Nevada Supreme Court<sup>80</sup> said that the headline and tag-line were indeed libelous. Under any reasonable definition, it said, "black market sale" and "blackmail" "would tend to lower the subject in the estimation of the community and to excite derogatory

<sup>79</sup> *Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane*, 408 Pa. 314, 319, 182 A.2d 751, 753 (1962). Also, *Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.*, 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971).

<sup>80</sup> *Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Franklin*, 74 Nev. 282, 329 P.2d 867 (1958). The *Sun* won the appeal on other grounds.



opinions against him and hold him up to contempt." Then it explained the part that the headline had in creating a libel:<sup>81</sup>

Appellants \* \* \* contend, the headline must be qualified by and read in the light of the article to which it referred and the tag-line must be qualified by and read in the light of the subsequent article to which it referred.

This is not so. The text of a newspaper article is not ordinarily the context of its headline, since the public frequently reads only the headline \* \* \*. The same is true of a tag-line or leader, since the public frequently reads only the leader without reading the subsequent article to which it refers. The defamation of Franklin contained in the headline was complete upon its face \* \* \*. The same is true of the tag-line.

We conclude that the trial judge properly instructed the jury that the article was libelous *per se*.

The dangers of libel in advertisements, of course, have already been illustrated in the case of Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane.<sup>82</sup> As for pictures, pictures standing alone, without caption or story with them, would rarely pose danger of defamation, but almost invariably in the mass media, illustration is accompanied by words, and it is almost always the combination that carries the damaging impact. In an issue of *Tan*, a story titled "Man Hungry" was accompanied by a picture taken several years earlier in connection with a woman's work as a professional model for a dress designer. With it were the words "She had a good man—but he wasn't enough. So she picked a bad one!" On the cover of the magazine was the title, "Shameless Love."

The woman sued for libel, and the court granted her claim for \$3,000. "There is no doubt in this court's mind that the publication libeled plaintiff," the judge wrote. "A publication must be considered in its entirety, both the picture and the story which it illustrates."<sup>83</sup>

During a program broadcast in Albuquerque, N. M., over station KGGM-TV, the secretary of a Better Business Bureau was speaking about dishonest television repairmen. He held up to the camera a newspaper advertisement of the Day and Night Television Service Company, which offered low-cost service through long hours of each

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.* at 869; But in some states, the meaning of headline and story *taken together* govern the finding: *Ross v. Columbia Newspapers, Inc.*, 266 S.C. 75, 221 S.E.2d 770 (1976); *Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc.*, — W.Va. —, 211 S.E.2d 674 (1975).

<sup>82</sup> 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962).

<sup>83</sup> *Martin v. Johnson Pub. Co.*, 157 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (1956). See also *Farrington v. Star Co.*, 244 N.Y. 585, 155 N.E. 906 (1927) (wrong picture); *Wasserman v. Time, Inc.*, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 424 F.2d 920 (1970), certiorari denied 398 U.S. 940, 90 S.Ct. 1844 (1970).

day. In making his point, the speaker said that some television servicemen were cheating the public:

This is what has been referred to in the trade as the ransom. Ransom, the ransom racket. The technique of taking up the stuff after first assuring the set owner that the charges would only be nominal, and then holding the set for ransom \* \* \*.

The New Mexico Supreme Court pointed up the effect of combining the picture and the words: "Standing alone, neither the advertisement nor the words used by Luttbeg could be construed as libel. But the two combined impute fraud and dishonesty to the company and its operators."<sup>84</sup>

The use of the wrong picture in an advertisement gives the foundation for actionable libel, as decided in *Peck v. Tribune Co.*<sup>85</sup> The use of false or unauthorized testimonials in advertisements may constitute libel, according to decisions in *Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.*<sup>86</sup> and *Foster Milburn Co. v. Chinn.*<sup>87</sup>

#### SEC. 14. BROADCAST DEFAMATION: SLANDER AND LIBEL

**The rules of slander apply to broadcast defamation in some states, of libel in others, with that which is read from a script more often held libel and that which is extemporaneous more often held slander.**

When radio broadcasting joined the printed media as a means of mass communication, new problems in defamation began to unfold. One concerned the old distinction between slander and libel: Was broadcast defamation to be classified as slander because it was speech, not writing? Or might it be treated as libel because, in reaching huge audiences, its potential for harm to reputation warranted the use of the looser rules and heavier penalties of libel as compared to those of slander? Or was it to be treated as something apart from either? As the rise of printing had forced the law to adjust rules of defamation, now voice broadcasting brought new questions.

For the broadcast media, the favorable settlement would be to treat their lapses as slander. Historic development and accident closed the field of slander to various legal actions and results that would be open to injured persons if radio defamation were to be

<sup>84</sup> *Young v. New Mexico Broadcasting Co.*, 60 N.M. 475, 292 P.2d 776 (1956); *Central Arizona Light & Power Co. v. Akers*, 45 Ariz. 526, 46 P.2d 126 (1935).

<sup>85</sup> 214 U.S. 185, 29 S.Ct. 554 (1909).

<sup>86</sup> 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).

<sup>87</sup> 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).

defined as libel. As slander actions moved into the common law courts of England in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, judges held that plaintiffs could recover only if they could prove "special damages," which involve pecuniary loss or harm to property or contracts. Exceptions to this rule came to be recognized; it was agreed by courts that the following words were so patently harmful that plaintiffs would not have to prove special damage to recover:

1. Words which impute the commission of a crime;
2. Words which impute that one has or has had a loathsome or contagious disease;
3. Words which damage a person in his business, trade, office, profession or calling;
4. Words that impute unchastity or immorality to a woman or girl.

Thus if one could not show that spoken disparaging words had caused him actual pecuniary damage, he sometimes had an alternative: he could still sue for slander if the words fell into one of the special categories.

When print came into wide use, its damaging words—libel—seemed to the courts much more serious because of their permanence and susceptibility of wide diffusion.<sup>88</sup> With this view of printed defamation, the courts did not require in a libel action that a plaintiff prove special damage or show that the damaging words fell into one of the special classes. An action could be brought for many printed words which, if spoken, would not permit recovery. It might be very hard for a physician, say, or an accountant or businessman to sue or recover for a spoken charge of "coward" because he would have to either:

- (a) Prove that he suffered actual pecuniary loss as a result, or
- (b) Claim and show that it affected him in the practice of his business or profession (category 3 above).

If, however, the charge were made in print, the courts would not require that he show either of these; they came to hold that damage would be assumed to result from printed defamation.<sup>89</sup> And they awarded larger damages for the presumably more harmful printed defamation than for the spoken.

Gross contradictions came to be perceived in the supposition that slander was less harmful than libel. Little has been done about the

<sup>88</sup> *Hinsdale v. Orange County Publications, Inc.*, 17 N.Y.2d 284, 270 N.Y.S.2d 592, 217 N.E.2d 650 (1960); *Fram v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh*, 380 F.Supp. 1314 (D.C.Pa.1974).

<sup>89</sup> This was to change only with the decision in *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3011 (1974), where the Supreme Court disapproved the old rule under which juries could "award \* \* \* compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred."

problem to this day. A single person besides the defamed might see a libel, perhaps in the form of a letter. Yet it was easier to get such a case accepted by a court than it was to get acceptance in court for some slanders uttered to large groups or audiences: unless the orally defamed could show special damages or that the words fell into one of the four special categories, he had no suit. And it was very difficult, ordinarily, to show special damages. The realities of libel to one person or slander to a host, moreover, were not always reflected in the size of the damages awarded to the defamed: the presumption that slander was of small harm at times prevented a reasonable level of recovery for real wrongs.<sup>90</sup>

If the printed or written word was libel and the spoken word was slander, other forms of communication existed that did not fit neatly into either category. Signs and gestures, pictures, statues, effigies, all could be defamatory; generally, they came to be categorized as libel rather than slander. Communications which reach the eye, it was sometimes said, are libel; those that reach the ear are slander. As movies entered the communication picture, they became identified with libel, the words accompanying the filmed pictures which were permanent in form. And when radio broadcasting began to reach mass audiences, the problem arose in a new way. State legislatures passed laws classifying broadcast defamation, some declaring that it was libel, others that it was slander.<sup>91</sup> One view was that since what was broadcast ordinarily was read from a page of typed or written manuscript, defamation that it carried must be libel. More persuasive, however, was the plain fact that millions of people might hear the defamation on radio, and it was preposterous to consider its potential for harm as less than that of defamation by newspapers.

An early case set one course of judicial decision-making that has classified radio and television defamation as libel. This was *Sorensen v. Wood*.<sup>92</sup> Sorensen was running for re-election as attorney general of Nebraska, when Wood took to the radio to read from an article he had written: Sorensen, he said, was "a nonbeliever, an irreligious libertine, a mad man and a fool." While the court did not deliberate the question whether the words were slander or libel, it noted that "The radio address was written and read by Wood." Then it ruled that "There can be little dispute that the written words charged and published constitute libel rather than slander."<sup>93</sup>

<sup>90</sup> Prosser, *op. cit.*, 754, 769-781; Samuel Spring, *Risks and Rights* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1956), pp. 42, 44; *Grein v. LaPoma*, 54 Wash.2d 844, 340 P.2d 766 (1959).

<sup>91</sup> Remmers, D. H., *Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio*, 64 *Harv.L.Rev.* 727, 1951; California, Illinois, and North Dakota passed laws calling it slander; Oregon and Washington, libel.

<sup>92</sup> 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 243 N.W. 85 (1932).

Decisions that followed generally took up this reasoning.<sup>94</sup> But many broadcasts did not flow entirely or even partly from scripted words: the interview, the panel discussion, the free-wheeling entertainment program all were likely to field at some time an uninhibited speaker who had no inclination to be bound by words on paper.

### **The ad lib and the Interview in Radio and Television.**

Broadcasting personnel who can screen and edit the manuscripts of entertainers, politicians, news analysts, advertisers, and others before their words go on the air have some chance of spotting grossly defamatory words in advance of the broadcast. Where this is the case, management can sometimes convince the author to modify the words. But how about the radio funny man or freely spouting politician who does not stick to his script? The spontaneous ad lib, certainly, has always been an ornament in the array of some comedians' talents. Is the station to be liable for a defamation suit rising out of the spontaneously articulated wit of a gifted man in the middle of a broadcast program? Is the careless slur of an insensitive entertainer or interviewee, injected without warning into the flow of his talk, to be the basis for libel action against the station that is powerless to prevent the misfortune?

Before the 1930's were out, one answer had been provided by the Pennsylvania court in the famous case of *Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.*<sup>95</sup> Here the great entertainer, Al Jolson, appeared on an NBC Program under the sponsorship of Shell Eastern Petroleum Products, Inc. He was paid by the advertising agency which Shell had hired, J. Walter Thompson. A golf champion appearing on Jolson's show mentioned that his first professional golf job was with the Summit Hotel. Jolson blurted out an unscripted ad lib: "That's a rotten hotel." Summit sued NBC.

Was NBC to be held to strict accountability for the words, as a newspaper is held strictly accountable for anything it publishes? Or would the nature of the communication process by radio, incompatible with total advance control by the broadcast company, permit a different treatment? The court took into account the special character of broadcasting, and held that the rule of strict accountability did not apply.<sup>96</sup>

Publication by radio has physical aspects entirely different from those attending the publication of a libel or a slander as the law understands them. The danger of

<sup>94</sup> *Hartmann v. Winchell*, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947); *Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.*, 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955); *Christy v. Stauffer Pubs., Inc.*, 437 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.1969). Slander: *Brown v. W.R. M.A. Broadcasting Co.*, 286 Ala. 186, 238 So.2d 540 (1970).

<sup>95</sup> 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 336 Pa. 182, 185-205, 8 A.2d 302, 310, 312 (1939). See also *Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp.*, 251 So.2d 405 (La.App.1971).

attempting to apply the fixed principles of law governing either libel or slander to this new medium of communication is obvious \* \* \*.

\* \* \*

A rule unalterably imposing liability without fault on the broadcasting company under any circumstances is manifestly unjust, unfair and contrary to every principle of morals \* \* \*.

\* \* \*

We \* \* \* conclude that a broadcasting company that leases its time and facilities to another, whose agents carry on the program, is not liable for an interjected defamatory remark where it appears that it exercised due care in the selection of the lessee, and, having inspected and edited the script, had no reason to believe an extemporaneous defamatory remark would be made. Where the broadcasting station's employe or agent makes the defamatory remark, it is liable, unless the remarks are privileged and there is no malice.

In trying to find ground that avoids such unsatisfactory distinctions as words read from the written page versus those ad libbed, courts have arrived at various positions. In *Grein v. LaPoma*<sup>97</sup> the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that there is no distinction between oral and written defamation. Georgia's court, after struggling with solutions, decided that a new tort was called for and affixed to it the unbelievable name "defamacast."<sup>98</sup> The rather flat ruling that defamation by television constitutes libel was made in *Shor v. Billingsley*.<sup>99</sup>

It is far from clear whether, in the long run, broadcasters will have to live with the hard rules of libel or will enjoy the barriers to recovery provided by the rules of slander.<sup>1</sup> Fairness would seem to require that the broadcaster deserves special protection from the consequences of the shocking burst of ad libbed defamation. Just as important, it seems, is the claim of the citizen defamed on television before millions to be allowed a legal action uncluttered by the ancient, restrictive rules of slander. But whether the broadcast newsman eventually is to be cheered by the universal arrival of the

<sup>97</sup> 54 Wash.2d 844, 340 P.2d 766 (1959).

<sup>98</sup> *American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson*, 106 Ga.App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962).

<sup>99</sup> 4 Misc.2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1956), affirmed without opinion 4 A.D.2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1957).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Prosser, *op. cit.*, p. 772, "The recent trend \* \* \* has been strongly in the direction of holding such defamation slander \* \* \*" and R. H. Phelps and E. D. Hamilton, *Libel* (New York: MacMillan, 1966), p. 333, "But the tendency has been, more and more, to consider all defamatory broadcasting as libel."

first, sobered by the adoption in all states of the second, or left to cope with things as they are or with things more confusing, his motto may remain the same: Accuracy always, and develop an instinct for detecting the ad lib a-borning.

### The Candidate for Public Office.

A special problem in broadcast defamation grew in the special relationship of the political candidates and the broadcast media. The famous Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934<sup>2</sup> says that if a station decides to carry one political candidate's message on the air, it must carry those of any of his political opponents who may seek air time. The station is permitted to refuse all candidates, but if it takes one it must take the opponents. Further, it is specifically barred from censoring the candidate's copy.

For decades, this put the station in a difficult position. If it refused air time to all candidates, it could be justly criticized for refusing to aid the democratic political process, even though it was within the law in so doing. But suppose that it accepted the responsibility of carrying campaign talks: Then, if it spotted possible defamation in the prepared script of the candidate about to go on the air, it had no way of denying him access to its microphone and no power to censor. The law in effect forced the station to carry material that might very well damage it.

Several cases arose in which campaign talk produced defamation for which stations were held liable.<sup>3</sup> But in 1959, a case from North Dakota reached the Supreme Court of the United States and the problem was settled in favor of the beleaguered broadcasters. A. C. Townley, some 30 years after he had been a major political figure in upper midwest states, returned to the political arena in 1956. He ran for the U. S. Senate in North Dakota. Under the requirements of Section 315, radio station WDAY of Fargo, N.D., permitted Townley to broadcast a speech in reply to two other candidates. In it, Townley accused the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America of conspiring to "establish a Communist Farmers Union Soviet right here in North Dakota." The FECUA sued Townley and WDAY for libel. The North Dakota courts ruled that WDAY was not liable and FECUA appealed.<sup>4</sup>

The Supreme Court held that stations did not have power to censor the speeches of political candidates. For with that power, it said, "Quite possibly if a station were held responsible for the

<sup>2</sup> 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(a).

<sup>3</sup> *Houston Post Co. v. U. S.*, 79 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.Tex.1948); *Sorensen v. Wood*, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932); *Daniell v. Voice of New Hampshire, Inc.*, 10 Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 2045.

<sup>4</sup> *Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.*, 360 U.S. 525, 79 S.Ct. 1302 (1959).

broadcast of libelous material, all remarks evenly [sic] faintly objectionable would be excluded out of an excess of caution," and further, a station could intentionally edit a candidate's "legitimate presentation under the guise of lawful censorship of libelous matter."<sup>5</sup> The Court was confident that Congress had intended no such result when it wrote Section 315.

FECUA also argued that Section 315 gave no immunity to a station from liability for defamation spoken during a political broadcast even though censorship of possibly libelous matter was not permitted. The court said:<sup>6</sup>

Again, we cannot agree. For under this interpretation, unless a licensee refuses to permit any candidate to talk at all, the section would sanction the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps criminal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of the licensee.

In ruling that WDAY was not liable for defamation in campaign broadcasts under Section 315, the Supreme Court gave great weight to the principle of maximum broadcast participation in the political process. And it relieved stations of an onerous burden that they had formerly carried in the furtherance of that participation.

#### SEC. 15. EXTRINSIC CIRCUMSTANCES, LIBEL PER SE, AND LIBEL PER QUOD

**Facts extrinsic to the story itself sometimes are necessary to make out a defamatory meaning; such "libel per quod" is distinguished from "libel per se" which ordinarily means that the words are defamatory on their face.**

In most cases of libel, the hard words that cause a suit are plain to see or hear in the written word or broadcast. They carry the derogatory meaning in themselves: "thief" or "swindler" or "whore" or "communist" is defamatory on its face if falsely applied to a person. Words that are libelous on their face are called libel *per se*.<sup>7</sup>

But on some occasions, words that have no apparent derogatory meaning turn out to be libelous because circumstances outside the words of the story itself become involved. In the classic case, there was no apparent derogatory meaning in a brief but erroneous story saying that a married woman had given birth to twins. But many people who read the story knew that the woman had been married only a month.<sup>8</sup> Facts extrinsic to the story itself gave the words of

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 530.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 531.

<sup>7</sup> 33 *Am.Jur.* Libel and Slander § 5; *Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp.*, 15 *Wis.2d* 452, 113 *N.W.2d* 135, 138 (1962); *Prosser*, p. 782.

<sup>8</sup> *Morrison v. Ritchie & Co.*, 39 *Scot.L.R.* 432 (1902).



the story a libelous meaning. Where extrinsic facts turn an apparently harmless story into defamation, it is called by many American courts libel *per quod*.<sup>9</sup>

In a vital statistics column in the *Spokane Chronicle*, this entry appeared on April 21, 1961: "Divorce Granted Hazel M. Pitts from Philip Pitts." In these words alone there was no defamation. But the divorce had taken place on Feb. 2, 1960, 14 months earlier, and now Pitts had been married to another woman for several months. Some of his acquaintances and neighbors concluded that Pitts had been married to two women at once and was a bigamist. Extrinsic facts made the story libelous, and the Pittses were awarded \$2,000.<sup>10</sup>

In some jurisdictions it is held that where extrinsic facts are involved in making out a libel, the plaintiff must plead and prove special damages. These damages are specific amounts of pecuniary loss that one suffers as a result of a libel, such as cancelled contracts or lost wages.

Where the defamatory nature of the writing does not appear upon the face of the writing, but rather appears only when all of the circumstances are known, it is said to be libel *per quod*, as distinguished from libel *per se*, and in such cases damages are not presumed but must be proven before the plaintiff can recover.<sup>11</sup>

The magazine *Life* published a story on May 20, 1966, dealing with electronic eavesdropping. With it was a picture of Mary Alice Firestone, her estranged husband, and Jack Harwood who had a business in electronic "snooping," especially in connection with divorce suits. The story read:<sup>12</sup>

TWO-WAY SNOOP. In Florida, where electronic eavesdropping is frequently employed in divorce suits, private eyes like Jack Harwood of Palm Beach shown above with some of his gear, do a thriving business. Harwood, who boasts, "I'm a fantastic wire man," was hired by tire heir Russell Firestone to keep tabs on his estranged wife, Mary Alice. \* \* \* She in turn got one of Harwood's assistants to sell out and work for her and, says Harwood "He plays just as rough with the bugs as I do." \* \* \* A court recently ordered Russell and Mary to stop spying on each other.

<sup>9</sup> 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 8a; Prosser, p. 781; *Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp.*, 325 F.2d 761, 764-765 (6th Cir. 1963).

<sup>10</sup> *Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co.*, 63 Wash.2d 763, 388 P.2d 976 (1964).

<sup>11</sup> *Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp.*, 325 F.2d 761, 764-765 (6th Cir. 1963); see also *Solotaire v. Cowles Magazines, Inc.*, 107 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup.1951); *Moore v. P. W. Pub. Co.*, 3 Ohio St.2d 183, 209 N.E.2d 412 (1965); *Campbell v. Post Pub. Co.*, 94 Mont. 12, 20 P.2d 1063 (1933). For other uses of "*per quod*" see *Developments in the Law of Defamation*, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 375, 889 (1956).

<sup>12</sup> *Firestone v. Time, Inc.*, 414 F.2d 790, 791 (5th Cir. 1969).

Mrs. Firestone brought suit for libel per quod, saying that the story injured her in her pending marital litigation. The trial court dismissed her complaint, but the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that she had a case, reversing the trial court. It said:<sup>13</sup>

We are of the opinion that appellant's allegations of injury to her pending marital litigation constitute allegations of "special damages" for libel per quod which are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. While it may be difficult indeed [for Mrs. Firestone] to prove these damages, we are not convinced that they are so speculative that she could not prove them under any circumstances.

For the mass media, the "special damage" requirement is the much more favorable rule; it is seldom easy for a plaintiff to demonstrate specific money loss as a result of derogatory words.<sup>14</sup> Some courts have in recent decades accepted the position that the plaintiff must show special damage if he is to recover for libel involving extrinsic facts; others hold that "all libels are actionable without proof of special damages."<sup>15</sup>

## SEC. 16. INNOCENT INTENT

**Defamation arising from accident, error, or carelessness is sometimes actionable; if malice is present, punitive damages may be assessed.**

The libeler ordinarily claims in court that his intent was innocent because to do so may hold down the amount of damages. Where a medium is reporting on public officials or public figures, "innocent intent" may shield it totally, because to prove it may negate the accusation of actual malice:<sup>16</sup> knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of falsity under the *Times v. Sullivan* rule.

Yet problems remain. Courts sometimes apply old definitions of malice that for centuries have fouled the law of defamation. A New York case says that malice can be inferred from "extrava-

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Laurence H. Eldredge, *The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod*, 79 *Harv.L.Rev.* 733, 755 (1966).

<sup>15</sup> *Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp.*, 15 *Wis.2d* 452, 113 *N.W.2d* 135, 139 (1962). For two interpretations of recent trends, see Eldredge, *op. cit.*, and William L. Prosser, *More Libel Per Quod*, 79 *Harv.L.Rev.* 1629 (1966).

<sup>16</sup> The term "actual" malice (also called "express malice") is to be distinguished from "malice in law" ("legal malice"). The latter term is a formality or technicality that persists in pleadings in some states, as a confounding holdover from libel requirements prior to 1825 when it was held that one must plead and prove that the defamer was moved by malice in order to have a case. Though the requirement has long since disappeared, the form lingers on as a legal fiction. It is not always necessary to liability in libel that malice be present. See Prosser, pp. 790-791; *Chesapeake Ferry Co. v. Hudgins*, 155 *Va.* 874, 156 *S.E.* 429, 438 (1931).

gance" of communications, or from "vituperation"<sup>17</sup>—terms hard to define that could be used to characterize a hard-hitting editorial in which the writer's intent might be unimpeachable. A Maine decision calls malice a design or purpose to do injury.<sup>18</sup> Such definitions have the best chance of acceptance by appeals courts if the person charging "malice" is a private individual.

Again, one court has found "reckless disregard" in a radio station's failure to use a delay device in broadcasting defamatory statements of a person who called in on a talk show.<sup>19</sup> It can scarcely be said that the radio host had an intent to help air words about whose truth he had "serious doubts"—one way of defining reckless disregard.

There are certain exceptions even to the old rule that "innocence is no excuse." The question often arises as to just what persons in the chain of news writing, editing, printing, and dissemination, may be liable for a libel. Decisions are not entirely consistent. In *World Pub. Co. v. Minahan*, the court held that the managing editor who was actively in control of the administration and policy of the publication was equally liable with the owner of the paper for a defamatory story.<sup>20</sup> This was the case even though the editor had no knowledge of the particular article. On the other hand, a federal court has taken the position that a corporation was liable, not the editor-in-chief who acted merely as an agent of the owner, who knew nothing about the libelous story in point, and who was not on duty at the time the defamation was published. The court said that the editor could not be held liable "without disregarding the settled rule of law by which no man is bound for the tortious act of another over whom he has not a master's power of control."<sup>21</sup>

Is the linotype operator who sets a story in print liable? Is the newsboy who sells the offending paper liable? In *Street v. Johnson*, which concerned the liability of vendors of newspapers for libelous statements, the court said:<sup>22</sup>

The authorities are to the effect that the mere seller of newspapers is not liable for selling and delivering a newspaper containing a libel \* \* \* if he can prove upon the trial to the satisfaction of the jury that he did not know that the paper contained the libel, that his ignorance was

<sup>17</sup> *Green v. Kinsella*, 36 A.D.2d 677, 319 N.Y.2d 780 (1971).

<sup>18</sup> *Cohen v. Bowdoin*, 288 A.2d 106, 112 (Maine 1972). For other courts' definitions, including the "ill-will" of long standing, see, e. g., *Stone v. Essex Co. Newspapers*, 365 Mass. 246, 311 N.E.2d 52 (1974); *Barlow v. International Harvester Co.*, 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974).

<sup>19</sup> *Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp.*, 251 So.2d 405 (La.App.1971).

<sup>20</sup> 70 Okl. 107, 173 P. 815 (1918).

<sup>21</sup> *Folwell v. Miller*, 75 C.C.A. 489, 145 F. 495 (1906).

<sup>22</sup> 80 Wis. 455, 50 N.W. 395 (1891).

not due to any negligence on his part, and that he did not know, and had no ground for supposing that the paper was likely to contain libelous material.

There was long a rule in libel that said the newspaper which printed a libelous wire service story was as liable as the wire service, even though it could not possibly check the accuracy of the wire story.<sup>23</sup> This rule has been eroded in the thrust of *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, and today the newspaper has relatively little to fear in this respect, protected because printing wire service or syndicated defamatory news of public figures and officials rarely would suggest reckless disregard,<sup>24</sup> while defamatory wire news of distant private persons would not likely be “negligence” under state rules.

### SEC. 17. LIBEL TO PROPERTY

**Disparagement of property, products, and goods may result in an action for trade libel or slander of title, in which malice and special damage must be shown.**

Although the terms libel and slander are ordinarily applied to defamation of individuals or specific organizations such as business corporations, they are applied also in the special case of disparagement of products and property. Employed under the general term “trade libel” are two other terms, slander of title and slander of goods. Distinction between oral and written disparagement is of no consequence in the law of trade libel.

A news medium is responsible for whatever it carries,<sup>25</sup> of course, and trade libel can insinuate itself into advertisements or into quotes carried as an interview in news columns. In addition, it need hardly be pointed out, the newspaper or television station could itself originate words in disparagement of goods, for example in an editorial.

Trade libel can easily be confused with libel or slander of a person in his business, calling or trade. There are real differences. Trade libel refers specifically to the products, goods, or title to property. Defamation of a person in his business or calling refers to questioning his honesty, integrity, or skill in work, or to the fitness of a firm to carry on business.<sup>26</sup> It's quite possible to libel a manufactured

<sup>23</sup> *Wood v. Constitution Pub. Co.*, 57 Ga.App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937); *Carey v. Hearst Publications*, 19 Wash.2d 655, 143 P.2d 857 (1943). For long, the only state with a contradictory position was Florida: *Layne v. Tribune Co.*, 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).

<sup>24</sup> *Washington Post Co. v. Keogh*, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 365 F.2d 965, 972 (1966).

<sup>25</sup> An exception is defamation spoken by a political candidate in a broadcast: above, Sec. 13, *Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc.*, 360 U.S. 525, 79 S.Ct. 1302 (1959).

<sup>26</sup> Above, Sec. 12.

product without libeling the manufacturer at the same time, and vice versa.

The law raises difficult barriers to recovery for trade libel, however, and criticism of the quality of goods ordinarily enjoys a wide leeway. A plaintiff who believes his product has been libeled must prove that the statement was untrue, that there was actual malice in the statement, and that he suffered special damages. Both malice and special damages are hard to prove. The New York Court of Appeals stated the requirements in *Drug Research Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co.*<sup>27</sup> In this case, the *Saturday Evening Post* was sued for an article that called into question the worth of weight-reducing pills. In holding for Curtis, the Court of Appeals stated the rule as to trade libel, and made the special point that the manufacturer had not been libeled:<sup>28</sup>

The rule is that, if a product has been attacked, the manufacturer may recover in a cause of action for libel, provided he proves malice and special damages as well as the falsity of the criticism \* \* \*.

Giving the pleading its most favorable construction, namely, that it states a libel on the product, it nonetheless must be dismissed for failure to allege special damages. A libel of the plaintiff's product is not necessarily a libel of the plaintiff.

Hard to prove as special damages are, there must be actual material or pecuniary loss incurred, shown in such ways as measurable amounts of money or loss of specific customers. When the loss of a sale of property is claimed in a suit for disparagement, it is necessary that the loss of the sale to a particular party be proved. General claims such as serious loss of business or damaged credit are ordinarily not enough unless supported by specific instances.<sup>29</sup>

The second difficulty in establishing trade libel is the proving of actual malice ("malice in fact") in the disparaging words. The protean character of the word malice in its travels through the courts is demonstrated well in the many definitions it has had in trade libel cases. One writer has even said that "In an action for disparagement, when brought against a stranger, the existence of

<sup>27</sup> 7 N.Y.2d 435, 199 N.Y.S.2d 33, 166 N.E.2d 319 (1960).

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, and see *Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields*, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).

<sup>29</sup> *Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories*, 17 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1926). See also *Pendleton v. Time, Inc.*, 339 Ill.App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435 (1950), and dissent.

'malice in fact' is never an essential requisite to making out of a *prima facie* case."<sup>30</sup>

However, in the courts' common practice of requiring actual malice in trade libel, it has been called the intent to injure business;<sup>31</sup> the publication of a false statement "without any regard to [its truth] and without having made proper inquiry to ascertain [the truth]";<sup>32</sup> and the showing of active malevolence by using extreme language in a single publication or by repeating the statement unduly.<sup>33</sup> A newspaper which, through repeated issues, failed to correct an erroneous advertisement despite two requests by the advertiser to do so, showed malice in its failure and lost a libel suit.<sup>34</sup>

In *Bourn v. Beck*, the court in giving judgment for the plaintiff stated:<sup>35</sup>

If the defendants knowingly made false statements with the purpose of preventing the sale of the property for the purpose of gaining some financial advantage to themselves at the expense of the plaintiffs, their conduct was malicious in the sense here important, although they may have had no personal ill will toward them.

Having seen the special requirements in trade libel of malice and special damages, then, it should be noted that in some cases both goods and a person's reputation may be libeled. And if a businessman's reputation in his calling is involved, he ordinarily does not need to plead and prove either malice or special damages. It has been held libelous *per se* to publish that a person sold impure ice cream which caused the death of a child;<sup>36</sup> the charge against the man took precedence over the charge against the product, and the special requirements of trade libel did not have to be met.

## SEC. 18. BRINGING A LIBEL ACTION

**The plaintiff in a libel suit must plead that there was publication, identification and defamation.**

Having taken care to meet the deadline set by his state's statute of limitations—in most, one year after publication and in others two

<sup>30</sup> Jeremiah Smith, *Disparagement of Property, Slander of Property*, 13 Col. Law R. 13, 25, 1913. See also *Shaw Cleaners & Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club*, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932).

<sup>31</sup> *Mowry v. Raabe*, 89 Cal. 606, 27 P. 157 (1891).

<sup>32</sup> *Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin*, 5 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).

<sup>33</sup> *Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino*, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1938).

<sup>34</sup> *Collier Cty. Pub. Co. v. Chapman*, 318 So.2d 492 (Fla. App. 1975).

<sup>35</sup> 116 Kan. 231, 226 P. 769, 770 (1924).

<sup>36</sup> *Larsen v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 165 App. Div. 4, 150 N.Y.S. 464 (1914), affirmed 214 N.Y. 713, 108 N.E. 1098 (1915); *Dabold v. Chronicle Pub. Co.*, 107 Wis. 357, 83 N.W. 639 (1900).

or three—the party<sup>37</sup> filing a libel suit must make three allegations. These are that the derogatory statement was published, that the statement identified the plaintiff, and that the statement was defamatory.<sup>38</sup>

To start with publication, the statement may of course be printed or written or, in the case of movies and broadcasting, oral.<sup>39</sup> It must be made not only to the defamed, for a communicator cannot blacken a reputation unless he spreads the charge to at least one person besides the target. Although those in the mass media ordinarily publish to huge audiences, it is worth remembering that no more than a “third person” need be involved for publication to take place. In *Ostrowe v. Lee*,<sup>40</sup> a man dictated a letter to his secretary accusing the addressee of grand larceny. The stenographer typed the letter and it was sent through the mail. The accused brought a libel suit and the court held that publication took place at the time the stenographic notes were read and transcribed.

The newspaper that “picks up” and prints a story from another newspaper or from any other news medium is itself making a publication and likely to be liable for libel that may be in the original. The rule is that “every republication of a libel is a fresh publication;” an often-quoted maxim is that to the law “tale bearers are as bad as tale makers.”<sup>41</sup>

For the printed media, courts of most states call the entire edition carrying the alleged libel one publication; an over-the-counter sale of back copies of a newspaper weeks or months after they were printed does not constitute a further publication. The rule is known as the “single publication rule.”<sup>42</sup> Where this is not the rule, there is a chance that a plaintiff can stretch the statute of limitations indefinitely, perhaps by claiming a separate publication in a newspaper’s selling a February issue the following December. In *Tocco v. Time, Inc.*, it was held that the publication takes place at the time a magazine is mailed to subscribers, or put in the hands of those who will ship the edition to wholesale distributors.<sup>43</sup> This rule has not

<sup>37</sup> See Sec. 10 for who may bring a libel action.

<sup>38</sup> Necessary allegations in trade libel include also untruth, actual malice, and special damages: *Supra*, Sec. 17.

<sup>39</sup> Signs, statues, effigies, and other communications that may carry libel are in Sec. 11, *supra*.

<sup>40</sup> 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931). See also *Arvey Corp. v. Peterson*, 178 F.Supp. 132 (E.D.Pa.1959); *Gambrill v. Schooley*, 93 Md. 48, 48 A. 730 (1901).

<sup>41</sup> *Billet v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co.*, 107 La. 751, 32 So. 17, 20 (1902); *Cavalier v. Original Club Forest, Inc.*, 59 So.2d 489 (La.App.1952).

<sup>42</sup> Robert Leflar, *The Single Publication Rule*, 25 *Rocky Mt. Law R.* 263, 1953; *Wheeler v. Dell Pub. Co.*, 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962). *Restatement of Torts*, § 578, Comment (b) does not accept the single publication rule.

<sup>43</sup> 195 F.Supp. 410 (E.D.Mich.1961).

been universally accepted; *Osmers v. Parade Publications, Inc.*, rejected it and stated this as its rule for publication date:<sup>44</sup>

\* \* \* what is really determinative is the earliest date on which the libel was substantially and effectively communicated to a meaningful mass of readers—the public for which the publication was intended, not some small segment of it.

Publication established, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that he was identified in the alleged libel—that the statement he complains of referred to him. In most cases, this presents little problem to the plaintiff. His name and the derogatory words are there, and one or more readers or listeners attach the name to the person. Yet as we have seen in the *Cosgrove Studio* case above (p. 72), a successful libel suit was brought by a merchant against a competitor who charged “dishonesty” in such a way as to identify the *Cosgrove* shop without naming it.

It is not uncommon for identification of a totally unintended kind to occur in the mass media. A typographical error, wrong initials, the incorrect address, the careless work of a reporter or editor—and an innocent person may have been linked with a crime, immorality, unethical business conduct, or another activity that is a basis for a libel suit. The law has modified the old “strict liability” rules in libel (p. 108), but innocent error in identification can still bring libel actions.<sup>45</sup>

In a celebrated English case, *E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones*,<sup>46</sup> the *Sunday Chronicle* had published a story from a correspondent in France concerning a supposedly fictitious person named Artemus Jones. He had been seen, the story said, in the company of a woman who was not his wife. The *Chronicle* soon learned, with the filing of a libel action, that a real Artemus Jones did, indeed, exist, and that he said that some of his friends believed that the story referred to him. The courts held that the identification was sufficient and awarded Jones, a lawyer, £ 1750 in damages.

Plaintiffs may, of course, allege identification but fail to establish it at trial. Harry Landau operated a business known as Credit Consultants. He brought a libel suit based on a television show titled “The Easy Way.” The plot involved a newspaper photographer’s attempt to expose a book-making ring headed by a character named Sam Henderson, whose private office door carried the printed legend, “Credit Consultant, Inc.” Landau contended that the use of that name identified him as Sam Henderson, the head of an unlawful gambling syndicate.

<sup>44</sup> 234 F.Supp. 924, 927 (D.C.N.Y.1964).

<sup>45</sup> See Chap. 3, Sec. 15.

<sup>46</sup> (1910) A.C. 20, 1909, 2 K.B. 444.



But the court held that there was no identification of Landau in the television drama. There was no resemblance between Landau and Henderson, or between the televised office and Landau's office. The fictional Henderson was killed at the end of the play, and Landau was alive and suing. The defendant Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., was given the judgment.<sup>47</sup>

In *Oma v. Hillman Periodicals*, a professional boxer sued for libel on the basis of a magazine article that attacked various practices in boxing, especially those of managers and promoters. The article portrayed fighters as victims who fight because of economic necessity or ambition. The plaintiff's picture and name were used on the back cover of the magazine, but he was not identified with the article in any derogatory way, and he lost the suit.<sup>48</sup>

Identification cannot be established by a person who says that an attack upon a large heterogeneous group libels him because he happens to belong to it. Derogatory statements about a political party, an international labor union, the Presbyterian church, the American Legion, for example, do not identify individuals so as to permit them to bring a libel action.

However, if the attack is on a small group such as the officers of a local post of the American Legion, or the presiding elders of a local church, or the directors of the Smith County Democratic Party, each individual of the group may be able to establish identification and bring suit.<sup>49</sup>

The case of *Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait*<sup>50</sup> involved the portion of a book entitled *U.S.A. Confidential* about a well-known department store in Dallas and its employees. An action for libel was brought by the Neiman-Marcus Co., operator of the store, nine individual models who were the entire group of models employed by the store, 15 salesmen of a total of 25 salesmen employed, and 30 saleswomen of a total of 382. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the individual plaintiffs were not capable of identification from the alleged libelous words. The court stated that the following rules were applicable:

- (1) Where the group or class libeled is large, none can sue even though the language used is inclusive.
- (2) When the group or class libeled is small, and each and every member of the group or class is referred to, then any individual member can sue.

<sup>47</sup> *Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.*, 205 Misc. 357, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1954).

<sup>48</sup> 281 App.Div. 240, 118 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1953).

<sup>49</sup> Above, Chap. 3, Sec. 10.

<sup>50</sup> 107 F.Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y.1952); 13 F.R.D. 311 (1952).

- (3) That while there is a conflict in authorities where the publication complained of libeled some or less than all of a designated small group, it would permit such an action.

In applying these rules to the facts, the court dismissed the suits of the saleswomen, but allowed the suits of the models and salesmen.

Identity may be in reference to a member of a board although no specific member of the board or no director is actually named,<sup>51</sup> to a "city hall ring,"<sup>52</sup> or to a radio editor when there are only a few to whom the libel could refer.<sup>53</sup>

The third necessary allegation, that the statement was defamatory, says in effect that the words injured reputation. The allegation of defamation must be made in bringing the suit, although it, like publication and identification, can fail of proof at trial. The court decides whether a publication is libelous *per se*; but when the words complained of are susceptible of two meanings, one innocent and the other damaging, it is for the jury to decide in what sense the words were understood by the audience. Both court and jury, in their interpretation of the alleged defamatory statement, should give the language its common and ordinary meaning.<sup>54</sup>

What sense will be given to them by a reader of ordinary intelligence? Will the natural and proximate consequence be to injure the person about whom they have been published? Will such words tend to bring a person into public hatred, contempt or ridicule? If the words are plain, and unambiguous and susceptible of but one meaning, it is the duty of the court to determine from the face of the writing without reference to innuendo, whether the same are actionable *per se*. If the article is not of such nature and character that the court can say as a matter of law that damages will be presumed as a consequence of its publication, then it cannot be made so by innuendo.

<sup>51</sup> *Children v. Shinn*, 168 Iowa 531, 150 N.W. 864 (1915).

<sup>52</sup> *Petsch v. St. Paul Dispatch Printing Co.*, 40 Minn. 291, 41 N.W. 1034 (1889).

<sup>53</sup> *Gross v. Cantor*, 270 N.Y. 93, 200 N.E. 592 (1936).

<sup>54</sup> *Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co.*, 122 Or. 408, 259 P. 307, 311 (1927).

## Chapter 4

# THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST LIBEL SUITS

### Sec.

19. The Public Principle.
20. The Constitution as a Defense: Public Officials.
21. Public Figures and Public Issues.
22. Separating Public Figures and Private Individuals.
23. Actual Malice.

## SEC. 19. THE PUBLIC PRINCIPLE

### **News media defend against libel suits on grounds of their service to the public interest.**

When the news media go to court to defend against libel suits, they make their claim heavily on principles whose ground is the media's service to the public, not on claims of their own private interest however much that may be involved. This "public principle" extends far back in the law of defamation, strengthening in America in the nineteenth century as new defenses arose, and in the 1960s reaching far beyond nineteenth-century reasoning. The public principle briefly stated is that in a self-governing society whose citizens are expected to participate in decisions that affect their lives, to have the opportunity to choose, and to have ultimate control over government, information and discussion are essential ingredients for that participation and choice. Defenses against those who complained that their reputations had been harmed by publication grew in this context. Where the publications furthered certain public goods and values, the news media had protection from those who claimed harm.

The principle received its fullest extension in defense against libel after the United States Supreme Court ruled that only malice—defined with precision—could render a publication about the public acts of a public official susceptible to a successful suit for damages. The Court laid down this rule as a constitutional principle under the First Amendment in 1964, long after the early- and mid-nineteenth century protections under the public principle had been developed through state statutes and decisions. One of the older protections is the defense known as qualified privilege, which provides that fair and accurate reports of public official proceedings can not be the basis for a successful libel suit. Another is the rule of fair comment and criticism, which says that publications criticizing the public offerings of those who seek public approval in their work are

protected against successful libel suit. A third major defense is proof that the words complained of are true, the public principle obviously (to the 20th-Century if not the 18th-Century mind) being served by such a defense. Chapter 5 will address the traditional defenses.

## SEC. 20. THE CONSTITUTION AS A DEFENSE: PUBLIC OFFICIALS

**Under the doctrine of *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, the First Amendment broadly protects the news media from judgments for defamation of public officials and public figures.**

The Supreme Court of the United States handed down a decision in 1964 that added a great new dimension of protection to news media in the field of libel. It said that news media are not liable for defamatory words about the public acts of public officials unless the words are published with malice. It defined the word "malice" with a rigor and preciseness that had been lacking for centuries and in a way that gave broad protection to publication. Public officials, it said, must live with the risks of a political system in which there is "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open \* \* \*." Even the factual error, it said, will not make one liable for libel in words about the public acts of public officials unless malice is present.

The case was *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*.<sup>1</sup> It stemmed from an "editorial advertisement" in the Times, written and paid for by a group intensely involved in the struggle for equality and civil liberties for the American Negro. Suit was brought by L. B. Sullivan, Commissioner of Public Affairs for the city of Montgomery, Alabama, against the Times and four Negro clergymen who were among the 64 persons whose names were attached to the advertisement.

The since-famous advertisement, titled "Heed Their Rising Voices," recounted the efforts of southern Negro students to affirm their rights at Alabama State College in Montgomery and told of a "wave of terror" that met them. It spoke of violence against the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. in his leadership of the civil rights movement:<sup>2</sup>

### Heed Their Rising Voices

As the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern Negro students are engaged in wide-spread, nonviolent

<sup>1</sup> 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, facing 292.

demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In their effort to uphold these guarantees, they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom \* \* \*

\* \* \*

In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truck-loads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.

\* \* \*

Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times—for "speeding," "loitering" and similar "offenses." And now they have charged him with "perjury"—a *felony* under which they could imprison him for *ten years*. Obviously, their real purpose is to remove him physically as the leader to whom the students and millions of others—look for guidance and support, and thereby to intimidate *all* leaders who may rise in the South \* \* \*. The defense of Martin Luther King, spiritual leader of the student sit-in movement, clearly, therefore, is an integral part of the total struggle for freedom in the South.

Sullivan was not named in the advertisement, but claimed that because he was Commissioner who had supervision of the Montgomery police department, people would identify him as the person responsible for police action at the State College campus. He said also that actions against the Rev. King would be attributed to him by association. Libel law, of course, does not require that identification be by name.

It was asserted by Sullivan, and not disputed, that there were errors in the advertisement. Police had not "ringed" the campus although they had been there in large numbers. Students sang the National Anthem, not "My Country, 'Tis of Thee." The expulsion had not been protested by the entire student body, but by a large part of it. They had not refused to register, but had boycotted classes for a day. The campus dining hall was not padlocked. The manager of the Times Advertising Acceptability Department said

that he had not checked the copy for accuracy because he had no cause to believe it false, and some of the signers were well-known persons whose reputation he had no reason to question.

The trial jury ruled that Sullivan had been libeled and awarded him \$500,000, the full amount of his claim. The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the finding and judgment. But the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision, holding that the Alabama rule of law was “constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments \* \* \*.”

The Court said there was no merit to the claim of Sullivan that a paid, commercial advertisement does not ever deserve constitutional protection. Of this advertisement it said:<sup>3</sup>

It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public concern \* \*. That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold \* \* \*. Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying “editorial advertisements” of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities—who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. The effect would be to shackle the First Amendment \* \* .

The Court said that the question about the advertisement was whether it forfeited constitutional protection “by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of respondent”.

The Court rejected the position that the falsity of some of the factual statements in the advertisement destroyed constitutional protection for the Times and the clergymen. “[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and \* \* \* it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive,’ \* \* \*” it ruled. Quoting the decision in *Sweeney v. Patterson*,<sup>4</sup> it added that “‘Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their governors \* \* \*. Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate.’”

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 266.

<sup>4</sup> 76 U.S.App.D.C. 23, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1952).

Elaborating the matter of truth and error, it said that it is not enough for a state to provide in its law that the defendant may plead the truth of his words, although that has long been considered a bulwark for protection of expression:<sup>5</sup>

A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a \* \* \* “self-censorship.” Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars \* \* \*. Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so \* \* \*. The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.

This was the end for Alabama’s rule that “the defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars.” But the decision reached much farther than to Alabama: most states had similar rules under which public officials had successfully brought libel suits for decades. In holding that the Constitution protects even erroneous statements about public officials in their public acts, the Court was providing protection that only a minority of states had previously accepted.

Having decided that the constitutional protection was not destroyed by the falsity of factual statements in the advertisement, the Court added that the protection was not lost through defamation of an official. “Criticism of their official conduct,” the Court held, “does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations.”<sup>6</sup>

Then Mr. Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority decision, stated the circumstances under which a public official could recover damages for false defamation: Only if malice were present in the publication:<sup>7</sup>

The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with

<sup>5</sup> *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 84 S.Ct. 710, 725 (1964).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 273.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 279–280.

“actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

That statement of the court not only gave the broadest protection to publications critical of public officials that had been granted by the “minority rule” states which had held similarly for almost 50 years. It also defined “malice” with a rigor and preciseness that it had seldom been given. Malice was not the vague, shifting concept of ancient convenience for judges who had been shocked or angered by words harshly critical of public officials. It was not the oft-used “evidence of ill-will” on the part of the publisher; it was not “hatred” of the publisher for the defamed; it was not “intent to harm” the defamed; it was not to be found in “attributing bad motives” to the defamed. Rather, the malice which the plaintiff would have to plead and prove lay in the publisher’s knowledge that what he printed was false, or else disregard on the part of the publisher as to whether it was false or not.

The state courts, it was soon plain, were required to recognize and use the new malice rule. This was noted in the decision in a case brought in the District of Columbia by Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut against columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. The federal district court decision said of Senator Dodd, his case, and the new rule as to malice:<sup>8</sup>

\* \* \* his rights in an action for libel have been limited by the decision in the *Sullivan* case. In this respect the law of libel now completely departs from the common law of libel that prevails in England and that existed in this country prior to 1964. The rule of the *Sullivan* case is predicated not merely on the law of libel but on a constitutional principle, namely, freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.

\* \* \*

The fact that the *Sullivan* case is predicated on a constitutional principle makes it applicable not only to the federal courts but also to the States.

The Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech and press, then, protects all that is said about a public official in his public conduct except the malicious. But did “public official” mean every person who is employed by government at any level? Justice Brennan foresaw that this question would arise, and said in a footnote in the *New York Times* case: “We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the ranks of government employees the ‘public official’ designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included \* \* \*. It is enough for the present case

<sup>8</sup> *Dodd v. Pearson*, 277 F.Supp. 469 (D.C.D.C.1967). See also *Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks*, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197 (1967).



that respondent's position as an elected city commissioner clearly made him a public official \* \* \*"<sup>9</sup>

As subsequent cases under the *Times v. Sullivan* doctrine arose, some definition of the public official who would have to prove malice in bringing libel suit occurred. In 1966, *Rosenblatt v. Baer* helped the definition. Newspaper columnist Alfred D. Rosenblatt wrote in the *Laconia Evening Citizen* that a public ski area which in previous years had been a financially shaky operation, now was doing "hundreds of percent" better. He asked, "What happened to all the money last year? And every other year?" Baer, who had been dismissed from his county post as ski area supervisor the year before, brought a suit charging that the column libeled him. The New Hampshire court upheld his complaint and awarded him \$31,500. But when the case reached the United States Supreme Court, it reversed and remanded the case. It said that Baer did indeed come within the "public official" category:<sup>10</sup>

Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free discussion. Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest criticism of government be penalized. It is clear, therefore, that the "public official" designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.

The Court also said that the *Times v. Sullivan* rule may apply to a person who has left public office, as Baer had, where public interest in the matter at issue is still substantial.

Meanwhile, cases that did not reach the United States Supreme Court were working their way through state courts. During 1964, the Pennsylvania court applied the rule to a senator who was candidate for re-election.<sup>11</sup> Shortly, state legislators were included,<sup>12</sup> a former mayor,<sup>13</sup> a deputy sheriff,<sup>14</sup> a school board member,<sup>15</sup> an

<sup>9</sup> *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, fn. 23 (1964).

<sup>10</sup> *Rosenblatt v. Baer*, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966).

<sup>11</sup> *Clark v. Allen*, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A.2d 42 (1964).

<sup>12</sup> *Washington Post Co. v. Keogh*, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 365 F.2d 965 (1966); *Rose v. Koch and Christian Research, Inc.*, 278 Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d 409 (1967).

<sup>13</sup> *Lundstrom v. Winnebago Newspapers, Inc.*, 58 Ill.App.2d 33, 206 N.E.2d 525 (1965).

<sup>14</sup> *St. Amant v. Thompson*, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323 (1968).

<sup>15</sup> *Cabin v. Community Newspapers, Inc.*, 50 Misc.2d 574, 270 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1966).

appointed city tax assessor,<sup>16</sup> and a police sergeant.<sup>17</sup>

## SEC. 21. PUBLIC FIGURES AND PUBLIC ISSUES

The doctrine of *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* extends the requirement of proving actual malice to public figures, such as nonofficial persons who involve themselves in the resolution of public questions, as well as to public officials; but private persons involved in matters of public interest or general concern that become news stories do not have to meet the requirement.

In the *Rosenblatt* case treated above, Mr. Justice William O. Douglas of the Supreme Court wrote a separate concurring opinion. In it he raised the question of what persons and what issues might call for an extension of the *Times v. Sullivan* doctrine beyond "public officials." He said:<sup>18</sup>

\* \* \* I see no way to draw lines that exclude the night watchman, the file clerk, the typist, or, for that matter, anyone on the public payroll. And how about those who contract to carry out governmental missions? Some of them are as much in the public domain as any so-called officeholder. And how about the dollar-a-year man \* \* ? And the industrialists who raise the price of a basic commodity? Are not steel and aluminum in the public domain? And the labor leader who combines trade unionism with bribery and racketeering? Surely the public importance of collective bargaining puts labor as well as management into the public arena so far as the present constitutional issue is concerned \* \* \*. [T]he question is whether a public issue not a public official, is involved.

And in 1966, the decision in a suit brought by the noted scientist and Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Linus Pauling, indeed said that not only "public officials" would have to prove malice if they were to succeed with libel suits.

Pauling sued the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* for alleged libel in an editorial entitled "Glorification of Deceit." It referred to an appearance by Pauling before a subcommittee of the United States Senate, in connection with Pauling's attempts to promote a nuclear test ban treaty. It read in part: "Pauling contemptuously refused to testify and was cited for contempt of Congress. He appealed to the United States District Court to rid him of the contempt citation, which that Court refused to do. The appeal from the lower court's affirmation

<sup>16</sup> *Eadie v. Pole*, 91 N.J.Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (1966).

<sup>17</sup> *Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, Inc.*, 84 Ill.App.2d 239, 228 N.E.2d 172 (1967).

<sup>18</sup> *Rosenblatt v. Baer*, 383 U.S. 75, 89, 86 S.Ct. 669, 678 (1966).

of contempt is expected to be handed down by the Supreme Court today.”

Pauling said that he had not been cited for contempt, that he had not appealed to any court to rid himself of any contempt citation and that no appeal was expected because there had been no affirmation.

The federal court conceded that Pauling was not a “public official” such as the plaintiff in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*. But it added:<sup>19</sup>

We feel, however, that the implications of the Supreme Court's majority opinions are clear. Professor Pauling, by his public statements and actions, was projecting himself into the arena of public controversy and into the very “vortex of the discussion of a question of pressing public concern”. He was attempting to influence the resolution of an issue which was important, which was of profound effect, which was public and which was internationally controversial \* \* \*

\* \* \*

We \* \* \* feel that a rational distinction cannot be founded on assumption that criticism of private citizens who seek to lead in the determination of national policy will be less important to the public interest than will criticism of government officials. A lobbyist, a person dominant in a political party, the head of any pressure group, or any significant leader may possess a capacity for influencing public policy as great or greater than that of a comparatively minor public official who is clearly subject to *New York Times*. It would seem, therefore, that if such a person seeks to realize upon his capacity to guide public policy and in the process is criticized, he should have no greater remedy than does his counterpart in public office.

Pauling took his case to the United States Supreme Court, but that court denied certiorari, and the lower court's decision stood.<sup>20</sup>

While public figure Linus Pauling was thus being embraced within the *Times v. Sullivan* rules, another man who had formerly been a general in the United States Army was undertaking a set of “chain” libel suits. This was retired Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker, who after a storm of controversy over his troop-indoctrination program had resigned from the Army in 1961. Opposed to the integration of the University of Mississippi, he had in 1962 appeared on the scene there when rioting took place over the enrollment of Negro James H. Meredith. An Associated Press dispatch, circulated

<sup>19</sup> Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d 188, 195-196 (8th Cir. 1966).

<sup>20</sup> Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc.2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1966).

to member newspapers around the nation, said that Walker had taken command of a violent crowd and had personally led a charge against federal marshals. Further, it described Walker as encouraging rioters to use violence.

Walker's chain libel suits totalled \$23,000,000 against the *Louisville Courier-Journal* and *Louisville Times* and their radio station; against *Atlanta Newspapers Inc.* and publisher Ralph McGill; against the Associated Press, the *Denver Post*, the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* and its publisher, Amon G. Carter, Jr.; against *Newsweek*, the Pulitzer Publishing Co. (*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*), and against the *Delta (Miss.) Democrat-Times* and its editor, Hodding Carter.<sup>21</sup>

Walker's case for recovery reached the Supreme Court of the United States through a suit against the Associated Press which he filed in Texas. He had been awarded \$500,000 by the trial court. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld the judgment, and stated without elaboration that the *Times v. Sullivan* rule was not applicable. The Supreme Court of Texas denied a writ of error,<sup>22</sup> and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The U.S. Supreme Court decided *Associated Press v. Walker and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts* in the same opinion.<sup>23</sup> Wallace Butts was former athletic director of the University of Georgia, and had brought suit against Curtis for a story in the *Saturday Evening Post* that had accused him of conspiring to "fix" a football game between Georgia and the University of Alabama. Neither Walker nor Butts was a "public official" and the late Justice John M. Harlan's opinion said explicitly that the Court took up the two cases to consider the impact of the *Times v. Sullivan* rule "on libel actions instituted by persons who are not public officials, but who are 'public figures' and involved in issues in which the public has a justified and important interest."<sup>24</sup>

Four opinions were delivered by the Court. All agreed that Walker, a "public figure," did not have grounds for recovery. Justice Harlan wrote the opinion endorsed by the largest number of justices: Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas joined him, making a total of four. They agreed that a publication deserves constitutional protection under the First Amendment. But while Walker was a man of "some political prominence" and a public figure "by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy," he was not to be treated in libel exactly the same as a "public official" would be.

<sup>21</sup> Editor & Publisher, Oct. 5, 1963, p. 10.

<sup>22</sup> *Associated Press v. Walker*, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Civ.App.1965).

<sup>23</sup> *Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts*, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 134.

Justice Harlan rejected the *Times v. Sullivan* malice rule as inapplicable to public figure Walker. Instead of using that rule requiring a plaintiff to show reckless disregard of falsity on the part of the publisher in order to recover, he expressed a new standard for a public figure:<sup>25</sup>

We consider and would hold that a "public figure" who is not a public official may \* \* \* recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.

While this opinion did not define "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure" from responsible reporting standards, it examined AP's work in this case and found no such departure:<sup>26</sup>

[T]he dispatch [of the AP reporter] which concerns us in *Walker* was news which required immediate dissemination. The Associated Press received the information from a correspondent who was present at the scene of the events and gave every indication of being trustworthy and competent. His dispatches in this instance, with one minor exception, were internally consistent and would not have seemed unreasonable to one familiar with General Walker's prior publicized statements on the underlying controversy. Considering the necessity for rapid dissemination, nothing in this series of events gives the slightest hint of a severe departure from accepted publishing standards.

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the Associated Press, the group with Justice Harlan finding no "severe departure from accepted publishing standards" in the AP reporter's work, and Chief Justice Warren, with Justices Brennan and White, finding no "reckless disregard" of truth or falsity in his work, and hence no malice.

But both groups of justices found that the libel judgment against the *Saturday Evening Post* should stand. Athletic director Wallace Butts of the University of Georgia had won \$460,000 in his suit against the Post. The magazine stated that Butts had revealed his school's football secrets to Alabama coach Paul Bryant just before a game between the schools. The article said that one George Burnett had accidentally been connected, in using the telephone, to the conversation between the two in which Butts told Bryant the secrets. According to the article, Burnett made notes of the conversation as he listened, and the Post obtained his story.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 155.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 158-159.

Justice Harlan's analysis of the Post's methods of investigation—analysis that was noted with approval in the separate opinion of Chief Justice Warren—found the Post wanting. He said, in part:<sup>27</sup>

The evidence showed that the Butts story was in no sense “hot news” and the editors of the magazine recognized the need for a thorough investigation of the serious charges. Elementary precautions were, nevertheless, ignored. The Saturday Evening Post knew that Burnett had been placed on probation in connection with bad check charges, but proceeded to publish the story on the basis of his affidavit without substantial independent support. Burnett's notes were not even viewed by any of the magazine personnel prior to publication. John Carmichael who was supposed to have been with Burnett when the phone call was overheard was not interviewed. No attempt was made to screen the films of the game to see if Burnett's information was accurate, and no attempt was made to find out whether Alabama had adjusted its plans after the alleged divulgence of information.

Justice Harlan found this kind of reporting to be “highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.” And in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, it was evidence of “reckless disregard” of whether the statements were false or not.

While a majority of the Court thus agreed that Butts should recover damages and Walker should not, they were also, thus, of two opinions as to whether the *Times v. Sullivan* malice rule applying to public officials should also apply to these “public figures.” Justice Harlan, as described above, expressed and applied a different standard—“extreme departure” from responsible reporting standards by a news medium was enough to warrant recovery by the defamed, he wrote. But Chief Justice Warren felt that the *Times v. Sullivan* malice rule should be applied to public figures as much as to public officials. This, of course, was what several lower courts had said in other cases since *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*. Chief Justice Warren wrote:<sup>28</sup>

To me, differentiation between “public figures” and “public officials” and adoption of separate standards of proof for each has no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy. Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred \* \*. This blending of positions and power has \* \* \* occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless intimate-

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 163–165.

ly involved in the resolution of important public questions, or by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.

Viewed in this context then, it is plain that although they are not subject to the restraints of the political process, "public figures" like "public officials," often play an influential role in ordering society \* \* \*. Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of "public officials."

\* \* \*

[T]he *New York Times* standard is an important safeguard for the rights of the press and public to inform and be informed on matters of legitimate interest. Evenly applied to cases involving "public men"—whether they be "public officials" or "public figures"—it will afford the necessary insulation for the fundamental interests which the First Amendment was designed to protect.

\* \* \*

Under any reasoning, General Walker was a public man in whose public conduct society and the press had a legitimate and substantial interest.

Chief Justice Warren also criticized the "extreme departure" formula which Justice Harlan substituted for the *Times v. Sullivan* malice rule. He said he could not believe that "a standard which is based on such an unusual and uncertain formulation" could either guide a jury or afford "the protection for speech and debate that is fundamental to our society and guaranteed by the First Amendment."<sup>29</sup>

Since Justice Harlan's opinion lacked majority support in the Court of nine persons, it cannot be said to have the force of a Court-adopted rule. Yet his standard of "extreme departure" from responsible reporting has had a persistent influence in subsequent decisions.<sup>30</sup>

In an evolving sphere of the law, lower courts seek guidance not only in rules endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court but also in opinions embraced by fewer than five justices. That search,

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.

<sup>30</sup> *Cerrito v. Time, Inc.*, 302 F.Supp. 1071 (D.C.Cal.1969); *Fotochrome Inc. v. New York Herald Tribune Inc.*, 61 Misc.2d 226, 305 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1969); *Holmes v. Curtis Pub. Co.*, 303 F.Supp. 522, 525 (D.C.S.C.1969); *Buckley v. Vidal*, 50 F.R.D. 271 (D.C.N.Y.1970); *Cervantes v. Time Inc.*, 330 F.Supp. 936 (D.C.Mo. 1971). See esp. *Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch*, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 341 N.E.2d 569 (1975) for the New York courts' development of a "fault" standard in libel cases brought by private persons under *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).

apparent in courts' occasional use of Justice Harlan's "extreme departure" standard, was vastly more prominent in their employment and elaboration of Justice Douglas' reasoning in *Rosenblatt v. Baer*, 1966.<sup>31</sup> Pointing out first, in his concurring opinion, why public figures as well as public officials should be required to prove actual malice in libel suits, Douglas then went further and said it really didn't matter much whether the people involved were public or private: The heart of the matter was " \* \* \* whether a public issue not a public official, is involved." For the next eight years, courts struggled with variations on this theme before a majority of the Supreme Court ruled in *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*,<sup>32</sup> and rejected it.

During this period 1967–1974, private persons involved in matters of public interest (Douglas' "public issues") were often faced with proving *New York Times* malice in their libel suits, no matter that many were unwilling participants in public events. Not only Douglas' reasoning supported the extension of the rule to private persons. A 1967 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the realm of privacy—*Time, Inc. v. Hill*—did also.<sup>33</sup>

*Life* magazine had published an article about a play based on a book about a family held hostage in its home by convicts. The article said that the novel was "inspired" by the true-life ordeal of the James Hill family. Hill sued, saying the article gave the impression that the play "mirrored the Hill family's experience" and referred to the play as a re-enactment of the Hills' ordeal, whereas *Life* knew this to be false. Hill won at trial, *Life* appealed, and the Supreme Court brought the *Times v. Sullivan* rule to bear against Hill. It said that a play is a matter of public interest, and even though Hill was a private citizen, he would have to prove that *Life* published the report with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth—the new actual malice of *Times v. Sullivan*.<sup>34</sup> (The case is discussed in Chap. 6.)

Having borrowed the malice rule from libel to apply it in privacy, the law now reversed the flow: It took the new "matter of public interest" interpretation—the broadest possible application of the public principle—from the *Time v. Hill* privacy case and began applying it in libel. The private individual who believed he was defamed would have to prove actual malice if the damaging news story concerned any matter of public interest. Now lower courts put this rule to work in libel suits brought by a mail-order medical

<sup>31</sup> 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966).

<sup>32</sup> 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).

<sup>33</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 388.



testing laboratory against CBS and Walter Cronkite;<sup>35</sup> by a man who said he had been identified incorrectly by NBC as a homosexual who had involved himself in the defense of Lee Harvey Oswald, accused assassin of Pres. John F. Kennedy;<sup>36</sup> by taxicab firm owners who said they were falsely charged in a newspaper with furnishing liquor to minors;<sup>37</sup> by a basketball player of whom a magazine said he was "destroyed" professionally by the skill of another.<sup>38</sup>

Then in the famous case of *Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.*,<sup>39</sup> in 1971, a plurality of three justices of the U.S. Supreme Court approved extending the actual malice requirement in libel whenever the news was a "matter of public interest." It denied recovery for libel to George Rosenbloom, distributor of nudist magazines in Philadelphia, a private citizen involved in a matter of public interest. Metromedia radio station WIP had said Rosenbloom had been arrested on charges of possessing obscene literature, and linked him to the "smut literature rackets." Later acquitted of obscenity charges, Rosenbloom sued for libel in the WIP broadcasts, and won \$275,000 in trial court before losing upon the station's appeal. In the U.S. Supreme Court, five justices agreed that Rosenbloom should not recover. Three of them endorsed the "matter of public interest" rationale, laid out in Justice William J. Brennan's plurality opinion:<sup>40</sup>

If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event \* \* \*. We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.

Lower courts accepted the plurality opinion as ruling. The sweep of "matter of public or general interest" was so powerful that few libel suits, whether by public or private persons, were won. Commentators on press law forecast the disappearance of libel suits.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *United Medical Laboratories, Inc., v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.*, 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), certiorari denied 394 U.S. 921, 89 S.Ct. 1197 (1969).

<sup>36</sup> *Davis v. National Broadcasting Co.*, 320 F.Supp. 1070 (D.C.La.1970).

<sup>37</sup> *West v. Northern Pub. Co.*, 487 P.2d 1304 (Alaska 1971).

<sup>38</sup> *Time, Inc. v. Johnston*, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).

<sup>39</sup> 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811 (1971).

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, at 1824.

<sup>41</sup> Frederick C. Coonradt, "The Courts Have All But Repealed the Libel Laws," Center Report, Dec. 1971, p. 26; Donald M. Gillmor, "The Residual Rights of Reputation and Privacy," *The Future of Press Freedom* (Racine, Wis., Johnson Foundation, May 1972), p. 25.

But in mid-1974, hardly three years after *Rosenbloom*, the support of a three-justice plurality in that decision for the “matter of public interest” interpretation revealed itself as a shaky foundation. A five-man majority of the U.S. Supreme Court rejected it as a rule in *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*:<sup>42</sup> Requiring private persons libeled in stories that were “matters of public interest” to prove actual malice was not required by the Constitution.

## SEC. 22. SEPARATING PUBLIC FIGURES AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

**Distinguishing a public from a private person under *Gertz* rests on either of two bases—fame, notoriety, power or influence that render one a public figure for all purposes, and the status that makes one a public figure only for a limited range of issues. In either case, the person assumes special prominence in the resolution of public questions, or invites attention and comment.**

Elmer Gertz, a Chicago lawyer, was retained by a family to bring a civil action against Policeman Nuccio who had shot and killed their son and had been convicted of second degree murder. *American Opinion*, a monthly publication given to the views of the John Birch Society, carried an article saying that Gertz was an architect of a “frame-up” of Nuccio, that he was part of a communist conspiracy to discredit local police, and that he was a Leninist and a “Communist-fronter.” Gertz, who was none of these things, brought a libel suit, and for six years battled the shifting uncertainties of the courts’ attitudes toward “public official,” “public figure,” and “matter of public interest” for the purposes of libel. A jury found libel *per se* and awarded Gertz \$50,000 in damages. But the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals<sup>43</sup> ruled that because the *American Opinion* story concerned a matter of public interest, Gertz would have to show actual malice on its part, even though he might be a private citizen. Objecting, Gertz appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

### **Private Individuals Exempted from Actual Malice Rule.**

With four other justices agreeing, Justice Powell wrote for the majority.<sup>44</sup> The plurality opinion in *Rosenbloom v. Metromedia*, relied on by the Circuit Court, should not stand. Justice Powell had no quarrel with requiring public officials and public figures to prove actual malice in their libel suits. But he reasoned that the legitimate state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals—of whom it was found, Gertz was one—requires

<sup>42</sup> 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).

<sup>43</sup> *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 471 F.2d 801 (1972).

<sup>44</sup> *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).

that such persons be treated differently. They are at a disadvantage, compared with public officials and public figures, where they are defamed: <sup>45</sup>

Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.

More important than the likelihood that private individuals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there is a compelling normative consideration underlying the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. \* \* \*

Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.

\* \* \* the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office nor assumed an "influential role in ordering society." \* \* \* He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.

### States Not To Impose Liability Without Fault.

For the above reasons, then, private individuals would not in the future have to meet the constitutional standard of proving actual malice. Instead, said the majority, states might set their own standards (adopt laws) imposing liability for defamatory falsehood harming private individuals—"so long as they do not impose liability without fault." <sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 3009-10.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 3010, emphasis supplied.

What did “liability without fault” mean? The Court was saying that states were not to use an ancient rule in “libel *per se*”—that with those words that are damaging on their face, the law presumes injury to reputation and the only question is the amount of damages that may be recovered. This was part of the long-standing rule of “strict liability” in libel; and the court said that the media must be shielded from strict liability. As for the “fault” that the plaintiff would have to show, Powell termed it “negligence.”

### Recovery of Presumed and Punitive Damages Barred.

The Court then elaborated the limits of the “strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.” It said that state laws would not be permitted to provide “recovery of presumed or punitive damages” but only “compensation for actual injury.”<sup>47</sup> An exception could occur where the plaintiff could show the knowing or reckless falsehood of the *New York Times* standard. It found that awarding presumed damages (“compensatory” or “general” damages)<sup>48</sup> given where there is no demonstrated loss, “unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms.”<sup>49</sup> It found that punitive damages do the same, and also are “wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. \* \* \* they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”<sup>50</sup>

Precisely what the Court meant by the permitted “compensation for actual injury” was not spelled out, but Justice Powell made it plain that he was not speaking strictly of compensation for proved dollar losses flowing from false defamation:<sup>51</sup>

We need not define “actual injury,” as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. \* \* \* all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 3011. This was close to Justice Marshall’s position in *Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.*, 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1836–38 (1971), above.

<sup>48</sup> Below, Chap. 5, Sec. 26.

<sup>49</sup> *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3011–12 (1974).

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 3012.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

Dissenting Justices Douglas and Brennan, who wanted to affirm the Court of Appeals finding against Gertz, found that the decision damaged the protection which mass media ought to have under the First Amendment. Douglas repeated his view that the First Amendment would bar Congress from passing any libel law; and like Congress, "States are without power 'to use a civil libel law or any other law to impose damages for merely discussing public affairs'." <sup>52</sup>

Brennan, who had written the plurality opinion in *Rosenbloom*, reiterated his point there: "Matters of public or general interest do not 'suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved'." <sup>53</sup> He found unconvincing the majority's reasoning that the private individual deserves a more lenient rule in libel than the public official or public figure. As to their comparative ability to respond through the media to defamation, he said it is unproved and highly improbable that the public figure will have better access to the media. The ability of all to get access will depend on the "same complex factor \* \* \* : the unpredictable event of the media's continuing interest in the story." As to the assumption that private people deserve special treatment because they do not assume the risk of defamation by freely entering the public arena, he relied on *Time, Inc. v. Hill* which had developed the reasoning that " \* \* \* voluntarily or not, we are all 'public' men to some degree." <sup>54</sup>

Brennan viewed the majority decision in *Gertz* as requiring media to observe a "reasonable care" standard, and said it would lead to self-censorship as publishers would weigh carefully, under it, "a myriad of uncertain factors before publication." The majority's examples of the "actual injury" for which states might provide compensation, he thought, were wide-ranging, and would give a jury bent on punishing expression of unpopular views a "formidable weapon for doing so." Finally, even if recovery were limited under "actual injury" rules, that would not stop the self-censorship arising from the fear of having to defend one's publication in an expensive and drawn-out libel suit. Brennan believed that the "general or public interest" concept that he expressed in *Rosenbloom* would lead to far less self-censorship by publishers than would state laws imposing liability for negligent falsehood. <sup>55</sup>

While Brennan and Douglas feared that the decision would damage the media's protection, and Chief Justice Burger thought it

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 3015.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 3018.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 3019.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 3020.

could inhibit some editors,<sup>56</sup> to Justice Byron White the decision endangered quite the opposite party: the ordinary citizen who might be defamed. White's opinion, the longest in the case, placed his central objections to the majority in its "scuttling the libel laws of the States in \* \* \* wholesale fashion."<sup>57</sup>

The majority accomplished this, he said:<sup>58</sup>

- By requiring the plaintiff in defamation actions to prove the defendant's culpability beyond his act of publishing defamation (i. e., the plaintiff could no longer have an actionable case by merely showing "libel *per se*;" he would also have to prove "fault" on the part of the publisher—variously referred to in the Gertz opinions as "negligence" or lack of "reasonable care");
- By requiring the plaintiff to prove actual damage to reputation resulting from the publication (i. e., no longer would harm be presumed and general damages automatic as under the libel *per se* rule);

In addition, White deplored the fact that it would no longer be possible to recover punitive damages by showing malice in the traditional (tort-related) sense of ill will; now the *Times v. Sullivan* malice—knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of truth—would be required.

White found that all this deprived the private citizen of his "historic recourse" under libel *per se* as recognized by all 50 states, to redress damaging falsehoods; he made no reference to the fact that libel under the old tort rules had had a shrunken role since *Times v. Sullivan* in 1964 had brought the offense under the Constitution, and that hardly a handful of judgments under them had been won by plaintiffs during the decade.

### Gertz as a Private Individual.

Returning, now, to Gertz and the finding that he was a private individual rather than a public person: The Supreme Court majority first brushed off the notion that he might be considered a public *official*.

He'd never had a remunerative government position, and his only "office" had been as a member of mayor's housing committees years before. As for the suggestion that he was a "de facto public official" because he had appeared at the coroner's inquest into the murder (incidental to his representing the family in civil litigation): If that made him a "public official," the court said, all lawyers would become such in their status as "officers of the court," and

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 3014.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 3022.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 3024–25.

that would distort the plain meaning of the "public official" category beyond all recognition.<sup>59</sup>

But the thorny possibility that Gertz was a public figure remained. Because lower courts have so frequently drawn on the Supreme Court's treatment of the matter in *Gertz*, detail is called for here.

To start with, the court said, the public figure designation may rest on either of two alternative bases, and the persons in either case "assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions."<sup>60</sup> In either case, "they invite attention and comment."

1. The first of the two is that kind of individual who "may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety," or many occupy a position of "such persuasive power and influence," that he is deemed a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. One should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life, "absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society."

Gertz was not public figure under this first rubric. He had, indeed, been active in community and professional affairs, serving as an officer of local civil groups and various legal agencies. He had published several works on law. Thus he was well-known in some circles. But he had "achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community." No member of the jury panel, for example, had ever heard of him.

2. The second of the "two alternative bases" under which some persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions or in the affairs of society is more common. (a) Here, "an individual voluntarily injects himself \* \* \* into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Alternative wording used by the court was that "commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." (b) As a variant of this "public figure for a limited range of issues," the court identified the person who has not voluntarily entered a particular public controversy, but is "drawn into" it.

In determining the status of this person who has no general fame or notoriety in the community, the court said the procedure should be "to reduce the public figure question to a \* \* \* meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation." Doing this for Attorney Gertz, the court found

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 3012.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 3013. Succeeding definitions and procedure in determining "public figure" are taken from *Gertz*, pp. 3009 and 3013.

again that he was not a public figure: He had played only a minimal role at the coroner's inquest, and only as the representative of a private client; he had had no part in the criminal prosecution of Officer Nuccio; he had never discussed the case with the press; and he "did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue \* \* \* nor "engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." Gertz was not, by this second basis, a public figure, and he would not, consequently, have to prove that *American Opinion* libeled him with actual malice. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial.

The modification of *Times v. Sullivan* and *Rosenbloom* by *Gertz* was a damaging retreat in protection, in the eyes of media commentators; Justice White's prediction that *Gertz* would be popular with media was nowhere to be found in professional journalism publications.<sup>61</sup> Even in the years of maximum protection, when lower courts—on their own at first and later under the *Rosenbloom* plurality—were requiring private persons to prove actual malice in their libel suits, it was not clear that there was any reduction in the number of suits brought (although the number of judgments won on appeal had dropped sharply). Now, journalists suspected that although there were gains for the media under *Gertz*—in requiring plaintiffs to show fault and in limiting sharply the reach of punitive damages—it was on the whole a great door-opener for libel suits by private plaintiffs who no longer had to prove actual malice.

David A. Anderson, legal scholar and former journalist, argues that even under the protection of the *Rosenbloom* interpretation, the self-censorship by the press which *Times v. Sullivan* had sought to minimize in establishing the malice rule and other safeguards, was real.<sup>62</sup> Not exclusively, but particularly, he finds, the unconventional, non-established media, sometimes known as the "alternative" press, and the world of magazines, are forced to self-censorship under *Gertz*. The people about whom the alternative press writes are frequently from spheres of life not much handled by the established newspaper media, and thus not established as "public figures." Further, he feels, the *Gertz* negligence standard could work out to be defined in the late Justice Harlan's terms in *Curtis Publishing Co.*—"the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." "For the advocacy press, adoption of this test would be disastrous," he says. "How much protection will the negligence requirement of *Gertz* give a small underground newspaper if its practices are to be compared with

<sup>61</sup> Press Censorship Newsletter No. V, Aug.-Sept. 1974, p. 6. D. Charles Whitney, "Libel \* \* \*," Quill, Aug. 1974, pp. 22-25.

<sup>62</sup> David A. Anderson, *Libel and Press Self-Censorship*, 53 *Tex.L.Rev.* 422 (1975).



those of *The New York Times*?"<sup>63</sup> A further problem for the unconventional, of course, is the high cost of legal defense.

### Courts Determine the "Public" and the "Private" under *Gertz*.

Whatever the level of press self-censorship under *Gertz* may be, subsequent cases show that media will need to be discriminating; to distinguish the "public" from the "private" is not easy, even for the courts. One judge has said that the two concepts are "nebulous," and "Defining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall."<sup>64</sup>

Starting with the individual who is deemed a public figure for all purposes and contexts, such were the children of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The parents had been executed in 1953 after a trial for conspiring to give national defense information to the Soviet Union.<sup>65</sup> A book by Attorney Louis Nizer, *The Implosion Conspiracy*, had told of the trial and of the Rosenberg children, Michael and Robert. They sued Nizer for libel in his use of letters written by their parents. The court, quoting *Gertz*, ruled that beyond any doubt, the two had "assumed roles of especial prominence in society." "As children of famous parents, they achieved 'general fame or notoriety in the community'."<sup>66</sup> It did not avail that the children later may have renounced the public spotlight by changing their name (to "Meeropol"). The Meeropols, as public figures, would have to prove actual malice on Nizer's part. Few libel plaintiffs since *Gertz* have so flatly been adjudged public figures for all purposes through "general fame or notoriety in the community," or for their persuasive power and influence.<sup>67</sup>

Far more common than the person of fame or power who is a public figure for all purposes is the individual who is such for a "limited range of issues." And among these, persons found by courts to have "voluntarily injected" or "thrust" themselves into a public controversy to influence the resolution of the issues are most numerous. Thus Dr. Frederick Exner for two decades and more had been "injecting" and "thrusting" himself into the fluoridation-of-water controversy through speeches, litigation, books, and articles. When he brought a libel suit for a magazine's criticism of his position, he was adjudged a public figure for "the limited issue of fluoridation" by having assumed leadership and by having attempt-

<sup>63</sup> *Id.*, "The Selective Impact of Libel Law," *Columbia Journalism Review*, 14:1, May/June 1975, pp. 38, 39.

<sup>64</sup> *Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.*, 411 F.Supp. 440, 443 (S.D.Ga.1976).

<sup>65</sup> *Meeropol v. Nizer*, 381 F.Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y.1974).

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>67</sup> *See Bandelin v. Pietsch et al.*, 2 Med.L.Rptr. 1600 (Ida., Decision 3/14/77); *Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co.*, 384 F.Supp. 166, 169 (C.D.Cal.1974); *Kapiloff v. Dunn*, 27 Md.App. 514, 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975).

ed to influence the outcome of the issue. He had taken the role of "attempting to order society" in its concern with fluoridation.<sup>68</sup>

Harry Buchanan and his firm were retained to perform accounting services for the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President in 1971. Common Cause brought suit in 1972 to force the Committee to report transactions, and Buchanan's deposition was taken in the matter. In reporting the suit, Associated Press compared matters involving Buchanan with the handling of money by convicted Watergate conspirator Bernard L. Barker. Buchanan sued AP for libel, and on the question whether he was a public figure, the court said "yes." There was intense interest in campaign finances at the time Buchanan was working for the Committee. The system he helped set up for the Committee and the cash transactions in which he took part, were legitimate matters of public scrutiny and concern. Buchanan was a key person for attempts to investigate. He was an agent of the Committee who voluntarily accepted his role, and as such a public figure.<sup>69</sup>

Turning now to those persons "drawn into" public controversy: *Gertz* included such as public figures, yet hedged: "\* \* \* it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."<sup>70</sup> In point is the case of the debt-collecting agency, Trans World Accounts. The Associated Press carried a story based on a press release of the Federal Trade Commission which said it intended to issue various complaints against Trans World and others, charging certain unfair and deceptive practices. AP got part of it wrong. It erroneously included Trans World among those accused of using threatening letters and misrepresenting themselves as bona fide collection agencies. When Trans World sued for libel, AP said Trans World was a public figure and should be required to prove actual malice.

The court said that *Gertz* recognizes that a person (read "corporation" in this case) may become a public figure for a limited range of issues by having been "drawn into a particular public controversy." It said that the FTC had investigated Trans World, found potentially harmful activities by the firm, and published its decision to issue a proposed complaint, and "thus draws the named respondent into a particular public controversy." It elaborated:<sup>71</sup>

Trans World may not have been a "public figure" until the proposed complaint issued but when it did it was clearly

<sup>68</sup> *Exner v. American Medical Association et al.*, 12 Wash.App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974).

<sup>69</sup> *Buchanan v. Associated Press*, 398 F.Supp. 1196 (D.D.C.1975).

<sup>70</sup> *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3009 (1974).

<sup>71</sup> *Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press et al.*, 425 F.Supp. 814 (N.D.Cal.1977).

drawn into a particular controversy having its origin in Trans World's own conduct and activities and thereby became a public figure for the limited range of issues relating to the FTC complaint.

One may argue that it is not appropriate to speak of Trans World's being "drawn into" public controversy because the root of the matter was its own activity which the FTC saw as misbehavior. On the other hand, if Trans World was not "drawn into" public controversy, could one accurately say that it "voluntarily injected" or "thrust" itself in? *Gertz* provides a solution for classifying such people, whose behavior results in official process against them but who are not clearly "drawn" and do not clearly "thrust": public figures include those whose activities "invite attention and comment." Ilya Wolston, for example, failed to respond to a grand jury subpoena and was convicted of contempt; and in a libel suit he brought later, the court did not worry much about whether he had been "drawn" or whether he "thrust" himself into the subpoena controversy that made him a public figure. It was enough that his failure to respond to the subpoena "invited attention and comment."<sup>72</sup>

Mrs. Mary Troman was "drawn" into a public controversy by a newspaper which, she said, implied that her home was a gang headquarters, when it was no such thing. The court ruled she was private, not public. She had not "invited attention or comment" and by no means had "injected" herself into public controversy.<sup>73</sup> In another case, the Washington Supreme Court said that "When chance and the news media bring a private citizen into the public eye," the right to redress for defamation is not diminished so long as the notoriety was not of the citizen's choosing.<sup>74</sup>

Persons such as Mrs. Troman may help the journalist shape and carry a mental image of the private individual, and remember the lesson that "private figures" do not necessarily lose that status overnight by sudden media publicity. The somewhat uncertain litmus of "any who escape the *Gertz* definitions" may serve as a rough, imperfect, and non-exhaustive guide to "private" individuals:

Those who do not assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions or the affairs of society;

Those without fame or notoriety in the community; those without positions of persuasive power;

<sup>72</sup> *Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn.*, 429 F.Supp. 167, 176 (D.C.D.C.1977). See also *Bandelin v. Pietsch et al.*, — Idaho —, 563 P.2d 395 (1977).

<sup>73</sup> *Troman v. Wood*, 62 Ill.2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).

<sup>74</sup> *Exner v. American Medical Association et al.*, 12 Wash.App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974).

Those who have not voluntarily injected or thrust themselves into public controversies to influence the resolution of issues, or been drawn into them;

Those whose activities do not invite attention and comment.

Classic elements of libel have emerged in some post-*Gertz* cases in which individuals were found to be “private” not “public.” Virginia Attorney Richard J. Ryder was confused in the minds of some readers with Virginia Attorney Richard R. Ryder through a *Time* magazine “Essay.” *Time* created the confusion by omitting the middle initial, in so doing libeling “J” by giving some people the impression that he, rather than “R”, had been suspended from practice for 18 months. “J” sued for libel and lost at trial because the trial court said he was a public figure, having formerly been a state legislator and also a candidate for public office. But the Court of Appeals overturned the trial court, going straight to the *Gertz* decision touchstone of examining “the nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.” It said in that context,<sup>75</sup> as it remanded the case to district court:

It is true that plaintiff had been a public official for a time and had been a candidate for public office. Yet these public activities had nothing to do with the reference to Richard Ryder in the essay and, in any case, those activities were no longer engaged in by plaintiff.

There remains the most spectacular, notorious case in the line of separating “private” from “public” persons since *Gertz*. Mary Alice Firestone—wife of a prominent member of the wealthy industrial family and member of the “society” elite of Palm Beach, Fla. (the “sporting set,” as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Marshall called it)—went to court to seek separate maintenance from her husband, Russell. He counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty. The trial covered 17 months, both parties charging extramarital escapades (“that would curl Dr. Freud’s hair,” the trial judge said). Several times during the 17 months, Mrs. Firestone held press conferences. She subscribed to a clipping service. *Time* magazine reported the trial’s outcome: Russell Firestone was granted a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery, *Time* said. But the trial judge had not, technically, found adultery, and Mrs. Firestone sued *Time* for libel.<sup>76</sup> A jury awarded her \$100,000 and *Time* appealed, arguing that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure and as such would have to prove actual malice in *Time*’s story.

<sup>75</sup> Richard J. Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824 (C.A.D.C.1976). Ryder lost his case on remand, but he was not found to be a public figure: 3 Med.L.Rptr. 1170 (D.C.D.C.1977).

<sup>76</sup> Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976).

Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of five of the U.S. Supreme Court, said “no” to *Time*’s appeal. He quoted various passages from the *Gertz* definition of ‘public figure’ which he said did not fit Mrs. Firestone: “special prominence in the resolution of public questions,” “persuasive power and influence,” “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” The crux of the matter was that, for all the publicity involved:<sup>77</sup>

Dissolution of marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of “public controversy” referred to in *Gertz*, even though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading public.

In spite of her position in the “Palm Beach 400,” her press conferences, and her clipping service, Mrs. Firestone was a “private” individual, and her “private” marital affairs did not “become public for the purposes of libel law solely because they are aired in a public forum.”<sup>78</sup>

The often difficult decision as to whether libel plaintiffs are “public” or “private” is a crucial one, to be determined early in libel suit proceedings. For if the plaintiff is a “public” person, and does not or cannot, at the outset, persuasively allege actual malice by the publisher, the court may and often does grant a summary judgment to the defendant, without further proceedings. The deep importance of the summary judgment procedure is that it can halt a suit early, and thus modify the threat of protracted, huge legal expense of chilling effect, which can lead to self-censorship by media and thus damage “uninhibited, robust, wideopen” debate on public issues.<sup>79</sup>

To the end that media do not become self-censors out of fear of crippling libel actions, then, the First Amendment bars “public” people from recovery unless they can prove the actual malice of *Times v. Sullivan*.

### Private Individuals Show “Negligence” Under *Gertz*.

The *Gertz* decision has further ruled that, to the same end, the First Amendment bars *private* libel plaintiffs from recovery unless they plead and prove fault, amounting at least to negligence on the news medium’s part.<sup>80</sup> Far less demanding of plaintiffs than actual

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 965.

<sup>78</sup> *Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n*, 429 F.Supp. 167, 175–6 (D.C.D.C.1977).

<sup>79</sup> See especially *Washington Post Co. v. Keogh*, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (1964), where the importance of the summary judgment in First Amendment cases is spelled out. See also *Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship*, at 436, 457.

<sup>80</sup> *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3012 (1974).

malice, the negligence barrier is appropriate to the private individual because, in the Supreme Court's reasoning, he is more vulnerable and more deserving of recovery than the public official or figure.<sup>81</sup> The states, which have a strong interest in providing reputational protection for their citizens, may set negligence or any other standard they wish, so long as they do not impose "liability without fault."<sup>82</sup>

In this, *Gertz* destroyed the ancient principle in libel called "strict liability."<sup>83</sup> Under it, a plaintiff had only to show that a defamatory statement had been published about him to make out a prima facie libel case against a publisher. The plaintiff did not have to allege "fault" on the part of the publisher, whose intent and care in publishing might be blameless. The plaintiff did not have to claim that the defamation had injured him; the law presumed damage in words defamatory on their face—libel *per se*.

Like actual malice for the public plaintiff, the fault claim is a threshold requirement in complaints by private individuals. It is an allegation to be scrutinized by the judge early in the libel proceedings, for if the claim is not present and persuasive, defending news media may win summary judgments, precluding trial.<sup>84</sup>

By early 1977, nine states had adopted the standard of negligence for private-individual libel plaintiffs to plead and prove against their alleged defamers.<sup>85</sup> One state had adopted a standard of "gross irresponsibility,"<sup>86</sup> more difficult to prove than negligence. Two had said they would make New York Times actual malice their fault standard: the private individual as much as the public official or public figure would have to prove knowing or reckless falsehood by the publisher.<sup>87</sup>

What kind of journalistic practice, then, will the courts term "negligence" that enables private-person plaintiffs to maintain libel suits? What faces the reporter and the editor? To start with, "negligence" will no doubt work out to mean different things from one state to another. A very few states have analyzed journalists'

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 3010.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 3011; Prosser, W.L., *Law of Torts*, 3d ed. (St. Paul, 1964), 790-791.

<sup>84</sup> *Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc.*, 31 N.C.App. 233, 228 S.E.2d 766 (1976).

<sup>85</sup> Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Oklahoma, Washington. Most of these cases are discussed in Harry W. Stonecipher and Robert Trager, "The Impact of *Gertz* on the Law of Libel," *Journalism Quarterly*, 43:4, Winter 1976, 609-618. See also *Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.*, 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977).

<sup>86</sup> *Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.*, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1975).

<sup>87</sup> *Indiana: Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.*, — Ind.App. —, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1975); *Colorado: Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.*, 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975).

reporting and writing as evidence of negligence. The Arizona *Republic* of Phoenix was sued for a 1970 story saying that Peagler's auto sales firm had the most consumer complaints lodged against it of all firms in the Better Business Bureau's records. The reporter's authority for this was Mrs. Kay Runser, a recently resigned employee of the Phoenix Better Business Bureau, who, the story implied, had quit the BBB in disillusionment with its consumer protection work. The reporter had not checked the statement with the manager of the BBB. The story added that Peagler's company showed a lack of response to complaints.

The newspaper asked for a directed verdict (summary judgment) in its favor, and the trial judge granted it. But the *Gertz* decision intervened before the case reached the Arizona Supreme Court on appeal; and under *Gertz* principles, the high state court reversed the trial court. First it laid out and discussed the negligence standard that it was choosing—that of the American Law Institute's *Second Restatement of Torts*:<sup>88</sup>

One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a private person \* \* \* is subject to liability, if, but only if, he (a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other, (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or (c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.

Elaborating, it added that negligence "is the failure to use that amount of care which a reasonably prudent person would use under like circumstances." And the question for a jury to decide, is "whether the defendant acted reasonably in attempting to discover the truth or falsity or the defamatory character of the publication \* \* \*."

Applying this standard to the reporter of the Peagler-BBB story, the court focused on his methods of reporting. It said that a jury<sup>89</sup>

could \* \* \* conclude that in publishing Mrs. Runser's statements without seriously attempting to verify them, particularly knowing that she was a disgruntled ex-employee of the Better Business Bureau, he failed to use that amount of care which a reasonably prudent person would use under like circumstances.

It would be hard to find a clearer example of a court's telling the journalist what professional journalistic standards must be: *something better than a single, possibly biased source* for derogatory remarks about private persons. The reporter had used only one

<sup>88</sup> Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1977). Maryland has also chosen the Restatement standard: Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688, 697-8 (1976).

<sup>89</sup> Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216, 1223 (1977).

source; he was not a "reasonably prudent person"; he was negligent.

Most states have not yet laid out similar detail about the meaning of "negligence" in libel. Illinois' Supreme Court adopted negligence as its standard, saying recovery might be had on proof that the defendant knew the statement to be false, or "believing it to be true, lacked reasonable grounds for that belief." It added that a journalist's "failure to make a reasonable investigation into the truth of the statement is obviously a relevant factor."<sup>90</sup> And it quoted the Kansas Supreme Court with approval as further elaboration of what "negligence" means: "\* \* \* the lack of ordinary care either in the doing of an act or in the failure to do something. \* \* \* The norm usually is the conduct of the reasonably careful person under the circumstances."<sup>91</sup>

If it's any help to the reporter, it may be noted that the word "care" is used in various courts' discussions of negligence: simply the "care" of the reasonably prudent person in the Arizona case above; "ordinary care" in the Illinois/Kansas wording above; "reasonable care" (Washington);<sup>92</sup> "due care" (Ohio).<sup>93</sup>

In New York, the fault that will permit a private individual to maintain a libel suit appears harder to establish than negligence. The New York Court of Appeals has specified that recovery for the private individual depends on his establishing "that the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties."<sup>94</sup> The *Utica Observer-Dispatch* had reported two different episodes involving drug-charge arrests in a single story. At one point, it incorrectly brought together school teacher Chapadeau and two other men at a drug-and-beer party, referring to "the trio." Chapadeau was not there, and he brought a libel action. The Court of Appeals noted the error but also pointed out that the story was written only after two authoritative agencies had been consulted, and that the story was checked by two desk hands at the newspaper. "This is hardly indicative of gross irresponsibility," said the court. "Rather it appears that the publisher exercised reasonable methods to insure accuracy."<sup>95</sup> Summary judgment for the newspaper was upheld.

<sup>90</sup> *Troman v. Wood*, 62 Ill.2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292, 298-9 (1975).

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 299; *Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co.*, 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).

<sup>92</sup> *Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co.*, 86 Wash.2d 439, 546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976).

<sup>93</sup> *Thomas H. Maloney and Sons, Inc. v. E. W. Scripps Co.*, 43 Ohio App.2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974).

<sup>94</sup> *Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.*, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1975).

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 572. See also *Goldman v. New York Post*, 58 A.D.2d 769, 396 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1977).



A still sterner test faces the private-person libel litigant in Indiana and Colorado. The courts in these states have chosen to apply the *Rosenbloom v. Metromedia* plurality position as the fault standard: All persons—including private individuals—involved in matters of general or public interest must plead and prove *New York Times* actual malice. In addition, a federal judge of the District of Columbia has ruled that where a corporation, as distinct from a “natural person”, brings a libel suit, it must expect to do the same.<sup>96</sup>

Indiana's Court of Appeals ruled only six months after *Gertz*. It said that Indiana's own constitution called for this rigorous barrier to recovery for libel, rather than for a negligence standard. Differentiating requirements for public and private persons' libel suits, it said, “makes no sense in terms of our constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.”<sup>97</sup> As for Colorado's Supreme Court, it denied libel plaintiffs the use of *Gertz* negligence and said liability would issue “if, and only if, [the publisher] knew the statement to be false or made the statement with reckless disregard for whether it was true or not.”<sup>98</sup> The court felt that freedom of speech and press would be damaged with a lesser standard of fault than *Times* actual malice.

### SEC. 23. ACTUAL MALICE

**The United States Supreme Court has defined reckless disregard of truth as “high degree of awareness of probable falsity” and as “entertaining serious doubts as to the truth of publication”; knowing falsehood has required less definition and has seldom been found.**

If a news medium can successfully demonstrate that its allegedly defamatory words were published of a public official or public figure, its next move under the constitutional protection is to defend against the charge of actual malice. This term, as we have seen, is defined by the Supreme Court as reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the publication, or knowledge that the publication was false.

#### **Reckless Disregard of Truth.**

Very soon after *Times v. Sullivan* had established the new definition of actual malice, the Supreme Court began the process of

<sup>96</sup> *Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.*, 417 F.Supp. 947 (D.D.C.1976).

<sup>97</sup> *Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.*, — Ind.App. —, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1975), certiorari denied 424 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 1112 (1976); *Patten v. Smith*, — Ind.App. —, 360 N.E.2d 233 (1977).

<sup>98</sup> *Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.*, 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975), certiorari denied 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S.Ct. 469 (1976). The court reserved judgment on precisely what “reckless disregard” should mean in Colorado.

defining “reckless disregard.” In *Garrison v. Louisiana*,<sup>99</sup> a criminal libel action, it said that reckless disregard means a “high degree of awareness of probable falsity” of the publication, and in 1968 in *St. Amant v. Thompson*, it said that for reckless disregard to be found, “There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”<sup>1</sup>

St. Amant read, in a televised political campaign speech, the accusation by one Albin that Herman Thompson had had money dealings with another man accused of nefarious activities in labor union affairs. Thompson sued for defamation, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld a judgment in his favor. It said there was sufficient evidence that St. Amant recklessly disregarded whether the statements about Thompson were true or false. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision.

Reviewing decisions since *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, it said:<sup>2</sup>

These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.

But the decision added that a defendant may not count on a favorable verdict merely by *testifying* that he published with a belief that the statements were true:<sup>3</sup>

The finder of fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith. Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the publisher’s allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.

In this case, the Supreme Court found, there was no evidence that St. Amant was aware of the probable falsity of Albin’s statement

<sup>99</sup> 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216 (1964).

<sup>1</sup> *St. Amant v. Thompson*, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325 (1968).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 1325.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1326.

about Thompson. Albin had sworn to his statements and St. Amant had verified some of them, and Thompson's evidence had failed to demonstrate "a low community assessment of Albin's trustworthiness."

As for the specifying of reckless disregard in *Garrison v. Louisiana*: Garrison, a Louisiana prosecuting attorney, had attacked several judges during a press conference, for laziness and inattention to duty. He was convicted of criminal libel, and the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction. It said that the fact that the case was a criminal case made no difference to the principles of the *Times v. Sullivan* rule, and that malice would have to be shown. And the "reckless disregard" of truth or falsity in malice, it said, lies in a "high degree of awareness of falsity" on the part of the publisher. Nothing indicated that Garrison had this awareness of falsity when he castigated the Louisiana judges.<sup>4</sup>

Since the first case providing the constitutional protection in libel, the courts have been at pains to distinguish between "reckless disregard of truth" and "negligence."<sup>5</sup> The latter is not enough to sustain a finding of actual malice. In the leading case, the Court went to this point. Errors in the famous advertisement, "Heed Their Rising Voices," could have been discovered by the *New York Times* advertising staff had it taken an elevator up a floor to the morgue and checked earlier stories on file. Failure to make this check, the Supreme Court said, did not constitute "reckless disregard"; at the worst it was negligence, and negligence is not enough to indicate malice.<sup>6</sup>

In another case, a New York congressman sued the *Washington Post* for a story by columnist Drew Pearson which the Post carried. The story accused the congressman of bribe-splitting. The Post did not check the accuracy of the columnist's charges. The Federal Court of Appeals held that the Post showed no reckless disregard in not verifying Pearson's charge, regardless of Pearson's reputation for accuracy. The court held that to require such checking by the Post would be to burden it with greater responsibilities of verification than the Supreme Court required of the *New York Times* in the landmark case. It said:<sup>7</sup>

Verification is \* \* \* a costly process, and the newspaper business is one in which economic survival has become a major problem. \* \* \* We should be hesitant to impose responsibilities upon newspapers which can be met

<sup>4</sup> 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964).

<sup>5</sup> *Priestely v. Hastings & Sons Pub. Co. of Lynn*, 360 Mass. 118, 271 N.E.2d 628 (1971); *A. S. Abell Co. v. Barnes*, 258 Md. 56, 265 A.2d 207 (1970).

<sup>6</sup> *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 288, 84 S.Ct. 710, 730 (1964).

<sup>7</sup> *Washington Post Co. v. Keogh*, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 365 F.2d 965, 972-973 (1966).

only through costly procedures or through self-censorship designed to avoid risks of publishing controversial material. The costliness of this process would especially deter less established publishers from taking chances and, since columns such as Pearson's are highly popular attractions, competition with publishers who can afford to verify or to litigate, would become even more difficult. It is highly unlikely, moreover, that the form of journalism engaged in by Pearson and other columnists could survive in the face of a rule requiring verification to negate recklessness. Pearson and his fellow columnists seek and often uncover the sensational, relying upon educated instinct, wide knowledge and confidential tips. Verification would be certain to dry up much of the stream of information that finds its way into their hands. Whether or not this would please a number of us is irrelevant. What matters is that a rule requiring certification in the absence of evidence that the publisher had good reason to suspect falsity would curtail substantially a protected form of speech.

In *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, it was shown that a story said that a play "re-enacted" the ordeal of the Hill family, held as hostages in their home by convicts. Testimony in the trial showed that the *Life* editor possessed in his "story file" several news clippings that portrayed the real-life ordeal as non-violent and thus different from the play. The clippings also said that the author of the play had stated that it "was based on various news stories" of incidents in at least four states. Was it reckless disregard for *Life* to say incorrectly that the play "re-enacted" the Hill family experience, when a correct version of the experience was on hand for checking in the editor's story file? The Supreme Court did not say, but ruled that the question was a real one and should be decided by a jury in any retrial of the case.<sup>8</sup>

Turning now to cases in which libel suits have been won on grounds that the publisher showed reckless disregard for truth: The earliest was the 1967 case, *Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts*, treated above, in which the former athletic director of the University of Georgia sued for a *Saturday Evening Post* story accusing him of conspiring to "fix" a football game between Georgia and Alabama. The *Post* had relied on the story of Burnett, a man serving on probation in connection with bad check charges, had not seen Burnett's notes about the alleged telephone conversation he said he had overheard, had not interviewed a man supposedly in the company of Burnett at the time of the phone conversation. Furthermore, the story was not "hot news" that demanded immediate publication. In the words of part of the Supreme Court, this was reckless

<sup>8</sup> *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, 385 U.S. 374, 393-394, 87 S.Ct. 534, 544-545 (1967).

disregard of whether the statements were true or false; to other members it was "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure" from responsible reporting standards.<sup>9</sup>

*Goldwater v. Ginzburg*<sup>10</sup> was decided in 1969. Here Sen. Barry Goldwater, running as the Republican candidate for President of the United States, sued the publisher of *Fact* for libel. At issue was an article advertised as "The Unconscious of a Conservative: A Special Issue on the Mind of Barry Goldwater." One article portrayed him as "paranoid," and under "an inner conviction that everybody hates him and it is better to attack them first"; these statements were based on editor Ginzburg's own conclusion without benefit of expert psychiatric advice. Another reported the results of a "poll" of psychiatrists, using methods termed invalid by an expert witness at the trial and by many respondents in the survey. A jury found for Goldwater, \$1.00 in compensatory damages and \$75,000 in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the verdict, saying that a false charge of mental illness is libel per se in New York, place of publication, and that reckless disregard or knowing falsehood was proved.

In 1970, a divided court let stand a libel judgment in which a jury found reckless disregard. An inmate died in jail, and another inmate was convicted of beating him shortly before his death. The *Indianapolis Star* carried many stories on the matter. One said that a third inmate, McAdams, claimed that deputy sheriff King had actually administered the beating. Later, McAdams repudiated this story. The newspaper said that the sheriff, Fields, in trying to protect the deputy from facing or answering the charges, intimidated McAdams into repudiating history of the deputy's involvement. The sheriff sued for libel, and the jury returned a \$60,000 verdict.

In reviewing facts of the trial and the newspaper stories, two of the Indiana Supreme Court (made up of five members, one of whom disqualified himself in this case) said that the *Star's* reporter knew of evidence that contradicted McAdams' original story, but barely mentioned it only once. Further, some statements reported in the news stories indicated that other deputies were witnesses to the alleged beating by King, but the deputies denied at the libel trial that they had told that to the reporter, or that King had performed the beating. All this, said the two justices, was sufficient evidence to sustain a jury finding that the *Star* published with reckless disregard of truth, or with knowledge of falsity.<sup>11</sup>

A Louisiana case decided in 1971 demonstrates the danger in a radio station's broadcasting a "call-in" show live, without a delay

<sup>9</sup> *Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts*, 388 U.S. 130, 155, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967). *Supra*, fn. 30 for subsequent cases employing "extreme departure" standard.

<sup>10</sup> 414 F.2d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 1969).

<sup>11</sup> *Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields*, 254 Ind. 219, 259 N.E.2d 651 (1970).

device. WBOX of Bogalusa had such a show. The announcer asked call-ins not to use specific names and places unless they were willing to identify themselves, in fairness to all people. On April 2, 1968, a call-in by an unidentified person associated the Pizza Shanty with narcotics, and said that Dr. Newman "is writing those prescriptions," and "Guerry Snowden [manager of a drug store] is filling them and they are selling them down there." The announcer broke in repeatedly, trying to get the name of the caller, but did not succeed. After the program, the Bogalusa police department was besieged with calls, so vehement that the police chief on April 4 issued a statement saying that characters of innocent persons were being slandered by rumors of trafficking. Snowden, Newman and Blackwell of the Pizza Shanty sued, and a jury awarded them \$4,000, \$5,000, and \$2,500 respectively. The station appealed, and in upholding the judgments, the Louisiana Appeals Court explained in detail why the station's behavior was reckless disregard of truth or falsity:<sup>12</sup>

The question here presented is whether a radio station, having invited the public to speak freely through its facilities on a matter of public interest, is impressed with the duty of preventing such persons from making defamatory statements over the air. We would have no difficulty in finding a station liable, if it received defamatory material from an anonymous source, and broadcast the report without attempting verification. The direct broadcast of such anonymous defamatory material, without the use of any monitoring or delay device, is no less reprehensible in our judgment. The publication, in either event, is done by the station, and we find that there is the same reckless disregard for the truth in each instance.

The procedure employed amounted to an open invitation to make any statement a listener desired, regardless of how untrue or defamatory it might be, about any person or establishment, provided only that the declarer identify himself. The announcer's qualifying remarks did not even remotely indicate that unfounded remarks were out of order, or that statements and accusations should be based on personal knowledge, or that mere rumor, speculation, suspicion and hearsay would not be permitted. The clear import of the announcer's remarks was that an identified caller was free to make such accusations as he chose. To the uninitiated, at least, it extended both the privilege and opportunity to make any statement whatsoever, provided only that the declarer shed the cloak of anonymity. It also inferred that disclosure of identity would render a certain

<sup>12</sup> Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., 251 So.2d 405 (La.App.1971).

degree of respectability and propriety to such charges and accusations as might be made against named individuals. Appellant could have effectively monitored the program by the use of tape recorders or delayed broadcast equipment. For the reasons above noted, it did not choose to do so. It is contended the announcer terminated the anonymous call as soon as possible under the circumstances. The quoted excerpt from the broadcast does not support this argument. At no time was the caller informed that his interview would be terminated if he did not identify himself. The announcer merely requested that the caller disclose his identity, and concluded by thanking the caller when the caller finished his statement. We find that the style utilized encouraged the utterance of defamatory statements with utter disregard of their truth or falsity. Appellant placed itself in a position fraught with the imminent danger of broadcasting anonymous unverified, slanderous remarks based on sheer rumor, speculation and hearsay, and just such a result actually occurred. Such an eventuality was easily foreseeable and likely to occur, as it in fact did. In our judgment, the First Amendment does not protect a publisher against such utter recklessness.

In 1972, a federal court found reckless disregard in the *Washington Star's* articles about the financing of the Airlie Foundation which operates a conference center in Virginia. *Star* reporter Robert Walters had gone to a press conference of one Higgs, who gave each reporter a 16-page handout. Higgs said that the foundation was secretly financed by government agencies including the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State Department. *Star* stories on two successive days carried these statements, and some that did not come from Higgs. Airlie brought suit, and the jury returned verdicts of \$419,800 to the corporation and \$100,000 to Head, founder of the foundation. The *Star* moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The federal court upheld the verdict, reducing the awards to \$50,000 and \$10,000. One point of evidence for reckless disregard was that the *Star's* editor-in-chief, Newbold Noyes, called a personal friend at the CIA the evening that the first story ran—the friend being Richard Helms, the director of the CIA. Helms told Noyes the story was false, and Noyes testified that this conversation left him “considerably shaken as to my original impression as to the validity of Mr. Higgs’ charges.” The second-day story repeated the charges, though emphasizing Head’s denial, and added other details: that a “government source” denied the financing, but that “the CIA declined to comment on the charges \* \* \*.” Fresh details also said that there was a large discrepancy between Airlie’s 1965 expenses (\$49,684) and its income (\$561,205), when actually the ex-

penses were \$500,000 more than the story stated; and in this discrepancy, the reporter's testimony showed conflicts as to why he had included the figures. In approving the jury finding of reckless disregard, the court said:<sup>13</sup>

Faced with this testimony and evidence there was a basis established with convincing clarity upon which the jury might well have concluded these details were known by the *Star* to be false and were added by it to lend credence to the Higgs charges at a time when it entertained serious doubts as to the validity of those charges. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the question of whether the *Star* published "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" as required by the *New York Times* case.

### Knowledge of Falsity.

Seldom is it shown that a news medium has published defamation in the knowledge that it was false, the second aspect of actual malice, although, as the court said in the case above, it may have been present there.

In a Wisconsin case, banker Howard Meister was sued for libel by former Assistant Attorney General LeRoy Dalton. Meister had been exonerated of charges of bribery and unlawful lobbying brought by Dalton, and at a press conference afterward released a statement calling Dalton a "gestapo leader" and charging that Dalton had campaigned to "smear" him. Evidence in the case showed that Meister had tried through influence, political pressure and spending large sums of money to have Dalton removed from his job. Ultimately, Dalton was removed from office by his supervisor, who said the removal was not the result of Meister's political influence—"a statement the jury apparently did not believe," the Wisconsin Supreme Court said. The Court said that the evidence plainly showed a "persistent course of conduct on the part of Meister to 'get Dalton'." The jury had found that Meister's statements had been made with malice and knowledge of their falsity, and the Court observed that "even a casual reading of this record would lead one to believe as a matter of law that the proof of malice and knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth was by clear and convincing evidence."<sup>14</sup> Dalton was awarded \$150,000, half in compensatory and half in punitive damages.

Dun & Bradstreet, in a credit report to subscribers, linked Joseph F. Morgan to his brother, Claude B., in a scheme of incorporating

<sup>13</sup> *Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.*, 337 F.Supp. 421, 428 (D.D.C.1972). See also *Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc.*, 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).

<sup>14</sup> *Dalton v. Meister*, 52 Wis.2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494, 500 (1971).



retail stores and defaulting on obligations due suppliers. The publication implied that Joseph F. was a deadbeat and fraud, and as a result his credit was terminated and finally his drug business was destroyed. Despite notices from Joseph to Dun & Bradstreet that he had not since 1959 associated with his brother in business, and responsible third parties' similar notices, the company republished the report in November 1965 and March 1966, "in the teeth of findings by [its own] agent Olney that there was no business connection between the Morgan brothers in 1965." The Court of Appeals held that "The subsequent publication of a libel with knowledge of its falsity is proof of malice."<sup>15</sup> Morgan's recovery included \$25,000 punitive damages.

<sup>15</sup> *Morgan v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.*, 421 F.2d 1241, 1242 (5th Cir. 1970).

## Chapter 5

### TRADITIONAL DEFENSES IN LIBEL

Sec.

24. Qualified Privilege as a Defense.
25. Fair Comment as a Defense.
26. Truth as a Defense.
27. Damages.
28. Retraction.

#### SEC. 24. QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE AS A DEFENSE

**News media may publish defamation from legislative, judicial or other public and official proceedings without fear of successful libel or slander action; fair and accurate reports of these statements are privileged.**

Since long before the landmark year 1964 and the constitutional defense developed in and after *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, libel suits have been defended under statutory and common law provisions termed *qualified privilege, fair comment and criticism, and truth*. As noted earlier, the theory that free expression contributes to the public good in a self-governing society underlies the older defenses as well as the constitutional defense. The older ones say there are certain kinds of events and ideas about which a democratic public has a need to know that override an individual's right to reputation; the newer expands the range of events and ideas, still in the name of the public. The older defenses ordinarily were defeated by a finding of malice; the newer by the same finding, but under a more rigorous definition of malice than state courts ordinarily have used. Many terms of the older defenses run through decisions dealing with the new.

In some circumstances it is so important to society that people be allowed to speak without fear of a suit for defamation as a result, that their words are given immunity from a finding of libel or slander. The immunity is called privilege. For purposes of the mass media, it is applicable especially in connection with government activity.<sup>1</sup> The paramount importance of full freedom for participants in court, legislative or executive proceedings to say whatever bears on the matter, gives all the participants a full immunity from successful libel action. The immunity for the participant in official proceedings is called "absolute" privilege. No words relevant to the business of the proceeding will support a suit for

<sup>1</sup> For other circumstances where it applies, see Prosser, pp. 804-805.

defamation. If a person is defamed in these proceedings, he cannot recover damages.

Public policy also demands, in an open society, that people know to the fullest what goes on in the proceedings; for this reason, anyone who reports proceedings is given an immunity from successful suit for defamation. For the public at large, "anyone" ordinarily means the mass media. The protection is ordinarily more limited for the reporter of a proceeding than for the participant in the proceeding. It is thus called "qualified" (or "conditional") privilege.<sup>2</sup>

It may be argued that the mere fact of a person's participation in an official proceeding makes him a "public figure," and so puts him under the rigorous requirements of proving *Times v. Sullivan's* actual malice in a libel suit. The response, of course, is that neither Attorney Gertz nor Mrs. Firestone became a public figure through taking part in official court proceedings that resulted in news stories about them. Both received damages for libel. (Ch. 4)

It has been held that any citizen has *absolute* immunity in any criticism he makes of government. The City of Chicago brought a libel suit against the *Chicago Tribune*, claiming damages of \$10,000,000 through the *Tribune's* campaign coverage in 1920. The stories had said that the city was broke, that its credit "is shot to pieces," that it "is hurrying on to bankruptcy and is threatened with a receivership for its revenue." As a result, the city said, competitive bidding on materials used by the city was stifled, and it was unable to conduct business on an economical basis because of injury to its credit.

The court denied the city's claim. It said that in any libelous publication concerning a municipal corporation, the citizen and the newspaper possess absolute privilege:<sup>3</sup>

Every citizen has a right to criticize an inefficient government without fear of civil as well as criminal prosecution. This absolute privilege is founded on the principle that it is advantageous for the public interest that the citizen should not be in any way fettered in his statements, and where the public service or due administration of justice is involved he shall have the right to speak his mind freely.

Qualified privilege in reporting official proceedings is the heart of the concern here. The privilege arose in the law of England, the basic rationale having been developed before the start of the nine-

<sup>2</sup> A few states give absolute privilege to press reports of official proceedings, e. g. Thompson's *Laws of New York*, 1939, Civ.P. § 337, *Wis.Stats.*1931, § 331-05(1). And as we have seen in Ch. 3, Sec. 14, broadcasters are immune from defamation suits brought for the words of politicians in campaign broadcasts: *FECUA v. WDAY, Inc.*, 360 U.S. 525, 79 S.Ct. 1302 (1959).

<sup>3</sup> *City of Chicago v. Tribune Co.*, 307 Ill. 595, 139 N.E. 86, 90 (1923).

teenth century in connection with newspaper reports of court proceedings.<sup>4</sup> While American courts relied on English decisions, America was ahead of England in expanding the protection for press reports. The immunity was broadened to cover the reporting of legislative and other public official proceedings by the New York legislature in 1854, 14 years before privilege for reporting legislative bodies was recognized in England.<sup>5</sup> Other states readily adopted the New York rule.

For America a famous figure in jurisprudence stated the heart of the rationale for qualified privilege in an early case that has been relied upon by American courts countless times since. Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., then of the Massachusetts bench and later a justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote the words in *Cowley v. Pulsifer*, 1884.<sup>6</sup> Publisher Royal Pulsifer's *Boston Herald* had printed the content of a petition seeking Charles Cowley's removal from the bar, and Cowley sued. Judge Holmes wrote that the public must have knowledge of judicial proceedings, not because one citizen's quarrels with another are important to public concern,<sup>7</sup>

\* \* \* but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.

The advantage to the nation in granting the privilege of press report, he stressed, is "the security which publicity gives for the proper administration of justice."<sup>8</sup>

While the privilege is "qualified" in the sense that it will not hold if the report of the proceeding is made with malice, it also requires that the story be a fair and accurate account of the proceeding, and not engage in comment. And, most states hold, the story must be one of a "public and official proceeding," not a report of related material that emerges before, after, or in some way outside the proceeding.

#### **Fair and Accurate Reports.**

Errors can destroy qualified privilege: careless note-taking by a reporter at a court trial, the constant danger of a misspelled name, the arcane and technical jargon and findings of law courts, and all the slip-ups of life with tight deadlines. Further, if the report of an official proceeding is not fair to people involved in it, the reporter

<sup>4</sup> *Curry v. Walter*, 170 Eng.Rep. 419 (1796); *King v. Wright*, 101 Eng.Rep. 1396 (1799).

<sup>5</sup> New York Laws, 1854, Chap. 130; *Wason v. Walter*, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868).

<sup>6</sup> 137 Mass. 392 (1884).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 394.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

can be in trouble. We have seen in the previous chapter how Mrs. Firestone won a libel judgment for \$100,000 from Time, Inc., for its error in reporting that her husband's divorce was granted on grounds of adultery.

Jones v. Commercial Printing Co.<sup>9</sup> illustrates one court's reasoning in retaining long-standing qualified privilege rules. The *Pine Bluff Commercial* attempted unsuccessfully to use the constitutional defense in a libel suit on grounds that its news stories reported on a man "involved in a matter of public interest." The *Commercial* had covered court proceedings at which attorney Jones petitioned with others for an order to allow them to inspect financial records in a bank in which they held stock. Jones interpreted the *Commercial's* three stories on the proceedings as an attack on his integrity. He sued for libel saying the stories were not true and fair reports of the proceedings, and thus not privileged. He lost and appealed.

The *Commercial* argued that Jones was "involved in matters of \* \* \* public concern" in the court proceedings, and would therefore have to prove actual malice in the stories if he were to recover. It relied on an early libel decision that had expanded the *Times v. Sullivan* doctrine to stories on "matters of public interest." But the Arkansas Supreme Court said no, the standing rules of the state on qualified privilege would apply, and if the stories were not fair and accurate, that was enough to defeat the *Commercial's* defense. Agreeing that trials are often of great public interest, the Court said "we do not think that this is sufficient reason to engraft an 'actual malice' requirement onto the rule presently applicable to reports of judicial proceedings \* \* \*." <sup>10</sup>

An account of what transpired at trial is not contingent upon fallible or futile modes of investigation. Court records are available; and, insofar as reports of in-progress proceedings are concerned, the threat of a libel prosecution emanates only from incompetent reporting \* \* \*. Since it is always possible for a report of a judicial proceedings to be complete, impartial and accurate, we decline to engraft the actual malice requirement onto our present rule, regardless of the notoriety of the subject matter or participants involved in the judicial proceedings.

The Arkansas Supreme Court said that the trial judge's instructions to the jury requiring proof of actual malice as the basis of recovery constituted prejudicial error.

A newsman who relied on second-hand information from persons in a court-room following a judge's charge to a grand jury wrote this story:

<sup>9</sup> 249 Ark. 952, 463 S.W.2d 92 (1971).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

(Special Dispatch to the News)

ANNAPOLIS, Oct. 20.—Corruption in official circles of Annapolis and Anne Arundel County was strongly hinted at by Judge Robert Moss of the Circuit Court in his charge to the grand jury this morning. The judge's charge also included a stinging rebuke to Sheriff Bowie of the county. After declaring the increase of bootlegging was a disgrace to the county, Judge Moss said a clean up of conditions was in order. He referred to Garfield Chase \* \* \* who was employed as a stool pigeon by the sheriff's office in running down bootlegs and said repeated attempts to tamper with Chase and make him useless as a state's witness had been made. He blamed Sheriff Bowie for permitting these attempts and intimated that a member of the city police force was responsible for them. The court insisted that Chase be indicted either for bootlegging or for perjury and urged the jury to go to the bottom of the plot to save those against whom Chase was to testify.

Taking a chance on the hearsay picked up from persons to whom he talked, and not checking with Judge Moss, the newsman had made major blunders. Sheriff Bowie sued for libel, and as the suit unfolded, it turned out that there was no evidence that Judge Moss had blamed the sheriff for increasing illegal liquor sales, for lax conditions in the county jail, nor for permitting inmates at the jail to be influenced or tampered with. It was by no means a fair and accurate report of a proceeding, and qualified privilege as a defense failed.<sup>11</sup>

Not every inaccuracy in reporting proceedings is fatal, however. Privilege did not fail in *Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star*,<sup>12</sup> merely because the news story of a court action for liquor ordinance violation got the violators' place of arrest wrong. In *Josephs v. News Syndicate Co., Inc.*,<sup>13</sup> the newspaper did not lose privilege because somehow the reporter incorrectly slipped into his story of a burglary arrest the statement that the accused had been found under a bed at the scene of the burglary.

The story that is not "fair" often comes from an error of omission rather than one of commission. Given the complexity of some court proceedings, avoiding this is far from easy in many situations. An omission from the following story, rich in human interest and the kind that delights city editors, turned out later to be fatal to a newspaper's plea of privilege.

<sup>11</sup> *Evening News v. Bowie*, 154 Md. 604, 141 A. 416 (1928).

<sup>12</sup> 76 Ill.App.2d 154, 221 N.E.2d 516 (1966).

<sup>13</sup> 5 Misc.2d 184, 159 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1957).

Ninety-nine-year-old twin sisters, perhaps the oldest twins in the United States, Saturday had won their suit for 13 acres of oil-rich land in Starr County.

The sisters, Inez Garcia Ruiz, and Aniceta Garcia Barrera, had alleged that the land was fraudulently taken from them by a nephew, Benigno Barrera, and Enrique G. Gonzalez, both of Starr County.

The women said they signed a deed to the land when Barrera represented it as a document permitting him to erect a corral fence there. The sisters cannot read or write Spanish or English.

Judge C. K. Quinn in 45th District Court last year returned the sisters the land, which had been in their family since a Spanish grant.

Saturday it was announced the appeals court had ruled against Barrera and Gonzalez.

But the story did not carry the fact that the sisters' original charge against both men had been amended to leave Gonzalez out of it. Gonzalez brought suit for libel against the newspaper and won. The appeals court said that the story implied that Gonzalez had been found guilty of fraud, and that the newspaper could not successfully plead privilege.<sup>14</sup> It upheld an award of \$12,500 to Gonzalez.

The reporter who has absorbed the lessons of accuracy and responsibility—important parts of a professional attitude—is unlikely to risk damaging reputations in a complex court trial by going into print without checking with specialists in the court for accuracy and fairness. Equally, he is unlikely to risk damaging his boss's bankroll.

### **Opinion and Extraneous Material.**

One way to destroy immunity for a news story is to add opinion or material extraneous to the proceeding. It is necessary for reporters to stick to the facts of what comes to light under officials' surveillance. Radio station KYW in Philadelphia broadcast a "documentary" on car-towing rackets, and Austin Purcell sued for defamation. The broadcast had used a judicial proceeding as a basis—a magistrate's hearing at which Purcell was convicted of violating the car-tow ordinance. (Purcell later was exonerated, on appeal.) But the producer of the documentary wove into his script all sorts of material that he had gathered from other sources—the voices of a man and a woman telling how they had been cheated, a conversation with detectives, and something from the district attorney. He

<sup>14</sup> Express Pub. Co. v. Gonzalez, 326 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Civ.App.1959); 350 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.Civ.App.1961).

added comment of his own to the effect that “the sentencing of a few racketeers is not enough.” Said the court:<sup>15</sup>

Thus through this manipulation of the audio tape and the employment of anonymous voices, the public was made to believe that Purcell was a “mug,” a “thug,” a “racketeer,” one who “gypped” others, and one who “terrified” his victims who were afraid of “reprisals.”

\* \* \* All the derogatory phrases and attacks on character employed in the broadcast were funneled by Taylor into a blunderbus which was fired point-blank at Purcell

\* \* \*

That was defamation, the court said, and it was not protected by qualified privilege. The documentary lost the protection because it contained “exaggerated additions”:<sup>16</sup>

The fault lay in breaking the egg of the extra-judicial “investigation” and the egg of judicial hearing into one omelet and seasoning it with comment and observations which made the parentage of either egg impossible of ascertainment \* \* \*

### Malice.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan gave the term “malice” a restricted meaning and one increased in vigor and precision, where public officials and figures are concerned. This malice means that the publisher knew his words were false, or had reckless disregard for whether they were false or not. Malice before that decision was defined in many ways—as ill will toward another, hatred, intent to harm, bad motive, lack of good faith, reckless disregard for the rights of others, for example. People who claimed that news stories of government proceedings libeled them, often charged “malice” in the stories, in terms such as these. Such definitions are still alive for libel that does not proceed under the constitutional protection. One case shows a court’s feeling its way in dealing with the question.

A news story in the *St. Paul Dispatch* told of a complaint filed in district court, which accused William and Frank Hurley of depleting almost the entire fortune of an aged woman during her last years of life when she was in an impaired state of mind. Some \$200,000 was involved. The complaint had been filed at the order of the Probate Court, where the dead woman’s estate was in process. The Hurleys sued for libel, saying among other things that the news report was malicious and thus not privileged.

<sup>15</sup> Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167, 191 A.2d 662, 666 (1963).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 668. See also Jones v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 240 Mo. 200, 144 S.W. 441 (1912); Robinson v. Johnson, 152 C.C.A. 505, 239 F. 671 (1917).



But the court did not agree. It spoke of two malice rules: *New York Times* and *Restatement of Torts*. The court felt that the Restatement standard, which while it does not use the word malice, "states in effect \* \* \* that actual malice will be present only if a publication was either an inaccurate report of the proceedings or 'made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed'"<sup>17</sup> This, it said, seemed more difficult to prove than the *Times* rule, but "whichever standard is adopted, plaintiffs in this case must prove actual malice or its equivalent in order to remove the cloak of privilege." And under either standard, the court said, it could find no malice: the news story reporter did not know the Hurleys and the Hurleys could produce no evidence of malice at the trial.

Other courts are using old definitions of malice, where qualified privilege is pleaded, alongside knowing or reckless falsehood. Thus one says there is no malice in that which "the publisher reasonably believed to be true"; another speaks of malice as "intent to injure," and another of malice as "ill will."<sup>18</sup>

#### Official Proceedings.

Reports of official activity outside the proceeding—the trial, the hearing, the legislative debate or committee—may not be protected. Some official activity has the color of official proceeding but not the reality.

To start with the courts: Any trial including that of a lesser court "not of record" such as a police magistrate's furnishes the basis for privilege.<sup>19</sup> The *ex parte* proceeding in which only one party to a legal controversy is represented affords privilege to reporting.<sup>20</sup> So does the grand jury report published in open court.<sup>21</sup>

In most states, the attorneys' pleadings filed with the clerk of court as the basic documents for joining issue are not proceedings that furnish protection. The judge must be involved; an early decision stated the rule that for the immunity to attach, the pleadings must have been submitted "to the judicial mind with a view to judicial action,"<sup>22</sup> even if only in pretrial hearings on motions.

<sup>17</sup> *Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc.*, 273 F.Supp. 967, 972, 974 (D.C.Minn. 1967).

<sup>18</sup> *Bannach v. Field Enterprises, Inc.*, 5 Ill.App.3d 692, 284 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1972); and *Brunn v. Weiss*, 32 Mich.App. 428, 188 N.W.2d 904, 905 (1971). See, also, *Orrison v. Vance*, 262 Md. 285, 277 A.2d 573, 578 (1971); 3 Med.L.Rptr. 1170 (D.C.D.C.1977).

<sup>19</sup> *McBee v. Fulton*, 47 Md. 403 (1878); *Flues v. New Nonpareil Co.*, 155 Iowa 290, 135 N.W. 1083 (1912).

<sup>20</sup> *Metcalfe v. Times Pub. Co.*, 20 R.I. 674, 40 A. 864 (1898).

<sup>21</sup> *Sweet v. Post Pub. Co.*, 215 Mass. 450, 102 N.E. 660 (1913).

<sup>22</sup> *Barber v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch Co.*, 3 Mo.App. 377 (1877); *Finnegan v. Eagle Printing Co.*, 173 Wis. 5, 179 N.W. 788 (1920).

A New York decision, as so often in defamation, led the way for several states' rejecting this position and granting protection to reports of pleadings. Newspapers had carried a story based on a complaint filed by Mrs. Elizabeth Nichols against Mrs. Anne Campbell, claiming the latter had defrauded her of \$16,000. After the news stories had appeared, Mrs. Nichols withdrew her suit. Mrs. Campbell filed libel suits. Acknowledging that nearly all courts had refused qualified privilege to stories based on pleadings not seen by a judge, the New York Court of Appeals said it would no longer follow this rule. It acknowledged that it is easy for a malicious person to file pleadings in order to air his spleen against another in news stories, and then withdraw the suit. But it said that this can happen also after judges are in the proceeding; suits have been dropped before verdicts. It added that newspapers had so long and often printed stories about actions brought before they reached a judge, that "the public has learned that accusation is not proof and that such actions are at times brought in malice to result in failure."<sup>23</sup> The newspapers won.

At least a dozen jurisdictions follow this rule today; the filing of a pleading is a public and official act in the course of judicial proceedings in Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming.

But most states have not chosen to follow this rule. Massachusetts specifically rejected it in 1945. The *Boston Herald-Traveler* had published a story based on pleadings filed in an alienation of affections case, had been sued for libel, and had lost. The state Supreme Court said:<sup>24</sup>

\* \* \* the publication of accusations made by one party against another is neither a legal nor a moral duty of newspapers. Enterprise in that matter ought to be at the risk of paying damages if the accusations prove false. To be safe, a newspaper has only to send its reporters to listen to hearings rather than to search the files of cases not yet brought before the court.

Stories based on the following situations were outside "official proceedings" of courts and did not furnish news media the protection of qualified privilege: A newsman's interview of ("conversation with") a United States commissioner, concerning an earlier arraignment before the commissioner;<sup>25</sup> the words of a judge<sup>26</sup> and of an

<sup>23</sup> *Campbell v. New York Evening Post*, 245 N.Y. 320, 327, 157 N.E. 153, 155 (1927).

<sup>24</sup> *Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.*, 318 Mass. 156, 61 N.E.2d 5 (1945).

<sup>25</sup> *Wood v. Constitution Pub. Co.*, 57 Ga.App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937).

<sup>26</sup> *Douglas v. Collins*, 243 App.Div. 546, 276 N.Y.S. 87 (1935).

attorney<sup>27</sup> in courtrooms, just before trials were convened formally; the taking by a judge of a deposition in his courtroom, where he was acting in a "ministerial capacity" only, not as a judge.<sup>28</sup>

To shift now to news stories about the executive and administrative sphere of government, where the officer in a government holds a hearing or issues a report or even a press release, absolute privilege usually protects him. And where absolute privilege leads, qualified privilege for press reports ordinarily follows. Yet while major and minor federal officials enjoy the privilege under federal decisions, state courts have not been unanimous in granting it.<sup>29</sup>

The formalized hearings of many administrative bodies have a quasi-judicial character, in which testimony is taken, interrogation is performed, deliberation is engaged in, and findings are reported in writing. The reporter can have confidence in such proceedings as "safe" to report. The minutes of a meeting and audits of a city water commission were the basis for a successful plea of privilege by a newspaper whose story reflected on an engineer.<sup>30</sup> The Federal Trade Commission investigated a firm and an account based on the investigation told that the firm had engaged in false branding and labeling; the account was privileged.<sup>31</sup> A news story reporting that an attorney had charged another with perjury was taken from a governor's extradition hearing, a quasi-judicial proceeding, and was privileged.<sup>32</sup>

Also, investigations carried out by executive-administrative officers or bodies without the dignity of hearing-chambers and the gavel that calls a hearing to order ordinarily furnish privilege. For example, a state tax commissioner audited a city's books and reported irregularities in the city council's handling of funds. A story based on the report caused a suit for libel, and the court held that the story was protected by privilege.<sup>33</sup>

Yet not every investigation provides a basis for the defense of qualified privilege; reporters and city editors especially need to know what the judicial precedent of their state is. In a Texas case, a district attorney investigated a plot to rob a bank, and obtained confessions. He made them available to the press. A libel suit brought on the basis of a news story that resulted was the confes-

<sup>27</sup> *Rogers v. Courier Post Co.*, 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 869 (1949).

<sup>28</sup> *Mannix v. Portland Telegram*, 144 Or. 172, 23 P.2d 138 (1933).

<sup>29</sup> *Barr v. Matteo*, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335 (1959); Prosser, pp. 802-803.

<sup>30</sup> *Holway v. World Pub. Co.*, 171 Okl. 306, 44 P.2d 881 (1935).

<sup>31</sup> *Mack, Miller Candle Co. v. Macmillan Co.*, 239 App.Div. 738, 269 N.Y.S. 33 (1934).

<sup>32</sup> *Brown v. Globe Printing Co.*, 213 Mo. 611, 112 S.W. 462 (1908).

<sup>33</sup> *Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co.*, 125 W.Va. 731, 26 S.E.2d 209 (1943).

sions were held insufficient executive proceedings to provide the protection.<sup>34</sup>

“Proceedings” that need especially careful attention by the reporter alert to libel possibilities are the activities of police. Police blotters, the record of arrests and charges made, are the source for many news stories. Their status as a basis for a plea of privilege varies from state to state.<sup>35</sup> Oral reports of preliminary investigations by policemen do not support a plea of privilege in some states. The *Rutland Herald* published a story about two brothers arrested on charges of robbery, and included this paragraph:

Arthur was arrested on information given to police by the younger brother, it is said. According to authorities, Floyd in his alleged confession, stated that Arthur waited outside the window in the rear of the clothing store while Floyd climbed through a broken window the second time to destroy possible clues left behind.

A suit for libel was brought, and the court denied qualified privilege to the story. It reviewed other states’ decisions on whether statements attributed to police were a basis for privilege in news, and held that “a preliminary police investigation” is not a proper basis.<sup>36</sup>

The State of New Jersey has provided by statute that “official statements issued by police department heads” protect news stories, and Georgia has a similar law.<sup>37</sup> In other states, courts have provided the protection through decisions in libel suits. In *Kilgore v. Koen*,<sup>38</sup> privilege was granted to a story in which deputy sheriffs’ statements about the evidence and arrest in a case involving a school principal were the newspaper’s source.

As for the legislative branch, the third general sphere of government, state statutes have long declared that the immunity holds in stories of the legislative setting. A New York law led the way in this declaration even before the privilege was recognized in England.<sup>39</sup> For debates on the floor of Congress or of a state legislature, there has been no question that protection would apply to news stories. A few early cases indicated that stories of petty legislative

<sup>34</sup> *Caller-Times Pub. Co. v. Chandler*, 134 Tex. 1, 130 S.W.2d 853 (1939). But see *Woolbright v. Sun Communications, Inc.*, 480 S.W.2d 864 (Mo.1972).

<sup>35</sup> *Sherwood v. Evening News Ass’n*, 256 Mich. 318, 239 N.W. 305 (1931); *M. J. Petrick, The Press, the Police Blotter and Public Policy*, 46 *Journalism Quarterly* 475, 1969.

<sup>36</sup> *Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass’n*, 111 Vt. 371, 17 A.2d 253 (1941); *Burrows v. Pulitzer Pub. Co.*, 255 S.W. 925 (1923); *Pittsburgh Courier Pub. Co. v. Lubore*, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 200 F.2d 355 (1952).

<sup>37</sup> *Angoff*, p. 134; *Rogers v. Courier Post*, 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 869 (1949); *Code of Ga.*1933, § 105-704.

<sup>38</sup> 133 Or. 1, 288 P. 192 (1930).

<sup>39</sup> *New York Laws*, 1854, Chap. 130; *Wason v. Walter*, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868).

bodies such as a town council<sup>40</sup> would not be privileged; but today's reporter need have little fear on this count.

In news stories about a New Jersey municipal council meeting, the city manager was quoted as saying that he was planning to bypass two policemen from promotion because they were insubordinate and "I should have fired them." There was some question as to whether the meeting was the regular one, or a session held in a conference room later. The New Jersey Supreme Court said that that didn't matter. It was not only an official but also a public meeting, at which motions were made by councilmen, sharp discussion was held, and the city manager was queried by councilmen. Privilege held for the newspaper.<sup>41</sup>

A series of "chain" libel suits in the 1920's against several major newspapers settled any question about immunity in news reporting of committees of legislative bodies: Immunity holds for press reports of committees.<sup>42</sup>

Legislative committees have a long history of operating under loose procedural rules.<sup>43</sup> Irregular procedures raise the question whether committee activity always meets the requirements of a "legislative proceeding" that gives the basis for immunity in news reports.<sup>44</sup> In reporting committee activity, the reporter may sense danger signals if the committee:

- Holds hearings without a quorum;
- Publishes material that its clerks have collected, without itself first investigating charges in the material;
- Has not authorized the work of its subcommittees;
- Has a chairman given to issuing "reports" or holding press conferences on matters that the committee itself has not investigated.

When state and congressional investigating committees relentlessly hunted "subversion" in the 1940s and 1950s, thousands of persons were tainted with the charge of "communist" during the committee proceedings. High procedural irregularity was common. Yet only one libel case growing out of these irregular proceedings reached the highest court of a state, and the newspaper successfully defended with a plea of privilege.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>40</sup> *Buckstaff v. Hicks*, 94 Wis. 34, 68 N.W. 403 (1896).

<sup>41</sup> *Swede v. Passaic Daily News*, 30 N.J. 320, 153 A.2d 36 (1959).

<sup>42</sup> *Cresson v. Louisville Courier-Journal*, 299 F. 487 (6th Cir. 1924).

<sup>43</sup> Walter Gellhorn (ed.), *The States and Subversion* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1952); Ernst J. Eberling, *Congressional Investigations* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1928).

<sup>44</sup> H. L. Nelson, *Libel in News of Congressional Investigating Committees* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press, 1961), Chs. 1, 2.

<sup>45</sup> *Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.*, 29 N.J. 357, 149 A.2d 193 (1959).

### Public Proceedings.

The laws of at least ten states provide that qualified privilege applies to news reports of "public" proceedings.<sup>46</sup> In some other states, the same rule has been applied under common law principles.<sup>47</sup> The word "public" has in almost all cases meant "not secret" rather than proceedings which have a strong element of "public interest" or "public concern."<sup>48</sup> In several cases, immunity has been lost where a newspaper obtained access to secret proceedings of government bodies and reported libelous stories based on these proceedings. In *McCurdy v. Hughes*,<sup>49</sup> a newspaper reported on the secret meeting of a state bar board in which a complaint against an attorney was considered. The attorney brought a libel suit for derogatory statements in the story and won.

The state of New York denied privilege to news reports of secret proceedings repeatedly, under its ground-breaking statute of 1854. The statute provided privilege to a "fair and true report \* \* \* of any judicial, legislative, or other public official proceeding."<sup>50</sup> But in 1956, after 102 years under the "public" provision of the statute, New York changed its law and eliminated the word "public." *Editor & Publisher*, trade publication of the American daily newspaper world, reported that the legislature made this change "at the behest of newspaper interests."<sup>51</sup> The change was "drafted as the aftermath to two successful libel suits against New York City newspapers," the magazine said, and added that with the change, it had become possible for a newspaper to publish with immunity news of an official proceeding even though the proceeding was not public.

But the New York Court of Appeals ruled in a 4-3 decision in 1970 that elimination of the word "public" from that statute does not mean that news stories of matrimonial proceedings—secret under New York law—are protected by qualified privilege. Matrimonial proceedings are "inherently personal," the Court held, and "the

<sup>46</sup> Angoff, *Passim*, shows Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin besides New York which in 1956 deleted the word "public" from its statute.

<sup>47</sup> *Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub. Co.*, 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913); *Switzer v. Anthony*, 71 Colo. 291, 206 P. 391 (1922).

<sup>48</sup> A rare exception is *Farrell v. New York Evening Post*, 167 Misc. 412, 3 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1022 (1938) where the word "public" was held to mean "of general interest or concern," and a story based on the report by an executive officer of his secret proceeding was held privileged.

<sup>49</sup> *McCurdy v. Hughes*, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933).

<sup>50</sup> *New York Laws*, 1854, Chap. 130; *McCabe v. Cauldwell*, 18 Abb Pr. 377 (N.Y.1865); *Danziger v. Hearst Corp.*, 304 N.Y. 244, 107 N.E.2d 62 (1952); *Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co.*, 276 App.Div. 614, 96 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1950).

<sup>51</sup> May 5, 1956, p. 52. See *New York State Legislative Annual*, 1956, pp. 494-495.

public interest is served not by publicizing but by sealing them and prohibiting their examination by the public.”<sup>52</sup>

With the New York law, there is the New Jersey decision mentioned above, *Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.*<sup>53</sup> In 1953, the late Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was investigating the Army Signal Corps laboratory at Fort Monmouth, N. J. Sitting as a one-man subcommittee of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, McCarthy repeatedly held secret executive-session hearings. Occasionally he emerged from them to give oral “reports” to waiting newsmen, portraying a sensational “spy ring” in operation at Fort Monmouth, associated with Julius Rosenberg who had been executed for espionage.

On October 23, 1953, the *Newark Star-Ledger* ran a story saying McCarthy orally reported that his secret investigation had learned that an ex-Marine officer, suspended from his Fort Monmouth job in 1949 after military intelligence found classified documents in his apartment, had once roomed with Rosenberg. Keys to the apartment were in the possession of known Communists, McCarthy said. Then on December 9, 1953, the *Star-Ledger* identified the ex-Marine as Coleman, in reporting a public hearing held by McCarthy.

Coleman sued the *Star-Ledger* for libel. He said that the statements were false and were unprotected because they were spoken outside the proceeding. McCarthy was among the witnesses at the libel trial. He said that the newspaper story was an accurate report of his report of the secret proceeding. He also said that he had been authorized by the subcommittee, in executive session, to make reports to the press as to what transpired during executive sessions.

The court accepted McCarthy’s testimony, and held that the newspaper’s plea of qualified privilege was good. It denied that the secret nature of McCarthy’s subcommittee session destroyed qualified privilege for McCarthy as a reporter or for the newspaper as a reporter. Secret sessions often are indispensable, it said, and “this does not preclude the publication of such information as the committee may in its discretion deem fit and proper for the general good.”<sup>54</sup>

Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court was the only dissenter in the 5-to-1 decision for the newspaper. He said that qualified privilege depends everywhere on a “fair and accurate report” of the proceedings; but who could say whether McCarthy gave the fair and accurate report required? In his words, “There is no way to measure a report against this standard when the

<sup>52</sup> *Shiles v. News Syndicate Co.*, 261 N.E.2d 251, 27 N.Y.2d 9, 313 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (1970).

<sup>53</sup> 29 N.J. 357, 149 A.2d 193 (1959).

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 205–206.

proceedings are secret,” and “The secret nature of the hearing negates the reason for the privilege.”<sup>55</sup>

A final note about the word “public” in connection with qualified privilege: The immunity has been held to apply for news reports of the “public meeting” or “public gathering” where people are free to attend for discussion of matters of public concern. This is the general rule in England. The reasons for it are similar to those protecting reports of official proceedings: It is important for the community to know what is happening in matters where the public welfare and concern are involved. The protection in this situation has been granted by a few courts in America.<sup>56</sup> As for private gatherings of stockholders, directors, or members of an association or organization, they are no basis for privilege in news reports.

## SEC. 25. FAIR COMMENT AS A DEFENSE

**Fair comment on matters of public concern, a complete defense in libel, protects criticism of the work of persons and institutions who offer their work for public approval or whose work affects the public interest. Its use in law is giving way to the constitutional defense.**

The term “fair comment on matters of public concern” refers to a set of rules—varying somewhat from state to state—that formerly made up a fairly distinct defense to libel. Today, while the term “fair comment” continues to run through libel decisions, its content is largely absorbed by the constitutional defense.

Alongside facts, comment permeates news and editorial pages and broadcasts, explaining, drawing inferences, reacting, evaluating. “Fair comment” arose to protect the public stake in the evaluation of public matters—whether the works of authors and musicians, the work of the hospital or public utility, or the work of a public official—through comment and opinion. Anyone was protected in commenting fairly on the public acts of public persons and institutions; all such entities involve the public interest whether in matters of taste and culture, health and daily living, or government. He who offered himself for public approval would also have to offer himself for public disapproval.

Such comment and criticism, of course, was very much part of the communication protected by the *Times v. Sullivan* decision, which quoted with approval an earlier opinion:<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 209.

<sup>56</sup> *Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser*, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d 150 (1957); *Pulverman v. A. S. Abell Co.*, 228 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1956).

<sup>57</sup> *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721 (1964), quoting *Cantwell v. Conn.*, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906 (1940).



"In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy."

The identity between the principles of the two protections became apparent as lower courts began applying the new doctrine in cases where the old previously applied; the terminologies of the two became interwoven in decisions. For example, a case of 1967 spoke of fair comment in applying the *Times v. Sullivan* rule to a libel case brought by the principal of a Negro school in Mississippi.<sup>58</sup> An issue of a publication called *The Freedom Train* had called the principal an "Uncle Tom," the equivalent of traitor to his race. He won a \$60,000 judgment in trial court, but the case was appealed and there he lost. The state Supreme Court ruled that the attacks on the principal were fair comment under the *Times v. Sullivan* rule, and that only knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for falsity could meet the definition of malice that would destroy the publication's defense.

The doctrine of fair comment was less protection than the constitutional protection, to begin with precisely because a constitutional shield has more strength than a statutory or common law shield. But furthermore, certain provisions in the former varied from state to state, and the protection was applied unevenly.

1. Most states said that the protection for comment did not extend to that which was falsely given out as "fact." This presented at the outset the often difficult problem of distinguishing fact from comment; where one left off and the other started was sometimes an arbitrary finding, better suited to philosophers than jurists.<sup>59</sup> But beyond that problem of making an often cloudy distinction was the diversity from state to state. Most insisted on the rule of "no protection for misstatement of fact," Oregon's Supreme Court, for example, saying "it is one thing to comment upon or criticize \* \* \* the acknowledged or proved act of a

<sup>58</sup> *Reaves v. Foster*, 200 So.2d 453, 458 (Miss.1967).

<sup>59</sup> For difficulties in distinguishing "fact" and "opinion," see *Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.*, 17 Cal.3d 596, 131 Cal.Rptr. 641, 552 P.2d 425, 428-9 (1976).

public man, and quite another to assert that he has been guilty of particular acts of misconduct.”<sup>60</sup>

California had long held to this view when in 1921 its Supreme Court reversed its position in deciding a libel suit brought by the Los Angeles police chief against the *Los Angeles Record* for a cartoon of him. He said it suggested he was receiving money secretly for illegal purposes. The court held that even if false, the cartoon was protected as fair comment:<sup>61</sup>

[T]he right of the publisher to speak or write is complete and unqualified, under the Code, except that he must speak or write “without malice.” When under these conditions he honestly believes that the person of whom he speaks or writes is guilty of a crime of a nature that makes the fact material to the interests of those whom he addresses, it is as much his right and duty to declare to them that fact as it would be to tell them any other fact pertinent to the occasion and material to their interests. If the publisher of a newspaper honestly believes that a public officer has committed a crime of a nature which would indicate that he is unfit for the office he holds, we think he is not liable for damages \* \* \*.

A second problem involving “fact” faced the writer: the comment must be based on facts—facts stated with the comment, or facts that are known or readily available to the reader. The Fisher Galleries asked art critic Leslie Ahlander of the *Washington Post* to review an exhibition of paintings by artist Irving Amen. Later, Mrs. Ahlander’s column carried this comment:

The Fisher Galleries are showing about 20 oils by the noted printmaker, Irving Amen. The paintings are warm in color and expressionist in tendency, but lack the distinction of the prints. They are so badly hung among many commercial paintings that what quality they might have is completely destroyed. The Fisher Galleries should decide whether they are a fine arts gallery or a commercial outlet for genuine “handpainted” pictures. The two do not mix.

Fisher sued for libel, and the *Post* defended on the grounds of fair comment and criticism. Fisher argued that in order for opinion to be protected by the fair comment doctrine, the facts upon which it is based must be stated or referred to so that the reader may draw his own conclusions. The court acknowledged that that is the rule in some jurisdictions.<sup>62</sup> But it followed instead the view adopted by

<sup>60</sup> *Marr v. Putnam*, 196 Or. 1, 246 P.2d 509, 524 (1952).

<sup>61</sup> *Snively v. Record Pub. Co.*, 185 Cal. 565, 571, 198 P. 1, 5 (1921).

<sup>62</sup> *A. S. Abell Co. v. Kirby*, 227 Md. 267, 176 A.2d 340 (1962); *Cohalan v. New York Tribune*, 172 Misc. 20, 15 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1939).

the *Restatement of Torts*,<sup>63</sup> that the facts do not necessarily have to be stated in the article, but may be facts "known or readily available to the persons to whom the comment or criticism is addressed \* \*." The court said:<sup>64</sup>

We believe that this is the better view, for criticism in the art world may be based on such intangibles as experience, taste, and feeling. It is often impossible for the critic to explain the basis for his opinion; to require him to do so would tend to discourage public discussion of artistic matters. So long as the facts are available to the public, the criticism is within the doctrine of fair comment. The *Amen* show was open to the public both before and after publication, and the facts upon which Mrs. Ahlander based her conclusions were readily accessible to any who wanted to test them.

A final warning to critics and commentators that fall in the realm of "fact" is this: There is danger in assigning corrupt and dishonorable motives to a person; many courts have held this is to be treated as fact, not as comment, and will not be protected by the defense of fair comment but must be defended by a plea of truth. This principle goes far back in the libel law, as expressed in a famous nineteenth-century case, *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*, where the court held:<sup>65</sup>

A line must be drawn between criticism upon public conduct and the imputation of motives by which that conduct may be supposed to be actuated; one man has no right to impute to another, whose conduct may be open to ridicule or disapprobation, base, sordid and wicked motives, unless there is so much ground for the imputation that a jury shall find, not only that he had an honest belief in the truth of his statements but that his belief was not without foundation.

2. Besides the problem of "fact," the ancient question of what constituted "malice" entered the picture and had much to do with what was "fair." Malice would destroy the protection of fair comment; and malice for centuries before *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* had been defined in various ways. Furthermore, various characteristics of "unfair" expression were sometimes treated as suggesting malice. Thus from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction, malice could be pretty much what the court felt it ought to be: ill-will, enmity, spite, hatred, intent to harm; "excessive

<sup>63</sup> # 606.

<sup>64</sup> *Fisher v. Washington Post Co.*, 212 A.2d 335, 338 (D.C.App.1965).

<sup>65</sup> 32 L.J.Q.B. 185, 3 B. & S. 769, 776 (1863). See, also, *Cross v. Guy Gannett Pub. Co.*, 151 Me. 491, 121 A.2d 355 (1956).

publication,"<sup>66</sup> vehemence,<sup>67</sup> words that were not the honest opinion of the writer,<sup>68</sup> words which there was no "probable cause to believe true,"<sup>69</sup> words showing reckless disregard for the rights of others,<sup>70</sup> words which a reasonable man would not consider fair.<sup>71</sup> Malice still can be "adduced"<sup>72</sup> from such qualities of expression in some jurisdictions where qualified privilege or fair comment is at issue.

Thus the West Virginia Supreme Court held in denying fair comment's protection to the *Charleston Gazette* which had tongue-lashed several legislators who sued it for saying, among other things, that they had sold their votes:<sup>73</sup>

While it is very generally held that fair comment as to matter of public affairs is not actionable, where sufficient facts exist on which to ground such comment, it appears to be definitely settled that if such comment is unfair or unreasonably violent or vehement, immunity from liability is denied. "Matters of public interest must be discussed temperately. Wicked and corrupt motive should never be wantonly assigned. And it will be no defense that the writer, at the time he wrote, honestly believed in the truth of the charges he was making, if such charges be made recklessly, unreasonably, and without any foundation in fact \* \* \*. [T]he writer must bring to his task some degree of moderation and judgment." Newell, Slander and Libel \* \* \*.

But in another state—Iowa—there was no suggestion in a Supreme Court decision that "Matters of public interest must be discussed temperately." Journalists everywhere know the case of the Cherry sisters, one of the most famous in the annals of libel in America. The *Des Moines Leader* successfully defended itself in their libel suit, using the defense of fair comment. It started when the Leader printed this:

Billy Hamilton, of the *Odebolt Chronicle*, gives the Cherry Sisters the following graphic write-up on their late appearance in his town: "Effie is an old jade of 50 summers, Jessie a frisky-filly of 40, and Addie, the flower of the family, a capering monstrosity of 35. Their long skinny arms, equipped with talons at the extremities, swung me-

<sup>66</sup> Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 643 (Mo.1966).

<sup>67</sup> England v. Daily Gazette Co., 143 W.Va. 700, 104 S.E.2d 306 (1958).

<sup>68</sup> Russell v. Geis, 251 Cal.App.2d 560, 59 Cal.Rptr. 569 (1967).

<sup>69</sup> Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal.App. 381, 22 P.2d 569 (1933).

<sup>70</sup> Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 32 L.J.Q.B. 185 (1863).

<sup>71</sup> James v. Haymes, 160 Va. 253, 168 S.E. 333 (1933).

<sup>72</sup> Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 342 (2d Cir. 1969).

<sup>73</sup> England v. Daily Gazette Co., 143 W.Va. 700, 104 S.E.2d 306, 316 (1958).

chanically, and anon waved frantically at the suffering audience. The mouths of their rancid features opened like caverns, and sounds like the wailing of damned souls issued therefrom. They pranced around the stage with a motion that suggested a cross between the *danse du ventre* and fox trot,—strange creatures with painted faces and hideous mien. Effie is spavined, Addie is stringhalt, and Jessie, the only one who showed her stockings, has legs with calves as classic in their outlines as the curves of a broom handle.”

There was nothing moderate about Billy Hamilton's criticism of these three graces, but the Iowa Supreme Court said that that did not matter. What Hamilton wrote about the three sisters, and the *Leader* reprinted, was fair comment and criticism:<sup>74</sup>

One who goes upon the stage to exhibit himself to the public, or who gives any kind of a performance to which the public is invited, may be freely criticized. He may be held up to ridicule, and entire freedom of expression is guaranteed to dramatic critics, provided they are not actuated by malice or evil purpose in what they write. \* \* \* Ridicule is often the strongest weapon in the hands of a public writer; and, if fairly used, the presumption of malice which would otherwise arise is rebutted \* \* \*.

The actual malice that will destroy the privilege of fair comment is narrowing in the light of the United States Supreme Court's restrictive definition of the term in 1964 in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*. One court has said that the defense of fair comment and criticism raised against a newspaper columnist's libel suit will prevail unless the new definition of malice can be proved. This case rose from editorials appearing in the *Fairbanks (Alaska) Daily News-Miner*, attacking columnist Drew Pearson for his belittling of Alaska Governor Mike Stepovich in the drive for Alaska statehood. One editorial was titled “The Garbage Man of the Fourth Estate.” A few weeks later, the *News-Miner* said it was dropping Pearson's column because it did not wish to distribute garbage with its newspaper. Pearson sued for libel, lost, and appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. The court said that the privilege of fair comment and criticism existed in this case, because the subject of Alaska statehood was a matter of public interest and concern. The privilege extended to the newspaper, it said, unless the statements about Pearson were made with actual malice. It discarded its own earlier acceptance of malice as being ill will, enmity, hatred, spite, or desire to injure, and said:<sup>75</sup>

<sup>74</sup> *Cherry v. Des Moines Leader*, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901).

<sup>75</sup> *Pearson v. Fairbanks Pub. Co., Inc.*, 413 P.2d 711, 715 (Alaska 1966).

We adopt for this jurisdiction the meaning of "actual malice" as given by the United States Supreme Court in the case of *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*. Actual malice exists when it is proved that the defamatory statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with a reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. \* \* \*

The trial court found that there was no actual malice. \* \* \* We perceive no clear error. In referring to appellant as a "garbage man" and to his writings as "garbage", the imputation was that appellant was inaccurate and that his writings were worthless, that they were literary trash.

Cases continue to be adjudicated today under the rules of fair comment.<sup>76</sup> Occasionally, a decision will be written that separately takes account of the fair comment rules and the Constitutional defense.<sup>77</sup> Under either, the touchstone is the public's right to know about the public acts of public persons and agencies. Always, the reporter needs to remember that the private characters and acts of public persons retain protection, for although one's private character can deeply affect his public acts, there remains a sphere of life that is recognized as private. Going far back in the law of libel, it was long ago articulated thus:<sup>78</sup>

In our opinion, a person who enters upon a public office, or becomes a candidate for one, no more surrenders to the public his private character than he does his private property. Remedy by due course of law, for injury to each, is secured by the same constitutional guaranty, and the one is no less inviolate than the other. To hold otherwise, would, in our judgment drive reputable men from public positions, and fill their places with others having no regard for their reputation; and thus defeat the object of the rule contended for, and overturn the reason upon which it is sought to sustain it.

<sup>76</sup> *Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc. v. Newsday, Inc.*, 70 Misc.2d 437, 334 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1972); *Miller v. News Syndicate Co.*, 445 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1971); *Buckley v. Vidal*, 327 F.Supp. 1051 (D.C.N.Y.1971); *Christy v. Stauffer Publications, Inc.*, 437 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.1969).

<sup>77</sup> *Griffin v. Clemow*, 28 Conn.Sup. 109, 251 A.2d 415 (1968).

<sup>78</sup> *Post Pub. Co. v. Moloney*, 50 Ohio St. 71, 89, 33 N.E. 921, 926 (1893).

Cases since *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* have continued to point this out.<sup>79</sup>

## SEC. 26. TRUTH AS A DEFENSE

### Showing the truth of the defamation, or truth with good motives and for justifiable ends, is a complete defense.

The defense of truth (often called "justification") in civil libel has ancient roots developed in the common law of England. It was taken up by American courts as they employed the common law in the colonial and early national periods, and was transferred from the common law to many state statutes. Its basis appeals to common sense and ordinary ideas of justice: Why, indeed, should an individual be awarded damages for harm to his reputation when the truth of the matter is that his record does not merit a good reputation? To print or broadcast the truth about a person is no more than he should expect; and in addition the social good may be served by bringing to light the truth about people whose work involves them in the public interest.

Most states provide that truth is a complete defense. Others hedge, however, and provide that truth is a defense if it is published "with good motives and for justifiable ends."<sup>80</sup> The qualifying term was perhaps originated by Alexander Hamilton in his defense of newspaper editor Harry Crosswell in a celebrated New York criminal libel case of 1804.<sup>81</sup> It moved from there into civil libel, persuasive in its implication that the printing of malicious words could be minimized by reminding the publisher to consider his motives before going into print.

The burden of proving truth is on the defendant, and it is also up to him to prove that his motives were good and his ends justifiable if his state requires the qualification. It is often a heavy burden. A common phrasing is that the truth must be as broad and as narrow as the defamatory accusation if it is to be a complete defense.<sup>82</sup> Not every detail of an allegedly libelous story must be proved accurate in order to have a good defense, but no formula can measure just what inaccuracy will be tolerated by a particular court.

<sup>79</sup> *Zeck v. Spiro*, 52 Misc.2d 629, 276 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1966); *Stearn v. MacLean-Hunter, Ltd.*, 46 F.R.D. 76 (D.C.N.Y.1969); *Standke v. B. E. Darby & Sons, Inc.*, 291 Minn. 468, 193 N.W.2d 139, 144 (1971).

<sup>80</sup> State statutes and constitutional provisions are collected in Charles Angoff, *Handbook of Libel*, New York, 1946. See, also, Note, 56 N.W.Univ.L.Rev. 547 (1961); Roy R. Ray, *Truth: A Defense to Libel*, 16 Minn.L.Rev. 43 (1931); *Garrison v. La.*, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 214 footnote 7 (1964).

<sup>81</sup> 3 Johns.Cas. 337 (N.Y.1818).

<sup>82</sup> *Empire Printing Co. v. Roden*, 17 Alaska 209, 247 P.2d 8 (1957); *Stephens v. Columbia Pictures Corp.*, 240 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1957); *Benn v. Lucks*, 201 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup.1960).

The *New York World-Telegram and Sun* tried to establish truth of the following statement from its pages, but failed:

John Crane, former president of the UFA now under indictment, isn't waiting for his own legal developments. Meanwhile, his lawyers are launching a \$\$\$\$\$\$ defamation suit.

Focusing on the word "indictment," Crane brought a libel suit against the newspaper and the columnist who wrote the item. He said that the defendant knew or could have learned the falsity of the charge by using reasonable care.

The defendants chose to try to establish the truth of the charge. They did not try to show that there had been a legal indictment by a grand jury. Instead, they said that the facts were widely published and commented upon by the press of the city. They claimed that Crane was "under indictment" in a nonlegal sense, that he had been accused of various crimes by others.

But you cannot prove the truth of one charge against a man by showing that he was suspected or guilty in connection with another.<sup>83</sup> The court held that "indictment" means the legal action, ordinarily carried out by a grand jury, and that use of the term to mean accusation by private persons is rare. No reader, it said, would accept the looser usage as the intended one.<sup>84</sup>

Yet a newspaper's loose usage of certain technical terms does not always destroy a plea of truth. This is what a court ruled when a Massachusetts newspaper said that a man named Joyce had been "committed" to a mental hospital when actually he had been "admitted" to the hospital at the request of a physician as the state law provided. The newspaper's words that caused the man to bring a libel suit were that the man "charges \* \* \* that his constitutional rights were violated when he was committed to the hospital last November." In ruling for the newspaper which pleaded truth, the court said:<sup>85</sup>

Strictly \* \* \* "commitment" means a placing in the hospital by judicial order \* \* \*. But the words [of the news story] are to be used in their "natural sense with the meaning which they could convey to mankind in general." This meaning of the word "commitment" was placing in the hospital pursuant to proceedings provided by law. In so stating as to the plaintiff \* \* \* the defendant reported correctly.

<sup>83</sup> *Sun Printing and Pub. Ass'n v. Schenck*, 40 C.C.A. 163, 98 F. 925 (1900); *Kilian v. Doubleday & Co.*, 367 Pa. 117, 79 A.2d 657 (1951); *Yarmove v. Retail Credit Co.*, 18 A.D.2d 790, 236 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1963).

<sup>84</sup> *Crane v. New York World Telegram Corp.*, 308 N.Y. 470, 126 N.E.2d 753 (1955); *Friday v. Official Detective Stories*, 233 F.Supp. 1021 (D.C.Pa.1964).

<sup>85</sup> *Joyce v. George W. Prescott Pub. Co.*, 348 Mass. 790, 205 N.E.2d 207 (1965).



Of course, the newsman who is highly attuned to nuances in word meanings may save his newspaper the expense and trouble of even a successful libel defense by avoiding gaffes such as confusing "commit" with "admit." While news media continue to be staffed in part by writers insensitive to shades of meaning, however, they may take some comfort in the law's willingness to bend as in the Joyce case.

Courts frequently hold that a plea of truth will not be destroyed by a story's minor inaccuracies. Thus a plea of truth succeeded although a newspaper had printed that the plaintiff was in police custody on August 16, whereas he had been released on August 15;<sup>86</sup> and it was not fatal to a plea of truth to report in a news story that an arrest, which in fact took place at the Shelly Tap tavern, occurred at the Men's Social Club.<sup>87</sup>

In accord with the maxim that "tale bearers are as bad as tale tellers," it is no defense for a news medium to argue that it reported accurately and truthfully someone else's false and defamatory statements. The broadcaster or newspaper reporter writes at his employer's peril; the words "it is reported by police" or "according to a reliable source" do not remove from the news medium faced with a libel suit the job of proving that the allegation or rumor itself is true.<sup>88</sup>

Belief in the truth of the charge may be useful in holding down damages, if it can be established to the satisfaction of the court. Showing honest belief indicates good faith and absence of malice, important to the mitigation of general damages and the denial or lessening of punitive damages to the successful suit-bringer in a libel case.

The plea of truth always presents an uncomfortable possibility to the defendant in a libel case: If the proof fails, the attempt to prove it may be considered a republication of the libel and become evidence of malice.<sup>89</sup> And malice, as indicated earlier, may be reason for assessing punitive damages. There seems to be a tendency in recent decades, however, to examine the manner and spirit with which the defense of truth is made. If the plea of truth appears to have as its real object the defense of the case, rather than to repeat the defamation, evidence of malice is not necessarily concluded.

The *Las Vegas (Nev.) Sun* pleaded the truth of this charge which it made in a headline concerning one Franklin: "Babies for Sale. Franklin Black Market Trade of Child Told." The judge instructed

<sup>86</sup> Piracci v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.Supp. 511, affirmed 371 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1966).

<sup>87</sup> Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, 76 Ill.App.2d 154, 221 N.E.2d 516 (1966).

<sup>88</sup> Miller, Smith & Champagne v. Capital City Press, 142 So.2d 462 (La.App. 1962); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 345 S.W.2d 34 (1961).

<sup>89</sup> Hall v. Edwards, 138 Me. 231, 23 A.2d 889 (1942); Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190, 50 A. 567 (1901).

the jury that "Failure to prove a plea of truth may be considered as evidence of express and continued malice." The jury decided that the Sun had not proved truth, and awarded Franklin damages. The Sun appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the judge's instruction to the jury was in error. It said that although there is authority to support the judge's instruction,<sup>89a</sup>

\* \* \* the better rule is that failure of proof of truth is not itself evidence of malice. Where malice appears a plea of truth may be considered in aggravation of damages as an unprivileged republication of the original libel. However, to constitute such aggravation it should appear that the defense of truth was not pleaded in good faith. When the defendant actually believes his plea to be true and offers evidence in support of it in good faith, the rule should not apply to penalize him \* \* \*.

## SEC. 27. DAMAGES

**Compensatory or general damages are granted for injury to reputation, special damages for specific pecuniary loss, and punitive damages as punishment for malicious or extremely careless libel.**

Courts and statutes are not entirely consistent in their labeling of the kinds of damages that may be awarded to a person who is libeled. Generally, however, three bases exist for compensating the injured person.

The first is that injuring reputation or causing humiliation ought to be recognized as real injury, even though it is impossible to make a scale of values and fix exact amounts due the injured for various kinds of slurs. If such injury is proved, "general" or "compensatory" damages are awarded.

There is also harm of a more definable kind—actual pecuniary loss that a person may suffer as a result of a libel. It may be the loss of a contract or of a job, and if it can be shown that the loss is associated with the libel, the defamed may recover "special" damages—the cost to him. It is plain, however, that some states use the term "actual damages" to cover both pecuniary loss and damaged reputations. Thus it was held in *Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Brown*:<sup>90</sup>

<sup>89a</sup> *Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Franklin*, 74 Nev. 282, 329 P.2d 867 (1958). See, also, *Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc.*, 76 Ill.App.2d 154, 221 N.E.2d 516 (1966).

<sup>90</sup> 66 So.2d 679, 680 (Fla.1953). See, also, *Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co.*, 198 Mass. 538, 84 N.E. 1018 (1908); *Osborn v. Leach*, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904).

Actual damages are compensatory damages and include (1) pecuniary loss, direct or indirect, or special damages; (2) damages for physical pain and inconvenience; (3) damages for mental suffering; and (4) damages for injury to reputation.

The third basis for awarding damages is public policy—that persons who maliciously libel others ought to be punished for the harm they cause. Damages above and beyond general and actual damages may be awarded in this case, and are called punitive or exemplary damages.

Huge amounts of damage are often claimed, and sometimes awarded. Thus not only “private” persons such as Mrs. Firestone (\$100,000), but also public officials and public figures, even under the requirement of proving actual malice, have in recent years won such amounts as \$114,000 compensatory plus \$100,000 punitive damages (charge of soliciting bribes);<sup>91</sup> \$250,000 plus interest (dishonest practices in real estate);<sup>92</sup> \$85,000 (sadistic, paranoid);<sup>93</sup> \$450,000 (fixed a football game);<sup>94</sup> \$350,000 plus possible \$50,000 court costs (connections with underworld);<sup>95</sup> \$50,000 (judge put drug pushers back on the street—settled out of court).<sup>96</sup>

## SEC. 28. RETRACTION

**A full and prompt apology following the publication of a libel will serve to mitigate damages awarded to the injured.**

The news medium that has libeled a person may retract its statement, and in doing so, hope to lessen the chances that large damages will be awarded to the injured. The retraction must be full and without reservation, and there should be no attempt to justify the libel. But while a full and timely apology will go to mitigate damages, it is in no sense a complete defense. The law reasons that many persons who saw the original story may not see the retraction. The retraction must be given the prominence in space or time that the original charge received.

<sup>91</sup> *Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams*, 336 So.2d 1197 (Fla.App.1976), certiorari denied 348 So.2d 945 (1977).

<sup>92</sup> *Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc.*, — W.Va. —, 211 S.E.2d 674 (1975).

<sup>93</sup> *Goldwater v. Ginzburg*, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969).

<sup>94</sup> *Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts*, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967).

<sup>95</sup> *Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc.*, 430 F.Supp. 1363 (N.D.Cal.1977). Four trials were conducted over eight years before ex-Mayor Alioto of San Francisco won the judgment. The verdict may be appealed by Cowles, whose *Look* magazine carried the article.

<sup>96</sup> *Editor & Publisher*, Feb. 26, 1977, p. 24. *Village Voice* and its advertising agency Scali, McCabe, Sloves paid New York Supreme Court Justice Dominick Rinaldi.

Generally, a full and prompt retraction will serve to negate punitive damages, for it is considered an indication that the libel was not published with malice. Further, it may help reduce the award of compensatory damages.

Many states have had retraction statutes, some providing that punitive damages may not be awarded if retraction is made properly and the publisher shows that he did not publish with malice. Others have gone further, providing that only special damages may be awarded following a retraction and demonstration of good faith on the part of the publisher. California has the statute most favorable to publishers. It provides that a proper retraction limits recovery to special damages, no matter what the motives of the publisher.<sup>97</sup>

Some retraction statutes have been attacked as unconstitutional, one reason being that they sometimes are applicable only to newspapers and as such are discriminatory. Many persons may publish libel in non-newspaper form, but not have the advantage of retraction statutes in these states. In *Park v. Detroit Free Press*, a Michigan retraction statute was held unconstitutional, the Court holding that "It is not competent for the legislature to give one class of citizens legal exemptions from liability for wrongs not granted to others."<sup>98</sup> The Supreme Court of Kansas held that state's retraction provision unconstitutional. The decision went to the law's preventing recovery of general damages, and said:<sup>99</sup>

The injuries for which this class of damages is allowed are something more than merely speculative \* \* \*. In short, they are such injuries to the reputation as were contemplated in the bill of rights \* \* \*.

Where punitive damages only are barred to the defamed, however, the constitutionality of the statute ordinarily has been upheld.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>97</sup> T. M. Newell, and Albert Pickerell, *California's Retraction Statute: License to Libel?*, 28 *Journ.Quar.* 474, 1951. See also *Wis.Stats.* 895.05, 1967.

<sup>98</sup> 72 *Mich.* 560, 40 *N.W.* 731 (1888).

<sup>99</sup> *Hanson v. Krehbiel*, 68 *Kan.* 670, 75 *P.* 1041 (1904).

<sup>1</sup> *Comer v. Age Herald Pub. Co.*, 151 *Ala.* 613, 44 *So.* 673 (1907); *Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co.*, 45 *N.D.* 568, 178 *N.W.* 792 (1920).

## Chapter 6

### THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA

#### Sec.

29. Development of Privacy Law.
30. "Intrusion" as Invasion of Privacy.
31. Publication of Private Matters.
32. False Publications Which Invade Privacy.
33. Appropriation of Plaintiff's Name or Likeness.
34. The Right of Publicity.
35. *Time, Inc. v. Hill*.
36. Defenses: Newsworthiness.
37. Defenses: Consent.
38. Defenses: Limitations and Problems.

#### SEC. 29. DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY LAW

**Privacy—"the right to be let alone"—is protected by an evolving area of tort law and has been recognized as a constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United States.**

Privacy—roughly but usefully defined as "the right to be let alone"<sup>1</sup>—was one of the hottest political issues in the nation during the late 1970s. Privacy was seen to be in peril by politicians, legal scholars, anthropologists, and just plain concerned citizens. Infra-red telephoto lenses which "see in the dark." Super-sensitive directional microphones. Dossier compilation by credit bureaus. Data banks operated by myriads of government agencies.<sup>2</sup> All were continuing phenomena in the further development of what Vance Packard termed "The Naked Society."<sup>3</sup>

Americans' realization that they might be snooped at by credit bureaus as well as by police agencies and other arms of government has caused grim little jokes. "Smile," said one bit of graffiti in a rest room. "You're on Candid Camera." And if privacy-minded

<sup>1</sup> Thomas M. Cooley, *A Treatise on the Law of Torts*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Callaghan and Co., 1888) p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> See, e. g., Arthur R. Miller, *The Assault on Privacy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971); Don R. Pember, *Privacy and the Press* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); Alan Westin, *Privacy and Freedom* (New York: Atheneum, 1967); Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety Second Congress, First Session ("The Ervin Subcommittee"), February 23–25, March 2–4, 9–11, 15 and 17, Parts 1 and 2, pp. 1–2164, *passim*; Final Recommendations of the Privacy Study Commission, and P. Allan Dionisopoulos and Craig R. Ducat, *The Right to Privacy* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1976).

<sup>3</sup> Vance Packard, *The Naked Society* (New York: David McKay and Co., 1964).

citizens could not trust a bathroom, studies by Professor Arthur Miller of the Harvard School of Law would make them feel even less secure. Miller's important study, *The Assault on Privacy*, investigated the impact of the technological explosion upon citizens' privacy, looking at topics ranging from the abuses of credit bureaus to the increasingly more sophisticated systems for data collection and information storage and retrieval. Acknowledging "enormous long-range beneficial consequences for society" from such technology, Miller then cautioned: "we must be concerned about the axiom—so frequently verified since the industrial revolution—that man must shape his tools lest they shape him."<sup>4</sup>

Grave threats to freedom and privacy were seen. A central computer system, for example, might become the hub of a government surveillance operation which could reveal "our finances, our associations, our mental and physical health to government inquisitors or even to casual observers."<sup>5</sup> In the end, the clamor was so loud that a National Data Center proposal was dropped.

Misconduct reaching into the Oval Office of the White House helped popularize the privacy issue. The term "Watergate" became a shorthand term for political chicanery and invasion of privacy by bugging and wiretapping. Persons highly placed in then-President Richard M. Nixon's "law and order" Administration were shown to be involved in lawless behavior: wiretapping, bugging, and even a break-in into the office of the psychiatrist of Pentagon Papers case defendant Daniel Ellsberg. The privacy issue helped lead to President Nixon's resignation. While some Congressmen moved toward impeachment proceedings, one cartoonist suggested a new version of the Presidential Seal: an eagle clutching a camera and a (presumably tapped) telephone in its talons.<sup>6</sup>

A man far less famous than Daniel Ellsberg or Richard Nixon found himself ensnared by what he argued was an erroneous dossier in California's Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. Gene Arthur White declared that he had repeatedly tried to have an incorrect reference to a "fictitious checks" incident pulled from his file, but to no avail. Failing to clear his name, he was denied jobs—ironically, as a policeman—because of the material in his file at the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. White sued the State of California for libel. A majority of the California Court of Appeals, Third District, tossed aside White's suit, saying in 1971:<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>5</sup> Arthur R. Miller, "The National Data Center and Personal Privacy," *The Atlantic*, Nov. 1967, p. 53.

<sup>6</sup> *Newsweek*, April 30, 1973; *Time*, April 16, May 14, 1973.

<sup>7</sup> *White v. California*, 17 Cal.App.3d 621, 630, 95 Cal.Rptr. 175, 181 (1971).

There is no showing of malice on the part of the Bureau or its employees. It is true that the Bureau was advised by unsubstantiated statements that the information in plaintiff's [Gene Arthur White's] record was false. However, the Bureau was under no duty to change or alter its records on the basis of the unsubstantiated word of the concerned individual.

The Court's majority added that the Bureau had reasonable grounds for believing the statements: the information, after all, had come from a law enforcement agency.<sup>8</sup> Whether or not he believed White, Acting Presiding Judge Leonard M. Friedman dissented strongly.<sup>9</sup>

Our nation's current social developments harbor insidious evolutionary forces which propel us toward a collective, Orwellian society. One of the features of that society is the utter destruction of all privacy, the individual's complete exposure to the all-seeing, all-powerful state. Government agencies, civilian and military, federal, state, and local, have acquired miles and acres of files, enclosing revelations of the personal affairs and conditions of millions of private individuals. \* \* \* These vast depositories of personal information may easily be assembled into millions of dossiers characteristic of a police state. Our age is one of shriveled privacy. Leaky statutes imperfectly guard a small portion of these monumental revelations. Appellate courts should think twice, should locate a balance between public need and private rights, before deciding that custodians of sensitive personal files may with impunity refuse to investigate claims of mistaken identity or other error which threaten the subject with undeserved loss. The office of judges is to strike that balance rather than pursue sentiments of sympathy. It is obvious, nevertheless, that an unwarranted record of conviction, even of arrest, may ruin an individual's reputation, his livelihood, even his life.

While such a computer-microform-record explosion is cause for the gravest concern, the sense of privacy is being nibbled away, almost subliminally, even during a trip to the drug store. For example, parabolic mirrors—designed to detect shoplifters—make sure that merchants' eyes can follow shoppers around every aisle and counter in a store. Speaking of such devices—and closed circuit television cameras which have been installed in restrooms by some companies—American Civil Liberties Union Attorney Lawrence Speiser

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> 17 Cal.App.3d 621, 631, 95 Cal.Rptr. 175, 181–182 (1971).

has asked: "Where do you go to scratch that irresistible itch?"<sup>10</sup> Business was not merely spying on its customers or employees: big firms were snooping for each other's trade secrets.<sup>11</sup>

But privacy is worth fighting for, against governmental stupidity or arrogance, or against the prying of businesses or private individuals. Louis D. Brandeis, one of the Supreme Court's greatest justices, once wrote that the makers of the American Constitution "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They [the Constitution's framers] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."<sup>12</sup>

Privacy is a problem for each citizen, a desired right to be fought for and zealously guarded. Privacy is also a communications media problem, one to be reported upon. And finally, privacy is a media problem in another sense because missteps by newspapers, magazines and radio and television stations have resulted in all too many of those privacy cases.

What, then, is privacy? *Black's Law Dictionary* says, in pertinent part:<sup>13</sup>

PRIVACY, RIGHT OF. The right to be let alone, the right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity  
\* \* \* The right of an individual (or corporation) to withhold himself and his property from public scrutiny, if he so chooses.

Many of the more humorous—or tragicomic—American court decisions have come from contests involving privacy. When a landlord plants a microphone in the bedroom of a newly married couple, is that an invasion of privacy?<sup>14</sup> When a tavern owner takes a picture of a woman customer against her will—and in the women's restroom, later displaying the photograph to patrons at the bar—is that an invasion of privacy?<sup>15</sup>

Such cases, in their rather comical aspects, indicate growing pains in an area of law which is—in terms of legal gestation time—remarkably new. Privacy is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, and its absence is understandable. In America during the Revolu-

<sup>10</sup> Speiser speech, Conference on the Right of Privacy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, April 15, 1967.

<sup>11</sup> Time, July 15, 1966, pp. 38–39; "Engineers Told of Bugging Boom," New York Times, March 21, 1968, p. 47M.

<sup>12</sup> Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928).

<sup>13</sup> Henry Campbell Black, *Black's Law Dictionary*, Rev. 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1968) p. 1358.

<sup>14</sup> Such "bugging" was held to be an invasion of privacy. See *Hamberger v. Eastman*, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239, 11 A.L.R.3d 1288 (1964).

<sup>15</sup> *Yoeckel v. Samonig*, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).



tionary generation, most people lived on farms. Urban residents made up not much more than 10 per cent of the new nation's population. When the Constitution was ratified, Philadelphia, then the nation's largest city, had little more than 40,000 residents. When people were out-of-doors, there was little felt need for any specific Constitutional statement of a right to privacy. Indoors, privacy was another matter. As Don R. Pember has written,<sup>16</sup>

Paradoxically, while considerable physical distance existed between villages and residences, little privacy was possible within most homes and in most places of public accommodation and work. While men had progressed a long way from caves and tentlike dwellings, homes with living, eating and sleeping facilities in the same room where often the rule. In public inns, travelers shared many of the same facilities.

Although privacy was not mentioned by the Constitution by name, its first eight amendments, plus the Fourteenth Amendment, include the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure and the principle of due process of law. Taken together with the Declaration of Independence's demands for the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," it can be seen that the men who founded the nation had a lively concern for something like the "right to be let alone."

Here, a useful distinction may be made between the *right* of privacy and the *law* of privacy. As Professor James Willard Hurst of the University of Wisconsin Law School has shown, American legal history is replete with evidence of concern for a broad *right* to privacy, represented by interests protected in the Constitution's Bill of Rights. Of this broad *right* to privacy, only small slivers have been hammered into the narrower *law* of privacy as enunciated by judges and legislatures.<sup>17</sup>

The narrower *law* of privacy is, as law goes, very new indeed. It has been traced to an 1890 *Harvard Law Review* article written by two young Boston law partners, Samuel D. Warren and future Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis. The article, often named as the best example of the influence of law journals on the development of the law, was titled "The Right to Privacy."

If this law journal article was the start of the formalization of a law of privacy in America, it should also be noted that the newspaper press was involved too. Standard accounts of the origins of the Warren-Brandeis article have it that Warren and his wife had been greatly annoyed by newspaper stories about parties which they gave. This irritation, so the story goes, led to the drafting of the

<sup>16</sup> Pember, *Privacy and the Press*, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> James Willard Hurst, *Law and Conditions of Freedom* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956) p. 8.

article, which is now thought to have been written primarily by Brandeis. The co-authors asserted that an independent action for privacy could be found lurking within then-established areas of the law such as defamation and trespass to property. Warren and Brandeis wrote:<sup>18</sup>

The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.

While this law journal article was indeed a catalyst toward the development of a law of privacy, the article's evidence, at some points, left something to be desired. As Justice Peters of the California Supreme Court noted in 1971,<sup>19</sup>

[t]ry as they might, Warren and Brandeis had a difficult time tracing a right of privacy to the common law. In many respects a person had less privacy in the small community of the 18th century than he did in the urbanizing late 19th century or he does today in the modern metropolis. Extended family networks, primary group relationships, and rigid communal mores served to expose an individual's every deviation from the norm and to straitjacket him in a vise of backyard gossip, which threatened to deprive men of the right of "scratching where it itches."

But as a judge in a Missouri appeals court noted in 1911, the concept of a right of privacy was not new at all. Privacy, the judge wrote, "is spoken of as a new right, when in fact it is an old right with a

<sup>18</sup> Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 *Harvard Law Review* (1890) p. 196.

<sup>19</sup> *Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n*, 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34, 36-37 (1971). Justice Peters cited Alan Westin, "Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's," 66 *Columbia Law Review* 1003, at 1025. See, also, John P. Roche's essay, "American Liberty: An Examination of the Tradition of Freedom," in *Shadow and Substance* (New York: Macmillan, 1964) pp. 3-38.

new name. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are rights of all men.”<sup>20</sup>

Long before 1890, when Warren and Brandeis added the word “privacy” to the vocabulary of the law, England’s William Pitt gave ringing affirmation to the idea that “a man’s home is his castle.” Pitt said: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the winds may blow through it; the storms may enter,—but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!”

From such beginnings has emerged an expanding law of privacy. Although Warren and Brandeis complained about the excesses of the news media, the first privacy cases involved other settings. In his pathbreaking study, *Privacy and the Press*, Professor Don R. Pember argued that the first privacy case appeared in 1881—nine years before the Warren and Brandeis article was published. In that case, *Demay v. Roberts*, a woman sued a doctor when she discovered that the doctor’s “assistant,” who had been present when the woman gave birth to a baby, had no medical training. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the woman could collect damages from the doctor. The court declared that the moment of a child’s birth was sacred and that the mother’s privacy had been invaded.<sup>21</sup>

Twelve years later, misdeeds by advertisers led to an early—and famous—privacy case in New York. The judges of two New York courts were evidently readers of the *Harvard Law Review*, because they would have allowed recovery in a privacy lawsuit brought by Miss Abigail M. Roberson. She had sued for \$15,000 because her pretty likeness was used to decorate posters advertising Franklin Mills flour without her consent. But in 1902, New York’s highest court—the Court of Appeals—ruled that she could not collect because there was no precedent which established a “right of privacy.” Despite Miss Roberson’s unwilling inclusion in an advertising campaign featuring the slogan of “The Flour of the Family,” the Court of Appeals held that her injury was “merely” a mental one. The court added that if her claim were allowed, a flood of litigation would result, and that it was too difficult to distinguish between public and private persons.<sup>22</sup>

The *Roberson* decision, however, hinted broadly that if the New York legislature wished to enact a law of privacy, it could do so. Considerable public outcry and a number of outraged newspaper editorials greeted the outcome of the *Roberson* case. The next year,

<sup>20</sup> *Munden v. Harris*, 153 Mo.App. 652, 659–660, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (1911).

<sup>21</sup> Pember, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51; 46 Mich. 160 (1881).

<sup>22</sup> 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902).

in 1903, the New York legislature passed a statute which made it both a misdemeanor and a tort to use the name, portrait, or picture of any person for advertising or "trade purposes" without that person's consent. Note that this was narrowly drawn legislation, limited to the kind of fact situation which had arisen in *Roberson*.<sup>23</sup>

The New York statute, an amendment to the Civil Rights Law of the State of New York, has turned out to be a great generator of privacy law, and is responsible for about one-half of all the reported privacy decisions in the United States since 1903.<sup>24</sup> New York is a natural birthplace for such lawsuits: it is highly populous, and it is also the center of America's publishing and broadcasting industries.

In 1905, two years after the New York privacy statute was passed, the Georgia Supreme Court provided the first major judicial recognition of a law of privacy. An unauthorized photograph of Paolo Pavesich and a testimonial attributed to him appeared in a newspaper advertisement for a life insurance company. The Georgia court ruled that there is a law of privacy which prevents unauthorized use of pictures for advertising purposes.<sup>25</sup>

Since the 1905 *Pavesich* decision, the law of privacy has grown mightily. It has been recognized in some 40 states: by statute in six states, and by common law by courts of 34 states.<sup>26</sup> Courts in Rhode Island, Texas, Nebraska, and Wisconsin have denied that there is a law of privacy. In Wisconsin, despite a woman's plea that her privacy had been disturbed in a tavern restroom by a flash camera, no right of privacy was found. The affronted woman, Mrs. Norma Yoeckel, declared that when she emerged from the restroom, men standing at the bar in Sad Sam's Tavern were passing pictures back and forth. No matter.

<sup>23</sup> New York Session Laws 1903, Ch. 132, §§ 1-2, now known as §§ 50-51, New York Civil Rights Law.

<sup>24</sup> Pember, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>25</sup> *Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.*, 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 79 (1905).

<sup>26</sup> Privacy statutes have been passed in New York, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, California and Wisconsin, in 1977. In 1971, the California Legislature added Section 3344 to the state's Civil Code. Section 3344 is similar to the New York privacy statute, New York Civil Rights Law § 50-51. The California Legislature specified \$300 as the minimum amount recoverable. Courts in Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Nebraska and Texas have held that there is no right of privacy. Colorado, Minnesota, Massachusetts and Washington courts have had the opportunity to try cases under the law of privacy, but have decided those cases on other grounds. Many other states have recognized a common law of privacy by court decisions. The law of privacy has long been recognized as an action by the federal courts.

Cases in which state courts at one time or another have rejected the law of privacy include: Wisconsin, *Yoeckel v. Samonig*, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956); Rhode Island, *Henry v. Cherry & Webb*, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909); Nebraska, *Brunson v. Ranks Army Store*, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Texas, *Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co.*, 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.1952). Privacy is recognized in the District of Columbia.

When considering privacy law, two things should be kept in mind:

*First*, the law of privacy is not uniform. In fact, one judge once compared the state of the law to a haystack in a hurricane. There is great conflict of laws from state to state and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

*Second*, when courts or legislatures become involved with the law of privacy, they are attempting to balance interests. On one side of the scale, you have the public interest in freedom of the press and the right to publish. On the other side, you have the individual's right to privacy.

The late William L. Prosser, for many years America's foremost torts scholar, suggested that there are four kinds of torts included under the broad label of "invasion of privacy."<sup>27</sup>

1. Intrusion on the plaintiff's physical solitude.
2. Publication of private matters violating the ordinary decencies.
3. Putting plaintiff in a false position in the public eye, as by signing his name to a letter attributing to him views he does not hold.
4. Appropriation of some element of plaintiff's personality—his name or likeness—for commercial use.

It should be noted that these are not mutually exclusive categories: more than one of these four kinds of privacy actions may be present in the same case.

Professor Prosser noted that an action for invasion of privacy is much like "*libel per se*:" a plaintiff does not have to plead or prove actual monetary loss ("special damages") in order to have a cause of action. In addition, a court may award punitive damages. But while actions for defamation and for invasion have points of similarity, there are also major differences. As a Massachusetts court said, "The fundamental difference between a right to privacy and a right to freedom from defamation is that the former directly concerns one's own peace of mind, while the latter concerns primarily one's reputation."<sup>28</sup>

While such a distinction may exist in theory, in practice the distinction between defamation and invasion of privacy is blurred. As noted previously, in 1890 Warren and Brandeis drew upon a number of old defamation cases on the way to extracting what they

<sup>27</sup> *Barbieri v. News-Journal Co.*, 189 A.2d 773, 774 (Del.1963). The Delaware Supreme Court summarized Dean Prosser's analysis of the kinds of actions to be included by the law of privacy. For fuller treatment, see Prosser's much-quoted "Privacy," 48 *California Law Review* (1960), pp. 383-423, and his *Handbook of the Law of Torts*, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1971) pp. 802-818.

<sup>28</sup> *Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co.*, 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1940).

called a right to privacy. Privacy, it would seem, may often be regarded as a close, if young, cousin of defamation. Some publications, indeed, may be both defamatory and an invasion of privacy, and shrewd attorneys have often sued for both libel and invasion of privacy on the basis of a single publication.<sup>29</sup>

Privacy actions also resemble defamation lawsuits in that the right to sue belongs only to the affronted individual. Relatives or friends cannot sue because the privacy of someone close to them was invaded, unless their own privacy was also invaded. In general, the right to sue for invasion of privacy dies with the individual.<sup>30</sup>

### SEC. 30. "INTRUSION" AS INVASION OF PRIVACY

**Invading a person's solitude, including the use of microphones or cameras, has been held to be actionable.**

In the area which has been called "intrusion on the plaintiff's physical solitude," the media must beware of the modern technology which they increasingly call upon to gather and to broadcast news. Telephoto lenses on cameras—including television cameras—and microphones which can pick up quiet conversations hundreds of feet away—should be used with care by the media.

Back in 1765, Sir William Blackstone's *Commentaries* dealt with part of the problem of intrusion, naming eavesdropping as part of a list of nuisances which the law should control and punish. Eavesdroppers were defined as "people who listen under windows, or the eaves of a house, to conversation, from which they frame slanderous and mischievous tales."<sup>31</sup> Today, the tort subdivision of intrusion includes affronts ranging from illegal entry into a person's dwelling to peeping into windows. Where intrusion cases are concerned, occasionally the camera has been a big troublemaker. Courts have held that it is not an invasion of privacy to take someone's photograph in a public place. Here, the media's cameramen are protected on grounds that they "stand in" for the public, taking pictures of what any persons could see if they were there.

It follows, of course, that photographers should beware of taking photos in private places. When a journalist or photographer invades

<sup>29</sup> In general, although invasion of privacy and defamation are often included as elements of the same lawsuit, usually courts have not allowed a plaintiff to collect for both actions in one suit. "Duplication of Damages: Invasion of Privacy and Defamation," 41 *Washington Law Review* (1966), pp. 370-377; see, also, *Brink v. Griffith*, 65 *Wash.2d* 253, 396 *P.2d* 793 (1964), and Donald Elliott Brown, "The Invasion of Defamation by Privacy," *Stanford Law Review* 23 (Feb., 1971), pp. 547-568.

<sup>30</sup> *Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co.*, 247 *Iowa* 817, 76 *N.W.2d* 762 (1956); *Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studios*, 71 *Misc.* 199, 128 *N.Y.S.* 247 (1911).

<sup>31</sup> Sir William Blackstone, *Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law*, ed. by Bernard C. Gavit (Washington, D. C., Washington Book Co., 1892) p. 823.

private territory, he and his employer could be in trouble. A classic case of this sort is that of *Barber v. Time*. In 1939, Dorothy Barber was a patient in a Kansas City hospital, undergoing treatment for a disease which caused her to eat constantly but still lose weight. An International News Service (INS) photographer invaded her hospital room and took a picture of Mrs. Barber despite her protests. Such activities resulted in stories about Mrs. Barber's ailment appearing in Kansas City area newspapers for several days. *Time* purchased the picture from INS, and published it under the caption "Starving Glutton" along with a 150-word story drawn from the original INS account. The cutline under the picture said "Insatiable-Eater Barber; She Eats for Ten." Mrs. Barber won \$3,000 in damages from *Time, Inc.*<sup>32</sup>

Although *Barber v. Time* is a famous case, it is—as a noted privacy scholar has argued—in some respects a bad decision, one which is out of step with the subsequent development of the law of privacy.<sup>33</sup> If the Missouri Supreme Court had limited tort liability to the International News Service—and to the photographer who took the picture over Mrs. Barber's protests—that would have squared with the law as it has evolved since the *Barber* decision in 1939.

Instead, the court ruled that Mrs. Barber's identity should not have been given by news accounts: "It was not necessary to state plaintiff's name in order to give medical information to the public as to the symptoms, nature, causes or results of her ailment."<sup>34</sup>

Much more recently, in 1971, *Time, Inc.* lost a privacy lawsuit which again was one that may be labeled under the subdivision of intrusion.

#### **Dietemann v. Time, Inc.**

Over the years, there have been few cases of the "intrusion" privacy lawsuits against the news media. Reporters for *Life* magazine, however, were guilty of intrusive behavior, and that cost the now defunct *Life's* parent corporation \$1,000 in damages for invasion of privacy. Despite the small size of the judgment, the case of *A. A. Dietemann v. Time, Inc.* has sizable significance.

In its November 1, 1963, edition, *Life* published an article entitled "Crackdown on Quackery," depicting A. A. Dietemann as a quack and including two pictures of him. *Life* had done a reporting job with a difference—it had entered an agreement with the office of the Los Angeles District Attorney. "It had been agreed that *Life*

<sup>32</sup> *Barber v. Time, Inc.*, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1948). *Time* purchased the picture from "International," a syndicate dealing in news pictures, and mainly followed the wording of an account furnished by United Press.

<sup>33</sup> Pember, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

<sup>34</sup> 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1948).

would obtain pictures and information for use as evidence, and later could be used by Life for publication.”<sup>35</sup> After this agreement, two *Life* reporters—William Ray and Mrs. Jackie Metcalf—went to Dietemann’s home. They rang a bell at a locked gate at the front of Dietemann’s yard, and Dietemann invited them in after the reporters said—as a ruse to gain admittance—that one of Dietemann’s friends had sent them. Once inside Dietemann’s house, the reporters were ushered into his den, where a number of other persons were sitting.

Mrs. Metcalf then told Dietemann that she had a lump in her breast. Dietemann, a journeyman plumber, then proceeded to examine her. Surreptitiously, without Dietemann’s knowledge or consent, *Life* employee Ray photographed the “examination.” *Life* subsequently published one of these photos, showing Dietemann with his left hand on the upper part of Mrs. Metcalf’s breast. Meanwhile, Dietemann seemed to be looking at some gadgets and holding what appeared to be a wand (mercifully, not a plumber’s friend) in his right hand. After this diagnosis, Dietemann concluded that Mrs. Metcalf’s complaint was caused by her having eaten some rancid butter 11 years, 9 months, and 7 days prior to that time.

There was more to Mrs. Metcalf’s presence in Dietemann’s den than met the eye. Her purse contained a radio transmitter which relayed her conversation with the friendly plumber to a tape recorder in an automobile parked near Dietemann’s house. Keeping the tape recorder company in the car were *Life* reporter Joseph Bride, John Miner of the District Attorney’s office, and Grant Leake, an investigator from the California State Department of Public Health. Bride took notes on the radio transmissions received from Dietemann’s house, although the recorded conversation was not used in *Life*’s article.<sup>36</sup>

As the result of such sleuthing, Dietemann was arrested at his home on a charge of practicing medicine without a license. Dietemann, it may be noted, did not advertise, nor did he make charges when he attempted to diagnose illnesses or when he prescribed herbs and minerals. He *did* accept contributions.<sup>37</sup>

As might be imagined, Dietemann was not overjoyed. He sued *Life* magazine for invasion of privacy, asking \$100,000 general damages and \$200,000 exemplary damages. Employees of the magazine had gained admission to his home through subterfuge. They photographed him and electronically transmitted and recorded conversations in his home, without his knowledge or consent, resulting in emotional distress. The trial court held that these circumstances

<sup>35</sup> Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1971).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*



amounted to a cause of action against the magazine for invading Dietemann's privacy.<sup>38</sup> A jury awarded Dietemann only \$1,000 in general damages, and made no exemplary damage award. Writing for the trial court, District Judge Charles H. Carr said that although Dietemann was entitled to damages for injury to his feelings and peace of mind, "the injury is mental and difficult of ascertainment. \* \* \*"<sup>39</sup> Judge Carr, nevertheless, indicated that he was putting the magazine's conduct in the light most favorable to the press:<sup>40</sup>

In view of the unusual facts of this case, it is concluded that the award of punitive damages is not warranted. It cannot be overlooked that defendant's efforts were directed toward the elimination of quackery, an evil which has visited great harm upon a great number of gullible people. Furthermore, if this decision correctly states the law, publishers will undoubtedly be guided accordingly in the future.

Attempting to defend the magazine's conduct, attorneys tried to find refuge in their version of the First Amendment. In upholding the judgment against *Life* magazine, Circuit Judge Shirley Hufstедler disagreed with those attorneys. She wrote:<sup>41</sup>

The defendant claims that the First Amendment immunizes it from liability for invading plaintiff's den with a hidden camera and its concealed electronic instruments because its employees were gathering news and its instrumentalities "are indispensable tools of investigative reporting."

That was apparently too much for Judge Hufstедler to ignore. She proceeded to deliver a lesson in journalistic ethics—and privacy law—which *Life* should not have had to learn at the late date of 1971:<sup>42</sup>

We agree that newsgathering is an integral part of news dissemination. We strongly disagree, however, that the hidden mechanical contrivances are "indispensable tools" of newsgathering. Investigative reporting is an ancient art; its successful practice long antecedes the invention of miniature cameras and electronic devices. The First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office. It does not become

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247; and at the trial level, 284 F.Supp. 925, 926 (D.C.Cal.1968).

<sup>39</sup> 284 F.Supp. 925, 932 (D.C.Cal.1968).

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 932-933.

<sup>41</sup> 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

such a license simply because the person subjected to the intrusion is reasonably suspected of committing a crime.

Judge Hufstedler said that an actionable invasion of privacy had occurred during the reporting process as carried out by *Life's* employees; publication was not an essential part of plaintiff Dietemann's cause of action. Moreover, the judge added that the magazine could not shield itself from an invasion-of-privacy lawsuit by publishing a story and then saying that the intrusion was necessary to get that story. She declared:<sup>43</sup>

No interest protected by the First Amendment is adversely affected by permitting damages for intrusion to be enhanced by the fact of later publication of the information that the publisher improperly acquired. Assessing damages for the additional emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff when the wrongfully acquired data are purveyed to the multitude chills intrusive acts. It does not chill freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.

### Pearson v. Dodd

Although Dietemann won his "intrusion" privacy lawsuit against Time, Inc., and *Life* magazine, Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut was not so fortunate in his suit against muckraking columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. Pearson and Anderson did great harm to the reputation and political career of Senator Dodd by publishing papers from Dodd's office files which showed an appropriation of campaign funds for personal purposes. The exposé of Dodd began during the summer of 1965 when two employees and two former employees of Senator Dodd removed documents from his files, photocopied them, and then replaced the originals in their filing cabinets. The copies were turned over to Anderson, who knew how they had been obtained. The Pearson-Anderson "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column proceeded to run six stories about the Senator, dealing—among other matters—with his relationships with lobbyists for foreign interests.

Dodd argued that the manner in which the information for the columns was obtained was an invasion of his privacy. After hearing Pearson and Anderson's appeal from a lower court judgment,<sup>44</sup> Circuit Court Judge J. Skelly Wright said:<sup>45</sup>

The question then becomes whether appellants Pearson and Anderson improperly intruded into the protected sphere of privacy of appellee Dodd in obtaining the information on which their columns were based. In determining

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>44</sup> 279 F.Supp. 101 (D.C.D.C.1968).

<sup>45</sup> 133 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 410 F.2d 701, 704-705 (1969).

this question, we may assume, without deciding, that appellee's [Dodd's] employees and former employees did commit such an improper intrusion when they removed confidential files with the intent to show them to unauthorized outsiders.

\* \* \*

If we were to hold appellants [Pearson and Anderson] liable for invasion of privacy on these facts, we would establish the proposition that one who receives information from an intruder, knowing it has been obtained by improper intrusion, is guilty of a tort. In an untried and developing area of tort law, we are not prepared to go so far.

Judge Wright commented that a person approached by an eavesdropper bearing information should perhaps "play the nobler part" and shut his ears. But this, the judge suggested, might place too great a strain on human weakness, holding a person liable for damages who merely gives in to temptation and listens.

Of course, Judge Wright noted, columnists Pearson and Anderson did much more than take and read copies of documents from Senator Dodd's files: they published excerpts from them in the national press. Judge Wright added:<sup>46</sup>

But in analyzing the claimed breach of privacy, injuries from intrusion and injuries from publication should be kept clearly separate. Where there is intrusion, the intruder should generally be liable whatever the content of what he learns. An eavesdropper to the marital bedroom may hear marital intimacies, or he may hear statements of fact or opinion of legitimate interest to the public; for purposes of liability, that should make no difference. On the other hand, where the claim is that private information concerning the plaintiff has been published, the question of whether that information is genuinely private or is of public interest should not turn on the manner in which it has been obtained.

A number of scholars have expressed consternation over this decision. Professor William H. Fortune of the University of Kentucky College of Law declared that the effect of the Dodd case is that journalists—as long as they do not actively participate in intruding in a search for damaging private documents—can receive the fruits of other person's illegal activity.<sup>47</sup> Jack Anderson had met one of the documents' takers, sometime before the documents were copied, and that person described his knowledge of evidence of Dodd's misconduct. According to that person, Anderson said, "If we

<sup>46</sup> 133 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (1969).

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Professor Fortune, Lexington, Ky., October 16, 1972.

can substantiate half of this it will be the most significant disclosure of misconduct in Washington for forty years, certainly in all my time as a reporter.”<sup>48</sup>

In the excitement of “getting the goods” on Dodd, Anderson exaggerated the importance of the exposé. As Professor Fortune suggested, the decision brings up some enormously perplexing problems of journalism law—and of journalism ethics. “What if the media know of information of public interest which cannot be obtained without committing a crime? Is there a First Amendment defense under those circumstances to a private damage suit or to a criminal prosecution?”<sup>49</sup> Although the late Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson successfully defended the invasion of privacy suit brought against them by Senator Dodd, the “Pentagon Papers Case”—*United States v. New York Times*, discussed in Section 9 of Chapter 2, suggests that no such First Amendment right exists.<sup>50</sup>

#### Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher

In 1972, 17-year-old Cindy Fletcher was alone one afternoon at her Jacksonville, Fla., home when a fire of undetermined origin did severe damage to the house. She died in the blaze. When the Fire Marshal and a police sergeant arrived at the house to make their investigation, they invited news media representatives to join them as was their standard practice.

The Fire Marshal desired a clear picture of the “silhouette” left on the floor after the removal of Cindy Fletcher’s body to show that the body was already on the floor before the fire’s heat did any damage in the room. The marshal took one polaroid picture of the silhouette, but that picture was unclear and he had no more film. A photographer for the Florida *Times-Union* was then asked to take the silhouette picture, which was made part of the official investigation files of both the fire and police departments.

This picture was not only part of the investigative record, it was also published—along with other pictures from the fire scene—in a *Times-Union* story on September 16, 1972. Cindy’s mother, Mrs. Klenna Ann Fletcher, first learned of the facts surrounding the death of her daughter by reading the newspaper story and by seeing the published photographs.

Mrs. Fletcher sued the newspaper [“Florida Publishing Company”] and alleged three things: “(1) trespass and invasion of privacy, (2) invasion of privacy, [and 3] wrong intentional infliction of emotional

<sup>48</sup> Note, “The Emerging Tort of Intrusion,” 55 *Iowa Law Review* (1970) pp. 718–728, at p. 723n. That case comment argued that the court was unimaginative; that Pearson and Anderson should have been held liable for the intrusion because it was a wrongful act done for their benefit.

<sup>49</sup> Fortune interview, Oct. 16, 1972.

<sup>50</sup> 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140 (1971).

distress—seeking punitive damages.<sup>51</sup> The trial court dismissed Count 2 and granted summary judgments in favor of the newspaper on Counts 1 and 3. Speaking to the question of trespass, the trial judge said:<sup>52</sup>

“The question raised is whether the trespass alleged in Count I of the complaint was consented to by the doctrine of common custom and usage.

“The law is well settled in Florida that there is no unlawful trespass when peaceable entry is made, without objection, under common custom and usage.”

Numerous affidavits had been filed by the news media saying that “common custom and usage” permitted the news media to enter the scene of a disaster.<sup>53</sup>

Mrs. Fletcher appealed from the trial court to Florida District Court of Appeal, First District, which held that she should have been able to go to trial on the issue of trespass.<sup>54</sup> The Florida Supreme Court, however, ruled that no actionable trespass or invasion of privacy had occurred. The Florida Supreme Court quoted approvingly from a dissenting opinion by Florida District Court of Appeal Judge McCord:<sup>55</sup>

*“It is my view that the entry in this case was by implied consent.*

“It is not questioned that this tragic fire and death were being investigated by the fire department and the sheriff’s office and that arson was suspected. The fire was a disaster of great public interest and it is clear that the photographer and other members of the news media entered the burned home at the invitation of the investigating officers.

“ \* \* \*

“The affidavits as to custom and practice do not delineate between various kinds of property where a tragedy occurs. They apply to any such place. If an entry is or is not a trespass, its character would not change depending upon whether or not the place of the tragedy is a burned out home (as here), an office or other building or place. An analysis of the cases on implied consent \* \* \* indicates that they do not rest upon the previous nonobjection to the

<sup>51</sup> Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914, 915–916 (Fla.,1977).

<sup>52</sup> Quoted at Ibid., p. 916.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. Affidavits came from such sources as the Chicago Tribune; ABC-TV News, New York; the Associated Press; the Miami Herald; United Press International; the Milwaukee Journal, and the Washington Post.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., pp. 917–918.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., pp. 918–919.

entry by the property owner in question but rest upon custom and practice generally. Implied consent would, of course, vanish if one were informed not to enter at that time by the owner or possessor or by their direction. But here there was not only no objection to the entry, but *there was an invitation to enter by the officers investigating the fire.*"

Therefore, there was no trespass by the news media in this case.

### SEC. 31. PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE MATTERS

**With the law of privacy, "truth can hurt." Unlike the law of defamation, truth is not necessarily a defense to a lawsuit for invasion of privacy.**

The case of Dorothy Barber discussed in the last section was not only an incident of "Intrusion," but also involved a second sub-area of privacy law: "publication of private matters violating the ordinary decencies." In this area of law, far more than in the category of "intrusion," missteps by the mass media have led to lawsuits. In publishing details of private matters, the media may make scrupulously accurate reports and yet—at least on some occasions—be found liable for damages. A suit for defamation would not stand where the press has accurately reported the truth, but the press could nevertheless lose an action for invasion of privacy based on the same fact situation. Here, the truth sometimes hurts.

In most cases, the existence of a public record has usually precluded recovery for invasion of privacy. Even if persons are embarrassed by publication of dates of a marriage or birth,<sup>56</sup> or information which is a matter of public record,<sup>57</sup> publication accurately based on such records have escaped successful lawsuits. Where there is a legitimate public record—and where the media's use of that record is not forbidden by law—the material generally may be used for publication. In 1960, the Albuquerque (N.M.) *Journal* published a story which said:<sup>58</sup>

Richard Hubbard, 16, son of Mrs. Ann Hubbard, 532 Ponderosa, NW, was charged with running away from home, also prior to date, several times endangered the physical and moral health of himself and others by sexually assaulting his younger sister. Court ordered a suspended sentence to the New Mexico Boys' Home on the condition that he serve 60 days in the Juvenile Detention Home.

<sup>56</sup> *Meetze v. Associated Press*, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).

<sup>57</sup> *Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp.*, 108 Cal.App.2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).

<sup>58</sup> *Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co.*, 69 N.M. 473, 474, 368 P.2d 147 (1962).

The younger sister, Delores Hubbard, sued for invasion of privacy, asserting that she had suffered extreme humiliation and distress and that the story "caused her to be regarded as unchaste, and that her prospects of marriage have been adversely affected thereby." Attorneys for the newspaper, however, brought proof that the *Albuquerque Journal's* story was an exact copy of an official court record. In upholding a lower court's judgment for the newspaper, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that because this was a public record, the newspaper enjoyed privilege. Although the plaintiff complained that the article was not newsworthy, the court held that the story was "accurate, newsworthy, and exercised in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose." The court added that the girl, although an unwilling participant who did not seek publicity, was in the unfortunate position of being a person who might come to the notice of the public and have her misfortunes told to the world.<sup>59</sup>

In at least four states, statutes prohibited publishing the *identity* of a rape victim. Those states are Wisconsin, Florida, South Carolina, and Georgia.<sup>60</sup> A case based upon the South Carolina statute—*Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company*—resulted in a 1963 Federal District Court ruling indicating that such statutes were valid. However, as will be shown, a 1975 Supreme Court of the United States decision held otherwise when publication of a rape victim's name was based on a public record.<sup>61</sup>

In November, 1961, reporters for a Florence, S. C., television station took pictures of a station wagon which had been abandoned in that city, and the pictures were used in TV newscasts. The station wagon was in the news because its former occupants, Patricia Nappier and Maxine Gunter, had been raped, and the rapist had fled in the station wagon the women had driven. The televised news shows never used the women's names, but on the side of the auto was a sign closely associated with those women. They were puppeteers employed by the South Carolina State Department of Health; they traveled from school to school presenting shows about health and hygiene. Signs on the state-owned station wagon said "Little Jack, Dental Division, South Carolina State Department of Health." Because of this, the women had come to be known around the state as the "Little Jack Girls."

At the trial court level, it was held that a South Carolina statute specified that it was a misdemeanor and an invasion of privacy if a rape victim were to be *named*. Since the victims' names were not used, the court held that the women could not succeed in a lawsuit

<sup>59</sup> 69 N.M. 473, 474-475, 368 P.2d 147, 148-149 (1962).

<sup>60</sup> Wis.Stat. Ann. 348.412; Fla.Stat. Ann., § 794.03; S.C. Ann. Code, § 16-81, and Ga.Stat., § 26-9901.

<sup>61</sup> *Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.*, 213 F.Supp. 174 (D.C.S.C., 1963) but see *Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029 (1975).

for invasion of privacy.<sup>62</sup> Patricia Nappier and Maxine Gunter appealed that decision, arguing that the pictures of the label on the car in effect named them, and a United States Court of Appeals agreed with their contention. Circuit Judge Albert V. Bryan said that the statute's use of the word "name" was to be read as being synonymous with "identity," and that the televised pictures "transgressed the statute and trespassed on the plaintiffs' privacy."<sup>63</sup>

The television station contended that the crime was newsworthy, and that the defense of newsworthiness should therefore overcome the lawsuit for invasion of privacy. Judge Bryan ruled, however, that South Carolina law specifically declared that identities of rape victims could not be published or broadcast, and that a statutory exemption to the defense of newsworthiness had thus been created.<sup>64</sup>

In 1975, however, the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated Georgia's statute forbidding publication of the identity of a rape victim. The Court held that when a television reporter took notes during a court proceeding and obtained the rape victim's name from official court records open to public inspection, reporting of such information was protected by freedom of the press.

#### **Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975)**

Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn grew out of tragic circumstances. In August, 1971, 17-year-old Cynthia Cohn was gang-raped and died, and six youths were soon indicted for the crimes against her. There was considerable coverage of the crime, but the identity of the victim was not disclosed until one defendant's trial began. Some eight months later, in April of 1972, five of the six youths entered pleas of guilty to rape or attempted rape, the charge of murder having been dropped. Those guilty pleas were accepted, and the trial of the defendant who pled not guilty was set for a later date.<sup>65</sup>

Georgia had a statute forbidding publication of the identity of a rape victim. Despite this, a television reporter employed by WSB-TV—a Cox Broadcasting Corporation station—learned Cynthia Cohn's name from indictments which were open to public inspection. Later that day, the reporter broadcast her identity as part of his story on the court proceedings, and the report was repeated the next day.<sup>66</sup>

Martin Cohn sued Cox Broadcasting, claiming that the broadcasts which had identified his daughter invaded his own privacy by reason

<sup>62</sup> 213 F.Supp. 174 (D.C.S.C., 1963).

<sup>63</sup> 322 F.2d 502, 503 (4th Cir. 1963).

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1034–1035 (1975).

<sup>66</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 471, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1034–1035 (1975).



of the publication of his daughter's name. After hearing the Cohn case twice, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the statute forbidding publication of the name of a rape victim was constitutional \* \* \* "a legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression contained in the First Amendment." <sup>67</sup>

The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed by a vote of 8-1. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice White said: <sup>68</sup>

The version of the privacy tort now before us—termed in Georgia the "tort of public disclosure" \* \* \* is that in which the plaintiff claims the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Because the gravamen [gist] of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.

Justice White emphasized that truth may not always be a defense in either defamation or privacy actions. "The Court has \* \* \* carefully left open the question of action brought by a private person as distinguished from a public official or public figure." <sup>69</sup> Thus the Court recognized—but backed away from—a troubling area of defamation and privacy law: may a state ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted *truthful* publicity in the press? If so, then truth would not be a defense in such privacy areas. But having recognized this problem, White then turned his majority opinion to narrower and safer ground. In *Cox Broadcasting*, the key question was whether Georgia might impose sanctions against the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records. "[M]ore specifically," Justice White wrote, the issue arose when the rape victim's name was obtained "from judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection. We are convinced that the State may not do so." <sup>70</sup>

He wrote that the news media have a great responsibility to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government, "and official records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations." The function of the news media

<sup>67</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 475, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1036 (1975). Justices Powell and Douglas filed concurring opinions, and Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction in this case for want of a final decree or judgment from a lower court.

<sup>68</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 489, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1043 (1975).

<sup>69</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 490, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1044 (1975).

<sup>70</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 491, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1044 (1975).

reporting of judicial proceedings “serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.”<sup>71</sup> Justice White declared:<sup>72</sup>

The special protected nature of accurate reports of judicial proceedings has repeatedly been recognized. This Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, has said: “A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property. If a transcript of the court proceedings had been published, we suppose none would claim that the judge could punish the publisher for contempt. And we can see no difference though the conduct of the attorneys, of the jury, or even of the judge himself, may have reflected on the court. *Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.* There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in events before it.” *Craig v. Harney*, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1254 (1947).

The general rule for a journalist, then, is that if the material is part of a public record—in this case, of a judicial proceeding—it can be reported. “Under these circumstances,” Justice White wrote in *Cox Broadcasting*, “the protection of freedom of the press provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments bars the State of Georgia from making appellants’ broadcast the basis of civil liability.”<sup>73</sup> Despite White’s language (quoted above at footnote 72) about the importance of public records and news reports based on them, he also wrote some words which ingenious legislatures or courts might use as a justification for sealing some judicial records away from public view.<sup>74</sup>

At the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records. If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information. Their political institutions must weigh the interests of the public to know and of the press to publish. Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot

<sup>71</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 492, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1044–1045 (1975), citing *Sheppard v. Maxwell*, 384 U.S. 333, 350, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 (1966).

<sup>72</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 492–493, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1045 (1975). Emphasis Justice White’s.

<sup>73</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 497, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1047 (1975).

<sup>74</sup> 420 U.S. 469, 496, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1047 (1975).

be sanctioned for publishing it. In this instance as in others reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or broadcast. See *Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S., at 258, 94 S.Ct., at 2840.

### The "Social Value" Test: A California Aberration?

In decisions separated by 40 years, California courts added an element to privacy law: the existence of a public record did not necessarily serve as a defense to a lawsuit for invasion of privacy. One of the most famous—and wrong-headed—cases involving the disclosure of embarrassing private facts came in the 1931 case of *Melvin v. Reid*, which for many years was regarded as a leading decision in the law of privacy. Gabrielle Darley Melvin sued when a motion picture—"The Red Kimono"—was made about her life as a prostitute and her trial for murder in 1918. But Gabrielle Darley had been acquitted of the murder charge, and thereafter led a changed life: she got married, found many friends who were not aware of her tawdry past, and became an accepted member of society.<sup>75</sup>

Although the court found that a movie could be made about Mrs. Melvin's life without penalty—because the facts were part of a public record—it was found that damages could be recovered for the use of her name, both in the motion picture and in advertisements for it. Strangely, the California Supreme Court—via a decision written by Justice Emerson J. Marks—said that privacy as a tort action did not then (in 1931) exist in California. However, Justice Marks found provisions in the California state constitution, such as Section 1, Article I: "men are by nature free \* \* \* and have certain inalienable rights, among which are pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."<sup>76</sup>

So it was that Mrs. Melvin won her lawsuit, even though Justice Marks denied the existence of the tort of invasion of privacy in California. One especially curious thing about *Melvin v. Reid* is that the California Supreme Court gave little heed to the qualified privilege attached to reports made from public records. But perhaps, in 1931, a movie such as "The Red Kimono" was not believed to be a defensible part of "the press" which is protected by the First Amendment.<sup>77</sup> The court suggested strongly that if the motion

<sup>75</sup> *Melvin v. Reid*, 112 Cal.App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).

<sup>76</sup> This was indeed a curious reading of the state's constitution. Usually, constitutions or bills of rights are seen as protecting individuals from the actions and powers of governments, rather than establishing protection against the actions of other individuals. See Pember, *Privacy and the Press*, p. 98.

<sup>77</sup> For years, courts were reluctant to accord First Amendment protection to motion pictures. See, e. g., *Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio*, 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915); *Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct.

picture company had used only those aspects of Gabrielle Darley's life which were in the trial record or public record of her case, then the film would have been privileged. Even so, Gabrielle Darley's name surely was part of the public record and it would seem that using it should have been "privileged."

In 1968, *Readers Digest* magazine published an article titled "The Big Business of Hijacking," describing various truck thefts and the efforts being made to stop such thefts. Dates ranging from 1965 to the time of publication were mentioned throughout the article, but none of the hijackings mentioned had a date attached to it in the text.<sup>78</sup>

One sentence in the article said: "Typical of many beginners, Marvin Briscoe and [another man] stole a 'valuable-looking' truck in Danville, Ky. and then fought a gun battle with the local police, only to learn that they had hijacked four bowling-pin spotters."

There was nothing in the article to indicate that the hijacking had occurred in 1956, some 11 years before the publication of the *Reader's Digest* article. In the words of the California Supreme Court, "As a result of defendant's [*Reader's Digest's*] publication, plaintiff's 11-year-old daughter, as well as his friends, for the first time learned of the incident. They thereafter scorned and abandoned him."<sup>79</sup> Briscoe argued that he had since "gone straight" and that he had become entirely rehabilitated, and led an exemplary and honorable life, making many friends in respectable society who were not aware of the hijacking incident in his earlier life.

Briscoe conceded the truth of the facts published in the *Reader's Digest* article, but claimed that the public disclosure of such private facts humiliated him and exposed him to contempt and ridicule. He conceded that the *subject* of the article might have been "news-worthy," but contended that the use of his *name* was not, and that *Reader's Digest* had therefore invaded his privacy.

Writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court, Justice Raymond E. Peters agreed with Briscoe's arguments, saying:<sup>80</sup>

Plaintiff is a man whose last offense took place 11 years before, who has paid his debt to society, who has friends and an 11-year-old daughter who were unaware of his early life—a man who has assumed a position in "respectable society." Ideally, his neighbors should recognize his present worth and forget his past life of shame. But men are not

777 (1952) was the case which first termed movies a significant medium for the expression of ideas.

<sup>78</sup> *Briscoe v. Readers Digest Ass'n*, 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34, 36 (1971).

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34, 41-42 (1971).

so divine as to forgive the past trespasses of others, and plaintiff therefore endeavored to reveal as little as possible of his past life. Yet, as if in some bizarre canyon of echoes, petitioner's past life pursues him through the pages of Reader's Digest, now published in 13 languages and distributed in 100 nations, with a circulation in California alone of almost 2,000,000 copies.

In a nation built upon the free dissemination of ideas, it is always difficult to declare that something may not be published. But the great general interest in an unfettered press may at times be outweighed by other societal interests. As a people we have come to recognize that one of these societal interests is that of protecting an individual's right to privacy. The right to know and the right to have others *not* know are simplistically considered, irreconcilable. But the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a minimum of intrusion on the other.

Although the California Supreme Court was not in a position to actually award damages to Mr. Briscoe, it did send his case back to a lower court for trial. Justice Peters declared that although there was good reason to discuss the crime of truck hijacking in the media, there was no reason to use Briscoe's name. A jury, in the view of the California Supreme Court, could certainly find that Mr. Briscoe had once again become an anonymous member of the community.<sup>81</sup>

Once legal proceedings have concluded, and particularly once the individual has reverted to the lawful and unexciting life led by the rest of the community, the public's interest in knowing is less compelling.

Second, a jury might find that revealing one's criminal past for all to see is grossly offensive to most people in America. Certainly a criminal background is kept even more hidden from others than is a humiliating disease (*Barber v. Time, Inc.*, *supra*, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291) or the existence of business debts (*Trammell v. Citizens News Co., Inc.*, *supra*, 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708; *Tollefson v. Price*, *supra*, 247 Or. 398, 430 P.2d 990). The consequences of revelation in this case—ostracism, isolation, and the alienation of one's family—make all too clear just how deeply offensive to most persons a prior crime is and thus how hidden the former offender must keep the knowledge of his prior indiscretion.

Third, in no way can plaintiff be said to have voluntarily consented to the publicity accorded him here. He commit-

<sup>81</sup> 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34, 43 (1971).

ted a crime. He was punished. He was rehabilitated. And he became, for 11 years, an obscure and law-abiding citizen. His every effort was to forget and to have others forget that he had once hijacked a truck.

Despite such sweeping language, Mr. Briscoe did not win his lawsuit. The action was removed to a United States District Court for the Central District of California, where the judge granted a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the magazine. No published opinion was provided. The California Supreme Court's judgment was on a demurrer by *Reader's Digest*, with the magazine pleading that even if the facts were as alleged, they did not constitute a viable lawsuit. In such a situation, a court will give a highly favorable reading to plaintiff's statement of the facts. In the U. S. District Court trial, Briscoe evidently was unable to show "actual malice" required to sustain his suit. See the discussion of "actual malice" in Section 23 at pages 122-130.

### Time Lapse

One of the problems referred to in *Briscoe v. Reader's Digest* involved the so-called time lapse problem.<sup>82</sup> How much time must pass before a person recovers from unwanted publicity, loses his or her newsworthiness, and again can be said to have regained anonymity? Take the case of William James Sidis, a person who did not seek publicity but who was found by it. In 1910, Sidis was an 11-year-old mathematical prodigy who lectured to famed mathematicians. He was graduated from Harvard at 16, and received a great deal of publicity. More than 20 years after his graduation, the *New Yorker Magazine*—in its August 14, 1937 issue—ran a feature story about Sidis plus a cartoon, with the captions "Where Are They Now?" and "April Fool." The article told how Sidis lived in a "hall bedroom of Boston's shabby south end," working at a routine clerical job, collecting streetcar transfers and studying the history of American Indians. Sidis sued for invasion of privacy, but a United States Court of Appeals ultimately held that he could not collect damages.

The court admitted that the *New Yorker* had perpetrated "a ruthless exposure of a once public character, who has since sought and has now been deprived of the seclusion of private life." Even so, the lawsuit did not succeed.<sup>83</sup>

\* \* \* [W]e are not yet disposed to afford to all of the intimate details of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the press. Everyone will agree that at some point the individual interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the individual's desire for privacy.

<sup>82</sup> See Chief Justice Raymond E. Peters opinion, 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34, 41-42 (1971).

<sup>83</sup> *Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.*, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).

\* \* \* At least we would permit limited scrutiny of the "private" life of any person who has achieved, or has had thrust upon him, the questionable and indefinable status of a "public figure." \* \* \*

\* \* \*

The article in the *New Yorker* sketched the life of an unusual personality, and it possessed considerable popular news interest.

We express no comment on whether or not the newsworthiness of the matter printed will always constitute a complete defense. Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency. But when focused upon public characters, truthful comments upon duress, speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality will usually not transgress this line. Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and "public figures" are subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the population. And when such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in the newspapers, books, and magazines of the day.

The court implied that the invasion of privacy must be so severe that it would cause more than minor annoyance to an hypothetical "average" or "reasonable" man of "ordinary sensibilities." William James Sidis was an unusually sensitive man, and it has been speculated that the *New Yorker* article was in large measure responsible for his early death.<sup>84</sup>

Despite circumstances such as those surrounding the *Sidis* case, American courts have generally given the media the benefit of the doubt. However, when "embarrassing private facts" brought to light by publication are painful to ordinary persons who do not have Mr. Sidis's eccentricities, the media may be held liable.

### Virgil v. Time, Inc. (1975)

The door to recovery in a privacy lawsuit may be open even when a truthful report is made by the news media. For example, consider *Virgil v. Time, Inc.*, a case which has drawn horrified comment from the noted constitutional lawyer Alan U. Schwartz. Schwartz recently termed the *Virgil* case even more ominous for the news media than the *Gertz* and *Firestone* libel decisions.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Prosser, "Privacy," *California Law Review*, Vol. 48 (1960) at p. 397.

<sup>85</sup> Alan U. Schwartz, "Danger: Pendulum Swinging," *The Atlantic*, Feb. 1977, at p. 32.

*Sports Illustrated*, a Time, Inc. publication, published an article on body surfing in February, 1971. This article devoted considerable attention to Mike Virgil, a man well known as a frequenter of "The Wedge," a dangerous beach near Newport Beach, California. *Sports Illustrated* staff writer Curry Kirkpatrick had interviewed Virgil at length—which obviously required a kind of consent from Virgil—and Virgil had also consented to the taking of pictures by a free-lance photographer working with Kirkpatrick.<sup>86</sup>

Before the article was published, another *Sports Illustrated* staffer called Virgil's home and verified some of the information with his wife. At this point, Virgil "revoked all consent" for publication of the article and photographs and indicated that he did not want his name used in the story. Circuit Judge Merrill summed up Virgil's attempt to revoke his consent:<sup>87</sup>

While not disputing the truth of the article or the accuracy of the statements about him which it contained, and while admitting that he had known that his picture was being taken, the plaintiff indicated that he thought the article was going to be limited to his prominence as a surfer at The Wedge, and that he did not know that it would contain references to some rather bizarre incidents in his life that were not directly related to surfing.

It can be objected that Judge Merrill was placing himself in the editor's chair: is it for a *judge* to say whether some of the "bizarre incidents" in Virgil's life are "not directly related to surfing." If a person persists in body-surfing at a place known as one of earth's most dangerous beaches, might not some of his other actions—such as extinguishing a cigarette in his mouth, or diving down a flight of stairs because "there were all these chicks around"—indicate an unusually reckless (and therefore newsworthy?) approach to life? Or, consider this passage from Kirkpatrick's *Sports Illustrated* article, the accuracy of which is unchallenged:<sup>88</sup>

"Every summer I'd work construction and dive off billboards to hurt myself or drop loads of lumber on myself to collect unemployment compensation so I could surf at The Wedge. Would I fake injuries? No, I wouldn't fake them. I'd be damn injured. But I would recover. I guess I used to live a pretty reckless life. I think I might have been drunk most of the time."

It was argued for *Sports Illustrated*—which had proceeded, on advice of counsel, to publish the article even after Virgil "revoked" his consent—that Virgil had voluntarily made public the facts he

<sup>86</sup> Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1975).

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p. 1125n, quoting the *Sports Illustrated* article.



complained about. Judge Merrill disagreed, in words which frightened reporters and editors:<sup>89</sup>

Talking freely to a member of the press, knowing the listener to be a member of the press, is not then in itself making public. Such communication can be said to anticipate that what is said will be made public since making public is the function of the press, and accordingly such communication can be construed as a consent to publicize. Thus if publicity results it can be said to have been consented to. However, if consent is withdrawn prior to the act of publicization, the consequent publicity is without consent.

We conclude that the voluntary disclosure to Kirkpatrick did not in itself constitute a making public of the facts disclosed.

Judge Merrill paid particular attention to the Restatement, Second, Torts § 652D (Tentative Draft No. 21, 1975), saying that unless a subject is newsworthy, the publicizing of private facts is not protected by the First Amendment.<sup>90</sup> He then quoted a comment from the Restatement:<sup>91</sup>

“In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores. The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into public lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern. \* \* \*”

In an action which startled constitutional lawyers, the Supreme Court refused to review the Court of Appeals decision in *Virgil*.<sup>92</sup> This meant that the *Virgil* case went back to the District [trial] Court, which decided—fortunately for *Sports Illustrated*—that the article about Virgil was “newsworthy.”<sup>93</sup> But was this a victory for the magazine? Constitutional law specialists Alan U. Schwartz and Floyd Abrams say otherwise. Schwartz complained, “Under this formula truth becomes immaterial. The test is whether community mores (and *what* community? one may ask) have been offended.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1127.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1128.

<sup>91</sup> Restatement quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 1129, 1129n.

<sup>92</sup> *Virgil v. Time, Inc.*, 527 F.2d 1122, 1130–1132 (9th Cir. 1975), certiorari denied 425 U.S. 998, 96 S.Ct. 2215 (1976). Justices Brennan and Stewart said they would have granted certiorari.

<sup>93</sup> Floyd Abrams, “The Press, Privacy and the Constitution,” *New York Times Magazine*, August 21, 1977, pp. 11ff, at p. 13.

The peril to the journalist is extreme.”<sup>94</sup> Abrams declared, “the test set forth by the Court in the *Virgil* case contains language so broad (‘morbid and sensational prying’), so open-ended (‘a reasonable member of the public’) and so subjective (‘decent standards’) that it makes it all but impossible to determine in advance what may be published and what not.”<sup>95</sup>

## SEC. 32. FALSE PUBLICATIONS WHICH INVADE PRIVACY

### Putting a person in a false position before the public has proven costly for many publications.

A third sub-area of privacy law, “putting plaintiff in a false position in the public eye,” is one which holds great dangers of lawsuits for the mass media.<sup>96</sup> The first invasion of privacy case dealing with the mass media to be decided by the Supreme Court of the United States involved the “false position in the public eye” area.<sup>97</sup>

This branch of privacy law has roots which go back to an outraged English poet, Lord Byron, who successfully sued to prevent the publication of inferior poems under Lord Byron’s name.<sup>98</sup> In more recent years, the press—or people who use the press—have misrepresented the views of other people at their peril. For example, the New York *Herald* published a fake story on “stopping a congo cannibal feast”—ostensibly written in a self-praising autobiographical style—which made fun of Antonio B. D’Altomonte, a well-known explorer. D’Altomonte collected damages as a result of this playfulness by the newspaper.<sup>99</sup> And in 1960, Rabbi Julius Goldberg received a judgment against a “romance” magazine. This publication had attributed to Rabbi Goldberg views on sex which he did not hold.<sup>1</sup>

The old saw that “photographs don’t lie” is perhaps true most of the time, but photos—and especially their captions—must be care-

<sup>94</sup> Schwartz, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>95</sup> Abrams, op. cit., pp. 13, 65.

<sup>96</sup> It should be noted that this third area of privacy overlaps a fourth area discussed later in this chapter, “appropriation of some element of plaintiff’s personality for commercial use.” This overlapping is especially apparent in cases involving spurious testimonials in advertisements. See, e. g., *Flake v. Greensboro News Co.*, 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) where a woman’s picture was placed, by mistake, in an advertisement; *Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co.*, 138 Cal.App.2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955), where a plaintiff was labeled one of a number of law firms which used a certain brand of photocopying machine.

<sup>97</sup> *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967).

<sup>98</sup> *Lord Byron v. Johnston*, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng.Rep. 851 (Chancery 1816).

<sup>99</sup> *D’Altomonte v. New York Herald*, 154 App.Div. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200 (1913).

<sup>1</sup> *Goldberg v. Ideal Pub. Corp.*, 210 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup.1960).

fully watched by editors. Pictures which would give, or are used in such a way that they give, a misleading impression of a person's character are especially dangerous. The *Saturday Evening Post* was stung by a privacy lawsuit in *Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co.* The magazine published an article about Washington, D. C., taxicab drivers titled "Never Give a Passenger an Even Break." The court noted that this article painted the city's drivers as "ill mannered, brazen, and contemptuous of their patrons \* \* \* dishonest and cheating when opportunity arises."<sup>2</sup> The *Saturday Evening Post's* article was worth money to cab-driver Muriel Peay, whose picture had been used, without her permission, to illustrate the article.

The Curtis Publishing Company lost another invasion of privacy lawsuit only three years later, and the cause was again careless use of a picture. Back in 1947, ten-year-old Eleanor Sue Leverton was knocked down by a careless motorist. A news photographer snapped a picture of a woman helping the little girl to her feet. This photo was published in a Birmingham, Ala., newspaper. To this point, there was no action for invasion of privacy possible for young Miss Leverton.

But 20 months after the little girl was hit by the car, the *Saturday Evening Post* used her picture to illustrate an article headlined "They Ask to Be Killed." The little girl's picture was captioned, "Safety education in schools has reduced child accidents measurably, but unpredictable darting through traffic still takes its sobering toll." In a box next to the headline, these words appeared: "Do you invite massacre by your own carelessness? Here's how to keep them alive." A Federal Court of Appeals said:<sup>3</sup>

The sum total of all this is that this particular plaintiff, the legitimate subject for publicity for one particular accident, now becomes a pictorial, frightful example of pedestrian carelessness. This, we think, exceeds the bounds of privilege.

The lesson for photo-editors should be plain: if a picture is not taken in a public place or if that picture—or its caption—places someone in a false light, don't use it. The exception, of course, would be when you have received permission, in the form of a signed release, from the persons pictured. Two invasion of privacy lawsuits of Mr. and Mrs. John W. Gill, one successful and one not, illustrate the point rather neatly.

Mr. and Mrs. Gill were seated on stools at a confectionery stand which they operated at the Farmer's Market in Los Angeles. Famed photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson took a picture of the Gills, as Mr. Gill sat with his arm around his wife. The photograph

<sup>2</sup> *Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co.*, 78 F.Supp. 305 (D.C.D.C.1948); *Fowler v. Curtis Pub. Co.*, 78 F.Supp. 303, 304 (D.C.D.C.1948).

<sup>3</sup> *Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co.*, 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).

was used in *Harper's Bazaar* to illustrate an article titled "And So the World Goes Around," a brief commentary having to do with the poetic notion that love makes the world go 'round. Although the Gills sued, they failed to collect from the Hearst Corporation, publisher of the magazine. The court held that the Gills had no right to collect since they took that voluntary pose in public and because there was nothing uncomplimentary about the photograph itself.<sup>4</sup>

Although they couldn't collect from the Hearst Corporation for invasion of privacy, Mr. and Mrs. Gill had already won damages from the Curtis Publishing Company. The *Ladies Home Journal*, a Curtis publication, had printed the very same photograph taken at the Farmer's Market but had made that photo an invasion of privacy by using faulty captions. The *Journal* used the Gills' picture to illustrate an article titled "Love." Underneath the picture was this caption "Publicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love at first sight' is a bad risk." The story termed such love "100% sex attraction" and the "wrong" kind. The court held that the article implied that this husband and wife were "persons whose only interest in each other is sex, a characterization that may be said to impinge seriously upon their sensibilities."<sup>5</sup>

### Fictionalization

The misuse of pictures or photographs is one way to lose a privacy lawsuit. So is *fictionalization*. Fictionalization, as used by the courts, involves more than mere incidental falsity. Fictionalization appears to mean the deliberate or reckless addition of untrue material, perhaps for entertainment purposes or to make a good story better. Although the courts' rules for determining fictionalization are by no means clear, journalists should be warned to look to their ethics and accuracy. Jazzing up or "sensationalizing" a story by adding untrue materials so that a false impression is created concerning the subject of the story may be actionable.

Triangle Publications, which produced magazines such as *Timely Detective Cases* and *Uncensored Detective*, lost a privacy suit because of fictionalization. Robert H. Garner and Grace M. Smith had become legitimate objects of news interest because they were on trial for the murder of her husband. Mr. Garner and Mrs. Smith were convicted of the murder. Meanwhile, magazines published by Triangle carried numerous articles about the crime, adding some untrue elements to their stories. The magazines claimed that Mr. Garner and Mrs. Smith had had "improper relations with each other." However, after the detective magazines had published their stories, the convictions of Mr. Garner and Mrs. Smith were reversed.

<sup>4</sup> Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal.2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1952).

<sup>5</sup> Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal.2d 273, 239 P.2d 636 (1952).

A Federal District Court held that there could be no liability for presenting news about a matter of public interest such as a murder trial. However, Triangle Publications could be liable for a privacy lawsuit because when the magazines

enlarged upon the facts so as to go beyond the bounds of propriety and decency, they should not be cloaked with and shielded by the public interest in dissemination of "information." \* \* \* It is no answer to say, as defendants do, that such interests, if they exist, can be adequately compensated for under the libel laws. If the articles violate rights of privacy, plaintiffs may bring their action under the privacy laws also.<sup>6</sup>

It appears, however, that minor errors in fact will not be sufficient to defeat the defense of newsworthiness, which will be discussed later. In the first media-related privacy case to reach the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that Constitutional protections for speech and press forbid recovery for false reports "in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth."<sup>7</sup>

A more recent lawsuit for fictionalization involved the famed Warren Spahn, the left-handed pitcher who won more than 300 games during a long career with the Boston—and later the Milwaukee—Braves. Spahn was a hero to many baseball card collectors in the 1950s and early 1960s, and some people wanted to cash in on "Spahnie's" success. Writer Milton J. Shapiro and publisher Julian Messner, Inc., brought out a book titled *The Warren Spahn Story*. This book was aimed at a juvenile audience, and was assembled from the author's vivid imagination and a pastiche of secondary sources—newspaper and magazine articles, for example—about Spahn. Throughout this book, Spahn's feats were exaggerated. For one thing, Spahn was portrayed as a war hero, which he was not. An elbow injury finally brought an end to Spahn's career; author Shapiro consistently wrote about Spahn's "shoulder injury." Such inaccuracies were topped off by page after page of fictional dialogue—words attributed to Spahn and his associates but which had been invented by author Shapiro.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc.*, 97 F.Supp. 546, 550 (D.C.N.Y.1951). For similar holdings, see *Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.*, 116 F.Supp. 538 (D.C.Conn.1953); *Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co.*, 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).

<sup>7</sup> *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, 385 U.S. 374, 388, 87 S.Ct. 534, 542 (1967). See also *Binns v. Vitagraph Corp. of America*, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913); *Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp.*, 108 Cal.App.2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).

<sup>8</sup> *Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.*, 43 Misc.2d 219, 230–232, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 540–542 (1964).

Shapiro and Julian Messner, Inc., argued strenuously that Spahn was a public figure who enjoyed no right of privacy.<sup>9</sup> Spahn v. Julian Messner worked its way through the courts of New York from 1964 to 1967. Justice Charles Breitel of the Appellate Division, New York Supreme Court disagreed with contentions that Spahn no longer possessed a right of privacy. Justice Breitel said:<sup>10</sup>

It is true \* \* \* that a public figure is subject to being exposed in a factual biography, even one which contains inadvertent or superficial inaccuracies. But surely, he should not be exposed, without his control, to biographies not limited substantially to the truth. The fact that the fictionalization is laudatory is immaterial.

This was by no means the end of the *Spahn* case, which went up and down through the New York State and federal court systems, yo-yo fashion, from 1964 until it was finally settled out of court in the late 1960s.<sup>11</sup>

If, indeed, a writer cannot down the impulse to fictionalize, he would be more likely to avoid a lawsuit if he does not use the names of actual people involved in an event upon which he bases his fictionalization. Where there is no identification, courts will not be able to find for the plaintiffs.<sup>12</sup> But where there is both identification and fictionalization, the publisher is in danger of losing a suit.<sup>13</sup>

### Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. (1974)

Major fact errors—or large swatches of fictionalizing—in something purporting to be a news story—can mean serious difficulty for the news media. Consider the case known as *Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Company*. Mrs. Margaret Mae Cantrell and her son sued the company for an article which appeared in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* in August of 1968, claiming that the article placed her and her family in a false light.

The facts underlying the lawsuit were these: in December, 1967, Mrs. Cantrell's husband was killed—along with 43 other persons—

<sup>9</sup> See *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967).

<sup>10</sup> 23 A.D.2d 216, 221, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 456 (1965).

<sup>11</sup> Michael F. Mayer, *Rights of Privacy* (New York: Law-Arts Publishers, 1972), pp. 145–151; PEMBER, op. cit., 218–222.

<sup>12</sup> *Bernstein v. NBC*, 129 F.Supp. 817 (D.C.D.C.) affirmed 98 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 232 F.2d 369 (1955); *Smith v. NBC*, 138 Cal.App.2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).

<sup>13</sup> *Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co.*, 28 F.Supp. 845 (D.C.Cal.1939); *Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc.*, 97 F.Supp. 546 (D.C.N.Y.1951). But see *Leopold v. Levin*, 45 Ill.2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970), where a fictional treatment of Nathan Leopold's participation in the famed 1924 murder of Bobby Franks was declared to be protected by the First Amendment despite the addition of fictional embellishments. See Mayer, op. cit., p. 151.

when the Silver Bridge across the Ohio River at Point Pleasant, W.Va., collapsed. Cleveland *Plain Dealer* reporter Joseph Eszterhas had covered the disaster and he wrote a news feature on Mr. Cantrell's funeral. Five months later, Eszterhas and *Plain Dealer* photographer Richard Conway returned to Point Pleasant and went to the Cantrell residence. Mrs. Cantrell was not there, so Eszterhas talked to the Cantrell children and photographer Conway took 50 pictures. Eszterhas' story appeared as the lead article in the August 4, 1968, edition of the *Plain Dealer's* Sunday magazine.

The article emphasized the children's old, ill-fitting clothes and the poor condition of the Cantrell home. The Cantrell family was used in the story to sum up the impact of the bridge collapse on the lives of people in the Point Pleasant area. Even though Mrs. Cantrell had not been present during Eszterhas' visit to her home, he wrote:<sup>14</sup>

“Margaret Cantrell will talk neither about what happened nor about how they are doing. She wears the same mask of non-expression she wore at the funeral. She is a proud woman. She says that after it happened, the people in town offered to help them out with money and they refused to take it.”

In a ruling that Mrs. Cantrell should be allowed to collect the \$60,000 awarded by a U.S. District Court jury, the Supreme Court said:<sup>15</sup>

\* \* \* the District Judge was clearly correct in believing that the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support a jury finding that the respondents Joseph Eszterhas and Forest City Publishing Company had published knowing or reckless falsehoods about the Cantrells. There was no dispute during the trial that Eszterhas, who did not testify, must have known that a number of the statements in the feature story were untrue. In particular, his article plainly implied that Mrs. Cantrell had been present during his visit to her home and that Eszterhas had observed her “wear[ing] the same mask of non-expression she wore [at her husband's] funeral.” These were “calculated falsehoods,” and the jury was plainly justified in finding that

<sup>14</sup> 419 U.S. 245, at 248, 95 S.Ct. 465 at 468 (1974), quoting Eszterhas, “Legacy of the Silver Bridge,” *The Plain Dealer Sunday Magazine*, Aug. 4, 1968, p. 32, col. 1.

<sup>15</sup> 419 U.S. 245, 253, 95 S.Ct. 465, 470–471 (1974).

Eszterhas had portrayed the Cantrells in a false light through knowing or reckless untruth.

### SEC. 33. APPROPRIATION OF PLAINTIFF'S NAME OR LIKENESS

**The appropriation or "taking" of some element of a person's personality for commercial or other advantage has been a source of many privacy lawsuits.**

Often, careless use of a person's name or likeness will be the misstep which results in a privacy action. The first widely known privacy cases, *Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.*<sup>16</sup> and *Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.*,<sup>17</sup> both discussed earlier in this chapter, turned on taking a person's name or picture for advertising purposes.

The use of a name, by itself, is not enough to bring about a successful lawsuit. For example, a company could publish an advertisement for its breakfast cereal and say that the cereal "gave Fred Brown his tennis-playing energy." There are, of course, many Fred Browns in the nation. However, should the cereal company, without explicit permission, identify a *particular* individual—such as "Olympic High Hurdle Champion Fred Brown"—then Mr. Brown, the hurdler, would have an action for invasion of privacy. Thus a *name* can be used, as long as a person's *identity* is not somehow appropriated.

A good example of this point is a suit which was brought by a Joseph Angelo Maggio, who claimed that the use of a name—"Angelo Maggio"—in James Jones' best-selling novel, *From Here to Eternity*, invaded his privacy. The court ruled, however, that although the name was the same as that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's *identity* had not been taken. The fictional "Angelo Maggio" was held not to be the same individual as Joseph Angelo Maggio.<sup>18</sup>

Where the media are concerned, however, the great bulk of the trouble has come in cases involving advertising. There have been successful lawsuits, time and time again, when a person's identity or picture is used in an ad.<sup>19</sup> Even the fact that a person's name or likeness appears in an advertisement through an innocent mistake will not provide a defense. For example, the Greensboro, N. C.,

<sup>16</sup> 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).

<sup>17</sup> 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).

<sup>18</sup> *People on Complaint of Maggio v. Charles Scribner's Sons*, 205 Misc. 818, 130 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1954). See, also, *Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Company*, 8 F.Supp. 358 (D.C.Mass.1934), affirmed 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936); *Nebb v. Bell Syndicate*, 41 F.Supp. 929 (D.C.N.Y.1941).

<sup>19</sup> See, e. g., *Flores v. Mosler Safe Co.*, 7 N.Y.2d 276, 196 N.Y.S. 975, 164 N.E.2d 853 (1959); *Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Tullos*, 219 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1955).



News advertised the appearance of Mademoiselle Sally Payne at the Folies de Patee Theatre through a joint advertising agreement with a bakery. The published advertisement was intended to show a picture of Miss Payne in a bathing suit, but instead was printed with a picture of Miss Nancy Flake in a bathing suit. The court held that Miss Flake had a property right in her name and likeness. However, punitive damages were not allowed because the advertisement was a mistake made without malice and because the newspaper printed an apology.<sup>20</sup>

Persons who use the media should develop a kind of self-protective pessimism: it should always be assumed that if something could go wrong and result in a lawsuit, it might indeed go wrong. This is, of course, an overly pessimistic approach, but it can help to avoid much grief. Take, for example, the case of *Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.*, where a simple failure to check as obvious a reference as a telephone directory led to a lost lawsuit. A publicity gimmick boosting one of the *Topper* movies involved the studio's sending out 100 perfumed letters to men in the Los Angeles area. These letters gushed:<sup>21</sup>

Dearest:

Don't breathe it to a soul, but I'm back in Los Angeles and more curious than ever to see you. Remember how I cut up about a year ago? Well, I'm raring to go again, and believe me I'm in the mood for fun.

Let's renew our acquaintanceship and I promise you an evening you won't forget. Meet me in front of Warner's Downtown Theatre at 7th and Hill on Thursday. Just look for a girl with a gleam in her eye, a smile on her lips, and mischief on her mind!

Fondly,

Your ectoplasmic playmate,  
Marion Kerby.

Marion Kerby was the name of one of the characters—a lady ghost—portrayed in the movie. Unfortunately for the Hal Roach Studios, there was a real-life Marion Kerby in Los Angeles, an actress and public speaker. She was the only one listed in the Los Angeles telephone directory. Miss Kerby, after being annoyed by numerous phone calls and a personal visit, sued for invasion of privacy, and ultimately collected.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Flake v. Greensboro News Co.*, 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).

<sup>21</sup> *Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.*, 53 Cal.App.2d 207, 127 P.2d 577, 578 (1942).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, at 578. It should be noted that this case is also a good example of the privacy tort category called "false position in the public eye."

Sometimes the out-and-out use of a person's name or likeness is permissible in an advertisement—if a court decides that the use of the name or likeness is “incidental.” Take Academy Award and Emmy Award winning actress Shirley Booth, who was vacationing in Jamaica some years ago. A *Holiday* magazine photographer asked, and received, permission to take her picture, and that picture was later used in a *Holiday* feature story about Jamaica's Round Hill resort. Several months later, however, the same picture appeared in full-page promotional advertisements for *Holiday* in *Advertising Age* and *New Yorker* magazines. Beneath the picture of the actress were the words “Shirley Booth and Chapeau, from a recent issue of *Holiday*.”<sup>23</sup>

Miss Booth sued *Holiday's* publisher, the Curtis Publishing Co., in New York, claiming invasion of privacy on the ground that *Holiday's* advertising use of that picture was impermissible. New York's privacy statute, after all, prohibits use of a person's name or likeness “for purposes of trade” unless the person involved has given consent.<sup>24</sup> Curtis Publishing responded that this sort of promotional advertising was needed to help magazine sales, thus supporting the public's interest in news.<sup>25</sup>

Miss Booth won \$17,500 at the trial level, but that finding was reversed on appeal. Finding for the Curtis Publishing Co., Justice Charles D. Breitler termed *Holiday's* advertising use of the picture “incidental,” and therefore not prohibited by New York's privacy statute.<sup>26</sup>

Author-playwright A. E. Hotchner's attempt to write an intimate biography of the American literary giant Ernest Hemingway led to another privacy suit under the New York statute. Hemingway had died in 1961, and his widow, Mary Hemingway, sued to enjoin Random House from publishing Hotchner's manuscript. Hotchner's biography covered the Nobel laureate's life from 1948, when Hemingway and Hotchner first met in a bar in Havana, Cuba, up to the time of Hemingway's death. New York Supreme Court Judge Harry B. Frank wrote of Hotchner's book:<sup>27</sup>

The format and narrative style of the work make immediately apparent that it is intended as a subjective present-

<sup>23</sup> Booth v. Curtis Pub. Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1962).

<sup>24</sup> Sections 50–51, New York Civil Rights Law, McKinney's Consolidated Laws, Ch. 6. See 15 A.D.2d 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, at 739 (1962).

<sup>25</sup> Booth v. Curtis Pub. Co., 15 App.Div.2d 343, 349, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 743–744 (1962).

<sup>26</sup> 11 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1962). See, also, University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century Fox, 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1965).

<sup>27</sup> Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 49 Misc.2d 726, 268 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (1966).

tation from the vantage of the friendship, camaraderie, and personal experiences that the younger author shared with the literary giant. Their adventures, their travels, their meetings are all set forth in detail and the portrait of Hemingway that emerges is shaded in terms of the unique self that he manifested and revealed in the course of his particular relationship with Hotchner.

Mary Hemingway's suit for an injunction complained, among other things, that the Hotchner manuscript violated her statutory right of privacy under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. Mrs. Hemingway was mentioned in various places throughout the book, and she charged that those references to her amounted to an invasion of her privacy.<sup>28</sup> Judge Frank rejected Mrs. Hemingway's privacy contentions and allowed Random House to publish the book:<sup>29</sup>

The individual's security has fared best when pitted against naked commercial assault, and protection is afforded under the statute where the invasion has been solely for "advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade." A book of biographical import such as is here involved, however, has been held not to fall within such category. Compelling public interest in the free flow of ideas and dissemination of factual information has outweighed considerations of individual privacy in conjunction with factual publications of such type, whether authorized or not, and as to such book the statutory proscription is ordinarily without relevance. \* \* \* Moreover, plaintiff's status as the wife and widow of a man of celebrated prominence who was the recipient of both the Nobel and Pulitzer Prizes during his lifetime and her own activities incidental to such position have thrust her into the category of a newsworthy personality \* \* \*.

In other lawsuits dealing with "appropriation," it has been held that the taking or appropriation need not be for a financial gain in those jurisdictions where the common-law right of privacy is recognized. Just as long as someone's identity or likeness is used for some advantage, an action for invasion of privacy may succeed. An example of this occurred when a political party used a man's name as a candidate when he had not given his consent.<sup>30</sup> However, five states which have privacy statutes—New York, Oklahoma, Virginia, Utah, and California—require proof of monetary advantage gained

<sup>28</sup> 49 Misc.2d 726, 268 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (1966).

<sup>29</sup> 49 Misc.2d 726, 268 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (1966).

<sup>30</sup> State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 P. 317 (1924).

by the publication.<sup>31</sup> It has often been urged that everything published by the mass media is done “for purposes of trade.”<sup>32</sup> If such a construction were allowed, the press might be greatly threatened by privacy suits brought by persons who objected to the use of their names, even in news stories. In defense of press freedom, however, courts have repeatedly held that just because a newspaper, magazine, or broadcasting station makes a profit does not mean that everything published is “for purposes of trade.”<sup>33</sup>

### SEC. 34. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

**From Bela Lugosi to a “Human Cannonball,” the right to profit from one’s own efforts or fame is emerging as a spin-off from the privacy sub-tort of “appropriation.”**

As a general rule, the right of privacy dies with the individual.<sup>34</sup> As tort scholar William L. Prosser noted, “there is no common law right of action for a publication concerning one who is already dead.” However, as with most general rules, there are exceptions. A viable lawsuit for invasion of privacy may exist after a person’s death, “according to the survival rules of the particular state.”<sup>35</sup>

Similarly, there is a general rule that relatives have no right of action for an invasion of the privacy of a deceased person. A satirical national television show, “That Was the Week that Was,” included this statement in a broadcast over the National Broadcasting Company network: “Mrs. Katherine Young of Syracuse, New York, who died at 99 leaving five sons, five daughters, 67 grandchildren, 72 great grandchildren, and 73 great-great grandchildren—gets our First Annual Booby Prize in the Birth Control Sweepstakes.” Two of Mrs. Young’s sons sued for invasion of privacy, but failed because there is no relative’s right to sue for invasion of the privacy of a deceased person.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>31</sup> McKinney’s N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50–51; Virginia Code 1950, § 8–650; 15 Oklahoma Statutes Anno. § 839.1; Utah Code Ann. 1953, 76–4–8, and § 3344, California Civil Code.

<sup>32</sup> See *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 501, 72 S.Ct. 777, 780 (1952); *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 at 266, 84 S.Ct. 710 at 718 (1964).

<sup>33</sup> See, e. g., *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 546 (1967).

<sup>34</sup> *Schuyler v. Curtis*, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E.2d 22 (1897); *Lunceford v. Wilcox*, 88 N.Y.S.2d 225 (City Ct. 1949).

<sup>35</sup> William L. Prosser, *Handbook of the Law of Torts*, 4th ed., St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1971, at p. 815, citing the highly confusing decision in *Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co.*, 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).

<sup>36</sup> *Young v. That Was the Week that Was*, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970); accord: see *Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc.*, 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965); *Ravellette v. Smith*, 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962).

The legal ghost of the late horror-film star, Bela Lugosi, came back to haunt Universal Pictures Company. Lugosi, famed for his portrayal of Count Dracula, was one of a number of actors to take the role of the worthy vampire. Lugosi died in 1956, but beginning in 1960, Universal began to capitalize on his fame, entering into lucrative licensing agreements with a number of manufacturing firms. These agreements allowed production and sale of a number of items, including shirts, cards, games, kites, bar accessories and masks—all featuring the likeness of the character of Count Dracula as portrayed by Bela Lugosi.<sup>37</sup>

Lugosi's son, Bela George Lugosi, and his widow, Hope Lininger Lugosi, sued to recover the profits made by Universal Pictures in its licensing arrangements.<sup>38</sup> A Superior Court for the State of California in 1972 found in favor of the son and the widow, holding that Lugosi's widow and son were correct in their assertions that there was a violation of a "right of property or right of contract which, upon Bela Lugosi's death, descended to his heirs."<sup>39</sup> Universal Pictures appealed.

In 1977, however, a California appellate court<sup>40</sup> had bad news for Mrs. Lugosi and her son. Presiding Judge Roth, quoting the late tort expert, Dean William L. Prosser, said that a dispute over whether a person's name or likeness is a "property right" is pointless. "'Once protected by the law,' Prosser had written, [the right of a person to use of his name and likeness] \* \* \* is a right of value upon which plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses."<sup>41</sup> Judge Roth added:<sup>42</sup>

The law is that upon Lugosi's death anyone, related or unrelated to Lugosi, with the imagination, the enterprise, the energy and the cash could have in their own name or in a fictitious name, or a trade name coupled with that of Lugosi, have impressed a name so selected with a secondary meaning and realized a profit or loss by so doing \* \* \*.

After Lugosi's death, his name was in the public domain. Anyone, including respondents, or either of them, or Universal, could use it for a legitimate commercial purpose.

Judge Roth held that the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to an artist and must be exercised—if at all—by that individual alone, during that person's lifetime.

<sup>37</sup> Bela George Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., No. 877875, Memorandum Opinion, Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, case published in full in *Performing Arts Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1972), pp. 19–62.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

<sup>40</sup> California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, *Lugosi v. International Pictures*, 2 Med.L.Rptr. 2348 (June 9, 1977).

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2349.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2351.

Other cases have held that there is a kind of a property right in a person's picture or likeness. Bubble-gum "trading cards" offer cases in point. Beginning with Judge Jerome D. Frank's 1953 decision in *Haelan Laboratories, Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum*, several cases involved players' photographs. Judge Frank wrote of a "right of publicity" apart from a right of privacy which compensates a person for mental suffering because that person has received unwanted publicity. Judge Frank said: "We think that in addition to an independent right of privacy \* \* \* a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i. e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture \* \* \*. This right might be called a 'right of publicity.'" <sup>43</sup>

Other "right of publicity" cases involved outfielder Ted Uhlaender and slugging first baseman Orlando Cepeda. Both sued for compensation for the unauthorized use of their names for advertising or promotional purposes. In the *Uhlaender* case, a court decided that a public figure such as a baseball player has a property or proprietary interest in his public personality. This included his identity, as embodied in his name, likeness, or other personal characteristics. This property interest—in effect the "right of publicity" of which Judge Frank wrote in 1953 in the *Haelan Laboratories* case—was held in *Uhlaender* to be sufficient to support an injunction against unauthorized appropriation.<sup>44</sup>

After considering such cases, Judge Jefferson concluded that Bela Lugosi's "rights to his likeness and appearance as Count Dracula is a descendible property right and that the cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs rests upon the tort theory of an appropriation of such property right by defendant." Lugosi's heirs were entitled to collect from Universal Pictures.<sup>45</sup>

As if Bela Lugosi didn't add a certain flair to the law of privacy, what about Hugo "Human Cannonball" Zacchini? Zacchini was doing his thing at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio—being shot out of a cannon into a net some 200 feet away. This high-calibre entertainer, however, took exception to being filmed by a freelance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting. Zacchini noticed the reporter and his camera and asked him not to film the performance, which took place in a fenced area, surrounded by

<sup>43</sup> *Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.*, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).

<sup>44</sup> *Uhlaender v. Henricksen*, 316 F.Supp. 1277 (D.C.Minn.1970); *Cepeda v. Swift & Co.*, 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969).

<sup>45</sup> *Lugosi v. Universal Pictures*, published in *Performing Arts Review*, Vol. 3:1 (1972) pp. 59–61. The court ruled that considerations involving a two-year statute of limitations meant that Lugosi's heirs could recover those damages arising out of licensing agreements entered into by Universal Pictures for the two years before February 3, 1966, the date the lawsuit was filed against Universal Pictures.

grandstands. Members of the public going to the fair were not charged a separate admission fee to observe Zacchini's performances.

Zacchini sued for infringement of his "right of publicity," claiming that he was engaged in the entertainment business, following after his father, who had invented this act. He claimed that the television station had "showed and commercialized the film of his act without his consent," and that this was "an unlawful appropriation of plaintiff's professional property."

The television station broadcast the film of the 15-second flight by Zacchini, with the newscaster saying this:<sup>46</sup>

"This \* \* \* now \* \* \* is the story of a *true spectator sport* \* \* \* the sport of human cannonballing \* \* \* in fact, the *great Zacchini* is about the only human cannonball around these days \* \* \* just happens that, *where* he is, is the Great Geauga County Fair, in Burton \* \* \* and believe me, although it's not a *long* act, it's a thriller \* \* \* and you really need to see it *in person* to appreciate it. \* \* \*

The Ohio Supreme Court had rejected Zacchini's claims, saying that a TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts "matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of publicity." The TV station could be held liable, but only when the actual intent of the station was to appropriate the benefit of the publicity for some non-privileged private use, or unless the actual intent was to injure the individual involved.<sup>47</sup>

The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, saying that Zacchini was not contending that his act could not be reported as a newsworthy item.<sup>48</sup>

His complaint is that respondent filmed his entire act and displayed the film on television for the public to see and enjoy.

\* \* \*

It is evident, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that petitioner's state-law right of publicity would not serve to prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts about petitioner's act. Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immu-

<sup>46</sup> Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849 (1977).

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 2091–2092.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 2093–2094, 2095.

nize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent.

\* \* \*

The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.

\* \* \*

We conclude that although the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.

A five-member majority of the Supreme Court then sent the Zacchini case back to the Ohio courts for a decision on whether the Human Cannonball should recover damages. In dissent, Justice Powell—who was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall—wondered just what constituted “an entire act.”<sup>49</sup> As attorney Floyd Abrams has asked—following Justice Powell's question—does the “entire act” include the fanfare and getting into the cannon, possibly lasting for several minutes?<sup>50</sup>

Justice Powell expressed concern that this decision might lead to media self-censorship when television news editors are unsure when their camera crews might be held to depict “an entire act.” “The public is then the loser,” Powell said. “This is hardly the kind of news reportage that the First Amendment is meant to foster.”<sup>51</sup>

### SEC. 35. TIME, INC. v. HILL

**The “malice rule” from the libel landmark case, *New York Times v. Sullivan*, was stirred into privacy law in *Time, Inc. v. Hill*.**

When the Supreme Court weighed the right to privacy against the First Amendment freedom to publish, the freedom to publish was given preference. The 1967 case of *Time, Inc. v. Hill* was noteworthy in one respect because the losing attorney was Richard Milhous Nixon, more recently known as sometime President of the United States.<sup>52</sup> Beyond that, *Time v. Hill* melds together the concepts of privacy-as-tort and privacy-as-constitutional right. This decision is important because it represents the first time that the Supreme Court decided a privacy case dealing with the mass media. Furthermore, *Time v. Hill* has become a key precedent in strengthening the media's defenses against lawsuits for invasion of privacy. Such defenses are discussed in Sections 36 to 38 of this chapter.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2096.

<sup>50</sup> Floyd Abrams, “The Press, Privacy, and the Constitution,” *New York Times Magazine*, August 21, 1977, at pp. 11ff.

<sup>51</sup> *Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard*, at p. 2096.

<sup>52</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967).



In 1952, the James J. Hill family was minding its own business, living in the suburban Philadelphia town of Whitemarsh. Like most families, the Hills wanted to be left alone. On September 11, 1952, however, the Hills' anonymity was taken away from them by three escaped prisoners. The convicts held Mr. and Mrs. Hill and their five children hostage in their own home for 19 hours. The family was not harmed, but the Hills—much against their wishes—were in the news.<sup>53</sup> The Hills stayed in the news for some time; their story became even more sensational when two of the three convicts who had held them hostage were killed in a shoot-out with police.<sup>54</sup>

In 1953, Random House published Joseph Hayes' novel, *The Desperate Hours*, a story about a family which was taken hostage by escaped convicts. The novel was later made into a successful play and, subsequently, a motion picture.

The publicity which led the Hills to sue for invasion of their privacy was an article published in 1955 by *Life* magazine. The article, titled "True Crime Inspires Tense Play," described the "true crime" suffered by the James Hill family of Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania.<sup>55</sup> The article said:<sup>56</sup>

"Three years ago Americans all over the country read about the desperate ordeal of the James Hill family, who were held prisoners in their home outside Philadelphia by three escaped convicts. Later they read about it in Joseph Hayes's novel, *The Desperate Hours*, inspired by the family's experience. Now they can see the story reenacted in Hayes's Broadway play based on the book, and next year will see it in his movie, which has been filmed but is being held up until the play has a chance to pay off.

"The play, directed by Robert Montgomery and expertly acted, is a heart-stopping account of how a family rose to heroism in a crisis. LIFE photographed the play during its Philadelphia tryout, transported some of the actors to the actual house where the Hills were besieged. On the next page scenes from the play are re-enacted on the site of the crime."

*Life's* pages of photographs included actors' depiction of the son being "roughed up" by one of the escaped convicts. This picture was captioned "brutish convict." Also, a picture titled "daring daughter" showed the daughter biting the hand of a convict, trying to make him drop the gun.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>53</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 377, 87 S.Ct. 534, 536 (1967).

<sup>54</sup> Pember, *Privacy and the Press*, p. 210.

<sup>55</sup> *Life*, Feb. 28, 1955.

<sup>56</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 377, 87 S.Ct. 534, 536–537 (1967).

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

The Joseph Hayes novel and play, however, did not altogether match up with *Life's* assertion that Hayes' writings were based on the ordeal of the Hill family. For one thing, Hayes' family was named "Hilliard," not Hill. Also, the Hills had not been harmed by the convicts in any way, while in the Hayes novel and play the father and son were beaten and the daughter was "subjected to a verbal sexual insult."

Hill sued for invasion of privacy under the privacy sections of New York's Civil Rights Law, which provides:<sup>58</sup>

**"§ 50. Right of Privacy**

"A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor."

In addition, the New York law provides that a person whose name or picture was so used "for purposes of trade" without his consent could "sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use."<sup>59</sup>

The Hills sought damages on grounds that the *Life* article "was intended to, and did, give the impression that the play mirrored the Hill family's experience, which, to the knowledge of defendant \* \* was false and untrue." In its defense, Time, Inc., argued that "the subject of the article was 'a subject of legitimate news interest,' 'a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public' at the time of publication, and that it was 'published in good faith without any malice whatsoever \* \* \*.'"<sup>60</sup>

The trial court jury awarded the Hills \$50,000 compensatory and \$25,000 punitive damages. On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York ordered a new trial on the question of damages, but upheld the jury's finding that *Life* magazine had invaded the Hills' privacy. The Appellate Division bore down hard on the issue of fictionalization:<sup>61</sup>

"Although the play was fictionalized, *Life's* article portrayed it as a reenactment of the Hills' experience. It is an inescapable conclusion that this was done to advertise and attract further attention to the play, and to increase present and future magazine circulations as well. It is evident that the article cannot be characterized as a mere

<sup>58</sup> Sections 50-51, New York Civil Rights Law, McKinney's Consolidated Laws, Ch. 6.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 378, 87 S.Ct. 534, 537 (1967).

<sup>61</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 379, 87 S.Ct. 534, 537 (1967), quoting *Hill v. Hayes*, 18 A.D.2d 485, 489, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290 (1963).

dissemination of news, nor even an effort to supply legitimate newsworthy information in which the public had, or ought have a proper interest."

At the new trial on the issue of damages, a jury was waived and the court awarded \$30,000 compensatory damages with no punitive damages.

When the *Hill* case reached the Supreme Court, it took up Constitutional issues of freedom of speech and press raised in the appeal by *Time, Inc.* Justice Brennan's majority opinion first dealt with the issue of whether truth could be a defense to a charge of invasion of privacy. Quoting a recent New York Court of Appeals decision, Brennan noted that it had been made "crystal clear" in construing the New York Civil Rights Statute, "that truth is a complete defense in actions under the statute based upon reports of newsworthy people or event."<sup>62</sup> Brennan added, "Constitutional questions which might arise if truth were not a defense are therefore no concern."<sup>63</sup>

Justice Brennan then wrestled with the issue of fictionalization. He noted that James Hill was a newsworthy person "'substantially without a right to privacy' insofar as his hostage experience was involved." Hill, however, was entitled to sue to the extent that *Life* magazine "fictionalized" and "exploited for the defendant's commercial benefit." Brennan then turned to a libel case, *New York Times v. Sullivan*, for guidance.<sup>64</sup>

Material and substantial falsification is the test. However, it is not clear whether proof of knowledge of the falsity or that the article was prepared with reckless disregard for the truth is also required. In *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* \* \* \* we held that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to an award of damages for false statements unless actual malice—knowledge that the statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth—is alleged and proved. \* \* \*

We hold that the Constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report

<sup>62</sup> At the outset of his opinion, Justice Brennan relied heavily upon *Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.*, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 274 N.Y.S. 877, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966).

<sup>63</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 383-384, 87 S.Ct. 534, 539-540 (1967).

<sup>64</sup> *New York Times v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964), used in *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, 385 U.S. 374, 386-388, 87 S.Ct. 534, 541-542 (1967).

with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.

The Supreme Court, however, did not appear to wish to tie all future privacy holdings to the "Times Rule" cited above. Justice Brennan carefully emphasized that the malice rule from *New York Times v. Sullivan*—"knowledge that it was false, or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"—was here being applied only in the "discrete context" of the facts of the *Hill* case.<sup>65</sup> It was, however, important to Brennan's opinion that the trial judge, in Brennan's view, had failed to instruct the jury correctly. The instructions to the jury, Justice Brennan maintained, would have included a call for a verdict finding "knowing or reckless falsehood" to be able to assess damages against *Life* magazine.

It should be emphasized that Justice Brennan's opinion in *Time v. Hill* has not made truth an entirely dependable defense against a lawsuit for invasion of privacy. For one thing, the Supreme Court's adoption of the malice rule from *New York Times v. Sullivan* applies only to those privacy cases involving falsity. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was badly split in *Time v. Hill*; a five-Justice majority did vote in favor of *Life* magazine, but only two justices—Potter Stewart and Byron White—agreed with Brennan's use of the "Sullivan rule." Justices Hugo L. Black and William O. Douglas concurred in the decision, but on other grounds.

Brennan appeared to prize press freedom's benefits to society more than the individual's right to privacy.<sup>66</sup> If incidental, nonmalicious error crept into a story, that was part of the risk of freedom, for which a publication should not be held responsible. Justice Brennan wrote:<sup>67</sup>

Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and press.

\* \* \*

Erroneous statement is no less inevitable in \* \* \* [a case such as discussion of a new play] than in the case of comment upon public affairs, and in both, if innocent or merely negligent, \* \* \* it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the "breathing space" that they "need \* \* \* to survive."

\* \* \*

<sup>65</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 390–391, 87 S.Ct. 534, 543 (1967).

<sup>66</sup> See the dissent by Mr. Justice Abe Fortas, which was joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and by Justice Tom C. Clark, 385 U.S. 374, 411, 416, 87 S.Ct. 534, 554, 556 (1967).

<sup>67</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 388–389, 87 S.Ct. 534, 542–543 (1967).

We create grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable services of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the acts associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter. Even negligence would be a most elusive standard \* \* \*. A negligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, portrait or picture.

The "breathing space" mentioned by Justice Brennan—a phrase borrowed from *New York Times v. Sullivan*—indicated that the Court was giving the press a healthy "benefit of the doubt." Press freedom, Brennan declared, is essential to "the maintenance of our political system and an open society." Yet this freedom, he argued, could be dangerously invaded by lawsuits for libel or invasion of privacy.<sup>68</sup>

Fear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or mere negligent misstatement, even fear of the expense involved in the defense, must inevitably cause publishers to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone."

Was the *Life* article done "for purposes of trade" under the terms of the New York statute? Or was it a legitimate, newsworthy job? Perhaps the best answer to these questions was given in a dissent at an earlier stage in the *Hill* case in New York's Supreme Court (an intermediate appellate court) by Presiding Judge Bernard Botein:<sup>69</sup>

To hold \* \* \* that a violation of Section 51 [of New York's Civil Rights Law] may be established by showing that a newsworthy item has been published solely to increase circulation injects an unrealistic ingredient into the complex of the right to privacy and would abridge dangerously the people's right to know. In the final analysis, the reading public, not the publisher, determines what is newsworthy, and what is newsworthy will perforce tend to increase circulation.

Despite the lower courts' contentions that the *Life* article was not legitimate news but was fictionalized entertainment for purposes of trade, Justice Brennan quickly disposed of such arguments. "We have no doubt," Brennan wrote, "that the subject of the *Life* article, the opening of a new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest. The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of \* \* \* [freedom of the

<sup>68</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 389, 87 S.Ct. 534, 543 (1967).

<sup>69</sup> *Hill v. Hayes*, 18 A.D.2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286, at 293 (1963).

press]’.”<sup>70</sup> Author Joseph Hayes had said that he did not consciously portray the Hill family’s experience, but did admit that the Hills’ ordeal “triggered” the writing of the book and the play.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, “That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”<sup>72</sup>

Justice Brennan’s language gave the longer-recognized right of freedom of the press precedence over the right of privacy. Even so, the concurring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas contained stinging assertions that Brennan had undervalued the liberty of the press. Black repeated his bitter disagreement with the “Sullivan rule.” “The words ‘malicious’ and particularly ‘reckless disregard’ can never serve as effective substitutes for the First Amendment words: ‘ \* \* \* make no law \* \* \* abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press \* \* \*.’”<sup>73</sup> And Justice Douglas dismissed discussions of privacy as “irrelevant” in the context of *Time v. Hill*; the Hills’ activities, he maintained, were fully in the public domain. “Once we narrow the ambit of the First Amendment, creative writing is imperiled and the ‘chilling effect’ on free expression \* \* \* is almost sure to take place. That is, I fear, the result once we allow an exception for ‘knowing or reckless falsity.’”<sup>74</sup>

Justice Abe Fortas, however, answered with a polished dissent complaining that the Court’s majority “does not repeat the ringing words of so many of its members on so many occasions in exaltation of the right to privacy.”<sup>75</sup> Fortas added,<sup>76</sup>

\* \* \* First Amendment values are supreme and are entitled to at least the types of protection that this Court extended in *New York Times v. Sullivan* \* \* \*.

For this Court totally to immunize the press—whether forthrightly or by subtle indirection—in areas far beyond the need of news, comment on public persons and events, discussion of public issues and the like would be no service

<sup>70</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 388, 87 S.Ct. 534, 542 (1967), quoting *Winters v. New York*, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665, 667 (1948).

<sup>71</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 392–393, 87 S.Ct. 534, 544 (1967).

<sup>72</sup> Quoting *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 780 (1952).

<sup>73</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 398, 87 S.Ct. 534, 547 (1967). See also Justice Black’s concurring opinion in *New York Times v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 at 293m, 84 S.Ct. 710 at 773 (1964).

<sup>74</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 401–402, 87 S.Ct. 534, 549 (1967).

<sup>75</sup> Fortas’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark, 385 U.S. 374, 416, 87 S.Ct. 534, 556 (1967), citing *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532 (1886); *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961); *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965).

<sup>76</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 420, 87 S.Ct. 534, 559 (1967).

to freedom of the press but an invitation to public hostility to that freedom. This Court cannot and should not refuse to permit under state law the citizen who is aggrieved by the type of assault which we have here and which is not within the specially protected core of the First Amendment to recover compensatory damages for recklessly inflicted invasion of his rights.

Fortas, in sum, did not believe that "the First Amendment precludes effective protection of the right of privacy—or, for that matter, an effective law of libel."<sup>77</sup>

Despite such recriminations, Justice Brennan's opinion carried the day. His opinion in *Time v. Hill* is rambling and hard to follow. Nevertheless, it is an important decision on several counts. First, this was the first case on the law of privacy involving the communications media which was decided by the Supreme Court. Second, the use of the malice rule from *New York Times v. Sullivan* requiring proof that the defendant published material "with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth"<sup>78</sup> is highly significant. True, the *Times v. Sullivan* malice formula was to be applied "only in this discrete context."<sup>79</sup> But the context involved here appeared to be in publications "of public interest," and not just political comment.<sup>80</sup>

The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials.

### SEC. 36. DEFENSES: NEWSWORTHINESS

**The media's most useful defense against an invasion of privacy lawsuit is the concept of "newsworthiness."**

The best defense in privacy cases is the concept of newsworthiness. What is news? While no two editors are apt to be able to agree on a definition of the term, courts, in numerous privacy cases, have attempted to present definitions of news and newsworthiness. But news has proved to be hard for courts to define too. One court has even called news "that indefinable quality of information which

<sup>77</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 412, 87 S.Ct. 534, 554 (1967).

<sup>78</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 393, 87 S.Ct. 534, 545 (1967). In a footnote, Justice Brennan added that it was for a jury, not for the Supreme Court, to determine whether there had been "knowing or reckless falsehood." Cf. *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 284-285, 84 S.Ct. 710, 728-729 (1964).

<sup>79</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 391, 87 S.Ct. 534, 543 (1967).

<sup>80</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 388, 87 S.Ct. 534, 542 (1967).

arouses public attention.” Newsmen will often assert that “news is what we say it is” or that news is “whatever interests people.” Fortunately for the media, where the defense of newsworthiness is concerned, the courts have tended to accept newsmen’s definitions.<sup>81</sup>

If an event falls within this loosely drawn concept of “newsworthiness”—in general, whatever interests the public—the media may be protected from successful privacy suits by the privilege to report the news. Here, the courts have reached a public policy which gives the media a kind of judicial benefit of the doubt. It has generally been held that news is what people *are* interested in, not what they *ought* to be interested in.<sup>82</sup>

Often, of course, people are caught up in the news when they would much rather retain the anonymity of private persons. But when an event is news, the courts have uniformly forbidden recovery for substantially accurate accounts of an event which is of public interest. A rather extreme case in point here involved the unfortunate John Jacova, who had bought a newspaper at a Miami Beach hotel’s cigar counter. As Jacova innocently stood at the counter, police rushed into the hotel in a raid and mistook Jacova for a gambler. Jacova was taken into custody, but was released after he showed identification. Mr. Jacova was understandably annoyed later in the day to see himself on television being questioned by policemen. He sued the television station for invasion of privacy. He was not allowed to collect, however, because the court ruled that Jacova had become an “unwilling actor” in a news event.<sup>83</sup>

Mrs. Lillian Jones—much against her will—originated the “unwilling public figure” rule in a famous privacy case decided in 1929. Her husband was stabbed to death on a Louisville street in her presence. The Louisville *Herald-Post* published a picture of Mrs. Jones, and quoted her as saying of her husband’s attackers: “I would have killed them.” The court expressed sympathy and acknowledged the existence of a right to privacy, but added:<sup>84</sup>

There are times, however, when one, whether willing or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest. When this takes place, he emerges from his seclusion and it is not an invasion of his right to privacy to publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence.

<sup>81</sup> *Sweenek v. Pathe News Co.*, 16 F.Supp. 746, 747 (D.C.N.Y.1936); *Sidis v. F-R Pub. Co.*, 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); *Associated Press v. International News Service*, 245 F. 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1917) affirmed 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68 (1918); *Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co.*, 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir., 1958).

<sup>82</sup> *Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.*, 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); *Goelet v. Confidential, Inc.*, 5 A.D.2d 226, 230, 171 N.Y.S.2d 223, 227 (1958).

<sup>83</sup> *Jacova v. Southern Radio Television Co.*, 83 So.2d 34 (Fla.1955); see, also, *Hubbard v. Journal Pub. Co.*, 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962); *Elmhurst v. Pearson*, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 153 F.2d 467 (1946).

<sup>84</sup> *Jones v. Herald-Post Co.*, 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929).



If unwilling public figures have been so treated by the courts in privacy lawsuits, what of people who seek fame, public office, or otherwise *willingly* bring themselves to public notice? Public figures have been held to have given up, to some extent their right to be "let alone." Persons who have sought publicity—actors, explorers, or politicians to give a few examples—have made themselves "news" and have parted with some of their privacy. In one case, a suit by a former husband of movie star Janet Leigh was unsuccessful despite his protestations that he had done everything he could to avoid publicity. Her fame rubbed off on him.<sup>85</sup>

Even so, when the media go "too far," celebrities can bring successful privacy lawsuits. The taking of a name of a public figure, for example, to advertise a commercial product without his consent would be actionable. Also, even newsworthy public figures can collect damages when fictionalized statements are published about them. Some areas of life are sufficiently personal and private that the media may intrude only at their peril. Private sexual relationships, homes, bank accounts, and private letters of an individual would all seem to be in a danger zone for the press.<sup>86</sup>

One way in which the privilege of newsworthiness is sometimes attacked in court involves the passage of time since an event was first reported. This argument runs that although an event may have been legitimate news when it occurred, say five years ago, the story is now out of the public eye and cannot be legitimately revived. A case in which a time lapse of seven years was crucial was the famed "Red Kimono" case discussed earlier in this chapter, *Melvin v. Reid*. Gabrielle Darley Melvin, the reformed prostitute, had been acquitted of a murder charge in 1918, and the movie based upon her involvement in the "Red Kimono" murder trial, was brought out in 1925.<sup>87</sup> The time lapse argument, however, used by itself, almost uniformly has failed to rebut a defense of newsworthiness. But when a time lapse argument is coupled with a publication's dredging up a reformed ex-convict's 11-year-old misadventure

<sup>85</sup> *Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications*, 201 Cal.App.2d 733, 20 Cal.Rptr. 405 (1962).

<sup>86</sup> See *Garner v. Triangle Publications*, 97 F.Supp. 546 (D.C.N.Y.1951); *Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital*, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); *Baker v. Libbie*, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912); *Pope v. Curl*, 2 Atk., 341, 26 Eng.Rep. 608 (1741).

<sup>87</sup> 112 Cal. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). However, more than mere time-lapse was involved in this decision. This case suggested that re-creating events might have been permissible, but that the unnecessary use of the name "Gabrielle Darley" in advertising and in the movie itself was not to be tolerated. More innocuous subject matter, however, has since been dealt with more leniently by the courts. See, e. g., *Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp.*, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); *Smith v. Doss*, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948); *Smith v. NBC*, 138 Cal.App.2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).

as a truck hijacker, as in *Briscoe v. Reader's Digest* discussed earlier in this chapter, time lapse may be part of a privacy suit.<sup>88</sup>

Even after *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, the newsworthiness of a publication will not always protect the publisher. The protection of newsworthiness may vanish suddenly if a careless or misleading caption is placed on a picture. Consider the case of *Holmes v. Curtis Publishing Company*.

"MAFIA: SHADOW OF EVIL ON AN ISLAND IN THE SUN" screamed the headline on a feature story in the February 25, 1967 issue of the *Saturday Evening Post*. Published along with the article was a picture of James Holmes and four other persons at a gambling table, evidently playing blackjack. This picture was captioned, "High-Rollers at Monte Carlo have dropped as much as \$20,000 in a single night. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that the Casino grosses \$20 million a year, and that one-third is skimmed off for American Mafia 'families.'"

Holmes objected to publication of this article, and sued for libel and invasion of privacy, arguing that the picture and caption had placed him in a false light. Holmes was not mentioned by name in the article, but he was, however, the focal point of the photograph. A United States district court in South Carolina noted that the article dealt with subjects of great public interest—organized crime, the growth of tourism in the Bahama Islands, and legalized gambling.

The court refused to grant the Curtis Publishing Company's motions that the libel and privacy lawsuits by Holmes could not stand because of precedents such as *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*<sup>89</sup> and *Time, Inc. v. Hill*.<sup>90</sup> Instead, the court declared that the libel and privacy issues would have to go to trial:<sup>91</sup>

Certainly defendant's caption is reasonably capable of amounting to a defamation, for one identified as a high-stakes gambler or having a connection with the Mafia would certainly be injured in his business, occupation, and/or reputation.

As to plaintiff's action for privacy, there appears no question that if it were not for defendant's caption beneath plaintiff's photograph, this court would be justified in dismissing plaintiff's invasion of privacy cause of action. But such is not the case. Conflicting inferences also arise from the record as it stands today which preclude disposition of this cause of action summarily.

<sup>88</sup> *Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n*, 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 (1971).

<sup>89</sup> 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).

<sup>90</sup> 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967).

<sup>91</sup> *Holmes v. Curtis Pub. Co.*, 303 F.Supp. 522, 527 (D.C.S.C.1969).

Unwilling subjects of photographs or motion pictures caused considerable activity in the law of privacy in the wake of *Time, Inc. v. Hill*. Consider the case of Frank Man, a professional musician who made the scene at the Woodstock Festival in Bethel, N.Y., in August of 1969. At someone's request, Man clambered onto the stage and played "Mess Call" on his flugelhorn to an audience of movie cameras and 400,000 people. Subsequently, Warner Bros., Inc. produced and exhibited a movie under the title of "Woodstock." Man claimed that the producers and distributors of the film included his performance without his consent, and brought suit in New York against Warner Bros.

A United States District Court said:<sup>92</sup>

The film depicts, without the addition of any fictional material, actual events which happened at the festival. Nothing is staged and nothing is false. \* \* \*

There can be no question that the Woodstock festival was and is a matter of valid public interest.

Man argued that a movie depicting Woodstock could no longer be treated as news because of the lapse of time. The court replied that "the bizarre happenings of the festival were not mere fleeting news but sensational events of deep and lasting public interest." The court concluded that Frank Man, by his own volition had placed himself in the spotlight at a sensational event. He had made himself newsworthy, and thus deprived himself of any right to collect for invasion of privacy.<sup>93</sup>

It should not, however, be inferred that all factual reports of current events have been—or will be—held absolutely privileged. Film Producer Wiseman produced a film—"The Ticut Follies"—which showed conditions in a mental hospital, with individuals identifiable. The film showed naked inmates, forced feeding, masturbation and sadism, and the court concluded that Wiseman's film had—by identifying individuals—gone beyond the consent which mental hospital authorities had given him to make the film. The film was taken out of commercial distribution, but was not destroyed. The court ruled that the film was of educational value, and that it could be shown to special audiences such as groups of social workers, or others who might be moved to work toward improving conditions in mental hospitals.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>92</sup> 317 F.Supp. 51, 53 (D.C.N.Y.1970).

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Commonwealth v. Wiseman*, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969). See, also, *Daily Times Democrat v. Graham*, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So.2d 474 (1964), where a woman collected for invasion of privacy after a newspaper used her identifiable picture as she emerged from a "fun house" where a jet of air blew her dress above her waist.

The defense of newsworthiness seems to have been greatly strengthened by courts' reliance on *Time, Inc. v. Hill*. The potency of the concept of newsworthiness may be seen in the outcome of a privacy lawsuit against *Life* magazine by two young travelers to Europe. During the summer of 1968, *Life* magazine ran a cover story picturing Rick Heckler and Cathy Goldman, with the captions "Young American Nomads Abroad" and "Two Californians at home in a cave in Crete."<sup>95</sup> Inside the magazine appeared an article entitled "CRETE: A STOP IN THE NEW ODYSSEY," subtitled, "A restless generation of U.S. youth roams abroad." The article's pictures showed people in and around the caves of Matola, Crete, making their homes in the caves. One picture showed Rick Heckler and Cathy Goldman, dressed in bathing suits, sitting in front of their cave. *Life* reporter Thomas Thompson's 5,000 word story included these paragraphs referring to Mr. Heckler and Ms. Goldman:<sup>96</sup>

Rick Heckler, who was a champion sprinter at San Diego State, took a degree in English and then wondered what on earth it was good for, told me [Reporter Thompson] how it happened with him: "Four of us decided to open a restaurant in California at Big Bear Lake. We found an old place and cleaned it up, fixed it up—I mean from top to bottom—and we got our liquor license and we were going great. Then one of our partners—a Rhodes Scholar candidate by the way—got busted for smoking grass. They took away our liquor license and the restaurant folded.

Rick's dream folded, too. So rather than try a new one, he and his girl, Cathy Goldman, 20, left America to wander.

"Are you going back?"

Shrugs. "Maybe," Rick said.

Plaintiffs Heckler and Goldman contended that they had been given the impression that Thompson was doing a travelog rather than an article on disenchanting American youth, and that they never expected to be front-page attractions. Further, and perhaps more important, they objected to the light in which the article placed them. They argued that the implied association with drug-users, draft-dodgers and "others of social opprobrium" subjected them to ridicule, shame, and disgust in their community. They added that they had been on the island of Crete only two days when they first talked with reporter Thompson, and that they always intended to return to America after their travels overseas.

<sup>95</sup> *Life*, July 19, 1968.

<sup>96</sup> *Goldman v. Time, Inc.*, 336 F.Supp. 133, 135 (D.C.Cal.1971).

Rick Heckler and Cathy Goldman sued *Life* magazine under the “false light category” of privacy, but to no avail. Awarding the defendant magazine a summary judgment, Judge Knox wrote:<sup>97</sup>

It is now unquestioned that the *New York Times* rule, requiring plaintiff in a libel-type action to show actual malice, includes matters of newsworthiness or public interest, even where the plaintiff is not a public official or public figure. As the Court held recently in *Rosenbloom v. Metromedia*, 403 U.S. 29, 43–44, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1819–1820, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971):

“If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety. \* \* \* We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous. [Footnotes omitted.]”

\* \* \*

\* \* \* “false light” claims are to be treated by the same standard; a plaintiff cannot avoid the impact of the *New York Times* rule merely by labelling his action as one for invasion of privacy rather than libel. See *Time, Inc. v. Hill* \* \* \*

Youth’s disenchantment—and travels and living overbroad—was held to be of current interest and newsworthy, and the *Life* article in question presented facts about a significant segment of the American population. Plaintiffs Goldman and Heckler, the court added, could not have expected much privacy, in view of the tourism on Crete and the public nature of the caves in which they had taken up residence. Finally, they did not resist, “and in fact made themselves readily available for both the text and photographs which eventually appeared in the *Life* magazine article.”<sup>98</sup>

Judge Knox said that in a “false light” privacy action, as in a libel case, there is<sup>99</sup>

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 137–138.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

\* \* \* a constitutionally required showing of clearly convincing actual malice on the part of the person or persons responsible for publishing the allegedly defamatory [or privacy invading] article. Such actual malice cannot be found simply from the language of the article alone \* \* \* but must amount to the printing of a knowing falsehood or the printing of such matter with a reckless disregard for whether it is false or not. Reckless disregard is not measured by what a reasonably prudent person would have published or would have investigated before publishing. Rather, there must be sufficient evidence for the conclusion that the party responsible for publication in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the published matter.

Because plaintiffs Goldman and Heckler were unable to show such "actual malice," their lawsuit failed.

### SEC. 37. DEFENSES: CONSENT

**If a person has consented to have his privacy invaded, that individual cannot later sue to collect damages.**

In addition to *newsworthiness*, another important defense to a lawsuit for invasion of privacy is *consent*. Logically enough, if a person has consented to have his privacy invaded, he should not be allowed to sue for the invasion. As Warren and Brandeis wrote in their 1890 *Harvard Law Review* article, "The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual or with his consent."<sup>1</sup>

The defense of consent, however, poses some difficulties. To make this defense stand up, it must be *pleaded* and *proved* by the defendant. An important rule here is that the *consent* must be as broad as the invasion.

A young man had consented to have his picture taken in the doorway of a shop, supposedly discussing the World Series. But the youth was understandably chagrined when *Front Page Detective* used this photograph to illustrate a story titled "Gang Boy." The Supreme Court of New York allowed the young man to recover damages, holding that consent to one thing is not consent to another. In other words, when a photograph is used for a purpose not intended by the person who consented, that person may be able to collect damages for invasion of privacy.<sup>2</sup>

In the case of *Russell v. Marboro Books*, a professional model was held to have a suit for invasion of privacy despite the fact that she

<sup>1</sup> Warren and Brandeis, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

<sup>2</sup> *Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co.*, 207 Misc.2d 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1955).

had signed a release. (In the states which have privacy statutes—California, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, Wisconsin and Virginia—prior consent in writing is required before a person's name or picture can be used in advertising or "for purposes of trade.") Miss Russell, at a picture-taking session had signed a printed release form:<sup>3</sup>

#### Model release

The undersigned hereby irrevocably consents to the unrestricted use by \* \* \* [photographer's name], advertisers, customers, successors and assigns of my name, portrait, or picture, for advertising purposes or purposes of trade, and I waive the right to inspect or approve such completed portraits, pictures or advertising matter used in connection therewith \* \* \*.

Miss Russell maintained that her job as a model involved portraying an "intelligent, refined, well-bred, pulchritudinous, ideal young wife and mother in artistic settings and socially approved situations." Her understanding was that the picture was to depict a wife in bed with her "husband"—also a model—in bed beside her, reading. Marboro books did use the pictures in an advertisement, with the caption "For People Who Take Their Reading Seriously." Thus far, there was no invasion of privacy to which Miss Russell had not consented.

Marboro Books, however, sold the photograph to Springs Mills, Inc., a manufacturer of bed sheets which enjoyed a reputation for publishing spicy ads. The photo was retouched so that the title of the book Miss Russell was reading appeared to be *Clothes Make the Man*, a book which had been banned as pornographic. The advertisement suggested that the book should be consulted for suitable captions, and also suggested captions such as "Lost Weekend" and "Lost Between the Covers." The court held that Miss Russell had an action for invasion of privacy despite the unlimited release that she had signed. Such a release, the court reasoned, would not stand up "if the picture were altered sufficiently in situation, emphasis, background, or context \* \* \* liability would accrue where the content of the picture had been so changed that it is substantially unlike the original."<sup>4</sup>

Even if a signed release is in one's possession, it would be well to make sure that the release is still valid. In a Louisiana case, a man had taken a body-building course in a health studio. This man had agreed to have "before" and "after" photos taken of his physique, showing the plaintiff's body in trunks. Ten years later, the health

<sup>3</sup> Russell v. Marboro Books, Inc., 18 Misc.2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1955).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

studio used the pictures in an ad. The court held that privacy had been invaded.<sup>5</sup>

Also, it would be well to make sure that you have explicit consent. On occasion, courts have found that the circumstances of a publication were such that there was *implied consent*. One such instance was when a person published a personal letter himself, and then sued to prevent further publication of the letter. The court held that the man had forfeited his right to prevent the letter's appearing in another publication.<sup>6</sup>

The best rule is this: make sure that the consent or release is broad and explicit enough to cover any invasion of privacy which might be claimed. A casual, offhand consent may be taken back at any time before publication actually takes place. Even celebrities such as movie stars have brought suit when they felt that their performances had been put to uses which they did not intend. Comedienne Beatrice Lillie, for example, sued Warner Bros. Pictures, contending that her contract with the company did not include the use of her performances in "short subjects." However, the court held that Miss Lillie's consent to such use of the film was included in her contract.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, actor Douglas Fairbanks, Sr. was defeated in an attempt to control the use of one of his films. The court decided that Fairbanks had given up control of the film. However, he could have had an action for damages if the film had been so garbled that Fairbanks' reputation was impaired.<sup>8</sup>

When a defendant does not have consent and does invade someone's privacy, good intentions are not a defense. It may be pleaded that the defendant honestly believed that he had consent, but this can do no more than to mitigate punitive damages. Some of the consequences of a publication's not getting a clear and specific consent from persons whose pictures were used in a magazine article may be seen in the case of *Raible v. Newsweek*. According to Eugene L. Raible, a Newsweek photographer visited his home in 1969, and asked to take a picture of Mr. Raible and his children in their yard for use in "a patriotic article." Then, the October 6, 1969, issue of that magazine featured an article which was headlined on the cover, "The Troubled American—A Special Report on the White Majority."<sup>9</sup> Newsweek did use Mr. Raible's picture (with his children cropped out of it); he was wearing an open sport shirt and standing next to a large American flag mounted on a pole on his lawn. The article ran for many pages thereafter, with such margin-

<sup>5</sup> *McAndrews v. Roy*, 131 So.2d 256 (La.App.1964).

<sup>6</sup> *Widdemer v. Hubbard*, 19 Phil. 263 (Pa.1887), cited in Hofstadter and Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>7</sup> *Lillie v. Warner Bros. Pictures*, 139 Cal.App. 724, 728, 34 P.2d 835 (1934).

<sup>8</sup> *Fairbanks v. Winik*, 119 Misc. 809, 198 N.Y.S.2d 299, 301 (1922).

<sup>9</sup> *Raible v. Newsweek, Inc.*, 341 F.Supp. 804, 806, 809 (1972).



al headlines as "You'd better watch out, the common man is standing up," and "Many think the blacks live by their own set of rules."<sup>10</sup> Mr. Raible sued for libel and for invasion of privacy.

Although Raible's name was not used in the story, the court said it was readily understandable that his friends and neighbors in Wilkensburg, Pa., might consider him to be typical of the "square Americans" discussed in the article. Raible argued that his association with the article meant that he was being portrayed as a " \* \* \* typical 'Troubled American,' a person considered 'angry, uncultured, crude, violence prone, hostile to both rich and poor, and racially prejudiced.'" <sup>11</sup>

District Judge William W. Knox granted *Newsweek* a summary judgment, thus dismissing Mr. Raible's libel claims. Judge Knox declared that since the article indicated that the views expressed are those of the white majority of the United States—of whom Mr. Raible was one—"then we would have to conclude that the article, if libelous, libels more than half of the people in the United States and not plaintiff in particular."<sup>12</sup>

Judge Knox declared, however, that Mr. Raible's invasion of privacy lawsuit appeared to stand on firmer ground. Directing that Raible's privacy lawsuit go to trial, Judge Knox wrote:<sup>13</sup>

It is true that if plaintiff [Raible] consented to the use of his photograph in connection with *this article*, he would have waived his right of action for invasion of privacy. However, it would appear to the court that the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show just what plaintiff consented to and the varying inferences from this testimony will have to be resolved by the trier of facts.

## SEC. 38. DEFENSES: LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS

**Privacy is a relatively new region of law which has had much unplanned growth. Complexities and confusions affect defenses to privacy lawsuits.**

Journalists should not take too much comfort in the defenses of newsworthiness and consent. Although the courts have generally been most lenient in their interpretation of what constitutes a "newsworthy" story, the press has reason to be concerned. The concept of "newsworthiness" could prove to be so elastic that it might be dangerously subject to the whims of a judge or jury.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 805.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 806. See also *De Salvo v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 300 F.Supp. 742 (D.C.Mass.1969).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 807.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 809.

Although it must be emphasized that the courts have been careful lest their definitions of “news” and “public interest” become too restrictive, the fact remains that courts have what amounts to a power of censorship in deciding privacy cases.

Privacy is a new area of law, and has not had the centuries of trial-and-error development that attended the law of defamation. This relative newness is a great source of privacy law’s danger for the media. Over time, defenses to defamation were built up: for one thing, truth was made a defense. And where slander is concerned, “special damages”—actual monetary loss—must generally be proved before a plaintiff can collect. Where retraction statutes are in force, a plaintiff must prove special damages once a fair and full apology for the defamation has been published.<sup>14</sup> But with the law of privacy, the media do not have such shields. In only one of the privacy tort sub-groups discussed above—“putting plaintiff in a false position in the public eye”—would truth be a defense to a privacy action. Also, a publication need not be defamatory to invade someone’s privacy.

Small wonder, then, that some eminent scholars have viewed the law of privacy as a threat to freedom of the press. Professor William L. Prosser has suggested that the law of privacy, in many respects, comes “into head-on collision with the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press.” He said privacy law may be “capable of swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public defamation.”<sup>15</sup>

If, for example, a newspaper were to be sued for *both* libel and invasion of privacy for the same article, difficulties in making a defense hold up might well arise. If the publication were defamatory, the newspaper might be able to plead and prove truth as a defense. But proving truth would not halt the privacy suit unless the article had to do with “putting plaintiff in a false position in the public eye.” It could be possible, if a plaintiff alleged that a newspaper printed “embarrassing private facts,” that proving the truth of an article might encourage a sympathetic jury to find against the newspaper for invasion of privacy.

This means that an article containing no defamation, based on true facts, and published with the best of intentions or through an innocent mistake could be the basis for a successful invasion of privacy lawsuit. If, indeed, it becomes easier to collect for an

<sup>14</sup> When the fact situation giving rise to a privacy action also involves defamation, retraction statutes have been held to apply. *Werner v. Times-Mirror Co.*, 193 Cal.App.2d 111, 14 Cal.Rptr. 208 (1961).

<sup>15</sup> Prosser, *Handbook of the Law of Torts*, 3d. ed., p. 844; 4th ed. (1971), pp. 815–816; “Privacy,” 48 *California Law Review* 383, 401 (1960).

invasion of privacy suit than for a defamation action, it has been suggested that privacy suits may supplant libel actions.<sup>16</sup>

The foregoing discussion has concentrated on invasion of privacy as a tort. Privacy, however, is protected not only by tort law—in which individuals may sue for damage if their privacy is invaded. Since 1960, privacy has become a constitutional right, a right which to some extent protects citizens from intrusions by government or police agencies.<sup>17</sup>

Privacy was indeed a hot issue in the mid-1970s. "The trouble was," writer Paul Clancy has asserted, "it was already too hot, and freedom of information considerations were being largely ignored." Draft versions of the Privacy Act of 1974—which was to open government files so that individuals might see and correct dossiers which various government agencies have—would have also shut the press away from much information \* \* \* and from many records previously believed to be public. After re-drafting in response to press complaints, the Privacy Act of 1974 said that matters which may be disclosed in the Freedom of Information Act, as amended, [discussed in Chapter 12] are exempted from the sweep of the Privacy Act. And under the Freedom of Information Act, the public—and thus the press—has a right to all information but that which "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."<sup>18</sup>

In addition, federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) guidelines—as adopted in some cities and states—made it more difficult, if only for a time, to get criminal records. Related to this were proposals to seal arrest records after a period of years to protect reformed criminals or persons who were accused of a crime but never convicted.<sup>19</sup> Here, however, the balancing act juggling freedom of information and individuals' right to privacy becomes difficult to maintain. A truism among journalists is that governments should never give government the power of secret arrest, secret confinement, or secret trial. In order to preserve due process of law, information about police and judicial activities must be kept public and published in the press. As noted by W. H. Hornby, chairman of the American Society of Newspaper Editors' Freedom of Information Committee in 1975:<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> John W. Wade, "Defamation and the Right of Privacy," 15 *Vanderbilt Law Review* 1093, 1121 (1962); Prosser, "Privacy," *loc. cit.*

<sup>17</sup> See, e. g., *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961); *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965).

<sup>18</sup> Paul Clancy, *Privacy and the First Amendment* (Columbia, Mo.: Freedom of Information Foundation Series, No. 5, March, 1976).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> W. H. Hornby, "Secrecy, Privacy, and Publicity," *Columbia Journalism Review*. March - April, 1975, p. 11, quoted in Clancy, *op. cit.*

We still need to know who is in jail and what the charges are against him. We still need to know who has been indicted. If we don't insist on this knowledge, we are in the same position as the Germans who, in their privacy, wondered about the sighing cargoes of those long freight trains that passed in the night.

## Chapter 7

### COPYRIGHT

Sec.

39. Development of Copyright Law.
40. Securing a Copyright.
41. Originality.
42. Infringement and Remedies.
43. Copyright, Unfair Competition and the News.
44. The Defense of Fair Use.

#### SEC. 39. DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW

**Copyright is the right to control or profit from a literary, artistic or intellectual production.**

The horse-and-buggy Copyright Statute of 1909 has been replaced by a new and complex measure which went into effect January 1, 1978. This act, "Senate Bill 22," was signed into law on October 19, 1976, by President Gerald R. Ford.<sup>1</sup> The emergence of a new copyright statute is in itself a remarkable event. Copyright law revision has been underway in Congress since 1961, with massive snags lurking all about: where onrushing technology didn't cause problems, vigorously competing special interest groups did. Take photocopying. The photocopying machine was unknown in 1909 and thus was nowhere mentioned by the old statute. But in the 1960s and 1970s, teachers and librarians wanted few if any restraints on photocopying, while authors and publishers wanted to halt any copying which could cut into the sale of even one book or magazine.<sup>2</sup>

#### Copyright Defined

*Black's Law Dictionary* defines copyright as:<sup>3</sup>

The right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. An intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a

<sup>1</sup> One of the more useful sources in studying these changes is House of Representatives Report No. 94-1476, "Copyright Law Revision." Title 17, United States Code, "Copyrights," was amended in its entirety by Public Law 94-553, 94th Congress, 94 Stat. 2541 (1976).

<sup>2</sup> For a view of efforts to resolve such disputes, see H. R. Report No. 94-1476, "Copyright Law Revision," pp. 66-70. The guidelines printed there were later approved by the Senate-House conference committee which hammered out the final bill.

<sup>3</sup> *Black's Law Dictionary*, Revised 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1968) p. 406.

Co., 1968) p. 406. A most useful compendium on copyright law is Melville E. Nimmer, *Nimmer on Copyright* (New York, Matthew Bender, 1963-1976, 2 vols.).

limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them.

\* \* \*

International copyright is the right of a subject of one country to protection against the republication in another country of a work which he originally published in his own country.

Such definitions aside, journalists must have a basic understanding of this complicated, frustrating area of the law. Perhaps this area of law is so complex because it draws authority from a number of bases: Anglo-American literary history and common law, state and federal laws, court decisions, plus Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States:<sup>4</sup>

The Congress shall have power \* \* \* to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

Passage of the first federal copyright statute as early as 1790 indicates that America's Revolutionary generation had a lively concern about the need for copyright protection. Additional copyright statutes were enacted during the 19th century.<sup>5</sup>

### History of Copyright

Underlying the words of the Fourth Amendment was the principle of copyright, which had been known since ancient times. It is known that the Republic of Venice in 1469 granted John of Speyer the exclusive right to print the letters of Pliny and Cicero for a period of five years.<sup>6</sup>

The development of printing increased the need for some form of copyright. Although printing from movable types began in 1451 and although Caxton introduced printing into England in about 1476, the first copyright law was not passed in England until 1709 in the "Statute of 8 Anne." Before this time, the printing business was influenced in two distinct ways. First, printing gave royalty and government in England the opportunity to reward favored individuals with exclusive printing monopolies. Second, those in power recognized that printing, unless strictly controlled, tended to endanger their rule.

<sup>4</sup> Benjamin Kaplan and Ralph S. Brown, Jr., *Cases on Copyright* (Brooklyn, Foundation Press, 1960) pp. 22-52.

<sup>5</sup> Thorvald Solberg, *Copyright Enactments of the United States, 1783-1906*. Washington, 1906.

<sup>6</sup> R. C. DeWolf, *Outline of Copyright Law* (Boston: John W. Luce, 1925) p. 2.

Hoping to control the output of the printing presses, Queen Mary I granted a charter to the Stationers Company in 1556. The Stationers Company, a guild of printers, was thus given a monopoly on book printing. Simultaneously these printers were given the authority to burn prohibited books and to jail the persons who published them.<sup>7</sup> The Stationers Company acted zealously against printers of unauthorized works, making use of terrifying powers of search and seizure. Tactics paralleling those of the Inquisition were used defending the doctrines of the Catholic Church against the burgeoning Reformation movement.<sup>8</sup>

The Stationers Company remained powerful into the seventeenth century, with its authority augmented by licensing statutes. The Act of 1662, for example, confined printing to 59 master printer members of the Stationers Company then practicing in London, and to the printers at Oxford and Cambridge Universities. The privileged position of the Stationers Company in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries underlies the development of the law of copyright of more recent times. Printers who were officially sanctioned to print by virtue of membership in the Stationers Company complained when their works were issued in pirated editions by unauthorized printers.<sup>9</sup>

In time the guild printers who belonged to the Stationers Company began to recognize a principle now known as "common law copyright." They began to assume that there was a common law right, *in perpetuity*, to literary property. That is, if a man printed a book, duly approved by government authority, the right to profit from its distribution remained with that man, or his heirs, forever.<sup>10</sup>

Authors, like England's printers, came to believe that they also had some rights to profit from their works. Authors joined printers in the latter half of the seventeenth century in seeking Parliamentary legislation to establish the existence of copyright. In 1709, Parliament passed the Statute of 8 Anne, believed to have been drafted, in part, by two famed authors, Joseph Addison and Jonathan Swift. This statute recognized the author's rights, giving him—or his heirs or persons to whom he might sell his rights—exclusive powers to publish the book for 14 years after its first printing. If the author were still alive after those 14 years, he could renew his copyright for an additional 14 years.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Philip Wittenberg, *The Law of Literary Property* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 25–26; Fredrick S. Siebert, *Freedom of the Press in England, 1476–1776* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952) pp. 22, 65, 249.

<sup>8</sup> Siebert, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–86; Mrs. Edward S. Lazowska, "Photocopying, Copyright, and the Librarian," *American Documentation* (April, 1968) pp. 123–130.

<sup>9</sup> Siebert, pp. 74–77, 239.

<sup>10</sup> Wittenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46.

<sup>11</sup> Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 249; Wittenberg, *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48.

This limitation of copyright to a total of 28 years displeased both authors and printers. They complained for many years that they should have copyright in perpetuity, forever, under the common law. In 1774, the House of Lords, acting in its capacity of a court of the highest appeal, decided the case of *Donaldson v. Beckett*.

This 1774 decision was of enormous importance to American law, because it outlined the two categories of copyrights, *statutory copyright* and *common law copyright*. The House of Lords ruled that the Statute of 8 Anne, providing a limited 28 year term of copyright protection, had superseded the common law protection for *published works*. Only *unpublished works*, therefore, could receive common law copyright protection in perpetuity. An author was to have automatic, limitless common law copyright protection for his creations only as long as they remained unpublished. But once publication occurred, the author or publisher could have exclusive right to publish and profit from his works for only a limited period of time as decreed by legislative authority. The Statute of 8 Anne, as upheld by the House of Lords in *Donaldson v. Beckett*, is the progenitor of modern copyright legislation in the United States.<sup>12</sup>

When the first federal copyright statute was adopted in the United States in 1790, implementing Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it gave the federal government *statutory* authority to administer copyrights. Since there is no common law authority for federal courts, questions involving *common law* copyright remained to be adjudicated in state courts.<sup>13</sup> In the 1834 case of *Wheaton v. Peters*, the Supreme Court of the United States enunciated the doctrine of common law copyright in America:<sup>14</sup>

That an author at common law has a property right in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who endeavors to realize a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall have published it to the world.

Common law copyright—which has been wiped out of existence by the new copyright statute—had both advantages and disadvantages. Its advantages were that it was automatic and perpetual so long as a manuscript or creation was not published. True, an author could circulate a manuscript among friends, could use it in a class for experimental teaching materials, or, perhaps, circulate it to several publishing houses. As long as the manuscript was not offered to the

<sup>12</sup> 4 Burr. 2408 (1774); Lazowska, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>13</sup> *Wheaton v. Peters*, 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834); W. W. Willoughby, *Constitutional Law of the United States*, p. 446.

<sup>14</sup> 8 Pet. 561, 657, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834); *Hirsh v. Twentieth-Century Fox Films Corp.*, 207 Misc. 750, 144 N.Y.S.2d 38, 105 U.S.P.Q. 253 (1955).



general public, common law copyright protection remained intact. Published works, however, had to have a copyright notice—for example, © John Steinbeck, 1941—in a specified place on a book or magazine or other copyrightable item or the work would fall into the public domain sans copyright protection.<sup>15</sup> Note, however, that the new federal copyright act passed in 1976 and placed in effect in 1978 expressly supersedes the states' common law authority to deal with copyright. Congress has pre-empted copyright law for itself and for the federal court system: “ \* \* \* no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.”<sup>16</sup>

Copyright is an exclusive, legally recognizable claim to literary or pictorial property. It is a right, extended by federal statute, to entitle originators to ownership of the literary or artistic products of their minds. Before launching into more detailed discussion of provisions of the copyright statute now in force, consider the following three principles:

- (1) *Facts or ideas cannot be copyrighted.* Copyright applies only to the literary style of an article, news story, book, or other intellectual creation. It does *not* apply to the themes, ideas, or facts contained in the copyrighted material. Anyone may write about any subject. Copyright's protection extends only to the particular manner or style of expression. What is “copyrightable” in the print media, for example, is the order and selection of words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and the arrangement of paragraphs.<sup>17</sup>
- (2) *Copyright is both a protection for and a restriction of the communications media.* Copyright protects the media by preventing the wholesale taking of the form of materials, without permission, from one person or unit of the media for publication by another person or unit of the media. Despite the guaranty of freedom of the press, newspapers and other communications media must acquire permission to publish material that is protected either by common law copyright or by provisions of federal copyright statutes.<sup>18</sup>
- (3) *As a form of literary property, copyright belongs to that class of personal property including patents, trade-marks, trade names, trade secrets, good will, unpublished lectures, musical compositions, and letters.*
  - (a) Copyright, it must be emphasized, is quite different from a patent. Copyright covers purely composition,

<sup>15</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 102.

<sup>16</sup> H.R. Report No. 94-1476, pp. 146-149.

<sup>17</sup> *Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchants Ass'n*, 64 F.2d 575, 577 (6th Cir. 1933); *Eisenshiml v. Fawcett*, 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n*, 275 F. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).

style of expression or rhetoric, while a patent is the right given to protect a novel idea which may be expressed physically in a machine, a design, or a process.

- (b) Copyright may be distinguished from a trade-mark in that copyright protects a particular literary style while a trade-mark protects the sign or brand under which a particular product is made or distributed.
- (c) When someone sends you a letter, you do not have the right to publish that letter. You may keep the letter, or throw it away; indeed, you can do anything you wish with the letter but publish it. Although the recipient of a letter gets physical possession of it—of the paper it is written upon—the copyright ownership remains with the sender.<sup>19</sup>

#### SEC. 40. SECURING A COPYRIGHT

**Essentials in acquiring a copyright include notice of copyright, application, deposit of copies in the Library of Congress, and payment of the required fee.**

##### What May Be Copyrighted

Reflecting awareness that new technologies will emerge and that human ingenuity will devise new forms of expression, the language of the new copyright statute is sweeping in defining what may be copyrighted. Section 102 says:<sup>20</sup>

- (a) Copyright protection subsists \* \* \* in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, not known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
  - (1) literary works;
  - (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
  - (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
  - (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
  - (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
  - (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
  - (7) sound recordings.
- (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,

<sup>19</sup> Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 210 Mass. 599 (1912); Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 157 N.E. 604, 260 Mass. 453 (1927).

<sup>20</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 102.

method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.

### The Copyright Notice

Under the new statute, once something has been published the omission of a copyright notice or an error in that notice does not destroy the author or creator's protection.<sup>21</sup> Section 405 gives a copyright owner up to five years to register a work with the Register of Copyrights, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., even if that work has been published without notice. (Formerly, under the 1909 statute, publication without notice could mean that the authors lost any copyrights in their works if a defective notice—or no notice at all—was used.)<sup>22</sup> The copyright owner, however, must make a reasonable effort to add a copyright notice to all copies or phonorecords distributed in the United States after the omission has been discovered.<sup>23</sup>

Section 401 makes the following general requirement about placing copyright notices on "visually perceptible copies."<sup>24</sup>

Whenever a work protected under this title [Title 17, United States Code, the copyright statute] is published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided in this section shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.

The copyright notice shall consist of these three elements:<sup>25</sup>

- (1) the symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word "Copyright" or the abbreviation "Copr.;" and
- (2) the year of first publication of the work; in the case of compilations or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year date of the first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient. The year date may be omitted where a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, with accompanying text matter, if any, is reproduced in or on greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful articles; and
- (3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized or a generally known alternative designation of the owner.

<sup>21</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 405, 406.

<sup>22</sup> Leon H. Amdur, *Copyright Law and Practice* (New York: Clark Boardman Co., 1936), pp. 64–65; *Holmes v. Hurst*, 174 U.S. 82, 19 S.Ct. 606 (1899).

<sup>23</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 405.

<sup>24</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(a).

<sup>25</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(b).

If a sound recording is being copyrighted, the notice takes a different form. The notice shall consist of the following three elements:<sup>26</sup>

- (1) the symbol **⒫** (the letter P in a circle); and
- (2) the year of first publication of the sound recording; and
- (3) the name of the owner of copyright in the sound recording, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner; if the producer of the sound recording is named on the phonorecord labels or containers, and if no other name appears in conjunction with the notice, the producer's name shall be considered a part of the notice.

The copyright statute adopts one of the former law's basic principles: in the case of works made for hire, the employer is considered the author of the work (and therefore the initial copyright owner) unless there has been an agreement to the contrary. The statute requires that any agreement under which the employee will own rights be in writing and signed by both the employee and the employer.<sup>27</sup>

The copyright notice shall be placed on the copies "in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright." Special methods of this "affixation" of the copyright notice and positions for notices on various kinds of works will be prescribed by regulations to be issued by the Register of Copyrights.<sup>28</sup>

### Duration of Copyright

A most welcome change under the new statute sets copyright duration at the life of the owner plus 50 years. This replaced the fouled up and complicated system of the 1909 statute of an initial period of 28 years plus a renewal period of another 28 years. Renewals had to be applied for, and if unwary copyright owners waited a full 28 years to apply for their second term, they had waited too long and their works became part of the public domain—everybody's property. (The quote may be delivered out of context, but small wonder that Mark Twain once said that when copyright law was made, then all the idiots assembled.) Also, the U.S. system was badly out of step with a great majority of the world's nations which had adopted a copyright term of the author's life plus 50

<sup>26</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 402(b), (c).

<sup>27</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(b); see discussion of this section in House of Representatives Report No. 94-1476, "Copyright Law Revision."

<sup>28</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(c). As of late June, 1977, the Register of Copyrights had not issued such regulations. However, a letter to the Register can add you to such regulations and advisories as will be issued by that office.

years. As noted in the legislative commentary accompanying the 1976 statute,<sup>29</sup>

\* \* \* American authors are frequently protected longer in foreign countries than in the United States, the disparity in the duration of copyright has provoked \* \* some proposals of retaliatory legislation. \* \* \* The need to conform the duration of U.S. copyright to that prevalent throughout the rest of the world is increasingly press in order to provide certainty and simplicity in international business dealings. Even more important, a change in the basis of our copyright term would place the United States in the forefront of the international copyright community. Without this change, the possibility of future United States adherence to the Berne Copyright Union would evaporate, but with it would come a great and immediate improvement in our copyright relations.

Existing works already under statutory copyright protection at the time of passage of the new copyright statute have had their copyright duration increased to 75 years. Works now in their first 28-year copyright under the old system must be renewed if they are in their 28th year, but the second term will be expanded to 47 years to provide a total of 75 years' protection. For copyrighted works in their renewal term, 19 years will be added so that copyright on such works will exist for a total of 75 years.<sup>30</sup> Congress repeatedly extended the terms of expiring copyrights during the past dozen years, in anticipation of the enactment of copyright revision.<sup>31</sup>

### Copyright Registration and Deposit

As in the past, copyright registration will be accomplished by filling out a form obtainable from the Register of Copyrights, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The Register of Copyrights will require (with some exceptions which will be specified by the Copyright Office) that material deposited for registration shall include two complete copies of the best edition.<sup>32</sup> (The deposit of two copies of each work being copyrighted has built the collections of the Library of Congress.) These copies are to be deposited within three months after publication, along with a completed form as prescribed by the Register of Copyrights.<sup>33</sup> A fee of \$10 must be paid for most items being copyrighted.<sup>34</sup> It should be noted that

<sup>29</sup> H.R. Report No. 94-1476, p. 135, discussing 17 U.S.C.A. § 302.

<sup>30</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 304.

<sup>31</sup> See H.R. Report No. 94-1476, p. 140.

<sup>32</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 407.

<sup>33</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 407.

<sup>34</sup> Payment of fees is specified by 17 U.S.C.A. § 708.

registration is required before any action for copyright infringement can be started.<sup>35</sup>

If an individual carries out a “bluff copyright”—that is, places a copyright notice on a work at the time of publication without bothering to register it and deposit copies as outlined above, that person could have some difficulties with the Register of Copyrights. The Register of Copyrights may demand deposit of such unregistered works. Unless deposit is made within three months, an individual may be liable to pay a fine of up to \$250. If a person “willfully or repeatedly” refuses to comply with such a demand, a fine of \$2,500 may be imposed.<sup>36</sup>

#### SEC. 41. ORIGINALITY

**The concept of originality means that authors or artists have done their own work, and that their work is not copied from or grossly imitative of others’ literary or artistic property.**

Originality is a fundamental principle of copyright; originality implies that the author or artist created the work through his own skill, labor, and judgment.<sup>37</sup> The concept of originality means that the particular work must be firsthand, pristine, not copied or imitated. Originality, however, does not mean that the work must be necessarily novel or clever, or that it have any value as literature or art. What constitutes originality was explained in an old but frequently quoted case, *Emerson v. Davies*. The famous Justice Joseph Story of Massachusetts stated:<sup>38</sup>

In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science, and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before. No man creates a new language for himself, at least if he be a wise man, in writing a book. He contents himself with the use of language already known and used and understood by others. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have thought and expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection. If no book could be the subject of copyright which was not new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be no

<sup>35</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 411; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 205.

<sup>36</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 407(d).

<sup>37</sup> *American Code Co. v. Bensinger, et al.*, 282 F. 829 (2d Cir. 1922).

<sup>38</sup> 8 Fed.Cas. 615, No. 4,436 (C.C.Mass.1845).

ground for any copyright in modern times, and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such eminence. \* \* \*

An author has as much right in his plan, and in his arrangements, and in the combination of his materials, as he has in his thoughts, sentiments, opinions, and in his modes of expressing them. The former as well as the latter may be more useful or less useful than those of another author; but that, although it may diminish or increase the relative values of their works in the market, is no ground to entitle either to appropriate to himself the labor or skill of the other, as embodied in his own work.

It is a great mistake to suppose, because all the materials of a work or some parts of its plan and arrangements and modes of illustration may be found separately, or in a different form, or in a different arrangement, in other distinct works, that therefore, if the plan or arrangement or combination of these materials in another work is new, or for the first time made, the author, or compiler, or framer of it (call him what you please), is not entitled to a copyright.

The question of originality seems clear in concept but this quality of composition is not always easy to separate and identify in particular cases, especially when different authors have conceived like expressions or based their compositions upon commonly accepted ideas, terms, or descriptions in sequence. It must be borne in mind that an idea as such cannot be the subject of copyright; to be eligible for copyright, ideas must have particular physical expressions, as signs, symbols, or words. As was stated in *Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Association, Inc.*, "copyright law does not afford protection against the use of an idea, but only as to the means by which the idea is expressed."<sup>39</sup>

Artistic treatment is one element in the consideration of copyright but not an absolutely necessary element. One might compile a directory of residents of a city, giving names, occupations, places of business and residence; information about the names and addresses of individuals cannot be subject to copyright. But when thousands of citizens' names are compiled, together with directory information about them, that creates an item which may be copyrighted. In *Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone*, a court stated:<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> 64 F.2d 575, 577 (6th Cir. 1933). See, also, *Holmes v. Hurst*, 174 U.S. 82, 19 S.Ct. 606 (1899); *Eisenshiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.*, 246 F.2d 598, 114 U.S.P.Q. 199 (7th Cir. 1957).

<sup>40</sup> *Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.*, 281 F. 83, 88, 26 A.L.R. 571 (2d Cir. 1922).

The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected consist or not of matters which are *publici juris* [news of the day], or whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or language, or anything more than industrious collection. The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street number, acquires material of which he is the author.

While such a compiler would have no right to copyright information on a mere listing of one man and his address and occupation, he would have a right to copyright a compilation of a large number of such names, their addresses, and occupations.

In sum, then, the best advice is this: do your own work. You may keep it in mind that the law does not copyright ideas or facts; only the manner in which these ideas or facts are expressed is protected by the law of literary property. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in 1899, "the right secured by copyright is not the right to forbid the use of certain words or facts or ideas by others; it is a right to that arrangement of words which the author has selected to express his ideas which the law protects."<sup>41</sup> Or, as a Circuit Court of Appeals said so aptly in 1951, "'Original' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work 'owes its origin' to the author. No large measure of novelty is necessary."<sup>42</sup> Thus, if care is taken to express ideas in one's own words—and to do one's own research or creative work—you are not likely to run afoul of copyright law.

## SEC. 42. INFRINGEMENT AND REMEDIES

**Violation of copyright includes such use or copying of an author's work that his possibility of profit is lessened.**

Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights spelled out by Sections 106 through 108 of the copyright statute is an infringer. Section 106 provides that copyright owners have the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Holmes v. Hurst*, 174 U.S. 82, 19 S.Ct. 606 (1899); *Van Renssalaer v. General Motors*, 324 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1963).

<sup>42</sup> *Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler*, 352 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1965) quoting *Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.*, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).

See, also, *Runge v. Lee*, 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971), certiorari denied 404 U.S. 887, 92 S.Ct. 197 (1971).

<sup>43</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 106. Note, however, that these "exclusive rights" are subject to limitations as spelled out in §§ 107 ("Fair Use"), 108 ("Reproduction by Libraries and Archives,"), 109 ("Effect of transfer of a particular copy or



- (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
- (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
- (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending;
- (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly, and
- (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.

The next section of the statute—Section 107—inserted sizable limitations on the above-enumerated “exclusive rights” by sketching—in broad terms—the judicially created doctrine of fair use. Fair use is discussed in some detail in Section 44 later in this chapter.

It should be kept in mind that copyright law is now analogous to old wine in a new bottle. The “bottle” which holds this area of law together, so to speak, is the new statute. But its provisions, by and large, will be interpreted to a considerable extent in terms of copyright cases—some decided many years ago.

In order to win a lawsuit for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish two separate facts, as the late Circuit Judge Jerome N. Frank wrote some years ago: “(a) that the alleged infringer copied from plaintiff’s work, and (b) that, if copying is proved, it was so ‘material’ or substantial as to constitute unlawful appropriation.”<sup>44</sup> Even so, the material copied need not be extensive or “lengthy” in order to be infringement. “In an appropriate case,” Judge Frank noted, “copyright infringement might be demonstrated, with no proof or weak proof of access, by showing that a simple brief phrase, contained in both pieces, was so idiosyncratic in its treatment as to preclude coincidence.”<sup>45</sup> Judge Frank also noted that even a great, famous author or artist might be found guilty of copyright infringement. He wrote, “we do not accept the aphorism,

phonorecord”), and 110 (“Exemption of certain performances and displays,” as by instructors or pupils in teaching activities in non-profit educational institutions.) See, also, §§ 111–118, dealing with secondary transmissions by cable TV systems, ephemeral recordings, pictorial, sculptural and graphic works, sound recordings, plays, juke boxes, computers and information systems, and certain works’ use in non-commercial broadcasting.

<sup>44</sup> *Heim v. Universal Pictures Co.*, 154 F.2d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 1946).

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 488.

'when a great composer steals, he is "influenced"; when an unknown steals, he is "infringing."'"<sup>46</sup>

Copyright protection continues even though a usurper gives away the copyrighted material or obtains his profit on some associated activity. The old case of *Herbert v. Shanley* (1917) is relevant here. Shanley's restaurant employed musicians to play at mealtimes. Victor Herbert's song "Sweethearts," was performed, but no arrangement had been made with Herbert or his representatives to use the song. Defendant Shanley argued that he had not infringed upon Herbert's copyright because no profit came from music which was played merely to lend atmosphere to his restaurant. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, held that Shanley had benefited from the playing of the music.<sup>47</sup>

As under the former statute, a court may, in its discretion, award full court costs plus a "reasonable attorney's fee" to the winning party in a copyright lawsuit.<sup>48</sup> A plaintiff in an infringement suit also may opt to ask for "statutory damages" rather than actual damages and profits:<sup>49</sup>

- (1) \* \* \* the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than \$250 or more than \$10,000 as the court considers just. \* \* \*
- (2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than \$50,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than \$100.

If you own a copyright and it is infringed upon, you have an impressive arsenal of remedies or weapons under the 1976 copyright statute.

For openers, if you know that someone is infringing on your copyright or can prove is about to do so, a federal court has the power to issue temporary and final injunctions "on such terms as it

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> 242 U.S. 591, 37 S.Ct. 232 (1917).

<sup>48</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 505.

<sup>49</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1), (2).

may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain injunction.”<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, this injunction may be served on the suspected copyright infringer anywhere in the United States.<sup>51</sup> That’s a form, in other words, of prior restraint at the disposal of an affronted copyright owner.

A copyright owner may also apply to a federal court to get an order to impound “on such terms as it may deem reasonable, \* \* all copies or phonorecords claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.”<sup>52</sup> And, if a court orders it as part of a final judgment or decree, the articles made in violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.<sup>53</sup>

A copyright infringer, generally speaking, is liable for either of two things: (1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer \* \* \* or (2) statutory damages.<sup>54</sup>

#### Actual Damages and Profits

Consider the statute’s language on “actual damages and profits”:<sup>55</sup>

The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.

“Damages are awarded to compensate the copyright owner for losses from the infringement, and profits are awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.”<sup>56</sup>

In seeking to recover profits from a copyright infringer, the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to show the gross sales or profits arising from the infringement. The copyright infringer is permitted to deduct any legitimate costs or expenses which he can prove were incurred during publication of the stolen work. The

<sup>50</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 502(a).

<sup>51</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 502(b).

<sup>52</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 503(a).

<sup>53</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 503(b).

<sup>54</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(a).

<sup>55</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(b).

<sup>56</sup> H.R.Rep.No.94-1476 (Sept. 3, 1976), “Copyright Law Revision,” p. 161.

winner of a suit to recover profits under copyright law can receive only the *net profits* resulting from an infringement. As the Supreme Court of the United States has declared, "The infringer is liable for actual, not for possible, gains."<sup>57</sup>

Net profits can run to a great deal of money, especially when the work is a commercial success as a book or motion picture. Edward Sheldon sued Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. and others for infringing on his play, "Dishonored Lady" through the production of the Metro-Goldwyn film, "Letty Lynton." A federal district court, after an accounting had been ordered, found that Metro-Goldwyn had received net profits of \$585,604.37 from their exhibitions of the motion picture.<sup>58</sup>

Mr. Sheldon did not get *all* of Metro-Goldwyn's net profits from the movie, however. On appeal, it was held that Sheldon should not benefit from the profits that motion picture stars had made for the picture by their talent and box-office appeal. Sheldon, after his case had been heard by both a United States Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States, came out with "only" 20 per cent of the net profits, or roughly \$118,000. It still would have been much cheaper for Metro-Goldwyn simply to have bought Sheldon's script. Negotiations with Sheldon for his play had been started by Metro-Goldwyn, but were never completed. The price for movie rights to the Sheldon play was evidently to be about \$30,000, or slightly more than one-fourth of the amount the courts awarded to the playwright.<sup>59</sup>

Copyright cases involving music have proved to be difficult. The evidence in such cases is largely circumstantial, resting upon similarities between songs. The issue in such a case, as one court expressed it, is whether "so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."<sup>60</sup>

More than "lay listeners" often get involved in such cases, however. Expert witnesses sometimes testify in copyright infringement cases involving music. But it can happen that the plaintiff who feels that his musical composition has been stolen, and the defendant as well, will *both* bring their own expert witnesses into court, where these witnesses expertly disagree with each other.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400-401, 60 S.Ct. 681, 683 (1940); Golding v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950).

<sup>58</sup> Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 26 F.Supp. 134, 136 (D.C.N.Y. 1938), 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).

<sup>59</sup> 309 U.S. 390, 398, 407, 60 S.Ct. 681, 683, 687 (1940).

<sup>60</sup> Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

In proving a case of copyright infringement—and not just for those cases dealing with music—it is often useful if plaintiffs can show that the alleged infringement had “access” to the original work from which the copy was supposed to have been made. Such “access” needs to be proved by the plaintiff, if only by the circumstantial evidence of similarity between two works.

During the 1940s, songwriter Ira B. Arnstein tried to show that the noted composer, Cole Porter, not only had access to his work, but that Porter had plagiarized freely from Arnstein. The courts declared that Porter had not infringed any common law or statutory copyrights held by Arnstein. Porter’s victory in the courts was hard-won, however.

Arnstein began a copyright infringement lawsuit against Cole Porter in a federal district court. Arnstein charged that Porter’s “Begin the Beguine” was a plagiarism from Arnstein’s “The Lord is My Shepherd” and “A Mother’s Prayer.” He also claimed that Porter’s “My Heart Belongs to Daddy” had been lifted from Arnstein’s “A Mother’s Prayer.”

On the question of access, plaintiff Arnstein testified that 2,000 copies of “The Lord is My Shepherd” had been published, and sold, and that over one million copies of “A Mother’s Prayer” had been published and sold. Furthermore, Arnstein complained that his apartment had been burglarized and accused Porter of receiving the stolen manuscripts from the burglars. Arnstein declared that Porter’s “Night and Day” had been stolen from Arnstein’s “I Love You Madly,” which had never been published but which had been performed once over the radio. Technically, this meant that Arnstein’s “I Love You Madly” had never been published.

In reply, Porter swore that he had never seen or heard any of Arnstein’s compositions, and that he did not know the persons said to have stolen them. Even so, Arnstein’s lawsuit asked for a judgment against Porter of “at least one million dollars out of the millions this defendant has earned and is earning out of all the plagiarism.”<sup>62</sup>

At the original trial, the district court directed the jury to bring in a summary verdict in favor of Porter. Arnstein then appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, where Judge Jerome Frank explained what the appellate court had done. The Circuit Court of Appeals had listened to phonograph records of Cole Porter’s songs and compared them to records of Arnstein’s songs. As he sent the case back to a district court jury, Judge Frank wrote:<sup>63</sup>

\* \* \* we find similarities, but we hold that unquestionably, standing alone, they do not compel the conclusion,

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 474.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

or permit the inference, that defendant copied. The similarities, however, are sufficient so that, if there is enough evidence of access to permit the case to go to the jury, the jury may properly infer that the similarities did not result from coincidence.

The jury then found that Cole Porter's "Begin the Beguine" had indeed been written by Cole Porter.

Also, there can be *criminal* penalties for copyright infringement. The new statute ups the ante where phonorecord or movie pirates are concerned. Section 506 provides:<sup>64</sup>

- (a) CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT.—Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both: *Provided, however,* That any person who infringes willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain the copyright in a sound recording shall be fined not more than \$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than \$50,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both, for any subsequent offense.

Criminal penalties—fines of up to \$2,500—await any person who, "with fraudulent intent," places on any article a notice of copyright that is known to be false. Similar fines may be levied against individuals who fraudulently remove a copyright notice, or who knowingly make misstatements in copyright applications or related written statements.<sup>65</sup>

### SEC. 43. COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND THE NEWS

**The news element of a story is not subject to copyright, although the style in which an individual story is written may be protected from infringement. Reporters, in short, should do their own reporting.**

Any unauthorized and unfair use of a copyrighted news story constitutes an infringement which will support either lawsuits for damages or an action in equity to get an injunction against further publication. Although a news story—or even an entire issue of a newspaper—may be copyrighted, the *news element* in a newspaper story is not subject to copyright. News is *publici juris*—the history of the day—as was well said by Justice Mahlon Pitney in the

<sup>64</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 506. See also § 507, which orders a three-year statute of limitations for both criminal prosecutions and civil proceedings under the Copyright Statute.

<sup>65</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(c), (d) and (e).

important 1918 case of *International News Service v. Associated Press*. Justice Pitney wrote:<sup>66</sup>

A News article, as a literary production, is the subject of copyright. But the news element—the information respecting current events in the literary production, is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day. It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries (Const. Art. 1, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one who might happen to be first to report an historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.

The Associated Press had complained of news pirating by a rival news-gathering agency, International News Service. The Supreme Court granted the Associated Press an injunction against the appropriation, by INS, of AP stories while the news was still fresh enough to be salable. "The peculiar value of news," Justice Pitney declared, "is in the spreading of it while it is fresh; and it is evident that a valuable property interest in the news, as news, cannot be maintained by keeping it secret."

Justice Pitney also denounced the taking, by INS, of AP stories, either by quoting or paraphrasing. Justice Pitney wrote that INS, "in appropriating \* \* \* news and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to newspapers that are competitors \* \* \* of AP members is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown."<sup>67</sup>

What, then, can a newspaper or other communications medium do when it has been "beaten" to a story by its competition? It must be emphasized that the historic case of *International News Service v. Associated Press* did *not* say that the "beaten" news medium must sit idly by. "Pirating" news, of course, is to be avoided: pirating has been defined as "the bodily appropriation of a statement of fact or a news article, with or without rewriting, but without independent investigation or expense."<sup>68</sup> However, first-published news items may be used as "tips." When one newspaper discovers an event, such as the arrest of a kidnaper, its particular news presentation of the facts may be protected by copyright. Even so, such a first story may serve as a tip for other newspapers or press associations. After the first edition by the copyrighting news organization, other organizations may independently investigate and present their

<sup>66</sup> 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 71 (1918).

<sup>67</sup> 248 U.S. 215, 239–240, 39 S.Ct. 68, 71–72 (1918).

<sup>68</sup> 248 U.S. 215, 243, 39 S.Ct. 68, 74 (1918).

own stories about the arrest of the kidnaper. In such a case, the time element between the appearance of the first edition of the copyrighting newspaper and the appearance of a second or third edition by a competing newspaper might be negligible as far as the general public is concerned; only a few hours. If other newspapers or press associations make their own investigations and obtain their own stories, they do not violate copyright.

However, to copy a copyrighted news story—or to copy or paraphrase substantially from the original story—may bring about a successful court action for infringement, as was shown in the 1921 case of *Chicago-Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Association*. The point of this case is clear: “lifting” or “stealing” of news items can lead to the courts. This case arose when the *New York Tribune* copyrighted a special news story on Germany’s reliance upon submarines. This story, printed in the *New York Tribune* on Feb. 3, 1917, was offered for simultaneous publication in the *Chicago Herald*. The *Herald* declined this opportunity, and the *Chicago Daily News* then purchased the Chicago rights to the story.

With full knowledge that the *Tribune*’s story on the German submarine campaign was fully copyrighted, the *Herald* nevertheless ran a condensed version or rewrite of the same story on the morning of Feb. 3.

A comparison of stories as reported in the official report of the case follows:

### Chicago Herald

#### Germany Pins Hope of Fleet on 300 Fast Supersubmarines

New York, Feb. 3—3 a.m. (special).—The Tribune this morning in a copyrighted article by Louis Durant Edwards, a correspondent in Germany, says that Germany to make the final effort against Great Britain has plunged 300 or more submersibles into the North Sea. These, according to this writer, were mobilized from Kiel, Hamburg, Wilhelmshaven, and Bremerhaven where for months picked crews were trained.

“They form the world’s first diving battle fleet,” he says, “a navy equally prepared to fight above or beneath the waves.”

There are two types of these new boats now in commission, one of 2,400 tons and one of 5,000 tons displacement.

They dive beneath the water in a fraction of the time that it takes the older types to submerge. They mount



powerful guns, are capable of great surface speeds, and are protected by a heavy armor of tough steel plate.

The motors develop 7,000 horsepower and drive the boats under the surface at 22 knots an hour. These smaller cruisers carry a crew of from 60 to 80 men.

The submersibles have a radius of action of 8,000 miles.

### New York Tribune

By Louis Durant Edwards. Copyright, 1917, by  
The Tribune Association (New York Tribune).

Germany plays her trumps. Three hundred or more submersibles have plunged into the waters of the North Sea to make the final effort against Great Britain. They mobilized from Kiel, Hamburg, Wilhemshaven, Bremerhaven, where, for months, picked crews have trained.

\* \* \*

They form the world's first diving battle fleet, a navy equally prepared to fight above or beneath the waves.

\* \* \*

There are two types of these new boats now in commission, one of 2,400 tons and one of 5,000 tons displacement.

\* \* \*

They dive beneath the water in a fraction of the time that it took the older types to submerge. They mount powerful guns, are capable of great surface speeds, and are protected by a heavy armor of tough steel plate.

\* \* \*

The motors develop 7,000 horsepower, and drive the boats over the surface at a speed of 22 knots an hour. These smaller cruisers carry a crew of from 60 to 80 men.

\* \* \*

They have a radius of action of 8,000 miles.<sup>69</sup>

\* \* \*

The *Chicago Daily News* then refused to publish the story or to pay the *New York Herald Tribune* for it. The *Daily News*, having agreed to purchase an exclusive story, had the right to refuse a story already published in its market. The publishers of the *New York Tribune* sued the *Chicago Daily News* for payment, but lost.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> 275 F. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

In *International News Service v. Associated Press* (1918), the AP won its case despite the fact that the news stories it telegraphed to its members were not copyrighted. There, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the AP had a "quasi property" right in the news stories it produced, even after their publication. Once the Supreme Court found that such a "quasi property" right existed, it then declared that appropriation of such stories by INS amounted to unfair competition and could be stopped by a court-issued injunction against INS.<sup>71</sup>

Far more recently, a newspaper—the Pottstown, Pa., *Mercury*—won an unfair competition suit against a Pottstown radio station, WPAZ, getting an injunction of which prevented WPAZ "from any further appropriation of the newspaper's local news without its permission or authorization."<sup>72</sup> The court noted that competition among radio, television, and newspapers were "competing with each other for advertising which has become a giant in our economy." This court viewed the Pottstown *Mercury's* news as "a commercial package of news items to service its advertising business." In the rather jaundiced view of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, advertising has become virtually all-important, with "the presentation of news and entertainment almost a subsidiary function of newspapers, radio and television stations." Although copyright infringement was not the precise issue here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found itself able to punish the radio station for appropriating news stories under the area of law dealing with unfair competition. The court said:<sup>73</sup>

\* \* \* for the purpose of an action of unfair competition the specialized treatment of news items as a service the newspaper provides for advertisers gives the News Company [publishers of the Pottstown *Mercury*] a limited property right which the law will guard and protect against wrongful invasion by a competitor whereas, for the purpose of an action for the infringement of copyright, the specialized treatment of news is protected because "the law seeks to encourage creative minds."

The limited property right in news is to some extent waived by member organizations of the Associated Press. All A.P. members are entitled to all *spontaneous* news from areas served by other A.P. member newspapers or broadcasting stations. Membership in the

<sup>71</sup> The case of *International News Service v. Associated Press* was cited as important by the more recent case of *Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co.*, 411 Pa. 383, 192 A.2d 657, 662 (1963).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> 411 Pa. 383, 192 A.2d 657, 663-664 (1963).

Associated Press includes agreement to follow this condition as stated in Article VII of the A.P. bylaws:<sup>74</sup>

Sec. 3. Each member shall promptly furnish to the [A.P.] Corporation all the news of such member's district, the area of which shall be determined by the Board of Directors. No news furnished to the Corporation by a member shall be furnished by the Corporation to any other member within such member's district.

Sec. 4. The news which a member shall furnish to the Corporation shall be all news that is spontaneous in origin, but shall not include news that is not spontaneous in its origin, or which has originated through deliberate and individual enterprise on the part of such member.

A.P. member newspapers or broadcasting stations are expected to furnish spontaneous or "spot" news stories to the Associated Press for dissemination to other members throughout the nation. However, Section 3 of the A.P. By-Laws (above) will protect the news medium originating such a story within its district. If a newspaper copyrights a spot news story about the shooting of a deputy sheriff by a gambler, other A.P. members could use the story despite the copyright. By signing the A.P. By-Laws, the originating newspaper has given its consent in advance for all A.P. members to use news stories of *spontaneous* origin. On the other hand, if a newspaper copyrights an exposé of gambling in a city based on that newspaper's individual enterprise and initiative, the other A.P. members could not use the story without permission from the copyrighting newspaper.

We now turn to a discussion of a major defense against claims of copyright infringement: the doctrine of "fair use."

#### SEC. 44. THE DEFENSE OF FAIR USE

To soften the impact of the terms of the Federal copyright statute, courts have developed the doctrine of fair use which allows "reasonable" use of another's literary property.

The old 1909 copyright statute gave each copyright holder an exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work \* \* \*." As stated in that Act, it was an *absolute* right; the wording was put in terms so absolute that even pencil-and-paper copying was a violation of the U.S. Copyright Act.<sup>75</sup> Because the 1909 statute's terms were so stringent, if enforced to the letter, it could have prevented anyone except the copyright

<sup>74</sup> Charter and By-Laws of the Associated Press.

<sup>75</sup> See 17 U.S.C.A. § 10 of the statute which preceded the Copyright Statute of 1976: Verner W. Clapp, "Library Photocopying and Copyright: Recent Developments," Law Library Journal 55:1 (Feb., 1962) p. 12.

holder from making any copy of any copyrighted work. Such a statute was clearly against public policy favoring dissemination of information and knowledge and was plainly unenforceable. As a result, courts responded by developing the doctrine called "fair use."

American courts assumed—in creating a judge-made exception to the absolute language of the 1909 copyright statute—that "the law implies the consent of the copyright owner to a fair use of his publication for the advancement of science or art."<sup>76</sup> The fair use doctrine, although a rather elastic yardstick, was a needed improvement. The 1976 copyright statute has distilled the old common law copyright doctrine into some statutory guidelines. Factors to be considered by courts in determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use include:<sup>77</sup>

- (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
- (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
- (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
- (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

What, then, is fair use? In 1964, one expert asserted that fair use of someone's copyrightable materials exists "somewhere in the hinterlands between the broad avenue of independent creation and the jungle of unmitigated plagiarism."<sup>78</sup> No easy or automatic formula can be presented which will draw a safe line between fair use and infringement. Fifty words taken from a magazine article might be held to be fair use, while taking one line from a short poem might be labeled infringement by a court. The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary said this in its report on the 1976 copyright statute:<sup>79</sup>

Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts. \* \* \* These criteria have been stated in various ways, but essentially they can be reduced to the four standards which have been adopted in section

<sup>76</sup> Wittenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 148, offers a good non-technical description of fair use before it was expanded in 1967. See Section 44 in this chapter.

<sup>77</sup> 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.

<sup>78</sup> Arthur N. Bishop, "Fair Use of Copyrighted Books," *Houston Law Review*, 2:2 (Fall, 1964) at p. 207.

<sup>79</sup> H.R. Report No. 94-1476, discussing the fair use provisions of 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.

107: "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

\* \* \*

*General intention behind the provision*

The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.

Generally speaking, courts have been quite lenient with quotations used in scholarly works or critical reviews. However, courts have been less friendly toward use of copyrighted materials for commercial or non-scholarly purposes, or in works which are competitive with the original copyrighted piece.<sup>80</sup> The problems surrounding the phrase "fair use" have often arisen in connection with scientific, legal, or scholarly materials. With such works, it is to be expected that there will be similar treatment given to similar subject matters.<sup>81</sup> A crucial question, obviously, is whether the writer makes use of an earlier writer's work without doing substantial independent work. Wholesale copying is *not* fair use.<sup>82</sup> Even if a writer had no intention of making unfair use of someone else's work, that writer still could be found liable for copyright infringement.<sup>83</sup> The idea of independent investigation is of great importance here.

<sup>80</sup> *Eisenshiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.*, 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957); *Benny v. Loew's, Inc.*, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affirmed 356 U.S. 43, 78 S.Ct. 667, rehearing denied 356 U.S. 934, 78 S.Ct. 770 (1958); *Pilpel and Zavin*, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

<sup>81</sup> *Eisenshiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.*, 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957), certiorari denied 355 U.S. 907, 78 S.Ct. 334 (1957).

<sup>82</sup> *Benny v. Loew's Inc.*, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affirmed 356 U.S. 43, 78 S.Ct. 667, rehearing denied 356 U.S. 934, 78 S.Ct. 770 (1958).

<sup>83</sup> *Wihtol v. Crow*, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).

Copyrighted materials may be used as a *guide* for the purpose of gathering information, provided that the researcher or writer then performs an original investigation and expresses the results of such work in his or her own language.<sup>84</sup>

### Fair Use and Public Interest

Although many earlier cases expressed a narrow, restrictive view of the doctrine of fair use, some important decisions since the mid-1960s have emphasized the idea of *public interest*. This changed approach is of great importance to journalists and scholars, for where there are matters which are newsworthy or otherwise of interest to the public, courts will consider such factors in determining whether a fair use was made of copyrighted materials. A key case here is the 1967 decision known as *Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. and John Keats*. This case arose because Howard Hughes, a giant in America's aviation, oil and motion picture industries had a passionate desire to remain anonymously out of the public eye. A brief chronology will illustrate how this copyright infringement action came about:

- January and February, 1954: *Look* magazine, owned by Cowles Communications, Inc., published a series of three articles by Stanley White, titled "The Howard Hughes Story."
- In 1962, Random House, Inc., hired Thomas Thompson, a journalist employed by *Life* magazine, to prepare a book-length biography of Hughes. Later, either Hughes or his attorneys learned of the forthcoming Random House book. An attorney employed by Hughes warned Random House that Hughes did not want this biography and "would make trouble if the book was published." Thompson resigned from the project, and Random House then hired John Keats to complete the biography.
- Rosemont Enterprises, Inc., was organized in September, 1965 by Hughes' attorney and by two officers of his wholly-owned Hughes Tool Company.
- On May 20, 1966, Rosemont Enterprises purchased copyrights to the *Look* articles, advised Random House of this, and five days later brought a copyright infringement suit in New York. Attorneys for Rosemont had somehow gained possession of Random House galley proofs of the Random House biography of Hughes then being published: "Howard Hughes: a Biography by John Keats."<sup>85</sup>

*Rosemont Enterprises* sought an injunction to restrain Random House from selling, publishing, or distributing copies of its biography of Hughes because the book amounted to a *prima facie* case of

<sup>84</sup> *Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co.*, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), certiorari denied 259 U.S. 581, 42 S.Ct. 464 (1922).

<sup>85</sup> *Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. and John Keats*, 366 F.2d 303, 304-305 (2d Cir. 1966).

copyright infringement. With his five-day-old ownership of the copyrights for the 1954 *Look* magazine articles, Hughes was indeed in a position to "cause trouble" for Random House.

The trial court agreed with the Rosemont Enterprises argument that infringement had occurred, and granted the injunction against Random House, holding up distribution of the book. The trial court rejected Random House's claims of fair use of the *Look* articles, saying that the privilege of fair use was confined to "materials used for purposes of criticism or comment or in scholarly works of scientific or educational value." This district court took the view that if something was published "for commercial purposes"—that is, if it was designed for the popular market—the doctrine of fair use could not be employed to lessen the severity of the copyright law.<sup>86</sup> The district court found that the Hughes biography by Keats was for the popular market and therefore the fair use privilege could not be invoked by Random House.<sup>87</sup>

Circuit Judge Leonard P. Moore, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals, took another view. First of all, he noted that the three *Look* articles, taken together, totalled only 13,500 words, or between 35 and 39 pages if published in book form. Keats' 1966 biography on the other hand, had 166,000 words, or 304 pages in book form. Furthermore, Judge Moore stated that the *Look* articles did not purport to be a biography, but were merely accounts of a number of interesting incidents in Hughes' life. Judge Moore declared:<sup>88</sup>

\* \* \* there can be little doubt that portions of the *Look* article were copied. Two direct quotations and one eight-line paraphrase were attributed to Stephen White, the author of the articles. A mere reading of the *Look* articles, however, indicates that there is considerable doubt as to whether the copied and paraphrased matter constitutes a material and substantial portion of those articles

Furthermore, while the mode of expression employed by White is entitled to copyright protection, he could not acquire by copyright a monopoly in the narration of historical events. Finally, in an affidavit submitted to the district court, Thompson asserted that he engaged in extensive research while preparing his manuscript, which included personal interviews with many people familiar with Hughes' activities (fifteen of whom he listed by name) and the employment of a Houston newspaperman to conduct additional interviews for him. There is no dispute that defendant Keats, named as author of the biography, was retained solely to revise Thompson's manuscript, which, as

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304, citing the trial court, 256 F.Supp. 55 (D.C.N.Y.1966).

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 306-307, certiorari denied 385 U.S. 1009, 87 S.Ct. 714 (1967).

described in his contract with Random House, was to include rewriting and reorganization, rechecking facts against the sources used, and such additional research as was necessary to "update the work and fill in facts and events."

Circuit Judge Moore noted, however, that Thompson's research work remained the core of Keats' book. In any case, the Keats book should fall within the doctrine of fair use. Quoting a treatise on copyright, Judge Moore stated: "Fair use is a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner \* \* \*"<sup>89</sup>

Judge Moore demanded that public interest considerations—the public's interest in knowing about prominent and powerful men—be taken into account. He wrote that "public interest should prevail over possible damage to the copyright owner." He complained that the district court's preliminary injunction against Random House deprived the public of the opportunity to become acquainted with the life of a man of extraordinary talents in a number of fields: "A narration of Hughes' initiative, ingenuity, determination and tireless work to achieve his concept of perfection in whatever he did ought to be available to a reading public."<sup>90</sup>

A stunning event—the assassination of President John F. Kennedy—gave rise to a copyright case which added lustre to the defense of fair use in infringement actions. On November 22, 1963, dress manufacturer Abraham Zapruder of Dallas stationed himself along the route of the President's motorcade, planning to take home movie pictures with his 8 millimeter camera. As the procession came into sight, Zapruder started his camera. Seconds later, the assassin's shots fatally wounded the President and Zapruder's color film caught the reactions of those in the President's car.

On that same day, Zapruder had his film developed and three color copies were made from the original film. He turned over two copies to the Secret Service, stipulating that these were strictly for governmental use and not to be shown to newspapers or magazines because Zapruder expected to sell the film. Three days later, Zapruder negotiated a written agreement with *Life* magazine, which bought the original and all three copies of the film (including the two in possession of the Secret Service). Under that agreement, Zapruder was to be paid \$150,000, in yearly installments of \$25,000. *Life*, in its November 29, 1963, issue then featured thirty of Zapruder's frames. *Life* subsequently ran more of the Zapruder pictures.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 306, quoting Ball, *Copyright and Literary Property*, p. 260 (1944).

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 309. And, at p. 311, Judge Moore discussed Rosemont's claim that it was planning to publish a book: "One can only speculate when, if ever, Rosemont will produce Hughes' authorized biography."



*Life* gave the Commission appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to investigate the killing of President Kennedy permission to use the Zapruder film and to reproduce it in the report.<sup>91</sup>

In May of 1967, *Life* registered the entire Zapruder film in the Copyright office as an unpublished "motion picture other than a photoplay." Three issues of *Life* magazine in which the Zapruder frames had been published had earlier been registered in the Copyright office as periodicals.<sup>92</sup> This meant that *Life* had a valid copyright in the Zapruder pictures when Bernard Geis Associates sought permission from *Life* magazine to publish the pictures in Thomas Thompson's book, *Six Seconds in Dallas*, a serious, thoughtful study of the assassination. The firm of Bernard Geis Associates offered to pay *Life* a royalty equal to the profits from publication of the book in return for permission to use specified Zapruder frames in the book. *Life* refused this offer.

Having failed to secure permission from *Life* to use the Zapruder pictures, author Thomas Thompson and his publisher decided to copy certain frames anyway. They did not reproduce the Zapruder frames photographically, but instead paid an artist \$1,550 to make charcoal sketch copies. Thompson's book was then published, relying heavily on the sketches, in mid-November of 1967. Significant parts of 22 copyrighted frames were reproduced in the book.<sup>93</sup>

The court ruled that *Life* had a valid copyright in the Zapruder film, and added that "the so-called 'sketches' in the Book are in fact copies of the copyrighted film. That they were done by an 'artist' is of no moment." The Court then quoted copyright expert Melville B. Nimmer:<sup>94</sup>

"It is of course, fundamental, that copyright in a work protects against unauthorized copying not only in the original medium in which the work was produced, but also in any other medium as well. Thus copyright in a photograph will preclude unauthorized copying by drawing or in any other form, as well as by photographic reproduction."

The court then ruled that the use of the photos in Thompson's book was a copyright infringement, "unless the use of the copyrighted material in the Book is a 'fair use' outside the limits of copyright protection."<sup>95</sup> This led the court to a consideration of fair use, the issue which is "the most troublesome in the whole law of copy-

<sup>91</sup> *Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates*, 293 F.Supp. 130, 131-134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Although the Commission received permission from *Time, Inc.* to reproduce the photos, the Commission was told that it was expected to give the usual copyright notice. That proviso evidently was disregarded by the Commission.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 137.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144, citing Nimmer on Copyright, p. 98.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

right.' ”<sup>96</sup> The court then found in favor of Bernard Geis Associates and author Thompson, holding that the utilization of the Zapruder pictures was a “fair use.”<sup>97</sup>

There is an initial reluctance to find any fair use by defendants because of the conduct of Thompson in making his copies and because of the deliberate appropriation in the Book, in defiance of the copyright owner. Fair use presupposes “good faith and fair dealing.” \* \* \* On the other hand, it was not the nighttime activities of Thompson which enabled defendants to reproduce copies of Zapruder frames in the Book. They could have secured such frames from the National Archives, or they could have used the reproductions in the Warren Report [on the assassination of President Kennedy] or in the issues of *Life* itself. Moreover, while hope by a defendant for commercial gain is not a significant factor in this Circuit, there is a strong point for defendants in their offer to surrender to *Life* all profits of Associates from the Book as royalty payment for a license to use the copyrighted Zapruder frames. It is also a fair inference from the facts that defendants acted with the advice of counsel.

In determining the issue of fair use, the balance seems to be in favor of defendants.

There is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President Kennedy. Thompson did serious work on the subject and has a theory entitled to public consideration. While doubtless the theory could be explained with sketches \* \* \* [not copied from copyrighted pictures] \* \* \* the explanation actually made in the Book with copies [of the Zapruder pictures] is easier to understand. The Book is not bought because it contained the Zapruder pictures; the Book is bought because of the theory of Thompson and its explanation, supported by the Zapruder pictures.

There seems little, if any, injury to plaintiff, the copyright owner. There is no competition between plaintiff and defendants. Plaintiff does not sell the Zapruder pictures as such and no market for the copyrighted work appears to be affected. Defendants do not publish a magazine. There are projects for use by plaintiff of the film in the future as a motion picture or in books, but the effect of the use of certain frames in the Book on such projects is speculative. It seems more reasonable to speculate that the Book would,

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, quoting from *Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.*, 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 146.

if anything, enhance the value of the copyrighted work; it is difficult to see any decrease in its value.

One of the cases underlining the need for clarification of the fair use doctrine was *Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States*. That company published medical journals, and sued the United States because photocopies of millions of pages were being made by libraries of federal agencies. Medical journals are expensive, and, for example, the National Library of Medicine would subscribe to a certain journal. Then, after a request from a medical researcher in another part of the nation, one photocopy of the desired article would be sent to the researcher.<sup>98</sup>

The *Williams & Wilkins Co.* then sued the United States, but a United States Court of Claims said in 1973 that medical research is of such great importance that this copying must be regarded as a fair use. The Supreme Court of the United States took jurisdiction in this case, but split 4-4 over whether the federally funded medical library operations should be allowed to continue their massive photocopying without payment to the publisher of many of the medical journals which were being copied. That 4-4 vote was not, in legal terms, a "tie." An evenly divided court means that the ruling of the court below still stands. The *Williams & Wilkins Co.* was thus told, in effect, that it was helpless to stop the photocopying. This case was part of the background which led to provisions in the copyright statute allowing photocopying to be done by libraries and archives. Section 108 says that libraries may make "no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work," so long as it is done for research purposes, not for profit, and so long as the reproduction of the work includes a notice of copyright.<sup>99</sup>

If you suspect that the definition of "fair use" will always be incomplete, you are probably correct. Cases will continue to arise in which courts will have to build upon the statutory language and upon judicial precedents. A recent case in point involved famed lawyer Louis Nizer as a defendant in an infringement lawsuit.<sup>1</sup> (Ironically, Nizer was the winning attorney years earlier in a major infringement suit involving the World War II song hit, "Rum and Coca Cola." The defendant in that case was comedian Morey Amsterdam.)<sup>2</sup>

Michael and Robert Meeropol—the sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg—sued Nizer and his publishers, Doubleday & Co. and Fawcett

<sup>98</sup> *Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States*, 203 Ct.Cl. 74, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973).

<sup>99</sup> *Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States*, 420 U.S. 376, 95 S.Ct. 1344 (1975), 17 U.S.C.A. § 108.

<sup>1</sup> *Meeropol v. Nizer*, 429 U.S. 1337, 97 S.Ct. 687 (1977); the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in this case on January 9, 1978.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Nizer, *My Life in Court* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1961), pp. 234-286.

Publications. The Rosenbergs were executed in June, 1953, after conviction for conspiring to give national-defense related information to the Soviet Union. In 1973, Nizer's book—*The Implosion Conspiracy*—was published. It was an account of the events surrounding the trial of the Rosenbergs. The Meeropol brothers brought suit, claiming that Nizer had incorporated in his book—without authorization—substantial portions of copyrighted letters written by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. It was asserted that this use amounted to infringement of their statutory and common law copyright.<sup>3</sup>

The *Implosion Conspiracy* contained verbatim excerpts from 28 copyrighted letters, with the excerpts totaling 1,957 words. The quoted letters represented less than one per cent of the book, but the letters were prominently featured in promotional material for the book.<sup>4</sup>

A district court judge ruled in 1974 that the Meeropols had not established sufficient likelihood that they had a valid infringement claim for an injunction to be issued to halt distribution of Nizer's book. The judge's decision rested in part on the possibility of Nizer successfully invoking the "fair use" defense, arguing that the greater public interest in the dissemination of knowledge is paramount over copyright claims.<sup>5</sup> In 1976, another Federal District Court judge dismissed the Meeropols' copyright claims.<sup>6</sup>

On appeal, Circuit Judge Smith said that the courts below had erred in this case by upholding the fair use doctrine "as a matter of law as to all defendants. As to Nizer and Doubleday it also was error to uphold the defense in the alternative on factual findings, in the absence of evidence on the question of damages." The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, and sent the case back to the trial level so that the Meeropols might have the opportunity to introduce evidence on all aspects of the fair use defense.<sup>7</sup> As this book goes to press, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in order to take jurisdiction of this case.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup> 429 U.S. 1337, 97 S.Ct. 687 (1977); 505 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1974), 417 F.Supp. 1201, 1206 (S.D.N.Y., 1976).

<sup>4</sup> 417 F.Supp. 1201, 1206 (S.D.N.Y., 1976).

<sup>5</sup> 361 F.Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y., 1973).

<sup>6</sup> 417 F.Supp. 1201, 1215 (S.D.N.Y., 1976).

<sup>7</sup> 2 Med.L.Rptr. 2269, 2273-2276 (1977).

<sup>8</sup> *The Capital Times*, Madison, Wis., Jan. 10, 1978.

## Chapter 8

### FREE PRESS—FAIR TRIAL

#### Sec.

45. Free Press *Versus* Fair Trial.
46. Pre-Trial Publicity.
47. Publicity During Trial.
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50. External Guidelines and Self-Regulatory Efforts.
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#### SEC. 45. FREE PRESS *VERSUS* FAIR TRIAL

**Attorneys, judges and members of the press continue to try to settle long-standing issues in the “free press—fair trial” dispute.**

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States says that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury \* \* \*” The First Amendment says that Congress (and by extension, state and local governments) shall make no law abridging freedom of the press.

These two constitutional provisions outline a continuing struggle between the news media and the judiciary. This conflict is called the “free press-fair trial” problem by journalists and the “fair trial-free press” problem by attorneys and judges. This dispute has a lengthy and nasty history in this country, and there are signs that it may get worse before it gets better.

Back in the 1960s, “trial by newspaper” or “trial by mass media” were phrases which were often heard as bar-press controversy heated up. Some attorneys blamed the mass media for many of the shortcomings of the American court system.<sup>1</sup> In reply, many journalists went to great lengths in attempting to justify some tacky actions of the mass media in covering criminal trials.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, e. g., Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, *Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press* (New York, 1966); see also draft approved Feb. 19, 1968, by delegates to American Bar Association convention as published in March, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> See, e. g., American Newspaper Publishers Association, *Free Press and Fair Trial* (New York): American Newspaper Publishers Association, 1967, p. 1 and passim.

Many of the lawyers' arguments contained the assertion that the media were destroying the rights of defendants in criminal trials by publicizing cases before they got to court.<sup>3</sup> Such publicity, it was said, prejudiced potential jurors to such a degree that a fair trial was impossible. Editors and publishers—and some attorneys, too—were quick with rejoinders that the media were not all *that* harmful, and with arguments that the First Amendment's free press guarantees took precedence over other Constitutional provisions, including the Sixth Amendment.<sup>4</sup>

Such oversimplified argumentation was but a prologue to the situation as this book goes to press. As discussed in Section 52 of this chapter, an apparent victory for the news media in their right to cover trials—in *Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart* (1976)—now looms as a major defeat. That case held that what goes on in open court—or that is part of judicial records—can be reported because it is a public record: it belongs to the public. But as Deidre Carmody reported in the *New York Times* late in 1977:<sup>5</sup>

Increasingly, trial courts around the country are closing courtroom proceedings, sealing records and ordering attorneys, witnesses, defendants and court personnel not to speak to reporters on the ground that doing so will jeopardize the defendant's chances for a fair trial.

At issue here, as Charles R. Seib of the *Washington Post* has noted, are mechanisms called “gag orders” by the press and “protective orders” or “restrictive orders” by the judiciary.<sup>6</sup> *Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart* (1976)—in general—forbade gagging the press in its coverage of the criminal justice process. Recent developments indicate, however, that courts are making heavy use of closed court proceedings, sealed court records, and gagging attorneys and witnesses. At stake is the ability of the news media to report on the judicial system. As Deidre Carmody wrote,<sup>7</sup>

some judges tried to find ways other than gag orders to assure fair trials. Many judges simply began to hold evidentiary hearings in private or to clear courtrooms when particularly sensitive testimony was about to be given. The other tactic was to gag everybody but the press, and forbidding participants in the trial, often including the defendant, to speak to reporters.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, above.

<sup>4</sup> *American Newspaper Publishers Association*, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Deidre Carmody, “Practices Curbing Press at Trials Pose Tricky Questions,” *New York Times*, November 26, 1977, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> Charles B. Seib, “When free press and fair trial collide—the ‘gag order’ issue,” in *The Louisville Courier-Journal*, Oct. 25, 1975, p. A 9.

<sup>7</sup> Carmody, loc. cit.

This chapter will outline some of the events and cases which, beginning in the 1960s, brought the free press—fair trial problems to a head. Then, efforts to reach a bar-press accommodation will be discussed. Finally, some “restrictive order” or “gag order” cases and problems will be explored.

The free press—fair trial controversy of the 1960s took place against a background including a number of sensational, nationally publicized trials and the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and Senator Robert Kennedy in 1968. This continuing dispute, which arrayed the media's right to report against defendants' rights to a fair trial, generated new law in the form of several important Supreme Court decisions, and also brought forth attempts to codify or regularize dealings between the media and law enforcement officials with a view toward protecting defendants' rights to a fair trial.<sup>8</sup>

Although the mass media became a favorite whipping boy of some attorneys and legal organizations, with all manner of violations of defendants' rights laid at the media's doorstep, this is most certainly the result of oversimplification. To the extent that the media, in some cases, *did* create an atmosphere in which it was difficult to select a jury which had not already made up its mind, law enforcement officials who made available such prejudicial information to the press also deserved a share of the blame. Statements by a public official—Los Angeles Mayor Samuel Yorty—during the aftermath of the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy in 1968—provide a case in point.

When Robert Kennedy was fatally wounded in a kitchen corridor in Los Angeles' Ambassador Hotel in June, 1968, a suspect—Jordanian immigrant Sirhan Bishara Sirhan—was apprehended on the spot by Kennedy's bodyguards and onlookers. Sirhan was placed under tight security guard, and newsmen and even Sirhan's attorney entering the courtroom for the arraignment were frisked for weapons. Los Angeles Police Chief Thomas Reddin was very careful as he answered newsmen's questions. He refused to speculate on anything of which he did not have first-hand knowledge. Chief Reddin told reporters that even if Sirhan confessed, that news would not be released in order to avoid prejudicing the case. Mayor Yorty, however, was not nearly so cautious in his utterances concerning the assassination of Robert Kennedy.

The day after the shooting, Yorty began holding press conferences. At one such conference, Yorty released the contents of two notebooks which he said had been found in Sirhan's home. Yorty

<sup>8</sup> See Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, *op. cit.*, *passim*; see, also, *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961); *Rideau v. Louisiana*, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417 (1963); *Sheppard v. Maxwell*, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966).

reported that one of the notebooks said, "Kennedy has to be assassinated before June 5, 1968," the first anniversary of the start of an Arab-Israeli conflict in which the Arabs were ignominiously defeated. Yorty also commented vaguely about "Communist influences" in Sirhan's life, and asserted that a car belonging to Sirhan had been seen near a place where a leftist W.E.B. DuBois Club was meeting.<sup>9</sup>

California Attorney General Thomas Lynch phoned Yorty immediately after the mayor's first press conference, expressing concern about the mayor's remarks. Lynch later said Yorty's statements "referred to evidence that would have to be ruled upon by the court. He said he wasn't going to make any more statements like that." Even so, Yorty again released statements about Sirhan's diary on the following day, saying that it revealed "definite Communist leanings" by Sirhan.<sup>10</sup>

Except for Mayor Yorty's ill-considered eloquence, Los Angeles officials did an excellent job of protecting the assassination suspect and in refusing to make utterances which might prejudice potential jurors. It should be noted, however, that video-taped television coverage of a pistol being wrestled away from Sirhan as Senator Kennedy lay dying on the hotel floor was rerun repeatedly by all three major television networks, which would be likely to make finding "unprejudiced" jurors incalculably more difficult if not impossible.

Los Angeles officials, however, had learned their lesson well from the events which followed the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963. That assassination had brought the problems of "trial by mass media" dramatically to public consciousness, a fact which was underscored by the report of a Presidential Commission headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren. The Warren Commission was intensely critical of both the Dallas police and the news media for their reports of the news of that event. Oswald, of course, never lived to stand trial, because he was assassinated by Jack Ruby in a hallway of Dallas police headquarters which was a scene of confusion, clogged with reporters, cameramen, and the curious.<sup>11</sup> Los Angeles police simply would not permit such a circus to occur, and took great pains to isolate Sirhan Bishara Sirhan from such dangerous mob scenes.

The month after President Kennedy's assassination, the American Bar Association charged that "widespread publicizing of Oswald's alleged guilt, involving statements by officials and public disclosures

<sup>9</sup> San Francisco Chronicle, *This World*, June 16, 1968, p. 5, cols. 4-5. The W.E.B. DuBois Clubs promptly attacked Yorty's insinuation that Sirhan had been connected with those clubs, saying that Sirhan had no connection with them. San Francisco Chronicle, June 8, 1968, p. 9, cols. 1-2.

<sup>10</sup> San Francisco Chronicle, *This World*, June 16, 1968, p. 5, cols. 4-5.

<sup>11</sup> Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964) p. 241.



of the details of 'evidence' would have made it extremely difficult to impanel an unprejudiced jury and afford the accused a fair trial." Indeed, it is likely that had Oswald lived to stand trial, he might not have been convicted of the murder of President Kennedy, even though the Warren Commission—after the fact—declared that Oswald was in all likelihood Kennedy's assassin. Under American judicial procedures, it seems probable that Oswald could not have received a fair and unprejudiced trial, and any conviction of Oswald might well have been upset on appeal.<sup>12</sup>

The Warren Commission placed first blame on police and prosecutors, but additionally criticized the media for their part in the events following the President's death. The Commission said that "part of the responsibility for the unfortunate circumstances following the President's death must be borne by the news media \* \* \*." Newsmen were excoriated by Commission members for showing a lack of self-discipline, and a code of professional conduct was called for as evidence that the press was willing to support the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial as well as the right of the public to be informed.<sup>13</sup>

If the reporters behaved badly in Dallas, so did the Dallas law enforcement officials, who displayed "evidence" in crowded corridors and released statements about other evidence. Conduct of police and other law enforcement officials, however, has by no means been the only source of prejudicial materials which later appeared in the press to the detriment of defendants' rights. All too often, both defense and prosecution attorneys have released statements to reporters which were clearly at odds with the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon 20, adopted more than 50 years ago, provided:<sup>14</sup>

Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An *ex parte* reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court . . . .

Canon 20, in theory, could be used as a weapon to silence lawyers who released statements to the press which harmed a defendant's

<sup>12</sup> William A. Hachten, *The Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press: Decisions and Dissents* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1968) p. 106.

<sup>13</sup> Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, p. 241.

<sup>14</sup> Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association, Canon 20.

chances for a fair trial. Although this Canon was adopted by the bar associations of most states, there was rarely if ever a case brought to disbar or discipline an attorney or judge who made prejudicial remarks to the press.<sup>15</sup> In mid-1968, however, flamboyant defense attorney F. Lee Bailey was removed from a case by the New Jersey Supreme Court. That court ruled that Bailey's behavior was "so gross that we cannot risk more of it." A United States District Court Judge [Robert Shaw] upheld the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling, refusing to reinstate Bailey as defense attorney in the Kavanaugh-DeFranco murder cases.<sup>16</sup>

The ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility—which has superseded the old ABA Canons—outlines standards of trial conduct for attorneys. Disciplinary Rule DR 7-107 deals with "Trial Publicity." It says that lawyers who are involved in a criminal matter shall not make "extrajudicial statements" to the news media which go beyond unadorned factual statements including:<sup>17</sup>

- (1) Information contained in the public record.
- (2) That the investigation is in progress.
- (3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
- (4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other matters and the information necessary thereto.
- (5) A warning to the public of any dangers.

Newsmen are not the only offenders in creating what are called "trials by newspaper" or, more recently, "trials by mass media." A quick skimming of the General Index of a legal encyclopedia, *American Jurisprudence*, adds support for such a generalization. The General Index of "Amjur" contains nearly 600 categories under the topic, "New Trial." New trials may be granted because something went awry in the original trial, somehow depriving a defendant of his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment. These categories include such things as persons fainting in the courtroom, hissing, technical mistakes by attorneys, prejudice of judges, and misconduct by jurors: jurors who read newspapers.<sup>18</sup>

Findings of social scientists lend some support assumptions about jurors' being prejudiced by the mass media.<sup>19</sup> Much more research,

<sup>15</sup> Donald M. Gillmor, *Free Press and Fair Trial* (Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1966) p. 110.

<sup>16</sup> Associated Press dispatch, published June 19, 1968 in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> American Bar Association, *Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct* (Chicago, ABA, 1976) p. 37C.

<sup>18</sup> 3 Am.Jur., Gen.Index, New Trial.

<sup>19</sup> See, e. g., Mary Dee Tans and Steven H. Chaffee, "Pretrial Publicity and Juror Prejudice," *Journalism Quarterly* Vol. 43:4 (Winter, 1966) pp. 647-654, and a list of juror prejudice studies on p. 647, notes 4, 5 and 6.

however, remains to be done before assertions can be made confidently that what a juror reads or learns from the mass media will affect the juror's subsequent behavior. On the other hand, it has been argued that lawyers, before casting aspersions at the press, might consider the question of whether their own legal house is in order. Consider what psychologists can tell lawyers about a fair trial. Consider the rules of procedure in a criminal trial as attorneys make their final arguments to a jury. First, the prosecution sums up its case. Then the defense attorney makes his final argument. And last, the prosecuting attorney makes his final statement to the jury. For years, psychologists have been arguing about order of presentation in persuasion. Some evidence has been found that having the first say is most persuasive; there is other evidence that having the last word might be best.<sup>20</sup> But who gets neither the first say nor the last word during the final arguments before a jury? The defendant.<sup>21</sup>

#### SEC. 46. PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY

**Pre-trial publicity which makes it difficult—if not impossible—for a defendant to receive a fair trial was summed up in the Supreme Court cases of *Irvin v. Dowd* (1961) and *Rideau v. Louisiana* (1963).**

“Pre-trial publicity” is a phrase which is a kind of shorthand expression meaning strain between the press and the courts. The kind of publicity which “tries” a defendant in print or over the air before the real courthouse trial starts—that’s the issue here. This section discusses two classic instances of pre-trial publicity, instances in which the news media did not cover themselves with glory: *Irvin v. Dowd* and *Rideau v. Louisiana*.

##### *Irvin v. Dowd* (1961)

The *Irvin* case represents the first time that the Supreme Court overturned a state criminal conviction because publicity before the trial had prevented a fair trial before an impartial jury.<sup>22</sup>

The defendant in this murder case, Leslie Irvin, was subjected to a barrage of prejudicial news items in the hysterical wake of six murders which had been committed in the vicinity of Evansville, Indiana. Two of the murders were committed in December, 1954, and four in March, 1955. These crimes were covered extensively by news media in the locality, and created great agitation in Vanderburgh County, where Evansville is located, and in adjoining Gibson County.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> See, e. g., Carl I. Hovland, et al., *The Order of Presentation in Persuasion*, (New Haven: Yale, 1957) *passim*.

<sup>21</sup> The authors are grateful to Professors Jack M. McLeod and Steven H. Chaffee, both of the University of Wisconsin Mass Communications Research Center, for this insight.

<sup>22</sup> Gillmor, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–117.

<sup>23</sup> *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717, 719, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1641 (1961).

Leslie Irvin, a parolee, was arrested on April 8, 1955, on suspicion of burglary and writing bad checks. Within a few days, the Evansville police and the Vanderburgh County prosecutor issued press releases asserting that “Mad Dog Irvin” had confessed to all six murders, including three members of one family. The news media had what can conservatively be described as a field day with the Irvin case, and were aided and abetted in this by law enforcement officials. Many of the accounts published or broadcast before Irvin’s trial referred to him as the “confessed slayer of six.” Irvin’s court-appointed attorney was quoted as saying he had received much criticism for representing Irvin; the media, by way of excusing the attorney, noted that he faced disbarment if he refused to represent the suspect.<sup>24</sup>

Irvin was soon indicted by the Vanderburgh County Grand Jury for one of the six murders. Irvin’s court-appointed counsel sought—and was granted—a change of venue. However, the venue change was made only from Vanderburgh County to adjoining Gibson County, which had received similar prejudicial accounts about “Mad Dog Irvin” from the news media in the Evansville vicinity. Irvin’s attorney then sought to have the trial removed from Gibson County to a location which had not received such widespread and inflammatory publicity. This motion was denied on grounds that Indiana law allowed only one change of venue.<sup>25</sup>

The trial began November 14, 1955. Of 430 prospective jurors examined by the prosecution and defense attorneys, 370—nearly 90 per cent—had formed some opinion about Irvin’s guilt. These opinions ranged from mere suspicion to absolute certainty.<sup>26</sup> Irvin’s attorney had used up all of his 20 peremptory challenges. When 12 jurors were finally seated by the court, the attorney then unsuccessfully challenged all jurors on grounds that they were biased. He complained bitterly that four of the seated jurors had stated that Irvin was guilty.<sup>27</sup> Even so, the trial was held, Irvin was found guilty, and the jury sentenced him to death. Irvin’s conviction was upheld by the Indiana Supreme Court, which denied his motions for a new trial.<sup>28</sup> Protracted appeals brought Irvin’s case to the Supreme Court of the United States twice,<sup>29</sup> but his case was not decided on its merits by the nation’s highest court until 1961.

<sup>24</sup> 366 U.S. 717, 725–726, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1641, 1645 (1961); Gillmor, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>25</sup> 366 U.S. 717, 720, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1641 (1961).

<sup>26</sup> 366 U.S. 717, 727, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1645 (1961).

<sup>27</sup> 359 U.S. 394, 398, 79 S.Ct. 825, 828 (1959).

<sup>28</sup> 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E.2d 898 (1957).

<sup>29</sup> Irvin’s appeal for a writ of *habeas corpus* to a Federal District Court was denied on the basis that he had not exhausted his opportunities to appeal through the Indiana courts. 153 F.Supp. 531 (D.C.Ind.1957). A United States Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the writ, 251 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1958). In a 5–4 decision in 1959, the Supreme Court of the United States sent Irvin’s case back to the Federal Court of Appeals for reconsideration. 359 U.S. 394, 79 S.Ct. 825 (1959). The Court of Appeals again refused to grant a writ of *habeas corpus* to Irvin, 271 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1959). Irvin’s case was then appealed to the Supreme Court for the second time.

Then, in 1961, all nine members of the Supreme Court ruled that Irvin had not received a fair trial. The upshot of this was that Irvin received a new trial, although he was ultimately convicted. This time, however, his sentence was set at life imprisonment.<sup>30</sup>

In his majority opinion, Justice Tom C. Clark—a former attorney general of the United States—concentrated on the effect of prejudicial publicity on a defendant's rights. Clark noted that courts do not require that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a criminal trial. It is sufficient if a juror can render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.<sup>31</sup>

Justice Clark then considered the publicity Irvin had received, and concluded: "Here the build-up of prejudice is clear and convincing." He noted that arguments for Irvin presented evidence that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against him during the six or seven months before his trial" in Gibson County, Indiana. Furthermore, that evidence indicated that the newspapers in which the stories appeared were delivered regularly to 95 per cent of the residences in that county. Furthermore, "Evansville radio and TV stations, which likewise blanketed the county, also carried extensive newscasts covering the same incidents."

After noting the difficulty in finding impartial jurors, Justice Clark emphasized that eight of the 12 jurors finally placed in the jury box believed Irvin to be guilty. One juror announced that he "could not \* \* \* give the defendant the benefit of the doubt that he is innocent." Another said that he had "'somewhat' certain fixed opinions about Irvin's guilt." Justice Clark concluded:<sup>32</sup>

No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to the petitioner, but psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father. Where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight. As one of the jurors put it, "You can't forget what you hear and see." With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter unleashed a bitter denunciation of "trial by newspapers instead of trial in court before a jury." He stated that the Irvin case was not an isolated incident or an atypical miscarriage of justice. Frankfurter wrote:<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Gillmor, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–12.

<sup>31</sup> *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642–1643 (1961).

<sup>32</sup> 366 U.S. 717, 728, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1645 (1961).

<sup>33</sup> 366 U.S. 717, 730, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1646 (1961).

Not a term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had in States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts—too often, as in this case, with the prosecutor's collaboration—exerting pressures upon potential jurors before trial and even during the course of trial, thereby making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to secure a jury capable of taking in, free of prepossessions, evidence submitted in open court. Indeed such extraneous influences, in violation of the decencies guaranteed by our Constitution, are sometimes so powerful that an accused is forced, as a practical matter, to forego trial by jury.

Justice Frankfurter concluded his opinion with a thinly veiled threat that legal restrictions might be found which could halt pre-trial publicity:<sup>34</sup>

This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal justice must be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system—freedom of the press, properly conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.

#### **Trial by Television: Rideau v. Louisiana (1963)**

If Leslie Irvin was mistreated primarily by newspapers during the period before his trial, Wilbert Rideau found that television was the major offender in interfering with his right to a fair trial. Early in 1961, a Lake Charles, La., bank was robbed. The robber kidnaped three of the bank's employees and killed one of them. Several hours later, Wilbert Rideau was arrested by police and held in the Calcasieu Parish jail in Lake Charles. The next morning, a moving picture film—complete with a sound track—was made of a 20-minute "interview" between Rideau and the Sheriff of Calcasieu Parish. The Sheriff interrogated the prisoner and elicited admissions that Rideau had committed the bank robbery, the kidnaping, and the murder. Later in the day, this filmed interview was broadcast over television station KLPC in Lake Charles. Over three days' time, the film was televised on three occasions to an estimated total audience of 97,000 persons, as compared to the approximately 150,000 persons then living in Calcasieu Parish.<sup>35</sup>

Rideau's attorneys subsequently sought a change of venue away from Calcasieu Parish. It was argued that it would take away Rideau's right to a fair trial if he were tried there after the three television broadcasts of Rideau's "interview" with the sheriff. The motion for change of venue was denied, and Rideau was convicted

<sup>34</sup> 366 U.S. 717, 730, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1647 (1961).

<sup>35</sup> Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1419 (1963).

and sentenced to death on the murder charge in the Calcasieu Parish trial court. The conviction was affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court,<sup>36</sup> but the Supreme Court of the United States granted *certiorari*.<sup>37</sup>

Justice Potter Stewart's majority opinion noted that three of the 12 jurors had stated during *voir dire* examination before the trial that they had seen and heard Rideau's "interview" with the Sheriff. Also, two members of the jury were Calcasieu Parish deputy sheriffs. Although Rideau's attorney challenged the deputies, asking that they be removed "for cause," the trial judge denied this request. Since Rideau's lawyer had exhausted his "peremptory challenges"—those for which no reason need be given—the deputies remained on the jury.<sup>38</sup>

Justice Stewart then described the televised "interview" in withering fashion.<sup>39</sup>

What the people of Calcasieu Parish saw on their television sets was Rideau, in jail flanked by the sheriff and two state troopers, admitting in detail the commission of the robbery, kidnaping, and murder, in response to leading questions by the sheriff. The record fails to show whose idea it was to make the sound film, and broadcast it over the local television station, but we know from the conceded circumstances that the plan was carried out with the active cooperation and participation of the local law enforcement officers. And certainly no one has suggested that it was Rideau's idea, or even that he was aware of what was going on when the sound film was being made.

Justice Stewart noted that the *Rideau* case did not involve physical brutality. However, he declared that the "kangaroo court proceedings in this case involved a more subtle but no less real deprivation of due process of law." Justice Stewart added:<sup>40</sup>

Under our Constitution's guarantee of due process, a person accused of committing a crime is vouchsafed basic minimal rights. Among these are the right to counsel, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a judge. Yet in this case the people of Calcasieu Parish saw and heard, not once but three times, a "trial" of Rideau in a jail, presided over by a sheriff, where there was no lawyer to advise Rideau of his right to stand mute.

Rideau's conviction was reversed, and a new trial was ordered by the Supreme Court.

<sup>36</sup> 242 La. 431, 137 So.2d 283 (1962).

<sup>37</sup> 371 U.S. 919, 83 S.Ct. 294 (1962).

<sup>38</sup> 373 U.S. 723, 725, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1418 (1963).

<sup>39</sup> 373 U.S. 723, 725, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1419 (1963).

<sup>40</sup> 373 U.S. 723, 727, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1419 (1963).

## SEC. 47. PUBLICITY DURING TRIAL

**The notorious kidnaping trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann of the 1930s and the 1965 Supreme Court decision in the case of Billie Sol Estes are examples of excessive publicity while a case is underway.**

“The Lindbergh Case” and “the trial of Bruno Hauptmann” are phrases heard whenever the free press—fair trial debate heats up. These phrases, of course, refer to the kidnaping in 1932 of the 19-month-old son of the aviator famed for the first solo crossing of the Atlantic. The child’s kidnaping was front-page news for weeks, long after the child’s body was found in a shallow grave not far from the Lindbergh home in New Jersey.

More than two years later, in September, 1934, Bruno Richard Hauptmann was arrested. His trial for the kidnap-murder of the Lindbergh child did not begin until January, 1935. The courtroom where Hauptmann was tried had a press section jammed with 150 reporters. During the Hauptmann trial, which lasted more than a month, there were sometimes more than 700 newsmen in Flemington, N. J., the site of the trial.<sup>41</sup>

Much of the publicity of the Hauptmann trial was prejudicial, and lawyers and newsmen authored statements which were clearly inflammatory. Hauptmann was described in the press, for example, as a “thing lacking in human characteristics.”<sup>42</sup> After the trial—and after Hauptmann’s execution—a Special Committee Between the Press, Radio, and Bar was established to search for “standards of publicity in judicial proceedings and methods of obtaining an observance of them.” In a grim report issued in 1937, the 18-man committee—including lawyers, editors, and publishers—termed Hauptmann’s trial “the most spectacular and depressing example of improper publicity and professional misconduct ever presented to the people of the United States in a criminal trial.”<sup>43</sup>

One result of the committee’s investigation of the Hauptmann trial was the American Bar Association’s adoption in 1937 of Canon 35 of its Canons of Professional Ethics. [Canon 35] forbade taking photographs in the courtroom, including both actual court sessions and recesses. As updated, Canon 35 declared that broadcasting or televising court proceedings “detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the participants and witnesses in giving testimony, and create misconceptions \* \* \* and should not be

<sup>41</sup> John Lofton, *Justice and the Press* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) pp. 103–104.

<sup>42</sup> Lofton, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>43</sup> American Bar Association, “Report of Special Committee on Cooperation between Press, Radio and Bar,” Annual Report, Volume 62, pp. 851–866 (1937), at p. 861. See, also, *New Jersey v. Hauptmann*, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 Atl. 809 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935), certiorari denied 296 U.S. 649, 56 S.Ct. 310 (1935).



permitted.” This was replaced by ABA Canon of Judicial Conduct 3(7), which says:<sup>44</sup>

A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:

- (a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial administration;
- (b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings;
- (c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions:
  - (i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the dignity of the proceedings;
  - (ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and reproduction.
  - (iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
  - (iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in educational institutions.

*Commentary:* Temperate conduct of judicial proceedings is essential to the fair administration of justice. The recording and reproduction of a proceeding should not distort or dramatize the proceeding.

Canon 3(7) does not have the force of law in and of itself. However, it has the voice of the ABA and that means it may be followed, for the most part, in the states. Federal court rules forbid televising or photographic proceedings other than ceremonial matters.<sup>45</sup> As noted on pages 272–273 of this chapter, television personnel and photographers seemed in 1978 to be making some inroads against blanket rules forbidding them entry into state courtrooms. Perhaps this represents some return to an earlier notion that photographing and televising in courtrooms could help enlighten the public about the American judicial system.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> American Bar Association, Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct, p. 59C. For Canon 35, see ABA, Annual Report, Vol. 62, at p. 1134; see it as updated by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his concurring opinion in *Estes v. Texas*, 381 U.S. 532, 601n; 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1669n (1965).

<sup>45</sup> Lofton, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>46</sup> Gillmor, op. cit., pp. 34–35; see discussion at footnotes 64–65, *infra*.

### Estes v. Texas

Excesses in televising a trial in Texas during the 1960s, now seem to mean that most criminal trials may not be televised. The crucial case involved the swindling trial of flamboyant Texas financier, Billie Sol Estes. Estes was ultimately convicted, but not until he had received a new trial as a result of the manner in which a judge allowed Estes' original trial to be photographed and televised.

Estes came before a judicial hearing in Smith County, Texas, in September, 1962, after a change of venue from Reeves County, some 500 miles west. At a hearing which began on September 24, the courtroom was packed and about 30 persons stood in the aisles. A *New York Times* story described the setting for the trial in this way:<sup>47</sup>

A television motor van, big as an intercontinental bus, was parked outside the courthouse and the second-floor courtroom was a forest of equipment. Two television cameras have been set up inside the bar and four more marked cameras were aligned just outside the gates.

\* \* \*

Cables and wires snaked over the floor.

With photographers roaming unchecked about the courtroom, Estes' attorney moved that all cameras be excluded from the courtroom. As the attorney spoke, a cameraman walked behind the judge's bench and took a picture.<sup>48</sup>

After the two-day hearing was completed on September 25, 1962, the judge granted a continuance (delay) to the defense, with the trial to begin on October 22. Meanwhile, the judge established ground rules for television and still photographers. Televising of the trial was allowed, with the exception of live coverage of the interrogation of prospective jurors or the testimony of witnesses. The major television networks, CBS, NBC, and ABC, plus local television station KLTV were each allowed to install one television camera (without sound recording equipment) and film was made available to other television stations on a pooled basis. In addition, through another pool arrangement, only still photographers for the Associated Press, United Press, and from the local newspaper would be permitted in the courtroom.

<sup>47</sup> *Estes v. Texas*, 381 U.S. 532, 553, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1638 (1965). Quoted from the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren, with whom Justice Douglas and Goldberg concurred.

<sup>48</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 553, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1638 (1965). From concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren.

At its own expense, and with the permission of the court, KLTV built a booth at the back of the courtroom, painted the same color as the courtroom. An opening in the booth permitted all four television cameras to view the proceedings. However, in this small courtroom, the cameras were visible to all.<sup>49</sup>

Despite these limitations the judge placed on television and still photographers, a majority of the Supreme Court held that *Estes* had been deprived of a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Clark asserted that a fair trial could not be had when television is allowed in any criminal trial. Justice Harlan, the fifth member of the majority in this 5-4 decision, voted to overturn *Estes*' conviction because the case was one of "great notoriety." Even so, it should be noted that Harlan reserved judgment on the televising of more routine cases.

In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Clark wrote:<sup>50</sup>

We start with the proposition that it is a "public trial" that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to the "accused." The purpose of the requirement of a public trial was to guarantee that the accused would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. His story had proven that secret tribunals were effective instruments of oppression \* \* \*.

It is said, however, that the freedoms granted in the First Amendment extend a right to news media to televise from the courtroom, and that to refuse to honor this privilege is to discriminate between the newspapers and television. This is a misconception of the rights of the press.

The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court proceedings. While maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this important function in a democratic society its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process.

Justice Clark then attempted to dispose of one of the arguments often made by proponents of electronic journalism. He took aim on the assertion that if courts exclude television cameras or microphones, they are thus discriminating in favor of the print media. But Clark retorted, "[t]he news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press." Clark also suggested that techni-

<sup>49</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 554-555, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1638-1639 (1965), from Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion.

<sup>50</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 538-539, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1631 (1965).

cal advances might someday make television equipment and cameras quieter and less obtrusive.<sup>51</sup>

Justice Clark believed that televising and photographing criminal trials did not aid the courts' solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth. Instead, he argued, television injects an irrelevant factor into court proceedings which might well increase the chance of prejudicing jurors. Jurors might not only be distracted by the presence of cameras, with their "telltale red lights," but by an awareness of the fact of televising felt by jurors throughout an entire trial. Also, if a new trial be ordered, prospective jurors for the second trial might be prejudiced by what they had seen over television of the first trial.<sup>52</sup>

Justice Clark maintained that televising a trial court impair the quality of witnesses' testimony.<sup>53</sup>

The impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. Embarrassment may impede the search for truth, as may a natural tendency toward over-dramatization.

In addition, televising a trial could simply make a judge's task of attempting to insure fairness in the proceedings that much more difficult. And finally, the presence of the television cameras in a courtroom was termed by Clark a form of mental if not physical harassment, "resembling a police line-up or the third degree." Clark added:<sup>54</sup>

A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevitably result in prejudice. Trial by television is, therefore, foreign to our system. Furthermore, telecasting may also deprive an accused of effective counsel. The distractions, intrusions into confidential attorney-client relationships and the temptation offered by television to play to the public audience might often have a direct effect not only upon the lawyers, but the judge, the jury and the witnesses.

Chief Justice Warren was joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg in his concurring opinion. Warren agreed with Clark that

<sup>51</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 540, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1631 (1965).

<sup>52</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 544-547, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1634-1636 (1965).

<sup>53</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 547, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1635 (1965).

<sup>54</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 549, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1636 (1965).

televising criminal trials is a denial of due process of law. Warren argued that televising diverts a trial from its proper purpose by having an inevitable impact on all the trial participants. Furthermore, a televised trial seemed to Warren to detract from the dignity of court proceedings and to lessen their reliability. Finally, the Chief Justice argued that some defendants—those whose trials are televised—are singled out for days in court under prejudicial conditions not experienced by other defendants.<sup>55</sup>

Chief Justice Warren rejected contentions that excluding cameras and microphones from court unfairly or unconstitutionally discriminated against the electronic media. Warren wrote:<sup>56</sup>

So long as the television media, like the other communications media, is free to send representatives to trials and to report on those trials to its viewers, there is no abridgment of the freedom of the press. The right of the communications media to comment on court proceedings does not bring with it the right to inject themselves into the fabric of the trial process to alter the purpose of that process.

\* \* \*

On entering that hallowed sanctuary, where the lives, liberty and property of people are in jeopardy, television representatives have only the rights of the general public, namely, to be present to observe the proceedings, and thereafter, if they choose, to report them.

In his concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan agreed that in the notorious *Estes* case, the use of television was made in such a way that the right to a fair trial assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was infringed. But even so, Harlan suggested that<sup>57</sup>

\* \* \* the day may come when television will have become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process. If and when that day arrives, the constitutional judgment called for now would of course be subject to re-examination in accordance with the traditional workings of the Due Process Clause.

In a strongly worded dissent, Justices Stewart, Black, Brennan and White raised constitutional arguments in objecting to the ban

<sup>55</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 565, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1644 (1965).

<sup>56</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 585–586, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1654 (1965).

<sup>57</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 595–596, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1662 (1965).

on television from courtrooms, at least at that stage of television's development. Justice Stewart wrote:<sup>58</sup>

I think that the introduction of television into a courtroom is, at least in the present state of the art, an extremely unwise policy. It invites many constitutional risks, and it detracts from the inherent dignity of a courtroom. But I am unable to escalate this personal view into a *per se* constitutional rule. And I am unable to find, on the specific record of this case, that the circumstances attending the limited televising of the petitioner's trial resulted in the denial of any right guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution.

Justice Stewart argued that the Court was not here dealing with mob domination of a courtroom, with a kangaroo court atmosphere, or with a jury inflamed with bias. He argued that the Court's limited grant of certiorari should have permitted his brethren to consider only one thing: "the regulated presence of television and still photography at the trial itself." Pre-trial events, such as the circus-like two-day hearing in September, 1962, were not the problem. The only problem for the Supreme Court's consideration, Stewart argued, should have been *Estes'* trial, which officially began on Oct. 22, 1962.<sup>59</sup> Justice Stewart wrote:<sup>60</sup>

While no First Amendment claim is made in this case, there are intimations in the opinions filed by my Brethren in the majority which strike me as disturbingly alien to the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees against federal or state interference with the free communication of information and ideas. The suggestion that there are limits upon the public's right to know what goes on in the courts causes me deep concern. The idea of imposing upon any medium of communications the burden of justifying its presence is contrary to where I had always thought the presumption must lie in the area of First Amendment freedoms.

The constitutional question in *Estes*, to Mr. Justice Stewart, became one of whether the Fourteenth Amendment excludes television cameras from criminal trials in state courtrooms. Justices Stewart, White, Black, and Brennan simply did not believe that the case against televising trials had been sufficiently well proved. A flat ban against such televising, Justices White and Brennan said in a separate dissenting opinion, was premature.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>58</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 601-602, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1669 (1965).

<sup>59</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 611, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1675 (1965).

<sup>60</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 613, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1675-1676 (1965).

<sup>61</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1677 (1965).

In a final separate dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan contended that the *Estes* decision was “not a blanket constitutional prohibition against the televising of state criminal trials.” Television according to the opinions on the majority side of *Estes*, barred television only from “notorious trials.”<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, judges are certainly apt to ask themselves whether allowing television into a courtroom, even under the most carefully regulated circumstances, might not in and of itself make a trial “notorious.” As William A. Hachten has written, “[t]he *Estes* decision doesn’t kill television in the courtroom, but it leaves it in a critical condition.”<sup>63</sup>

### Cameras in the Courtroom?

Professor Hachten wrote that back in 1968, and the “patient”—the idea of having cameras or television in the courtroom—is now in somewhat improved condition. In 1977, the Associated Press Managing Editors Association published a Freedom of Information Report titled “Cameras in the Courtroom: How To Get 'Em There.” The report noted that if “you’re going to get your Nikon into that courtroom you’ve got to have more tools than just a camera. For one thing, you’ve got to have the clout of your State Supreme Court.” The report added:<sup>64</sup>

That the highest court must give the “go ahead” is testified to by the experience of editors in three states that allow cameras in the courtroom—Colorado, Washington and Alabama—and the two states that are allowing it on an experimental basis—Florida and Georgia.

Without that approval, forget it, they’ll tell you.

\* \* \* [H]ere are the additional tools used to attain photography of trial proceedings (with the states that utilized each particular one listed):

1. A committee of the bench and the press, either a new one or an existing bench-bar-press group that has been dealing with fair trial and free press. It is here that initial discussion of the objective takes place (Washington, Georgia, Alabama and Florida).
2. Still and TV coverage of actual trials, the result either to be confined to a review by a committee or by the courts, or also to be shown by the press or on television (Washington and Florida).
3. A hearing conducted by the State Supreme Court at which the pros and cons of the proposed change

<sup>62</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 615–616, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1677–1678 (1965).

<sup>63</sup> Hachten, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

<sup>64</sup> Freedom of Information Committee, APME, “Cameras in the Courtroom: How to Get 'Em There,” p. 2.

in court rules is fully aired (Colorado and Alabama).

4. Production of a film of the trial coverage experiment, to be used in making a sales pitch, particularly before lower court and bar associations which are generally opposed to courtroom photography (Washington, which loaned it to Florida).
5. Writing of guidelines for the courtroom coverage for review and adoption by the State Supreme Court (Colorado, Washington, Alabama, Florida and Georgia).

Slowly and cautiously, a few states are allowing still and/or motion picture or television cameras into courtrooms. Modern cameras, available-light photography, smaller and quieter camera/television gear: technology has helped get cameras back into some courtrooms. More important, however, has been intelligent negotiation by thoughtful members of bench, bar and press who realize that photography in the courtroom, properly used, can be a valuable tool for educating and informing the public.

In time, perhaps, more courts will join Colorado and Washington. Here and there, one may see signs of that: in Jefferson County (Louisville), Kentucky, 14 of the 16 circuit court judges signed a resolution to permit the news media to film trials in their courtrooms. The resolution gives the press "unrestricted access" to Jefferson County courts except in "sensitive trial situations involving children and in any matters of domestic relations", or in situations where the coverage disrupts the proceedings." Chief Judge Michael O. McDonald of the Jefferson Circuit Court said that the news media will be allowed to bring cameras and tape recording equipment into trials and court hearings for the first time in Kentucky.<sup>65</sup>

#### SEC. 48. PUBLICITY BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL

**The long ordeal of Dr. Samuel Sheppard ended with the reversal of his murder conviction on grounds that pre-trial and during-trial publicity had impaired his ability to get a fair trial.**

##### The Trial of Dr. Sam Sheppard

When the free press—fair trial controversy is raised, the case most likely to be mentioned is that *cause celebre* of American jurisprudence, Sheppard v. Maxwell.<sup>66</sup> This case was one of the most

<sup>65</sup> Southern Newspaper Publishers Association, SNPA Bulletin-News, Sept. 26, 1977, p. 4.

<sup>66</sup> 384 S.Ct. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966).



notorious—and most sensationally reported—trials in American history. With perhaps the exception of the Lindbergh kidnaping case of the 1930s, the ordeal of Dr. Sam Sheppard may well have been the most notorious case of the Twentieth Century.

This case began in the early morning hours of July 4, 1954, when Dr. Sheppard's pregnant wife, Marilyn, was found dead in the upstairs bedroom of their home. She had been beaten to death. Dr. Sheppard, who told authorities he had found his wife dead, called a neighbor, Bay Village Mayor Spence Houk. Dr. Sheppard appeared to have been injured, suffering from severe neck pains, a swollen eye, and shock.

Dr. Sheppard, a Bay Village, Ohio, osteopath, told a rambling and unconvincing story to officials: that he had dozed off on a downstairs couch after his wife had gone upstairs to bed. He said that he heard his wife cry out and ran upstairs. In the dim light from the hall, he saw a "form" which he later described as a bushy haired man standing next to his wife's bed. Sheppard said he grappled with the man and was knocked unconscious by a blow to the back of his neck.

He said he then went to his young son's room, and found him unharmed. Hearing a noise, Sheppard then ran downstairs. He saw a "form" leaving the house and chased it to the lake shore. Dr. Sheppard declared that he had grappled with the intruder on the beach, and had been again knocked unconscious.<sup>67</sup>

From the outset, Dr. Sheppard was treated as the prime suspect in the case. The coroner was reported to have told his men, "Well, it is evident the doctor did this, so let's go get the confession out of him." Sheppard, meanwhile had been removed to a nearby clinic operated by his family. While under sedation, Sheppard was interrogated in his hospital room by the coroner. Later, on the afternoon of July 4, he was also questioned by Bay Village police, with one policeman telling Sheppard that lie detector tests were "infallible." This same policeman told Dr. Sheppard, "I think you killed your wife." Later that same afternoon, a physician sent by the coroner was permitted to make a careful examination of Sheppard.<sup>68</sup>

As early as July 7—the date of Marilyn Sheppard's funeral—a newspaper story appeared quoting a prosecuting attorney's criticism of the Sheppard family for refusing to permit his immediate questioning. On July 9, Sheppard re-enacted his recollection of the crime at his home at the request of the coroner. This re-enactment was covered by a group of newsmen which had apparently been invited by the coroner. Sheppard's performance was reported at

<sup>67</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 335–336, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1508–1509 (1966).

<sup>68</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 337–338, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1509–1510 (1966).

length by the news media, including photographs. Front-page headlines also emphasized Sheppard's refusal to take a lie-detector test.<sup>69</sup>

On July 20, 1954, newspapers began a campaign of front-page editorials. One such editorial charged that someone was "getting away with murder." The next day, another front-page editorial asked, "Why No Inquest?" A coroner's inquest was indeed held on that day in a school gymnasium. The inquest was attended by many newsmen and photographers, and was broadcast with live microphones stationed at the coroner's chair and at the witness stand. Sheppard had attorneys present during the three-day inquest, but they were not permitted to participate.<sup>70</sup>

The news media also quoted authorities' versions of the evidence before trial. Some of this "evidence"—such as a detective's assertion that "'the killer washed off a trail of blood from the murder bedroom to the downstairs section'"—was never produced at the trial. Such a story, of course, contradicted Sheppard's version of what had happened in the early morning hours of July 4, 1954.<sup>71</sup>

The news media's activities also included playing up stories about Sheppard's extramarital love life, suggesting that these affairs were a motive for the murder of his wife. Although the news media repeatedly mentioned his relationship with a number of women, testimony taken at Sheppard's trial never showed that Sheppard had any affairs except the one with Susan Hayes.<sup>72</sup>

Late in July, newspaper editorials appeared bearing titles such as "Why Don't Police Quiz Top Suspect?" and "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?" Another headline shrieked: "Quit Stalling—Bring Him In." The night that headline appeared—July 30—Sheppard was arrested at 10 p. m. at his father's home on a murder charge. He was then taken to the Bay Village City Hall where hundreds of spectators, including many reporters, photographers, and newscasters, awaited his arrival. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Justice Tom C. Clark's majority opinion in the Sheppard case in 1966, summed up the news accounts in this way:<sup>73</sup>

The publicity then grew in intensity until his indictment on August 17. Typical of the coverage during this period is a front-page interview entitled: "Dr. Sam: 'I Wish There Was Something I Could Get Off My Chest—but There Isn't.'" Unfavorable publicity included items such as a cartoon of the body of a sphinx with Sheppard's head and the legend below: "I Will Do Everything In My Power to

<sup>69</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 338, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1510 (1966).

<sup>70</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 339, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1510 (1966).

<sup>71</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 340, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1511 (1966).

<sup>72</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 340–341, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1511 (1966).

<sup>73</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 341–342, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1511–1512 (1966).

Help Solve This Terrible Murder.'—Dr. Sam Sheppard." Headlines announced, *inter alia* [among other things], that: "Doctor Evidence is Ready for Jury," "Corrigan Tactics Stall Quizzing," "Sheppard 'Gay Set' Is Revealed by [Bay Village Mayor Spence] Houk," "Blood Is Found in Garage," "New Murder Evidence Is Found, Police Claim," "Dr. Sam Faces Quiz At Jail on Marilyn's Fear Of Him."

Justice Clark indicated that there were many other newspaper articles which appeared before and during the trial: "five volumes filled with similar clippings from each of the three Cleveland newspapers covering the period from the murder until Sheppard's conviction in December, 1954." Although the record of Sheppard's trial included no excerpts from radio and television broadcasts, the Court assumed that coverage by the electronic media was equally extensive since space was reserved in the courtroom for representatives of those media.

Justice Clark also noted that the chief prosecutor of Sheppard was a candidate for common pleas judge and that the trial judge, Herbert Blythin, was a candidate to succeed himself. Furthermore, when 75 persons were called as prospective jurors, all three Cleveland newspapers published their names and addresses. All of the prospective jurors received anonymous letters and telephone calls, plus calls from friends, about the impending Sheppard trial.<sup>74</sup>

Even the physical arrangements made in the courtroom to accommodate the newsmen and photographers seemed to work to Dr. Sheppard's disadvantage. The courtroom where the trial was held measured only 26 by 48 feet. In back of the single counsel table, inside the bar, a long temporary table stretching the width of the courtroom was set up, accommodating about 20 reporters who were assigned seats for the duration of the trial. One end of this table was less than three feet from the jury box. Behind the bar railing were four rows of benches, with seats likewise assigned by the court for the entire trial. The first row behind the bar was assigned to representatives of the television and radio stations, with the second and third rows being occupied by reporters from out-of-town newspapers and magazines. Thus the great majority of the seats in the courtroom were occupied by reporters. Private telephone lines were installed in other rooms on the same floor with the courtroom, and one radio station was allowed to make broadcasts from the room next to the jury room throughout the trial, and while the jury reached its verdict. Photographs could be taken in court during recesses. All of these arrangements, and the massive coverage by the media, continued during the nine weeks of the trial. Reporters moving in and out of the courtroom during times when the court

<sup>74</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 342, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1512 (1966).

was in session caused so much confusion that it was difficult for witnesses and lawyers to be heard despite a loudspeaker system.<sup>75</sup>

During the trial, pictures of the jury appeared more than 40 times in the Cleveland newspapers. And the day before the jury rendered its verdict of guilty against Dr. Sam Sheppard, while the jurors were at lunch in the company of two bailiffs, the jury was separated into two groups to pose for pictures which were published in the newspapers. The jurors, unlike those in the *Estes* case, were not sequestered ["locked up" under the close supervision of bailiffs]. Instead, the jurors were allowed to do what they pleased outside the courtroom while not taking part in the proceedings.<sup>76</sup>

The intense publicity given the Sheppard case in the news media continued unabated while the trial was actually in progress. Sheppard's attorneys took a "random poll" of persons on the streets asking their opinion about the osteopath's guilt or innocence in an effort to gain evidence for a change of venue. This poll was denounced in one newspaper editorial as smacking of "mass jury tampering" and stated that the bar association should do something about it.

A debate among newspaper reporters broadcast over radio station WHK in Cleveland contained assertions that Sheppard had admitted his guilt by hiring a prominent criminal lawyer. In another broadcast heard over WHK, columnist and radio-TV personality Robert Considine likened Sheppard to a perjurer. When Sheppard's attorneys asked Judge Blythin to question the jurors as to how many had heard the broadcast, Judge Blythin refused to do this. And when the trial was in its seventh week, a Walter Winchell broadcast available in Cleveland over both radio and television asserted that a woman under arrest in New York City for robbery had stated that she had been Sheppard's mistress and had borne him a child. Two jurors admitted in open court that they had heard the broadcast. However, Judge Blythin merely accepted the jurors' statements that the broadcast would have no effect on their judgment and the judge accepted the replies as sufficient.<sup>77</sup>

When the case was submitted to the jury, the jurors were sequestered for their deliberations, which took five days and four nights. But this "sequestration" was not complete. The jurors had been allowed to call their homes every day while they stayed at a hotel during their deliberations. Telephones had been removed from the jurors' hotel rooms, but they were allowed to use phones in the bailiffs' rooms. The calls were placed by the jurors themselves, and no record was kept of the jurors who made calls or of the telephone

<sup>75</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 343–344, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1512–1513 (1966).

<sup>76</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 345, 353, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1513, 1517 (1966).

<sup>77</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 346, 348, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1514–1515 (1966).

numbers or of the persons called. The bailiffs could hear only the jurors' end of the telephone conversations.<sup>78</sup>

When Sheppard's case was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1966, Justice Tom C. Clark's majority opinion included this ringing statement of the importance of the news media to the administration of justice.<sup>79</sup>

The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has long been reflected in the "Anglo-American distrust for secret trials." A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Implicit in some of Justice Clark's other statements in his opinion was deep disapproval of the news media's conduct before and during the Sheppard trial. But the news media were by no means the only culprits who made it impossible for Sheppard to get a fair trial. There was more than enough blame to go around, and Justice Clark distributed that blame among the deserving: news media, police, the coroner, and the trial court. The trial judge, Herbert Blythin, had died in 1960, but Justice Clark nevertheless spelled out what Judge Blythin should have done to protect the defendant.

At the outset of Sheppard's trial, Judge Blythin stated that he did not have the power to control publicity about the trial. Justice Clark declared that Judge Blythin's arrangements with the news media "caused Sheppard to be deprived of that 'judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled.'" Justice Clark added that "bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard."<sup>80</sup> Justice Clark asserted:<sup>81</sup>

The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court. As we stressed in *Estes*, the presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged. Bearing in mind the massive pretrial publicity, the judge should have adopted

<sup>78</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 349, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 (1966).

<sup>79</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 349-350, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1515-1516 (1966).

<sup>80</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 355, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1518 (1966).

<sup>81</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1520 (1966).

stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen, as Sheppard's counsel requested. The number of reporters in the courtroom itself could have been limited at the first sign that their presence would disrupt the trial. They certainly should have not been placed inside the bar. Furthermore, the judge should have more closely regulated the conduct of newsmen in the courtroom. For instance, the judge belatedly asked them not to handle and photograph trial exhibits lying on the counsel table during recesses.

In addition, the trial judge should have insulated the jurors and witnesses from the news media, and "should have made some effort to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both sides." Justice Clark contended:<sup>82</sup>

The fact that many of the prejudicial news items can be traced to the prosecution, as well as the defense aggravates the judge's failure to take any action. \* \* \* More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to submit to interrogation or take any lie detector tests; any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the identity of prospective witnesses or the probable testimony; any belief in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the case. See *State v. Van Dyne*, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964) in which the court interpreted Canon 20 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics to prohibit such statements.

#### SEC. 49. THE JUDGE'S ROLE

**It is the judge's responsibility to see that each defendant receives a fair trial.**

The decision in the Sheppard case left its mark in the recommendations of the American Bar Association's "Reardon Report" discussed earlier in this chapter. The cases discussed in this chapter—*Irvin*, *Rideau*, *Estes*, and *Sheppard*—generated new law and suggested strongly that American courts may insist more and more on tighter controls over the information released to the news media in criminal trials by police, prosecution and defense attorneys, and by other employees under the control of the courts. The primary responsibility, however, for seeing to it that a defendant receives a fair trial, rests with the courts. Judges are expected to remain in control of trials in their courts.

<sup>82</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 359, 361, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1521–1522 (1966).

A judge who has great respect for the press, Frank W. Wilson of a U.S. District Court in Nashville, Tenn., has written: "Certain it is that the press coverage of crimes and criminal proceedings make more difficult the job that a judge has of assuring a fair trial. But no one has yet shown that it renders the job impossible. In fact, no one has yet shown, to the satisfaction of any court, an identifiable instance of miscarriage of justice due to press coverage of a trial where the error was not remedied."<sup>83</sup> Note that Judge Wilson says that it is the *judge's* job to assure a fair trial. Judge Wilson has declared, "show me an unfair trial that goes uncorrected and I will show you a judge who has failed in his duty."<sup>84</sup>

Judge Wilson thus placed great—many would argue too great—<sup>85</sup> reliance upon the remedies which a judge can use to attempt to set things right for the defendant once he has received what the judge considers to be an undue amount of prejudicial publicity. Some of the most important of these trial-level "remedies" are outlined below:

- (1) *Change of venue*, moving the trial to another area in hopes that jurors not prejudiced by mass media publicity or outraged community sentiment can be found. This "remedy," however, requires that a defendant give up his Sixth Amendment right to a trial in the "State and *district* wherein the crime shall have been committed \* \* \*"<sup>86</sup> Change of venue may have been a relatively effective remedy, say, in 1900, before radio and television blanketed the nation so effectively with instantaneous communications. Also, one locality's sensational trial, after it is moved, will become another locality's sensational trial, largely defeating the change of venue.
- (2) *Continuance or postponement*. This is simply a matter of postponing a trial until the publicity or public clamor abates. A problem with this "remedy" is that there is no guarantee that the publicity will not begin anew. It might be well to remember the axiom, "justice delayed is justice denied." A continuance in a case involving a major crime might mean that a defendant—even an innocent defendant—might thus be imprisoned for a lengthy time before his trial. A contin-

<sup>83</sup> Frank A. Wilson, "A Fair Trial and a Free Press," presented at 33rd Annual convention of the Ohio Newspaper Association, Columbus, Ohio, Feb. 11, 1966.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> Don R. Pember, *Pretrial Newspaper Publicity in Criminal Proceedings: A Case Study* (unpublished M.A. thesis, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich.) pp. 12-16.

<sup>86</sup> Constitution, Sixth Amendment, emphasis added; Lawrence E. Edenhöfer, "The Impartial Jury—Twentieth Century Dilemma: Some Solutions to the Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial," *Cornell Law Quarterly* Vol. 51 (Winter, 1966) pp. 306, 314.

uance means that a defendant gives up his Sixth Amendment right to a *speedy* trial.

- (3) *Voir dire* examination of potential jurors. This refers to the procedure by which each potential juror is questioned by opposing attorneys and may be dismissed “for cause” if the juror is shown to be prejudiced. (In addition, attorneys have a limited number of “peremptory challenges” which they can use to remove jurors whose prejudice cannot be sufficiently demonstrated but who may give hints that they favor the other side in the impending legal battle.) Professor Don R. Pember of the University of Washington says that the *voir dire* examination is an effective tool and one of the best available trial-level remedies.
- (4) *Sequestration*, or “locking up” the jury. Judges have the power to isolate a jury, to make sure that community prejudices—either published or broadcast in the mass media or of the person-to-person variety—do not infect a jury with information which might harm a defendant’s chances for a fair trial by an impartial jury. This remedy, of course, could not halt the pre-trial publicity which jurors might have seen or heard before the trial. As Professor Pember has said, judges are reluctant to do this today because of the complexities in the life of the average person.<sup>87</sup>
- (5) *Contempt of Court*. This punitive “remedy” is discussed at length in Chapter 10. Courts have the power to cite for contempt those actions—either in court or out of court—which interfere with the orderly administration of justice. American courts—until the “gag order” controversies of recent years—have been reluctant to use the contempt remedy to punish pre-trial or during-trial publications. (See Section 51 of this chapter, on “restrictive” or “gag” orders.) Some critics of the American mass media would go even further: they would like to see the British system imported. That would mean using contempt of court citations as a weapon to control media coverage of criminal cases.

The British system of contempt citations to regulate media activities has worked well, according to some observers. The British press—knowing that the threat of a contempt citation hangs over it for a misstep—cannot quote from a confession (or even reveal its existence); nor can the British publish material—including previous criminal records—which would not be admissible evidence. One of

<sup>87</sup> Another trial-level remedy which is more infrequently used is the blue-ribbon jury. When a case has received massive prejudicial publicity, a court may empower either the prosecution or the defense to empanel a special, so-called “blue ribbon” jury. Intelligent jurors are selected through the use of questionnaires and interviews, under the assumption that a more intelligent jury will be more likely to withstand pressures and remain impartial.



the things about the British system which is most offensive to American journalists is the prohibition of a newspaper's making its own investigation and printing the results of it. After the trial is concluded, *then* British newspapers can cover the trial.<sup>88</sup>

As distinguished American journalists have pointed out, however, America is not Britain. The *New York Times'* Anthony Lewis has suggested that the British system of using contempt citations to preclude virtually all comment on criminal cases simply could not work in the United States. While some criminal trials in the United States drag on for years, even trials involving major crimes—including appeals—are usually completed in Britain in less than two months' time.<sup>89</sup> Anthony Lewis has also argued that Britain is a small, homogeneous nation where police or judicial corruption is virtually unknown. America has not been so fortunate: occasionally corrupt policemen or judges are discovered, and perhaps the media's watchdog function is more needed in reporting on police and courts in this nation than it is in Britain.<sup>90</sup>

#### SEC. 50. EXTERNAL GUIDELINES AND SELF-REGULATORY EFFORTS

**An external regulatory threat—the fair trial reporting guidelines of the “Reardon Committee”—led to press-bar-bench efforts to agree to rules for covering the criminal justice process.**

During the middle 1960s, the American Bar Association again got into the act in attempting to regulate prejudicial publicity.<sup>91</sup> As should be evident from preceding sections, there was plenty of pressure on the ABA to do something. First, as noted earlier in Section 45, the Warren Commission investigating the assassination of President Kennedy had some harsh things to say about media coverage of the arrest of suspect Lee Harvey Oswald.<sup>92</sup> Then, there had been a chain of cases involving prejudicial publicity—*Irvin v. Dowd* (1961),<sup>93</sup> *Rideau v. Louisiana* (1963),<sup>94</sup> *Estes v. Texas* (1965)<sup>95</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Harold W. Sullivan, *Trial by Newspaper* (Hyannis, Mass., Patriot Press, 1961).

<sup>89</sup> *New York Times*, June 20, 1965.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, *Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press* (New York, 1966); see also draft approved Feb. 19, 1968, by delegates to the ABA Convention as published in March, 1968. For earlier ABA involvement in trying to come to terms with prejudicial publicity see ABA, “Report of Special Committee on Cooperation Between [sic] Press, Radio and Bar,” *Annual Report*, Volume 62, pp. 851–866 (1937).

<sup>92</sup> Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964) p. 241.

<sup>93</sup> 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961).

<sup>94</sup> 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417 (1963).

<sup>95</sup> 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628 (1965).

and *Sheppard v. Maxwell* (1966).<sup>96</sup> Although the Katzenbach Guidelines for federal courts and law enforcement officers had met with considerable approval, the ABA's concern continued. Early in 1968, the ABA Convention meeting in Chicago approved the "Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press" recommended by the Advisory Committee headed by Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Paul C. Reardon.<sup>97</sup> The "Reardon Report," as the document came to be known, was greeted with outraged concern by a large segment of the American media.<sup>98</sup> This report dealt primarily with things that attorneys and judges were *not* to say lest the rights of defendants be prejudiced. For example, if a defendant in a murder case had confessed before trial, that confession should not be revealed until duly submitted as evidence during an actual trial. What was most frightening to the media, however, were suggestions that contempt powers be used against the media if it were to publish a statement which could affect the outcome of a trial.<sup>99</sup>

Replies from representatives of the news media were not long in coming after the ABA House of Delegates adopted the "Reardon Report" on February 19, 1968. J. Edward Murray, managing editor of *The Arizona Republic*, said: "Fortunately, neither the ABA nor the House of Delegates makes the law." Murray emphasized that the ABA action was merely advisory, and had no force of law unless adopted by statutes or as rules of courts at the state and local levels.<sup>1</sup> The Reardon Report touched off many press-bar meetings, seeking to reach voluntary guidelines on coverage of the criminal arrest, arraignment, hearing and trial process. More than two dozen states adopted voluntary agreements based on conferences among judges, lawyers, and members of the media. States with such guidelines include Colorado, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.

In such a setting—in the aftermath of the Warren Commission Report on the Kennedy assassination (which called for curtailment of pretrial news)—the *Sheppard* case came along to illustrate once again just how wretchedly prejudicial news coverage of a criminal trial could become. In that setting, the ABA Advisory Committee on Fair Trial—Free Press (Reardon Committee) was

<sup>96</sup> 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966).

<sup>97</sup> Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press (of the ABA), Approved Draft, *op. cit.*

<sup>98</sup> See, e. g., American Newspaper Publishers Association, *Free Press and Fair Trial* (New York: ANPA, 1967) p. 1 and *passim*.

<sup>99</sup> Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, *op. cit.*, 1966 and 1968.

<sup>1</sup> "Bar Votes to Strengthen Code on Crime Publicity," *Editor & Publisher*, Vol. 101 (Feb. 24, 1968) p. 9.

formed. As Professor J. Edward Gerald of the University of Minnesota has written:<sup>2</sup>

the American Newspaper Publishers Association responded defensively with its Committee on Free Press and Fair Trial. Other associations in law and journalism joined in, and a long dialogue ensued in which strong positions were taken. However, these positions masked a serious discussion between liberals, moderates, and conservatives inside both the bar and the press.

The internal discussions caused attitudes to change. Criminal sanctions for lawyers, peace officers, or journalists, freely discussed at the outset, no longer seem tenable. Concurrently, pretrial use of prejudicial news has been substantially curtailed by the mass media.

In many places, a press-bar *rapprochement* occurred, leading to construction, by joint committees of press and bar, of guidelines for the coverage of criminal trials. In Wisconsin, for example, the following guidelines were adopted:<sup>3</sup>

#### STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF THE WISCONSIN BAR AND NEWS MEDIA

The bar and news media of Wisconsin recognize that freedom of the news media and the right to a fair and swift trial are fundamental to the basic liberties guaranteed by the first and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution. The news media and the bar further recognize that these basic rights must be rigidly preserved and responsibly practiced according to highest professional standards.

The bar and the news media, and indeed all citizens, are obliged to preserve the principle that any person suspected or accused of a crime is innocent until found guilty in a court under competent evidence fairly presented and accurately reported.

The bar and news media recognize that access to legitimate information involving the administration of justice is as vital to the public's concern in the commission of crimes against society as is guaranteeing the suspect and the state a fair trial free of prejudicial information and conduct. The same principles apply in all civil proceedings.

<sup>2</sup> J. Edward Gerald, "Press-Bar Relationships: Progress Since *Sheppard* and *Reardon*," *Journalism Quarterly* 47:2 (Summer, 1970) p. 223. See, also, the Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (1964), and Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Jury System, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the Free Press—Fair Trial Issue 1-3 (1968).

<sup>3</sup> Reprinted from Wisconsin Bar Bulletin, February, 1969, pp. 7-9.

To promote understanding toward reconciling the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to a fair, impartial trial, the following principles, mutually drawn and submitted for voluntary compliance, are recommended to all members of these professions in Wisconsin.

1. The news media have the right and responsibility to disseminate the news. Free and responsible news media enhance the administration of justice. Members of the bar should co-operate, within their canons of legal ethics, with the news media in the reporting of the administration of justice.

2. All parties to litigation, including the state, have the right to have their causes tried fairly by an impartial tribunal. Defendants in criminal cases are guaranteed this right by the Constitutions of the United States and Wisconsin.

3. No trial should be influenced by the pressure of publicity from news media or by the public. Lawyers and journalists share responsibility to prevent the creation of such pressures.

#### **“Strive for Accuracy”**

4. All news media should strive for accuracy and objectivity. The public has a right to be informed, the accused the right to be judged in an atmosphere free from undue prejudice.

5. The news media and bar recognize the responsibility of the judge to preserve order in the court and to seek the ends of justice by all appropriate legal means.

6. Decisions about handling news rest with editors. In the exercise of news judgment, the communicator should remember that:

(a) An accused person is presumed innocent until proved guilty.

(b) Readers, listeners and viewers are potential jurors.

(c) No person's reputation should be injured needlessly.

7. The public is entitled to know how justice is being administered. No lawyer should use publicity to promote his side of a pending case. The public prosecutor should not take unfair advantage of his position as an important source of news. These cautions shall not be construed to limit a lawyer's obligation to make available information to which the public is entitled.

### Meaning of Rights

8. Journalistic and legal training should include instruction in the meaning of constitutional rights to a fair trial, freedom of press, and the role of both journalist and lawyer in guarding these rights.

9. A committee of representatives of the bar and the media, possibly aided by or including representatives of law enforcement agencies and other interested parties, should meet from time to time to promote understanding of these principles by the public and especially by all directly involved persons, agencies or organizations. Its purpose may include giving advisory opinions concerning the interpretation and application of these principles as specific problems arise.

### GUIDELINES ON THE REPORTING OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

1. There should be no restraint on making public the following information concerning the defendant:

- (a) The defendant's name, age, residence, employment, marital status and other factual background information.
- (b) The substance or text of the charge, such as complaint, indictment, information or, where appropriate, the identity of the complaining party.
- (c) The identity of the investigating and arresting agency, and the nature of the investigation where appropriate.
- (d) The circumstances surrounding an arrest, including the time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, possession and use of weapons and a description of items seized at the time of arrest.

2. The release to news media of certain types of information, or its publication, may create dangers of prejudice to the defense or prosecution without serving a significant law enforcement or public interest function. Therefore, all concerned should be aware of the dangers of prejudice in making pretrial public disclosures of the following:

- (a) Opinions about a defendant's character, his guilt or innocence.
- (b) Admissions, confessions or the contents of a statement or alibis attributable to a defendant.

- (c) References to investigative procedures, such as fingerprints, polygraph examinations, ballistic tests or laboratory tests.
- (d) Statements concerning the credibility or anticipated testimony of prospective witnesses.
- (e) Opinions concerning evidence or argument in the case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evidence or argument will be used at trial.

Exceptions to these points may be in order if information to the public is essential to the apprehension of a suspect, or where other public interests will be served.

3. Prior criminal charges and convictions are matters of public record, available through police agencies or court clerks. Law enforcement agencies should make such information available upon legitimate inquiry but the public disclosure of it may be highly prejudicial without benefit to the public's need to be informed. The news media and law enforcement agencies have a special duty to report the disposition or status of prior charges.

4. Law enforcement and court personnel should not prevent the photographing of defendants, or suspects, when they are in public places outside the courtroom. They should not promote pictures or televising nor should they pose a defendant or suspect of a person in custody against his will. They may make available a suitable photograph of a defendant or a person in custody.

5. Photographs of a suspect not in custody may be released by law enforcement personnel provided a valid law enforcement function is served thereby. It is proper to disclose information necessary to enlist public assistance in apprehending fugitives. Disclosure may include photographs as well as records of prior arrests and convictions.

6. Freedom for news media to report proceedings in open court is generally recognized. The bench may utilize measures—such as cautionary instructions, sequestration of the jury and the holding of hearings on evidence in the absence of the jury—to insure that the jury's deliberations are based upon evidence presented to them in court. All concerned should co-operate toward that end.

7. Sensationalism should be avoided by all.

## **GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING JUVENILE OFFENSES**

The news media and the bar recognize the distinction between juvenile and adult offenders established by law. We also recognize the right of the media to have free access

to all matters concerning juvenile offenders and juvenile proceedings and to report the same, except as prohibited by law.

The bar and the media further recognize that they share, with the courts and other officials, responsibility for developing sound public interest in and understanding of juvenile problems as they relate to the community.

We therefore recommend:

1. In the handling of juvenile matters, basic principles of fairness and cooperation, as defined in the Statement of Principles of the bench-media committee of Wisconsin, shall apply. When a juvenile is regarded as an adult under criminal law, the bar-media guidelines for reporting crime and ordinance violations shall apply.
2. When news media attend sessions of the juvenile court, they may disclose names or identifying data of the participants, unless prohibited by law. News media should make every effort to fully observe and report such sessions, and the disposition thereof by the court, with regard for the juvenile's rights and the public interest.

One set of guidelines—the “Statement of Policy Concerning the Release of Information by Personnel of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal Proceedings”—attempted to take both First and Sixth Amendment rights into account. These guidelines, more commonly known as the Katzenbach Guidelines after former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, were first announced in 1965 and amended in 1975. Note that these guidelines, reproduced below, allow the release of information prejudicial to a defendant when such information is in the public interest: something the public needs to know to protect itself. They are addressed not to the mass media, but to law enforcement officers.

**Office of the Attorney General Washington, D. C.**

**Statement of Policy Concerning the Release of Information by Personnel of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal and Civil Proceedings**

[28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1975)]

(a) *General.* (1) The availability to news media of information in criminal and civil cases is a matter which has become increasingly a subject of concern in the administration of justice. The purpose of this statement is to formu-

late specific guidelines for the release of such information by personnel of the Department of Justice.

(2) While the release of information for the purpose of influencing a trial is, of course, always improper, there are valid reasons for making available to the public information about the administration of the law. The task of striking a fair balance between the protection of individuals accused of crime or involved in civil proceedings with the Government and public understandings of the problems of controlling crime and administering government depends largely on the exercise of sound judgment by those responsible for administering the law and by representatives of the press and other media.

(3) Inasmuch as the Department of Justice has generally fulfilled its responsibilities with awareness and understanding of the competing needs in this area, this statement, to a considerable extent, reflects and formalizes the standards to which representatives of the Department have adhered in the past. Nonetheless, it will be helpful in ensuring uniformity of practice to set forth the following guidelines for all personnel of the Department of Justice.

(4) Because of the difficulty and importance of the questions they raise, it is felt that some portions of the matters covered by this statement, such as the authorization to make available Federal conviction records and a description of items seized at the time of arrest, should be the subject of continuing review and consideration by the Department on the basis of experience and suggestions from those within and outside the Department.

(b) *Guidelines to criminal actions.* (1) These guidelines shall apply to the release of information to news media from the time a person is the subject of a criminal investigation until any proceeding resulting from such an investigation has been terminated by trial or otherwise.

(2) At no time shall personnel of the Department of Justice furnish any statement or information for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a defendant's trial, nor shall personnel of the Department furnish any statement or information, which could reasonably be expected to be disseminated by means of public communication, if such a statement or information may reasonably be expected to influence the outcome of a pending or future trial.

(3) Personnel of the Department of Justice, subject to specific limitations imposed by law or court rule or order, may make public the following information:

(i) The defendant's name, age, residence, employment, marital status, and similar background information.



(ii) The substance or text of the charge, such as a complaint, indictment, or information.

(iii) The identity of the investigating and/or arresting agency and the length or scope of an investigation.

(iv) The circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest, including the time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, possession and use of weapons, and a description of physical items seized at the time of arrest.

Disclosures should include only incontrovertible, factual matters, and should not include subjective observations. In addition, where background information or information relating to the circumstances of an arrest or investigation would be highly prejudicial or where the release thereof would serve no law enforcement function, such information should not be made public.

(4) Personnel of the Department shall not disseminate any information concerning a defendant's prior criminal record.

(5) Because of the particular danger of prejudice resulting from statements in the period approaching and during trial, they ought strenuously to be avoided during that period. Any such statement or release shall be made only on the infrequent occasion when circumstances absolutely demand a disclosure of information and shall include only information which is clearly not prejudicial.

(6) The release of certain types of information generally tends to create dangers of prejudice without serving a significant law enforcement function. Therefore, personnel of the Department should refrain from making available the following:

(i) Observations about a defendant's character.

(ii) Statements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make a statement.

(iii) Reference to investigative procedures such as fingerprints, polygraph examinations, ballistic tests, or laboratory tests, or to the refusal by the defendant to submit to such tests or examinations.

(iv) Statements concerning the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses.

(v) Statements concerning evidence or argument in the case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evidence or argument will be used at trial.

(vi) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt, or the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged, or the possibility of a plea to a lesser offense.

(7) Personnel of the Department of Justice should take no action to encourage or assist news media in photographing or televising a defendant or accused person being held or transported in Federal custody. Departmental representatives should not make available photographs of a defendant unless a law enforcement function is served thereby.

(8) This statement of policy is not intended to restrict the release of information concerning a defendant who is a fugitive from justice.

(9) Since the purpose of this statement is to set forth generally applicable guidelines, there will, of course, be situations in which it will limit the release of information which would not be prejudicial under the particular circumstances. If a representative of the Department believes that in the interest of the fair administration of justice and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be released, in a particular case, he shall request the permission of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General to do so.

(c) *Guidelines to civil actions.* Personnel of the Department of Justice associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, which a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial and which relates to:

(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.

(2) The character, credibility, or criminal records of a party, witness, or prospective witness.

(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.

(4) An opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as required by law or administrative rule.

(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.

[Order 470-71, 36 FR 21028, Nov. 3, 1971, as amended by Order No. 602-75, 40 FR 22119, May 20, 1975]

## SEC. 51. RESTRICTIVE ORDERS AND REPORTING THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

Such bar-press guidelines tried to honor and forward both the public's right to know about the judicial process and a defendant's

right to a fair trial. Not all was well, however, despite the various meetings-of-minds between press and bar. A disturbing counter-current was perceived during the late 1960s, starting mainly in California and involving judges issuing "restrictive" or "gag" orders in some cases.<sup>4</sup> In a Los Angeles County Superior Court in 1966, for example, a judge ordered the attorneys in a case, the defendants, the sheriff, chief of police, and members of the Board of Police Commissioners not to talk to the news media about the case in question. The order forbade "[r]eleasing or authorizing the release of any extra-judicial statements for dissemination by any means of public communication relating to the alleged charge or the Accused."

All that could be reported under such an order were the facts and circumstances of the arrest, the substance of the charge against the defendant, and the defendant's name, age, residence, occupation, and family status. If such an arrangement were to be worked out on a voluntary basis between press and bar, that might be one thing. However, the fact of a judge's order—a "gag rule"—worried some legal scholars,<sup>5</sup> and with good reason.

Such fears about the so-called gag rules have substance, in light of a number of orders from judges that reporters curtail various aspects of their reporting of criminal trials. One kind of "gag rule" deals with judges telling reporters that they should confine themselves to reporting only those events which take place in front of a jury, in open court. Judge Thomas D. McCrea of the Snohomish County, Washington, Superior Court issued such an order to reporters just before a jury trial for first-degree murder was about to begin in his courtroom. Reporters Sam Sperry and Dee Norton of the Seattle Times ignored the order, and wrote a story about an evidence hearing which occurred while the jury was outside of the courtroom.

After they were cited for contempt, Sperry and Norton appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, claiming that the judge's order was prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment.

The Washington Supreme Court overturned the contempt citation, saying that the trial court's earnest efforts to provide a fair and impartial jury had taken away the reporters' constitutional right to report to the public what happened in the open trial.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Robert S. Warren and Jeffrey M. Abell, "Free Press—Fair Trial: The 'Gag Order,' A California Aberration," *Southern California Law Review* 45:1 (Winter, 1972) pp. 51–99, at pp. 52–53.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>6</sup> *State ex rel. Superior Court of Snohomish County v. Sperry*, 79 Wash.2d 69, 483 P.2d 608, 613 (1971).

In a New York case during 1971, Manhattan Supreme Court Justice George Postel, concerned about possibly prejudicial news accounts, called reporters into his chambers and laid down what he called "Postel's Law." The trial involved Carmine J. Persico, who had been charged with extortion, coercion, criminal usury ("loan sharking") and conspiracy. Justice Postel admonished the reporters not to use Persico's nickname ("The Snake") in their accounts and not to mention Persico's supposed connections with Joseph A. Colombo, Sr., a person said to be a leader of organized crime. The reporters, irked by Postel's declarations, reported what the judge had told them, including references to "The Snake" and to Colombo.

Persico's defense attorney then asked that the trial be closed to the press and to the public, and Judge Postel so ordered. However, the prosecutor—Assistant District Attorney Samuel Yasgur—complained that the order would set an unfortunate and dangerous precedent. For one thing, Yasgur declared, the absence of press coverage might mean that possible witnesses who could become aware of the trial through the media would remain ignorant of the trial and thus could not come forward to testify: Prosecutor Yasgur added:<sup>7</sup>

But most importantly, Your Honor, as the Court has noted, the purpose of having press and the public allowed and present during the trial of a criminal case is to insure that defendants do receive an honest and a fair trial.

Newsmen appealed Judge Postel's order closing the trial to New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals. Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld then ruled that the trial should not have been closed.<sup>8</sup>

"Because of the vital function served by the news media in guarding against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and the judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism," the Supreme Court has emphasized that it has been "unwilling to place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised by the news media for '[w]hat transpires in the court room is public property.'"

\* \* \* This, though, imposes a heavy responsibility on the press, not alone to the accused on trial but to the administration of justice as well, to weigh carefully the potential impact of material considered for publication relating to a pending criminal prosecution lest there be a mistrial or a reversal on appeal.

Chief Judge Fuld added that courts should meet problems of prejudicial publicity not by declaring mistrials, but by taking careful

<sup>7</sup> *New York Times*, "Trial of Persico Closed to Public," pp. 1, 40, November 16, 1971.

<sup>8</sup> *Oliver v. Postel*, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 282 N.E.2d 306, 311 (1972).

preventive steps to protect their courts from outside interferences. In most cases, Judge Fuld suggested, a judge's cautioning jurors to avoid exposure to prejudicial publicity, or to disregard prejudicial material they had already seen or heard, would be effective. In extreme situations, he said, a court might find it necessary to sequester ("lock up") a jury for the duration of a trial.<sup>9</sup>

In an Arizona case, the Supreme Court of that state suggested that the right to a public trial belongs not only to an accused person but to the public as well. Attorneys for John G. Freeman, who was to answer murder charges in a preliminary hearing, evidently believed that if the hearing were reported, it would imperil Freeman's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. After locally published articles reporting that Freeman had earlier been accused of child molesting in Los Angeles were shown to the justice of the peace who was to conduct the preliminary hearing, that hearing was ordered closed. Defendant Freeman was involved in a clearly sensational case, one involving the homicide of seven persons.

Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. then appealed the closing of the case to the Arizona Supreme Court. Chief Justice Fred C. Struckmeyer, Jr. said, for a unanimous court, that the exclusionary order was not justified. He noted that Standard 3.1 of the Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press as approved by the American Bar Association in 1968 recommended excluding the press from preliminary or other pre-trial hearings when such hearings might disclose evidence which would be inadmissible during the actual trial of a defendant. Nevertheless, the Arizona Supreme Court said that the "disclosure of evidentiary facts by which the public may form an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant does not pose a clear and present threat to a fair trial sufficient to support an order excluding the public from a preliminary hearing."<sup>10</sup>

Although reporters were ultimately vindicated in the *Postel*, *Sperry*, and *Phoenix Newspapers* cases, a Louisiana case went against the press. This case, *United States v. Dickinson*, arose when reporters Larry Dickinson and Gibbs Adams of the Baton Rouge *Star Times* and the *Morning Advocate* tried to report on a U.S. District Court hearing involving a VISTA worker who had been indicted by a Louisiana state grand jury on suspicion of conspiring to murder a state official. The District Court hearing was to ascertain whether the state's prosecution was legitimate. In the course of this hearing, District Court Judge E. Gordon West issued this order:

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* See, also, *People of the State of New York v. Holder*, 70 Misc.2d 31, 332 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1972).

<sup>10</sup> *Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, Justice of the Peace*, 107 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d 563, 566-567 (1971).

“And, at this time, I do want to enter an order in the case, and that is in accordance with this Court’s rule in connection with Fair Trial—Free Press provisions, the Rules of this Court.

“It is ordered that no report of the testimony taken in this case today shall be made in any newspaper or by radio or television, or by any other news media.”

Reporters Dickinson and Adams ignored that order, and wrote articles for their newspapers summarizing the day’s testimony in detail. After a hearing, Dickinson and Adams were found guilty of criminal contempt and were sentenced to pay fines of \$300 each. Appealing to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the reporters were told that the District Court judge’s gag order was unconstitutional.<sup>11</sup> They were not in the clear, however. The Court of Appeals sent their case back to the District Court so that the judge could reconsider the \$300 fines. The judge again fined the reporters \$300 apiece, and they again appealed to the Court of Appeals. This time, the contempt fines were upheld. The Fifth Circuit Court declared that the reporters could have asked for a rehearing or appealed against the judge’s order not to publish. Once the appeal was decided in their favor, the court evidently reasoned, *then* they could publish.<sup>12</sup>

*New York Times* Vice President James C. Goodale—an attorney himself—was indignant.

It doesn’t take much analysis to see that what the Court has sanctioned is the right of prior restraint subject to later appeal. \* \* \* What this case means, in effect, is that when a judge is disposed to order a newspaper not to report matters that are transpiring in public he may do so, and a newsman’s only remedy is to appeal or decide to pay the contempt penalty, be it a fine or imprisonment.

In the fall of 1973, the Supreme Court—evidently not seeing a major issue requiring its attention—refused to grant certiorari, thereby allowing the lower court decision to stand.<sup>13</sup> By 1976, however, the gag issue was an obvious problem. Attorney Jack C. Landau, Supreme Court reporter for the Newhouse News Service and a trustee of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, came up with some agonizing statistics. From 1966 to 1976, at least

<sup>11</sup> *United States v. Dickinson*, 465 F.2d 496, 514 (1972).

<sup>12</sup> 476 F.2d 373, 374 (1973); 349 FS 227 (1972). See also James C. Goodale’s “The Press ‘Gag’ Order Epidemic,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, Sept./Oct. 1973, pp. 49–50.

<sup>13</sup> 414 U.S. 979, 94 S.Ct. 270 (1973), refusing certiorari in 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).

174 restrictive orders were issued by courts against the news media.<sup>14</sup>

## SEC. 52. UNGAGGING THE PRESS; GAGGING THE REST?

After *Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart* (1976), restrictive orders moved away from the press \* \* \* and toward news sources.

Although the Supreme Court refused to hear the reporters' appeal in the *Dickinson* case<sup>15</sup>—thus allowing contempt fines against two reporters to stand—a virtual nationwide epidemic of restrictive orders quickly showed that the *Baton Rouge* case was no rarity.<sup>16</sup> A ghastly 1976 multiple-murder case in the hamlet of Sutherland, Neb. (population 840) was reported avidly by the mass media. This provided the Supreme Court with the factual setting which led to the Court's clamping down on the indiscriminate issuance of gag orders. The issue was stated succinctly by E. Barrett Prettyman, the attorney who represented the news media in *Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart*.<sup>17</sup>

The basic question before the Court is whether it is permissible under the First Amendment for a court to issue direct prior restraint against the press, prohibiting in advance of publication the reporting of information revealed in public court proceedings, in public court records, and from other sources about pending judicial proceedings.

The nightmarish *Nebraska* case involved the murder of six members of one family, and necrophilia was involved. Police released the description of a suspect, 29-year-old Erwin Charles Simants, an unemployed handyman, to reporters who arrived at the scene of the crime. After a night of hiding, Simants walked into the house where he lived—next door to the residence where six had been slain—and was arrested.

Three days after the crime, the prosecuting attorney and Simants' attorney jointly asked the Lincoln County Court to enter a restrictive order. On October 22, 1975, the County Court granted a sweeping order prohibiting the release or publication of any "testimony given or evidence adduced \* \* \*".<sup>18</sup> On October 23, Simants' preliminary hearing was open to the public, but the press was subject to the restrictive order. On that same day, the *Nebras-*

<sup>14</sup> Jack C. Landau, "The Challenge of the Communications Media," 62 *American Bar Association Journal* 55 (January, 1976).

<sup>15</sup> 414 U.S. 979, 94 S.Ct. 270 (1973).

<sup>16</sup> Landau, p. 57.

<sup>17</sup> "Excerpts from the Gag Order Arguments," Editor & Publisher, May 1, 1976, p. 46A.

<sup>18</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 542, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2795 (1976).

ka Press Association intervened in the District Court of Lincoln County and asked Judge Hugh Stuart to set aside the County Court's restrictive order. Judge Stuart conducted a hearing and on October 27 issued his own restrictive order, prohibiting the Nebraska Press Association and other organizations and reporters from reporting on five subjects:<sup>19</sup>

- (1) the existence or contents of a confession Simants had made to law enforcement officers, which had been introduced in open court at arraignment;
- (2) the fact or nature of statements Simants had made to other persons;
- (3) the contents of a note he had written the night of the crime;
- (4) certain aspects of the medical testimony at the preliminary hearing;
- (5) the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault and the nature of the assault.

This order also prohibited reporting the exact nature of the restrictive order itself, and—like the County Court's order—incorporated the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines.<sup>20</sup>

The Nebraska Press Association and its co-petitioners on October 31 asked the District Court to suspend its restrictive order and also asked that the Nebraska Supreme Court stop the gag order. Early in December, the state's Supreme Court issued a modification of the restrictive order "to accommodate the defendant's right to a fair trial and the petitioners' [i. e., the Nebraska Press Association, other press associations, and individual journalists'] interest in reporting pretrial events." This modified order prohibited reporting of three matters:<sup>21</sup>

- (a) the existence and nature of any confessions or admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers;
- (b) any confessions or admissions made to any third parties, except members of the press, and
- (c) other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused.

The Nebraska Supreme Court did not rely on the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. After interpreting state law to permit closing of court proceedings to reporters in certain circumstances, the Nebraska Supreme Court sent the case back to District Judge Hugh Stuart for reconsideration of whether pretrial hearings in the Simants case should be closed to the press and public. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.<sup>22</sup>

Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger reviewed free press-fair trial cases and prior restraint cases discussed in Sections 9 and Sections 51 through 53 of Law of Mass

<sup>19</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 543–544, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2795 (1976).

<sup>20</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 545, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2796 (1976).

<sup>21</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 545, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2796 (1976).

<sup>22</sup> 423 U.S. 1027, 96 S.Ct. 557 (1975).



Communications, 2nd ed. (1973). He wrote: "None of our decided cases on prior restraint involved restrictive orders entered to protect a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, but the opinions on prior restraint have a common thread relevant to this case." The Chief Justice then quoted from *Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe*:<sup>23</sup>

"Any prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity. \* \* \* Respondent [Keefe] thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint. He has not met that burden. \* \* \*"

Chief Justice Burger noted that the restrictive order at issue in the *Simants* case did not prohibit publication but only postponed it. Some news, he said, can be delayed and often is when responsible editors call for more fact-checking. "But such delays," he added, "are normally slight and they are self-imposed. Delays imposed by governmental authority are a different matter."<sup>24</sup>

The Court then turned to an examination of whether the threat to a fair trial for *Simants* was so severe as to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality which prior restraints carry with them. The Chief Justice borrowed Judge Learned Hand's language (oft criticized by libertarians) from a case involving the trial of Communists in 1950: whether the "gravity of the evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.<sup>25</sup> The Court's review of the pretrial record in the *Simants* case indicated that Judge Stuart was justified in concluding that there would be intense and pervasive pretrial publicity. The judge could have concluded reasonably that the publicity might endanger *Simants*' right to a fair trial.

Even so, the restrictive order by the trial court judge was not justified in the view of the Supreme Court of the United States. Alternatives to prior restraint were not tried by the Nebraska trial court. Those alternatives included a change of venue; postponement of the trial to allow public furore to subside, and searching questioning of prospective jurors to screen out those who had already made up their minds about *Simants*' guilt or innocence. Sequestration ("locking up") of jurors would insulate jurors from prejudicial publicity only after they were sworn, but that measure "enhances the likelihood of dissipating the impact of pretrial publicity and emphasizes the elements of the jurors' oaths." The Chief Justice wrote:<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 558, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2802 (1976).

<sup>24</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 560, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2803 (1976).

<sup>25</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 562, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2804 (1976).

<sup>26</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 565, 570, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2804, 2806 (1976).

\* \* \* [P]retrial publicity, even if pervasive and concentrated, cannot be regarded as leading automatically and in every kind of criminal case to an unfair trial.

\* \* \*

We reaffirm that the guarantees of freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition under all circumstances, but the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption against its use continues intact. We hold that, with respect to the order entered in this case prohibiting reporting or commentary on judicial proceedings held in public, the barriers have not been overcome; to the extent that this order restrained publication of such material, it is clearly invalid. To the extent that it prohibited publication based on information gained from other sources, we conclude that the heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing prior restraint was not met and the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court is therefore reversed.

Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion included language that First Amendment guarantees are not absolutes. It is noteworthy, however, that concurring opinions subscribed to by five Justices suggested that a majority of this Court may be inching toward an absolute prohibition of prior restraint where reporting of the judicial process is concerned. Justice Brennan's concurrence, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, declared that "resort to prior restraints on the freedom of the press is a constitutionally impermissible method for enforcing \* \* \* the right to a fair trial by jury."<sup>27</sup> Judges have devices available to insure fundamental fairness for a defendant without turning to judicial censorship. Justice White's concurring opinion expressed "grave doubt \* \* \* whether orders \* \* \* such as were entered in this case would ever be justifiable."<sup>28</sup> Finally, Justice John Paul Stevens' concurrence did not quite accept an absolute ban on restrictive orders, but added: "I do, however, subscribe to most of what Mr. Justice Brennan says and, if ever required to face the issues squarely, may well accept his ultimate conclusion."<sup>29</sup>

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart was hailed as a sizable victory for the news media. Nevertheless, some scholars are fretful about that decision's ultimate impact. Columbia University law professor Benno C. Schmidt, for example, found some "disturbing undertones." He expressed the fear that the<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 572-573, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2809 (1976).

<sup>28</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 570-571, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2808 (1976).

<sup>29</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 617, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2830 (1976).

<sup>30</sup> Schmidt, "The Nebraska Decision," Columbia Journalism Review, November/December, 1976, p. 51.

\* \* \* Court may have invited severe controls on the press's access to information about criminal proceedings from principals, witnesses, lawyers, the police, and others; it is even possible that some legal proceedings may be closed completely to the press and public as an indirect result of *Nebraska*.

He also worried that the Supreme Court's decision might encourage trial judges to place increasing reliance on stipulations that parties in a trial—lawyers, witnesses, police, etc.—not provide information in the press.

Schmidt appears to be correct in his gloomy assessment of the *Simants* case; the so-called victory of the press in *Nebraska Press Association* now seems hollow. It is a truism for civil libertarians and journalists that government must never be given the power of secret arrest, secret confinement, or secret trial. As former *Washington Star* editor Newbold Noyes has observed<sup>31</sup>

It was *Star Chamber*, not publicity, that the founding fathers worried about. Defendants were guaranteed a public trial, not a cleared courtroom. The whole thrust of these amendments was—and must remain—that what happens in the courts happens out in the open, in full view of the citizenry, and that therein lies the individual's protection against the possible tyranny of government. There is no possible conflict between this idea and the idea of a free press.

### Gagging Everybody *But* the Press?

The trend—by early 1978—was to gag news sources related to judicial proceedings while leaving the press alone. The net result, of course, was much the same: a diminished flow of information about our court system. Beyond that, it is difficult to generalize. As trial courts close various courtroom proceedings, seal certain records, and decree that witnesses, attorneys, and participants in trials do not speak to the press, all that can be done is for news media units to fight back by going to court themselves. At this point, however, decisions of appellate courts on questions of closing courtrooms and sealing records ride off in many directions and it is impossible to guess whether such procedures ultimately will be adjudged constitutional.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Speech at the University of Oregon, Ruhl Symposium Lectures, November 21, 1975, reprinted in "The Responsibilities of Power," *School of Journalism*, University of Oregon, June, 1976, pp. 16–17.

<sup>32</sup> See Carmody, *op. cit.*; and Floyd Abrams, "Gathering the News, Rights and Restraints" in James C. Goodale, Chairman, *Communications Law 1977*, Volume One (New York City: Practising Law Institute, 1977), pp. 85–103.

A case which Miami Herald attorney Dan Paul has called “a real high water mark showing just how far a judge can go and get away with it”<sup>33</sup> involved a criminal prosecution of former U.S. Senator Edward J. Gurney of Florida. During Gurney’s 1975 trial, Federal District Judge Ben Krentzman would not allow the press access to exhibits which had been identified but were not yet received as evidence. The press could not see written communications between the judge and the jury. Reporters were also denied access to a list of jury members, and could not listen in on conferences at the bench between attorneys and the judge. The Miami Herald had argued that access to such exhibits and information was necessary for an understanding of the case. On appeal, the Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court was within its rights in denying press access to the information it sought.<sup>34</sup>

Cheerier news for the press was contained in *Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court* (1977). The Supreme Court of the United States issued an order overturning an Oklahoma court’s order that the news media not be allowed to publish the name and picture of an 11-year-old defendant on trial for second degree murder. The press could publish the name and picture of the child because that information had been made public by being part of the records of an earlier court hearing.<sup>35</sup> And in *Gannett Company v. DePasquale* (1976), a New York appellate court overturned a trial judge’s order excluding press and public from a pre-trial hearing in a murder case. In language which was drawn from *Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart* (1976),<sup>36</sup> the New York appellate court said that the order to close the hearing was in violation of the First Amendment. The order was issued without any consideration of the nature and effect of pre-trial publicity.<sup>37</sup>

At this writing, the Supreme Court of the United States has dismissed news media challenges to “restrictive” orders barring the press from covering pre-trial hearings in three Pennsylvania murder cases.<sup>38</sup> This case, known as *Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome*, had to do with three different trial courts closing pre-trial hearings, sealing records, and telling participants not to talk to the press. The most heavily covered of these three hearings involved the retrial of W. A. (Tony) Boyle, former president of the United Mine Workers. Boyle’s conviction for killing a competitor for power in the union was overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,

<sup>33</sup> Paul quoted in Carmody, *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> *United States v. Gurney*, 562 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1977).

<sup>35</sup> 430 U.S. 308, 97 S.Ct. 1045 (1977).

<sup>36</sup> 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976).

<sup>37</sup> 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (2d Cir., 4th Dept. 1976).

<sup>38</sup> *The Capital Times*, Madison, Wis., Jan. 10, 1978.

which had ordered a new trial for Boyle.<sup>39</sup> It appears that gag order problems will continue to plague the press for some time to come.

### More ABA Recommendations

The continuing tension between press and bar led to the American Bar Association's creation of a Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press. This committee, chaired by U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Paul H. Roney, had its recommendations adopted at the December, 1977, meeting of the ABA.

Jack C. Landau, Supreme Court reporter for Newhouse Newspapers, had recommended what is called a "Standing Guideline—Special Order" approach to the gag order problem. As a 1976 ABA report explained this procedure:

#### Recommended Court Procedure to Accommodate Rights to Fair Trial and Free Press

##### *Preamble*

The Committee believes that accommodation between the First Amendment rights of free press and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair and public trial can best be achieved by representation before the court of those persons primarily concerned with each constitutional provision, and by a full discussion of the various interests involved, preferably prior to emergency situations. To achieve this goal the Committee has concluded that it is essential that a procedure be developed to permit the news media and other interested parties to have the opportunity to participate in a public proceeding prior to a court's issuance of guidelines or orders which will govern the conduct of trials. A Procedure which provides for media input in the decision-making process should assure that all judicial determinations as to critical Sixth Amendment questions will be made with full cognizance of First Amendment requirements.

As the first step in its recommended procedure, the Committee proposes that every court develop and adopt Standing Guidelines as a permanent guide for the conduct of attorneys, law enforcement officers, judges, and judicial employees, and for the edification and guidance of news media personnel in connection with the release of information and pretrial publicity of criminal litigation. While it recognizes that some courts presently maintain standing orders enforceable by contempt relating to such matters,

<sup>39</sup> Floyd Abrams, "Gathering the News: Rights and Restraints," in James C. Goodale, chairman, Communications Law 1977, Vol. One (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1977), p. 91; Deidre Carmody, "Practices Curbing Press at Trials Pose Tricky Questions," New York Times, Nov. 26, 1977, p. 14.

the Committee strongly recommends that such orders be superceded [sic] by Standing Guidelines, enforcement of which will be limited to administrative or professional sanction or citation but would not be enforceable by contempt.

The Standing Guidelines of general application to all proceedings, including those in which the court functions as an administrative review body, would be continually in force, and would establish general standards for the disclosure of information.

The Committee also recommends that there be a procedure for consideration of Special Orders. It is the Committee's view that the issuance of Special Orders should only be considered in those few cases in which potential prejudicial publicity is found to pose such a substantial threat to a fair trial as would justify use of the court's contempt power, consistent with constitutional and other substantive standards applicable in the jurisdiction. Special Orders would be tailored to the particular circumstance of the case. Violations of Special Orders would be enforceable by contempt.

\* \* \*

### Procedure for Entry of Special Orders

1. Special Orders, enforceable by contempt, may be entered only in particular cases under applicable constitutional standards. Special Orders may incorporate Standing Guidelines, and such additional directions as are necessary.

2. In any case where the court decides that a Special Order may be necessary, it should draft a proposed Special Order. In considering whether a Special Order should be proposed or entered, the court shall determine whether other judicial procedures for assuring a fair trial would suffice. Whenever possible such other procedures should be used instead of an order restricting the flow of information to the public.

3. The draft of a proposed Special Order shall be distributed generally to the community and public notice shall be given as set forth in the Standing Guidelines. An explanation of the necessity for a Special Order should accompany the draft.

4. The proposed Special Order shall be accompanied by a notice giving the time within which written comments shall be received and the time for hearing oral argument on the proposed order.

5. Objections and other argument may be heard at an informal or an evidentiary hearing depending upon the circumstances and within the discretion of the court. Interested persons may appear with or without counsel or other representatives, and without conceding personal jurisdiction of the court.

6. To assure proper consideration by the court, notice to interested persons, and an adequate record for any appeal, a final Special Order shall set forth the applicable standards and the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; and shall describe in reasonable detail the restraints imposed by the order and the manner in which the directives shall be carried out.

7. The final order shall be disseminated or designated in the Standing Guidelines or in such other manner as the court may direct.

8. Any temporary Special Order entered by the court without following the above procedure shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall set forth the extraordinary circumstances and necessity for entering the order without notice; shall set a time within which written comments shall be received and for a hearing to consider continuation, modification, or termination of the order; shall be filed with the clerk of court and entered of record; and shall be disseminated as designated in the Standing Guidelines.

9. Any party, persons or organizations aggrieved by the Special Order should have the right to obtain appellate review forthwith, in the most expeditious manner provided by the particular jurisdiction for review of temporary injunctive orders or any other orders which are subject to expedited review.

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## B. FREE EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE AND MORAL ORDER

### Chapter 9

#### CRIMINAL WORDS: LIBEL

**Sec.**

- 53. Criminal Libel Under Common Law and Statutes.
- 54. Criminal Libel and Breach of the Peace.
- 55. Criminal Libel as Defamation of Individuals.
- 56. Criminal Libel and Public Officials.

#### SEC. 53. CRIMINAL LIBEL UNDER COMMON LAW AND STATUTES

**At common law, criminal libel included sedition, obscenity, blasphemy, and defamation, but state statutes ordinarily treat it as defamation.**

To understand the freeing of speech and press from real controls that long existed in American law, the story of criminal libel may be read with profit. The rarest of rare official charges brought against the mass media today, criminal libel once lived an active life. For certain words, the state itself brought actions, alleging harm to the public welfare. At common law, the public welfare could be damaged, it was said, by words that would tend to make the target breach the peace in seeking satisfaction,<sup>1</sup> or by words that defamed institutions or persons:<sup>2</sup>

At the time of Revolution the English common law divided unlawful publications into four species of libel, viz.: defamatory libels, or publications defamatory of personal or professional reputations; seditious libels, or publications defamatory of existing public officers, government, institutions, and laws; blasphemous libels, or publications defamatory of the Christian religion; obscene and immoral libels, or publications defamatory of England's existing standard of public morality.

Thus under the common law, "defamation" and "criminal libel" could apply not only to persons but also to institutions that were highly valued by society. However, states today define criminal libel in statutes separate from those defining blasphemy (almost non-existent), sedition, and obscenity, each of which, if included in

<sup>1</sup> Kennerly v. Hennessy, 68 Fla. 138, 139, 66 So. 729 (1914).

<sup>2</sup> Henry Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the United States, 11 Constitutional Law and Equity 510, 515 (Boston, 1921).



states' laws, is likely to be a separate offense.<sup>3</sup> This books treats each offense separately, in this chapter the offense of criminal libel being defamation of individuals and groups, and words tending to breach of the peace.

A rather typical statute defines criminal libel thus:<sup>4</sup>

#### Defamation

- (1) Whoever with intent to defame communicates any defamatory matter to a third person without the consent of the person defamed may be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both.
- (2) Defamatory matter is anything which exposes the other to hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation or disgrace in society or injury in his business or occupation.
- (3) This section does not apply if the defamatory matter was true and was communicated with good motives and for justifiable ends or if the communication was otherwise privileged.

Some states provide that "truth" is a defense, rather than truth qualified by good motives and justifiable ends. But the many states with the qualifications are not likely to be able to retain them, for sanctified by widespread use though they have been since Alexander Hamilton first coined them as terms in libel in 1804,<sup>5</sup> they have been declared an unconstitutional weakening of the defense of truth in several court decisions of the mid-Twentieth Century. Other variants in statutes provide for the crime of group libel,<sup>6</sup> or include among libelous words those that "provoke one to wrath," or that "tend to cause a breach of the peace."

Criminal libel may best be read as history, perhaps, for little of it remains today. About 100 cases in all states per decade were reported after 1885 until a sharp decline set in soon after World War I. By 1935-45 the number had dropped to fewer than 15;<sup>7</sup> by 1970, the action had almost disappeared from compilations. The decline is related to the fact that, under most state statutes, there is little or no difference between libel under the criminal law and libel under the civil law—both concentrating upon protection of individual reputations—and that courts have increasingly taken the position that the civil remedy is much to be preferred to the criminal, which

<sup>3</sup> 19 A.L.R. 1470, 1471.

<sup>4</sup> Wis.Stat. Ann. 942.01.

<sup>5</sup> *People v. Crosswell*, 3 Johnson's Cases 337 (N.Y.1804).

<sup>6</sup> Hadley Arkes, *Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups*, 1974 Sup.Ct.Rev. 281, 283 (1975), finds that only four states have group defamation statutes on the books—Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, and West Virginia.

<sup>7</sup> J. D. Stevens, et al., "Criminal Libel as Seditious Libel, 1916-65," 43 *Journalism Quarterly* 110, 111 (1966).

seems inappropriate to personal squabbles.<sup>8</sup> As for the defamed himself, he ordinarily has more to gain through a civil judgment for damages than through a criminal conviction that helps only in the sense that it is a “moral victory.”

Almost unused as the crime was in the mid-Twentieth Century, in 1964 it received a blow that further weakened it in *Garrison v. Louisiana* (below, Sec. 56). Here the Supreme Court ruled that a critic of Louisiana judges could not be convicted of criminal libel unless the complainants proved his words carried the actual malice of *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*: knowing or reckless falsehood. And under *Garrison* also, criminal libel statutes of several states have been held unconstitutional because they diluted the defense of truth.

#### SEC. 54. CRIMINAL LIBEL AND BREACH OF THE PEACE

**The tendency of words to cause a breach of the peace remains as an infrequently used justification for prosecuting publishers.**

The central rationale justifying the criminal libel action existed at common law as far back as the early seventeenth century, and has persisted in some states since the early national period. This was the reasoning which said that harsh words about another person tend to cause him to seek revenge through violence against the writer, and that such breach of the peace is a public evil to be guarded against. The Star Chamber decision of 1605, *De Libellis Famosis*, often is given credit for shaping the thought behind criminal libel and its sanctions:<sup>9</sup>

If it be against a private man it deserves a severe punishment, for although the libel be made against one, yet it incites all those of the same family, kindred, or society to revenge, and so tends *per consequens* to quarrels and breaches of the peace, and may be the cause of shedding of blood, and of inconveniences: if it be against a magistrate or other public person, it is a greater offense; for it concerns not only the breach of peace, but also the scandal of government.

Furthermore, the reasoning went, if the offending words were true, the offense was aggravated, for true defamation would make revenge even more sought after than would a lie, which could be disproved. This was the rule known to the eighteenth century as “the greater the truth, the greater the libel.” The evils of duelling as a way of avenging verbal insults were perhaps real enough to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to justify laws for choking off

<sup>8</sup> *Garrison v. La.*, 379 U.S. 64, 69, 85 S.Ct. 209, 213 (1964); *State v. Browne*, 206 A.2d 591, 596, 86 N.J.Super. 217 (1965); S.H.A. (Ill.) c. 38, § 27.

<sup>9</sup> 5 Coke 125 (1605), 3 Coke's Reports (Fraser ed., 1826) 254, part 5-125a.

inflaming talk that led to swordplay and pistols; but such breach of the peace became less and less likely as civil actions in courts of law displaced personal violence as an avenue for satisfying one's outrage at being defamed.<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, the rule of "the greater the truth, the greater the libel" shriveled in the American colonies and the new nation. The truth, it was argued in major cases and major legislation, ought to be a defense for the accused, not an exacerbation of a supposed crime. Heavily influenced by the action of New York in 1805, state after state passed statutes that ignored the old breach of peace rationale for the crime and provided for truth as a defense.<sup>11</sup>

By the twentieth century, relatively few states continued to rely upon breach of the peace as an element in criminal libel. It persisted in the statutes of Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, and Virginia and in a modified form (words that "provoke to wrath") in a handful of states.<sup>12</sup> In addition, those states without criminal libel statutes relied upon common law and thus presumably on breach of the peace.<sup>13</sup>

In the case of *State v. Gardner*, the latter published in the *Bridgeport (Conn.) Herald* an article about the police chief of New Britain, saying in part:

Chief Hart is the owner of three autos \* \* \*. I believed these were bought with bootleg money. Chief Hart and his wife are bootleggers. In fact the whole d\_\_\_\_\_ family are. They meet bootleggers at the town line and escort them in and many times the illicit liquor is transferred to the Chief's car, or his wife's auto, and delivered to the consumers.

In upholding Gardner's conviction for criminal libel, the Connecticut Supreme Court indicated its reliance on breach of the peace, saying "The gist of the crime is, not the injury to the reputation of the person libeled, but that the publication affects injuriously the peace and good order of society."<sup>14</sup> In a subsequent case in the same state, it was made plain by the Supreme Court that the crime lies in the *tendency* of the words to create a breach of the peace, and that

<sup>10</sup> *Garrison v. La.*, 379 U.S. 64, 68, 85 S.Ct. 209, 212 (1964).

<sup>11</sup> Joseph Tannehaus, *Group Libel*, 35 Cornell L.Q. 261, 273 and fn. 67 (1950).

<sup>12</sup> For the former, Ala.Code, 1958, Tit. 14, § 347; C.G.S.A. (Conn.) § 53-174; Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, c. 38, § 27-1; Va.Code, 1950, § 18-133. For the latter, I.C.A. (Iowa) § 737.1; Me.Rev.Stat.1944, c. 117, § 30; T.C.A. (Tenn.) § 39-2701; V.A.M.S. (Mo.) § 559.410.

<sup>13</sup> Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia: *Beauharnais v. Ill.*, 343 U.S. 250, 255 fn. 5, 72 S.Ct. 725, 730 (1952).

<sup>14</sup> *State v. Gardner*, 112 Conn. 121, 124, 151 A. 349, 350 (1930).

“it is immaterial that no one was incited to commit any act by reason of the libel \* \* \*.”<sup>15</sup>

Nor is it necessary that the person attacked in a criminal libel consider himself scandalized or disgraced by the words. In *State v. Levand*, the editor of the *Casper (Wyo.) Herald* printed a story attacking a jury for freeing Undersheriff Cantlin who had shot and killed a woman when she committed a minor traffic violation. Levand’s attorneys presented in defense a Mr. Jackson, member of the jury that had been attacked; and Jackson testified that he had lost no friends or been disgraced by the article in any way. The court held that Jackson’s assessment of the effects of the article made no difference,<sup>16</sup> for “a defendant may be held responsible in a criminal case if the defamatory words are of such a nature that they tend to disgrace and degrade the person libeled or hold him up to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule \* \* \*.”

In 1966, The Supreme Court of the United States focussed on breach of the peace in common law criminal libel, and found that it did not square with the First Amendment. Merely to say that words which tend to cause breach of the peace are criminal, is too indefinite to be understandable, the court said. The case, *Ashton v. Kentucky*,<sup>17</sup> involved a pamphlet in which Ashton charged a police chief with law-breaking during a strike of miners, a sheriff with attempts to buy off a prosecution, and a newspaper owner with diverting food and clothing collected for strikers, to anti-strike workers. Ashton was convicted under a definition of criminal libel given, in part, by the judge as “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace.” The Supreme Court said that without specification that was too vague an offense to be constitutional:<sup>18</sup>

\* \* \* to make an offense of conduct which is “calculated to create disturbances of the peace” leaves wide open the standard of responsibility. It involves calculations as to the boiling point of a particular person or a particular group, not an appraisal of the comments *per se*. This kind of criminal libel “makes a man a criminal simply because his neighbors have no self-control and cannot refrain from violence.” Chafee, *Free Speech in the United States* 151 (1954).

Here \* \* \* we deal with First Amendment rights. Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct

<sup>15</sup> *State v. Whiteside*, 148 Conn. 208, 169 A.2d 260 (1961).

<sup>16</sup> *State v. Levand et al.*, 262 P. 24, 29 (1927).

<sup>17</sup> 384 U.S. 195, 86 S.Ct. 1407 (1966).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 384 U.S. 195, 198, 86 S.Ct. 1407, 1409–1411.

that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.

Reversed.

There are two special circumstances in which criminal libel is held to stem from the tendency of words to cause a breach of the peace. One, extremely rare, is libel of the dead, which is presumed to provoke relatives and friends of the deceased to violence.<sup>19</sup> The other is libel of groups, also virtually unknown since the leading case, *Beauharnais v. Illinois*, was decided in 1952 with a finding of "guilty."<sup>20</sup> It involved a leaflet attack on the Negro race in Chicago, at a time when the memory of Hitler Germany's proscription, ostracism, and mass killing of Jews was fresh in the minds of the nation. Migration of Negroes from the south into northern cities was swelling. *Beauharnais*, president of the White Circle League, had organized his group to distribute the leaflets, and they did so in downtown Chicago. Among other things, the leaflet called for city officials to stop "the further encroachment, harassment, and invasion of the white people \* \* \* by the Negro \* \* \*", and predicted that "rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marijuana of the negro" surely would unite Chicago whites against blacks.

*Beauharnais* was prosecuted and convicted under an Illinois law making it unlawful to exhibit a publication which "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication \* \* \* exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots."<sup>21</sup>

In affirming the conviction, Justice Frankfurter's decision said that this statute did not suffer from vagueness, as had some laws declared unconstitutional in other cases involving punishment for words tending to cause breach of the peace. This feature of the Illinois statute was thus constitutional.

The charges against Negroes, said the Court, were unquestionably libelous; and the central question became whether the "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from punishing such libels when they are directed not at an individual, but at "designated collectivities." The Court said that only if the law were a "wilful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State," could the Court deny a state power to punish utterances directed at a defined group.

<sup>19</sup> *State v. Haffer*, 94 Wash. 136, 162 P. 45 (1916).

<sup>20</sup> 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952). See also *People v. Spielman*, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925). Also "Knights of Columbus" cases: *People v. Turner*, 28 Cal.App. 766, 154 Pac. 34 (1914); *People v. Gordon*, 63 Cal.App. 62, 219 Pac. 486 (1923); *Crane v. State*, 14 Okl.Crim. 30, 166 P. 1110 (1917); *Alumbaugh v. State*, 39 Ga.App. 599, 147 S.E. 714 (1929). And see *Joseph Tannehaus, Group Libel*, 35 Cornell L.Q. 261 (1950).

<sup>21</sup> *Beauharnais v. Ill.*, 343 U.S. 250, 251, 72 S.Ct. 725, 728 (1952).

Justice Frankfurter found that for more than a century, Illinois had been “the scene of exacerbated tension between races, often flaring into violence and destruction.” He cited the murder of abolitionist Elijah Lovejoy in 1837, the “first northern race riot”—in Chicago in 1908—in which six persons were killed, and subsequent violence in the state of Illinois down to the Cicero, Ill. race riot of 1951. He concluded that “In the face of this history and its frequent obligato of extreme racial and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say that the Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups.”<sup>22</sup>

Four members of the court delivered strong dissents to the majority opinion that sustained *Beauharnais*' conviction. Justice Hugo Black stated much of the case against the concept of group libel as an offense acceptable to American freedom. Calling the law a “state censorship” instrument, Black said that permitting states to experiment in curbing freedom of expression “is startling and frightening doctrine in a country dedicated to self-government by its people.” He said that criminal libel as “constitutionally recognized” has provided for punishment of false, malicious, scurrilous charges against individuals, not against huge groups.<sup>23</sup>

Despite the court's upholding of the Illinois statute, the statute was not re-enacted when the Illinois legislature in 1961 revised its criminal law.

## SEC. 55. CRIMINAL LIBEL AS DEFAMATION OF INDIVIDUALS

### **Most state statutes treat criminal libel as defamation of individuals which warrants criminal prosecution and punishment.**

As noted earlier, statutes in the nineteenth century replaced the common law rules of criminal libel in many states, and most of them ignored the tendency of harsh words to cause breach of the peace. The definition of criminal libel became almost indistinguishable from that of civil libel in the majority of states,<sup>24</sup> as the focus turned to defamation of individuals: printing, writing, signs, pictures that impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation of an individual, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 258–261.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 270, 272, 273. See Arkes, *op. cit.*, for a view that group libel may continue to possess a useful function.

<sup>24</sup> (Anon.,) *Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel*, 52 *Col.L.R.* 521, 525 (1952); Tannehaus, *op. cit.*, 273.

injury, or deprive him of public confidence or social intercourse.<sup>25</sup> Vestiges of the breach of peace rationale remained even in some of these laws, however, where the special cases of libel of the dead or of groups still were credited with the power to arouse uncontrollable anger of surviving relatives or of members of interest groups,<sup>26</sup> and were made punishable.

In *Garland v. State*, for example, breach of peace was not at issue, but rather, said the Georgia Supreme Court, whether Garland's article in the *Monroe Advertiser* defamed the members of a jury. In speaking of a trial jury that had convicted one William Ogiltree, Garland had said "I know the jury composed of fine men, did not even deliberate on the case—the verdict was already made." The Georgia court ruled in reversing Garland's conviction:<sup>27</sup>

The controlling and decisive question is whether the published words \* \* \* are words of defamation as applied to the members of the jury \* \* \*. The words do not charge that the jurors had prejudged the case before they were sworn as jurors in the case. They do not charge that the jurors violated their oath \* \* \*. Taking the words as they would be ordinarily understood, they meant that the jury, after retiring, did not deliberate \* \* \* or consult with one another to form an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, but that their individual and collective minds had arrived at a verdict of guilty when they reached the jury room. It is not a ground for granting a new trial that the jury in a capital-felony conviction case returned a verdict of guilty within fifteen minutes after receiving the case for consideration \* \* \*. We know of no rule or law or code of juror's ethics that prevents a juror from rendering his conscientious judgment on the first ballot in the jury room.

## SEC. 56. CRIMINAL LIBEL AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS

**The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in *Garrison v. Louisiana* that a criminal libel action for statements about a public official could be maintained only if actual malice could be shown, thus drastically limiting the field for libel of officials.**

Criminal libel actions have often been brought for criticism of public officials. One study found that 31, or about one-fifth of the 148 criminal libel cases reported in the half-century after World War

<sup>25</sup> For common formulas, see *Beauharnais v. Ill.*, 343 U.S. 250, 255 fn. 5, 72 S.Ct. 725, 730 (1952).

<sup>26</sup> E. g., I.C.A. (Iowa) § 737.1.

<sup>27</sup> *Garland v. State*, 211 Ga. 48, 84 S.E.2d 13, 14 (1954). See also *State v. Reade*, 136 N.J.L. 432, 56 A.2d 566 (1948).

I, grew out of charges made against officials.<sup>28</sup> These actions have sometimes been viewed as a substitute for seditious libel prosecutions, or perhaps as seditious libel actions in disguise: government's punishment of those who dare to criticize its personnel.<sup>29</sup>

The Supreme Court's ruling in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, however, had its impact in the realm of criminal libel as well as civil libel. The requirement that criticism of a public official must be characterized by actual malice to support a libel charge found its way into criminal libel. The leading case is *Garrison v. Louisiana*.<sup>30</sup> Here Garrison, a prosecuting attorney for the State of Louisiana, gave out a statement at a press conference attacking several judges of his parish (county) for laziness and inattention to their official duties. He was convicted of criminal libel, and his case ultimately reached the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Court cited the *Times v. Sullivan* rule defining malice—that a public official might recover damages as a remedy for civil libel only “if he establishes that the utterance was false and that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.”<sup>31</sup>

The reasons which led us so to hold \* \* \* apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal. The constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel application of the same standard to the criminal remedy. Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned. And since “\* \* \* erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate \* \* \*” only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by *New York Times* may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions. For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.

The Louisiana court's ruling that Garrison's criticism of the judges constituted an attack on the personal integrity of the judges, rather than on their official conduct, was not accepted by the United States Supreme Court. The state court had said that Garrison had imputed fraud, deceit, and dishonesty to the judges; violation of Louisiana's “deadhead” statute; and malfeasance in office. But, said the United States Supreme Court:<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Stevens, *op. cit.*, at 110.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*; *Garrison v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 64, 80, 85 S.Ct. 209, 218, 220 (1964).

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, at 74, 215.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, at 77, at 217.



Of course, any criticism of the manner in which a public official performs his duties will tend to affect his private, as well as his public, reputation. The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. The public official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation \* \* \*.

As criminal libel cases arose on rare occasions during the decade after *Garrison*, several state statutes were found in violation of the Constitution—Pennsylvania's,<sup>33</sup> Arkansas',<sup>34</sup> and in 1976, California's. In the last of these, an action was brought against the publisher of the *L.A. Star*, a weekly tabloid of southern California, by the Los Angeles city attorney. The *Star* had published a photo superimposing a picture of actress Angie Dickinson's face on an unidentified nude female body in "a sexually explicit pose."<sup>35</sup> At trial and on appeal, the California criminal libel statute was held unconstitutional.<sup>36</sup> For one thing, it provided that truth was a defense to a charge of criminal libel only if it were published with good motives and for justifiable ends, and that was an unconstitutional limitation on the truth defense. Further, the law provided that an injurious publication is presumed to be malicious if no justifiable motive is shown, and malice may not be presumed but must be alleged and proved. Burdened with these rules out of the past which now were rejected under an outlook in the Supreme Court of the United States that over a 50-year period had slowly freed the press from ancient restrictions of English origin and American adoption, the criminal libel statute of California was shredded by the decision. The Supreme Court of the state said that "any attempt at draftmanship on the part of the court to save the remainder of the statute would transgress both the legislative intent and the judicial function and would be a flagrant breach of the doctrine of separation of powers."<sup>37</sup> Broken and impotent, the law was an unlikely candidate for salvage by the state's legislature.

<sup>33</sup> *Commonwealth v. Armao*, 446 Pa. 325, 286 A.2d 626 (1972).

<sup>34</sup> *Weston v. State*, 258 Ark. 707, 528 S.W.2d 412 (1975).

<sup>35</sup> *Press Censorship Newsletter* No. VI, Dec.–Jan. 1974–75, p. 31.

<sup>36</sup> *Eberle v. Municipal Court*, L.A. Judicial District, 55 Cal.App.3d 423, 127 Cal.Rptr. 594, 600 (1976).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

## Chapter 10

### DEFIANCE OF AUTHORITY: CONTEMPT

#### Sec.

57. Contempt as Inherent Power of the Courts.
58. The Contempt Power in Legislative and Administrative Bodies.
59. Direct Contempt as a Press Restriction.
60. Contempt by Publication (Constructive Contempt).

Refusal to accept rules and orders of judicial, legislative, or administrative agencies is, in various circumstances, to be in contempt of these agencies. In this chapter, we examine essentially two manifestations of contempt: journalists' refusals to testify as to confidential news sources and information when called by the judiciary or the legislative branch to do so, and publication by the news media of criticism of the judiciary. Contempt arises in other contexts, some of them mentioned briefly in this chapter and given detailed consideration in Chapter 8, Free Press—Fair Trial, in which the possibility of damage to the judicial process through news coverage of court trials is the central subject.

#### SEC. 57. CONTEMPT AS INHERENT POWER OF THE COURTS

**Courts' contempt power is the basis of their authority, applying, where news media are concerned, largely to actions in the presence of judges, and far less than formerly to published criticism of courts.**

Annette Buchanan wrote a story for her college newspaper, the University of Oregon *Daily Emerald*, about the use of marijuana among students at the University. She said that seven students, whom she did not name, gave her information. And when the district attorney asked her to name the sources of information to a grand jury that was investigating drug use, and subsequently a judge directed her to do so, she refused. A reporter should be privileged not to reveal his sources, she said, and not to break confidences. To betray a pledge of secrecy to a source, Buchanan added, would be a signal to many sources to "dry up." The judge, and upon appeal the Oregon Supreme Court, found her in contempt of court for refusing to obey the judge's order, and she was sentenced to a brief jail term.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *State v. Buchanan*, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968), certiorari denied 392 U.S. 905, 88 S.Ct. 2055 (1968).

Buchanan's was a case of "direct" contempt: it took place in the presence of the judge. Goss, a television personality, was not within shouting distance of the court when on his program he attacked witnesses in a divorce case in which he was accused of adultery with the wife. For his attempt to prevent witnesses from giving testimony unfavorable to him by vilifying them, he was convicted of contempt which takes place away from the court, by publication, called indirect or "constructive" contempt.<sup>2</sup> On appeal, his conviction was overruled, the court holding that his broadcasts were no real danger to justice because while the targets might have been angered by his words, they had no reason to feel threatened in their testimony by them.<sup>3</sup>

In the Goss case of contempt by publication as in the *Buchanan* case of direct contempt, a judge ruled initially that the reporter's acts interfered with the administration of justice—that the acts were contemptuous of court. In each case, the judge convicted the reporter under his inherent power to punish for the interference, punishment for contempt being the basis of all legal procedure and the means of courts' enforcing their judgments and orders.<sup>4</sup>

The cases diverged in their outcomes, Buchanan failing in her appeal, Goss succeeding in his; and, indeed, the outcomes illustrate the fortunes of reporters in recent years in similar circumstances. Direct contempt is a current, serious problem for the press; constructive contempt has almost vanished.

Summary procedure is the ordinary procedure in contempt. In it, the judge accuses, tries, and sentences in his own case without resort to trial by jury. It is often justified by reference to the British legal writer of the 18th Century, Sir William Blackstone, who wrote:<sup>5</sup>

Some \* \* \* contempts may arise in the face of the court; as by rude and contumelious behavior; by obstinacy, perverseness, or prevarication; by breach of the peace; or any wilful disturbance whatever; others, in the absence of the party; as by disobeying or treating with disrespect the king's writ, or the rules of process of the court; by perverting such writ or process to the purposes of private malice, extortion, or injustice; by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges, acting in their judicial capacity; by printing false accounts (or even true ones, without proper permission) of causes then depending in judgment

\* \* \*

<sup>2</sup> *People v. Goss*, 10 Ill.2d 533, 141 N.E.2d 385, 390 (1957).

<sup>3</sup> *Goss v. State of Illinois*, 204 F.Supp. 268 (N.D.Ill.1962), reversed on other grounds, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963).

<sup>4</sup> Sir John C. Fox, *History of Contempt of Court* (Oxford, 1927), p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Blackstone, pp. 284, 285.

The process of attachment for these and the like contempts must necessarily be as ancient as the laws themselves \* \* \*. A power therefore in the supreme courts of justice to suppress such contempts by an immediate attachment of the offender results from the first principles of judicial establishments and must be an inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal.

For the United States, an act declaratory of the law of contempt in the federal courts, passed in 1831, is the basis of contempt proceedings before federal judges.<sup>6</sup> State courts likewise possess the power to punish for contempt, under authority of inherent power or statute, or both.<sup>7</sup>

Indirect or constructive contempt arose with the growth of printing, journalism and out-of-court publication which criticized or commented on cases pending in courts. The power to punish such publications in Anglo-American jurisprudence is founded on Almon's case,<sup>8</sup> in which because of a technicality no judgment was ever rendered. Fox points out that the notes of Justice Wilmot in this case are a weak foundation for acceptance of constructive contempt for out-of-court publications as part of the common law.<sup>9</sup> There nevertheless has been practical acceptance of the Wilmot doctrine in both England and America, although in America the doctrine was heavily discredited and courts' power under it sharply curtailed in the mid-Twentieth Century.

The Act of 1831<sup>10</sup> that is the basis of contempt proceedings before federal judges specifies that the power to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court does not extend to any cases "except the misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."<sup>11</sup> Yet under the authority of this act, newspaper comments on proceedings pending in a federal court were for some time held contemptuous, as in the 1918 decision in *Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States*.<sup>12</sup> The dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes that "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" means so near as actually to obstruct, and that misbehavior means more than unfavorable comment or even disrespect, became recognized in 1941 when the decision in *Nye v. United States* declared that "so near thereto" referred to physical proximity to the

<sup>6</sup> Act of Mar. 2, 1831, c. 99, 4 Stat. 487.

<sup>7</sup> See W. Nelles and C. W. King, *Contempt by Publication in the United States*, 28 *Columbia L.Rev.* 554 (1928).

<sup>8</sup> Fox, p. 5 and references there cited.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>10</sup> *Supra*, footnote 6.

<sup>11</sup> Act of Mar. 2, 1831, c. 99; 4 Stat. 487.

<sup>12</sup> 247 U.S. 402, 38 S.Ct. 560, 62 L.Ed. 1186 (1918).

court.<sup>13</sup> Subsequent decisions drove the power to convict for contempt by publication into deep retreat under the clear and present danger doctrine. (Below, Sec. 60).

State courts as well as federal long clung to the power of summary punishment for contempt by publication, and like federal courts ignored or denied acts by state legislatures to limit this power. Many followed the early lead of *State v. Morrill*,<sup>14</sup> an influential Arkansas case of 1855. In it, a charge published in a newspaper that an alleged murderer had bribed the state supreme court was the basis for summary contempt proceedings. The court was faced with a state statute limiting contempt proceedings to specified acts not including out-of-court publications. The court ruled that the statute was not binding upon the judiciary, for it must have power to enforce its own process, and the contempt power which provides this springs into existence upon the creation of the courts.<sup>15</sup>

Attempts by Congress and legislatures of the states to limit contempt to certain specific classifications have not been universally successful. The legislative and judicial branches of government are coordinate. While the legislative branch of any governmental unit has the power to make the law, the judicial branch has inherent rights to enforce its orders, rules, writs, or decrees. Even in states where there is a strict definition of what constitutes contempt, under special circumstances there is precedent for the courts' considering their inherent power above the legislative enactment.<sup>16</sup>

Some headway has been made by those who pose a more general challenge to the contempt power of courts, and who assert that jury trials should be substituted for a judge's summary proceeding. It is sometimes objected by these that American traditions are violated where a judge may sit as accuser, prosecutor, and judge in his own or a fellow judge's case: "It is abhorrent to Anglo-Saxon justice as applied in this country that one man, however lofty his station or venerated his vestments, should have the power of taking another man's liberty from him."<sup>17</sup> There are flaws in the Blackstonian position that summary procedure is an "immemorial power" of judges in constructive contempt cases;<sup>18</sup> and the United States Supreme Court in 1968 addressed itself to the problem and said that the old rule did not justify denying a jury trial in serious contempt

<sup>13</sup> 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941).

<sup>14</sup> 16 Ark. 384 (1855).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 384, 407.

<sup>16</sup> *Farr v. Superior Court*, 22 Cal.App.3d 60, 99 Cal.Rptr. 342, 348 (1972).

<sup>17</sup> *Ballantyne v. U. S.*, 237 F.2d 657, 667 (5th Cir. 1956); J. Edward Gerald, *The Press and the Constitution*, pp. 30-31.

<sup>18</sup> *Nelles and King*, pp. 408, 409.

cases. It ruled in *Bloom v. Illinois*<sup>19</sup> that "If the right to jury trial is a fundamental matter in other criminal cases, \* \* \* it must also be extended to criminal contempt cases." The length of the sentence imposed was used by the Court as the test of "seriousness," which it found in a two-year jail term given Bloom.

## SEC. 58. THE CONTEMPT POWER IN LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

**Congress, state legislatures, and some administrative bodies have power to cite for contempt.**

In addition to courts, legislative bodies are jealous of their power to cite for contempt. Congressional and state legislative investigating committees sometimes seek the testimony of reporters who have special knowledge about subjects under the committees' official inquiry. Citations for contempt have occurred when reporters have refused to answer lawmakers' questions, and occasionally, over the last two centuries, convictions have been had.

The legislative power to cite for contempt derives its force from the power possessed by the English Parliament, on which both the legislatures and the Congress were modeled.<sup>20</sup> No limitations are imposed upon Congress in its punishment for either disorderly conduct or contempt, but in *Marshall v. Gordon*,<sup>21</sup> it was held that the punishment imposed could not be extended beyond the session in which the contempt occurs.

The Supreme Court has conceded to Congress the power to punish nonmembers for contempt when there occurs "either physical obstruction of the legislative body in the discharge of its duties, or physical assault upon its members, for action taken or words spoken in the body, or obstruction of its officers in the performance of their official duties, or the prevention of members from attending so that their duties might be performed, or finally, for refusing with contumacy to obey orders, to produce documents or to give testimony which there was a right to compel."<sup>22</sup>

Seldom has a reporter gone to jail for refusing to reveal to Congress a source of information. One of the cases involved Z. L. White and Hiram J. Ramsdell, Washington correspondents of the *New York Tribune*. They published what they claimed was the "Treaty of Washington," a document being studied by the Senate in executive meeting. They refused to say from whom they got the

<sup>19</sup> 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1485 (1968).

<sup>20</sup> Max Radin, *Anglo American Legal History*, pp. 63, 64.

<sup>21</sup> 243 U.S. 521, 37 S.Ct. 448, 61 L.Ed. 881, L.R.A.1917F, 279, Ann.Cas.1918B, 371 (1917).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 243 U.S. 521, 37 S.Ct. 448, 61 L.Ed. 881, L.R.A.1917F, 279, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 371 (1917).

copy, were tried and convicted of contempt by the Senate, and were committed to the custody of the Sergeant at Arms until the end of the Session.<sup>23</sup>

Congress has not in many decades chosen to try and convict for contempt. Instead, it has cited for contempt and certified the persons cited to the district attorney of the District of Columbia for prosecution under a law that gives the courts power to try such cases.<sup>24</sup>

It is uncertain how far the principles of freedom of the press protect a reporter from contempt charges if he refuses to answer the questions of a Congressional Committee. Newsmen have argued that the First Amendment sharply limits Congress in questioning and investigating the press: Congress may investigate only the matters on which it may legislate, they point out, and the First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law \* \* \* abridging freedom of \* \* \* the press."

In 1971, a prize-winning television documentary by CBS, "The Selling of the Pentagon," raised a storm of protest against alleged bias in the film's portrayal of the American military's public information programs. Selective editing for the documentary, the military charged, distorted the intent, management and messages of the military. The House of Representatives Commerce Committee, under its chairman Rep. Harley O. Staggers, undertook an investigation of the matter, and CBS president Frank Stanton refused to furnish the committee parts of film edited out of the final version. In response to the subpoena ordering him to appear with the materials, he appeared but declared that furnishing materials would amount to a violation of freedom of the press. The Committee voted 25 to 13 to recommend to Congress a contempt citation. The House, however, turned down the recommendation, Rep. Emanuel Celler declaring that "The First Amendment towers over these proceedings like a colossus. No tenderness of one member for another should cause us to topple over this monument to our liberties."<sup>25</sup>

More recently, newsman Daniel Schorr, then of CBS, came under protracted investigation by Congress, and heavy fire from a segment of the media, for his refusal to testify. Schorr had obtained a copy of the Pike Committee (House Intelligence Committee) report on operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, which the House of

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of Committee on the Judiciary, *The Newsmen's Privilege*, 89 Cong., 2 Sess., Oct. 1966, pp. 57-61. Nineteenth century investigations of news media and reporters were not rare according to Thomas H. Kaminski, "Congress, Correspondents and Confidentiality in the 19th Century: a Preliminary Study," *Journalism History*, 4:3 Autumn, 1977, p. 83.

<sup>24</sup> 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 192, 194.

<sup>25</sup> Congressional Record, 117:107, July 13, 1971, p. 6643.

Representatives had voted should be kept secret after heavy pressure not to disclose it from the federal administration. National security, the administration said, was at stake. Schorr broadcast some of the contents; passed the report to the *Village Voice* which published much of it; was investigated for several months during which he was suspended by CBS; and finally came before the House Ethics Committee.<sup>26</sup> Under a congressman's solemn admonition against publishers' taking it "upon themselves to publish secret and classified information against the will of Congress and the people,"<sup>27</sup> Schorr illuminated the rationale for a journalist's refusing to reveal sources, saying in part:<sup>28</sup>

We all build our lives around certain principles, without which our careers lose their meaning.

For some of us—doctors, lawyers, clergymen, and journalists—it is an article of faith that we must keep confidential those matters entrusted to us only because of the assurance that they would remain confidential.

For a journalist, the most crucial kind of confidence is the identity of a source of information. To betray a confidential source would mean to dry up many future sources for many future reporters. The reporter and the news organization would be the immediate losers. The ultimate losers would be the American people and their free institutions.

But, beyond all that, to betray a source would be to betray myself, my career, and my life. It is not as simple as saying that I refuse to do it. I cannot do it.

Unlike the committee that recommended on Stanton, the Ethics Committee did not recommend to the full House that Schorr be cited for contempt. He was released from subpoena without revealing his source.

The courts have not decided contempt of Congress cases on First Amendment grounds, one of them saying, "We shrink from this awesome task" of drawing lines between the investigative power of Congress and the First Amendment rights of a member of the press.<sup>29</sup> Instead, the courts have found other reasons for reversing convictions of newsmen who were found in contempt of Congress for

<sup>26</sup> See Daniel Schorr, *Clearing the Air* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), passim; "The Daniel Schorr Investigation," *Freedom of Information Center Report*. # 361, Oct. 1976.

<sup>27</sup> Anthony Lewis, "Congress Shall Make No Law \* \* \*," *New York Times*, Sept. 16, 1976, p. 39.

<sup>28</sup> I. William Hill, "Schorr Sticks to His Refusal to Name Source," *Editor & Publisher*, Sept. 25, 1976, p. 14.

<sup>29</sup> *Shelton v. U. S.*, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 155, 327 F.2d 601 (1963); 89 *Editor & Publisher* 12, July 7, 1956.



refusing to answer questions. In 1956, William Price of the *New York Daily News* and Robert Shelton and Alden Whitman of the *New York Times* refused to answer certain questions put by committees of Congress that were investigating communism. All three were indicted for contempt and convicted. The Supreme Court overturned the convictions, not on press freedom grounds, but because the indictments that put the newsmen before the grand jury were faulty. They failed to state the subject of the investigation, the Court held, and without knowing that, Price, Shelton and Whitman could not know just what they were accused of. "Price was put to trial and convicted upon an indictment which did not even purport to inform him in any way of the identity of the topic under subcommittee inquiry. \* \* \* Far from informing Price of the nature of the accusation against him, the indictment instead left the prosecution free to roam at large—to shift its theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of the trial and appeal."<sup>30</sup>

Under certain circumstances there may be contempt of a semi-judicial administrative body like the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the Federal Trade Commission. Some state public utility, tax, and other commissions which have power to subpoena witnesses to testify in hearings have statutory authority to cite and punish for contempt. Where there is no statutory authority to cite, these bodies in some instances may apply to the courts for an order directing a person who has refused to answer a commission's subpoena to appear before the commission or one of its examiners for examination. Refusal to comply with the court's order may then be cited as contempt of the court's order. Such essentially is the provision of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended in 1934.<sup>31</sup>

## SEC. 59. DIRECT CONTEMPT AS A PRESS RESTRICTION

**Interference with the orderly administration of justice in the presence of the court may subject the newspaper to contempt proceedings.**

When the claim of freedom of the press comes into conflict with the contempt power, the former may emerge from the contest second best. The variety of activities other than publication that may collide with the contempt power includes four news procedures that may cause direct contempt citations:

<sup>30</sup> *Russell v. U. S.*, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1049 (1962).

<sup>31</sup> Sec. 22(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77v(b). See R. John Tresolini, *The Use of Summary Contempt Powers by Administrative Agencies*, 54 *Dickinson L.Rev.* 395 (1950).

1. Any disobedience of a court's order,
2. Any disturbance in the courtroom,
3. Attempts to influence decisions or participants in court cases,
4. Refusal to testify as to a news source or other information.

(1) The first circumstance is disobedience of a court's order. In the case of *Ex parte Sturm*,<sup>32</sup> the appellants were adjudged in contempt of trial court for violation of its orders about photographing Richard Whittemore, held on an indictment for murder. Shortly before the beginning of trial, a photographer took a flash picture of the prisoner as he entered the courthouse lockup. The judge ordered the photographer to surrender the photographic plate. Unknown to the judge, the plate which the photographer surrendered was blank.

Following the opening of court, the judge said that he felt it incompatible with judicial dignity to allow the courtroom or the precincts of the court to be used for taking pictures. He mentioned the confiscation of the picture taken that morning. The court declared that the prisoner, unable to protect himself, would be protected by the court. Nevertheless, photographer William Sturm of the *Baltimore News* took several pictures secretly with a small camera upon order of his city editor, and two appeared in the *News* and in the *Baltimore American*.

Judge O'Dunne instituted contempt proceedings against the managing editors of both newspapers, the city editor of the *News*, and the two photographers. Upon appeal the contempt proceedings were upheld. The court stated:<sup>33</sup>

The challenge in this case of the court's right to forbid the use of cameras in the courtroom during the progress of the trial presents an issue of vital importance. If such a right should yield to an asserted privilege of the press, the authority and dignity of the courts would be seriously impaired. It is essential to the integrity and independence of the judicial tribunals that they shall have the power to enforce their own judgment as to what conduct is incompatible with the proper and orderly course of their procedure.

*Ex parte Sturm* displays a court decision in the main historical stream of the use of the contempt power: the court has an inherent power to institute contempt proceedings that will back up its orders.

The order of a judge that no pictures would be taken in a courtroom did not extend, however, to a photographer who took a picture of the court in session through the window of a door leading

<sup>32</sup> 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312, 51 A.L.R. 356 (1927).

<sup>33</sup> 152 Md. 114, 121, 136 A. 312, 315, 51 A.L.R. 356 (1927). See also *Seymour v. U. S.*, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).

to a corridor. A conviction for contempt for disobeying the court order was overruled, the appeals court saying that the order did not extend to taking pictures from the corridor.<sup>34</sup>

(2) We may see the courts and the press in conflict over disturbance to the court—the second cause listed above—in a Georgia case where a judge forbade photography in the near environs of a court house. Here Atlanta Newspapers brought a petition excepting to a court order that barred taking pictures of spectators and others not in the custody of the court, who were gathered on streets and sidewalks surrounding the court house. The newspapers argued that freedom of the press was limited by the order. The petition was denied and the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the denial. The circumstances of the case involved crowds of some 300 persons completely blocking traffic on the street and sidewalk around the court house; defense counsels' addresses from the steps of the court house to the crowds; and some 50 or 60 reporters and photographers who were covering the gathering for the news media. The Georgia code provides that "Every court has power \* \* \* to preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence, and as near thereto as is necessary to prevent interruption, disturbance, or hindrance to its proceedings." The Supreme Court said that "the duty and disposition of a court to accord a justly ample scope to the liberty of the press should not be carried to the point of an undue abridgment of the court's own freedom," and ruled that the trial judge had not abused his discretionary powers in his order banning photography under these circumstances.<sup>35</sup>

(3) Influencing participants in a court case is illustrated by *Ex parte Aldridge*.<sup>36</sup> While a jury in a murder case was being chosen, several veniremen waited to be called in a corridor outside the courtroom, as instructed. The judge learned that 20 copies of a publication called *C.C.C. News* had been placed on a chair near the veniremen, and that a story in it intimated that the defense attorney claimed he had special influence with the judge. The judge was convinced that circulation of the publication among the veniremen meant that a fair trial could not be had and a jury could not be selected from this group of veniremen. He postponed the case. A charge of contempt was placed against the editor and publisher of the publication, and he was convicted. On appeal, the court held that circulation of the publication interfered with the due administration of justice, and that it was a case of direct contempt because

<sup>34</sup> *In re Greenfield*, 163 N.E.2d 910, 82 Ohio Law Abstracts 120 (Ohio App. 1959).

<sup>35</sup> *Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes*, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d 421 (1960).

<sup>36</sup> 169 Tex.Crim. 395, 334 S.W.2d 161 (1959).

the presence of the court extended to the courtroom, jury, and veniremen.<sup>37</sup>

(4) None of the foregoing journalistic practices in relation to courts has developed a handful of contempt actions as compared with the fourth: The refusal to testify before grand juries and courts about confidential sources and about information obtained from such sources. Subpoenas to appear and testify were for decades only an occasional problem for newsmen whose stories suggested to officialdom that the reporters had information of use to government; there are probably fewer than 40 reported contempt cases for newsmen's refusal to testify when subpoenaed before 1970. But in 1969 and 1970 the sometime problem of subpoenas changed to a burst, and across the nation reporters faced demands that they appear and testify. No one was able to track down every subpoena issued during these years and in 1971 and 1972. In a two-and-one-half-year segment of this period, 121 subpoenas for news material were said to have gone to CBS and NBC alone, and in three years, more than 30 to Field Enterprises newspapers.<sup>38</sup> A high level persisted, the U.S. attorney general reporting that his office had approved 42 requests to him for subpoenas of reporters between May 1975 and November 1976.<sup>39</sup>

In particular demand were reporters who had been reporting widespread social and political turmoil. Grand juries wanted these journalists to reveal their confidential sources as well as to surrender their unpublished notes and records, unused photographs, tape recordings and television film "outtakes." To much of this, newsmen responded "no" with intensity and solidarity.<sup>40</sup> The unwritten code of ethics of newsmen stood in the way of their breaking confidences, they said; but more important, if they broke confidences they would become known as untrustworthy and their sources would dry up, thereby harming or destroying their usefulness as news gatherers for the public, and would damage their own status as professionals. Moreover, some argued, compelling them to disclose their news sources was tantamount to making them agents of government investigation.

As for turning over unused film, files, photos and notes, some media adopted the policy of early destruction of unpublished materials after *Time*, *Life*, *Newsweek*, the *Chicago Sun-Times*, CBS, NBC

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, at 165.

<sup>38</sup> House of Rep. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 3, 92 Cong., 2d Sess., "Newsmen's Privilege," Hearings, Oct. 4, 1972, p. 204; Sept. 27, 1972, p. 134.

<sup>39</sup> "Justice Department Subpoenas Fewer Reporters," *News Media and the Law* 1:1 (Oct. 1977), p. 30.

<sup>40</sup> S.Res. 3552, 91 Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong.Rec. 4123-31, 1970; Noyes & Newbold, "The Subpoena Problem Today," *Am. Soc. Newspaper Editors Bull.*, Sept. 1970, pp. 7-8; Editor & Publisher, Feb. 7, 1970, p. 12.

and others were called by subpoena, or in the name of cooperation with government, to deliver large quantities of news materials.<sup>41</sup> According to Attorney General John Mitchell, journalists' willingness to accept contempt convictions and jail terms rather than reveal confidences, along with their unyielding protests to government, made the controversy "one of the most difficult issues I have faced \* \* \*."<sup>42</sup> The storm of objection to subpoenas issuing from the Department of Justice led attorneys general to issue "Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media"—a set of instructions to Justice Department attorneys over the nation—that sought to resolve testimonial questions with reporters through negotiating rather than through subpoenas except in the last resort.<sup>43</sup>

The privilege not to break the confidence of sources has deep roots in the history of certain professional groups. The common law and some states by statute have long provided full or partial protection to the attorney in relation to his client, the physician to his patient, and the priest to his parishioner.<sup>44</sup> Here the private interest of the person seeking help is in some circumstances paramount to the needs of the state in obtaining evidence. But the common law never provided such a privilege for newsmen, and legal authority heavily opposed extending the privilege to new groups such as social workers and journalists.<sup>45</sup> The first state statute to shield journalists from being compelled to testify was passed by Maryland in 1896; other states slowly followed, the list reaching more than 20 by 1973.<sup>46</sup>

### The Constitutional Protection

Journalists who have assumed or asserted that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press has protected the craft

<sup>41</sup> Columbia Journalism Rev., Spring 1970, pp. 2-3.

<sup>42</sup> Editor & Publisher, Aug. 15, 1970, pp. 9-10.

<sup>43</sup> Department of Justice, Memo No. 692, Sept. 2, 1970. The Guidelines were expanded in 1973. For texts, see Joel Gora, *Rights of Reporters* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1974), p. 249.

<sup>44</sup> 8 J. Wigmore, *Evidence* 2286, 2290, 2394 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 2285. Major studies on newsmen's privilege include Blasi, Vince, *Press Subpoenas: An Empirical and Legal Analysis*, 1972, for Reporters' Committee on Freedom of the Press; Gordon, A. D., *Protection of News Sources: the History and Legal Status of the Newsmen's Privilege*, Dec. 1970 (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Wis.); Guest & Stanzler, *The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources*, 64 *N.W.U.L.Rev.* 18, 1969.

<sup>46</sup> Ala.Code Tit. 7, 370 (1960); Alaska Stat. 09.25.150-220 (Supp.1970); Ariz. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (Supp.1970); Ark.Stat. Ann. § 43-917 (1964); West's Ann. Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (1966); Ill. Legis. H. Bill 1756, 1971 Gen. Assembly; Burns' Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 421.100 (1969); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 45.1451-54 (Supp.1971); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 2 (1971); Mich. Stat. Ann. 28.945(1) (1954); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. 1964, § 93-601-1 to 2; Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.087 (1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:84A-21 (Supp.1970); N.M. Stat. Ann. 20-1-12.1 (1970); McKinney's N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (Supp.1971); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.12 (Baldwin 1970); 28 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 330 (Supp.1971).

historically against compelling testimony have not reckoned with the course of court decisions. Privilege cases were adjudicated for most of a century under the common law or state statutes without the Constitution's even entering the picture. Not until 1958, in *Garland v. Torre*,<sup>47</sup> was the first claim to First Amendment protection an issue in the reported cases.

Here, Marie Torre, columnist for the *New York Herald Tribune*, attributed to an unnamed executive of a broadcasting company, certain statements which actress Judy Garland said libeled her. In the libel suit, Torre refused to name the executive, asserting privilege under the First Amendment. She was cited for contempt and convicted, and the appeals court upheld the conviction. "The concept that it is the duty of a witness to testify in a court of law," the decision said, "has roots fully as deep in our history as does the guarantee of a free press." It added that if freedom of the press was involved here, "we do not hesitate to conclude that it too must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice."<sup>48</sup> Subsequent claims to constitutional protection were likewise denied in other cases.<sup>49</sup>

The United States Supreme Court in 1972 ruled for the first time on whether the First Amendment protects journalists from testifying about their confidential sources and information. The cases of three newsmen who had refused to testify before grand juries during 1970 and 1971 were decided together in *Branzburg v. Hayes*.<sup>50</sup> Paul Branzburg, a reporter for the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, had observed two people synthesizing hashish from marijuana and written about that and drug use, and had refused to answer the grand jury's questions about the matters. Paul Pappas, a television reporter of New Bedford, Mass., had visited Black Panther headquarters during civil turmoil in July 1970, and refused to tell a grand jury what he had seen there. Earl Caldwell, a black reporter for the *New York Times* in San Francisco, who had covered Black Panther activities regularly for some years, was called by a federal grand jury and had refused to appear or testify.

Only Caldwell received protection from the lower courts. The federal district court of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the First Amendment provided a qualified privi-

<sup>47</sup> 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), certiorari denied 358 U.S. 910, 79 S.Ct. 237.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, at 548-549.

<sup>49</sup> *In re Goodfader's Appeal*, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); *In re Taylor*, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); *State v. Buchanan*, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968) certiorari denied 392 U.S. 905, 88 S.Ct. 2055 (1968); *Murphy v. Colorado*, (Colo. Supreme Court), certiorari denied 365 U.S. 843, 81 S.Ct. 802 (1961).

<sup>50</sup> *Branzburg v. Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (1972).

lege to newsmen and that it applied to Caldwell.<sup>51</sup> The Kentucky Court of Appeals refused Branzburg protection under either the Kentucky privilege statute, or the First Amendment interpretation of the Caldwell case.<sup>52</sup> And the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, where no privilege statute existed, rejected the idea of a First Amendment privilege.<sup>53</sup>

The Supreme Court of the United States found that none of the three men warranted First Amendment protection. It reversed the Caldwell decision of the lower federal court and upheld the Kentucky and Massachusetts decisions, in a 5-4 decision.<sup>54</sup> It said that the First Amendment would protect a reporter if grand jury investigations were not conducted in good faith, or if there were harassment of the press by officials who sought to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources.<sup>55</sup> But it found neither of these conditions present here. The newsman's obligation is to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to commission of crime, it said.

The Caldwell decisions in lower courts had focused on the need of recognition for First Amendment protection for the news gathering process; the Supreme Court said "It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally \* \* \*," and "Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session \* \* \*."<sup>56</sup>

The reporters had asserted that the First Amendment should take precedence over the grand jury's power of inquiry. The Supreme Court said that at common law, courts consistently refused to recognize a privilege in newsmen to refuse to reveal confidential information, and that the First Amendment claim to privilege had been turned down uniformly in earlier cases, the courts having concluded "that the First Amendment interest asserted by the newsman was outweighed by the general obligation of a citizen to appear before a grand jury or at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, and give what information he possesses."<sup>57</sup> It said that the only constitutional privilege for unofficial witnesses is the Fifth Amendment

<sup>51</sup> Application of Caldwell, 311 F.Supp. 358 (N.D.Cal.1970); Caldwell v. U. S., 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).

<sup>52</sup> Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky.1971); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (1972).

<sup>53</sup> In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).

<sup>54</sup> Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (1972).

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., at 2669-2670.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., at 2657, 2658.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., at 2658, 2659.

privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and the Court declined to create another.

The reporters argued that the flow of news would be diminished by compelling testimony from them; the Supreme Court said it was unconvinced, and “the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if the Court reaffirms the prior common law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen.”<sup>58</sup>

The reporters said the freedom of the press would be undermined; the Court said this is not the lesson that history teaches, for the press had operated and thrived without common law or constitutional privilege since the beginning of the nation.<sup>59</sup>

The Supreme Court said that while the Constitution did not provide the privilege sought, Congress and the state legislatures were free to fashion standards and rules protecting newsmen from testifying by passing legislation.

Concurring, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., expanded, in general terms, the possibilities for First Amendment protection for journalists subpoenaed to testify. “The Court,” he said, “does not hold that newsmen \* \* \* are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safe-guarding their sources. \* \* \* the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.”<sup>60</sup>

The dissenting justices wrote two opinions. One was that of Justice William O. Douglas, who said that a reporter’s immunity from testifying is “quite complete” under the First Amendment and a newsman “has an absolute right not to appear before a grand jury \* \* \*.”<sup>61</sup>

Writing for himself and two others, Justice Potter Stewart argued for a qualified privilege. He called the majority’s opinion a “crabbed view of the First Amendment” that reflected a disturbing insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press. And he said that in denying the protection, “The Court \* \* \* invites state and federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government.” Justice Stewart said the protection was essential, not “for the purely private interests of the newsman or his informant, nor even, at bottom, for the First Amendment interests of either partner in the news-gathering relationship.”<sup>62</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, at 2662.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, at 2665.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, at 2670, 2671.

<sup>61</sup> *U. S. v. Caldwell*, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2686, 2691 (1972).

<sup>62</sup> *Branzburg v. Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2678 (1972).



Rather it functions to insure nothing less than democratic decisionmaking through the free flow of information to the public, and it serves, thereby, to honor the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."

Stewart indicated what he felt the government should be required to do in overriding a constitutional privilege for the reporter:<sup>63</sup>

\* \* \* it is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association and petition that the State show a *substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.*

\* \* \*

Government officials must, therefore, demonstrate that the information sought is *clearly* relevant to a *precisely* defined subject of governmental inquiry. \* \* \* They must demonstrate that it is reasonable to think the witness in question has that information. \* \* \* And they must show that there is not any means of obtaining the information less destructive of First Amendment liberties.

These were essentially the requirements placed upon government by the lower courts in holding that Caldwell had been protected by the First Amendment, and Stewart endorsed that decision. He would have upheld the protection for Caldwell, and vacated and remanded the *Branzburg* and *Pappas* judgments.

Largely innocent of the history of the shield, reporters and editors expressed shock and dismay that the First Amendment did not protect the reporters in the Supreme Court's *Branzburg* decision.<sup>64</sup> Still innocent several years later, one wrote that the decision had "beclouded what American newsmen had come to assume was a traditional privilege—to refuse to testify either as to the source or the content of information received under confidential circumstances."<sup>65</sup> Predictions of doom for press freedom, on the heels of *Branzburg*, scouted the several statements in that decision which said that the First Amendment was still around and might well see service in future confidentiality cases: Justice White's plurality opinion, assuring journalists that the First Amendment would pro-

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, at 2679–2680.

<sup>64</sup> See generally *Columbia Journalism Review*, 10:3, Sept.–Oct. 1972, for articles by Norman E. Isaacs, Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., and Fred W. Friendly. The only extensive history of journalists' privilege is A. David Gordon, "Protection of News Sources: the History and Legal Status of the Newsman's Privilege," 925 pp., Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Wis., 1970.

<sup>65</sup> William Hornby, "Journalists Split in Shield Law Imbroglia," *IPI Report*, 25:3, March 1976, p. 8.

tect them against bad faith investigations of grand juries and against harassment by officials; Justice Powell's concurring opinion, asserting that this decision didn't strip journalists of "constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news," and that the courts would protect them "where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection"; Justice Stewart's dissent containing concepts that courts quickly were to employ in support of journalists in subsequent cases.

Within months after the cold application of *Branzburg* to the sensitive skin of American journalists, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, presented the doom-sayers with a new shock: Magazine journalist Alfred Balk, it said, was *protected* by the First Amendment in his refusal to reveal a source. Balk had once written an article for the *Saturday Evening Post* on Chicago "block busting"—real estate practices including racially discriminatory activities by landlords and speculators. Now civil rights proponents sought, in a court action, the identity of one of Balk's sources ("Vitchek," a pseudonym). Balk refused, on grounds that Vitchek gave him the information in confidence. The trial court ruled for Balk; the appeals court affirmed.<sup>66</sup>

The court found that the identity of Vitchek did not go to the heart of the appellants' case, and that, anyway, there were other available sources that the appellants could have tried to reach and that might have disclosed Vitchek's identity (vide Stewart, dissent in *Branzburg*). It said that the majority in *Branzburg* had applied traditional First Amendment doctrine, which teaches that First Amendment rights cannot be infringed absent a "compelling" or "paramount" state interest (once more, Stewart); that the *Branzburg* majority had indeed found that overriding interest in the investigation of crime by grand juries; but that:<sup>67</sup>

\* \* \* though a journalist's right to protect confidential sources may not take precedence over that rare overriding and compelling interest, we are of the view that there are circumstances, at the very least in civil cases, in which the public interest in non-disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources outweighs the public and private interest in compelled testimony. The case before us is one where the First Amendment protection does not yield.

\* \* \*

Manifestly, the [Supreme] Court's concern with the integrity of the grand jury as an investigating arm of the criminal justice system distinguishes *Branzburg* from the case presently before us. If, as Mr. Justice Powell noted in

<sup>66</sup> *Baker v. F & F Investment Co.*, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 966, 93 S.Ct. 2147 (1973).

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 783-85. See also *U. S. v. Orsini*, 424 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y.1976).

that case, instances will arise in which First Amendment values outweigh the duty of a journalist to testify even in the context of a criminal investigation, surely in civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in non-disclosure of journalists' confidential news sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled disclosure.

Here was the start of a line of reasoning (one which took its departure from the widely damned *Branzburg* decision) that was to prove a protection for the journalist in the court-room faceup in which his testimony was demanded, disturbingly frequent as such was becoming. In civil cases, the public's interest was likely to weigh with the journalist's refusal to name his sources, and thus the journalist's position would outweigh the private litigant's demand for disclosure.

The argument was used repeatedly, and often successfully, in subsequent cases.<sup>68</sup> In one that rose in 1973, the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on a demand of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (Nixon) for news materials.<sup>69</sup> The Committee was party to civil actions arising out of the break-in at the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee. It had obtained subpoenas for reporters or management of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Washington Star-News*, and *Time* magazine to appear and bring all papers and documents they had relating to the break-in. The media ("movants") asked the court to quash the subpoenas.

Judge Richey defined the issue: Were the subpoenas valid under the First Amendment? He distinguished this case from *Branzburg*, noting that the re-election committee was not involved in criminal cases, but civil. He felt, furthermore, that the cases were of staggering moment: "\* \* \* unprecedented in the annals of legal history." "What is ultimately involved in these cases \* \* \* is the very integrity of the judicial and executive branches of our Government and our political processes in this country."<sup>70</sup>

Not only did the civil nature of the cases involving the re-election committee weigh for the media in Richey's opinion. He saw a chilling effect in the enforcement of the subpoenas upon the flow of information about Watergate to the press and thus to the public:<sup>71</sup>

This court stands convinced that if it allows the discouragement of investigative reporting into the highest levels of Government no amount of legal theorizing could allay

<sup>68</sup> See Press Censorship Newsletter, IX, April-May 1976, pp. 46, 48-9; *Loeholtz v. Fields*, 389 F.Supp. 1299 (D.Fla.1975).

<sup>69</sup> *Democratic National Committee v. McCord*, 356 F.Supp. 1394 (D.D.C.1973).

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 1395-1397.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 1397.

the public suspicions engendered by its actions and by the matters alleged in these lawsuits.

Then Richey balanced; as Justice Powell had instructed in *Branzburg*, a reporter's claim to privilege should be judged " \* \* \* 'on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony.'" Richey said that here, "The scales are heavily weighted in the Movants' [media's] favor." For the Committee for the Re-Election of the President had made no showing that "alternative sources of information have been exhausted or even approached. Nor has there been any positive showing of the materiality of the documents and other materials sought by the subpoenas [i. e., that the materials sought "go to the heart of the claim"]."<sup>72</sup>

But not only in civil cases, and not only in cases where unimpeded flow of news about matters of transcendent importance to self-government was of overriding importance, did *Branzburg* serve journalists seeking a shield. Even the legal proceeding which the Supreme Court plurality was so singularly concerned to elevate above reporter's privilege—namely, the grand jury investigation—could in some circumstances give way to the journalist's claim. This happened in the case of Lucy Ware Morgan, who for three years fought a 90-day contempt sentence for refusing to disclose her source, and finally won.<sup>73</sup> Her story in the St. Petersburg, Fla., *Times* brought two actions against her to compel her to say who told her of a grand jury's secret criticism of Police Chief Nixon. The Florida Supreme Court found the story innocuous. It overruled the lower court which had found that the mere preservation of secrecy in grand jury proceedings outweighed any First Amendment considerations. The high state court said "A nonspecific interest, even in keeping the inner workings of the Pentagon secret, has been held insufficient to override certain First Amendment values."<sup>74</sup> It found further that the proceedings against Morgan had an improper purpose—namely, "to force a newspaper reporter to disclose the source of published information, so that the authorities could silence the source." Then it called on the leading case in precedent:<sup>75</sup>

The present case falls squarely within this language in the *Branzburg* plurality opinion: "Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 1398. On exhausting the sources of information, see also *Conn. Labor Relations Board v. Fagin*, 2 Med.L.Rptr. 1765, 1766 (Conn.Super.Ct.1976); *Altomose Constr. Co. v. Building Trades Council of Phila.*, 443 F.Supp. 492, 2 Med.L.Rptr. 1878 (E.D.Pa.1977).

<sup>73</sup> *Morgan v. State*, 337 So.2d 951 (Fla.1976). See also *U. S. v. Orsini*, 424 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y.1976) for court approval for non-disclosure in a criminal case.

<sup>74</sup> *Morgan v. State*, 337 So.2d 951, 955 (Fla.1976).

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 956.

but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no justification."

Thus *Branzburg* notwithstanding, or in some cases *Branzburg* supporting, First Amendment protection for the reporter's shield was being discovered. As ACLU attorney Joel M. Gora said about the prospects, "In short, the situation is far from bleak."<sup>76</sup>

Nevertheless, neither Gora nor any person following the fortunes of the shield could wink at the severe barriers, and sometimes hardships, that adverse decisions were bringing. Not every jurisdiction agreed that the First Amendment furnished protection, or that *Branzburg* had conceded that even a modicum of such protection existed. Massachusetts, which had found none for Paul Pappas' testimony regarding criminal activities before *Branzburg* (above, p. 328), found none after *Branzburg* in a civil case where a reporter was called to testify concerning an alleged libel.<sup>77</sup> Nor could Idaho's Supreme Court find constitutional protection in a libel case where reporter-editor Jay Shelledy's testimony was sought (below, p. 338). A New York case found no First Amendment protection.<sup>78</sup> If reporters' shock and dismay at *Branzburg* were over-reaction—stemming perhaps from their ignorance of the history of the shield and of the doctrine of "absolute" press freedom—nevertheless, they could not be faulted for anxiety and anger. Probably more newsmen had gone to jail in the 1970s for refusing to reveal sources, than for any offense since 1798–1800 and the Alien and Sedition Acts.<sup>79</sup> Examining the situation under statutes of the states is instructive.

### Confidentiality under Statutes

The Supreme Court found little protection in the Constitution for the newsman called to testify, but it had made it plain that either Congress or the states might pass laws providing a shield against testifying. State statutes, in fact, dated back to that of Maryland in 1896. Of the 25 or more statutes that followed, some provided absolute protection and others qualified. The absolute or unqualified laws flatly prohibited compelling newsmen to testify, as Alabama's, passed in 1935 and amended in 1949:<sup>80</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Gora, p. 28. Gora's excellent handbook, prepared for the American Civil Liberties Union, should be owned by every reporter and editor. It covers true-to-life, practical problems in several fields of law that involve journalists, using a "Q and A" approach.

<sup>77</sup> *Dow Jones & Co., Inc., v. Superior Court of Mass.*, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973).

<sup>78</sup> *Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co.*, 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791 (1977), cert. denied — U.S. —, 98 S.Ct. 418 (1977); *People v. Dupree*, 88 Misc.2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1976).

<sup>79</sup> Quill, 61:1, Jan. 1973, p. 28.

<sup>80</sup> Ala.Code, Tit. 7, § 370, 1960.

No person engaged in, connected with, or employed on any newspaper (or radio broadcasting station or television station) while engaged in a news gathering capacity shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding or trial, before any court or before a grand jury of any court, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal or his agent or agents, or before any committee of the legislature, or elsewhere, the sources of any information procured or obtained by him and published in the newspaper (or broadcast by any broadcasting station or televised by any television station) on which he is engaged, connected with, or employed.

Among states that hedged the privilege, Illinois, for example, said that a person seeking the reporter's information could apply for an order divesting the newsman of the privilege. The application would have to state the specific information sought, its relevancy to the proceedings, and a specific public interest which would be adversely affected if the information sought were not disclosed. And the court would have to find, before granting divestiture of the privilege, that all other available sources of information had been exhausted and that disclosure of the information was essential to the protection of the public interest involved.<sup>81</sup>

But absolute or qualified, every state law contained loopholes through which under certain conditions, journalists could lose the privilege. Branzburg, before seeking constitutional protection, had failed to receive protection under Kentucky's statute. The statute gave him a firm shield, as a newspaper employee, against disclosing before a court or grand jury, the source of information procured by him and published in a newspaper. But the Kentucky court held that he himself was the source of information for a story reporting his observation of the manufacture of hashish by others. He would have to give the identity of the manufacturers—to identify those whom he saw breaking the law. It was contempt for him to refuse to do so.<sup>82</sup>

Peter Bridge of the *Newark Evening News* wrote a story about the alleged offer of a bribe to Pearl Beatty, a member of the Newark Housing Authority. He quoted her as saying that an unknown man offered to pay her \$10,000 to influence her vote for the appointment of an executive director of the authority. Subpoenaed to testify, he argued that the New Jersey statute—which preserved in his case its unbroken record of failing to protect New Jersey newsmen from testifying—should shield him. It said that

<sup>81</sup> Ill.Legis.H.Bill 1756, 1971, Gen. Assembly.

<sup>82</sup> Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky.1970). For a similar position under New York's statute, see *People v. Dupree*, 88 Misc.2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1976).

one employed by a newspaper has a privilege to refuse to disclose the source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom any information published in his newspaper was procured.<sup>83</sup> He appeared before a grand jury but refused to answer questions about the matter, citing the statute. But the court held that, under another state evidence rule, he had waived his privilege through disclosure in the story of part of the privileged matter. Having in that way given some of the information—including the identity of the source—he would have to give other relevant information. He too was in contempt, and served 21 days in jail until the grand jury's term expired.<sup>84</sup>

A case that by 1977 had enmeshed its principal for six years was that of William Farr, reporter for the *Los Angeles Herald Examiner* and later the *Los Angeles Times*. Reporting the murder trial of Charles Manson, Farr learned that a Mrs. Virginia Graham had given a statement to a district attorney in the case, claiming that a Manson "family" member, Susan Atkins, had confessed taking part in the multiple crimes and told of the group's plans for other murders. The judge in the case had ordered attorneys, witnesses and court employees not to release for public dissemination, any content or nature of testimony that might be given at the trial; but Farr obtained copies of the Graham statement, according to him from two attorneys in the case. The court learned that he had the statement. Farr refused to tell the court the names of the sources, and published a story carrying sensational details. Later, he identified a group of six attorneys as including the two. The judge queried them, and all denied being the source. Once more the court asked Farr for his sources, and he continued to refuse under the California newsmen's privilege law.<sup>85</sup> The court denied him protection under the statute and he appealed.

The appeals court upheld the conviction for contempt, essentially under the doctrine of the "inherent power" of courts to regulate judicial proceedings without interference from other government branches—a principle, as we have seen, reaching far back in the history of contempt. It said that courts' power of contempt is inherent in their constitutional status, and no legislative act could declare that certain acts do not constitute a contempt. If Farr were immunized from liability, it would violate the principle of separation of powers among the three branches of government; it would mean that the legislative branch could interfere with the judicial branch's power to control its own officers:<sup>86</sup>

<sup>83</sup> N.J.Stat.Ann. 2A:84A-21 (Supp.1970).

<sup>84</sup> *In re Bridge*, 120 N.J.Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972).

<sup>85</sup> West's Ann.Cal.Evidence Code § 1070 (1966).

<sup>86</sup> *Farr v. Superior Court of Calif.*; 22 Cal.App.3d 60, 99 Cal.Rptr. 342, 348, (1971). New Mexico's Supreme Court ruled similarly that that state's shield law

Without the ability to compel petitioner to reveal which of the six attorney officers of the court leaked the Graham statement to him, the court is without power to discipline the two attorneys who did so, both for their violations of the court order [concerning no publicity] and for their misstatement to the court that they were not the source of the leak.

Farr served 46 days in jail before he was released pending a further appeal, and in his uncertain freedom lived with the possibility of indeterminate, unlimited imprisonment if his appeal failed and he persisted in refusing to reveal his sources. That "coercive" sentence was later ruled by the courts to have no further purpose, as there was no likelihood that continuing it would induce Farr to testify. It was still possible, however, that he might have to serve a further "punitive" sentence for his contempt. Five years after the opening of the case against Farr—on Dec. 6, 1976—he was finally freed from the latter possibility by ruling of the California Court of Appeal, Second District.<sup>87</sup> He had served the longest jail term on record in the United States for refusing to reveal news sources, and his case had lasted longer than any other. But his ordeal was not over. Two of the six attorneys whom he had identified brought a libel suit for \$24 million against him. The trial court and the California Appellate Court ruled that the shield law did not protect him from answering questions in the case.<sup>88</sup> Again he appealed, the web of process that had held him so long persisting unbroken into the late days of 1977.

Though vulnerable under any law, newsmen occasionally got more protection from their states' courts than the statutes suggested might be available. One loophole in several "absolute" statutes was their lack of provision protecting the newsman from revealing *information* that he had gathered, even though it protected him from revealing the *source* of that information. Robert L. Taylor, president and general manager, and Earl Selby, city editor of the *Philadelphia Bulletin*, were convicted of contempt of court for refusing to produce documents in a grand jury investigation of possible corruption in city government. Both were fined \$1,000 and given five-day prison terms. They appealed, relying on the Pennsylvania statute stating that no newsman could be "required to disclose the source of any information" that he had obtained. "Source" they said, means "documents" as well as "personal informants." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, agreed. The

was without effect where testimony before courts was concerned: *Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.*, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).

<sup>87</sup> *In re William T. Farr*, 64 Cal.App.3d 605, 134 Cal.Rptr. 595 (1976); *Milwaukee Journal*, Dec. 7, 1976.

<sup>88</sup> 64 Cal.App.3d 605, 134 Cal.Rptr. 595 (1976). See also Quill, Nov. 1977, p. 14.



court said that the legislature, in passing the act, declared the gathering of news and protection of the source of news as of greater importance to the public interest than the disclosure of the alleged crime or criminal.<sup>89</sup>

Courts have insisted that no "evidentiary privilege," as it is sometimes called, exists unless a statute has been enacted declaring it. Reporter Alan Goodfader of Honolulu refused to tell a court the name of the person who told him that the personnel director of a government commission was likely to be fired at a commission meeting. He said that to disclose the name would be a grievous breach of his professional ethics, and challenged the authority of the court to compel him to do so. The Supreme Court of Hawaii upheld the lower court's order. It said that the free press guarantee of the First Amendment is not sufficient to protect a reporter from the requirement to divulge his confidential sources in court. In the absence of a "statutory grant," it said, the privilege does not exist.<sup>90</sup>

Finally, there is the rather special case of whether a shield against testifying is justified where a newspaper and reporter are sued for libel. If a reporter refuses to reveal an unnamed source who has allegedly libeled the plaintiff, may the plaintiff be foreclosed from discovering and confronting his accuser? Conversely, if the sources must be revealed, then is it not possible "for someone to file a libel suit as a pretext to discover the reporter's sources and subject them to harassment"?<sup>91</sup> This line of actions, of course, produced the suit which, perhaps more than any other, alerted the news world to the possibilities of danger in required testimony—*Garland v. Torre*, of 1958. As Marie Torre in that case, most other reporters since then who have been sued for libel have argued fruitlessly that they should not be required to name the source.

Shield statutes of Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee provide expressly that the privilege is not available to persons sued for libel,<sup>92</sup> and the New Jersey statute is construed by that state's high court<sup>93</sup> to be unavailing in a libel case. Supreme Courts of Massachusetts<sup>94</sup> and Idaho, which have no shield statutes, reject reporters' claims that there is an alternative First Amendment protection against the requiring of testimony—including testimony about sources of alleged libel. An Idaho decision, in which certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, confirmed a 30-day jail

<sup>89</sup> *In re Taylor*, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963).

<sup>90</sup> *In re Goodfader's Appeal*, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).

<sup>91</sup> *Gora*, p. 40.

<sup>92</sup> *Gora*, p. 247. And see *Ibid.*, pp. 243–48, for a summary of 25 states' shield laws.

<sup>93</sup> *Brogan v. Passaic Daily News*, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956).

<sup>94</sup> *Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Superior Court*, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973).

sentence for reporter-editor Jay Shelledy.<sup>95</sup> He had quoted a "police expert" as criticizing a state narcotics agent in a shooting incident, was sued for libel by the agent, and, refusing to reveal the name of the expert, was held in contempt.

Nonetheless, though reporters facing libel actions often go unshielded, protection exists in some jurisdictions. Before Marie Torre ever pleaded for protection, a decision under the shield law of Alabama had furnished it to a reporter who refused to reveal sources of a story on prison conditions.<sup>96</sup> And in a case without precedent (a "case of first impression"), in the year 1977 a split (2-1) federal appeals court ruled that a journalist's thoughts, opinions, and conclusions about a story he is preparing are his own, and he may not be required to disclose them to persons suing him for libel. Mike Wallace and Barry Lando, correspondent and producer of a CBS "60 Minutes" program segment, had cast doubt on charges by former Lt. Col. Anthony Herbert that Army officers had concealed atrocities by American troops in the Vietnam War. Herbert sued for libel, and in pre-trial proceedings, Lando refused to answer questions about his thought process in preparing the show. A trial-court judge said Lando must respond, but Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said "no." Such inquiries, he said, "strike to the heart of the vital human component of the editorial process."<sup>97</sup>

We must permit only those procedures in libel actions which least conflict with the principle that debate on public issues should be robust and uninhibited.

If we were to allow selective disclosure of how a journalist formulated his judgments on what to print or not to print, we would be condoning judicial review of the editor's thought processes.

Such an inquiry, which on its face would be virtually boundless, endangers a constitutionally protected realm, and unquestionably puts a freeze on the free interchange of ideas within the news room.

A reporter or editor, aware that his thoughts might have to be justified in a court of law, would often be discouraged and dissuaded from the creative verbal testing, probing and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives which are the *sine qua non* of responsible journalism.

<sup>95</sup> *Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co.*, 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791 (1977), certiorari denied — U.S. —, 98 S.Ct. 418 (1977).

<sup>96</sup> *Ex parte Sparrow*, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D.Ala.1953).

<sup>97</sup> *New York Times*, Nov. 8, 1977, p. 1.

### Summarizing Issues in Confidentiality

The *Branzburg* decision having hedged heavily the constitutional protection that the news world sought, the media turned to lobbying for statutes at the state and federal levels, and to strengthening existing state statutes. The number of states with statutes reached 26 by 1975,<sup>98</sup> about half of them passed during the 1960s and 1970s. At the federal level, the major news organizations turned their leaders and lawyers to work in appearances before congressional committees. They found strong support and strong opposition among congressmen. It was estimated in early 1973 that more than 50 bills offering a shield had been introduced.<sup>99</sup> Whatever the level of government, the issues were similar.

(1) What are the competing social values in granting or denying newsmen an immunity from testifying? The newsmen's ethic of not betraying sources, and his property right in not losing his effectiveness and value as a reporter through losing his sources, had long been asserted unsuccessfully in cases under the common law. Now he was grounding his claim in society's loss of his service if he lost his sources through betraying them.

Earl Caldwell was one of a corporal's guard of reporters who had gained the confidence of the Black Panthers at a time when society had a real need to know about this alienated group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Caldwell's argument that he would lose the Panthers' confidence if he even entered the secret grand jury chambers, for this extremely sensitive group would not know what he might say under the compulsion of the legal agency.<sup>1</sup> And if Caldwell could not report the Panthers, society was the real loser. This situation illustrated the difference between the values served in the case of privilege for the journalist and that for the doctor, lawyer, or clergyman:

“ \* \* \* the doctor-patient privilege is there to make it possible for patients to get better medical care. A journalist's privilege should be there not only to make it possible for a journalist to get better stories, but to contribute to the public's right to know. So in that sense it is a more critical privilege than some of these other privileges, which are based primarily on the relationship between two people.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>98</sup> Press Censorship Newsletter No. VIII, Oct.–Nov. 1975, p. 29.

<sup>99</sup> Thomas Collins, “Congress Grapples with Press Bill,” *Milwaukee Journal*, March 25, 1973, p. 16.

<sup>1</sup> *Caldwell v. U. S.*, 434 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1970).

<sup>2</sup> House of Rep. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 3, 92 Cong., 2d Sess., “Newsmen's Privilege,” Hearings, Testimony of Victor Navasky, Oct. 5, 1972, p. 236.

Asserting an equal service in the cause of the "public's right to know" was the position that in many circumstances, government-as-the-public sought information vital to the public weal, from newsmen. In *State v. Knops*,<sup>3</sup> an "underground" newspaper editor refused to tell a grand jury the names of people to whom he had talked about the bombing of a university building that killed a professor, and about alleged arson of another university building. "[T]he appellant's information could lead to the apprehension and conviction of the person or persons who committed a major criminal offense resulting in the death of an innocent person," said the Wisconsin Supreme Court in denying privilege to editor Mark Knops.<sup>4</sup> Here government was saying that the journalist was practicing secrecy similar to that which he so often criticized in government, and that government was trying to serve the public's right to know about a major crime.

A few newsmen, meanwhile, rejected the notion that the privilege was either needed by or appropriate to the journalist. They said that most journalists of the nation had done their work for decades without a shield. And they worried about unethical reporters' using a shield law to hide behind in dishonest reporting.<sup>5</sup>

(2) Can the news gathering function be protected by a qualified immunity, or must it be absolute? Hard positions for absolute shields were taken by many journalists and their organizations including the directors of the American Newspaper Publishers Association and those of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.<sup>6</sup> U.S. Sen. Alan Cranston of California, a former reporter, introduced a bill in Congress that was sweeping, simple and unconditional, saying that

\* \* \* a person connected with or employed by the news media or press cannot be required by a court, a legislature, or any administrative body to disclose before the Congress or any federal court or agency any information or the source of any information procured for publication or broadcast.<sup>7</sup>

Many taking the absolutist view argued from the position that government in the early 1970's—and especially the federal executive branch—was actively seeking ways to curb the press, trying to "prevent the press from performing its duties."<sup>8</sup> From this vantage

<sup>3</sup> *State v. Knops*, 49 Wis.2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, at 99.

<sup>5</sup> Quill, 61:4, April 1973, p. 38.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 61:1, Jan. 1973, p. 29.

<sup>7</sup> Editor & Publisher, Aug. 19, 1972, p. 9.

<sup>8</sup> A. M. Rosenthal, "Press Government Conflict Escalates," *Milwaukee Journal*, Feb. 11, 1973, p. 1; N. E. Isaacs, "Beyond the 'Caldwell' Decision: 1," *Columbia Journalism Rev.*, Sept./Oct. 1972, p. 18; P. J. Bridge, "Absolute Immunity, Absolutely," Quill 61:1, Jan. 1973, p. 8.

point, qualifications in a shield bill often were seen as loopholes through which government could fire at the mass media. A qualified protection was no shield to these. They rejected the minority opinion in *Branzburg v. Hayes* that urged a shield unless the government could show a compelling and overriding interest in the information. The absolutists felt that courts would find "compelling and overriding interest" readily—ignoring the fact that the federal trial and appeals courts had protected Earl Caldwell under that principle the first time that it had appeared in a shield case.<sup>9</sup> Past protection afforded by qualified state shield laws under such circumstances, they held, was unlikely to be equal to the new challenge from government.

Yet "absolute" protection was a chimera, however much some states' statutes might be labeled with that word, as we have seen in the previous section.<sup>10</sup> And a federal statute of any kind became a more and more remote possibility as years of drafting, committee work, and lobbying progressed. The House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee under Rep. Robert Kastenmaier labored year after year, producing a qualified version that was introduced into the House but was referred back. The possibility was still alive in mid-1976, but no bill resulted.<sup>11</sup>

States' qualifications were many: that the shield could be lowered if the government could show that all other sources of information had been exhausted and disclosure of the information was essential to the public interest; that disclosure could be required upon an order from a superior court; that privilege would not be granted where a reporter was testifying in a libel suit brought for words in his story; that disclosure was essential to prevent injustice; that the shield would protect a reporter from testifying about material that had not been published or broadcast but not from testifying on what had been published or broadcast.

(3) Also at issue was the question: Who deserves the shield? and following that: Would not defining "reporter" in effect be to license the newsman and thus bring him under state control? The United States Supreme Court in denying Paul Branzburg protection summarized the question and found that deciding it would bring practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order:<sup>12</sup>

Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a

<sup>9</sup> *Caldwell v. U. S.*, 434 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1970).

<sup>10</sup> AP Log, Sept. 3-9, 1973, pp. 1, 4.

<sup>11</sup> Press Censorship Newsletter No. IX, April-May 1976, p. 53.

<sup>12</sup> *Branzburg v. Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2668 (1972).

questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods \* \* \*. Freedom of the press is a "fundamental personal right" which "is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets \* \* \*. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion \* \* \*." The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the public, that he relies on confidential sources of information, and that these sources will be silenced if he is forced to make disclosures before a grand jury.

Profound as the question was, it did not deter states as they adopted statutes from 1970 onward. New York's 1970 law defined "professional journalist" and "newscaster" in its law that protected only those agencies normally considered "mass media"—newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television transmission station or network.<sup>13</sup> Illinois, in its 1971 statute, defined "reporter" as one who worked for similar media.<sup>14</sup> Neither included books among the media immunized; neither included scholars and researchers among the persons immunized. In two cases, courts have ruled that state statutes which gave protection specifically to newspapers did not protect magazines.<sup>15</sup> But in late 1977, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, ruled that Arthur Buzz Hirsch, a film maker engaged in preparing a documentary on Karen Silkwood who had died mysteriously in a puzzling auto accident in Oklahoma, was indeed protected by the First Amendment in refusing to disclose confidential information concerning his investigation. This was the case despite the fact that the Oklahoma shield law gave protection only to those "regularly engaged in

<sup>13</sup> McKinney's N.Y.Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (Supp.1971).

<sup>14</sup> Ill.Legis.H.Bill 1756, 1971 Gen. Assembly.

<sup>15</sup> Application of Cepeda, 233 F.Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y.1964); Deltec, Inc. v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F.Supp. 788 (N.D.Ohio 1960).

obtaining, writing, reviewing, editing or otherwise preparing news."<sup>16</sup>

### SEC. 60. CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION (CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT)

**The United States Supreme Court, under the clear and present danger doctrine, has largely eliminated the citation and conviction of news media for contempt for admonishing or criticizing courts while cases are pending.**

For a century and a half, contempt actions for publishing news and editorial comment about the judicial branch lived a robust life, although unrecognized in some jurisdictions for nearly all this time.<sup>17</sup> It was axiomatic that courts could not function properly, that the administration of justice would be harmed, that the scales of justice would be joggled, if news media were freely allowed to publish criticisms of judges while cases were pending, or to attempt to influence judges or participants in pending cases, or to publish grossly false or inaccurate reports of court trials. "When a case is finished," said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in a federal decision of 1907, "courts are subject to the same criticism as other people, but the propriety and necessity of preventing interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument or intimidation hardly can be denied."<sup>18</sup> Eleven years later, the Supreme Court in upholding another conviction of a newspaper that had commented freely on a case pending in court, relied on the "reasonable tendency" rule: "Not the influence upon the mind of the particular judge is the criterion [of the offensiveness of newspaper comment] but the reasonable tendency of the acts done to influence or bring about the baleful result is the test."<sup>19</sup>

But the reasonable tendency formulation that critics of the law had decried for generations as an arrogantly restrictive device of courts attempting to preserve the status quo against critics of government finally gave way. So did the "pending case" doctrine. And, importantly, the courts restored the force of the federal contempt statute of 1831, which had said punishment for contempts does not extend to any cases "except the misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice"—a law seemingly ignored in the Supreme Court's decisions of 1907 and 1918 which had punished critical publications by newspapers.

<sup>16</sup> *Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee*, see "Court Protects Film Maker's Sources," *News Media & the Law*, 1:1 (Oct. 1977), p. 26.

<sup>17</sup> *Nelles and King*, op. cit.; Ronald L. Goldfarb, *The Contempt Power*, New York, 1963.

<sup>18</sup> *Patterson v. State of Colo. ex rel. Attorney General*, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct. 556 (1907).

<sup>19</sup> *Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U. S.*, 247 U.S. 402, 421, 38 S.Ct. 560 (1918).

Justice Holmes, who wrote the decision in the 1907 case that upheld a contempt finding, dissented in the 1918 case that did the same: "so near thereto," he said, means so near as actually to obstruct justice, and misbehavior means more than unfavorable comment or even disrespect.<sup>20</sup> In 1941, the Supreme Court majority agreed, and held that "so near thereto" means physical proximity and that punishment by summary contempt proceedings for published criticism is precluded.<sup>21</sup>

Then in a series of decisions in quick succession during the 1940s, the United States Supreme Court engaged in a remarkable release of its long-standing power, telling the entire judicial branch to do the same. In *Bridges v. California*,<sup>22</sup> both the pending case rule and the reasonable tendency test gave way under the majority opinion written by Justice Hugo Black. In two differing cases, combined under the *Bridges* title, trial-court judges had convicted Californians for contempt by publications that had admonished authorities about decisions in pending cases. In one case, the *Los Angeles Times* had warned a judge not to give probation to two convicts; in the other, labor leader Harry Bridges had threatened to tie up the entire west coast with a longshoreman's strike if a judge's ruling in a case were enforced.

Black said in addressing the pending case rule that contempt judgments punishing publications made during the pendency of a case<sup>23</sup>

\* \* \* produce their restrictive results at the precise time when public interest in the matters discussed would naturally be at its height. \* \* \* An endless series of moratoria on public discussion, even if each were very short, could hardly be dismissed as an insignificant abridgement of freedom of expression. And to assume that each would be short is to overlook the fact that the "pendency" of a case is frequently a matter of months or even years rather than days or weeks.

As for the rule that the publication, to be contempt, need present only a reasonable tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of justice, he denied it and applied a different test: whether the publication presented an immediate likelihood that justice would be thwarted—whether there were a "clear and present danger" that the publication would obstruct justice. The famous rule, expressed first in 1919 by Justice Holmes in *Schenck v. United States*<sup>24</sup> (a case

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, at 422.

<sup>21</sup> *Nye v. United States*, 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810 (1941).

<sup>22</sup> 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941).

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, at 268–269.

<sup>24</sup> 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919).



involving seditious, rather than contemptuous expression), now was expanded to embrace alleged contempt of court. Neither a reasonable tendency nor an inherent tendency of words to interfere with the orderly administration of justice was sufficient to justify restriction of publication, said Black. Instead, there must be a clear and present danger that the substantive evil would come about. The use of the test was continued in *Pennekamp v. Florida*,<sup>25</sup> *Craig v. Harney*,<sup>26</sup> and *Wood v. Georgia*,<sup>27</sup> in all of which convictions were overturned. Courts since then have found it largely fruitless to levy contempt charges for publication of criticism.

While the clear and present danger rule, in turn, was later to give way to other tests<sup>28</sup> and other reasoning in various spheres of the law, it had served as the instrument for freeing voices that had been muffled in commenting on courts of law. Contempt for publishing criticism of the judiciary, which was in effect the power to punish for the ancient, odious, and discredited crime of sedition, was dead. The rare contempt citation and conviction for publishing criticism of a court that occurs today is invariably overruled on appeal.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029 (1946).

<sup>26</sup> 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947).

<sup>27</sup> 370 U.S. 375, 82 S.Ct. 1364 (1962).

<sup>28</sup> E. g., *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827 (1969), where the court ruled that the Constitution does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."

<sup>29</sup> E. g., *Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers*, 34 Ill.App.3d 645, 339 N.E.2d 477, 2 Med.L.Rptr. 2288 (1977).

## Chapter 11

### CRIMINAL WORDS: OBSCENITY AND BLASPHEMY

#### Sec.

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#### SEC. 61. OBSCENITY: THE FREEDOM TO READ *VERSUS* CONCEPTS OF CONTROL

American courts and legislatures have long been searching for a “dim and uncertain line” which separates obscenity from constitutionally protected expression.

Legislatures and courts in this nation labor—with little discernible success to date—to decide what to do about what Justice John Marshall Harlan termed “the intractable obscenity problem.”<sup>1</sup> Every term of the Supreme Court of the United States seems to bring a new wave of obscenity cases, as if each year echoes the fear expressed by Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1948 that the Court would become the High Court of Obscenity.<sup>2</sup> Since Jackson’s words were spoken, the task of attempting to define obscenity has increasingly become that of the Supreme Court. Aging, dignified members of the Court have been forced to study works including John Cleland’s *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure* and even more explicit (and raunchier) depictions of sexual activities in print and on film.

The wording of the Justices’ opinions about obscenity over the years has reflected profound discomfort. The Justices have complained that they are judges, not literary historians or philosophers. One continuing problem, of course, is that one person’s obscenity may be another’s art. As Justice Potter Stewart noted, the Court

<sup>1</sup> *Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas*, 390 U.S. 676, 704, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 1313 (1968), in Justice Harlan’s concurring and dissenting opinion.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Anthony Lewis, “Sex and the Supreme Court,” *Esquire* Vol. 59 (June, 1963) p. 82.

persists in trying to define what may be indefinable. He added that he can not define obscenity, but that he knows it when he sees it.<sup>3</sup> In attempting to define the obscene, the Supreme Court has had to try to find a dim and uncertain—and certainly nonexistent—line which separates obscenity from constitutionally protected expression.

In searching for such an elusive line, American courts have been left floundering by a society which makes enormous financial successes of literature, motion pictures, art and advertising which celebrate (or at least suggest or imply) all manner of sexual exploits and bodily functions. As is discussed in Sec. 66 of this chapter, the Supreme Court in 1973 attempted to shift much of the burden of judging what is and what is not obscene from the Court to states and localities. The obscenity problem, however, simply will not go away. The Court, finds itself much in the position of a child trying to throw away an unwanted boomerang.

So the battle lines are drawn, and so the fight continues. The courts are faced with cases which call for choices between countervailing interests: protecting the public from noxious literature or films, and protecting the freedom to read or see.<sup>4</sup>

### The Freedom to Read

The freedom to read is implicit in the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.<sup>5</sup> But the freedom to read, as part of our freedoms of speech and press, is not absolute.<sup>6</sup> For the most part, however, we are free to read what we wish. It may not occur to most Americans that many books they enjoy reading today might have been banned as obscene and held out of circulation in another time or place.

The late Jake Ehrlich, one of America's leading criminal lawyers, once said that "every book that is worthwhile was condemned somewhere by someone."<sup>7</sup> Ehrlich's statement is accurate, for such works as Keats' *Endymion*, Shelley's *Queen Mab*, Whitman's *Leaves of Grass*, DeFoe's *Moll Flanders*, Dreiser's *An American Tragedy*

<sup>3</sup> Concurring opinion in *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683 (1964).

<sup>4</sup> Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Government and Mass Communications*, 2 vols. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947), Vol. I, pp. 210-211.

<sup>5</sup> See, e. g., *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697, 713-717, 51 S.Ct. 625, 630-631 (1931); *Ex Parte Jackson*, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1897).

<sup>6</sup> See, e. g., *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931); *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919).

<sup>7</sup> David Perlman, "Howl! Not Obscene, Judge Rules," *San Francisco Chronicle*, Oct. 4, 1957, p. 1. See also *People of the State of California v. Lawrence Ferlinghetti* (Municipal Court, Dept. 10, San Francisco, Calif., Oct. 3, 1957.)

and various editions of the Bible have at some time been condemned as obscene.<sup>8</sup>

That list of classic titles which have been banned indicates that the freedom to read cannot be taken for granted. Statutes which make it a criminal offense to distribute or to possess obscene literature are one way in which that freedom may be diminished. Such statutes, which will be discussed later in this chapter, draw no lines between obscenity and art. Obscenity is never really defined: instead, various synonyms are used by statutes and by court decisions interpreting those statutes. The statutes and court decisions say only that writings, pictures, statues, and substances which are obscene, lewd, immoral, lascivious, lecherous, libidinous, licentious, and so forth, may not be circulated in or imported into this nation.<sup>9</sup>

The roots of the freedom to read may be traced to what has been called the Democratic Creed, which has been expressed in the writings of John Milton, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill and many others. As Milton wrote in his *Areopagitica* in 1644:<sup>10</sup>

Since \* \* \* the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with less danger, scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of tractates and hearing all manner of reason?

Milton, who later in life served as a censor himself, clearly had a rather limited view of freedom. His ringing words have risen above his frailties, however, and the idea that knowledge of any kind will make people better able to cope with life is basic to the freedom to read.

### Concepts of Control

Concepts of control, to the contrary, have as their premise the notion that human beings are inherently weak and can be further weakened or even destroyed by reading improper literature. Attempts to censor literature regarded as obscene—or to legislate

<sup>8</sup> Stanley Fleishman et. al., Brief for Appellant in the Supreme Court of the United States (in the case of David S. Alberts v. State of California, No. 61, Oct. Term, 1956) p. 78.

<sup>9</sup> See, e. g., cases interpreting such statutes such as *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 493-494, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1314 (1957); *United States v. Bennett*, 24 Fed.Cas. 1093, 1104, No. 14,571 (S.D.N.Y.1879); *United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses,"* 5 F.Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y.1933); *Besig v. United States*, 208 F.2d 142, 146 (9th Cir. 1953); William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure, "Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution," *Minnesota Law Review* 38:4 (March, 1954) p. 324.

<sup>10</sup> John Milton, *The Student's Milton*, ed. by Frank Allen Patterson (Rev. ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1933), p. 738.

against obscene literature—are grounded on the assumption that if persons read such material, antisocial thoughts or actions will occur.

The roots of the various concepts of control may be traced to such varying personalities as Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Anthony Comstock. This wildly differing trio had at least one thing in common: all approved state control of moral virtue. Plato asserted that poets should be censored lest their subtleties corrupt children. St. Thomas believed that the aim of laws should be to make people good, and it followed that the control of the arts as part of education was within the sphere of human laws.<sup>11</sup>

Anthony Comstock was a Victorian American who played a major and sexually preoccupied part in the passage of federal and state obscenity statutes in the United States. These statutes were calculated to protect the young and the weak from being defiled by impure literature. Comstock was not without legal precedents to trot out in his attacks on literature, although the extent to which "obscenity" was a crime under English Common Law is by no means clear.<sup>12</sup>

An early case in the Anglo-American legal tradition which involved obscene conduct was that of *The King v. Sir Charles Sedley*. In 1663, Sir Charles—nude, drunk and noisily talkative—appeared on a London balcony and delivered a lengthy harangue to the crowd which gathered below him. He hurled bottles filled with an "offensive liquor" upon the crowd.<sup>13</sup>

Hurling flasks, however, was not the same as publishing. Perhaps the first *recorded* prosecution for publication of obscene literature was Curll's case, circa 1727. Curll had published a nastily anti-Catholic writing called "Venus in the Cloister or the Nun in Her Smock," which was suppressed as a threat to morals.<sup>14</sup> This decision apparently had little effect on the flourishing sale of lusty literature, and by the 19th Century, England had entered into what has been called its pornographic period.

In America, meanwhile, the Tariff Act of 1842 forbade the "importation of all indecent and obscene prints, paintings, lithographs, engravings, and transparencies."<sup>15</sup> In 1865, in response to complaints about the reading materials (including Cleland's *Memoirs of*

<sup>11</sup> Mortimer Adler, *Art & Prudence* (1st ed., New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1937), p. 103.

<sup>12</sup> H. Montgomery Hyde, *A History of Pornography* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Girous, 1965) pp. 165, 174.

<sup>13</sup> Noted in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the "Fanny Hill" case, 383 U.S. 413, 428n., 86 S.Ct. 975, 983n. (1966).

<sup>14</sup> Hyde, *op. cit.*, p. 165; 2 Strange 788, 93 Eng.Rep. 849 (N.D.1727).

<sup>15</sup> U. S. Public Statutes at Large, Vol. 5, Ch. 270, Sec. 28, pp. 566-567.

a *Woman of Pleasure*), Congress for the first time outlawed mailing obscene matter.<sup>16</sup>

### The Comstock Law

Anthony Comstock began his decency campaign shortly after the Civil War, and fervently denounced anyone who spoke up against him as lechers and defilers of American Womanhood.

"MORALS, not Art or Literature!" was the Comstockian battle cry.<sup>17</sup> In 1873, censorious pressure groups who favored what has come to be called "Comstockery" helped to force an obscenity bill through both houses of Congress. This law provided a maximum criminal punishment of a \$5,000 fine or a five-year penitentiary term, or both for anyone who sent obscene matter through the mail.<sup>18</sup> Although amended several times to broaden the definition of "obscene matter," the law is still on the books. The law now provides, in part, that:<sup>19</sup>

Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device or substance; and \* \* \*

Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters \* \* \* may be obtained \* \* \*

Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.

The 1873 Comstock Law was the forerunner of many other obscenity laws and ordinances which were soon thereafter enacted at the federal, state and local government levels. In California, for example, an obscenity law was put on the books within a year after the passage of the first Comstock law.<sup>20</sup>

### The Hicklin Rule

Once the laws were passed, it was up to the American courts to decide how the laws should be applied. When obscenity cases reached the American courts, there was little American precedent to

<sup>16</sup> James C. N. Paul and Murray L. Schwartz, *Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961) p. 244, citing *Congressional Globe*, 38th Congress, 2nd Sess., pp. 660-662 (1865).

<sup>17</sup> Alpert, loc. cit.

<sup>18</sup> 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461. See *Historical and Revision Notes*, p. 491.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> See *West's Ann.Cal.Pen.Code*, §§ 311-314.

follow. So, American courts found a decision which was to lay a chilling hand on the circulation of literature for years to come: the 1868 decision, in England, in the case of *Regina v. Hicklin*.

In *Hicklin*, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn ruled that an anti-Catholic pamphlet, *The Confessional Unmasked*, was obscene. Lord Cockburn set down this test for obscenity:<sup>21</sup>

Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort might fall.

This "Hicklin rule" was readily accepted by American courts.<sup>22</sup> It can be seen that this test of obscenity echoed the concepts of control voiced by Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas and seconded, with more fervor and far less intellect, by America's own Anthony Comstock. Under such a test, a book did not have to offend or harm a normal adult. If it could be assumed that a book might have a bad effect on children or abnormal adults—"those whose minds are open to such immoral influences"—such a book could be suppressed.

American law added the so-called "partly obscene" test to the *Hicklin* rule. This was the practice of judging a book by passages pulled out of context. If a book had any obscenity in it, the entire book was obscene.<sup>23</sup> Perhaps the most troublesome portion of the *Hicklin* rule, for Americans who tried to defend their freedom to read, was the statement that a book was obscene if it suggested "thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character."<sup>24</sup> This judicial preoccupation with *thoughts* induced by the reading of literature—with no requirement that antisocial actions be tied to the reading matter—has continued to this time. In the law of obscenity, no harm or even likelihood of harm to readers need be shown in order to suppress a book as obscene.<sup>25</sup>

In 1913, Judge Learned Hand wrote an often quoted protest against the *Hicklin* rule, which he termed "mid-Victorian precedent." Although Judge Hand felt compelled to uphold the condemnation as obscene of Daniel Goodman's novel *Hagar Revelley*, the judge wrote:<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 370 (1868).

<sup>22</sup> See *United States v. Bennett*, 24 Fed.Cas. 1093, 1103-1104, No. 14,571 (S.D.N.Y.1879); *Commonwealth v. Friede*, 271 Mass. 318, 320, 171 N.E. 472, 473 (1930).

<sup>23</sup> *Lockhart & McClure*, op. cit., p. 343.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 339.

<sup>25</sup> See *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 490, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312 (1957); see also dictum by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, *Beauharnais v. Illinois*, 343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S.Ct. 725, 735 (1952).

<sup>26</sup> *United States v. Kennerley*, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y.1913).

I question whether in the end men will regard that as obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate expression of innocent ideas, and whether they will not believe that truth and beauty are too precious to be mutilated in the interests of those most likely to pervert them to base uses. Indeed, it seems hardly likely that even today we are so lukewarm in our interest in letters or serious discussion to be content to reduce our treatment of sex to the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few, or that shame will long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the most serious and beautiful sides of human nature \* \* \*.

Despite such moving protests, the *Hicklin* rule remained the leading test of obscenity in America until the 1930s.<sup>27</sup>

### The Ulysses Decision

About this time, however, other American courts began to relax enforcement of the *Hicklin* rule to some extent. A mother who wrote a book to help her children learn about sex—and who later published the book at the suggestion of friends—successfully defended herself against charges that the book (*Sex Side of Life*) was obscene.<sup>28</sup> And in 1933, James Joyce's famed stream-of-consciousness novel *Ulysses*, now an acknowledged classic, was the target of an obscenity prosecution under the Tariff Act of 1930.<sup>29</sup>

Customs officers had prevented an actress from bringing *Ulysses* into this country. An American publishing firm, Random House, Inc., learned of the seizure of the book, intervened in the case, and pleaded that the court read the book in its entirety to see whether it was truly obscene. When *Ulysses* reached trial, Judge John Woolsey—a literate man acquainted with far more than law books—did read the entire book. He attacked the *Hicklin* test head-on and ruled that *Ulysses* was art, not obscenity. His decision has become one of the most noted in the law of criminal words, even though it by no means brought the end of the *Hicklin* rule, which continued to appear, in varying degrees of virulence, in the decisions of some other courts.<sup>30</sup> Overrated or not, the *Ulysses* decision represents an often cited step toward nullifying some of the most obnoxious aspects of the old *Hicklin* yardstick.

<sup>27</sup> See, e. g., *Commonwealth v. Friede*, 271 Mass. 318, 320, 171 N.E. 472, 473 (1930).

<sup>28</sup> *United States v. Dennett*, 39 F.2d 564, 76 American Law Reports 1092 (2d Cir. 1931).

<sup>29</sup> *United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"* 5 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.1933); Paul and Schwartz, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>30</sup> See e. g., *United States v. Two Obscene Books*, 99 F.Supp. 760 (N.D.Cal. 1951), affirmed as *Besig v. United States*, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953).



The *Ulysses* decision provided a new definition of obscenity for other courts to consider: that a book is obscene if it<sup>31</sup>

tends to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually impure and lustful thoughts. Whether a particular book would tend to excite such impulses must be the test by the court's opinion as to its effect (when judged as a whole) on a person with average sex instincts.

Four principles of law came from the *Ulysses* decision which had not then been accepted by most other courts:

- (1) The purpose of the author in writing his book was taken into account. This was one way of giving a book a kind of judicial benefit of the doubt, because a court could disregard "impure" words if purity of purpose was found.
- (2) The opinion rejected the isolated passages ("partly obscene") standard for judging whether a book was obscene. Instead, a book was considered as a whole, by its dominant effect.
- (3) A book was judged by its effect on reasonable persons, not children or abnormal adults.
- (4) Finally, literary or artistic merit was weighed against any incidental obscenity in the book.<sup>32</sup>

Only one portion of the old *Hicklin* rule appeared in Judge Woolsey's *Ulysses* opinion: the emphasis on thoughts produced by a book as an indicator of a book's obscene effect on a reader. This judicial preoccupation with thoughts—and the tests outlined by Judge Woolsey in 1933—are markedly similar to rules for judging obscenity laid down in the Supreme Court's landmark decision in the 1957 case of *Roth v. United States*.<sup>33</sup>

## SEC. 62. THE ROTH LANDMARK

**In *Roth v. United States*, the Supreme Court held that obscenity is not constitutionally protected expression and set down its most influential standard for judging what is—or is not—obscene.**

Even though efforts to control obscenity have a long history in this nation, it was not until the reasonably recent date of 1957—in the case of *Roth v. United States*—that the Supreme Court directly upheld the constitutionality of obscenity statutes.<sup>34</sup> This decision remains the most influential case in the law of obscenity because it declared that both state and federal anti-obscenity laws are valid exercises of government's police power.

<sup>31</sup> 5 F.Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y.1933).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 182–184.

<sup>33</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

Although this decision is customarily called “the Roth case,” it embraced two cases. The Court simultaneously decided cases involving New York book dealer Samuel Roth and Los Angeles book merchant David S. Alberts.<sup>35</sup> Roth was indicted on 26 counts on suspicion of violating the federal obscenity statute by mailing various circulars plus a book, *American Aphrodite*. A United States district court jury convicted Roth on four of the 26 counts, and Judge John M. Cashin imposed the maximum sentence: a \$5,000 fine plus a five-year penitentiary term. The conviction was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although the great Judge Jerome Frank questioned the constitutionality of obscenity laws in a powerful concurring opinion. In words which have been called the beginning of the modern law of obscenity, Judge Frank declared that obscenity laws are unconstitutionally vague.<sup>36</sup> Writing with great force and humor, Judge Frank noted that Benjamin Franklin, named Postmaster General by the First Continental Congress, had written books, including *The Speech of Polly Baker*, which a 20th Century jury might find obscene. He added,<sup>37</sup>

The troublesome aspect of the federal obscenity statute \* \* \* is that (a) no one can now show that with any reasonable probability obscene publications tend to have any effects on the behavior of normal, average adults, and (b) that under the [federal] statute \* \* \* punishment is apparently inflicted for provoking, in such adults, undesirable sexual thoughts, feelings, or desire—not overt dangerous or anti-social conduct, either actual or probable.

Despite Judge Frank’s denunciation of the “exquisite vagueness” of obscenity laws, Chief Judge Clark’s opinion for the Court of Appeals carried the day against Roth. Judge Clark refused to consider the contention that obscenity statutes are unconstitutionally vague curbs on speech and press. The judge held that such an argument of unconstitutionality could be considered only by the Supreme Court of the United States because that Court had previously held the federal obscenity statutes to be constitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari.<sup>38</sup>

### Alberts v. California

While Roth came to grief under a federal statute, David S. Alberts had been charged with violating a state law. The California

<sup>35</sup> *United States v. Roth*, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956); *People v. Alberts*, 138 Cal.App.2d Supp. 909, 911, 292 P.2d 90, 91–92 (1956).

<sup>36</sup> 237 F.2d 796, 826–827 (2d Cir. 1956).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 802, 806. Stanley Fleishman, “Witchcraft and Obscenity: Twin Superstitions,” *Wilson Library Bulletin*, April, 1965, p. 4.

<sup>38</sup> 352 U.S. 964, 77 S.Ct. 361 (1957).

statute involved provided that anyone who "writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for sale, or exhibits an obscene or indecent writing \* \* \* is guilty of a misdemeanor." Another clause of this section forbids the advertising of obscene or indecent writings.<sup>39</sup>

Alberts ran a mail-order book business in Los Angeles, Calif. In 1955, he was served with a warrant and his business office, warehouse, and residence were all searched. Police seized hundreds possibly thousands—of pictures and books.<sup>40</sup> At the trial in Beverly Hills Municipal Court, the district attorney selected from among the items seized 31 books, a large number of pictures, and 10 magazines. These items, along with three different mail order advertising circulars, were divided into 22 exhibits. The judge found the books in two exhibits to be obscene:<sup>41</sup>

Exhibit 9: [titles of books] "To Beg I Am Ashamed," "Witch on Wheels," "The Pleasures of the Torture Chamber," and "She Made It Pay."

Exhibit 11. "Sword of Desire."

Although the books in these two exhibits were found obscene, the trial judge did not read them in their entirety, showing that the *Ulysses* decision's 1933 holding that a book should be judged as a whole was not always followed.<sup>42</sup> In discussing "Sword of Desire," the judge wrote:

This book is about a psychiatrist who is using his ability in the touching of certain nerve centers, and so forth, to develop a sexual desire in any woman. Up to where I read he had used it twice. I did not go beyond p. 49.

The judge added about "Snow Job," "And I suppose that I could read through the rest of the book and continue to find references to sex, because that definitely seems to be what it is for."<sup>43</sup>

Alberts' conviction was upheld by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court for the State of California in Los Angeles County. This court concluded that the words "obscene" and "indecent" were not unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court of the United States then noted probable jurisdiction over the Alberts case.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>39</sup> West's Ann.Cal.Pen.Code, § 311.

<sup>40</sup> Fleishman, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, Alberts was tried by a judge sitting alone since Alberts had waived jury trial.

<sup>42</sup> *United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses,"* 5 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.1933).

<sup>43</sup> Justice Brennan quoting judge's charge to the jury in the original trial 911 (1956).

<sup>44</sup> *Alberts v. California,* 352 U.S. 962, 77 S.Ct. 349 (1956).

In jointly considering the *Roth* and *Alberts* cases, the Court did not rule on whether the books sold by the two men were in fact obscene. The only issue reviewed in each case was the validity of an obscenity law on its face.<sup>45</sup> Mr. Justice William J. Alberts argued that this mail-order business could not be punished under California law because a state cannot regulate an area pre-empted by the federal obscenity laws. The majority opinion replied that the federal statute deals only with actual mailing and does not prevent a state from punishing the advertising or keeping for sale of obscene literature.<sup>46</sup>

Roth contended, on the other hand, that the power to punish speech and press offensive to morality belongs to the states alone under the powers of the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. The majority opinion discarded this argument by returning to its earlier pronouncement that obscenity is not speech or expression protected by the First Amendment.<sup>47</sup> Justice Brennan added, in language which was to greatly affect later decisions in the law of obscenity:<sup>48</sup>

All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the guaranties [of free speech and press], unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.

This passage, as will be seen in a number of later court decisions relying on *Roth*, had within it elements of freeing literature. Later cases would make much of the phrase “redeeming social importance” as a lever to protect sexy materials, because most literature must have something good you can say about it.<sup>49</sup> In fact—where *Roth* is concerned—the past clearly has been prologue to almost everything in obscenity law since 1957. Justice Brennan’s majority opinion set the stage for obscenity law developments in two ways. First, obscenity laws may be used to punish *thoughts*; overt sexual actions are not needed to bring a conviction.<sup>50</sup> Second—and more important—obscenity is expression *not* protected by the First Amendment.<sup>51</sup> Those are the two main strands in the law of obscenity.

<sup>45</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1307 (1957).

<sup>46</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 493–494, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1314 (1957).

<sup>47</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 492, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1313 (1957).

<sup>48</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309 (1957).

<sup>49</sup> See, e. g., *A Book Named John Cleland’s “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts*, 383 U.S. 413, 419–420, 86 S.Ct. 975, 977–978 (1966).

<sup>50</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 486–487, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309–1310 (1957).

<sup>51</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 482, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1307 (1957).

Other strands woven in by concurring and dissenting Justices in *Roth v. United States* forecast other themes which would crescendo and diminish for the next 20 years in the silly symphony of obscenity law.<sup>52</sup> In this area of law, the present is but the cutting edge of the recent past.

### The Roth Test

Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan set down this try at defining the undefinable: "Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."<sup>53</sup> "Prurient interest," of course, refers to sexually oriented thoughts. Brennan then articulated "the Roth test" for judging whether or not material is obscene:<sup>54</sup>

\* \* \* whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.

Subsequent decisions have returned to these words again and again for guidance. This "*Roth* test" rejected some features of the American rendition of the *Hicklin* rule. The practice of judging books by the presumed effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons was rejected because it "might well encompass material legitimately dealing with sex."<sup>55</sup>

Although the language of the *Roth* test, as will be shown, was used in later decisions to uphold the freedom to read, Mr. Justice Brennan's words were not wholly libertarian. The *Roth* test, instead, is a "deprave and corrupt" test. Under *Roth*, a book could be declared obscene if it could be assumed that it might induce obscene thoughts in an hypothetical average person.<sup>56</sup> There is no need for the prosecution to prove that there is a "clear and present danger"<sup>57</sup>

<sup>52</sup> For example, Chief Justice Earl Warren's concurrence in *Roth* argued that the conduct of a defendant was the key point in an obscenity prosecution. For a case which turned on the defendant's conduct, see *Ginzburg v. United States*, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).

<sup>53</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 487, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1310 (1957). The terms used in the three "tests" approved in *Roth*—"lustful desire," "lustful thoughts," and "appeal to prurient interest"—all imply that if a book can be assumed to cause or induce "improper" sexual thoughts, that book can be "banned." The "appeal to prurient interest" test was drawn from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 6 (Philadelphia, American Law Institute, May 6, 1957).

<sup>54</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 489, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1311 (1957).

<sup>55</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 489, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1311 (1957).

<sup>56</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 486, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1310 (1957).

<sup>57</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 486, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1310 (1957).

or even a "clear and possible danger"<sup>58</sup> that a book will lead to antisocial conduct.

### Roth: Concurrences and Dissents

Chief Justice Earl Warren was evidently bemused by the idea that *books* rather than men, were defendants in obscenity prosecutions. His brief concurring opinion in *Roth* has proved to be remarkably influential since 1957. Chief Justice Warren stated that in an obscenity trial, the conduct of the defendant rather than the obscenity of a book should be the central issue:<sup>59</sup>

The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant as an attribute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus placed in context from which they draw their color and character. A wholly different result might be reached in a different setting \* \* \*.

The Chief Justice concluded that both Roth and Alberts had engaged in "the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect" and said that the state and federal governments could constitutionally punish such conduct.<sup>60</sup> Justice Brennan's majority opinion in *Roth* has influenced the course of the law of obscenity. So, in an increasing degree in recent years, has Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion, which insisted that the behavior of the defendant, rather than the nature of the book itself, was the "central issue" in an obscenity case.<sup>61</sup> The impact of the legal formulations in *Roth* by Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren will be discussed later in this chapter.

Justice Harlan also disagreed with the majority opinion's conclusion that obscenity laws are constitutional because an earlier Supreme Court had found that obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social importance":<sup>62</sup>

This sweeping formula appears to me to beg the very question before us. The Court seems to assume that "obscenity" is a particular *genus* of speech and press, which is as distinct, recognizable and classifiable as poison ivy is among plants. On this basis, the *constitutional* question before us becomes, as the Court says, whether "obscenity," as an abstraction, is protected by the First and Fourteenth

<sup>58</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1310 (1957), citing *Dennis v. United States*, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1952).

<sup>59</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 495, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1315 (1957).

<sup>60</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 496, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1315 (1957).

<sup>61</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 495, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1314-1315 (1957).

<sup>62</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 497, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1315 (1957).

Amendments, and the question whether a *particular* book may be suppressed becomes a mere matter of classification, of "fact" to be entrusted to a fact-finder and insulated from independent judgment.

Justice Harlan thus told his fellow justices that the vital question was "what is obscenity?" not "is obscenity good or bad?"

While Harlan asked this challenging question of his brethren on the Court, Justice William O. Douglas was joined by Justice Hugo L. Black in a scathing attack on obscenity laws and obscenity prosecutions. This dissent foreshadowed arguments these Justices would advance in obscenity cases which subsequently followed *Roth* to the Supreme Court:<sup>63</sup>

When we sustain these convictions, we make the legality of a publication turn on the purity of thought which a book or tract instills in the mind of the reader. I do not think we can approve that standard and be faithful to the command of the First Amendment which by its terms is a restraint on Congress and which by the Fourteenth Amendment is a restraint on the States.

Douglas wrote that *Roth* and *Alberts* were punished "for thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor antisocial conduct." He was unimpressed by the possibility that the books involved might produce sexual thoughts: "The arousing of sexual thoughts and desires happens every day in normal life in dozens of ways."<sup>64</sup> Justice Douglas added:<sup>65</sup>

The absence of dependable information on the effect of obscene literature should make us wary. It should put us on the side of protecting society's interest in literature, except and unless it can be said that the particular publication has an impact on action that the government can control.

Problems involving freedom of speech and press, it was argued, must not be solved by "weighing against the values of free expression, the judgment of a court that a particular form of expression has 'no redeeming social importance.'" Justice Douglas warned:<sup>66</sup>

For the test that suppresses a cheap tract today can suppress a literary gem tomorrow. All it need do is incite a lascivious thought or arouse a lustful desire. The list of

<sup>63</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 508, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1321 (1957).

<sup>64</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 509, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1322 (1957).

<sup>65</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 511, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1323 (1957).

<sup>66</sup> 354 U.S. 476, 514, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1324 (1957).

books that judges or juries can place in that category is endless.

### SEC. 63. PATENT OFFENSIVENESS

**In the *Manual Enterprises* case, the Supreme Court added a new element—"patent offensiveness"—to its attempts to define obscenity.**

Although *Roth* remains the leading decision on obscenity and said much, subsequent court decisions showed that it had settled little. Five years after *Roth* the Supreme Court attempted to refine its definition of obscenity in *Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. J. Edward Day, Postmaster General of the United States*. In writing for the Court, Justice Harlan termed *MANual* [sic], *Trim*, and *Grecian Pictorial* "dismally unpleasant, uncouth and tawdry" magazines which were published "primarily, if not exclusively, for homosexuals."<sup>67</sup>

Despite this, a majority of the Supreme Court held that these magazines which presented pictures of nude males were not obscene and unavailable because they were not "patently offensive." Harlan wrote:<sup>68</sup>

These magazines cannot be deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current community standards of decency—a quality that we shall hereafter refer to as "patent offensiveness" or "indecentcy." Lacking that quality, the magazines cannot be deemed legally obscene \* \* \*.

\* \* \*

Obscenity under the federal statute \* \* \* requires proof of two distinct elements: (1) patent offensiveness; and (2) "prurient interest" appeal. Both must conjoin before challenged material can be found obscene under § 1461. In most obscenity cases to be sure, the two elements tend to coalesce, for that which is patently offensive will also usually carry the requisite "prurient interest" appeal. It is only in the unusual instance where, as here, the "prurient interest" appeal of the material is limited to a particular class of persons that occasion arises for a truly independent inquiry into the question of whether or not the material is patently offensive.

Harlan reaffirmed the Supreme Court's long-held position that mere nudity was not enough to support a conviction for obscenity.<sup>69</sup>

After adding the "patent offensiveness" qualification to its definition of obscenity, the Court then turned to the tricky problem of

<sup>67</sup> 370 U.S. 478, 481, 82 S.Ct. 1432, 1434 (1962).

<sup>68</sup> 370 U.S. 478, 482-486, 82 S.Ct. 1432, 1434-1436 (1962).

<sup>69</sup> 370 U.S. 478, 490, 82 S.Ct. 1432, 1438 (1962).



giving meaning to the “contemporary community standards” phrase used in *Roth*. This time, a movie—the French film called “*Les Amants*” (“The Lovers”) was the vehicle of expression which confronted the Court. Nico Jacobellis, manager of a Cleveland, Ohio, motion picture theater, had been convicted under Ohio law on two counts of possessing and exhibiting an obscene film. Jacobellis had been fined a total of \$2,500 and his conviction was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court.<sup>70</sup>

Writing for the Supreme Court in reversing Jacobellis’ conviction, Mr. Justice Brennan ruled that the film was not obscene. He rejected the argument that the “contemporary community standards” aspect of the *Roth* test implied “a determination of the constitutional question of obscenity in each case by the standards of the particular local community from which the case arises.” Brennan declared that no “‘local’ definition of the ‘community’ could properly be employed in delineating the area of expression that is protected by the Federal Constitution.”<sup>71</sup>

The Court has explicitly refused to tolerate a result whereby “the constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary with state lines. \* \* \* we see even less justification for allowing such limits to vary with town or county lines. We thus reaffirm the position taken in *Roth* to the effect that the constitutional status of an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a national standard. It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding.”<sup>72</sup>

Despite these brave words, a majority of the Court failed to agree with Justice Brennan that there should be a national standard for judging obscenity. In 1973, in *Miller v. California*, the Court—casting about for a way of shrugging off the burden of judging so many obscenity cases—said that states and localities could set their individual (if contradictory) standards for judging what is permissible for expression about sex.<sup>73</sup> But—as will be discussed in Sections 66 and 69, some subsequent state and local prosecutions were so censoriously wrongheaded that the Court was forced to continue its role as the “High Court of Obscenity.”<sup>74</sup>

Back in 1966, however, the Court did not know what tortured obscenity cases it would face. Following—or at least echoing the

<sup>70</sup> 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964).

<sup>71</sup> 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1677 (1964).

<sup>72</sup> 378 U.S. 184, 194–195, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1682 (1964).

<sup>73</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).

<sup>74</sup> See, e. g. *Jenkins v. Georgia*, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750 (1974).

words of Chief Justice Warren in *Roth v. United States*,<sup>75</sup> the Court moved in 1966 toward judging the *conduct* of the distributor rather than the *contents* of the communication which was being distributed. Cases involved here were “Fanny Hill,”<sup>76</sup> *Mishkin v. State of New York*,<sup>77</sup> and *Ginzburg v. United States*.<sup>78</sup>

#### SEC. 64. FROM CONTENT TO CONDUCT

In 1966, the Supreme Court shifted—at least in part—from judging the *content* of a publication to judging the character of a bookseller’s or distributor’s *conduct*.

On March 21, 1966, the Supreme Court again tackled the tough problem of defining obscenity as decisions were announced in three cases, the “Fanny Hill” case,<sup>79</sup> *Mishkin v. New York*,<sup>80</sup> and *Ginzburg v. United States*.<sup>81</sup> First announced was the decision in the *Fanny Hill* case, in which the Court had to deal with one of the most durable wenches in Anglo-American literary history. *Fanny Hill*, or, as the book is also known, *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure*, was written in England about 1749 by John Cleland. The book was well known in the American colonies and was first published in the United States around 1800 by Isaiah Thomas of Worcester, Massachusetts, one of the foremost printers of the American Revolution.<sup>82</sup> *Fanny Hill*, it should be noted, was also one of the first books in America to be the subject of an obscenity trial: in Massachusetts in 1821.<sup>83</sup> More than 140 years later, *Fanny Hill* was back in the courts of Massachusetts, as well as in New York, New Jersey and Illinois.<sup>84</sup>

*Fanny Hill*, in one respect, was an oddity among books which are involved in obscenity cases. There is not one of the “four letter words” which have so often put more modern literature than *Fanny Hill* before the courts. But although the language of *Fanny Hill* was quite sanitary, author Cleland’s descriptions of Fanny’s bedroom performances left little to the imagination. Even so, some experts—

<sup>75</sup> See Chief Justice Warren’s dissent in *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, at 495–496, 77 S.Ct. 1304, at 1315 (1957).

<sup>76</sup> 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966).

<sup>77</sup> 383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958 (1966).

<sup>78</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).

<sup>79</sup> 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966).

<sup>80</sup> 383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958 (1966).

<sup>81</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).

<sup>82</sup> Peter Quennell, introduction to John Cleland’s *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure* (New York: Putnam, 1963) p. xv.

<sup>83</sup> *Commonwealth v. Peter Holmes*, 17 Mass. 336 (1821).

<sup>84</sup> These prosecutions, as Justice Douglas pointed out, seemed a bit ironic in view of the fact that the Library of Congress had asked permission to translate the book into braille. 383 U.S. 413, 425–426, 86 S.Ct. 975, 981 (1966).

including poet and critic Louis Untermeyer—testified that *Fanny Hill* was a work of art and was not pornographic. The experts, however, were asked by a cross-examining prosecuting attorney if they realized that the book contained “20 acts of sexual intercourse, four of them in the presence of others; four acts of lesbianism, two acts of male homosexuality, two acts of flagellation and one of female masturbation.”<sup>85</sup>

*Fanny Hill*, then, is a frankly erotic novel. Justice Brennan summed up the tests for obscenity which the highest court had approved:<sup>86</sup>

We defined obscenity in *Roth* in the following terms: “[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” 354 U.S. at 489; 77 S.Ct. at 1311. Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the materials taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Massachusetts courts had erred in finding that a book didn't have to be “unqualifiedly worthless” before it could be deemed obscene. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that a book “can not be proscribed unless it is found to be *utterly* without redeeming social value.”<sup>87</sup>

Next, Mr. Justice Brennan announced the Court's decision in the *Mishkin* case. Edward Mishkin, who operated a bookstore near New York City's Times Square, was appealing a sentence of three years and \$12,500 in fines. Mishkin's publishing speciality was sadism and masochism, and he had been found guilty by New York courts of producing and selling more than 50 different paperbacks. Titles involved included *Dance With the Dominant Whip*, *Cult of the Spankers*, *Swish Bottom*, *Mrs. Tyrant's Finishing School* and *Stud Broad*.<sup>88</sup>

Mishkin had instructed one author working for him that the books should be “‘full of sex scenes and lesbian scenes \* \* \*. [T]he

<sup>85</sup> Cf. the outraged dissent by Justice Tom C. Clark, 383 U.S. 413, 445–446, 86 S.Ct. 975, 990–991 (1966).

<sup>86</sup> 383 U.S. 413, 418, 86 S.Ct. 975, 977 (1966).

<sup>87</sup> 383 U.S. 413, 419, 86 S.Ct. 975, 978 (1966).

<sup>88</sup> 383 U.S. 502, 514–515, 86 S.Ct. 975, 978 (1966).

sex had to be very strong, it had to be rough, it had to be clearly spelled out.’”<sup>89</sup> Mishkin’s defense, however, was based on the notion that the books he published and sold did not appeal to the prurient interest of an average person. The average person, it was argued, would be disgusted and sickened by such books.<sup>90</sup>

Justice Brennan’s majority opinion, however, dismissed Mishkin’s argument.<sup>91</sup>

Where the material is designed primarily for and primarily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the *Roth* test is satisfied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest of the members of that group.

After upholding Mishkin’s conviction, Mr. Justice Brennan then turned to the *Ginzburg* case. With this opinion, the Supreme Court brought another element to the adjudication of obscenity disputes: the manner in which the matter charged with obscenity was sold. Justice Brennan wrote:

\* \* \* the question of obscenity may include consideration of the setting in which the publications were presented as an aid to determining the question of obscenity, and [we] assume without deciding that the prosecution could not have succeeded otherwise.<sup>92</sup>

The *Ginzburg* case involved three publications: “EROS, a hard-cover magazine of expensive format; *Liaison*, a bi-weekly newsletter; and *The Housewife’s Handbook on Selective Promiscuity*, \* \* a short book.” Justice Brennan took notice of “abundant evidence” from Ralph Ginzburg’s federal district court trial “that each of the accused publications was originated or sold as stock in trade of the sordid business of pandering—‘the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers.’”<sup>93</sup>

Included as evidence of this “pandering” were EROS magazine’s attempts to get mailing privileges from the whimsically named hamlets of Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pa. Mailing privileges were finally obtained in Middlesex, N. J.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>89</sup> 383 U.S. 502, 505, 86 S.Ct. 958, 961 (1966).

<sup>90</sup> 383 U.S. 502, 508, 86 S.Ct. 958, 963 (1966).

<sup>91</sup> 383 U.S. 502, 508–509, 86 S.Ct. 958, 963–964 (1966).

<sup>92</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 465–466, 86 S.Ct. 942, 944–945 (1966).

<sup>93</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 467, 86 S.Ct. 942, 945 (1966).

<sup>94</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 467, 86 S.Ct. 942, 945 (1966).

Also, Justice Brennan found “the leer of the sensualist” permeating the advertising for the three publications. *Liaison*, for example, was extolled as “Cupid’s Chronicle,” and the advertising circulars asked, “Are you a member of the sexual elite?”<sup>95</sup> It is likely, however, that publisher Ginzburg believed that the *Roth* test had left him on safe ground, for his advertising proclaimed:<sup>96</sup>

“EROS handles the subjects of Love and Sex with complete candor. The publication of this magazine—which is frankly and avowedly concerned with erotica—has been enabled by recent court decisions ruling that a literary piece or painting, though explicitly sexual in content, has a right to be published if it is a genuine work of art.”

“EROS is genuine work of art.”

The Court was severely split over the *Ginzburg* case, however, with Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan and Stewart all registering bitter dissents. Justice Black set the tone for his dissenting brethren, declaring:<sup>97</sup>

Only one stark fact emerges with clarity out of the confusing welter of opinions and thousands of words written in this and two other cases today. \* \* \* That fact is that Ginzburg, petitioner here, is now finally and authoritatively condemned to serve five years in prison for distributing printed matter about sex which neither Ginzburg nor anyone else could possibly have known to be criminal.

Justice Harlan accused the Court’s majority of rewriting the federal obscenity statute in order to convict Ginzburg, and called the new “pandering” test unconstitutionally vague.<sup>98</sup> And Justice Stewart asserted in his dissent that Ginzburg “was not charged with ‘commercial exploitation’; he was not charged with ‘pandering’; he was not charged with ‘titillation.’” Convicting Ginzburg on such grounds, Stewart added, was to deny him due process of law.<sup>99</sup>

Justice Douglas added his denunciation of the condemnation of materials as obscene not because of their content, but because of the way they were advertised.<sup>1</sup>

The advertisements of our best magazines are chockfull of thighs, ankles, calves, bosoms, eyes, and hair, to draw the potential buyers’ attention to lotions, tires, food, liquor,

<sup>95</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 469n, 86 S.Ct. 942, 946n (1966).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 476, 86 S.Ct. 942, 954 (1966).

<sup>98</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 476, 86 S.Ct. 942, 954 (1966).

<sup>99</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 494, 86 S.Ct. 942, 954 (1966).

<sup>1</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 494, 497, 86 S.Ct. 942, 954, 956 (1966).

clothing, autos, and even insurance policies. \* \* \* And I do not see how it adds or detracts from the legality of the book being distributed. A book should stand on its own, irrespective of the reasons why it was written or the wiles used in selling it. I cannot imagine any promotional effort that would make chapters 7 and 8 of the Song of Solomon any the less or any more worthy of First Amendment protection than does its unostentatious inclusion in the average edition of the Bible.

### Protecting the Young: The Ginsberg Case and the "Variable Obscenity" Concept

As if to confound careless spellers, it has happened that one of the most important cases after the Ralph *Ginzburg* case involved a man named *Ginsberg*: Sam Ginsberg. In the 1968 *Ginsberg* case, the Supreme Court held by a 6-3 vote that a New York statute which defined obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 was not unconstitutionally vague.

Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated "Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette" in Bellmore, Long Island. In 1965, a mother sent her 16-year-old son to the luncheonette to buy some "girlie" magazines. The boy purchased two magazines—apparently *Sir* and *Gent* or similar publications—and walked out of the luncheonette. On the basis of this sale, Sam Ginsberg was convicted of violation of a New York law making it a misdemeanor "knowingly to sell \* \* \* to a minor" under 17 "any picture \* \* \* which depicts nudity \* \* \* and which is harmful to minors" and "any \* \* \* magazine \* \* \* which contains \* \* \* [such pictures] and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors."<sup>2</sup>

It should be noted that magazines such as the 16-year-old boy purchased from Sam Ginsberg's luncheonette had recently been held *not* obscene for adults by the Supreme Court.<sup>3</sup> However, the judge at Sam Ginsberg's obscenity trial found pictures in the two magazines which depicted nudity in a manner that was in violation of the New York statute which forbids<sup>4</sup>

"the showing of \* \* \* female \* \* \* buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple \* \* \*"

<sup>2</sup> *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 634, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1277 (1968). The statute is Article 484-H of the New York Penal Law, McKinney's Consol. Laws c. 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Redrup v. New York*, 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967).

<sup>4</sup> *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 632, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1276 (1968), quoting New York Penal Law Article 484-h as enacted by L.1965, c. 327, subsections (b) and (f).

The trial judge found that the pictures were "harmful to minors" under the terms of the New York law.<sup>5</sup>

In affirming Ginsberg's conviction, Justice Brennan approved the concept of "variable obscenity." In a footnote, he recognized that this concept had been developed by two University of Minnesota law professors, William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure, who wrote:<sup>6</sup>

Variable obscenity \* \* \* furnishes a useful tool for dealing with the problem of denying adolescents access to material aimed at a primary audience of sexually mature adults. For variable obscenity focuses attention upon the make-up of primary and peripheral audiences in varying circumstances, and provides a reasonably satisfactory means for delineating the obscene in each circumstance.

Brennan noted that the magazines involved in the *Ginsberg* case were not obscene for sale to adults. However, the New York statute forbidding their sale to minors "does not bar the appellant from stocking the magazines and selling them to persons 17 years of age or older." Brennan also reiterated the holding that obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press.<sup>7</sup> He added that it was permissible for the state of New York to "accord to minors under 17 a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see."

In the case which resulted in the fining and jailing of *Eros* publisher Ralph Ginzburg, the Supreme Court served notice that not only *what* was sold but *how* it was sold would be taken into account.<sup>8</sup> The *how* of selling or distributing literature can include a legitimate public concern over the materials which minor children see. That is the lesson of the case of *Ginsberg v. New York*, and that lesson is wrapped up in the concept of "variable obscenity." That is, some materials are not obscene for adults but are obscene when children are involved.<sup>9</sup> Difficulties in the concept of "variable obscenity" were readily apparent: would this mean that adolescents will have to show an ID card—or a note demonstrating parental consent—to check out books at a public library? And which books and authors might be placed in this troublesome category of being "vari-

<sup>5</sup> 390 U.S. 629, 633, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1276 (1968).

<sup>6</sup> 390 U.S. 629, 635n, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1278n (1968), quoting Lockhart and McClure, "Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards," 45 *Minnesota Law Review* 5, 85 (1960).

<sup>7</sup> 390 U.S. 629, 635, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1277-1278 (1968); see *Butler v. Michigan*, 352 U.S. 380, 77 S.Ct. 524 (1957); *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309 (1957).

<sup>8</sup> *Ginzburg v. United States*, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).

<sup>9</sup> *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274 (1968).

ably obscene?" Rabelais? Twain? Hemingway? Steinbeck? Or merely Ralph Ginzburg?

### SEC. 65. INDECISIVENESS ON OBSCENITY: *REDRUP* AND *STANLEY*

From 1967 until 1973, many convictions were reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States because a majority could not agree upon a definition of obscenity.

In the spring of 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States openly admitted its confusion over obscenity law in a case known as *Redrup v. New York*.<sup>10</sup> This decision did not *look* important: it took up only six pages in *United States Reports* and only about four pages were devoted to its unsigned *per curiam* ["by the court"] majority opinion. The other two pages were given over to a dissent by the late Justice John Marshall Harlan, with whom the now-retired Justice Tom C. Clark joined.<sup>11</sup> *Redrup* was an important case simply because the Court said that a majority of its members could not agree on a standard which could declare so-called "girlie magazines" and similar publications to be obscene.

*Redrup* seemed for a time to be the most important obscenity case since *Roth v. United States* because it was used by both state and federal courts for several years to avoid many of the complexities of judging whether works of art or literature are obscene. On June 12, 1967, the date the Court's term ended that year and less than two months after *Redrup* was decided, the Court reversed 11 obscenity convictions by merely referring to *Redrup v. New York*.<sup>12</sup> Another dozen state or federal obscenity convictions were reversed during the next year, with *Redrup* being listed as an important factor in each reversal.<sup>13</sup>

*Redrup's* unsigned majority opinion was merely a sketchy review of the varying—and sometimes contradictory—attempts made by the Court to define obscenity. After reviewing the justices' differing views on the subject, the *Redrup* majority opinion took a new tack. The Court ruled that no matter what test was applied to the sexy paperback novels (*Lust Pool* and *Shame Agent*) or girlie magazines (*Gent*, *High Heels*, *Spree*) before the Court, the convictions for obscenity reviewed in *Redrup* simply could not be upheld. The unsigned majority opinion concluded, "Whichever of these constitutional views [definitions of obscenity listed sketchily in the *Redrup* opinion] are brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is

<sup>10</sup> 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967).

<sup>11</sup> 386 U.S. 767, 771, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 1416 (1967).

<sup>12</sup> Dwight L. Teeter, Jr., and Don R. Pember, "The Retreat from Obscenity: *Redrup v. New York*," *Hastings Law Journal* Vol. 21 (Nov., 1969) pp. 175–189.

<sup>13</sup> 386 U.S. 767, 771–772, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 1416–1417 (1967).



clear that the judgments [obscenity convictions in the lower courts] before us cannot stand.”<sup>14</sup>

The majority opinion in *Redrup* placed significant reliance upon the Court's 1966 decision in *Ginzburg v. United States*. In *Ginzburg*, discussed earlier in this chapter, it will be recalled that the Court took special notice of the *manner* in which magazines or books were sold.<sup>15</sup> *Redrup* echoed this concern, but also took into account the *recipients* of materials charged with obscenity. The Court suggested that convictions for selling or mailing obscenity should be upheld in three kinds of situations:

- (1) Where there is evidence of “pandering” sales as in *Ginzburg v. United States*.
- (2) Where there is a statute reflecting “a specific and limited state concern for juveniles.”<sup>16</sup>
- (3) Where there is “an assault upon individual privacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for the unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.”<sup>17</sup>

Beyond these kinds of forbidden conduct—“pandering,” selling to minors which violates a carefully, a narrowly drawn statute, or somehow invading privacy with a publication—*Redrup* gave little guidance. Perhaps, however, it may be hazarded that *Redrup* meant this: If the *conduct* of the seller did not offend the three kinds of prohibited actions listed above, and if the *contents* were not so wretched that they would be held to be “hardcore pornography,”<sup>18</sup> then the materials involved were constitutionally protected. As the Court said in *Redrup*, the publications involved in that case were “protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments from governmental suppression.”<sup>19</sup>

<sup>14</sup> 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 1416 (1967).

<sup>15</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).

<sup>16</sup> *Redrup v. New York*, 386 U.S. 767, 769, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 1415 (1967). Note that (2) above, announced in *Redrup* on May 8, 1967, forecast with considerable precision the Court's decision in *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274 (1968).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, citing *Breard v. Alexandria*, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920 (1951), and *Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak*, 343 U.S. 415, 72 S.Ct. 813 (1952).

<sup>18</sup> 386 U.S. 767, 771n, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 1416n, referring to Justice Potter Stewart's quotation, in his dissent in *Ginzburg v. United States*, of this definition of hardcore pornography, including writings and “photographs, both still and motion picture, with no pretense of artistic value, graphically depicting acts of sexual intercourse, including various acts of sodomy and sadism, and sometimes involving several participants in scenes of orgy-like character. \* \* \* verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner with no attempt whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or situation and with no pretense to literary value.” See *Ginzburg v. United States*, 383 U.S. 463, 499n, 86 S.Ct. 942, 956n (1966).

<sup>19</sup> 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 1416 (1967).

### Stanley v. Georgia (1969)

In 1969, there was hope that the Supreme Court of the United States—clearly irritated by obscenity cases which amounted to perhaps five per cent of its total workload—would bring order to that troublesome area of law. The Court's resolution of *Stanley v. Georgia* added to that hope.<sup>20</sup> The *Stanley* case arose when a Georgia state investigator and three federal agents, operating under a federal search warrant, searched the home of Robert E. Stanley, looking for bookmaking records. Evidence of bookmaking was not found, but the searchers found three reels of 8 millimeter film and—handily—a projector. They treated themselves to a showing and decided—as did a couple of courts—that the films were obscene. When Stanley's appeal reached the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall—writing for a unanimous Court—named two constitutional rights.<sup>21</sup>

- (1) A right growing out of the First Amendment, a "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth."<sup>22</sup>
- (2) A constitutional right to privacy tied to the right to receive information and ideas:<sup>23</sup>

\* \* \* [F]undamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. \* \* \* These are the rights that appellant [*Stanley*] is asserting. \* \* \* the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.

Because *Stanley v. Georgia* involved no dangers of either injuring minors or invading the privacy of the general public, the Supreme Court concluded:<sup>24</sup>

We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime. Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today's holding. As we have said, the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.

As 1971 decisions of the Supreme Court have shown, by way of hindsight, the last two sentences quoted above should have received

<sup>20</sup> *Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969).

<sup>21</sup> Black, J., concurred in the decision.

<sup>22</sup> 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969), citing *Winters v. New York*, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948).

<sup>23</sup> 394 U.S. 557, 564–565, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247–1248 (1969).

<sup>24</sup> 394 U.S. 557, 568–569, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1249–1250 (1969).

closer attention from a number of courts which instead jumped at the phrase "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth." The Stanley case, it should be emphasized, is now regarded by the Supreme Court as more of a privacy decision than an obscenity decision. The High Court has now rebuffed efforts to read a great liberalization of obscenity doctrine into the Stanley case.<sup>25</sup>

Taken together, *Redrup* and *Stanley* suggested to some judges that the strictures of obscenity law had been loosened by the Supreme Court. *Redrup* said that the Court could not define anything but hard-core porn, the grossest of the gross. And *Stanley* seemed to say that people had a right to possess sexually explicit literature and films at home. This meant, to some judges, that if you got the stuff home, somebody, somewhere, had to have at least a limited right to sell it to you. Right?<sup>26</sup> Or, what if you wanted to go into a Triple-X rated film such as "Naked Came the Professor?" Couldn't you be somehow "publicly private"—sit there in anonymous darkness in a theater? And you, in such a case, would be in effect a consenting adult whose privacy or other sensibilities were not being intruded upon.<sup>27</sup> Couldn't it be said that you have a right to receive such information and ideas?<sup>28</sup>

No to all questions. Take, for example, the case of *Byrne v. Karalex*.<sup>29</sup> Owners and operators of a theater sued in U.S. District Court for a declaration that a Massachusetts obscenity statute was unconstitutional and to enjoin the state from further prosecutions for exhibiting the film "I Am Curious (Yellow)." The three-judge court, with one judge dissenting, granted a preliminary injunction forbidding carrying out of sentence in the state prosecution or the starting of any future prosecutions.<sup>30</sup>

Ruling for the theater, Circuit Judge Bailey Aldrich wondered whether *Stanley v. Georgia* should be limited to "mere private possession of obscene material." He asked whether the *Stanley* case should be read as "the high water mark of a past flood, or is it the precursor of a new one?" Judge Aldrich then decided that the

<sup>25</sup> See, e. g., *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973), and *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628 (1973).

<sup>26</sup> See, e. g. *Dyson v. Stein*, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769 (1971).

<sup>27</sup> See, e. g., *United States v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise*, 315 F.Supp. 191 (D.C.N.Y.1970), and *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628 (1973).

<sup>28</sup> *Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969).

<sup>29</sup> 401 U.S. 200, 216, 91 S.Ct. 769, 777 (1971), reversing and remanding 306 F.Supp. 1363 (D.C.Mass.1969).

<sup>30</sup> 306 F.Supp. 1363 (D.C.Mass.1969), probable jurisdiction noted 397 U.S. 985, 90 S.Ct. 1123 (1970).

Stanley decision overturned the *Roth v. United States* ruling that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. Instead, he argued that”<sup>31</sup>

\* \* \* Roth remains intact only with respect to public distribution in the full sense \* \* \* restricted distribution, adequately controlled, is no longer to be condemned. It is difficult to think that if Stanley has a constitutional right to view obscene films, the Court would intend its exercise to be only at the expense of a criminal act on behalf of the only logical source, the professional supplier. A constitutional right to receive a communication would seem meaningless if there were not a coextensive right to make it \* \* \*. If a rich Stanley can view a film, or read a book, a poorer Stanley should be free to visit a protected theatre or library. We see no reason for saying he must go alone.

But in a *per curiam* decision, the Supreme Court of the United States showed that it was not impressed by the logic of Circuit Judge Aldrich’s arguments. The Supreme Court erased the injunction and remanded the case for further prosecution at the state level.<sup>32</sup>

Other cases during 1971 showed that the Supreme Court—as if regretting what it had said in *Redrup* (1967) and *Stanley* (1971)—was interpreting some vigor back into both federal and state obscenity prosecutions. Writing for the Court in both *United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs*<sup>33</sup> and *United States v. Reidel*,<sup>34</sup> Justice Byron R. White declared that federal obscenity statutes are constitutional. The key case involved Norman Reidel, who was charged with mailing a single copy of “The True Facts About Imported Pornography” to a postal inspector (who was more than 21 years old) who had responded to a newspaper ad. The federal trial court—with the judge assuming for purposes of the trial that the book was obscene—granted Reidel’s motion to dismiss. The trial court ruled that Reidel, under the reasoning of *Stanley v. Georgia*, had made a constitutionally protected delivery.

The Supreme Court of the United States, however, flatly rejected that manner of reading the Stanley case, and explicitly returned to the approach to obscenity used in *Roth v. United States* (1957). Justice White’s majority opinion in the Reidel case repeated the

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* 1366–1367 (citations omitted).

<sup>32</sup> 401 U.S. 200, 216, 91 S.Ct. 769, 777 (1971).

<sup>33</sup> 402 U.S. 363, 91 S.Ct. 1400 (1971).

<sup>34</sup> 402 U.S. 351, 91 S.Ct. 1410 (1971).

*Roth* holding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press \* \* \*." <sup>35</sup> Justice White added: <sup>36</sup>

The District Court ignored both *Roth* and the express limitations on the reach of the *Stanley* decision. Relying on the statement in *Stanley* that "the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas \* \* \* regardless of their social worth," 394 U.S. at 564, 89 S.Ct. at 1247, the trial judge reasoned that "if a person has the right to receive and possess this material, then someone must have the right to deliver it to him." He concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1461 could not be validly applied "where obscene material is not directed at an unwilling public, where the material such as in this case is solicited by adults. \* \* \*"

\* \* \*

Whatever the scope of the "right to receive" referred to in *Stanley*, it is not so broad as to immunize the dealings in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here—dealings which *Roth* held unprotected by the First Amendment.

### Abstention Doctrine

While *Reidel* (1971) affirmed the Supreme Court's support of federal obscenity statutes, other decisions by the Court strengthened local and state obscenity prosecutions. Let's put it this way. In the sword-game of American law, for almost every thrust, there is a parry. The "thrust" in obscenity law came in the form of an "intervention doctrine." <sup>37</sup> This doctrine said that federal courts could issue injunctions to halt state prosecutions when unconstitutional state acts were being enforced against petitioning individuals. In the late 1960s, some defendants in local or state obscenity prosecutions were able to short-circuit proceedings against them by asserting that the obscenity statutes under which they were being tried were unconstitutionally "overbroad." <sup>38</sup>

The "parry" here was the "doctrine of abstention." <sup>39</sup> In general terms, this means that a federal court will not intervene in the

<sup>35</sup> 402 U.S. 351, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1411 (1971), quoting *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309 (1957).

<sup>36</sup> 402 U.S. 351, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1412 (1971).

<sup>37</sup> *Dombrowski v. Pfister*, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116 (1965).

<sup>38</sup> See *Overstock Book Co. v. Barry*, 305 F.Supp. 842 (D.C.N.Y.1969); see also *U. S. v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise*, 315 F.Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.1970). An influential decision in which federal courts refused to declare an obscenity statute unconstitutional, thereby turning aside "overbreadth" considerations, was *Gable v. Jenkins*, 309 F.Supp. 998 (N.D.Ga.1969) (three judge court), affirmed 397 U.S. 592, 90 S.Ct. 1351 (1970).

<sup>39</sup> See *Perez v. Ledesma*, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674 (1971); *Dyson v. Stein*, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769 (1971); *Byrne v. Karalexis*, 401 U.S. 216, 91 S.Ct. 777 (1971); *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971), and *Samuels v. Mackell*, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764 (1971).

administration of a state's criminal laws unless a defendant can show harassment or a prosecution undertaken in bad faith, with no hope of success. To see some implications of the abstention doctrine for the law of obscenity, consider *Dyson v. Stein*.<sup>40</sup>

Brent Stein, publisher of an underground newspaper in Dallas, Texas, had sought a ruling from a three-judge federal court that the Texas obscenity statute was unconstitutional because of "overbreadth." "Overbreadth" is a term used to describe a situation where a statute forbids not only what may be forbidden constitutionally, but also outlaws conduct which is protected under the constitution. The three-judge court in *Dyson v. Stein* said that *Stanley v. Georgia* meant that obscenity was deprived of First Amendment protection only in the context of "public actions taken or intended to be taken with obscene matter." Therefore, the three-judge court reasoned that the Texas statute was overbroad because it prohibited private possession of obscene materials as well as public distribution of them.<sup>41</sup> The three-judge court, in other words, had *intervened* in a state prosecution.

The Supreme Court of the United States, however, used the doctrine of abstention, ruling that the state prosecution of Stein could continue. The Court said that federal intervention affecting pending state criminal prosecutions—either by injunction or by declaratory judgment—is proper only where irreparable injury would otherwise befall a defendant.<sup>42</sup> Such irreparable injury is difficult to prove, and decisions such as the Court's in *Dyson v. Stein* mean that defendants in an obscenity prosecution may have to go through all appellate court levels available in their states before reaching a federal judge. Every court level encountered, of course, means money for defendants in terms of lawyers fees and court costs. Decisions such as *Dyson v. Stein* have "upped the ante" for defendants in obscenity cases, in terms of money spent and time and effort expended.

#### SEC. 66. *MILLER v. CALIFORNIA*: ENCOURAGING STATE AND LOCAL CONTROL

**In 1973, a new majority emerged on the Supreme Court in obscenity cases, and ruled that "community standards" used in judging literature or films need not be national.**

Censors—or would-be censors—cheered when the Supreme Court decided *Miller v. California* in 1973.<sup>43</sup> This case, and four companion cases decided at the same time, said that a national standard was

<sup>40</sup> 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769 (1971).

<sup>41</sup> *Stein v. Batchelor*, 300 F.Supp. 602 (D.C.Tex.1969).

<sup>42</sup> *Dyson v. Stein*, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769, 777 (1971).

<sup>43</sup> *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).

not required to judge obscenity.<sup>44</sup> Censorship boards began forming in numerous locales across the nation, and many adult movie houses and book stores shut down or “cleaned up”—however temporarily.<sup>45</sup> Writing a month after the five decisions, critic Charles Champlin warned of the perils of misguided state or local censorship, which he argued would surely follow the 1973 Court rulings. He declared that the movie “Carnal Knowledge,” although too gloomy an indictment of man-woman relationships in middle-class America, was certainly a serious work of art. Champlin wrote, “To find it obscene, as the Georgia Supreme Court just did, is itself equally obscene.” He added:<sup>46</sup>

Equally, to attempt to censor the movie “Paper Moon” on grounds that Tatum O’Neal was too young to smoke or swear, as a Dallas jury recently did, is a kind of malevolent foolishness. But they are where community standards are—or rather, where the attempts to invent community standards are.

### Miller v. California

The most important of the five obscenity cases decided on June 21, 1973—and indeed the most important such case since *Roth v. United States* (1957)—was *Miller v. California*.<sup>47</sup> In that case, as in the four others of that date, the Court split 5–4, revealing a new coalition among the Justices where obscenity and pornography were concerned. This coalition included Justice Byron R. White (appointed by President John F. Kennedy) and four justices appointed by President Richard M. Nixon (Chief Justice Warren Burger, plus Justices Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist, and Lewis Powell). Dissenting in all five of those obscenity cases were Justices Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart, William O. Douglas, and the author of the *Roth* test of 1957 and of many of the obscenity decisions thereafter, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.

*Miller v. California* arose when Marvin Miller mailed five unsolicited—and graphic—brochures to a restaurant in Newport Beach. The envelope was opened by the restaurant’s manager, with his mother looking on, and they complained to police. The brochures advertised four books, *Intercourse*, *Man-Woman*, *Sex Orgies Illus-*

<sup>44</sup> *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628 (1973); *U. S. v. Orito*, 413 U.S. 139, 93 S.Ct. 2674 (1973); *Kaplan v. California*, 413 U.S. 115, 93 S.Ct. 2680 (1973), and *U. S. v. Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Super 8 mm Film*, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665 (1973).

<sup>45</sup> “Smut Peddlers Closing Doors—or Cleaning Up,” Associated Press dispatch in *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, June 23, 1973, Section A, pp. 1, 12.

<sup>46</sup> Charles Champlin, “Obscenity Decision May Bring Misguided Local Censorship,” *Los Angeles Times*—*Washington Post Service* story in *Louisville Courier-Journal*, July 21, 1973, p. A-6.

<sup>47</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).

trated, and An Illustrated History of Pornography, plus a film titled Marital Intercourse. The brochures were mostly pictures and drawings of men and women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals prominently displayed. After a jury trial, Miller was convicted of a misdemeanor under the California Penal Code.<sup>48</sup>

Writing for the majority in *Miller*, Chief Justice Burger ruled that California could punish such conduct. He noted that the case involved "a situation in which sexually explicit materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indicated any desire to receive such materials. He added:<sup>49</sup>

This Court has recognized that the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles. \* \* \* It is in this context that we are called on to define the standards which must be used to identify obscene material that a State may regulate without infringing on the First Amendment as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Endeavoring to formulate a new standard, Chief Justice Burger first returned to *Roth's* assurance that obscene materials were not protected by the First Amendment.<sup>50</sup> Then, he denounced the test of obscenity suggested in the *Fanny Hill (Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure)* case nine years after *Roth*, in 1966. In that case, three justices, in a plurality opinion, held that material could not be judged obscene unless it were proven to be "utterly without redeeming social importance." Burger added:<sup>51</sup>

While *Roth* presumed "obscenity" to be "utterly without redeeming social value," *Memoirs* required that to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively established that the

<sup>48</sup> West's Ann. California Pen. Code, § 312.2(a) makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly distribute obscene matter. After the jury trial, the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California, Orange County, summarily affirmed the conviction without offering an opinion.

<sup>49</sup> *Miller v. State of California*, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2612 (1973). Relevant cases cited included *Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969); *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274 (1968); *Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas*, 390 U.S. 676, 88 S.Ct. 1298 (1968); *Redrup v. New York*, 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967); *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964), and *Rabe v. Washington*, 405 U.S. 313, 92 S.Ct. 993 (1972).

<sup>50</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 20, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2613 (1973), citing *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957).

<sup>51</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 22, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2613-2614 (1973), citing *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts*, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966). Emphasis the Court's.



material is “utterly without redeeming social value.” Thus, even as they repeated the words of *Roth*, the *Memoirs* plurality produced a drastically altered test that called on the prosecution to prove a negative, *i. e.*, that the material was “utterly without redeeming social value”—a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof.

The Chief Justice said that since the 1957 decision in *Roth*, the Court had not been able to muster a majority to agree to a standard of what constitutes “obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States’ police power.”<sup>52</sup> In 1973, however, Burger found himself in substantial agreement with four other Justices. He made the most of it, setting out general rules on what States could regulate (“hard-core pornography”) and re-wording the *Roth* and *Memoirs* tests into a standard more congenial to convicting persons for distribution or possession of sexually explicit materials.<sup>53</sup>

\* \* \* [W]e now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest \* \* \* (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the “utterly without redeeming social value” test of *Memoirs v. Massachusetts*

<sup>52</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 22, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2614 (1973).

<sup>53</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 23–24, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2614, 2615 (1973). Emphasis the Court’s. Chief Justice Burger wrote that a State could, through statute, forbid:

“(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.

“(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.

“Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such public places. At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection.”

\* \* \* : that concept has never commanded the adherence of more than three Justices at one time.

The majority opinion then declared that there can be no uniform national standard for judging obscenity or what appeals to “prurient interest” or what is “patently offensive.” “[O]ur nation is simply too big and diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation \* \* \*”<sup>54</sup> The First Amendment, Burger said, did not require the people of Maine or Mississippi to put up with public depiction of conduct tolerated in Las Vegas or New York City.

Chief Justice Burger conceded that the “sexual revolution” may have been useful in striking away layers of prudery. “But it does not follow,” he added, “that no regulation of patently offensive materials is needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow unregulated access to heroin because it is a derivative of medicinal morphine.”<sup>55</sup>

Deep disagreement with Justice Brennan sounded throughout the Chief Justice’s opinion, providing a rather shrill counterpoint to Burger’s main arguments. Brennan, the author of the majority opinion in *Roth* and long considered the Court’s obscenity specialist, drew fire because the Justice had experienced a profound change of mind. Because of Justice Brennan’s long study of this area of law—and because the problems he pointed to in 1973 are underlined every time the Court decides an obscenity case—he will be quoted at some length.<sup>56</sup>

I am convinced that the approach initiated 15 years ago in *Roth v. United States* \* \* \* culminating in the Court’s decision today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing First Amendment values, and I have concluded that the time has come to make a significant departure from that approach.

\* \* \*

Our experience with the *Roth* approach has certainly taught us that the outright suppression of obscenity cannot be reconciled with the fundamental principles of the First

<sup>54</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 30, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2618 (1973).

<sup>55</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 36, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2621–2622 (1973).

<sup>56</sup> Brennan, in company with Marshall and Stewart, dissented in all five of the obscenity decisions of the Court on June 21, 1973. Douglas dissented separately in all five cases. Brennan’s dissent in *Miller* was brief, and referred to the major statement of his views in his dissent in the accompanying case of *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2627–2628 (1973), at pp. 2642–2663. Justice Brennan wrote opinions of the Court (or plurality opinions of the Court) in *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957); *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964); *Ginzburg v. United States*, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966); *Mishkin v. New York*, 383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958 (1966), and *Memoirs v. Massachusetts*, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966).

and Fourteenth Amendments. For we have failed to formulate a standard that sharply distinguishes protected from unprotected speech, and out of necessity we have resorted to the *Redrup*<sup>57</sup> approach, which resolves cases as between parties, but offers only the most obscure guidance to legislation, adjudication by other courts, and primary conduct.

\* \* \*

It comes as no surprise that judicial attempts to follow our lead conscientiously have often ended in hopeless confusion.

\* \* \*

We have more than once previously acknowledged that “constitutionally protected expression \* \* \* is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line.” *Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan*, 372 U.S. 58, 66, 83 S.Ct. 631, 637 (1963). \* \* \* I need hardly point out that the factors which must be taken into account are judgmental and can only be applied on a “case-by-case, sight-by-sight” basis. \* \* \* These considerations suggest that no one definition, no matter how precisely or narrowly drawn, can positively suffice for all situations, or carve out fully suppressible expression for all media without also creating a substantial risk of encroachment upon the guarantees of the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.

Brennan’s final rejection of the *Roth* test—and its modifications as expressed in *Memoirs*<sup>58</sup> and in *Miller v. California*<sup>59</sup>—was based in large measure upon his growing belief that obscenity statutes are unconstitutionally vague. That is, there are “*scienter*” problems: obscenity laws are so formless that defendants often do not have fair notice as to whether publications or films they distribute or exhibit are obscene. Without fair notice, there may occur a “chilling effect” upon protected speech.<sup>60</sup>

In addition, the vagueness of obscenity statutes creates another, although more subtle, set of problems. “These problems,” Brennan wrote, “concern the institutional stress that inevitably results where the line separating protected from unprotected speech is excessively vague. In *Roth*, the Court had noted that marginal cases might occur, in which it would be difficult to ascertain whether a particular expression was obscene or not obscene and therefore protected

<sup>57</sup> 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967).

<sup>58</sup> *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts*, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966).

<sup>59</sup> *Miller v. State of California*, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).

<sup>60</sup> Brennan dissent in *Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2651 (1973).

by the First Amendment. However, he declared, virtually every obscenity case turned out to be marginal, on the boundary line between protected and unprotected speech.<sup>61</sup>

Brennan argued that the Court's new modification of the *Roth-Memoirs* test assumes that some works will be deemed obscene, even though they clearly have *some* social value. Under the Burger variation of the test, convictions can be had whenever a State is able to prove that the value, "measured by some unspecified standard, was not sufficiently 'serious' to warrant constitutional protection."<sup>62</sup> He contended that the Court's new approach added no clarity, and that it did nothing about the problem of providing fairer notice to booksellers, theatre owners, and to the reading and viewing public. Brennan was also dissatisfied with the Court's definition of obscenity as being limited to depictions of explicit sexual acts and physical conduct. The "physical conduct" formulation, he said, would be difficult to apply to pictorial matter, and virtually impossible to apply to determine which descriptions of sexual conduct are protected and which are not.<sup>63</sup> Brennan urged that the Court withdraw from judging so many individual obscenity cases.<sup>64</sup>

Our experience since *Roth* requires us not only to abandon the effort to pick out obscene materials on a case-by-case basis, but also to reconsider a fundamental postulate of *Roth*: that there exists a definable class of sexually oriented expression that may be totally suppressed by the Federal and State governments. Assuming that such a class of expression does in fact exist, I am forced to conclude that the concept of "obscenity" cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a by-product of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms. Given these inevitable side-effects of state efforts to suppress what is assumed to be *unprotected* speech, we must scrutinize with care the state interest that is asserted to justify the suppression. For in the absence of some very substantial interest in suppressing such speech, we can hardly condone the ill effects that seem to flow inevitably from the effort.

\* \* \*

The opinions in *Redrup* and *Stanley v. Georgia* reflected our emerging view that the state interests in protecting children and in protecting unconsenting adults may stand

<sup>61</sup> 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2651 (1973).

<sup>62</sup> 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2654 (1973).

<sup>63</sup> 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2656 (1973).

<sup>64</sup> 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660 (1973).

on a different footing from the other asserted state interests. It may well be, as one commentator has argued, that "exposure to [erotic material] is for some an intense emotional experience. A communication of this nature, imposed upon a person contrary to his wishes, has all the characteristics of a physical assault. \* \* \* [and it] constitutes an invasion of his privacy \* \* \*<sup>65</sup>

\* \* \*

In short, while I cannot say that the interests of the State—apart from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults—are trivial or nonexistent, I am compelled to conclude that these interests cannot justify the substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation's judicial machinery that inevitably results from state efforts to bar the distribution even of unprotected material to consenting adults.

\* \* \*

I would hold, therefore, that at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the state and federal governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly "obscene" contents. Nothing in this approach precludes those governments from taking action to serve what may be strong and legitimate interests through regulation of the manner of distribution of sexually oriented material.

From the *Miller* decision of 1973 through 1977, the Court has been split 5-4 in most of the obscenity cases it has decided. The majority follows *Miller*, and favors stringent regulation of sexually explicit material. The split is profound, and may be traced to Justice Brennan's dissent which was quoted in the paragraphs immediately preceding this one. Time and time again, including many *per curiam* decisions in which the Court upheld obscenity prosecutions without an explanatory opinion, Brennan has dissented. He has said, repeatedly, that he does not believe that obscenity can be described with sufficient clarity to give defendants fair notice. Unless sexually explicit materials are distributed to juveniles or obtrusively presented to unconsenting adults, said Brennan, then the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid states or the federal governments from suppressing such materials.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Brennan quoted Thomas I. Emerson, *The System of Freedom of Expression* (1970), at p. 496.

<sup>66</sup> See, e. g., *Trinkler v. Alabama*, 414 U.S. 955, 94 S.Ct. 265 (1973); *Raymond Roth v. New Jersey*, 414 U.S. 962, 94 S.Ct. 271 (1973); *Jim Sharp v. Texas*, 414 U.S. 1118, 94 S.Ct. 854 (1974); *J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Washington*, 418 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3217 (1974). See also *Hamling v. U. S.*, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2919-2924 (1974).

### “Refinements” of Miller: *Jenkins* and *Hamling*

To prosecutors and would-be censors, the decisions in *Miller* and its companion cases appeared to allow a kind of local-option in setting the limits of candor or disclosure in sexy books, magazines or films. As a result, Mike Nichols' serious film, *Carnal Knowledge*, became the target of an obscenity prosecution in Albany, Georgia in a case known as *Jenkins v. Georgia*. The prosecution took place even though it contained no frontal nudity or explicit depictions of sexual acts. The manager of a theater, Billy Jenkins, was convicted under a Georgia statute<sup>67</sup> forbidding distribution of obscene material and was fined \$750 and sentenced to 12 months in jail.<sup>68</sup> His conviction was affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.<sup>69</sup>

Although agreeing with the Georgia Supreme Court that the U.S. Constitution does not require juries in obscenity cases to be instructed according to a hypothetical statewide standard,<sup>70</sup> the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously reversed Jenkins' conviction. Writing for the Court, Justice William H. Rehnquist ruled that *Carnal Knowledge* was not patently offensive. He referred to *Miller v. California*, which said that a state statute could forbid patently offensive materials, including<sup>71</sup>

“representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,” and “representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.”

Because *Carnal Knowledge* did not contain such representations as described in *Miller*, the conviction of Jenkins could not stand.<sup>72</sup>

Nothing in the movie falls within either of the two examples given in *Miller* of material which may be constitutionally found to meet the “patently offensive” element of those standards, nor is there anything sufficiently similar to such material to justify similar treatment. While the subject matter of the picture is, in a broad sense, sex, and there are scenes in which sexual conduct including “ultimate sexual acts” is understood to be taking place, the camera does not focus on the bodies of the actors at such times. There is no exhibition whatever of the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise, during these scenes. There are

<sup>67</sup> *Jenkins v. Georgia*, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2753 (1974) citing Ga.Code Ann. §§ 26-2011, 26-2105.

<sup>68</sup> 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2753 (1974).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2755 (1974).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

occasional scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not obscene under the *Miller* standards. We hold that the film could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and that it is therefore not outside the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments \* \* \*.

### Hamling v. United States

If the film *Carnal Knowledge* was not "patently offensive," *The Illustrated Presidential Report of The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography* was exceptionally offensive and obscene in the eyes of five members of the Court. The case which *The Illustrated Presidential Report* inspired—*Hamling v. United States*—was indeed ironic, because the book in question used excruciatingly explicit photos to illustrate a text provided by a sobersided U.S. government report on obscenity and pornography.<sup>73</sup>

The *Hamling* case arose when William L. Hamling and several co-defendants were indicted on 21 counts of using the mails to carry an obscene book. They had mailed approximately 55,000 copies of a single sheet advertising brochure to various parts of the U.S. One side contained a collage of photographs from the *Illustrated Report* portraying heterosexual and homosexual intercourse, fellatio, a group-sex arrangement involving nine persons, cunnilingus, and bestiality.<sup>74</sup> After a jury trial, the defendants were convicted on 12 counts of mailing and conspiring to mail an obscene advertisement.<sup>75</sup>

The book they advertised had taken the text from the actual report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, but illustrations had been added. The publishers of the *Illustrated Report* said the pictures were included "as examples of the type of subject matter discussed and the type of the material shown to persons who were part of the research projects engaged in for the Commission as the basis for their [sic] Report."<sup>76</sup>

The Court's majority opinion, delivered by Justice William H. Rehnquist, concluded that the advertising brochure was hard-core pornography.<sup>77</sup> That meant, of course, that circulating the brochure through the U.S. Mail was a crime. Beyond that finding, the *Hamling* decision bristles with procedural rulings and with attempts to resolve problems occasioned by the timing of Hamling's conviction. He had been convicted in March, 1971, at a time when the question of whether national standards or state/local standards should be applied in judging obscenity was in limbo. Subsequently,

<sup>73</sup> *Hamling v. United States*, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (1974).

<sup>74</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2895 (1974).

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2896 (1974).

<sup>77</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2906 (1974).

the Court announced—in *Miller v. California* (1973)—that state or local standards and *not* national standards were to be used in evaluating allegedly obscene material. The trial judge had instructed the jury that obscenity was to be weighed according to a national standard. That judge ruled inadmissible the results of a survey of 718 San Diego, California, residents which indicated that a substantial majority of the respondents believed that the brochure should be available to the public. This survey was excluded on the ground that it dealt with a local standard, and that the proper rule to be used was a national standard.<sup>78</sup>

Even though the Supreme Court had ruled in 1973 (*Miller*) that the appropriate standard was state or local, Justice Rehnquist upheld the trial judge's ruling. He wrote that a trial court "retains considerable latitude even with admittedly relevant evidence in rejecting that which is cumulative, and in requiring that which is to be brought to the jury's attention to be done so in a manner least likely to confuse that body."<sup>79</sup>

Hamling and his co-defendants had been convicted under a test rejected in *Miller*, a formulation drawn from *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts* (the *Fanny Hill* case of 1966).<sup>80</sup> The *Memoirs* test, it may be recalled, said that to be obscene, something had to be "utterly without redeeming social importance." In *Miller*, however, the Court complained that such a test required "proving a negative," and instead held that material could be found obscene if "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."<sup>81</sup> Justice Rehnquist wrote that any constitutional principle enunciated in *Miller* which would benefit the defendants must be applied in their case. The defendants contended, unsuccessfully, that the *Miller* treatment of the concept of "national standards" invalidated the District Court's charge to the jury.<sup>82</sup> It was said that the Court's *Miller* ruling that a state could constitutionally forbid obscenity in terms of a statewide or (smaller) standard did not mean that any precise geographical area is required as a matter of constitutional law.<sup>83</sup>

Elsewhere, the Court's majority affirmed some earlier pronouncements on the law of obscenity. The federal statute forbidding mailing of obscene material—Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461—again was said to provide adequate notice of what is prohibited by law.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>78</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2903; see also dissent of Justice Brennan, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, at pp. 2922–2923.

<sup>79</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2903 (1974).

<sup>80</sup> 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 977 (1966).

<sup>81</sup> 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).

<sup>82</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2900–2902 (1974).

<sup>83</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2901 (1974).

<sup>84</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2898 (1974).



Furthermore, in line with *Mishkin v. New York* (1966),<sup>85</sup> the Court held that in deciding whether the brochure appealed to a prurient interest in sex, the jury could consider whether some portions appealed to a specially defined deviant group as well as to average individuals.<sup>86</sup> Also, the Court approved the approach taken in *Ginzburg v. New York* (1966), saying that evidence of pandering sales can be relevant in determining obscenity<sup>87</sup>—as long as the correct constitutional definition of obscenity is applied.<sup>88</sup>

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissented vigorously. He again contended that material should not be suppressed unless there is distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults.<sup>89</sup> Brennan also drew dead aim on the dangers he saw in the local standards-let's-let-each-jury-call-the-shots approach to judging obscenity.<sup>90</sup>

The 1958 amendments to § 1461 constituted the mailing of obscene matter a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C.A. 3727. The practical effect of this amendment—intentionally adopted by Congress for that express purpose—is to permit prosecution “in the Federal district in which [the disseminator] mailed the obscenity, in the Federal district in which the obscenity was received, or in any Federal district through which the obscenity passed while it was on its route through the mails.” 104 Cong.Rec. 15610–15611 (remarks of Rep. Hillings). \* \* \* Under today’s “local” standards construction, therefore, the guilt or innocence of distributors of identical materials mailed from the same locale can now turn on the dicey course of transit or place of delivery of the materials. \* \* \*

Brennan’s dissent termed this situation one which must lead to a debilitating self-censorship. National distributors, facing “variegated standards \* \* \* impossible to discern,” will be wary of what might be done according to the community standards will inevitably grow cautious, and distribution of sexually oriented materials, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded.<sup>91</sup> He concluded that Hamling and friends had been charged with one crime—violating national obscenity standards—and their convictions were affirmed on another—violating local standards. He added: “Under standards long settled \* \* \* treating a conviction as a conviction upon a charge not made is a denial of due process of law.”<sup>92</sup>

<sup>85</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).

<sup>86</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2914 (1974).

<sup>87</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).

<sup>88</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2914 (1974).

<sup>89</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2919 (1974).

<sup>90</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2920–2921 (1974).

<sup>91</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2921 (1974).

<sup>92</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2924 (1974).

Justice Douglas dissented briefly, saying that the official report of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography contained references to many facets of sex. He argued that all the defendants had done was to supply the report with a visual glossary, and said that he saw nothing in the First Amendment which allows the Court to forbid use of a factual glossary to illustrate the contents of the Report.<sup>93</sup> In a footnote, he added:<sup>94</sup>

#### SEC. 67. CUSTOMS AND POSTAL CENSORSHIP

**Customs censorship continues to be a major activity, but postal censorship—after a generally disgraceful record throughout much of the nation's history—appears to have abated somewhat.**

There is a ripple effect in obscenity decisions of the Supreme Court. Standards laid down in *Roth v. United States* (1957) and *Miller v. California* (1973) sometimes surface in some rather unusual ways. Take, for example, the area of customs censorship. The U.S. Customs Service has a long and rather checkered history of stopping materials suspected of being obscene—including, during the 1930s, some nude drawings. Turned out those drawings were by an Italian artist named Michelangelo, and the sketches were his preliminary work for what turned out to be the ceiling in the Sistine Chapel.<sup>95</sup> In the 1970s, the Customs Service is still operating under Title 19 U.S.C.A. § 1305, "Immoral articles; importation prohibited." As the literate—if gently acerbic Circuit Judge Leonard P. Moore—has said, this statute contains "a curious assortment of immoral articles, e. g., those writings 'advocating or urging treason or insurrection against the United States,' obscene publications, drugs for causing unlawful abortions, and lottery tickets." Such articles may not be allowed to enter the United States.<sup>96</sup> Judge Moore then described the procedure which will be followed to seize materials suspected of dealing impermissibly with sex. He wrote:<sup>97</sup>

The customs employee is directed to seize the in-his-opinion offending article to wait the judgment of a district court thereon. To this end, the customs employee must transmit the article "to the district attorney of the district in which is situated the office at which such seizure has taken place", and he, undoubtedly through one of his assist-

<sup>93</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2919 (1974).

<sup>94</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2919n (1974).

<sup>95</sup> Anne Lyon Haight, *Banned Books*, 2nd ed., (New York, R. R. Bowker, 1955) p. 12.

<sup>96</sup> *United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise*, 562 F.2d 185-186 (2nd Cir. 1977).

See also *United States v. Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Super-8 mm Film*, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 2667-2668 (1973). See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1305(a).

<sup>97</sup> *United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise*, 562 F.2d 185, 186 (2nd Cir. 1977).

ants, "shall institute proceedings in the district court" for the confiscation and destruction of the matter seized.

Some Assistant United States Attorney prepares a complaint whereby he demands judgment that the article is obscene and declares that he wants it destroyed. He attaches a schedule of all seized items (usually a week's collection) and prays that all interested persons be duly cited to answer. To all addressees he then sends a notice, giving them 20 days in which to file a claim, together with a form for such claim and answer. Upon receipt of such claims, if any, the matter is set for a so-called hearing before a District Judge. \* \* \*

The institution of court proceedings adds to the two primary censors, the customs employee and the Assistant United States Attorney, a District Judge and, potentially, three Court of Appeals Judges and nine Supreme Court Justices.

A young man from Lancaster, Pa. was sent a pamphlet by a friend in Germany. The customs service, however, seized that pamphlet, which showed a young man and two women in varying combinations of close encounters of the sexual kind. The pamphlet was one of more than 500 printed articles seized that week by New York City customs employees. Circuit Judge Moore, writing for the court in this case which is rather coyly known as *U. S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise*, Schedule No. 1303, noted:<sup>98</sup>

Schedule 1303, attached to the complaint and listing articles seized as well as the mailing destinations, includes some 573 addressees located in some 48 states. Of the 50 states, only 2, Colorado and North Dakota, failed to have residents exhibiting some "prurient interest" or at least curiosity. Most of the items seized were listed only as "Illustrated Advertising." The titles of the other so-called magazines were "Weekend Sex", "Nympho", "Children Love", "Anal Sex", "Sexual Positions", and similar designations.

Of the 573 addressees, only 14 filed claims asking that the materials which had been shipped to them be released by the government. And only one individual—the young man from Lancaster, Pa., showed up to try to get his pamphlet. Circuit Judge Moore quoted what he called the young man's sagacious comment "that it seems unusual for the United States Government to spend an awful lot of time and money and effort for one small mail article \* \* \* when there is obviously better use for that money to be spent in the judicial system \* \* \*"<sup>99</sup>

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 186-187.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187.

The U.S. District Court in this case—having trouble with the state and local standards aspects of *Miller v. California*<sup>1</sup>—said that the obscenity (or lack thereof) of an imported article should not be judged at the port of entry, but at the place where the addressee was to receive it. For example, Lancaster, Pa. The Circuit Court disagreed. In order to get the forfeiture and destruction of allegedly obscene imported material, the government must show that the material is obscene in the district where it was seized by customs agents. “Import” implies entry into the country at those places which have customs officers—ports of entry, in other words. Therefore, inspection would have to take place at the port of entry. Circuit Judge Moore added:<sup>2</sup>

The District Court [here sitting without a jury] will have to serve as a composite for a Southern District jury—possibly representing the rural areas of Rockland and Dutchess Counties together with the urban sections of Manhattan and the Bronx. The Court will have to decide the question of obscenity “according to the average person in the community, rather than the most prudish or the most tolerant.” *Smith v. United States*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4495, 4498 (May 23, 1977). Thus, the “average person” takes his or her stand beside the hypothetical and court-created mythical character “the reasonably prudent man”. See *id.* *Hamling v. United States*, 418 U.S. 87, 104–105, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (1974). Again, there is probably no better way.

Shades of Anthony Comstock still hover over our obscenity statutes. But as long as they remain on the books it is the duty of Government to enforce them within constitutional limits.

### Postal Censorship

Postal censorship appears to be in retreat at this writing, but that mechanism for hampering freedom of expression has such a sorry history in this nation that constant vigilance is needed. George Clinton of New York, governor throughout the Confederation period, complained in 1788 that the mail service was poor and that someone had tampered with letters addressed to him.<sup>3</sup> Strange things happened to Abolitionist mail sent to the southward during the Presidency of Andrew Jackson.<sup>4</sup> In time of war, of course,

<sup>1</sup> See the discussion of *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973), in Section 66 of this chapter.

<sup>2</sup> *U. S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise*, 562 F.2d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 1977).

<sup>3</sup> Jackson Turner Main, *The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961) p. 250.

<sup>4</sup> Harold L. Nelson, ed., *Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court*, pp. 212–220.

many people other than the addressees were reading the mail.<sup>5</sup>

Where obscenity is concerned, the Post Office was very frisky during the 1930s and 1940s. Over the years, the Post Office had slowly developed a method of administrative censorship, denying the mails to publications suspected of obscenity even if prosecution was not actually intended. Postal censors thus became something of a law unto themselves. A publisher who wanted to fight the Post Office would have to hire an attorney and sue to enjoin the censors' activities.<sup>6</sup> Among books excluded from the mails in the 1930s and early 1940s were Erskine Caldwell's *Tobacco Road* and *God's Little Acre*. John O'Hara's *Appointment in Samarra* and Ernest Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* were confiscated when found in the mails even though they were sold freely in bookstores. John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath* was cleared for mailing, although a Post Office lawyer complained that it contained obscene passages.<sup>7</sup>

During World War II, however, the Post Office department overreached itself in trying to discipline *Esquire* magazine. In 1943, the Department attempted to withdraw second-class mailing rates in order to punish the magazine for its "smoking car" humor. Without that mail-rate classification, the magazine would have had to pay higher amounts to go through the mails. *Esquire's* publishers, fully realizing that the higher rates might cost an additional \$500,000 and put them out of business, took the Post Office to court.<sup>8</sup>

Speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice William O. Douglas demolished the Post Office's contentions that if a publication did not meet some postal employees' concepts of being published for the "public good" they would have to pay higher mailing rates. He wrote: "[A] requirement that literature or art conform to some norm prescribed by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our system."<sup>9</sup>

Despite the *Esquire* decision, the Post Office department retained the power to withdraw the second-class privilege if a publisher mails a series of "non-mailable" issues. (Recent hikes in the costs of mailing magazines by Congress have symbolized a retreat from the nationalizing Postal Act of 1872. That act, in a nation sprawling toward its western frontier, provided subsidized mailing rates which made it as inexpensive to mail a magazine across the continent as across town.) In practice, the *Esquire* decision has meant that the Post Office department largely gave up the practice of revoking

<sup>5</sup> Peterson, H. C. and Gilbert Fite, *Opponents of the War, 1917-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957) *passim*.

<sup>6</sup> James C. N. Paul and Murray L. Schwartz, *Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961) pp. 68-69.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

<sup>8</sup> *Hannegan v. Esquire*, 327 U.S. 146, 151n., 66 S.Ct. 456, 459n. (1946).

<sup>9</sup> 327 U.S. 146, 157-158, 66 S.Ct. 456, 462 (1946).

second-class permits to suppress materials which an administrator deemed obscene.<sup>10</sup>

As noted earlier, in Section 61 of this chapter, the basic federal anti-obscenity statute forbids mailing obscene literature or materials, and this has kept the Post Office Department very much involved in efforts to control obscene literature.<sup>11</sup> During the 1950s, the Post Office Department made use of the Postmaster General's administrative powers to stop mailings of questionable materials. The "administrative stop order" procedure enabled a decision by the department to declare a book non-mailable. However, a person wishing to mail the book had the right to appeal the administrative order (issued in the name of the Postmaster General.) The administrative order could be appealed to a U.S. District Court. If declared obscene, the book could not be mailed. If ruled not obscene by the court, it could be mailed freely. This procedure, although cumbersome, took away the fear that a person would get hit with heavy criminal penalties. The only issue was the mailability of the book; the only penalty for losing such a case would be that the distributor could not mail his book.<sup>12</sup>

In 1961, however, the Post Office Department decided to abandon the administrative stop order and turn to a prosecutorial approach. As former Postmaster General J. Edward Day wrote in 1966, "I concluded that grand juries and petit juries—representing community standards—are more appropriate bodies for deciding whether or not mail is obscene than are administrative officials at the Post Office \* \* \*"<sup>13</sup>

In 1970, the adoption of an "antipandering" statute changed the Post Office Department's stance somewhat. This statute allowed the Post Office to concentrate upon dealers who mail questionable material to persons who do not wish to receive it. This statute says that the mail recipients are the sole judges of whether advertising materials sent to them are arousing or sexually provocative. If recipients request that no more such materials be sent to them by a specific sender, the Post Office will order the sender to discontinue all mailings to that person. Also, the Postmaster General can order that the recipient's name be deleted from all mailing lists which the sender owns or controls. If the mailings continue, another complaint from the recipient can result in the Post Office asking the

<sup>10</sup> Paul and Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–77.

<sup>11</sup> 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461.

<sup>12</sup> Leon Friedman, "The Ginzburg Decision and the Law," *The American Scholar*, Vol. 36:1 (Winter, 1966–67) p. 80; J. Edward Day, "Mailing Lists and Pornography," *American Bar Association Journal* 52 (Dec.1966) p. 1104.

<sup>13</sup> Day, *loc. cit.*

Justice Department to halt such mailings. If a court order is ignored, the court will punish such violations as contempt of court.<sup>14</sup>

In 1971, another weapon was created for mail recipients to use against porn mailers. Mail recipients can fill out a form at their local Post Office, asking that their names be removed from any lists used by mailers of sexually explicit advertisements. The ads are defined in this fashion by the statute:<sup>15</sup>

- (d) "Sexually oriented advertisement" means any advertisement that depicts, in actual or simulated form, or explicitly describes, in a predominantly sexual context, human genitalia, any act of natural or unnatural sexual intercourse, any act of sadism or masochism, or any other erotic subject directly related to the foregoing. Material otherwise within the definition of this subsection shall be deemed not to constitute a sexually oriented advertisement if it constitutes only a small and insignificant part of the whole of a single catalog, book, periodical, or other work the remainder of which is not primarily devoted to sexual matters.

## SEC. 68. MOTION PICTURE AND BROADCAST CENSORSHIP

While problems arising out of attempts to censor allegedly obscene printed materials have presented an apparently insoluble dilemma for American courts and legislatures, motion pictures and broadcast media have had difficulties of their own. With motion picture censorship, the assumption is the same as in attempts to censor the printed word: the depiction of sexual scenes—if the sex is sufficiently blatant or explicit—is socially harmful and should be suppressed.

In recent years, the movies have been granted some of the protections of the First Amendment, yet they have also been subjected to censorship. And, in some instances, the courts have upheld systems of prior censorship over motion pictures. In 1915, when the film industry was in its infancy and the movies scarcely were out of the magic-lantern stage, the Supreme Court ruled that exhibiting films was a business which was not part of the press of the nation and therefore not deserving of constitutional protection.<sup>16</sup> In 1952, finally, the Supreme Court ruled that motion pictures are "a significant medium for the communication of ideas," important for the

<sup>14</sup> 39 U.S.C.A. § 3008. Constitutionality of this statute section was upheld in *Rowan v. United States Post Office Department*, 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484 (1970).

<sup>15</sup> 39 U.S.C.A. § 3010. This section was held constitutional in *Pent-R-Books*, 328 F.Supp. 297 (D.C.N.Y.1971).

<sup>16</sup> *Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio*, 236 U.S. 230, 244, 35 S.Ct. 387, 391 (1915).

expression of political or social views and thus an important organ of public opinion.<sup>17</sup>

This case—*Burstyn v. Wilson*—involved Roberto Rossellini's film, "The Miracle." This was a story about a simple-minded goatherd who had been raped by a bearded stranger whom she believed to be St. Joseph. The film was accused not of obscenity but of "sacrilege." The New York Education Department had issued a license to allow showing of "The Miracle," but the Education Department's governing body, the New York Regents, ordered the license withdrawn after the regents had received protests that the film was "sacrilegious."<sup>18</sup> *Burstyn* appealed the license's withdrawal to the New York Courts, claiming that the state's licensing statute was unconstitutional. New York's courts, however, rejected the argument that the New York law abridged freedom of speech and press and approved the Regents' ruling that the film was "sacrilegious." The Supreme Court of the United States, however, ruled unanimously that the New York statute and the term "sacrilegious" were so vague that they abridged freedom of expression.

Clark declared that the fact that motion pictures are produced by a large, profitable industry does not remove the protection of Constitutional guarantees. Although the Court said in *dicta* that a clearly drawn obscenity statute to regulate motion pictures might be upheld, the main thrust of the *Burstyn* decision was toward greater freedom. Not only were films given protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, movies which offended a particular religious group need not, for that reason alone, be banned. Thus "sacrilege" can no longer be a ground for censoring movies.<sup>19</sup>

Seven years after the *Burstyn* decision, the Supreme Court—in *Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. New York*—again upheld the idea that films are within the protection of the First Amendment. The *Kingsley* decision, however, had within it the possibilities for once again expanding controls over films. The Court specifically refused to decide whether "the controls which a State may impose upon this medium of expression are precisely co-extensive with those allowable for newspapers, books, or individual speech."<sup>20</sup>

Despite the veiled warning in the *Kingsley* opinion that the Supreme Court might once again strengthen controls over motion pictures, a bold attempt was made to get a prior censorship ordinance declared unconstitutional. This was the 1961 case of *Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago*, which involved a film with a spicy name: "Don Juan." However, this film was merely a motion

<sup>17</sup> *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* Wilson was chairman of the New York Board of Regents.

<sup>19</sup> 343 U.S. 495, 502, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781 (1952).

<sup>20</sup> 360 U.S. 684, 689–690, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 1366 (1959).



picture version of Mozart's opera, "Don Giovanni," obviously not obscene.

The Times Film Corporation paid the license fee for "Don Juan," but refused to submit the film to Chicago's Board of Censors for a license. Although the film was quite sedate, the company never argued that "Don Juan" was not obscene. Instead, the only question presented by the film company's lawyers was whether the Chicago ordinance which provided for pre-screening and licensing of motion pictures *before* public exhibition was constitutional. Thus the constitutionality of *prior restraint* was the sole issue in this film censorship case. Perhaps officials of the Times Film Corporation were irked by the Big-Brotherish overtones of Chicago's film censorship ordinance, which said:<sup>21</sup>

It shall be unlawful for any person to show or exhibit in a public place \* \* \* any \* \* \* motion picture \* \* \* without first having secured a permit therefore from the superintendent of police.

After a Federal District Court had dismissed the Times Film Corporation's complaint—and after a Court of Appeals had affirmed that decision—the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.<sup>22</sup>

The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision, held that Chicago's censorship ordinance was constitutional. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, said the question presented by this case was whether a film exhibitor has "complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture." Clark replied, however, "It has never been held that liberty of speech is absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all previous restraints on speech are invalid."<sup>23</sup>

Clark noted that the content of the motion picture had not been raised as an issue. Instead, the Times Film Corporation challenged the censor's basic authority. By raising such a challenge to prior restraint, Times Film Corporation simply aimed too high. It might have helped the corporation's case had its attorneys shown that the film involved was not objectionable. But this was not done. As a result, a majority of the Supreme Court upheld the Chicago ordinance, drawing on language first used in the *Burstyn* case and echoed in the *Kingsley Films* decision. Motion pictures are not

<sup>21</sup> Municipal Code of Chicago, Chapter 155, Section 1. However, Section 2 provided that newsreels do not have to be previewed. Films were to be approved before public showing by either the superintendent of police or by the "Film Review Section," six persons appointed by the superintendent of police.

<sup>22</sup> 362 U.S. 917, 80 S.Ct. 672 (1960).

<sup>23</sup> *Times Film Corp. v. Chicago*, 365 U.S. 43, 47, 81 S.Ct. 391, 393 (1961), citing *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).

“necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression.”<sup>24</sup>

In 1965, the Supreme Court moved to take a bit of the sting out of its 1961 holding in *Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago*.<sup>25</sup> The *Times Film* decision had upheld Chicago’s movie censorship ordinance, and the 1965 case of *Freedman v. Maryland* presented a challenge to the constitutionality of a similar law. Freedman had shown the film “*Revenge at Daybreak*” in his Baltimore theater without first submitting the picture to the State Board of Censors as required by Maryland law.<sup>26</sup>

However, Freedman’s challenge to the Maryland film censorship statute was much more focused and precise than the *Times Film Corporation*’s attack on the Chicago censorship ordinance. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan noted that<sup>27</sup>

[u]nlike the petitioner in *Times Film*, appellant does not argue that Article 2 [of the Maryland statute] is unconstitutional simply because it may prevent even the first showing of a film whose exhibition may legitimately be the subject of an obscenity prosecution. He presents a question quite distinct from that passed on in *Times Film*; accepting the rule in *Times Film*, he argues that Article 2 constitutes an invalid prior restraint because, in the context of the remainder of the statute, it presents a danger of unduly suppressing protected expression.

Brennan added that the Maryland law made it possible for the state’s Censorship Board to halt the showing of any film it disapproved, unless and until the film exhibitor started a time-consuming appeal procedure through Maryland Courts and got the Censorship Board’s ruling overturned. So in the *Freedman* case, prior restraint of movies was disallowed because of insufficient procedural safeguards in the Maryland law for the protection of the film exhibitor.

Nevertheless, the Court maintained that the “requirement of prior submission to a censor sustained in *Times Film* is consistent with our recognition that films differ from other forms of expression.” Justice Brennan suggested that an orderly, speedy procedure for pre-screening films could be constitutional.

Similarly, in *Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas* (1968), the Court declared an ordinance setting up a city’s censorship board to be

<sup>24</sup> 365 U.S. 43, 46, 49, 81 S.Ct. 391, 393–394 (1961); *Burstyn v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952); *Kingsley International Pictures v. Board of Regents*, 360 U.S. 684, 79 S.Ct. 1362 (1959).

<sup>25</sup> 365 U.S. 43, 81 S.Ct. 391 (1961).

<sup>26</sup> Article 66A of the 1957 Maryland Statutes made it unlawful to sell, lease, lend or exhibit a motion picture unless the film had first been submitted to and approved by the Maryland State Board of Censors.

<sup>27</sup> *Freedman v. Maryland*, 380 U.S. 51, 54, 85 S.Ct. 734, 737 (1965).

unconstitutionally vague. The Dallas ordinance had set up complicated procedures for exhibitors to follow in order to get Motion Picture Classification Board approval to show a film. In sticky instances, it could take three weeks or more before an exhibitor could get a definitive ruling. The Supreme Court, however, directed its scrutiny at the wording of the ordinance. Under that ordinance, the Board could declare a film "not suitable for young people"<sup>28</sup>

if, in the judgment of the Board, there is a substantial probability that \* \* \* [the film] will create the impression on young persons that \* \* \* [crime, delinquency or sexual promiscuity] is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy, or commonly accepted.

Justice Marshall's majority opinion ruled that this wording in the ordinance was so nebulous that the film industry might be intimidated into showing only totally inane films.<sup>29</sup> What, then, does an acceptable film censorship system have to do? This question was answered in the Supreme Court's affirmance of a three-judge district court action approving the wording of Maryland's censorship statute. That law includes these features:<sup>30</sup>

- Speedy procedures are required by the statute. Within five days after a film's submission, the Censor Board must decide whether it will grant a license to that film.
- Within three days of a license denial, the Board must initiate proceedings in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City for *de novo* review of the Board's decision.
- Prompt determination of obscenity (or lack thereof) by that court of equity after an adversary hearing *before* the Censor Board can make a final denial of a license.
- The Board must bear the burden of proof at all stages of the proceeding.

In addition to—and in part because of—public and legal pressures, the American motion picture industry has long had systems of self-regulation. The industry decided to regulate itself, lest states and cities do it entirely by laws and censorship boards. In 1922, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) was formed, and former Postmaster General Will Hays was hired to apply a code to preserve decency on the screen.<sup>31</sup> During the 1930s, the industry developed a Motion Picture Code which made it mandatory that each motion picture company submit its films to a committee of the MPPDA before public showings. If the committee found

<sup>28</sup> 390 U.S. 676, 688, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 1305 (1968).

<sup>29</sup> 390 U.S. 676, 682, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 1302 (1968).

<sup>30</sup> *Star v. Preller*, 419 U.S. 956, 95 S.Ct. 217 (1974).

<sup>31</sup> Raymond Moley, *The Hays Office* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945); Morris L. Ernst and Alexander Lindley, *The Censor Marches On* (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940) p. 80.

code violations (nudity, profanity, or obscenity, to give three examples), a producer could not release the picture until its offending scenes had been snipped out.<sup>32</sup>

The Motion Picture Code, although it underwent minor changes, continued in force well into the 1960s. This code, despite its drawbacks,<sup>33</sup> apparently played a role in reducing the number of state and local censorship groups and may have helped avoid creation of a federal motion picture censorship organization.

In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in *Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas*, a case discussed earlier in this section, the motion picture industry adopted a film rating system reflecting the Court's interest in protecting minors.<sup>34</sup> This rating system, which went into effect late in 1968, has become familiar to movie-goers. "G" means suggested for general audiences, and "PG" means that a film is intended for all ages, and that parental guidance is advised. "R" means restricted, and persons under the age of 17 are not admitted unless accompanied by a parent or an adult guardian. "X" means that persons under 17 are not admitted, and this age restriction may be higher in some areas.

### Broadcast Obscenity

Obscenity, variously defined, has never received constitutional protection from the Supreme Court of the United States. Where broadcasting is involved, moreover, explicitly sexy language or "dirty words" can bring down the wrath of the Federal Communications Commission and may even cause difficulties at license renewal time for the broadcaster who has allowed such stuff to be broadcast or televised.

For openers, the Federal Communications Act of 1934's Section 326 contained a prohibition against censorship but also included language outlawing obscene or indecent speech over the airwaves. In 1948, the proscription against obscenity was removed from Section 326 but reappeared in the United States Criminal Code. Title 18 U.S.C.A. Section 1464 says:

Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not

<sup>32</sup> Howard T. Lewis, *The Motion Picture Industry* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1933) p. 376.

<sup>33</sup> Two of the code's chief critics have charged that it creates a "viciously false picture of life" and that its mandates are too general. See Morris Ernst and Alexander Lindsey, *op. cit.*, p. 89. The code was amended in 1956, in order that films could deal with narcotics after a critically praised film, "The Man With the Golden Arm," had been denied an MPPDA seal for depicting a narcotic addict's problems. In 1961, the code was altered to "permit restrained, discreet treatment of sexual aberration in movies."

<sup>34</sup> Vincent Canby, "Movie Ratings for Children Grown Up," *New York Times*, Oct. 8, 1968, pp. 1 ff.

more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

Obscenity became a real problem for the FCC in the early 1960s. The now-legendary Charley Walker disc jockey programs broadcast by WDKD, Kingstree, S. C., foretold some of the difficulties for the Commission. The WDKD case—usually called the Palmetto Broadcasting Company case—came about as the result of good ole Charley's "bucolic humor" and ultimately resulted in the FCC's refusal to renew the station's license. His jibes were sufficiently ribald to the FCC of the early 1960s that the Commission did not quote examples. Instead, the Commission merely repeated an FCC examiner's conclusion that Walker's material was "'obscene and indecent and [certainly] coarse, vulgar and susceptible of indecent double meaning.'" <sup>35</sup>

Station owner Edward G. Robinson, Jr. had argued that he was not aware of extensive listener complaints, but the FCC found that many witnesses contradicted Robinson's claims.<sup>36</sup> The Walker programs were not isolated instances, the FCC said, being broadcast four hours a day from 1949 to 1952 and from 1954 to June, 1960.<sup>37</sup>

The FCC declared—and this was upheld by a Circuit Court of Appeals—that Palmetto licensee Robinson's misrepresentations to the Commission about the program contents formed sufficient grounds for the denial of a broadcast license. "[A]s the Supreme Court has stated '[t]he fact of concealment may be even more significant than the facts concealed. The willingness to deceive a regulating body may be disclosed by unmaterial and useless deceptions as well as by material and persuasive ones.'" <sup>38</sup>

Other matters, such as the likelihood that "listeners in the home or car (including children) might be subjected to such materials \* \* \*" simply by having the set tuned to a particular frequency or station were not pivotal in the Palmetto case although such matters were discussed. The mention of the problem of *who* might be listening or viewing, however, forecast later difficulties.

Although the *Palmetto* case turned, in part, upon the misrepresentations of the broadcaster and upon a "substantial period of operation inconsistent with the public-interest standard," the *Pacifica* case dealt with only "a few isolated programs, presented over a four-year period." FM radio stations owned by the *Pacifica* Foundation—

<sup>35</sup> *Palmetto Broadcasting Co. (WDKD), Kingstree, S. C.*, 33 FCC 250, 255 (July 25, 1962); 34 FCC 101 (Jan. 3, 1963), affirmed in *E. G. Robinson, Jr., t/a Palmetto Broadcasting Company (WDKD) v. Federal Communications Commission*, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C.Cir. 1964), certiorari denied 379 U.S. 843, 85 S.Ct. 84 (1964).

<sup>36</sup> 334 F.2d 534, 536 (D.C.Cir. 1964).

<sup>37</sup> 34 FCC 101, 104 (Jan. 3, 1963).

<sup>38</sup> 33 FCC 250, 253 (July 25, 1962), quoting *FCC v. WOKO*, 329 U.S. 223, 67 S.Ct. 213 (1939); 334 F.2d 534, 536 (D.C.Cir. 1964).

KPFK, Los Angeles, Calif., and KPFA, Berkeley, Calif.—had broadcast a number of programs which drew listeners' gripes. Poet Lawrence Ferlinghetti had read some of his own poems over KPFK during a 1959 program, and playwright Edward Albee, poet Robert Creeley, and novelist Edward Pomerantz read from their own works in three separate programs broadcast by KPFA during 1963. In addition, eight homosexuals discussed their attitudes and problems in a program called "Live and Let Live" broadcast at 10:15 p. m. over KPFK on January 15, 1963.<sup>39</sup>

The Commission's response to complaints that such programs were "offensive or 'filthy'" gave little comfort to the complainers. The FCC ruled that the broadcasts lay well within the licensee's judgment under the public-interest standard.<sup>40</sup>

The situation here stands on an entirely different footing than *Palmetto* \* \* \* where the licensee had devoted a substantial period of his broadcast day to material which we found to be patently offensive \* \* \* and as to which programing the licensee himself never asserted that it was not offensive or vulgar, or that it served the needs of his area or had any redeeming features. In this case, Pacifica has stated its judgment that the above-cited programs served \* \* \* the needs and interests of its listening public. \* \* \* Finally, as to the program "Live and Let Live," Pacifica states that "so long as the program is handled in good taste, there is no reason why subjects like homosexuality should not be discussed on the air" \* \* \*.

5. We recognize that as shown by the complaints here, such provocative programing as here involved may offend some listeners. But this does not mean that those offended have the right, through the Commission's licensing power, to rule such programing off the airwaves. Were this the case, only the wholly inoffensive, the bland, could gain access to the radio microphone or TV camera.

The Commission, however, was not grateful for the words which Jerry Garcia, leader of the California rock group called "The Grateful Dead," uttered over WUHY-FM in Philadelphia. On January 4, 1970, WUHY-FM broadcast its weekly "Cycle II" from 10 to 11 p. m., featuring an interview with Garcia. The licensee later told the Commission that this was a one-hour weekly broadcast which was "'underground'" in its orientation and "'is concerned with the avant-garde movement in music, publications, art, film, personalities, and other forms of social and artistic experimentation.'"

Garcia's interview ran 50 minutes, and his comments were intermixed frequently with the words "fuck" and "shit"—words which

<sup>39</sup> In re Pacifica Foundation, 36 FCC 147 (Jan. 22, 1964).

<sup>40</sup> 36 FCC 148-149 (Jan. 22, 1964).

were used as adjectives or as an introductory expletive or a substitute for "et cetera."<sup>41</sup> For example:

Shit.

Shit. I gotta get down there, man.

All that shit.

Readily available every fucking where.

Any of that shit either.

Political change is so fucking slow.

Thus Mr. Garcia used his capacious vocabulary to express "his views on ecology, music, philosophy, and interpersonal relations."<sup>42</sup> WUHY's problem was complicated because a visitor to the station, who called himself "Crazy Max," whose real identity was not known to the licensee, had asked to be allowed to make some remarks about computers. Put on the air, Max had his say and also used the word "fuck." The FCC noted in its report of the Eastern Education Radio case: "The licensee states that Mr. Hill did not know what 'Crazy Max' was going to say in detail or how he was going to say it. It adds that 'Crazy Max' will not be allowed access to the microphone again."<sup>43</sup>

The Jerry Garcia-Crazy Max show had been taped five hours before it was aired, so there was ample time for the producer to consult with the station manager to allow review of controversial subject matter or language before it was aired. Because such consultation did not take place, the producer was fired for that infraction of station policy.<sup>44</sup>

Citing an obscenity statute<sup>45</sup> and the public interest standard of the Communications Act,<sup>46</sup> the Commission imposed a forfeiture of \$100, adding: "The case was one of first impression and court review would be welcomed. The licensee, however, paid the \$100 fine and the FCC did not get the review it wished. The Commission action drew a typically heated dissent from Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, who complained that the FCC was condemning not words, but a culture—"a lifestyle it fears because it does not understand." He added: "To call The Grateful Dead a 'rock and roll musical group' is like calling the Los Angeles Philharmonic a 'jug band.' And that about shows 'where this Commission's at.'" Johnson also contended that when the FCC goes after broadcasters, it always seems to pick on small community service stations "that can scarcely afford the postage to answer our letters, let alone hire lawyers."<sup>47</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Eastern Educational Radio, WUHY-FM, 18 R.R.2d 860, 861 (April 1, 1970).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 861.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 862.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> 18 U.S.C.A. § 1464, at *Ibid.*, 867.

<sup>46</sup> Section 503(b)(1)(A)(B), at *Ibid.*, 867.

<sup>47</sup> 18 R.R.2d 860, 872d (April 1, 1970).

The Jerry Garcia-Crazy Max incident took up only an hour of air time. Consider, then, "Femme Forum," which ran five hours a day, 10 a. m. to 3 p. m. over WGLD-FM, Oak Park, Illinois. This station, licensed to the Sonderling Broadcasting Corporation, was one of a number of stations using a format nicknamed "topless radio." An announcer took calls from the audience and discussed topics, usually sexual ones. On February 23, 1973, the topic was "oral sex," and female callers talked explicitly about their oral sex experiences. Some recommended where to do it ("when you're driving") or and the discussions included suggestions for helpful substances (peanut butter, whipped cream, marshmallow \* \* \*).<sup>48</sup>

The FCC concluded that these broadcasts called for imposition of a \$2,000 forfeiture under Section 503(b)(1)(E) of the Communications Act. That section authorizes penalizing broadcasters who violate the federal obscenity statute by airing "obscene or indecent matter."<sup>49</sup> The FCC said that many basic concepts relevant to *Sonderling* had been set forth in *Eastern Educational Radio* (WUHY-FM).<sup>50</sup> The Commission's majority said that sex is not a forbidden subject on the broadcast medium. It added:<sup>51</sup>

In this area as in others, we recognize the licensee's right to present provocative or unpopular programming which may offend some listeners, *Pacifica Foundation*, 36 FCC 147, 149 (1964). Second, we note that we are not dealing with works of dramatic or literary art as we were in *Pacifica*. We are rather confronted with the talk or interview show where clearly the interviewer can readily moderate his handling of the subject matter so as to conform to the basic statutory standards—standards which, as we point out, allow much leeway for provocative material.<sup>52</sup>

The Commission turned to obscenity decisions by the Supreme Court, particularly the "Fanny Hill" case and the *Ginzburg* case.<sup>53</sup> The nature of radio, however, led the FCC to some observations on the "pervasive and intrusive nature of broadcast radio." The presence of children in the broadcast audience—for there is always a

<sup>48</sup> *Sonderling Broadcasting Corporation, Station WGLD-FM, Oak Park, Illinois*, 27 R.R.2d 285 (April 11, 1973).

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 287, citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 1464.

<sup>50</sup> 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 18 R.R.2d 860 (1970).

<sup>51</sup> *Sonderling Broadcasting Corporation, Station WGLD-FM*, 27 R.R.2d 285, 287 (April 11, 1973).

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 287n. "In order to assure compliance with the law and their own programming policies, many licensees interpose a 'tape delay' in telephone interview programs, enabling the licensee to delete certain material before it is broadcast."

<sup>53</sup> See Section 64 of this chapter for a discussion of the "Fanny Hill" case, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966), and the *Ginzburg* case, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).



significant number of school-age children out of school on any given day—was important to the Commission. “Many listen to radio; indeed it is almost the constant companion of the teenager.”<sup>54</sup> In *Sonderling*, the FCC again asked for a court review of its forfeiture order, but the broadcaster paid the fine. A citizens’ group and a civil liberties group asked the FCC to return the \$2,000 forfeiture and to reconsider the Commission’s notice of apparent liability against *Sonderling Broadcasting*. The Commission refused, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FCC was within its authority when it found the talk shows under consideration to be obscene.<sup>55</sup>

Considerations of *who* is listening were also important in a 1973 case involving yet another Pacifica Foundation station, WBAI-FM in New York City. That station broadcast—on October 30, 1973—a monologue by comedian George Carlin. This monologue, “Filthy Words,” amounted to a discussion of “Seven Words You Can’t Say on Radio,” was a cut from the album, “George Carlin, Occupation: FOOLE.” Indeed, it turned out that Carlin was correct—the seven words he used did cause WBAI-FM trouble. On December 3, 1973, the Commission received a complaint from a *New Yorker* saying that on October 30, he had been driving in his car and had heard offensive language on his car radio. The man said that any child could have been turning the dial, and added: “Incidentally, my young son was with me when I heard the above \* \* \*.”<sup>56</sup>

The station argued that the Carlin routine had been broadcast as part of a discussion of the use of language in American society. Just before the monologue was put on the air, listeners were warned that it contained language which might be offensive to some. Persons who might be offended were advised to change the station and to return to WBAI in 15 minutes.

The FCC noted that broadcasting comes directly into the home.<sup>57</sup>

Broadcasting requires special treatment because of four important considerations: (1) children have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where people’s privacy interest is entitled to extra defense, see *Rowan v. Post Office Dept.*, 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484 (1970); (3) unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and

<sup>54</sup> *Sonderling Broadcasting Corporation*, 27 R.R.2d 285, 289 (1973).

<sup>55</sup> *Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission*, 515 F.2d 397, 404 (D.C.Cir. 1975). The civil liberties group involved in this litigation was the Illinois Division of the American Civil Liberties Union.

<sup>56</sup> *Pacifica Foundation v. F. C. C.*, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C.Cir. 1977).

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

(4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must therefore license in the public interest.

The Commission attempted to distinguish “indecent” language from “obscene” language. Indecent language was defined as that which “describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. To the Commission, the most important characteristic of the broadcast medium is its intrusive nature—“the television or radio broadcast comes directly into the home without any significant affirmative activity on the part of the listener.” Circuit Judge Tamm added, in writing for the Court:<sup>58</sup>

In the light of these considerations, the Commission felt that questions concerning the broadcast of patently offensive language should be dealt with in a public nuisance context. As a result, the Commission determined that the principle of channeling<sup>59</sup> should be borrowed from nuisance law and applied to the broadcasting medium. Rather than prohibit the broadcast of indecent language altogether, the Commission sought to channel it to times of the day when it would offend the fewest number of listeners.

\* \* \*

Despite the Commission’s professed intentions, the direct effect of its *Order* is to inhibit the free and robust exchange of ideas on a wide range of issues and subjects \* \*. In promulgating the *Order* the Commission has ignored both the statute which forbids it to censor radio communications [47 U.S.C.A. § 326 (1970)] and its own previous decisions which leave the question of programming content to the discretion of the licensee.

\* \* \*

As the study cited by the amicus curiae \* \* \* illustrates, large numbers of children are in the broadcast audience until 1:30 a. m. The number of children does not fall below one million until 1:00 a. m. As long as such large numbers of children are in the audience the seven words

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 13–14.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, at p. 12 n. “The law of nuisance does not say, for example, that no one shall maintain a cement plant; it simply says that no one shall maintain a cement plant in an inappropriate place, such as a residential neighborhood.”

noted in the *Order* may not be broadcast. Whether the broadcast containing such words may have serious artistic, literary, political or scientific value has no bearing \* \*. The Commission's action proscribes the uncensored broadcast of many of the great works of literature including Shakespearian plays and contemporary plays which have won critical acclaim, the works of renowned classical and contemporary poets and writers, and passages from the *Bible*.

Pacifica argued that the Carlin monologue is not obscene in terms of *Miller v. California* because it has literary and political value. Therefore, the FCC standard of indecency "is overbroad as it does not assure that programs of serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value will be allowed to air." The court agreed, and overturned the FCC's order:<sup>60</sup>

## SEC. 69. OBSCENITY: MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS

**In a sexually fixated society, the law of obscenity is likely to remain an intractable problem area.**

The basic emotion after studying the law of obscenity is not lust or titillation but sympathy. Sympathy for the judges, who spend all too much of their time and effort on obscenity cases. Sympathy for authors or artists who run afoul of benighted prosecutors/censors. (It always seems that there are more obscenity cases in the months shortly before prosecuting attorneys' elections than during the remainder of their elective terms. Prosecutors should be in favor of God, Mother, and Apple Pie, and against pornography.) Sympathy for members of the decency groups who protect thee and me (whether we want protection or not) but who don't have anyone to protect them. (Who will watch the watchdogs while the watchdogs watch us?)

In this section, a few concepts related to the law of obscenity will be explored: sexual abuse of children for profit, *scienter* ("guilty knowledge,") and trial by jury. If this were not such a troubled, tortured area of law, some of what follows almost might be funny.

### Child Pornography

Some of the seamier kinds of sexually explicit writings and films are produced by some pretty slimy individuals—people you would not invite home to dinner. Even so, their basic rights of expression must be upheld. Our language is so clumsy an instrument that the verbal formulation which does away with repellent trash may also be used—when the dogs of censorship bay most loudly—to silence and punish politically and socially important expression. So runs

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

one point of view. Another, exemplified by Chief Justice Burger, would have states or localities control certain kinds of sexually explicit matter as long as that material does not have literary, artistic, scientific, or political importance. By and large, however, expression tends to be the rule, with censorship its exception.

Child pornography is a different matter. It might be defined as the unspeakable done by the inhuman to cater to the sexual appetites of the ill. Strong legislative measures have been taken to halt something far more dangerous than distributing pornography—however defined—to children. Legislation has been created to outlaw using minors to perform or act in the creation of films, books, or magazine articles or other items depicting the sexual exploitation of children.<sup>61</sup> This might put a stop to magazines which could be purchased in 1977 such as “Chicken Delight,” “Lust for Children,” “Lollitots,” and “Child Discipline.” Dr. Judianne Densen-Gerber, president of the Odyssey Institute, made this outraged statement to the Subcommittee on Crime of Congress’ Committee on the Judiciary:<sup>62</sup>

There comes a point where we can no longer defend by intellectualization or forensic debate. We must simply say “I know the difference between right and wrong and I am not afraid to say ‘no’ or demand that limits be imposed”.

Common sense and maternal instinct tell me that this [child pornography which she found in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Washington, New Orleans, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles] goes way beyond free speech. Such conduct mutilates children’s spirits; they aren’t consenting adults, they’re victims. The First Amendment isn’t absolute. Furthermore, even if I had to give up a portion of my First Amendment rights to stop this stuff, then I’d be willing to do it. When the Constitution and Bill of Rights were written, Franklin, Jefferson, Adams and Washington were interested in guaranteeing the right to religious, political and philosophical debate—not to publish a primer instructing a sex molester on how to pick up a child in the park and subsequently sexually assault her (“Lust for Children”) or a booklet advocating that a father have incest with his daughter and illustrating positions to be used if she, at nine, is too small for normal penetration (“School-girls”, Los Angeles, and “Preteen Sexuality”, Philadelphia). If we use constitutional rights to justify intercourse with

<sup>61</sup> Senate Bill 1585, 95th Congress, 1st Session, No. 95-438, “Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977; Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on S. 1585.

<sup>62</sup> Prepared Statement of Judianne Densen-Gerber, J.D., M.D., F.C.L.M., President, Odyssey Institute, for submission to The U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, May 23, 1977.

children \* \* \*! In summary, sadly, there is many a scoundrel wrapped in the American Flag.

This new legislation, formerly known as Senate Bill No. 1585 before it was signed into law on Feb. 6, 1978 by President James Earl Carter, was formally called the "Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977." This legislation, in the words of U. S. Senators John C. Culver of Iowa and Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland, is intended to do the following:<sup>63</sup>

- Make it a Federal crime to use children in the production of pornographic materials.
- Prohibit the interstate transportation of children for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, and
- Increase the penalty provisions of the current Federal obscenity laws if the materials adjudged obscene involve the use of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

This measure corrects loopholes in existing federal obscenity statutes. Before this legislation, there was no federal statute prohibiting use of children in production of materials that depict explicit sexual conduct. This statute defines "minor" as any person under the age of 16 years. "Sexually explicit conduct" is defined as actual or simulated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between people of the same or opposite sexes. Also forbidden are depiction of actual or simulated masturbation, bestiality, sado-masochistic abuse for purposes of sexual stimulation, or lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Penalties for violation of this statutory provision are two–tens years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to \$10,000 on first offense, or five–fifteen years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to \$15,000 for subsequent offenses.<sup>64</sup>

Committees of the U. S. Senate and House of Representatives found a close connection between child pornography and the use of young children as prostitutes. For example, a 17-year-old Chicago youth who had sold himself on the streets for two years, could often earn close to \$500 a week by selling himself two or three times a night to have various sex acts with "chicken hawks" or pose for pornographic pictures or both.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Form letter sent to the author by Senators Culver and Mathias, circa September 1977; letter to the author of October 19, 1977, by Rep. John Conyers, Jr. of Michigan's First District. See Public Law 95–225.

<sup>64</sup> 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251, Chapter 110—Sexual Exploitation of Children. The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423, prohibits the interstate transportation of minor females for purposes of prostitution and did not include young males until amended in 1977.

<sup>65</sup> Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate on S.1585, Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 7. See also Robin Lloyd, *For Money or Love: Boy Prostitution in America* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1976).

### Problems of "Vagueness" and *Scienter*

The law of obscenity is exquisitely vague, as Judge Jerome Frank once said. Many obscenity convictions have been reversed on appeal because the statute under which conviction was had suffered from "overbreadth"—that is, it prohibited constitutionally protected behavior as well as that which courts say is not subject to constitutional protection.<sup>66</sup> At stake here, of course, is fair play. A person should not be convicted of a crime unless he or she had some reasonable chance of knowing that a specific sort of behavior will result in a prosecution.

One of the most perplexing problems involves what lawyers call the question of *scienter* or "guilty knowledge." If the obscenity statutes are so all-fired vague, how—and when—does a bookseller or distributor know when something illegal has been done? In a leading case discussing the element of *scienter* in obscenity prosecutions, *Smith v. California*, the Supreme Court declared a Los Angeles ordinance unconstitutional because it made a bookseller liable to punishment even when he did not know the contents of a book. A unanimous Court said that if booksellers can sell only those materials which they have inspected, "the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature."<sup>67</sup>

Even that assumes, somehow, that booksellers or distributors will be able to do something that judges and lawyers have been unable to do: adequately define obscenity. Remember the case of Sam Ginsberg?<sup>68</sup> He got nailed under a New York obscenity statute for selling a so-called girlie magazine to a 16-year-old, not knowing that his state had a statute forbidding the sale of such materials to individuals under the age of 17.<sup>69</sup> Those materials had been declared not obscene in other jurisdictions,<sup>70</sup> and it is often difficult to discern someone's age. Should Sam Ginsberg have asked for an I.D.? Evidently so, if he had known enough of the law of New York to do

<sup>66</sup> *Scienter* questions have been raised in many obscenity cases. Notable examples include *Ginzburg v. United States*, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966), and *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274 (1968). See also Justice Brennan's dissent in *Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 96 S.Ct. 2628-2662 (1973).

<sup>67</sup> *Smith v. California*, 361 U.S. 147, 149, 153, 80 S.Ct. 215, 216 (1959); see also *Winters v. New York*, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). For a more recent case dealing with *scienter*, see *Miller v. California*, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).

<sup>68</sup> *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274 (1968).

<sup>69</sup> See discussion of *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274 (1968), in Sec. 64, this chapter.

<sup>70</sup> *Redrup v. New York*, 386 U.S. 767, 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967).

so. And what of Ralph Ginzburg? He was convicted under a federal obscenity statute not for *what* he sold, but for *how* he sold it—and the element of pandering sale was written into the obscenity law by the Supreme Court, not by Congress.<sup>71</sup>

The element of pandering sales in obscenity prosecutions was still with us in 1977. Roy Splawn, for example, was convicted back in 1971 of selling an obscene film, a misdemeanor under California law. The California trial judge's jury instructions said that not only the content of the film but also the manner in which it was advertised should be taken into account in judging whether or not the film was obscene. Writing for a 5–4 majority in *Splawn v. California* (1977) Justice Rehnquist upheld Splawn's conviction,<sup>72</sup> citing *Ginzburg v. United States* (1966)<sup>73</sup> *Hamling v. United States* (1973).<sup>74</sup> Rehnquist declared that there "is no doubt that as a matter of First Amendment obscenity law, evidence of pandering to prurient interests in the creation, promotion, or dissemination of material is relevant in determining whether the material is obscene."<sup>75</sup> A newcomer to the Court—Justice Stevens—showed himself to be a "quick study" on obscenity problems, and registered the following dissent in *Splawn*:

Even if the social importance of the films themselves is dubious, there is a definite social interest in permitting them to be accurately described. Only an accurate description can enable a potential viewer to decide whether or not he wants to see them. Signs which identify the "adult" character of a motion picture theater or of a bookstore convey the message that sexually provocative entertainment is to be found within; under the jury instructions which the Court today finds acceptable, these signs may deprive otherwise nonobscene matter of its constitutional protection. Such signs, however, also provide a warning to those who find erotic materials offensive that they should shop elsewhere for other kinds of books, magazines or entertainment. Under any sensible regulatory scheme, truthful description of subject matter that is pleasing to some and offensive to others ought to be encouraged, not punished.

I would not send Mr. Splawn to jail for telling the truth about his shabby business.

<sup>71</sup> See discussion of *Ginzburg v. United States*, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966), in Sec. 64, this chapter.

<sup>72</sup> *Splawn v. California*, 431 U.S. 595, 97 S.Ct. 1987 (1977).

<sup>73</sup> 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966).

<sup>74</sup> 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (1974).

<sup>75</sup> *Splawn v. California*, 431 U.S. 595, 97 S.Ct. 1987 (1977).

### Juries

Closely related to *scienter* and “vagueness” problems in obscenity law is the reliance placed on juries as final arbiters of what is and is not obscene. As Circuit Judge Leonard Moore has said:<sup>76</sup>

In reality, no judge or jury can be expected to determine “community standards” \* \* \*. The best that anyone can do is to give his or her personal reaction \* \* \*. No juror or judge armed with a copy \* \* \* [of an allegedly obscene work] will have the opportunity to rush up and down the streets of his community asking friends and neighbors how they feel about it. Nor should they rudely seek insights into community *mores* by asking others what their intimate sexual practices may be. Yet the fiction remains that a jury is somehow capable of reflecting or determining “community standards”. This is so probably because there is simply no better method for applying this test.

If judges, philosophers, and Presidential commissions can't make sense out of the law of obscenity, then what chance does a jury have? Relying on local juries has added even more variety to obscenity law, but it has not removed the Supreme Court of the United States from spending much of its valuable time and effort in obscenity cases. And all too many of these cases have aspects of damfoolishness. A Jacksonville, Fla., ordinance forbade drive-in theaters from exhibiting motion pictures showing “human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas \* \* \*” if the movies could be seen from a public street or public place. Did this ordinance forbid too much? Yes, said the Supreme Court in *Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville* (1975). Writing for a Court split 6–3, Justice Lewis Powell held that the ordinance was overbroad. The ordinance “would bar a film containing a picture of a baby’s buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which nudity is indigenous.”<sup>77</sup> But if that ordinance was overbroad, at least one ordinance was too specific. Consider this comment from a 1968 issue of *The Saturday Review*: “The Fort Lauderdale (Florida) City Commission just passed an ordinance banning obscenity in books, magazines, and records. The law is so specific that it is obscene in itself and cannot be made public.”<sup>78</sup>

<sup>76</sup> *United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise*, 562 F.2d 185, 189–190 (2d Cir. 1977).

<sup>77</sup> 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2271, 2274–2275 (1975).

<sup>78</sup> Jerome Beatty, Jr., “Trade Winds,” *Saturday Review*, November 23, 1968, p. 23.



A cartoon by Lichty published some years ago did better than most judges have done in making sense of the law of obscenity. The cartoon showed one judge saying to another: "I know it's obscenity if it makes my Adam's apple bobble." Meanwhile, the Supreme Court—and other courts as well—wish to get out of the obscenity-judging business.

Two additional cases will be mentioned here—the Detroit zoning case and the prosecution of Larry C. Flynt and his raunchy magazine, *Hustler*. In *Coleman A. Young, Mayor of Detroit v. American Mini Theatres*,<sup>79</sup> the Supreme Court's 5–4 decision gave rise to some sniggering that the Court thinks an erogenous zone may be measured in city blocks. The Court, with Justice Stevens delivering its judgment, upheld a Detroit ordinance which prohibits adult theaters or bookstores from being located within 500 feet of a residential area or within 1,000 feet of each other. Justice Stevens said that the city's interest "in the present and future character of its neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of motion pictures. We hold that the zoning ordinances \* \* \* do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."<sup>80</sup> In dissent, Justice Stewart said that he viewed the outcome of this case as an aberration:<sup>81</sup>

By refusing to invalidate Detroit's ordinance the Court rides roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law, which require that time, place and manner regulations that affect protected expression be content-neutral except in the limited context of a captive or juvenile audience.

It is often the people whom you would least like to invite home to dinner who make First Amendment law. Larry C. Flynt, when publisher and editor of *Hustler* magazine, was convicted in Cincinnati early in 1977 on some rather ingenious charges. A jury of seven men and five women found him guilty of pandering obscenity and participating in organized crime. This case, now on appeal, is expected to provide a major test of whether communities can dictate their own obscenity standards and indirectly set standards which are nationwide.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>79</sup> 44 U. S. Law Week 4999 (June 24, 1976).

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5006.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5009, citing *Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville*, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268 (1975).

<sup>82</sup> "We'll Sell More Copies Now," AP story in *The Lexington Leader*, Lexington, Ky., Feb. 9, 1977, p. A-8; G. G. LaBelle, "What Is Obscene?," AP story in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, p. A-3, Feb. 10, 1977; *FOI Digest*, January-February, 1977 (Vol. 19, No. 1), p. 1.

Flynt, who was freed on \$55,000 bond after six days behind bars, faces up to 25 years in prison if the organized crime charge sticks. And, as the Louisville Courier-Journal said in an editorial:<sup>83</sup>

[I]f any local community can toss a book or magazine publisher into the slammer, even if the offender lives and operates hundreds or thousands of miles away, then that community is able to impose its standards upon the nation, and the Supreme Court's 1973 ruling is turned upside-down. That's precisely what may happen because of the Cincinnati case. Hustler is published in Columbus, printed in Dayton, and distributed nationwide. Yet the decision of the Cincinnati jury, if it is not reversed on appeal, may shut down the whole operation.

The Courier-Journal added that the danger of the criminal conspiracy—community standards two-pronged attack on alleged pornography is obvious. Conspiracy laws won't stick unless the accused individuals have conspired to do something illegal. But if a local jury decides that the materials people are distributing are obscene and therefore illegal (according to the standards of that community as supposedly represented by a jury) then the conspiracy would be complete in law if not in fact. And local juries may be able to call the tune nationwide. "It is unfortunate," wrote Circuit Judge Leonard P. Moore, "as has been reiterated countless times by many judges, that these matters have to come before the courts."<sup>84</sup> It is likely, however, that this nation's courts will continue to be bedded down with hundreds of obscenity cases. That will mean repetition of what Nathan Lewin has deftly called "the [Supreme] Court's annual non-climactic arousal."<sup>85</sup>

## SEC. 70. BLASPHEMY

**Publications which defile the Deity were long held to be blasphemous; in 20th Century America, the crime has all but disappeared.**

The law of blasphemy, as it remains in the United States, is little more than an historical artifact. But blasphemy statutes—although never invoked today in America—are still on the books of some 15 states. The ancient crime of blasphemy (technically, a form of criminal libel) was first a common-law offense, although the crime was later codified into statutory form in both England and America.

<sup>83</sup> Courier-Journal editorial from February, 1977, reprinted in The Kentucky Press, March, 1977, page 4.

<sup>84</sup> U. S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 562 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1977).

<sup>85</sup> Nathan Lewin, "What's Happening to Free Speech," New Republic 171: 4 & 5 (July 27–Aug. 3, 1974) p. 14.

Blackstone defined blasphemy as “denying [God’s] being, or providence; or by contumelious reproaches of our Saviour Christ.”<sup>86</sup> Black’s Law Dictionary defines blasphemy as “[a]ny oral or written reproach maliciously cast upon God, His name, attributes, or religion.”<sup>87</sup>

Blasphemy should be distinguished from several other allied offenses:

*Sacrilege*: “The crime of breaking a church or chapel, and stealing therein. \* \* \* The desecration of anything considered holy \* \* \*”<sup>88</sup>

*Heresy*: “An offense against religion, consisting not in a total denial of Christianity, but of some of its essential doctrines [such as the Trinity], publicly and obstinately avowed.”<sup>89</sup>

*Apostacy*: “The total renunciation of Christianity, by embracing either a false religion or no religion at all.”<sup>90</sup>

*Profanity*: “Irreverance toward sacred things; particularly, an irreverant or blasphemous use of the name of God.”<sup>91</sup> Public swearing and cursing—variously defined—seems to be treated as “disturbing the peace” or a related offense in many jurisdictions today.

*Witchcraft*: This old and nearly forgotten crime doubtless has the bloodiest history of any offense listed in this brief catalog. Witchcraft—sometimes called sorcery, enchantment, or conjuration—has been called supposed communication with evil spirits. This offense was punishable by death, on the theory, evidently, that witches (female) and warlocks (male) revered the Devil more than God. Once people rejected the picturesque theology of the supernatural power of evil, prosecutions for witchcraft ceased. But in Salem Village, Massachusetts, in 1692, belief in witches and warlocks was in full flower. Twenty persons were killed for witchcraft in that enlightened village.<sup>92</sup>

Note that the early beginnings of the Anglo-American law of blasphemy were shot through with perfervid, right-minded attachment to the idea that there was only one true religion: Christianity. Violent advocates of such a view, in the 17th Century, were all too readily to kill, maim, or imprison nonconformists who questioned

<sup>86</sup> William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. IV, adapted by Robert Malcolm Kerr (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952) p. 55.

<sup>87</sup> Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1951) p. 216.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 1501.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 859.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 1375.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 1776.

their views. Over time, however, severity of punishment for blasphemy and related offenses in the United States decreased enormously. It should be noted, nevertheless, that as recently as 1937, a man was convicted in Connecticut for violating that state's blasphemy statute.<sup>93</sup> There is now grave doubt whether any statute serving as the basis for a conviction for blasphemy could be upheld as constitutional.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>93</sup> "Fined as Blasphemer," *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1937, p. 29, col. 1.

<sup>94</sup> See, e. g., *Burstyn v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952).

Part III  
FOR THE GREATEST GOOD: COMMUNI-  
CATIONS LAW AND THE PUBLIC  
INTEREST

Chapter 12

ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

**Sec.**

- 71. The Problem of Secrecy in Government.
- 72. Access and the Constitution.
- 73. Records and Meetings of Federal Government.
- 74. Records and Meetings in the States.
- 75. Access to Judicial Proceedings.

**SEC. 71. THE PROBLEM OF SECRECY IN GOVERNMENT**

**Following World War II, obtaining access to information at various levels of government became an acute problem in American journalism.**

A self-governing people needs to know what its public officials are up to. The proposition seems plain to reporters who work from day to day in the offices and chambers of government, as they gather information for publication to the people of a democracy. If officials in any branch of government, at any level, may do their work in secret, they may shield themselves from accountability. Ancient words like "tyranny" and "oppression" take on reality for modern man where secrecy pervades government; unfairness, unchecked power, unconcern for human rights and needs, and inefficiency and corruption can thrive in seclusion. The democratic public has every reason to assume that the great bulk of the work of government will be open and available for inspection.

The assumption has honorable origins. Colonial courts had been generally open, following Britain's practice since the mid-Seventeenth Century, and the new America accepted the practice as a matter of course. The Revolutionary Continental Congresses had, indeed, been highly secret bodies, as the colonial legislatures before them had generally been. But with the 1780s and 1790s, first the House of Representatives and then the Senate had opened its doors to the public and press. Granting access had been hard for some congressmen to concede; both Houses wrote rules under which they

might operate behind closed doors if the need arose.<sup>1</sup> But the policy was plain and was to be rarely breached during the decades to come: Legislative debates and halls were the domain of people and press as they were of the elected representatives.

No segment of the American public has been more concerned about tendencies to secrecy in government than journalists. Some feel that it is the central threat to freedom of expression in mid-Twentieth Century America. Accepting, during World War II, the need for extensive secrecy for an enormous war machine in a government bureaucracy grown gigantic, journalists after the war soon detected a broad pattern of continued secrecy in government operations. Access to meetings was denied; reports, papers, documents at all levels of government seemed less available than before officialdom's habits of secrecy developed in the passion for security during World War II. An intense, insistent campaign for access to government information was launched in the 1950's by editors, publishers, reporters, and news organizations. It went under a banner labeled "Freedom of Information," and under the claim that the press was fighting for the "people's right to know."<sup>2</sup>

To combat what they viewed as a severe increase in denial of access to the public's business, journalists took organized action. "Freedom of Information" committees were established by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) and by the Society of Professional Journalists—Sigma Delta Chi. The ASNE commissioned newspaper attorney Harold L. Cross to perform a major study on the law of access to government activity. His book, *The People's Right to Know*, was published in 1953 and served as a central source of information. State and local chapters of professional groups worked for the adoption of state access laws. In 1958, a Freedom of Information Center was opened at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, as a clearing house and research facility for those concerned with the subject. Meanwhile, an ally was found in the House Subcommittee on Government Information under Rep. John E. Moss of California, created to investigate charges of excessive secrecy in the Executive branch of government.<sup>3</sup>

Journalism had powerful allies also in the scientific community. It found that the advance of knowledge in vast areas of government-sponsored science was being slowed, sometimes crippled for

<sup>1</sup> Secret Journal of Congress, 1775–1788, Introduction; Lewis Deschler, Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, 82 Cong. 2d Sess., House Doc. 564 (1953), Rule 29.

<sup>2</sup> See Annual Reports, Sigma Delta Chi Advancement of Freedom of Information Committee (Chicago, Sigma Delta Chi).

<sup>3</sup> Rep. John E. Moss, Preface to Replies from Federal Agencies to Questionnaire Submitted by the Special Subcommittee on Government Information of the Committee on Government Operations, 84 Cong. 1 Sess. (Nov. 1, 1955), p. iii.

years, in the blockage of the flow of research information between and even within agencies of the federal government. Fear of “leakage” of secrets important to defense in the Cold War with the Soviet Union brought administrative orders that were contrary to the tenets of scientists and researchers. A snarl of regulations, rules, and red tape, besides official policy that fostered sequestering, prevented scientists from sharing their findings with others. Their concern about the damage to the advance of knowledge in science paralleled the news fraternity’s alarm about damage to the democratic assumption that free institutions rest on an informed public.<sup>4</sup>

Public understanding of the dangers of official secrecy broadened in the exposé of the Executive’s abuse of power in the Watergate episode of the mid-1970s. Earl Warren, retired Chief Justice of the United States, crediting the news media with a share in exposing the fraud and deceit, said if we are to learn from “the debacle we are in, we should first strike at secrecy in government wherever it exists, because it is the incubator for corruption.”<sup>5</sup> New recruits entered the battle against official secrecy—Common Cause, the Center for National Security Studies, and Ralph Nader among them.

## SEC. 72. ACCESS AND THE CONSTITUTION

**Courts have given little support to the position that the First Amendment includes a right of access to government information.**

In many journalists’ view, freedom of speech and press and the First Amendment encompass a right to gather government information as much as they encompass the right to publish and distribute it. Constitutional protection against denial of access seems to them only reasonable. Madison said that “A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both.”<sup>6</sup> For their own time, the legal scholar Harold Cross argued that “Freedom of information is the very foundation for all those freedoms that the First Amendment of our Constitution was intended to guarantee.”<sup>7</sup>

First Amendment legal scholar Thomas I. Emerson holds that “we ought to consider the right to know as an integral part of the system of freedom of expression, embodied in the first amendment and entitled to support by legislation or other affirmative government

<sup>4</sup> Science, Education and Communication, 12 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 333 (Nov. 1956); Walter Gellhorn, *Security, Loyalty, and Science* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1950).

<sup>5</sup> *Governmental Secrecy: Corruption’s Ally*, 60 ABA Journal 550 (May, 1974).

<sup>6</sup> James Madison to W. T. Barry, 1822, quoted in Saul Padover, ed., *The Complete Madison* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 337.

<sup>7</sup> Harold L. Cross, *The People’s Right to Know* (Morningside Heights: Columbia Univ. Press, 1953), pp. xiii–xiv.

action.” He finds the argument for “starting from this point \* \* \* overwhelming,” and further, that the Supreme Court has in some respects recognized a constitutional right to know.<sup>8</sup>

But the courts have provided scant acknowledgement of a “right of access” under the First Amendment. Reporter William Worthy of the *Baltimore Afro-American* in 1956 ignored an order of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles which barred American newsmen from going to Red China to report. When Worthy returned to the United States, the State Department revoked his passport and refused to give him another. Worthy went to court to attempt to regain his passport. The trial court held, without elaborating, that Dulles’ refusal to issue the passport did not violate Worthy’s rights to travel under the First Amendment. Worthy appealed, but his argument for First Amendment protection failed, the Court of Appeals holding:<sup>9</sup>

\* \* \* the right here involved is not a right to think or speak; it is a right to be physically present in a certain place \* \* \* .

The right to travel is a part of the right to liberty, and a newspaperman’s right to travel is a part of freedom of the press. But these valid generalizations do not support unrestrained conclusions. \* \* \* .

Freedom of the press bears restrictions \* \* \* . Merely because a newsman has a right to travel does not mean he can go anywhere he wishes. He cannot attend conferences of the Supreme Court, or meetings of the President’s Cabinet or executive sessions of the Committees of Congress. He cannot come into my house without permission or enter a ball park without a ticket of admission from the management \* \* \* .

In another case, Zemel argued that a State Department travel ban was a direct interference with the First Amendment rights of citizens to inform themselves at first hand of events abroad. The United States Supreme Court agreed that the Secretary’s denial rendered “less than wholly free the flow of information concerning that country,” but denied that a First Amendment right was involved. “The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information,”<sup>10</sup> the Court said. It drew parallels with other situations where access is restricted, such as the prohibition of unauthorized entry to the White House.

<sup>8</sup> Legal Foundations of the Right To Know, 1976 Wash.U.L.Quar. 1-3. See also Jacob Scher, “Access to Information: Recent Legal Problems,” *Journalism Quarterly*, 37:1 (1960), p. 41.

<sup>9</sup> *Worthy v. Herter*, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C.Cir. 1959), certiorari denied 361 U.S. 918, 80 S.Ct. 255.

<sup>10</sup> *Zemel v. Rusk*, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1281 (1965). See also *Trimble v. Johnston*, 173 F.Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1953); *In re Mack*, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).



While an occasional lower court or a dissenting judge has found reason for the First Amendment to protect a right of access to government information,<sup>11</sup> the United States Supreme Court has not. Justice Potter Stewart delivered a rationale for the denial of a constitutional right of access to government, in a 1975 speech:<sup>12</sup>

So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it knows, and may seek to learn what it can.

But this autonomy cuts both ways. The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The public's interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.

The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution. Congress may provide a resolution, at least in some instances, through carefully drawn legislation. For the rest, we must rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the political forces in American society.

Stewart's speech spelled out in fresh formulation views which he had expressed in writing the majority opinion in *Pell v. Procunier*.<sup>13</sup> Here, journalists Eve Pell, Betty Segal, and Paul Jacobs challenged a California prison regulation which barred press and other media interviews with specific, individual inmates. Denied their requests to interview prison inmates Apsin, Bly and Guild, they asserted that the rule limited their news-gathering activity and thus infringed freedom of the press under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They lost in District Court and appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. Stewart wrote for the majority that the press and public are afforded full opportunities to observe minimum security sections of prisons, to speak about any subject to any inmates they might encounter, to interview inmates selected at random by the corrections officials, to sit in on group meetings of inmates. "The sole limitations on news-gathering in California prisons is the prohibition

<sup>11</sup> *Providence Journal Co. et al. v. McCoy et al.*, 94 F.Supp. 186 (D.C.R.I.1950); *In re Mack*, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (1956); *Lyles v. Oklahoma*, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla.Cr.1958).

<sup>12</sup> Potter Stewart, *Or of the Press*, 26 *Hastings L.Journ.* 631 (1975).

<sup>13</sup> 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800 (1974). But see *Houchins v. KQED, Inc.*, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976), certiorari granted 431 U.S. 928, 97 S.Ct. 2630 (1977). At least 11 states have statutes permitting reporters to interview inmates in confidential settings: *Press Censorship Newsletter VII*, April-May 1975, p. 61.

in [regulation] # 415.071 of interviews with individual inmates specifically designated by representatives of the press.”<sup>14</sup>

Before the regulation was adopted, Stewart continued, unrestrained press access to individual prisoners resulted in concentration of press attention on a few inmates, who became virtual “public figures” in prison society and gained great influence. One inmate who advocated non-cooperation with prison regulations had extensive press attention, encouraged other inmates in his purpose, and eroded the institution’s ability to deal effectively with inmates in general. San Quentin prison authorities concluded that an escape attempt there, resulting in deaths of three staff members and two inmates, flowed in part from an unrestricted press access policy, and regulation # 415.071 was adopted as a result. Stewart wrote:<sup>15</sup>

The Constitution does not \* \* \* require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally. It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information not available to members of the general public \* \* \*. It is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally. The proposition finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court.

Dissenting in this case and in a companion case, *Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.*<sup>16</sup> which involved an unsuccessful challenge to a Federal Bureau of Prisons rule similar to California’s, was Justice Powell. He said that “sweeping prohibition of prisoner-press interviews substantially impairs a core value of the First Amendment.” In these cases, he argued, society’s interest “in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs” was great and was the value at stake. Since the public is unable to know most news at first hand, “In seeking out the news the press \* \* \* acts as an agent of the public at large. \* \* \* By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the press performs a critical function in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment.”

In thus urging that “the underlying right is the right of the public generally” Justice Powell was joined by three other justices in the *Pell* case and by two in the *Saxbe* case. This was perhaps the greatest support in the U.S. Supreme Court that “access to govern-

<sup>14</sup> *Pell v. Procunier*, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2808 (1974).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 2810.

<sup>16</sup> 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811 (1974). Powell’s statements are at 2820–2826.

ment information” cases had enjoyed as a constitutionally supported proposition.

### SEC. 73. RECORDS AND MEETINGS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

**Access to records and meetings of federal executive and administrative agencies is provided under the “Freedom of Information” and the “Sunshine in Government” Acts; the Privacy Act and the guidelines of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration provide for secrecy of records.**

#### Freedom of Information Act as amended Feb. 19, 1975

On July 4, 1966, Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Federal Public Records Law, shortly to be known as the federal Freedom of Information (FOI) Act.<sup>17</sup> Providing for the public availability of records of executive and administrative agencies of the government, it sprang, President Johnson said, “from one of our most essential principles: a democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits.” He expressed a “deep sense of pride that the United States is an open society in which the people’s right to know is cherished and guarded.”<sup>18</sup>

The FOI Act replaced section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, which had permitted secrecy if it was required in the public interest or for “good cause.”<sup>19</sup> The new law expressed neither this limitation nor another which had said disclosure was necessary only to “persons properly and directly concerned” with the subject at hand. In the words of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, the FOI Act<sup>20</sup>

imposes on the executive branch an affirmative obligation to adopt new standards and practices for publication and availability of information. It leaves no doubt that disclosure is a transcendent goal, yielding only to such compelling considerations as those provided for in the exemptions of the act.

Every federal executive branch agency is required under the FOI Act to publish in the Federal Register its organization plan, and the

<sup>17</sup> 5 U.S.C.A. § 552, amended by Pub. Law 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561-1564. For history, text, and extensive judicial interpretation of this act, and information on the federal Privacy Act and the “Sunshine Act,” see C. M. Marwick (ed.), *Litigation under the Amended Federal Freedom of Information Act* (Washington, D.C., 1966 and 1967).

<sup>18</sup> Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 II, p. 699.

<sup>19</sup> 5 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (1946).

<sup>20</sup> Foreword, Attorney General’s Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act (1967).

agency personnel and methods through which the public can get information. Every agency's procedural rules and general policies are to be published. Every agency's manuals and instructions are to be made available for public inspection and copying, as are final opinions in adjudicated cases. Current indexes are to be made available to the public. If records are improperly withheld, the U.S. district court can enjoin the agency from the withholding and order disclosure. And if agency officials fail to comply with the court order, they may be punished for contempt.

Exceptions to that which must be made public are called "exemptions." There are nine of them, some of them revised and tightened against abuse by agencies after a three-year congressional study which brought about amendments effective Feb. 19, 1975:

1. Records "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" and which are properly classified.
2. Matters related only to "internal personnel rules and practices" of an agency.
3. Matters exempt from disclosure by statute.
4. Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and that are privileged or confidential.
5. Inter-agency or intra-agency communications, such as memoranda showing how policy-makers within an agency feel about various policy options.
6. Personnel and medical files which could not be disclosed without a "clearly unwarranted invasion" of someone's privacy.
7. Investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes, if the production of such records would interfere with law enforcement, deprive one of a fair trial, constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, disclose the identity of a confidential source, disclose investigative techniques, or endanger the life or safety of law enforcement personnel.
8. Reports prepared by or for an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.
9. Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells—particularly explorations by gas and oil companies.

Long delays, high costs for searching and copying documents, and widespread agency reluctance to comply with the original act's provisions characterized its early history.<sup>21</sup> Not only were several

<sup>21</sup> Wallis McClain, "Implementing the Amended FOI Act," Freedom of Information Center Report No. 343, Sept. 1975, p. 1; U.S. Congress, Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502) Source Book: Legisla-

exemptions tightened by the amendments; also, rules were passed requiring agencies to inform persons making requests for information within ten days whether or not access would be granted, and to decide upon requests for appeals within 20 days. Uniform schedules of fees—limited to reasonable standard charges for document search and copying—were also mandated in the amendments.<sup>22</sup>

The amendments brought a flood of requests for information, primarily from persons who asked the FBI, the CIA, and the IRS, whether files were kept on them, and, if so, what the files contained. The Justice Department was receiving 2,000 requests per month by August 1975.<sup>23</sup> As for mass media, one Washington attorney active in access cases estimated that reporters increased their use of the Act—rather rarely used by them before the amendments—by five-fold or more.<sup>24</sup>

Court cases decided under the Act as of mid-1976 totaled 295, half of them less than two years old.<sup>25</sup> The increase suggested the impact of the 1975 amendments. Actions concerning investigatory files (exemption 7) outstripped the pre-amendments leaders, agency memoranda and trade secrets (exemptions 5 and 4). One important change provided for *in camera* review by judges of documents which the Executive Branch might refuse to open on grounds of national defense or foreign policy (exemption 1). Under the original FOI Act, Congress had not provided this, but rather, said Justice Stewart in an acid concurring opinion, had simply chosen “to decree blind acceptance of Executive fiat” that secrecy was called for.<sup>26</sup>

According to one journalistic analysis, the amended act is still far from a panacea. “About all that one can say about the act \* \* \* is that it is a better law than the previous one. It does not eliminate bureaucratic non-compliance, but it does reduce the available opportunities for agency bureaucrats to use delay and fee charges to

tive History, Texts, and Other Documents. Joint Committee Print (94th Cong., 1 Sess.), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1975.

<sup>22</sup> Anon., “FOI Act Amendments Summarized,” *FOI Digest*, 17:1, Jan.-Feb. 1975, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> Anon., “FOI Act: Access Increases, Some Nagging Problems Remain,” *FOI Digest*, 17:4, July-Aug. 1975, p. 5, citing *Wall Street Journal*, June 27, 1975; John A. Jenkins, “Ask, and You Shall Receive,” *Quill*, July-Aug. 1975, pp. 22, 24.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, quoting Attorney Ronald Plesser, p. 22. For reasons why media use the Act little, see “The FOI Act and the Media,” *Freedom of Information Center Report No. 303*, May 1973; Elsie S. Hiebert, “How Accessible are the Records in Government Records Centers?” *Journalism Quarterly*, 52:1, Spring, 1975, pp. 23, 60. For a list of noteworthy cases involving mass media, see *Publisher's Auxiliary*, Dec. 10, 1975, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> Anon., “Justice Dept. Indexes Decided FOIA Cases,” *FOI Digest*, 18:5, Sept.-Oct. 1976, p. 5, citing *Congressional Record*, Senate, Aug. 2, 1976, p. S13028. Reprinted in *Marwick*, App. p. 72.

<sup>26</sup> *Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink*, 410 U.S. 73, 136, 93 S.Ct. 827 (1973).

discourage requests.”<sup>27</sup> Media successes in prying open records under the act have not been notable.

Attempts by media to open records through court cases commonly run afoul of exemptions 7 and 5—investigatory files and agency memoranda—source materials which are often expected by media to be relevant to criminal activity. National Public Radio, for example, sought disclosure of records compiled by the Justice Department and the FBI about the perplexing death of Karen Silkwood. An employee of a manufacturer of plutonium and uranium fuels for nuclear reactors, Silkwood was reportedly driving to attend a meeting with a union official and a newspaper reporter when she was killed in an auto crash. Uncertain evidence suggested that her car might have been driven off the road by another car, and that a file of documents she was supposedly carrying was not recovered. NPR also sought the record of the agency’s investigation of the contamination of Silkwood by plutonium.

The Justice Department furnished NPR with some of the requested materials, but refused others. The parts of the death investigation file withheld were the “closing memoranda”—agency materials prepared during its final deliberations—and about 15 pages of notes and working papers of Justice Department attorneys. The Justice Department said that exemption 5 of the FOI Act—intra-agency memoranda or letters—protected these materials from disclosure. The Federal district court agreed,<sup>28</sup> saying the agency memoranda are protected as “papers which reflect the agency’s group thinking in the process of working out its policy and determining what its law shall be.”<sup>29</sup> The court rejected NPR’s argument that the memoranda were “final” opinions, which under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FOI Act would have been subject to disclosure.<sup>30</sup>

As for exemption 7 of the FOI Act, protecting from disclosure matters which are “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes” whose release would “interfere with enforcement proceedings \* \* \*”: This applied to the Justice Department investigation of Silkwood’s contamination by plutonium, and the court said that the records of the case suggested law-violation in materials-handling by personnel. It said that Congress’ intent in writing exemption 7 was plainly to prevent harm to a “concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding” that might result from disclosure of information. And though the department’s leads in the investigation had currently run out, and want of finances for the

<sup>27</sup> Anon., “Prying Open the Files,” *Newsweek*, Feb. 2, 1976, p. 50; McClain, p. 8.

<sup>28</sup> *National Public Radio et al. v. Bell*, 431 F.Supp. 509, 2 Med.L.Rptr. 1808 (D.D.C.1977).

<sup>29</sup> *National Public Radio et al. v. Bell*, 431 F.Supp. 509 (D.D.C.1977).

<sup>30</sup> *N. L. R. B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 421 U.S. 132, 95 S.Ct. 1504 (1975).

moment precluded assignment of an investigator to the case, the case was "active." Disclosure would present "the very real possibility of a criminal learning in alarming detail of the government's investigation of his crime before the government has had the opportunity to bring him to justice," said the court in rejecting NPR's request.<sup>31</sup>

A power of withholding has always been asserted by the President and his Executive Department heads. This is the power exercised under the doctrine of "executive privilege." President George Washington was asked by Congress to make available documents relating to General St. Clair's defeat by Indians. He responded that "the Executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public \* \* \*."<sup>32</sup> In this case the records were made available to Congress, but many presidents since have refused to yield records, as have the heads of executive departments. Their power to do so was upheld early in the nation's history by the United States Supreme Court. The famous decision written by Chief Justice John Marshall was delivered in 1803 in *Marbury v. Madison*, where Marshall said that the Attorney General (a presidential appointee) did not have to reveal matters which had been communicated to him in confidence.<sup>33</sup>

By the Constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to the country in his political character and to his own conscience.

Justice Marshall elaborated the principle in the trial of Aaron Burr, accused of treason, saying that "The propriety of withholding \* \* \* must be decided by [the President] himself, not by another for him. Of the weight of the reasons for and against producing it he himself is the judge."<sup>34</sup>

Executive privilege came to be asserted and used increasingly during the government's efforts to maintain security in the cold war with the U.S.S.R. following World War II. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower used the power to issue orders detailing what might and might not be released from the executive departments; both came under heavy attack from Congress and the news media.<sup>35</sup> President Nixon's Executive Order No. 11-652 of March 8, 1972, replaced and modified rules set by President Eisenhower.

<sup>31</sup> *National Public Radio et al. v. Bell*, 431 F.Supp. 509 (D.D.C.1977).

<sup>32</sup> Francis E. Rourke, *Secrecy and Publicity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 65. And see *Ibid.*, pp. 64-69, for general discussion of executive privilege.

<sup>33</sup> 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).

<sup>34</sup> 1 Burr's Trial 182.

<sup>35</sup> Rourke, pp. 75-83.

One of the most far-reaching directives of this period was issued by President Eisenhower in 1954. A senate subcommittee was investigating a controversy between the Army and Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. President Eisenhower sent to Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens a message telling him that his departmental employees were to say nothing about internal communications of the Department.<sup>36</sup>

Because it is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of the executive branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising with each other on official matters, and because it is not in the public interest that any of their conversations or communications, or any documents or reproductions, concerning such advice be disclosed, you will instruct employees of your Department that in all of their appearances before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations regarding the inquiry now before it they are not to testify to any such conversations or communications or to produce any such documents or reproductions.

While the directive was aimed at a single situation and a single Executive Department, it soon became used by many other executive and administrative agencies as justification for their own withholding of records concerning internal affairs.<sup>37</sup> While journalists protested the spread of the practice, and while Congressional allies joined them, there was not much legal recourse then apparent. As the years went on, however, the FOI Act was employed by media as a pry on executive privilege secrecy.

A head-on confrontation emerged in the Watergate investigations, as President Richard M. Nixon refused to turn over to a grand jury, tape recordings of conversations with his White House aides. Federal Judge John J. Sirica ruled that the tapes must be submitted to him for *in camera* scrutiny and possible forwarding to the grand jury. The President refused, asserting executive privilege, and said he was protecting "the right of himself and his successors to preserve the confidentiality of discussions in which they participate in the course of their constitutional duties." Special prosecutor Archibald Cox argued it was intolerable that "the President would invoke executive privilege to keep the tape recordings from the grand jury but permit his aides to testify fully as to their recollections of the same conversations." The President fired Cox, and the Attorney General resigned and his deputy was fired before the President yielded the tapes (which of course were to prove central to

<sup>36</sup> House Report, No. 2947, 84 Cong., 2 Sess., July 27, 1956. Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Sec. of Defense, May 17, 1954, pp. 64-65.

<sup>37</sup> Rourke, p. 74.



the discrediting of him and his aides) amid a public cry for his impeachment.<sup>38</sup>

The Supreme Court ruled that executive privilege is not absolute, but qualified. The *in camera* court inspection of the tapes that Sirica ordered, it said, would be a minimal intrusion on the President's confidential communications. The President's claim was not based on grounds of national security—that military or diplomatic secrets were threatened—but only on the ground of his “generalized interest in confidentiality.” That could not prevail over “the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice.” It would have to yield to the “demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.”<sup>39</sup>

Subsequent assertions of executive privilege by Nixon involved his post-resignation claim to custody of presidential papers from his term in office—millions of pages of documents and almost 900 tapes—and also his denial of the rights of record companies and networks to copy, sell, and broadcast tapes that had been played at one of the trials arising from Watergate. The Supreme Court ruled in one case that the government should have custody of all but Nixon's private and personal papers,<sup>40</sup> and in the other it granted Nixon's plea to deny networks and record companies the right to copy, sell, or broadcast the tapes.<sup>41</sup>

The recorded word, in literally billions of pages of government documents, is the focus of the FOI Act, dedicated to dissemination of this record. Two other federal measures concerned with government records emerged on the heels of the FOI Act, but dedicated to non-disclosure of information. One is a set of regulations that applies entirely to the dissemination of individuals' criminal history data in state criminal justice files. These regulations are promulgated by the Department of Justice agency called the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and are known as the LEAA Guidelines. The other measure is the Privacy Act of 1974.

### LEAA Guidelines

These took effect March 19, 1976, after a troubled history of delays, stormy objections, and extensive revision.<sup>42</sup> The LEAA for several years had been a source of substantial funds to state and

<sup>38</sup> New York Times, Sept. 11, 1973, p. 36; Oct. 24, 1973, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> U. S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 684–5, 713, 94 S.Ct. 3090–3095–6, 3110 (1974).

<sup>40</sup> Nixon v. General Services Administrator, — U.S. —, 97 S.Ct. 2777 (1977).

<sup>41</sup> Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., News Media and the Law, 1:1 (Oct. 1977), p. 14. Anon., “High Court Bars Networks' Right To Nixon Tapes,” New York Times, April 19, 1978, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> Anon., “Limitations on Media Access to Police and Criminal Trial Proceedings Threaten Freedom of Information,” FOI Digest, 18:2 (March-April 1976), pp. 4–5.

local law enforcement agencies under the Safe Streets Act of 1968. Now it promulgated guidelines restricting the dissemination of police records by the states. And it provided that states must adopt rules no less strict for the "security" of criminal history data and for the protection of the privacy of individuals on record in such data, or risk losing further funding.

Early drafts of the guidelines were put into effect in advance by some states, and met outraged reaction from the media as records that had previously been routinely available now "dried up."<sup>43</sup> Hammered hard in a series of hearings, the LEAA cut back sharply on restrictions. The heart of the modified regulations limits access to "nonconviction" criminal data, and to past arrest records kept as alphabetized lists or files (chronological files are unregulated). Access to these kinds of data by the press or others who are outside the institution of criminal justice depends on the existence of a state law, order, or rule authorizing access for these persons. Laws may include general state public record laws.<sup>44</sup>

#### Privacy Act of 1974 (effective Sept. 27, 1975)

"After long years of debate, a comprehensive federal privacy law passed the Congress \* \* \* as a solid legislative decision in favor of individual privacy and the 'right to be let alone,'" writes attorney James T. O'Reilly.<sup>45</sup> It is a statute shaped to deal with the federal government's gargantuan systems of secret dossiers on citizens, to give citizens access to the content of files that may be kept on them, and to provide citizens with a means for correcting inaccurate content of these files. If agencies are not responsive in making changes, civil suits may be brought against them. A crucial element in the law is that no file may be transferred from one agency to another without the individual's consent, except where the purpose squares with the purpose for which the information was collected.

Under the law, a supposedly exhaustive index to all federal government "data banks" or personal information systems on individuals has been published. Also published in the Federal Register are the categories of individuals on whom records are maintained, and where one can learn whether a particular government agency has information about him.<sup>46</sup> No citizen who inquires about himself

<sup>43</sup> Peggy Roberson, "What are these LEAA regulations \* \* \*?" Quill, 64:7 (July-Aug. 1976), p. 19.

<sup>44</sup> Federal Register, 41:55, March 19, 1976, Part III, Dept. of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, "Criminal History Records," p. 11714. Press Censorship Newsletter X, Sept.-Oct. 1976, p. 56.

<sup>45</sup> "The Privacy Act of 1974," Freedom of Information Report No. 342, Sept. 1975, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup> Anon., "Citizens' Guide to Privacy Act Available," FOI Digest, 18:2 (March-April 1976), p. 2. For an editor's struggle of more than a year to get a file kept on him by the FBI, see John Seigenthaler, "Publisher Finally Gets His FBI Files,

need give any reason for a request to examine the record, and may obtain a copy. Some exceptions to citizen access are provided, mostly dealing with law enforcement agencies' records, and including, notably, the CIA and the Secret Service.<sup>47</sup>

The Privacy Act's controls on the flow of personal information presents little or no conflict with the public's right to know proclaimed in the FOI Act, according to one analysis. "The Privacy Act \* \* \* simply does not affect the release of information that *must be released* under the FOIA. In other words, information not exempt [from disclosure] under the FOIA \* \* \* is still not exempt."<sup>48</sup>

Journalists see looming dangers to the "right to know" in the Privacy Act. Loss of "inside" sources of information in federal government is one, and the possibility of tracing "leaks" through the agencies' records of disseminations of files.<sup>49</sup> One reporter specialized in covering courts and law warns that the long partnership of journalists with civil rights lawyers may be damaged under growing privacy protection, for the lawyers "are keener on the protection of privacy."<sup>50</sup> It is too soon to know whether such somber speculations will be borne out.

#### Government in the Sunshine Act (effective March 12, 1977)

As the FOI Act of 1975 is to federal government records, so the "Sunshine Act"<sup>51</sup> is to federal government meetings. The Act mandates open meetings for regular sessions and quorum gatherings of approximately 50 agencies—all those headed by boards of two or more persons named by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Included are the major regulatory agencies such as the Securities Exchange Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission—whose meetings always had been secret—and such little-known

or Some of Them," (Memphis) Tennessean, July 10, 1977. False accusations of immoral conduct, the FBI said after finally releasing content of the file, would be purged.

<sup>47</sup> Anon., "Government Information and the Rights of Citizens," 73 Mich.L. Rev. 971, 1317. This study of more than 370 pages describes, analyzes, and criticizes the FOI Act, state open records and meetings laws, and the Privacy Act of 1974.

<sup>48</sup> William H. Harader, "Interface of FOI and Privacy Acts," FOI Center Report # 371, May 1977, pp. 2, 4.

<sup>49</sup> O'Reilly, p. 4.

<sup>50</sup> Lyle Denniston, "A Citizen's Right to Privacy," Quill, 63:4, April 1975, p. 16. See also Editor & Publisher, Jan. 31, 1976, p. 9.

<sup>51</sup> 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b. The FOI Act and the Privacy Act of 1974 are in the federal statutes under the same number, as 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a and 5 U.S.C.A. § 552c respectively.

entities as the National Council on Educational Research and the National Homeownership Foundation board of directors.<sup>52</sup>

All meetings of the named agencies are to be open—with at least one week's public notice—unless agendas take up matters in 10 categories which permit closed sessions. Either a verbatim transcript or detailed minutes of all matters covered in closed sessions is to be kept. And as for the record of open meetings, it is to be kept as minutes and made available to the public at minimal copying cost.

Closed-to-the-public meetings will hardly be rare, whatever strength the Sunshine Act may prove to generate. The ten categories of subject-matter whose discussion warrants closed doors for meetings of the boards and commissions are much like the exemptions to disclosure under the FOI Act. Abbreviated, the ten are:<sup>53</sup>

1. National defense or foreign policy matters which are properly classified;
2. Internal agency personnel matters;
3. Matters expressly required by law to be held confidential;
4. Confidential commercial or financial information, and trade secrets;
5. Accusations of criminal activity, or of censure, against a person;
6. Matters which if disclosed would be clearly unwarranted invasions of a person's privacy;
7. Law enforcement and criminal investigatory records (subject to the same categories as FOI Act exemption (b)(7));
8. Bank examiners' records;
9. Matters which if disclosed would generate financial speculation (included to protect the Federal Reserve Board Open Market Committee) or which would frustrate agency action which has not been announced;
10. Matters which involve the agency's issuance of a subpoena or participation in hearings or other adjudication-related proceedings.

It may prove significant that the ten exemptions of the Sunshine Act apply to the some 1,300 Advisory Committees spread throughout the Executive Branch of government. These committees of private citizens contribute expertise, advice, and recommendations to government policy making. The members tend to be prominent persons from industries which deal with the agencies they advise.

<sup>52</sup> Editor & Publisher, Feb. 26, 1977, p. 32. This account's details of the Sunshine Act are taken largely from James T. O'Reilly, "Government in the Sunshine," Freedom of Information Center Report # 366, Jan. 1977.

<sup>53</sup> O'Reilly, p. 2.

By one account, the Advisory Committees have “never been more powerful than they are now.”<sup>54</sup>

Untested ways exist for attacking illegal secrecy under the Sunshine Act. One may seek an injunction in advance to force a pending meeting to be open, and having found one illegal closing of an agency, a court may enjoin the agency from further illegal closings. One may sue, within 60 days after the secret meeting, to require that a transcript be furnished. No financial penalty for illegal meetings may be levied against members themselves, but courts may assign costs or fees against the United States—or against a plaintiff whose suit is found to be “dilatory or frivolous.” The range of possibilities for future secrecy or openness is large, and the crystal balls of various observers offer varied forecasts of cheer and gloom.<sup>55</sup>

#### SEC. 74. RECORDS AND MEETINGS IN THE STATES

**The extent of access in the states varies under statutes providing what shall be open and what closed in the meetings and records of executive, administrative, and legislative agencies.**

Many states have laws declaring that public policy demands maximum disclosure of official business, both meetings and records. Rarely, however, is it conceded that every act or every document of officialdom must be open to public scrutiny. Every branch of government within the states performs some of its work or maintains some of its records in secret. There are situations here as in the federal government’s domain which favor secrecy as protection for the individual’s private rights and for government’s carrying out its work. But the principle of disclosure and openness is as central to the democratic spirit at the state and local level as it is at the federal. A 1977 study found that all states had open records laws, and a 1974 study found that 48 states had open meetings laws.<sup>56</sup> Much of this legislation was enacted in the 1960s and 1970s.

The diversity among these statutes prohibits detailed treatment here.<sup>57</sup> Every reporter of government needs to know the peculiarities and special provisions of his own state’s access laws. Even

<sup>54</sup> FOI Digest, 19:1, Jan.-Feb. 1977, p. 4.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 19:2, March-April 1977, p. 1; O’Reilly, “Government in the Sunshine,” pp. 4–5.

<sup>56</sup> All except Miss. and W. Va.: John B. Adams, “State Open Meetings Laws: an Overview,” Freedom of Information Foundation Series No. 3, July 1974, pp. 1, 14; William Randolph Henrick, Public Inspection of State and Municipal Executive Documents, 45 Fordham L.Rev. 1105, 1106 (1977). Adams provides “model” open meetings statutes at pp. 22–29, and Henrick a model records statute at pp. 1143–50.

<sup>57</sup> Tables indicating presence or absence of various provisions of records and meetings laws of all the states are in Henrick, pp. 1151–53, and Adams, pp. 14–15.

among those newspapers or broadcast stations that rely more on their own power than on access laws to penetrate the offices and meetings of government, ignorance of the law's provisions leaves the reporter at the mercy of officials leery of disclosure.

To start with records kept by government offices, the fact that many may be termed "public" records does not necessarily mean that they are open to inspection by the public or the press. The common law definition of "public records" referred to the need of government to preserve the documents that told of the activities of its officers. Thus the definition of public record under the common law is that it is a written memorial by an authorized public officer in discharge of a legal duty to make such a memorial to serve as evidence of something written, said, or done.<sup>58</sup>

In that, of course, the word "public" does not imply a general right of inspection; and in the statutes, various qualifications in the public's right to inspect "public" records exist:<sup>59</sup>

Some documents which constitute public records under \* \* \* an open records statute have been exempted from disclosure. These may be available to specified individuals [e. g., licensing examination data available only to individual examinee, or reports of mental examinations of school children available only to their parents] \* \* \*. [Also] not all state-affiliated organizations will meet the definition of "agency" within an open records act [e. g., consulting firms and quasi-public corporations are frequently outside the terms of an open records act.]

Statutes may define records in extensive detail, or they may do so in brief and general terms. The latter kind may be so general as to give no guide to judges, leaving them to employ, in decisions, common law definition. On the other hand, open records statutes may be specific and limiting, as Pennsylvania's which goes to documents related to state funds and money transactions and state property, and to actions by state agencies that affect citizens' property rights and duties. The statute has been construed to deny public record status, and thus access, to personnel files. The statute specifically excludes from public records, "any record \* \* \* access to \* \* \* which would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person's reputation or personal security \* \* \*."<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *Amos v. Gunn*, 84 Fla. 285, 287, 94 So. 615, 616 (1922).

<sup>59</sup> *Henrick*, p. 1112. A qualified right of inspection does exist under common law: *Cross*, p. 35.

<sup>60</sup> *Henrick*, pp. 1114-20, includes the laws of Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, and New York, with Pennsylvania's, as "strict" definers of public records, and the "most liberal" laws as those of Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Montana.

All the statutes acknowledge and approve the fact that certain state laws specifically provide for secrecy, for example income tax laws that include clauses protecting the individual's income tax returns from disclosure. Frequent exemptions that appear in state open records statutes have much the character of the federal Freedom of Information Act exemptions (above, p. 421), such as intra- or inter-agency memoranda or preliminary draft documents, investigatory information, and trade secrets. And in addition, many exempt various health department records, juvenile and adoption records, licensing examination data, and public assistance records,<sup>61</sup> lawmakers having determined that injury to individuals concerned may result from disclosure. Not seldom, journalistic judgment disagrees.

While the common law right to inspect public records depends ordinarily on the citizen's having a proper purpose in seeing or copying the record, relatively few statutes speak to this. One study finds that Louisiana and Texas permit no inquiry by the keeper of the record into the applicant's motives; Michigan says that access may be had "for any lawful purpose"; and Washington prohibits its agencies from giving access to lists of persons wanted for commercial purposes.<sup>62</sup> Courts have held in some cases that "idle curiosity" is not a sufficient purpose for access to records, but in other cases have approved the same.<sup>63</sup>

Most open records laws provide legal instruments for the seeker to use in attempting to pierce denial of access. Most common is appeal to a court for an order to disclose, but administrative avenues are available in other states, including appeal to the state's attorney general, and in Connecticut and New York, appeal to a special freedom of information body. Penalties for illegal denial of access are provided in many statutes, ranging from the rare impeachment or removal from office, to the more common imprisonment and fines.<sup>64</sup>

Henrick finds a trend toward "liberality" developing in statutes and amendments of the past decade, particularly in definitions that expand the scope of "what is a public record." As an example, he cites the California statute of 1968:<sup>65</sup>

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1129-30.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1131. See also Anon., *Government Information and the Rights of Citizens*, 73 *Mich.L.Rev.* 971, at 1179 (1975). See also, for state records in general, *Ibid.*, pp. 1163-86.

<sup>63</sup> *Bend Pub. Co. v. Haner*, 118 *Or.* 105, 244 *P.* 868 (1926); *Hardman v. Collector of Taxes of North Adams*, 317 *Mass.* 439, 58 *N.E.2d* 845 (1945), both holding it insufficient; *contra.*, *State ex rel. Halloran v. McGrath*, 104 *Mont.* 490, 67 *P.2d* 838 (1937). For common law and records in general, see Cross, pp. 36, 55-56, *passim*.

<sup>64</sup> Henrick, pp. 1135-36. For the New York statute providing a Freedom of Information Committee to review, see "New York's Access to Records Law," *FOI Center Report* # 340, Aug. 1975.

<sup>65</sup> Henrick, p. 1137.

This was the first statute to encompass "all writings containing information relating to the conduct of the public's business," in its definition of public records. This is \* \* \* the second broadest of the [states' various] definitional categories in as much as it does not require "official" or "public" business of the agency as an essential factor. Other states adopted this definition \* \* \*.

In some statutes, "general exclusion" clauses permit custodians of records to refuse access if they find that opening the records would in some way damage the public interest. Then it is up to the applicant to bring an action to override the custodian's refusal. Wisconsin, without such a provision, has placed a similar procedure in effect by way of state Supreme Court decision.<sup>66</sup> Here, city officials refused to release to the *Waukesha Freeman* a report that concerned alleged mistreatment of citizens by police. In the first reported case brought by a newspaper to force access to Wisconsin government records, the *Freeman* obtained a court order requiring the release of the report under the state records law, and the city appealed to the State Supreme Court. The high court, in a preliminary decision, ordered the Circuit Court to read the secret document before deciding whether it should be made public. The Circuit Judge read it and again ordered that it be made public. Once more the city appealed, and the State Supreme Court in 1965 upheld the Circuit Court's order.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin placed real responsibility upon the officer withholding documents, in determining whether a request to disclose would be proper:<sup>67</sup>

The duty of first determining that the harmful effect upon the public interest of permitting inspection outweighs the benefit to be gained by granting inspection rests upon the public officer having custody of the record or document sought to be inspected. If he determines that permitting inspection would result in harm to the public interest which outweighs any benefit that would result from granting inspection, it is incumbent upon him to refuse the demand for inspection and state specifically the reasons for this refusal.

And once the officer states the reasons for the refusal, if the person seeking inspection takes the action to court, then the trial court has responsibilities:<sup>68</sup>

\* \* \* the proper procedure is for the trial judge to examine *in camera* the record or document sought to be

<sup>66</sup> State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis.2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 682. See also Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis.2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967).

<sup>68</sup> State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis.2d 672, 682-83, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).



inspected. Upon making such *in camera* examination, the trial judge should then make his determination of whether or not the harm likely to result to the public interest by permitting the inspection outweighs the benefit to be gained by granting inspection.

In reaching a determination so based upon a balancing of the interests involved, the trial judge must ever bear in mind that public policy favors the right of inspection of public records and documents, and, it is only in the exceptional case that inspection should be denied.

Access to certain personnel records, under the widespread recognition of claims to "privacy," was denied the Gannett Company under New York's Public Officers Law # 85, its "Freedom of Information Law." Gannett wanted the names, titles and salaries of 276 Monroe County employees laid off as the result of budget cuts in early 1977.<sup>69</sup> The county's regulations provided that each of its agencies should make such information on "every officer or employee" available to news media. The court held that the 276 discharged persons were no longer public "employees," but private citizens. The state FOI Law specifically provides that its command to release information should not apply to information that is "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," the court pointed out, and the discharged people feared that their chances for new jobs would be harmed by announcing their discharge. The court denied Gannett's request, saying the invasions of privacy and the "resultant economic or personal hardships" from disclosure were obvious.

The rules of states and municipalities about disclosure of police records vary widely. The most exhaustive study of the general picture of access—that by the late Harold L. Cross—found that press and public have no enforceable legal right to inspect police records, "using that term broadly, as such, as a whole, or without exceptions."<sup>70</sup> Unless statutes provide specifically for access to investigatory, arrest, and law enforcement records of police, there is long precedent for denying access to this most-requested of all classes of records.<sup>71</sup> Developing friendships and good working relations with police is probably as valuable an avenue to their records, for newsmen, as relying on statutes about access.

The power of state law to overrule local ordinances is illustrated in *State v. Mayo*.<sup>72</sup> Here the city of Hartford, Conn., had exercised

<sup>69</sup> *Gannett Co. v. Monroe County*, 90 Misc.2d 76, 393 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (1977). Not all personnel records in all jurisdictions are closed: *News-Press Pub. Co. v. Wisher*, 345 So.2d 646 (Fla.1977); *Ayers v. Lee Enterprises*, 277 Or. 527, 561 P.2d 998 (1977).

<sup>70</sup> Cross, Ch. 8 and p. 118.

<sup>71</sup> Anon., "Access to Police Blotters and Reports," Freedom of Information Center Report # 27, Jan. 1969 (mimeo).

<sup>72</sup> 4 Conn.Cir. 511, 236 A.2d 342 (1967).

its local option powers to pass its own building code, instead of adopting the state code. Part of the Hartford code provided that documents in support of applications for building permits were not public records. Two state agencies dealing with engineering and architecture wanted to review the documents, but Glendon R. Mayo, Hartford's Director of Licenses and Inspections, refused to disclose them on the basis of the city code. The state petitioned for a disclosure order, and won it. The court held that the Connecticut "right to know" statute should be construed broadly. The "exception" clauses of the statute did not cover the documents in question, it said, and no city ordinance in conflict with a state statute can stand, since the city's powers to legislate are conferred by the state.

In turning from laws on state government records to laws on meetings of executive/administrative and legislative bodies, the diversity of provisions from state to state is no less than with records. The publications of the University of Missouri Freedom of Information Center are of first importance to obtaining an understanding of the laws of 50 states. Adams, Higginbotham, and Thompson spread wide nets to capture similarities and differences among the statutes or decisions as they stood in the mid-1970s, and their accounts are central to this discussion.<sup>73</sup>

As of 1977, Keefe found that all states had open meetings laws,<sup>74</sup> many of them adopted in the 1970s and many others under state legislatures' ongoing scrutiny for possible change. Adams studied all meetings laws and ranked them on a scale reaching from maximum to minimum openness. Taking maximum openness to be desirable in a democracy, he identified 11 characteristics that would go into an "ideal" open meetings law, as follows:<sup>75</sup>

- (1) Include a statement of public policy in support of openness.
- (2) Provide for an open legislature.
- (3) Provide for open legislative committees.
- (4) Provide for open meetings of state agencies or bodies.
- (5) Provide for open meetings of agencies and bodies of the political subdivisions of the state.
- (6) Provide for open County boards.
- (7) Provide for open city councils (or their equivalent).
- (8) Forbid closed executive sessions.
- (9) Provide legal recourse to halt secrecy.

<sup>73</sup> Adams, *op. cit.*; Robert Higginbotham, "The Case Law of Open Meetings Laws," Freedom of Information [FOI] Center Report No. 354, May 1976; William Thompson, "FOI and State Attorneys General," *Ibid.*, No. 307, July 1973. See also Jack Clarke, "Open Meeting Laws: an Analysis," *Ibid.*, No. 338, June 1975.

<sup>74</sup> Pat Keefe, "State Open Meetings Activity," FOI Center Report # 378, Sept. 1977, p. 7.

<sup>75</sup> Adams, p. 4.

(10) Declare actions taken in meetings which violate the law to be null and void.

(11) Provide for penalties for those who violate the law.

A single state—Tennessee—scored the maximum of 11 points on Adams' scale, while three—Arizona, Colorado, and Kentucky—each scored 10, lacking in each instance a provision that would forbid closed executive sessions. Florida, the state which perhaps originated the term "Sunshine Law" as a popular name for open meetings acts, and which is perhaps the best-known to journalists as a model of openness, actually scored no more than "good" on the Adams scale—8. Major gaps in its law are those notable in many states: there is no provision for open legislative or legislative committee meetings. Here, of course, the legislative will is at work, permitting secrecy for itself (as in about half the states), forbidding it for others.<sup>76</sup>

Of all the 11 provisions, those which most states include are 4 through 7, those applying to state agencies and political subdivisions of states including county boards and city councils. Frequently, Adams found, exceptions were made for judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The rarest of all provisions, on the other end of the spectrum, is the forbidding of closed executive sessions of some or all agencies, found only in the states of Colorado, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Tennessee. Adams notes, however, that in 15 states, *final* action may not be taken in executive sessions.

A noteworthy feature of these laws is that they stimulate few news media to bring actions against alleged offenders. Higginbotham noted that "comparative dearth of cases involving the media" in his study of legal actions in eight of the 16 states Adams rates most open.<sup>77</sup> News media usually leave the instrument of legal actions for forcing admission, to other agencies and persons; the latter, of course, seldom have immediate access to the levers of publicity that media have at instant command: publicizing in columns or broadcasts the fact of closed meetings, cultivating sources who will talk on condition their names are not given in news stories, editorializing against those who apparently offend, and carrying a copy of the state open-meeting statute at all times, to show to door-closers.

The scaling of state statutes performed by Adams assigns equal weight to each of the 11 desirable characteristics. It is of course likely that some should outweigh the others in importance; but in the laws' and decisions' present state, it would be difficult indeed to suggest that number 1 is more important than, say, number 6, or 11 more important than 9. Number 11 was long absent from most

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

<sup>77</sup> Higginbotham, p. 9.

laws; its absence was widely thought to render the laws "toothless" and a matter of no concern to those who wanted closed meetings, and its addition was much sought in states without it. Yet a high incidence of cases under Arkansas' 1968 open meetings law has taken place despite the presence of number 11. And Florida, whose law includes number 11, according to the Higginbotham study "has perhaps the most extensive record of litigation of any state considered in this report."<sup>78</sup> Plainly, secret meetings are not ended because those who are responsible for the secrecy may be penalized for violation.

After reviewing the Arkansas cases, Higginbotham concludes they reveal "that a statute may seem to be weak or strong on its face," but the crucial fact is that the "interpretation of the statute by the courts can add or detract and cure an apparent weakness or hopelessly cripple an otherwise strong statute."<sup>79</sup> He illustrated with *Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens*,<sup>80</sup> which he says "shows that a court's interpretation can read a word into the statute that the legislature did not put there." Here, a board of trustees committee of the University of Arkansas had met with university legal counsel and executives on the matter of possessing or using alcoholic beverages on university property. It asked a *Gazette* reporter to leave the meeting. The *Gazette* took the action to court under the state Freedom of Information Law, and the trial court ruled that since the definition section of the act did not include committees or other subdivisions of governing bodies, the committees were not subject to the act's requirement of openness. But the State Supreme Court overturned the decision, saying it attached "no particular significance to the fact that the word 'committees' is not specifically enumerated" in the law itself. It elaborated:<sup>81</sup>

\* \* \* it was the intent of the legislature, as so emphatically set forth in its statement of policy, that "*public business* be performed in an open and public manner. \* \* \* it appears to us somewhat incongruous that a parent body cannot go into executive session \* \* \* but its component parts (the committees) which actually investigate the complaints, and act on those complaints by making recommendations to the board, are at liberty to bar the public from their deliberations. Surely a part (of a board) is not possessed of a prerogative greater than the whole.

Higginbotham concluded, on the basis of his study of the eight states, that the courts' refusal to permit attempted evasions of the

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4-7.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>80</sup> — Ark. —, 522 S.W.2d 350 (1975).

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, at 353-4.

state freedom of information laws “was the predominant pattern,” although some cases clearly illustrated successful evading methods.<sup>82</sup>

Attorneys general have been called on to interpret meetings and records laws in many states. As for meetings, it is occasionally feasible for a reporter to seek “instant action” in the form of an attorney general’s opinion even while a secret meeting is in session, and through such an opinion, force a meeting open. More likely, however, before an opinion can be had, the meeting will have adjourned. Nevertheless, either a formal opinion delivered at the request of a state government agency, or an informal one delivered at the request of a non-official person or entity—such as a reporter or newspaper—can have future impact on the behavior of the sequestering committee or group. For many reasons, “The opinions of an attorney general are followed by their recipients.”<sup>83</sup> The attorney general interprets the law of a state; his opinion does not carry the force of a court opinion, of course, but it is authoritative until a court has passed on the question.

A study of more than 250 attorneys general opinions in “right to know” cases of all states, covering the years 1930 to 1970, found that 43 concerned meetings and 216 concerned records. About 80% of the opinions on meetings favored openness, as did about 55% of those on records—for a total score of 59.8% favoring openness and 40.2% secrecy.<sup>84</sup> The governmental subject-matter that most often won the attorneys general ruling in favor of secrecy was predictably public safety—generally, law enforcement, in which only 26% of the opinions supported access. At the other end of the scale, where the subject-matter was education 70% of the opinions ruled for openness. Between were welfare (45% for openness) and health (43%). The attorney general of a state, of course, is often centrally involved with the police and is especially sensitized to the secrecy employed in investigating criminal activity.

Thompson points out that law enforcement and health and welfare often involve personal records of individuals, and that here principles and notions of privacy may forestall access. He found that among the opinions that specifically went to records of individuals, 42% held for openness, while of all other cases, 68% did.<sup>85</sup>

Other findings of Thompson:

- Over time, the ratio of attorneys general rulings on the side of granting access has increased: before 1950, 47%; decade of the 1950s, 61%; decade of the 1960s, 67%.

<sup>82</sup> Higginbotham, p. 9.

<sup>83</sup> Thompson, p. 1.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 10.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12.

“was aimed specifically at the news media and was intended as a punishment for what the [justice] characterized as their ‘contumacious conduct \* \* \*’.”<sup>91</sup> The newsmen had a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, as the justice’s action was aimed at them and would limit their ability to act as newsmen, and that stake gave them the standing to challenge the validity of his order. The articles that the justice objected to had not reached the jury and there was no basis for the threatened contempt citation. The justice’s order was an unwarranted effort to punish and censor the press.

In an Ohio case in which a judge excluded newspaper reporters from the courtroom during a pandering trial, a newspaper successfully challenged the trial court’s action. Reporters had been excluded at the request of the defendant during cross-examination of a state witness, counsel saying to the judge that he would be “better able to compel the witness to tell the truth” if she could be cross-examined in private. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the exclusion order violated the constitutional guarantee of a public trial in a criminal case. The court said that sometimes a defendant may waive the right to a public trial, but may not waive the right of the people to insist that court proceedings, “insofar as practicable and in the interest of the public health and public morals, be open to public view.” There is no right, the Court said, to a private trial.<sup>92</sup>

Pretrial hearings have at times been successfully closed to public and press. In a hearing in a skyjacking case, the court held that the secrecy of anti-skyjacking procedures was at stake, and closed the proceedings.<sup>93</sup> Some states have statutes that permit closing of hearings in narrow circumstance.<sup>94</sup> In the re-trial of W. A. (Tony) Boyle,<sup>95</sup> once president of the United Mine Workers of America, on charges of killing a union rival, the Pennsylvania trial court ordered the courtroom closed during a pretrial hearing—an action challenged by Pennsylvania news organizations in a petition to the United States Supreme Court. They called the matter “an issue of immense concern to courts throughout the country \* \* \*.”<sup>96</sup>

Journalists everywhere have found these and similar attempts to close courts to be an ominous drift of the 1970s. Alternative

<sup>91</sup> *Oliver v. Postel*, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 282 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1972). See also *State ex rel. Superior Court of Snohomish County v. Sperry*, 79 Wash.2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (1971).

<sup>92</sup> *E. W. Scripps et al. v. Fulton*, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955); *Anon.*, “State Ruling a ‘First,’” *Quill*, Jan. 1976, p. 8.

<sup>93</sup> *United States v. Bell*, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972), certiorari denied 409 U.S. 991, 93 S.Ct. 335.

<sup>94</sup> *Gora*, p. 123.

<sup>95</sup> *Commonwealth v. Boyle*, 470 Pa. 343, 368 A.2d 661 (1977).

<sup>96</sup> *New York Times*, Nov. 26, 1977, p. 14; *Philadelphia Newspapers v. Jerome*, 3 Med.L.Rptr. 1750 (1978).

measures of courts have included the sealing of trial records of various kinds, expanding the use of *in camera* procedures, impounding of complaints, and ordering attorneys and participants not to speak with reporters. Such measures are treated herein in Chapter 8, Free Press—Fair Trial.

One kind of judicial activity that is universally closed is the grand jury proceeding, which of course is not a trial. The grand jury investigates and deliberates the question whether persons must stand trial. In these proceedings, public policy calls for secrecy because early investigation may implicate persons who later turn out to be blameless, and publicity could injure them needlessly. Also, publicity during early stages of a grand jury investigation could serve as a warning for the guilty, not yet in custody, to escape.<sup>97</sup>

A few classes of civil cases are closed in some states to public and press. These generally have to do with family relations, divorce, and juvenile proceedings. Criminal and misdemeanor cases involving sex offenses are also closed in some states, especially if minors are involved.<sup>98</sup> Considerations about “public morals” lie behind the seclusion of divorce proceedings and domestic relations, which may involve heavy sexual content. As for juvenile proceedings, they are commonly held in secret on grounds of the welfare of the child, whose present or future, it is thought, may be damaged by publicity of his delinquency or neglect.

Colorado’s statute on divorce provides that the court exclude all except court officers or persons connected with the case, while in West Virginia, divorce trials are to be held in the judge’s chambers.<sup>99</sup> Wisconsin’s law on juveniles provides that the media may not publish the names of offenders under 18 that emerge in juvenile court proceedings.<sup>1</sup> This does not prohibit news media from publishing names of juveniles obtained in some way outside the proceedings of the courts, however.

The Los Angeles County Juvenile Court has opened juvenile criminal case proceedings to reporters for mass media, with the provisions that identities of persons involved not be divulged in news stories and that judges will decide whether confidential records like clinical studies will be released. The court hoped, in doing so, that better public understanding of juvenile courts would result, and

<sup>97</sup> Cross, pp. 173–174.

<sup>98</sup> Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Authorizing Exclusion of Public in Sex Offense Cases, 39 A.L.R.3d 852; Press Censorship Newsletter # VII, April-May, 1975, pp. 71–72, on Massachusetts and Rhode Island cases.

<sup>99</sup> Comp.L.1921, C.C.P., # 463; St.1935, Mar. 9, c. 35, # 23, respectively.

<sup>1</sup> Wis.Stat. 48.26 (1955).

improvement of juvenile courts as an instrument of social rehabilitation.<sup>2</sup>

Although the pencil-wielding reporter is seldom excluded from a criminal trial, his fellow reporter who carries a still camera, television camera, or microphone faces an entirely different situation. Many courts bar the photographer and broadcaster from taking the tools of their trade into the courts. A long and vigorous campaign has been waged against the ban, by individuals and organizations of journalists who use the camera and microphone. They have argued that the barrier prevents the public from getting the fullest, most direct knowledge of its courts' work. They have declared that a great opportunity for public education in government, offered by the television medium, is wasted by preventing television coverage. They have insisted that barring their instruments, while permitting the paper-and-pad newsman to report, discriminates against visual and audio media. They have demonstrated to courts that they can operate modern cameras without lights, with unobtrusive accessories, and without disrupting the "decorum of the court."

A variety of court rules and decisions stops the broadcaster and cameraman at the courtroom door or further away. For the federal courts, rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, long barring phototaking and radio broadcasting of federal judicial proceedings, since 1962 has applied to the "environs" of the court, not only to the courtroom itself; and to any judicial proceeding, not only to criminal proceedings as formerly.<sup>3</sup> Precisely what the "environs" of the court are may be open to interpretation. In 1964, Los Angeles federal judges ordered photographers and broadcasters to stay away from the courtroom floor of the Federal Building, and from a hearing room on another floor. In 1975, they expanded the ban to other rooms and floors of federal courthouses.<sup>4</sup>

Number 35 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of Judicial Ethics is a source for denial of access to state courts. The Canons are voluntarily adopted or not in the states, according to the judicial rulemaking authorities of each state. They may be incorporated into state laws or adopted as a rule of the courts. Many states have adopted Canon 35, which reads as follows:<sup>5</sup>

Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the

<sup>2</sup> Press Censorship Newsletter # VIII, Oct.-Nov. 1975, p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Am. Bar Ass'n, Special Committee on Proposed Revision of Judicial Canon 35, Interim Report and Recommendations, July 23, 1962, pp. 95-96.

<sup>4</sup> Editor & Publisher, Feb. 1, 1964, p. 52; Press Censorship Newsletter # VII, April-May, 1975, p. 68.

<sup>5</sup> American Bar Association Special Committee on Proposed Revision of Judicial Canon 35, Report, p. 3. The canon was revised and adopted by the ABA House of Delegates Feb. 5, 1963.



courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings, distract participants and witnesses in giving testimony, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.

The Canon makes an exception for televising or broadcasting naturalization proceedings carried out by courts, where the proceedings are "a ceremony for the purpose of publicly demonstrating in an impressive manner the essential dignity and the serious nature of naturalization."<sup>6</sup>

Two states, Colorado and Texas, did not adopt Canon 35, but left televising up to the discretion of the judge in the individual case, Colorado adding that televising should not take place over the objection of a witness or juror and Texas not over the objection of a witness.<sup>7</sup> In Colorado, about 95 trials were broadcast between 1956 and 1962. In one criminal case, where television was permitted, Judge Joseph H. McDonald was quoted as saying that he felt that the defendant (not a witness or juror, whose objections would have been honored) despite his objections to being televised, "has no rights in the premises," and that the defendant's rights were not being violated by the presence of television.<sup>8</sup>

In Texas, the trial of Billie Sol Estes on a state charge of swindling farmers by selling them non-existent fertilizer tanks and equipment, was televised (see Chap. 8 herein). Camera journalists' cause was set back. The famous Estes, a man with close connections in the White House, objected to the televising of the pre-trial proceedings, but his motion was denied. Heavy coverage resulted, with at least 12 cameramen taking motion and still pictures. Cables and wires stretched over the courtroom floor, and three microphones were on the judge's bench. At trial, coverage was far less intense and obtrusive. Estes was convicted, and appealed on the ground that he was deprived of his rights to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the televising and broadcasting of the trial. The United States Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, reversed his conviction.<sup>9</sup> Mr. Justice Tom Clark rested his argument heavily on the possible adverse psychological effect of being "on television" for witnesses, jurors, judge, and defendant, rather than on television's possible tendencies to disrupt order and decorum in the courtroom. These possible effects, he said, "are real enough to have

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* Canon 35 has been replaced by Canon 3A7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates 8/16/72. Its provisions are similar to those of Canon 35. See ABA Law Student Division, Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct, p. 47, 1972.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>8</sup> Special Committee on Proposed Revision of Judicial Canon 35, Report, p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> *Estes v. Texas*, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628 (1965).

convinced the Judicial Conference of the United States, this Court and the Congress that television should be barred in federal trials \* \* \* ; in addition they have persuaded all but two of our States to prohibit television in the courtroom."<sup>10</sup>

Following the *Estes* decision, Colorado revised its court rules to prohibit broadcasting and photography at the objection of the defendant, as well as of witness or juror.<sup>11</sup>

In 1975, ten years after *Estes* (which had not ruled that cameras were to be banned in all cases), the persistence of journalists' pressure opened cracks in the barriers. In June, *Broadcasting* reported that a committee chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington had recommended, following experiments in previous months, that state courts be opened to broadcast coverage. By 1976, the Washington Supreme Court had approved.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, Alabama's high court had approved camera and broadcast coverage. Its former Chief Justice called the prohibition of cameras and broadcasting under the ABA canon "prior restraint," and said that demonstrations by camera and radio journalists showed that reporting with modern technology could be done without damaging the rights of defendants and trial participants.<sup>13</sup> By 1977, courts of Florida, Georgia, and Wisconsin had approved experimental courtroom photography for a year or indefinitely.<sup>14</sup> In all cases, rules regulating the procedures were laid out by the courts, with permission of trial judges required in each case, and prohibitions against such possibilities as distracting witnesses, interfering with court decorum, and televising against the wishes of defendants in criminal cases. Television, still-photography, and radio journalism seemed on its way to controlled access to the courts. Still unresolved was the deepest concern of opponents—whether being "on camera" would have adverse psychological effects on trial participants.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 1634–1636.

<sup>11</sup> Editor & Publisher, July 10, 1965, p. 59.

<sup>12</sup> *Broadcasting*, June 16, 1975, p. 45; *Quill*, Sept. 1976, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> Howell T. Heflin, excerpts of remarks, RTNDA Communicator, Sept. 1977, pp. 7–8.

<sup>14</sup> Anon., "Cameras in the Courtroom: How To Get 'em There," Associated Press Managing Editors Association, 1977 Freedom of Information Report, is a 12-page analysis of five states' courts rules, and guidelines for camera journalists. For Wisconsin, see (Madison) Wisconsin State Journal, Dec. 27, 1977, p. 1.

## Chapter 13

### REGULATION OF BROADCASTING

Sec.

76. Broadcasting and Free Expression.
77. Licensing Broadcasters.
78. The Equal Opportunity Requirement.
79. The Fairness Doctrine: Controversial Issues of Public Importance.
80. The Fairness Doctrine: Personal Attacks and Political Editorials.
81. The Fairness Doctrine: Advertising.
82. Cable Television.

#### SEC. 76. BROADCASTING AND FREE EXPRESSION

**Government regulates broadcasting in ways that it does not regulate printed media because the air waves are of the nature of a public resource that can carry only a limited number of voices.**

Voice broadcasting emerged in the 1920's under law that permitted anyone who applied for a broadcast license to get one. By 1926, the limited number of frequencies available for broadcasting was unable to carry the traffic without intolerable interference among stations. A dial-twirler's excursion across his radio set frequencies was a tour of Babel. At broadcasters' request and with full agreement from officials, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927, establishing a Federal Radio Commission (FRC) as an administrative agency to regulate and control traffic and to see that broadcasting was carried out according to the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." The FRC was to choose among applicants for access to the air waves, and license the chosen. In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act establishing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), under which radio and television have been regulated since, and telephone and telegraph as well.<sup>1</sup>

The nature of the physical universe had dictated that broadcasting somehow be controlled; there were not enough frequencies to permit everyone who wished to do so to broadcast. And the fact that individuals and corporations could scarcely lay claim to ownership of the air waves, which existed much more in the context of a public resource than of a private one, argued for government's controlling access to the air waves in the name of the public.

<sup>1</sup> Sydney W. Head, *Broadcasting in America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972) 2d ed., Chap. 8. The Act of 1927 is 44 Stat. 1162; of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064.

Yet this situation plainly raised questions about government's relation to free speech and press. No agency of government regulated newspapers, books and magazines. The government's choosing among applicants and subsequent licensing of the chosen was a process that was not tolerable under free press principles for the print media. The FCC was indeed barred by the Communications Act from censorship of the content of broadcasting, but the choosing and licensing process was upheld by the courts as constitutional. It was held in *National Broadcasting Co. v. U. S.*:<sup>2</sup>

Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other media of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic; and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied \* \* \*. The standard provided for the licensing of stations by the Communications Act of 1934 was the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is not a denial of free speech.

Principles of free speech, then, did not stand in the way of denying a person a license. Furthermore, there were positive obligations upon the holder of a license to operate in the public interest, obligations which were not imposed upon the printed media. In a case involving complaints against a station for programming public affairs shows that had overtones of racial and religious discrimination, the Federal Court of Appeals spoke of the differences between newspapers and broadcasters:<sup>3</sup>

A broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper publisher, but he is not in the same category in terms of public obligations imposed by law. A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise, it is burdened by enforceable obligations. A newspaper can be operated at the whim or caprice of its owners; a broadcasting station cannot. After nearly five decades of operation, the broadcasting industry does not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of duty.

A striking example of expression that might result in the legal foreclosure of continued broadcasting, but not of newspaper publishing, appeared in a pair of court decisions in 1931 and 1932. The first

<sup>2</sup> 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1014 (1943).

<sup>3</sup> *Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC*, 123 U.S.App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (1966).

was *Near v. Minnesota*; the second was *Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC*. In the first case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that government could not forbid a newspaper to publish because it had made scurrilous attacks on police and law enforcement officials, and on Jews. In the second, the Federal Appeals Court ruled that the Federal Radio Commission could deny a radio broadcaster a new license and thus access to the air waves because it had previously made scurrilous attacks on judges and the administration of justice and on Roman Catholics.

*Near v. Minnesota*<sup>4</sup> involved a scandal sheet published in Minneapolis by J. M. Near and a partner who ran afoul of an extraordinary Minnesota law. The famous "Gag law" provided that it was a public nuisance to engage in the regular, persistent publication of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" periodical. The state could step in, stop, and permanently suppress such a publication. If a publisher disobeyed an injunction against his publishing, and resumed it, he could be punished for contempt of court. Under the law, Near was enjoined from continuing to publish his *Saturday Press*. He challenged the constitutionality of the law, and the United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction.

Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes said the question was whether a law authorizing such government action to restrain publication squared with freedom of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed. What was done to Near was to restrain him in advance of publication—the "prior restraint" that was the licensing and censorship of old. Tracing the history of the guarantee of free press, he said that previous restraint is unconstitutional except in "exceptional cases" such as publication of troop movements in war time and incitements to acts of violence endangering the community. He said it was unavailing to the state to insist<sup>5</sup>

\* \* \* that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal which tends to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the commission of crime. Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official malfeasance, unquestionably create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guaranty is that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to prevent publication.

Hughes said that "reckless assaults upon public men \* \* \* exert a baleful influence" and deserve condemnation by public opinion. But, he said, the growth of complexity in government, the opportunities for corruption in government, the rise in crime and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and official neglect,

<sup>4</sup> 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 283 U.S. 697, 722, 51 S.Ct. 625, 633 (1931).

emphasize "the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press." He added:<sup>6</sup>

The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct.

Prosecutions and law suits for libel, said Justice Hughes, are the proper remedy for false and defamatory statements, not prohibition of publishing which is "the essence of censorship." The law was unconstitutional, and Near was free to publish.

But not so the Reverend Doctor Schuler, lessee and operator of radio station KGEF in Los Angeles. He filed for the renewal of his broadcast license in 1930, and numerous citizens protested to the FRC. It denied Schuler's request for re-licensing on grounds that his broadcasts attacked the Roman Catholic Church, were sensational rather than instructive, and obstructed the orderly administration of public justice (he had been convicted of contempt for attacking judges). The Reverend Schuler's church, Trinity Methodist South, took the decision to court on grounds that it violated free speech and due process. The Federal Appeals Court denied its appeal and upheld the denial of a license.<sup>7</sup> It said that Congress has the right to establish agencies to regulate the airwaves, and such agencies can refuse to renew licenses to one who has abused a license to broadcast defamatory and untrue matter. This denial of a permit, the Court held, is different from taking away property. Then it spoke of the kinds of materials and attacks that KGEF had broadcast, and gave its view as to their effect:<sup>8</sup>

If it be considered that one in possession of a permit to broadcast in interstate commerce may, without let or hindrance from any source, use these facilities, reaching out, as they do, from one corner of the country to the other, to obstruct the administration of justice, offend the religious susceptibilities of thousands, inspire political distrust and civic discord, or offend youth and innocence by the use of words suggestive of sexual immorality, and be answerable for slander only at the instance of the one offended, then this great science, instead of a boon, will become a scourge, and the nation a theatre for the display of individual passions and collision of personal interests. This is neither censorship nor previous restraint, nor is it a whittling away of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, or an impairment of their free exercise \* \* \*.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 720.

<sup>7</sup> *Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC*, 61 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 62 F.2d 850 (1932), certiorari denied 284 U.S. 685, 52 S.Ct. 204, 288 U.S. 599, 53 S.Ct. 317 (1933).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 61 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 62 F.2d 850, 852-3 (1932).

Taken together, the two decisions made it clear that a newspaper owner could not be stopped from publishing because of his attacks on officials and religious groups, but that a radio broadcaster could be stopped for similar attacks.

Yet the Trinity decision was not the end of the matter. As the FCC groped in its early decades for policies that would regulate without violating free expression, it reached a position which said that the airing of controversial topics—including religion—should be encouraged in broadcasting. Its famous fairness doctrine, first elaborated in its report of 1949,<sup>9</sup> offered the position that the “public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views.” And in a case of 1968, where the Anti-Defamation League charged anti-Semitism in the broadcasts of station KTYM, Inglewood, Calif., the Commission did not refuse to renew the license. After noting that KTYM had offered the ADL free and equal time to respond to the anti-Semitism and that the ADL had refused, the Commission said:<sup>10</sup>

The Commission has long held that its function is not to judge the merit, wisdom or accuracy of any broadcast discussion or commentary but to insure that all viewpoints are given fair and equal opportunity for expression and that controverted allegations are balanced by the presentation of opposing viewpoints. Any other position would stifle discussion and destroy broadcasting as a medium of free speech.

## SEC 77. LICENSING BROADCASTERS

Under the Communications Act of 1934,<sup>11</sup> the FCC is to grant licenses to broadcast if the public convenience, interest or necessity will be served by doing so. It may award the license for no more than three years, and may renew it for further three-year periods (# 307(a)). Applicants must provide what information the Commission prescribes as to “citizenship, character, and financial, technical and other qualifications \* \* \* to operate the station. \* \* \*” (# 308). An application may be challenged by other “parties in interest” on grounds that in granting it, the public convenience, interest and necessity would not be served (# 309(d)(1)). If the Commission finds, in the applicant’s materials or through challenge, that “a substantial and material question of fact is presented,” or that for any reason the public interest, convenience or necessity

<sup>9</sup> Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).

<sup>10</sup> Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’Rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C.Cir. 1968), certiorari denied 394 U.S. 930, 89 S.Ct. 1190 (1969).

<sup>11</sup> U.S.C.A. § 151 and following. Appropriate sections of the Act are noted in the text rather than footnotes in this chapter.

would not be served by granting the license, it must hold hearings on the matter (# 309(e)).

The Commission issues broad policy statements as well as guidelines that describe factors it will employ in deciding who will be licensed. Issues in licensing emerge with special salience when the FCC is faced with choosing among competitors for a license, or when "parties at interest" ask the Commission to deny a license or a renewal. In the former case, the FCC holds Comparative Hearings; in the latter, the objectors file a petition with the Commission alleging specific facts to show that granting the application would be inconsistent with the public interest, convenience or necessity, and if the Commission decides the petition meets its requirements, it sets a formal hearing.

In its Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings of 1965,<sup>12</sup> the Commission said its choosing among contestants would be based on two principal considerations: the "best practicable service to the public," and the "maximum diffusion of control of the media of mass communications." Its decisions may be organized under these two concepts.

### **Best Practicable Service to the Public**

The indicators of best service to the public are many. Congress furnishes the FCC some of them in the Communications Act. The Commission must take into account citizenship, character, and financial, technical and other qualifications of applicants for licenses (# 308(b)). The historical development of the FCC's decision-making brings other factors into the accounting, and some of these are formalized in the 1965 Policy Statement (above): full-time participation in station operation by owners, the proposed program service and the past broadcast record, the efficient use of the frequency, character, and the catchall "other factors."<sup>13</sup>

Problems of "character" may include misrepresentations by applicants when they file their plans for service with the Commission. The Faith Theological Seminary of Elkins Park, Pa., was approved for transfer of WXUR licenses after various groups of people had opposed it. They held that the Rev. Carl McIntyre, one of its directors, had established a record as radio commentator that was sufficient evidence that he could not bring about a fair and balanced presentation of controversial public issues. Less than a year after the transfer, WXUR's licenses came up for renewal. The FCC found that the station, very soon after receiving the license, had

<sup>12</sup> 1 F.C.C.2d 393; 5 R.R.2d 1901.

<sup>13</sup> A total of 14 "best-service-to-the-public" factors that emerged before the 1965 policy statement was extracted from FCC decisions by William K. Jones, *Cases and Materials on Electronic Mass Media* (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1976), pp. 41-45.



drastically altered its programming to present an offering nothing like that which it had proposed in its application. On the grounds of misrepresentation about its intent, as well as others, the FCC denied renewal of the license, and was upheld by the federal appeals court.<sup>14</sup>

A broader range of character questions came into play in Star Stations of Indiana. Star applied for renewal of licenses, and the Commission denied them. Not only had the company misrepresented itself to the FCC; its president and principal stockholder “was intimately involved in and had knowledge of a range of misconduct including improper campaign contributions, slanted news broadcasts \* \* \*” and had made attempts to “frustrate the Commission’s processes by intimidating and harassing employees \* \* \* of Star. We have found \* \* \* a reprehensible course of misconduct involving the basic character qualifications of Burden [the president] and Star, clearly warranting their disqualification from operating these broadcast facilities.”<sup>15</sup>

Denials of re-licensing by the FCC, such as those above, are rare. It has often spoken of the importance of providing security to licensees and stability to the industry.<sup>16</sup> While a challenger at renewal time is given a chance to show that granting his application will better serve the public interest than would re-licensing the incumbent, “a challenger is in a less favorable position \* \* \* because he asks the Commission to speculate whether his untested proposal is *likely* to be superior to that of \* \* \* incumbent.”<sup>17</sup> Challenges are relatively few—only eight among approximately 250 television license renewals during the industry’s troubled year<sup>18</sup> following the opinion in the famous, protracted WHDH (Boston) case.

That case labored through FCC proceedings and into and out of the courts from 1954 to 1970. It is known as Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC.<sup>19</sup> WHDH and its television station were owned by and were a principal financial support of the *Boston Herald-Traveler* newspaper. Recommended for renewal by the FCC Hearing Examiner in 1966, WHDH lost out to one of three contesting applicants when the FCC reversed its Hearing Examiner’s

<sup>14</sup> Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 25 R.R.2d 2010, affirmed 473 F.2d 16 (D.C.Cir.1972).

<sup>15</sup> 51 F.C.C.2d 95, 97; 32 R.R.2d 1151, affirmed 527 F.2d 853 (D.C.Cir.1975).

<sup>16</sup> See FCC, Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970), for the FCC’s detailing of its attitude in this regard. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C.Cir. 1975).

<sup>17</sup> Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 37 R.R.2d 1487 (1976); on reconsideration, 39 R.R.2d 541 (1977).

<sup>18</sup> Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, fn. 21 (D.C.Cir. 1971).

<sup>19</sup> 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.Cir.1970).

decision and was upheld by the Federal Appeals Court.<sup>20</sup> How the FCC applies its criteria from the 1965 Policy Statement (*supra*, p. 451) to weigh merits of competing applicants in comparative hearings emerges in a digest made by the court as it developed its opinion. The relative merits of WHDH, Boston Broadcasters, Inc., and Charles River were assayed on several scores:<sup>21</sup>

On January 22, 1969, the Commission reversed the Hearing Examiner's decision, and entered an order denying the application of WHDH and granting that of BBI. 16 F.C.C.2d 1. Its Decision reviewed the comparative merits of the applications.

*Past Performance of WHDH*: The Commission's decision stated that the principles of the 1965 Policy Statement would be applied to the proceedings. Specifically it invoked the provision of its 1965 Policy Statement that an applicant's past record was to be given an affirmative preference only if it were outside the bounds of average performance. It read the Examiner's findings of fact as showing that the record of WHDH-TV was "favorable" on the whole—except for its failure to editorialize—but concluded that it was only within the bounds of average performance, and "does not demonstrate unusual attention to the public's needs or interests." 16 F.C.C.2d at 10.

*Diversification of Media of Mass Communications*: WHDH's ownership by the Herald-Traveler resulted in an adverse factor on the diversification criterion. The Commission stated that the desirability of maximizing the diffusion of control of the media of mass communications in Boston was highlighted by the incident wherein the Herald-Traveler prematurely published a preliminary draft of the report of the Massachusetts Crime Commission without also simultaneously publicizing the report over the broadcast station. It was brought out at the hearing that such a news broadcast would have impaired the story's "scoop" value for the Herald-Traveler.

The Commission further referred to the contention of WHDH that since it had never editorialized there existed a factor that minimized the charge of concentration of control. The Commission disagreed, stating that licensees have an obligation to devote reasonable broadcast time to controversial programs, and the failure to editorialize, if anything, demonstrated the wisdom of the Commission's policy for diversification of control of media of mass communications.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*; 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 15 R.R.2d 411; 17 F.C.C.2d 856 (1969).

<sup>21</sup> *Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC*, 444 F.2d 841, 847-48 (D.C.Cir. 1970).

On the factor of diversification, it concluded by awarding a substantial preference to both BBI and Charles River as against WHDH, and giving BBI a slight edge over Charles River (which also operates an FM radio station in Waltham, Massachusetts devoted to serious music).

*Integration of Ownership with Management:* The Commission affirmed the Examiner's conclusion that the applications of both Charles River and BBI reflect an integration—which in FCC parlance means integration of ownership with management—of substantially greater degree than WHDH, whose integration is small. It restated its view that the public interest is furthered through participation in operation by proprietors, as increasing the likelihood of greater sensitivity to an area's changing needs and programming to serve these needs. \* \* \*

*Proposed Program Service:* The Commission agreed that both BBI and Charles River proposed generally well-balanced program schedules, and concluded that neither proposal demonstrated such a substantial difference as to constitute a "superior devotion to public service." \* \* \*

The slight demerits assessed against BBI and Charles River on proposed program service, were deemed to offset each other.

*Other Factors:* The Commission assessed a demerit against WHDH because of a failure to obtain the approval of the Commission on the transfer of de facto control when Choate was selected as president following the death of his predecessor, and when his death was followed by the accession of Akerson. However, since there was no attempt at misrepresentation or concealment it was concluded that the circumstances did not reflect so adversely on character qualifications as to warrant the absolute disqualification of WHDH.

Cries of pain from the television industry followed the refusal to renew WHDH licenses. Broadcasters interpreted the action as unsettling patterns of stability and foreclosing reasonable predictions that licenses would be renewed. It was the first time that the Commission, "in applying comparative criteria in a renewal proceeding deposed the incumbent and awarded the frequency to a challenger."<sup>22</sup> Settled doctrine of earlier decisions had given the incumbent "a virtually insuperable advantage on the basis of his past broadcast record *per se*";<sup>23</sup> it seemed that the doctrine now was being abandoned. WHDH programming service had been only "within

<sup>22</sup> Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1208 (D.C.Cir. 1971).

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

the bounds of the average," the FCC found, and that performance entitled it to no preference in competition with the other applicants. Among the latter was at least one superior to WHDH on various criteria—especially integration of ownership and management, and diversification of control over mass media in Boston.

In a policy statement of 1970 the following year, the FCC tried to reassure the industry.<sup>24</sup> It said that, in a renewal proceeding where another applicant seeks the license of the incumbent, if the incumbent demonstrates substantial past performance without serious deficiencies, it shall have a controlling preference. And if the incumbent showed that, all other applicants would be dismissed without a hearing as to their own merits though they might, indeed, be heard for the purpose of calling attention to the incumbent's failings.

The Federal Appeals Court ruled that this policy violated the Communication Act of 1934.<sup>25</sup> The Act promises (Sec. 309(e)) a "full hearing" for contestants for a license and the FCC's 1970 policy statement short-changed challenging applicants in promising them only limited hearings.

Revising according to the court's finding, the Commission issued a new statement accepting the hearing requirement, and stressing that a "plus of major significance" should be awarded to a renewal applicant whose past record is outstanding.<sup>26</sup> It asked interested parties for their comments as to guidelines it was attempting to establish in assessing service substantial enough for the "plus of major significance."

The complexity of the challenges faced by renewal applicants in the licensing procedure emerges in many cases decided by the FCC. That of KMAP, Inc.,<sup>27</sup> of Bakersfield, Calif., in its application for renewal of a license for its station KWAC, illustrates the complexity. It illustrates also the application in the late 1960s and the 1970s of developing FCC and court doctrine.

When KMAP applied for renewal, it met with a petition to deny renewal by the Community Service Organization (CSO) and the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC). Mostly a Spanish-speaking station, KWAC had directed 97% of its programming to Mexican-Americans, numerous in the area, and the rest to Blacks. The CSO represented itself as a civic action and service

<sup>24</sup> Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).

<sup>25</sup> Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C.Cir.1971).

<sup>26</sup> Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 2 R.R. Current Service 53:442 (Aug. 20, 1971).

<sup>27</sup> KMAP, Inc., 40 R.R.2d 46 (1977).

organization providing many services to Spanish-speaking people of the area; the UFWOC said it was a national union aiming to improve working conditions and to establish collective bargaining standards for its thousands of members, including many minorities.

The CSO and UFWOC (“petitioners”) charged the station with eight practices that they said warranted denial of renewal: unsatisfactory ascertainment of community broadcasting needs, failure to perform as it promised, weak programming in the past, news suppression, discriminatory employment practices, broadcast of lottery information, logging violations, and payola.<sup>28</sup> A formidable range of allegations of misdeeds, it required the applicant to defend itself on many fronts, with data of varied kinds for the FCC to judge and weigh in coming to its decision—which was for a qualified, short-term renewal of KWAC’s license.

The challenge by such “parties at interest” who were not themselves seeking the frequency but rather were saying that the renewal applicant was not qualified to hold a license, is part of practice under doctrine stressed in the last decade. It had been recognized by the courts since the mid-1960s. In *Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC*,<sup>29</sup> the federal appeals court had granted standing to the United Church of Christ and to segments of the listening audience of WLBT, Jackson, Miss., to intervene in a station’s application for renewal. The church had objected to renewal on grounds that the station’s news and public affairs programming displayed racial and religious discrimination. The FCC twice found for WLBT, but the court found for the church and ordered the FCC to vacate its renewal of the license. The FCC’s hearings at which the church and other intervenors had appeared were ruled by the court to have been hopelessly biased against the intervenors; the FCC had exhibited, in the hearing and in its opinions and rulings, “a profound hostility to the participation of the Public Intervenors and their efforts.”<sup>30</sup> Henceforth, “parties in interest” was to be understood to include representatives of the station’s audience or any segment of the audience, as well as contestants for licenses.

The CSO and the UFWOC in the KMAP, Inc. case were activist groups which saw major importance in pressing for broadcast service of the kind they felt would most help the people they represented. Two of many such groups, they launched a challenge that typified similar attempts which burgeoned in the 1970s across the

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>29</sup> 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.Cir.1966).

<sup>30</sup> *Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC*, 425 F.2d 543, 550 (D.C.Cir.1969).

nation,<sup>31</sup> following the successful efforts of Office of Communications of United Church of Christ.

These petitioners, moreover, seized upon a factor emerging as a major theme in licensing in the late '60s and the '70s: the careful ascertainment by the licensees of the kinds of broadcast service needed by their communities.<sup>32</sup> A requirement strongly emphasized by the FCC, the ascertainment performed by KWAC was sharply attacked by the petitioners. The FCC found:<sup>33</sup>

#### Ascertainment

5. Petitioners assert that KWAC's ascertainment studies were insufficient because they were not representative of minority interests. They claim KWAC consulted only seven Mexican-Americans and one Black in its community leadership survey of 43 organizations, out of 289 possible civic groups. The leadership survey, petitioners claim, consisted of one meeting with 58 leaders which did not comply with the Commission's Ascertainment Primer, \* \* \* and that many of those leaders were KWAC sponsors. Petitioners also claim KWAC's telephone survey of people with Spanish surnames was its only ascertainment of the general public, which did not reach poor or migrant persons without telephones. Petitioners also state that the "areas of need" \* \* \* found by KWAC's ascertainment show a "patronizing, insensitive outsider's view" that Spanish-speaking citizens are inferior, and need to improve themselves to become more like the majority population. Additionally, petitioners commissioned the Department of Communication of Stanford University to conduct an "Ascertainment of Minority Community Leadership Opinion of the Broadcast Media in Bakersfield" which involved in-depth interviews with 45 selected leaders familiar with Bakersfield minority citizens. The "area of need" findings (unemployment, education, discrimination, housing, governmental attitudes) are said to be different from those found by KWAC. Petitioners say the study shows "the isolation, the insularity and poverty of information in which the minority community is kept by the media," \* \* \* Peti-

<sup>31</sup> For the history and growth of the citizen movement in broadcasting, see Joseph A. Grundfest, *Citizen Participation in Broadcast Licensing Before the FCC* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1976). A recapitulation of several local citizens'-group petitions against renewal of licenses to broadcast-newspaper combination owners is in *Editor & Publisher*, Jan. 29, 1977, p. 44.

<sup>32</sup> See FCC Ascertainment Primer, 27 F.C.C.2d 650; 21 R.R.2d 1507 (1971); and Ascertainment Primer for Renewal Applications, 54 F.C.C.2d 418; 35 R.R.2d 1555 (1975).

<sup>33</sup> KMAP, Inc., 40 R.R.2d 46, 51 (1977).

tioners also submitted the signed affidavits of 21 members of the Mexican-American community who state they were not consulted, and that if consulted, they would have objected to KWAC's programming as deficient and unresponsive to the needs of the Mexican-American community.

6. KWAC responds that it has complied with the Commission's Primer in conducting its ascertainment. It says that it employed six methods in ascertaining community needs: personal letters; interviews with community leaders; random telephone sampling; day-to-day contact with ethnic, business and organizational groups; and contacts with other Spanish language stations and contacts with government agencies. KWAC's amended ascertainment survey shows that the licensee interviewed 58 community leaders (15 were Spanish surnamed and three were Black Americans). Regarding petitioners' own ascertainment, KWAC points out the study was for all broadcast media with special emphasis on television rather than radio, and that only minority leaders were interviewed. KWAC says it based its ascertainment on interviews of a cross-section of the entire community, and not merely the minority, in compliance with the Commission's Primer. Nevertheless, it says that the general public portion of the survey, which included personal contacts with 71 members of the public and an additional 123 random telephone interviews, was heavily weighted for Mexican-American opinion. A letter from a social service worker is submitted to show that aid is allotted for phones and that 74% of his recipients have phones. Also, KWAC claims that its ascertained "areas of need" are in fact not greatly different from those in petitioners' study. With respect to petitioners' affidavits stating that 21 leading Mexican-Americans were not contacted, KWAC alleges that the affiants gave no addresses or affiliated organization, that the affidavits are all identically worded, and the integrity of some of the affiants is questionable.

7. After reviewing the pleadings and application, we find that KWAC's ascertainment study, as amended, is in compliance with our Primer, and that petitioners have failed to raise a substantial and material question of fact regarding its sufficiency. KWAC correctly asserts that its ascertainment must reflect the entire composition of the community, with an ultimate view to provide the licensee with programming ideas which will respond to the problems, needs and interests of the whole community and the listening area, not just a particular group of listeners.

8. As for petitioners' contention that the community leaders interviewed by KWAC were nonrepresentative of minorities:

"Weight will not be given to an allegation that a survey of a different set of community leaders more accurately represents the views of a particular segment of the population, unless it has been demonstrated that a significant segment has been ignored by the licensee." *Time-Life Broadcasting, Inc.*, 33 F.C.C.2d 1065, 1076 [23 R.R.2d 1129] (1972).

KWAC says it obtains its list of leaders from the Bakersfield Chamber of Commerce files. The method of selecting community leaders is a matter left to the discretion of the licensee. \* \* \* Therefore, absent specific factual evidence that a significant segment of the community has been ignored, the licensee's judgment will be accepted. A challenge must do more than merely state that a group of individuals has been omitted. *Time-Life Broadcasting, Inc.*, supra. Petitioners' 21 affidavits do not allege membership in any group or the omission of any group. They show only 21 individuals were not interviewed.

The petitioners also charged "news suppression" against KWAC. They said it gave directions to employees to broadcast nothing about UFWOC. The Commission found their evidence inconclusive, the allegations "stale" (some based on events occurring five years or more before the petition), and the licensee's pleadings tending to contradict the allegation. Nevertheless, it said:<sup>34</sup>

\* \* \* the licensee is admonished that the Commission may consider a programming policy of absolute exclusion of information concerning a particular group or subject \* \* \* as contrary to the public interest. \* \* \* In this respect, and in view of the uncertain record in this matter, the licensee will be required to submit a statement of KWAC's present and future programming policies as a condition to its grant of renewal of license.

Then the FCC took up the charge that KWAC had not observed the Commission's equal employment opportunity requirements—yet another licensing consideration that emerged in the 1960s:<sup>35</sup>

### Employment

25. Petitioners suggest that KWAC has failed to comply with the Commission's equal employment opportunity requirements as set forth in § 73.125 of the FCC rules,

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*



claiming Mexican-Americans employed by the station have been excluded from policymaking and official positions. We take official notice that the 1970 total labor force of the Bakersfield Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area was 27,716, of which 2,765 (10%) were Spanish speaking or Spanish surnamed. KWAC's 1971–1976 employment data from FCC Form 395 shows the following full-time employees:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Employees</u>	<u>Spanish Surnamed</u>	<u>Spanish-surnamed Officials</u>	<u>Spanish-surnamed Professionals</u>
1971	13	7 (54%)	1	4
1972	14	8 (57%)	2	5
1973	10	8 (80%)	1	4
1974	13	8 (62%)	1	5
1975	12	8 (67%)	1	5
1976	11	8 (73%)	1	5

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In addition, the station maintained a part-time staff of from four to seven employees, most of which were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Licensee states that "all key personnel involved in day-to-day programs, news and sales decisions (Marie "Elena" Anderson, Ramon V. Garza, and Michael Ramirez) are Spanish-surnamed Americans." We therefore find reasonable minority employment at KWAC when considered in conjunction with its employment efforts. See *Bilingual Coalition of Mass Media, Inc. v. F.C.C.* 466 F.2d 316 [24 R.R.2d 745] (D.C.Cir.1972).

KMAP, Inc., illustrated a further consideration in FCC licensing that came into increasing use by 1970: the "forfeiture," or fining of stations for improper practices. The only means of punishment of stations for violation of the Communication Act or FCC rules long had been non-renewal or revoking of licenses, but in the 1960s Congress provided for less draconian measures: forfeiture and short-term renewals.<sup>36</sup>

26. In reply to KWAC's opposition, petitioners additionally allege logging violations \* \* \* and broadcast of lottery information. KWAC admitted in all significant respects the broadcast of lotteries, failure to announce that dedications of programs or musical selections were paid for, failure to disclose that the station's announcers received consideration for the broadcast of dedications, and failure

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

to properly log dedications in violation of Section 317 of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended and 73.112(a)(2) and 73.119 of the Commission's rule.

27. We imposed and \* \* \* [KWAC] paid a \$2,000 forfeiture for violation of these rules. \* \* \* After imposition and satisfaction of the forfeiture, we consider further proceedings based on these rule violations to be unnecessary in this case. Sections 503 and 504 of the Communications Act provide for forfeiture as an alternative method of dealing with rule violations less drastic in nature than license revocation or denial of license renewal \* \* \*. [In] this case we find that the violations were not so serious in themselves \* \* \* as to warrant designation of the renewal application for hearing.

The final complaint against KWAC treated by the Commission was that the station's program director had engaged in "payola"—accepting gratuities from record manufacturers and distributors.<sup>37</sup>

\* \* \* The Commission conducted an investigation of these allegations, interviewing witnesses and KWAC staff. Transcripts of the interviews were turned over to the U. S. Department of Justice for possible prosecution of alleged violations of 47 USC 508. On April 24, 1975, the U. S. Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of California informed the Commission that it had declined prosecution of Ramon Garza. The reasons given were discrepancies in testimony, lack of corroborating evidence, suspect credibility of witnesses, and alternative plausible explanations for transactions involving Mr. Garza.

34. The Commission also finds the evidence insufficient to warrant hearing. Further, we find that this matter may be resolved by admonition and conditional renewal rather than license denial. Allegations of this nature reflect unfavorably on a licensee's ability to properly manage its responsibilities as a public custodian of the airwaves. The licensee of KWAC must be cognizant of its responsibilities to exercise special diligence to prevent improper use of its radio facilities when it has employees in a position to influence program content. Payola is a criminal violation involving the payor and payee. The allegations of payola were against an employee of the licensee, and not its owners, officers, or directors. We are concerned from the standpoint of our requirement that a licensee prevent payola violations by its employees.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 60–61.

Finally came the Commission's decision or conclusion, granting a short-term, conditional renewal of KWAC's license, from April 6, 1977—the date of the FCC decision—to December 1, 1977:<sup>38</sup>

### Conclusion

35. While petitioners have not provided adequate evidence for the Commission to make a prima facie case on any of the issues raised, we are concerned about the programming practices of this licensee which have resulted in a Commission investigation, a forfeiture, and a condition attached to this renewal. We admonish the licensee that it must exercise its responsibility to prevent the types of violations resulting in these sanctions. We shall grant KWAC's license term to December 1, 1977, at which time we shall carefully scrutinize KWAC's application to determine if the licensee is now operating in the public interest, convenience and necessity, and is qualified to continue doing so.

36. Accordingly, it is ordered, that the Petition to Deny, filed November 1, 1971, by the Community Service Organization and the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee is granted to the extent discussed herein, and in all other respects is denied.

37. It is further ordered, that the \* \* \* application for renewal of license for KWAC, Bakersfield, California, filed by KMAP, Inc., is granted subject to the following conditions:

“The licensee shall provide the Commission, within 30 days of the receipt of this notice of grant, with (1) a written response as to the procedures it intends to implement to prevent employee conflicts of interest and violations of the payola provisions of the Communications Act and Commission regulations, and (2) a written statement to make clear that the present and future policy of the licensee is to present all news, announcements and other programming required by the public interest, and that there is no exclusionary policy against the broadcast of any such subject.”

### Maximum Diffusion of Control of Broadcasting

Analyzing and testing as in the foregoing to gauge the “best practicable service to the public” in awarding licenses, the Commission decides only after it is satisfied as to a second major consideration as well: maximum diffusion of control of the media of mass

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

communications. This criterion flows not from conclusive empirical research that multiple station ownerships in a community will usually or always provide better broadcast fare than will fewer ownerships. It flows, rather, from faith in the tenet of the self-governing society that truth emerges from the clash of differing ideas and opinions. Borrowing heavily from judicial formulations developed over a half century, the Commission expresses the principle this way:<sup>39</sup>

Basic to our form of government is the belief that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." (*Associated Press v. United States*, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945).) Thus, our Constitution rests upon the ground that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Justice Holmes dissenting in *Abrams v. United States*, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17 (1919).

These principles, upon which Judge Learned Hand observed that we had staked our all, are the wellspring, together with a concomitant desire to prevent undue economic concentration, of the Commission's policy of diversifying control of the powerful medium of broadcasting. For, centralization of control over the media of mass communications is, like monopolization of economic power, per se undesirable. The power to control what the public hears and sees over the airways matters, whatever the degree of self-restraint which may withhold its arbitrary use.

It is accordingly firmly established that in licensing the use of the radio spectrum for broadcasting, we are to be guided by the sound public policy of placing into many, rather than a few hands, the control of this powerful medium of public communication \* \* \*.

Application of the principles set forth above dictates that one person should not be licensed to operate more than one broadcast station in the same place, and serving substantially the same public, unless some other relevant public interest consideration is found to outweigh the importance of diversifying control. It is elementary that the number of frequencies available for licensing is limited. In any particular area there may be many voices that would like to be heard, but not all can be licensed. A proper objective is the maximum diversity of ownership that technology permits in each area.

<sup>39</sup> Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and TV Broadcast Stations, 18 R.R.2d 1735, 1740-41; 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970).

Such principles and policies have led to rules governing patterns of ownership of stations. The long-standing “duopoly rule” first prohibited one party from owning, operating or controlling more than one station in the same “broadcast service” (AM radio, FM radio, or television) in the same area. The “one-to-a-market” restriction was extended by rules of 1970 to prevent common ownership of a VHF television station and a radio station (AM or FM) in the same market. For single ownership or control of both a UHF station and a radio station, the FCC said it would review each application on a case-by-case basis. It did not bar the formation of new AM–FM combinations.<sup>40</sup>

Meanwhile, the Commission evolved rules for maximum number of stations that might be owned or controlled, nationwide, by a single person or entity. The “concentration of control” rule permits common ownership of no more than seven AM stations, seven FM stations, and seven television stations not more than five of which may be VHF.<sup>41</sup>

With diversity not concentration of control of the broadcasting media standing as a first principle of the Commission, it was also troubled for years about concentration of control over mass media more generally. The implications of common ownership of a broadcast station and a newspaper in the same location were raised in 1970 by the Commission.<sup>42</sup> It began the formal process of considering rules about the matter. There were 94 ownership combinations of television and newspapers in the nation at the time, and many more radio-newspaper combinations.

By 1975, pros and cons of the matter had been canvassed and hearings and oral arguments had been held by the Commission. It issued a report and order.<sup>43</sup> It said that no future applicant would be permitted to own both a daily newspaper and a broadcast station in the same community. But it “grandfathered” all existing cross-ownerships except for 16 in small cities. The 16, it said, must within five years divest themselves of their broadcast holdings. Seven were television-newspaper combinations and nine were radio-newspaper.

The FCC said that in the early days of radio and television, it looked upon ownership of stations by newspapers favorably, for newspapers had then brought a pioneering spirit to broadcasting. But now, “the broadcast medium has matured \* \* \*. [T]he

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*; On reconsideration, 28 F.C.C.2d 662, 21 R.R.2d 1551 (1971).

<sup>41</sup> Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 18 Fed.Reg. 7796, 9 R.R. 1563 (1953).

<sup>42</sup> Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 22 F.C.C.2d 349 (1970).

<sup>43</sup> FCC, Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules (Newspapers), Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 32 R.R.2d 954, 40 Fed.Reg. 6449 (1975); On reconsideration 53 F.C.C.2d 589, 33 R.R.2d 1603 (1975).

special reason for encouraging newspaper ownership, even at the cost of a lessened diversity, is no longer generally operative in the way it once was \* \* \*." Diversity would not, under changed conditions of the present, be enhanced by cross-ownership, and "We think that any new licensing should be expected to add to local diversity. Accordingly, the rules will bar combinations that would not do so." The rules would apply to radio as well as television.

The Commission worked deliberately at the touchy matter of requiring divestiture of present combinations, noting that it had been urged to do so wherever "the two entities are co-located."<sup>44</sup>

We remain no less convinced than before of the importance of diversity, but this is not the only point to consider. Our examination of the situation leads us to conclude that we may have given too little weight [in previous analyses and statements of intent] to the consequences which could be expected to attend a focus on the abstract goal alone. There are a number of public interest consequences which form the basis of our concern. Requiring divestiture could reduce local ownership as well as the involvement of owners in management as many sales would have to be to outside interests. The continuity of operation would be broken as the new owner would lack the long knowledge of the community \* \* \*. Local economic dislocations are also possible as a result of the vast demand for equity capital \* \* \*.

In our view, stability and continuity of ownership do serve important public purposes. Traditions of service were established and have been continued. Entrance and exit from broadcast ownership by these parties are determined by factors other than just profit maximization. Many began operation long before there was hope of profit \* \* \*. There is a long record of service to the public \* \* \*. We have concluded that a mere hoped for gain in diversity is not enough [to warrant disturbing such ownerships] \* \* \*.

The Commission said that as a result of the disruption and losses which could be expected to attend divestiture, and the loss of service to the public that would follow, divestiture would be required only in the "most egregious cases." At the heart of the matter was obtaining for communities the mass communication service that would bring "a real diversity on vital issues of local concern. In fact, it is local issues on which so much decision making by the electorate is required." The "egregious cases" in which diversity on local issues seemed most threatened were those where a single ownership controlled the only local television station and the only

<sup>44</sup> Second Report and Order, paragraphs 108 and 109.

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local daily newspaper (regardless of number of local radio stations); or, if no television station existed, where a single ownership held the only local radio station and the newspaper. Finding 16 such combinations, it ordered them to divest themselves of either station or newspaper by Jan. 1, 1980.<sup>45</sup> That left scores of television-newspaper combinations unaffected, "grandfathered" by the FCC to protect them from the new rule.

At once, attacks were launched at this new level of divestiture, some declaring it unwarranted to break up newspaper-broadcast combinations, others incensed at divestiture rules that would break up fewer than a score of combinations out of a total estimated at 150 to 475.<sup>46</sup> Among the latter was a media "reform" group called the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting.<sup>47</sup> Among the former were the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the National Association of Broadcasters, and various "combination" owners. Both sides brought a challenge to the federal court, and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC indeed had power to ban cross-ownership, but that the divestiture order was far too narrow.<sup>48</sup> Unless the evidence "clearly discloses that cross-ownership is in the public interest," combinations would have to be broken up.

The appeals court with Chief Judge David Bazelon writing, found that the Commission's order banning cross-ownership was not arbitrary, did not exceed its authority, and did not violate the First Amendment. But it found that the Commission's decision not to order wide-scale divestiture, despite its oft-expressed dedication to diversity of ownership, was unexplained. It quoted heavily from the Commission's 1975 report and order which exalted the principle of diversity. The Commission had said:<sup>49</sup>

The premise is that a democratic society cannot function without the clash of divergent views. It is clear to us that the idea of diversity of viewpoints from antagonistic sources is at the heart of the Commission's licensing responsibility. If our democratic society is to function, nothing can be more important than insuring that there is a free flow of information from as many divergent sources as possible. This \* \* \* is a recognition that it is unrealistic to expect true diversity from a commonly owned station-

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraphs 115-117.

<sup>46</sup> Editor & Publisher, Feb. 1, 1975, p. 26; March 5, 1977, p. 8.

<sup>47</sup> Headed by former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, famed for his vigorous minority views favoring sterner regulation of broadcasting.

<sup>48</sup> *National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC*, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 39 R.R.2d 1463; certiorari granted *FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting*, — U.S. —, 98 S.Ct. 52 (1977).

<sup>49</sup> FCC, Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules (Newspapers), 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 32 R.R.2d 954 at paragraph 111.

newspaper combination. The divergency of their viewpoints cannot be expected to be the same as if they were antagonistically run.

Yet, the court said, despite such an affirmation the Commission had not called for general divestiture, subject to appropriate exceptions. It had said that divestiture "is a harsh remedy, one to be reserved [sic] only where the need is overwhelming and the evidence unambiguous." The appeals court said:<sup>50</sup>

\* \* \* at the least, consistency would call for ordering divestiture absent a showing of greater public interest harm [in divestiture].

The Commission did not do this, however. Although purporting to reaffirm the primacy of diversity, \* \* \* the *Order* ultimately did not adopt the presumption that cross-ownership does not serve the public interest, divestiture only being ordered where the "need is overwhelming and the evidence unambiguous." \* \* \*. The Commission never explained that \* \* \*. It simply cited the existence of competing policies it claimed not to have previously considered.

One by one, the court took up these "competing policies" and rejected them as worthy of outweighing divestiture. The first was preservation of local ownership and involvement of ownership in management, the FCC fearing that divestiture would mean selling many stations to outside interests. Bazelon wrote that local ownership by itself offers no promise that station policy will be attuned to local needs; and even when local ownership and owner management are both present, "they are not of primary importance to the Commission." And the court also felt that, if sale were required, "there is no reason to suppose that local entrepreneurs will not find television an attractive investment."<sup>51</sup>

The next "competing policy" rejected by the court was that divestiture might disturb continuity of operation as the new owner would lack long knowledge of the community. The court felt that a "one-time alteration in the ownership structure of the broadcast industry should not affect the public's interest in quality programming because the new owners will become the beneficiaries of any \* \* \* policy of continuity."<sup>52</sup>

Finally, the Commission had been concerned about wide-scale divestiture's bringing local economic dislocations. But the court could see no substantial private losses; most cross-owned stations

<sup>50</sup> National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 338, 963 (D.C.Cir. 1977); 39 R.R.2d 1463 (1977).

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 964.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*



are held "by their original owners who by now have long recouped their original investment," it said.<sup>53</sup>

Thus analyzed by the court, the Commission's "competing policies" that led it to reject wide-scale divestiture were "unreasonable." The court said:<sup>54</sup>

In sum, the Commission could not have rationally concluded that the competing policies it offered justified grandfathering absent a show of harm. And, since the record does not disclose the extent to which divestiture would actually threaten these values, the Commission could not have rationally concluded \* \* \* that their potential impairment overcame the presumption against cross-ownership. The gains in diversity from divestiture may be speculative, but since divestiture is the most promising method for increasing diversity that does not entail governmental supervision of speech, the Commission could not rationally conclude that lesser policies, lacking support in the record, require maintenance of the status quo.

The court added that the Commission "has sought to limit divestiture to cases where the evidence discloses that cross-ownership clearly harms the public interest." But, it said, "we believe precisely the opposite presumption is compelled, and that divestiture is required except in those cases where the evidence clearly discloses that cross-ownership is in the public interest."<sup>55</sup> It told the Commission to make new rules consistent with its opinion. The Commission appealed to the Supreme Court, where the matter stood for resolution as this book went to press.

## SEC. 78. THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY REQUIREMENT

**If a broadcaster furnishes air time to one candidate for public office, he must offer equal opportunity to opposing candidates.**

The Communications Act of 1934 under which the FCC holds its powers to regulate broadcasting carries a specific provision that shows Congress' concern over possible damage to the political process that unregulated broadcasting could cause. This is Section 315 of the Act, known to every radio and television newsman as the "equal time" or "equal opportunities" provision. It says, broadly, that if a station provides time for one political candidate, it must do so for his opponents. From the start of regulation in 1927, this principle has been part of the law, written to prevent the develop-

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 965.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 966.

ment of unequal treatment among candidates by partisan broadcasters. Its first part reads:<sup>56</sup>

If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: *provided*, that such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.

This said to a broadcaster: Refuse time to all qualified candidates for a political position, or accept all. While refusing access was thus legal, it hardly squared with the great potentialities of the medium for contributing to public information about candidates. Both politicians and citizens had legitimate questions to put to broadcasters who did not make air time available during campaign periods. Yet for the broadcaster, it could cause real problems, especially in contests where a great many candidates were running. Who could furnish "equal opportunities"—either on a free basis or on a "paid time" basis—to every candidate if 15 were running for mayor? Many broadcasters found the requirement a perilous one, and some were willing to accept the opprobrium that might go with refusing all candidates.

Within the terms of Section 315, the FCC had power to make rules as to what could constitute "equal opportunities." Through rules, letters, hearings, opinions and decisions of the FCC on various practices, as well as through stations' appeals to the courts, the details of "equal opportunities" were gradually described.<sup>57</sup>

The term "equal time" does not cover the entire consideration that must be given a candidate whose opponent has preceded him. The candidate must receive not only as much time, but also just as desirable a time of day or week as his opponent; a half hour on Sunday morning at 9 o'clock is not an "equal opportunity" for a candidate if his opponent has had prime evening time.<sup>58</sup> This does not mean, however, that all candidates must be given exactly the same opportunity, such as appearance on a regularly scheduled discussion program.

Equal opportunities do not extend to campaign managers or other spokesmen for candidates; Section 315 refers only to the candidates

<sup>56</sup> 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 315, 1934.

<sup>57</sup> Roscoe L. Barrow, *The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy*, 37 *Cincinnati L.Rev.* 447, 452-459 (1969).

<sup>58</sup> 31 *Fed.Reg.* 6660, 6661, 6669 (1966).

themselves. In *Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations*,<sup>59</sup> the court ruled that political parties, as such, did not have claim to “equal opportunities”; the law extends the claim only to candidates. This case also held that the “no-censorship” provision of Section 315 applies only to the candidates themselves, and not to their spokesmen.

“Equal opportunities” rules take hold after a legally qualified candidate has announced for office. Just who is the “legally qualified candidate” emerges in technical definition by the FCC and by the candidate’s own electoral jurisdiction. Condensing the detailed and qualified definition to workable prose is important if perilous: The candidate may be said, for working purposes, to be one who has announced that he is running for nomination or election; who is qualified under his local laws so that people may vote for him; who can get his name on the ballot or else has promised to run as a write-in candidate; and who makes a convincing case that he is a real candidate.<sup>60</sup>

In nominating or primary elections, equal opportunities must be afforded the candidates for an office within a single party. But the fact that all Democrats running for nomination as sheriff are given equal opportunities does not mean that equal time must be made available to all Republicans seeking nomination for the same post.<sup>61</sup>

Section 315 talks of equal opportunities for candidates in the “use” of broadcasting stations. The word “use” has caused many problems of interpretation. It has been held by the FCC that “use” includes air time employed by a candidate who did not speak directly to his candidacy; a station was not to evaluate whether the original user was furthering his campaign in his talk.<sup>62</sup> Also, the FCC held that a candidate who went on the air to broadcast in a capacity other than as a candidate, gave the basis for his opponent to claim equal opportunity. A Congressman’s weekly broadcast to his constituents, made after he became a candidate for re-election, might have no content dealing with his campaign, but it would furnish the ground for his opponent to claim equal time.<sup>63</sup>

In 1959, Congress amended § 315 of the Communications Act to provide that four kinds of broadcast news programs were exempt from the equal opportunities rule: bona fide newscasts, bona fide

<sup>59</sup> 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), certiorari denied 341 U.S. 909, 71 S.Ct. 622 (1951).

<sup>60</sup> For exact wording, see William K. Jones, *Electronic Mass Media 1977 Supplement* (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1977), p. 35. Hereinafter referred to as Jones, 1977 Supplement.

<sup>61</sup> KWFT, Inc., 4 R.R. 885 (1948).

<sup>62</sup> WMCA, Inc., 7 R.R. 1132 (1952).

<sup>63</sup> KNGS, 7 R.R. 1130 (1952).

news interviews, bona fide news documentaries, and spot coverage of bona fide news events.<sup>64</sup> The FCC ruled that none of these (the last was the most pertinent) exempted news conferences of presidential candidates from the equal opportunities rule.<sup>65</sup> And it ruled also that the bona fide news event exemption did not apply to broadcasts of debates between candidates in two gubernatorial campaigns, effectively excluding all campaign debates from the exemption.<sup>66</sup> The only debates between candidates for political office that escaped the equal opportunities rule were those for which Congress itself made an exception—those of the 1960 presidential campaign, which featured the so-called “Great Debates” between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon. Congress made no further exceptions in following years, and the FCC would not change its rule. Campaign year after campaign year echoed with denunciations of these FCC positions by broadcasters and concerned citizens. Networks worked on edge for fear that the equal opportunities rule would be triggered. CBS pointed out that Pres. Gerald Ford became a formally declared candidate for the presidency 15 months before the election; and had other Republicans qualified as “candidates” for the presidency at any time during this period, Ford’s press conferences would have constituted a trigger.

Until 1975, the FCC stood firm on both points. In *Aspen*,<sup>67</sup> it reversed the long-standing position. It ruled that presidential press conferences and press conferences of other candidates for political office, broadcast “live and in their entirety,” could be exempt under the “bona fide news events” provision. Broadcasters must make a good-faith judgment that the conferences were newsworthy; there must be no evidence of broadcaster favoritism.

Closing out its long-standing refusal to recognize campaign debates as exempt, it held further that the new rule would embrace “Debates between candidates for public office, not encompassing all candidates for the office, where such debates were arranged by organizations other than the broadcaster and were considered news-

<sup>64</sup> 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(a)(1)–(4). The amendments were a response to the alarm of broadcasters that was voiced after the FCC ruled in the famous *Lar Daly* case. Daly, running in a Chicago primary election for mayor on both the Republican and Democratic tickets in his typically quixotic form, declared he deserved equal time on regularly scheduled newscasts, following appearances of other candidates on these newscasts. The FCC ruled for him. *Columbia Broadcasting System*, 18 R.R. 238 (1959).

<sup>65</sup> *Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.*, 40 F.C.C. 395, 3 R.R.2d 623, 627 (1964).

<sup>66</sup> *The Goodwill Station, Inc.*, 40 F.C.C. 362, 24 R.R. 413 (1962); *National Broadcasting Co.*, 40 F.C.C. 370, 24 R.R. 401 (1962).

<sup>67</sup> *Aspen Institute Program on Communications and Society Petition*, 35 R.R.2d 49 (1975).

worthy by the broadcaster.”<sup>68</sup> Re-examination of its position, upon petition of the Aspen Institute and CBS, it said, led it to realize that its non-exemption rules for press conferences and debates rested on its own faulty reading of the legislative history surrounding Congress’s 1959 amendments. The Commission’s reversal was challenged in the courts by the Democratic National Committee, the National Organization for Women, and Rep. Shirley Chisholm. The U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, upheld the Commission.<sup>69</sup> And under the ruling, the 1976 televised debates between Pres. Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter were held—and arranged, as the ruling required, not by the broadcasters but by an outside agency—in this case, the League of Women Voters of the United States. The broadcasters were constrained, according to the FCC position in Aspen, to being observer and reporter of others’ event.

#### SEC. 79. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

**Broadcasters are charged by the Federal Communications Commission with the affirmative duty to seek out and broadcast contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance.**

Recognition of the public interest in wide ventilation of important public issues by broadcasting does not stop with the law requiring equal opportunities for political candidates. The principle has been recognized by FCC decisions and documents for decades in respect to the general airing of viewpoints on significant public issues. Under its “fairness doctrine” the Commission takes the position that “public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views \* \* \*” and it considers “strict adherence to the fairness doctrine as the single most important requirement of operation in the public interest—the ‘sine qua non’ for grant of a renewal of license.”<sup>70</sup>

The doctrine applies in any case in which broadcast facilities are used for discussion of a controversial issue of public importance; when one position has been broadcast, there must be an opportunity for opposing views to be heard. Furthermore, the doctrine holds, the licensee must devote a reasonable percentage of its broadcast time to the airing of controversial issues of public importance, although as we shall see below, there has been little enforcement of this provision by the FCC.

<sup>68</sup> William K. Jones, *Electronic Mass Media* (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1976), p. 195. And see Michael J. Petrick, “Equal Opportunities” and “Fairness” in Broadcast Coverage of Politics, *Annals, AAPSS*, 472, Sept., 1976, pp. 73–83.

<sup>69</sup> *Chisholm v. FCC*, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C.Cir.1976).

<sup>70</sup> *Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.*, 3 F.R.C. 32 (1929); *Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues*, 25 F.C.C.2d 283, 292 (1970).

Starting with the obligation to be fair in presenting opposing views on issues, then, the position was laid out broadly in the FCC report of 1949, *Editorializing by Broadcast Licensee*.<sup>71</sup> The station's part and the FCC's part in applying the doctrine are described thus:<sup>72</sup>

[T]he licensee, in applying the fairness doctrine, is called upon to make reasonable judgments in good faith on the facts of each situation—as to whether a controversial issue of public importance is involved, as to what viewpoints have been or should be presented, as to the format and spokesmen to present the viewpoints, and all the other facets of such programming \* \* \* .

In passing on any complaint in this area, the Commission's role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the licensee as to any of the above programming decisions, but rather to determine whether the licensee can be said to have acted reasonably and in good faith. There is thus room for considerably more discretion on the part of the licensee under the fairness doctrine than under the "equal opportunities" requirement.

The doctrine applies broadly to news, comment, and entertainment.<sup>73</sup> The Commission has not stated specific rules for its interpretation. Broadcasters receive guidance through such means as compilations of important FCC rulings of the past, occasional statements elaborating its stance and the scope of the doctrine,<sup>74</sup> and court decisions.

Repeatedly, the Commission has returned to its 1949 Report *Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees*, for explaining what is called for in the fairness doctrine. In the case of John J. Dempsey,<sup>75</sup> it held that the broadcaster's obligations in the public interest are not met simply by a general policy of not refusing to broadcast opposing views where a demand is made upon it for air time. More positive attention to the public interest in hearing various positions is needed from broadcasters; the FCC 1949 Report said that<sup>76</sup>

<sup>71</sup> 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).

<sup>72</sup> *Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance*, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599, 29 Fed.Reg. 10415, 10416 (1964). This is the so-called "Fairness Primer."

<sup>73</sup> Steven J. Simmons, *The Problem of "Issue" in the Administration of the Fairness Doctrine*, 65 Calif.L.Rev. 546, 554 (May, 1977).

<sup>74</sup> An extended re-examination of the Fairness Doctrine by the FCC resulted in its most recent comprehensive statement, *Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, Fairness Report Regarding Handling of Public Issues*, 39 Fed.Reg. 26372, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 30 R.R.2d 1261 (1974). The short title, "Fairness Report," is used hereinafter.

<sup>75</sup> 6 R.R. 615 (1950).

<sup>76</sup> 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1251 (1949).

\* \* \* broadcast licensees have an affirmative duty generally to encourage and implement the broadcast of all sides of controversial public issues over their facilities, over and beyond their obligation to make available on demand opportunities for the expression of opposing views. It is clear that any approximation of fairness in the presentation of any controversy will be difficult if not impossible of achievement unless the licensee plays a conscious and positive role in bringing about balanced presentation of the opposing viewpoints.

This is sometimes referred to as the “seek out” rule, in that the broadcaster is told it is his duty to take the initiative in encouraging those with varying viewpoints on an issue to broadcast. The “seek out” process is not finished if no opponent of an aired view shows up in response to an over-the-air invitation to do so; the licensee as a community expert on controversy should notify persons with contrasting viewpoints of their opportunity to be heard.

No aspect of broadcast regulation has come under heavier fire from broadcasters, perhaps, than the fairness doctrine. Government’s compelling “fairness”, with failure to be fair a possible ground for losing a license, flies in the face of the First Amendment, the argument runs, and demonstrates that freedom of expression is a weak freedom as applied to broadcasting.<sup>77</sup> For the print media, of course “freedom to be unfair” is broadly protected under the First Amendment. The controversy has mounted with the huge increase in complaints of fairness violations, largely following the 1966 court recognition of the public’s standing to intervene in licensing and re-licensing.<sup>78</sup>

Determining what is a “controversial issue of public importance” is a matter of judgment, not defined by the Commission. It is considerably up to the broadcaster. As stated above, he is to “make reasonable judgments in good faith on the facts of each situation—as to whether a controversial issue of public importance is involved, as to what viewpoints have been or should be presented, as to the format and spokesmen to present the viewpoints \* \* \*.”<sup>79</sup> Opposing positions do not need to be made on the same show or in the

<sup>77</sup> *Radio Television News Directors Ass’n v. U. S.*, 400 F.2d 1002, 1010, 1012 (7 Cir. 1969), reversed *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794 (1969). For a major journalist’s detailed account of major cases involving the fairness doctrine, see Fred W. Friendly, *The Good Guys, the Bad Guys and the First Amendment* (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1977).

<sup>78</sup> *Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC*, 359 F.2d 944 (D.C.Cir.1966). The number rose to 2,400 for the year 1973: *Fairness Report*, 30 R.R.2d 1261 (1974).

<sup>79</sup> *Supra*, text at footnote 72.

same programming format as that which gave rise to the claim of fairness violation.<sup>80</sup>

Difficult determinations are involved in many cases reaching the FCC, starting often with the question: What issue is raised by the program complained of?<sup>81</sup> In *Green v. FCC*<sup>82</sup> the appeals court found uncertainty as to what issues could invoke the fairness doctrine. It considered five possible issues that seemed to be involved in spot announcements that appealed for enlistment in the armed forces. Discarding two, it found that the other three could be equated: the “desirability” of military service, the draft, and the Vietnam War. It found that the undesirable features of the Vietnam War had been aired for years, and that prior coverage by the stations involved was sufficient to negate any fairness doctrine violation.

The famous “Pensions” case<sup>83</sup> illustrated the elusive nature of pinning down just what the issues are. NBC presented a one-hour documentary titled “Pensions; the Broken Promise.” Edwin Newman narrated it. It told of private pension plans that, for a variety of reasons, failed to provide retired workers with the pensions they had expected. Newman spoke of empty hopes, shattered dreams, and false promises that—experience showed—would visit many persons as they entered retirement. Case histories of workers to whom such had happened were prominent in the documentary. Before closing, Newman said “\* \* \* we don’t want to give the impression that there are no good private pension plans. There are many good ones, and there are many people for whom the promise has become reality.” But, he finished:<sup>84</sup> “Our own conclusion about all this, is that it is almost inconceivable that this enormous thing has been allowed to grow up with so little understanding of it and with so little protection and such uneven results for those involved. The situation, as we’ve seen it, is deplorable.”

Accuracy in Media brought a complaint of violating the fairness doctrine to the FCC. It charged that NBC’s program was a one-sided presentation of the controversial issue of the performance and regulation of private pension plans. The network’s response was that no controversial issue of public importance inhered in the program: NBC had sought to inform viewers of some of the problems that exist in some private pension plans and which “de-

<sup>80</sup> *Accuracy in Media, Inc.*, 39 F.C.C.2d 416, 421 (1973), 521 F.2d 288 (D.C.Cir. 1975); *Diocesan Union of Holy Name Societies*, 41 F.C.C.2d 297, 298–99 (D.C. Cir.1973).

<sup>81</sup> *Simmons*, op. cit.

<sup>82</sup> 447 F.2d 323 (D.C.Cir.1971).

<sup>83</sup> *Accuracy in Media, Inc.*, 40 F.C.C.2d 958 (1973). When NBC appealed the decision of the FCC to federal court, the name of the case became *National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C.Cir.1973).

<sup>84</sup> *Accuracy in Media, Inc.*, 40 F.C.C.2d 958, 963 (1973).



serve a closer look.” It said there was no question—no controversy—over the fact that some private pension plans present problems.<sup>85</sup>

The FCC ruled for Accuracy in Media. “Pensions,” it said, had indeed gone to the general performance and proposed regulation of private pension plans; this was a controversial issue of public importance; and the program had been overwhelmingly anti-pensions despite a few comments on successful plans.<sup>86</sup>

NBC took the case to the court of appeals. The court reversed the FCC, again with the matter of “controversial issue” prominent. It said that the case histories of hardships did not constitute a controversial issue because there was no questioning that such existed; that criticisms of private plans on the program were balanced by general comments that were pro-private pension plans; and that while specific proposals for remedial legislation were controversial, these were not raised in the documentary in detail, and the more general point of a need for legislation was not controversial.<sup>87</sup>

The Commission has said that “a fairness response is not required as a result of offhand or insubstantial statements.”<sup>88</sup> Within this context, it ruled in *National Broadcasting Co.*<sup>89</sup> that dangers caused by private pilots over congested airports, brought up during a segment on congestion by the Huntley-Brinkley news show, did not require a fairness response. It said that the “thrust of the program” was congestion at large airports. And, it added, “If every statement, or inference from statements or presentations, could be made the subject of a separate and distinct fairness requirement, the doctrine would be unworkable.”<sup>90</sup> The matter of private pilots was a subissue within the larger concern and danger in airport congestion in general.

Yet relying on *NBC* as it has in subsequent cases, the FCC has not produced consistent results on what is a “subissue” that requires a fairness response. Nor has it produced a clear-cut line between subissues and “passing references,” the latter more “offhand” or “insubstantial” than the former.

Not only politics and government are included in the realm of public controversial issues. As early as 1962, the FCC rejected several stations’ contention that a program conducted by a nutritionist on health and diet did not belong in the realm of controversial

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, at 959–60.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, at 967.

<sup>87</sup> *National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C.Cir. 1973). For a penetrating critique of the divided court’s decision, see Simmons, pp. 573–576.

<sup>88</sup> Fairness Report, 39 Fed.Reg. at 26376.

<sup>89</sup> 19 R.R.2d 137 (1970), on reconsideration 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970).

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 736.

issues of public importance. The fairness doctrine, it said, applied in the broadcasting of such subjects.<sup>91</sup> More recently, it has said that entertainment programs can include issues subject to the fairness doctrine, although it “has always found licensees to have been reasonable in concluding that fairness doctrine issues were not raised by entertainment programming.”<sup>92</sup> The Commission says, for example, that there is a difference between a fictional program’s *depicting* an issue and the program’s *discussing* an issue. Thus National Organization for Women, in challenging a television license renewal, said that the licensee was given to showing stereotyped women—sex objects, dependent creatures—without balancing that view with others. The FCC found no discussion of the matter, only depiction, and ruled against NOW.<sup>93</sup>

A further question is whether the issue is controversial and a matter of public importance. In its Fairness Report of 1964, the Commission says it relies heavily on the “reasonable, good faith judgments of our licensees” in determining these matters. It also, however, identifies three factors that are involved in the determination of whether a matter is of “public importance,” and is “controversial”: the amount of media attention; the degree of attention given the issue by leaders, including government officials; and the principal test—a “subjective evaluation [by the broadcaster] of the impact that the issue is likely to have on the community at large.”<sup>94</sup>

Bob Grant tried to reach Congressman Rosenthal, leader of a nationwide meat boycott, to get him to express his views on Grant’s radio call-in show at 10:45 a. m. Rosenthal refused, and Grant expressed his disappointment but spoke of his agreement with Rosenthal on the boycott. At 12:45 p. m., Grant was discussing mothballed ships with a caller who had kind words for Grant. “Well,” replied Grant, “when I hear about guys like Ben Rosenthal, I have to say I wish there were a thousand Bob Grants ’cause then you wouldn’t have \* \* \* a coward like him in the United States Congress.”<sup>95</sup>

Rosenthal complained. The FCC, under the part of the fairness doctrine called the Personal Attack Rule (below), said the station had failed to comply with procedures specified in the rule. Despite the two-hour lapse of time, it held, Grant’s comment was “part of a continuing discussion of the nationwide meat boycott and the Congressman’s role therein, and therefore was within the context of a controversial issue of public importance.”<sup>96</sup> But the court of ap-

<sup>91</sup> “Living Should Be Fun” Inquiry, 33 F.C.C. 101, 23 R.R. 1599 (1962).

<sup>92</sup> Simmons, p. 557.

<sup>93</sup> American Broadcasting Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 385 (1975).

<sup>94</sup> Fairness Report, 30 R.R.2d 1262, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 11–12 (1974).

<sup>95</sup> Straus Communications, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 385 (1975).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, at 388.

peals reversed the Commission, partly on the ground of whether the issue was a controversial one of public importance.

The station, the court said, had made a substantial argument that the "coward" remark was not made "during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance." It added:<sup>97</sup>

The 12:45 reference to Rosenthal was indeed fleeting, appearing abruptly in the midst of a discussion of ships to which Rosenthal had no ostensible relationship. The meat boycott \* \* \* had not been mentioned for a full two hours, and even at 10:45 there were only limited remarks tying Rosenthal to the boycott. Finally, in an important sense the "coward" remark did not relate to the boycott at all. Grant had made it clear that he agreed with the congressman on that issue, and his unfortunate comment related primarily to his private pique over Rosenthal's refusal to appear on his show.

The station's argument was a strong one: the Commission's own claim is that it relies heavily on the "reasonable, good faith judgments of our licensees."

Besides exercising judgment and "good sense" in deciding what constitutes a public controversial issue, the licensee must gauge what is "reasonable opportunity" for an opposing viewpoint to be heard. A candidate for Attorney General of North Dakota complained to the FCC that he deserved more air time on a group of stations that carried a controversy about a state hospital and a state training school. The stations had carried three programs: A half-hour documentary on the hospital, the last five minutes of which had been given to two state officials to discuss the candidate's earlier charges about the hospital; a half-hour program about a week later, and at about the same time of day, in which the complainant aired his allegations about the hospital and school; and a half-hour documentary the following day on the state training school, with five minutes again devoted to the two officials' discussion of the complainant's charges.

Although the complainant asked for "equal time," the FCC said that that did not apply; no opposing candidate for Attorney General was involved. Rather, it was a case which would have to be settled under the fairness doctrine. The FCC ruled that the Attorney General had had a "reasonable opportunity."<sup>98</sup>

Unlike the "equal opportunities" requirement of Section 315, the fairness doctrine requires that where a licensee affords time over his facilities for an expression of one

<sup>97</sup> *Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C.Cir. 1976).

<sup>98</sup> Hon. Charles L. Murphy, 23 R.R. 953 (1962). See also *Public Media Center v. 13 California Radio Stations*, 37 R.R.2d 263, 283 (1976).

opinion on a controversial issue of public importance, he is under obligation to insure that proponents of opposing viewpoints are afforded a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of such views.

Also unlike the equal opportunities rule, under the fairness doctrine the FCC gives the broadcaster discretion to choose a spokesperson for the contrasting views, and discretion to designate the techniques or formats of the program for contrasting views. There is "no single group or person entitled as a matter of right to present a viewpoint differing from that previously expressed on the station."<sup>99</sup> More recently, however, the Commission has ruled that:<sup>1</sup>

Where a spokesman for, or supporter of candidate A, buys time and broadcasts a discussion of the candidates or the campaign issues, there has clearly been the presentation of one side of a controversial issue of public importance. It is equally clear that spokesmen or supporters of opposing candidate B are not only appropriate, but the logical spokesmen for presenting contrasting views. Therefore, barring unusual circumstances, it would not be reasonable for a licensee to refuse to sell time to spokesmen for or supporters of candidate B comparable to that previously bought on behalf of candidate A.

Another difference between the equal opportunities rule regarding political candidates and the fairness doctrine applying to controversial issues: Under the former, the broadcaster who has charged the first candidate for air time, does not have to grant equal opportunity to an opponent who is not willing or able to pay. But under the fairness doctrine, the broadcaster who has aired one view on a controversial issue supported by a sponsor, may not ordinarily refuse to air another view on the issue on grounds that a sponsor for the second view cannot be found. The FCC held in *Cullman* that "the public's paramount right to hear opposing views on controversial issues \* \* \* cannot be nullified by \* \* \* the inability of the licensee to obtain paid sponsorship of the broadcast time."<sup>2</sup> Yet again, there are exceptions, at least in the "direct political arena." The *Zapple* decision said:<sup>3</sup>

When spokesmen or supporters of candidate A have purchased time, it is our view that it would be inappropriate to require licensees to in effect subsidize the campaign of an opposing candidate by providing candidate B's spokesmen or supporters with free time.

<sup>99</sup> Letter to Cullman Broadcasting Co., Inc., 25 R.R. 895 (1963).

<sup>1</sup> Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707, 19 R.R.2d 421, 422 (1970).

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Cullman Broadcasting Co., Inc., 25 R.R. 895 (1963).

<sup>3</sup> Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707, 19 R.R.2d 421-423 (1970).

Also in contrast with the equal opportunities rule, the fairness doctrine places “an affirmative duty” on the broadcaster to see to it that opposing views are presented. Equal opportunities requires only that the candidate who wishes to reply has the chance to do so.

Early in this section, attention was called to a part of the fairness doctrine that long went unenforced by the FCC. Not until 1976 did it say that licensees must air issues—not merely seek out responses to issues that happen to be aired. In the words of its 1949 Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, it recognized “the necessity for licensees to devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to the presentation of news and programs devoted to the consideration and discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by the particular station.”<sup>4</sup> The Commission has long felt that requiring a station to air any particular issue placed the Commission in the position of arbiter of programming, and that programming was the station’s function. Nevertheless, it had said that “some issues are so critical or of such great public importance that it would be unreasonable for a licensee to ignore them completely \* \* \*.”<sup>5</sup>

And that seemed to be its finding in Representative Patsy Mink.<sup>6</sup> The FCC ruled that a radio station which had simply ignored a controversy of central importance and interest to its area would have to provide coverage of the issue. Station WHAR of Clarksburg, W. Va., was one of several asked by Rep. Patsy Mink to broadcast a tape of her views on strip mining legislation. WHAR responded that it did no programming on strip mining. Mink made a case of it before the FCC, presenting heavy documentation that Clarksburg was in the heart of the West Virginia strip mining area, that the issue occupied newspapers and community and government leaders of the Clarksburg region intensely, that environment and people’s welfare were directly affected and that the legislation was involved in the future condition of the area. The Commission declared that it had “no intention of intruding on licensees’ day-to-day editorial decision making,” and that its intrusion in this case was one rarely to be followed. But the strip mining issue was of such magnitude in Clarksburg, that it could be considered to have a “significant and possibly unique impact on the licensee’s service area.”<sup>7</sup> WHAR would have to program the strip mining issue.

The Commission relies almost entirely on the warning force of its opinions and rulings to get stations to change their ways under the fairness doctrine. It has power to deny re-licensing, to issue cease

<sup>4</sup> New Broadcasting Co. (WLIB), 6 R.R. 258, 259 (1950).

<sup>5</sup> Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 25 (1974).

<sup>6</sup> 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 997. For a critique and warning in the FCC’s enforcement of this so-called “Fairness Doctrine Part One” obligation of licensees, see Simmons, pp. 582–586.

and desist orders, to give "short-term" license renewals (e. g., one year instead of the customary three), or even to revoke a license in mid-term. It has often come under heavy attack for not using these powers, its critics arguing that it is a "captive" of the industry it supposedly regulates. One study found that the FCC had used a sanction of this kind in only one fairness doctrine case in 1965.<sup>8</sup>

In this case, Lamar Life Broadcasting Co. was granted a conditional one-year renewal of its license for WLBT in Jackson, Miss. The United Church of Christ objected to any renewal, on grounds that the station's news and public affairs programming displayed racial and religious discrimination. The Church asked that it be granted the license instead. The FCC granted a one-year renewal of Lamar's license (instead of the usual three), provided that it comply strictly with the fairness doctrine and cease discriminatory programming patterns. It held no hearing in the matter.

The United Church of Christ took the case to federal court. There the FCC was told that renewal of the WLBT license was erroneous, for hearings should have been held and segments of WLBT's listening public allowed to intervene and participate. The church had standing to be heard as public intervenors.<sup>9</sup>

The FCC conducted the hearings, the church giving testimony about racial slurs, the cutting off of a network program and the results of its monitoring of the station for a week. The Commission then reconsidered the probationary license of one year, and decided it was in the public interest to remove the probationary status and grant WLBT a three-year renewal. Again the church appealed; the federal appeals court found for the church, and ordered the FCC to vacate its renewal of the license. The court said that the FCC examiner and the Commission itself incorrectly treated the intervenors like plaintiffs who must carry the burden of proof. They exhibited, in the hearing and in their opinions and rulings:<sup>10</sup>

\* \* \* at best a reluctant tolerance of this court's mandate [in the earlier decision granting the church standing to intervene] and at worst a profound hostility to the participation of the Public Intervenors and their efforts.

The court said the hearing and the decision to renew were so faulty that "it will serve no useful purpose to ask the Commission to reconsider the Examiner's actions and its own Decision and Order \* \* \*. The administrative conduct in this record is beyond

<sup>8</sup> Barrow, p. 469. For a case decided in 1977, involving a \$1,000 forfeiture for violation of the personal attack rule (see below, next section): Pleasant Broadcasting v. FCC, 2 Med.L.Rptr. 2277, 2279 (D.C.Cir. 1977).

<sup>9</sup> Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F. C. C., 123 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994 (1966).

<sup>10</sup> Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F. C. C., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 425 F.2d 543, 550 (1969).

repair.”<sup>11</sup> It directed the Commission to invite applications to be filed for the license held by WLBT.

### SEC. 80. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: PERSONAL ATTACKS AND POLITICAL EDITORIALS

**When a broadcast attacks the integrity or character of a person or group, or an editorial supports or opposes a political candidate, the station must promptly notify the person attacked or opposed, furnish him with the content of the attack, and offer him air time to respond.**

An attack on the character, honesty, or integrity of a person or group during a broadcast of a controversial issue of public importance, calls for the application of special rules under the fairness doctrine. So does a station's editorial support for or opposition to a political candidate. In both cases, the FCC reasons that the public interest in full debate and airing of issues, rather than the interest of the one attacked, is the factor of first concern.

The Commission's policies developed in cases over the years were formalized in rules in 1967 and 1968. One is that the broadcaster must notify the target of the attack promptly, and furnish him with a transcript, tape, or summary of the attack. Also, an offer of time to reply must be given. Where the licensee has broadcast an editorial endorsing or opposing a political candidate, the opposing candidates are supposed to be notified within 24 hours after the attack, and furnished with the transcript and an offer of time.<sup>12</sup>

A second rule refers to the kinds of programs that are exempt from the special provisions. A bona fide newscast, a broadcast of a bona fide news event, and news interviews and commentaries are not within the requirements.<sup>13</sup> This leaves editorials and documentaries among the kinds of programs that remain under the special requirements. The Commission recognizes, in the exceptions to the requirements, the broadcasters' strongly argued point that the rules calling for notice, transcript, and offer of time may have the effect of discouraging stations from airing important controversial issues.

One case involved the complaint of the general manager of a rural electric cooperative association. For five days, a station broadcast a series of editorials attacking him in connection with a public controversial issue. He learned of the attacks upon his arrival in town the fourth day. On the fifth day, he tried to get copies of the editorials, and on the same day, the station offered him a broadcast interview to answer the attacks. His total stay in town was for only two days,

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Barrow, pp. 472-476; 32 Fed.Reg. 10303-ff. (1967).

<sup>13</sup> 32 Fed.Reg. 11531 (1967).

and he rejected the offer because he would not have time to prepare an adequate reply. In ruling that the station "had not fully met the requirements of the Commission's fairness doctrine," the FCC said that<sup>14</sup>

[T]he fairness doctrine requires that a copy of the specific editorial or editorials shall be communicated to the person attacked either prior to or at the time of the broadcast \* \* so that a reasonable opportunity is afforded that person to reply. This duty on the part of the station is greater where, as here, interest in the editorials was consciously built up over a period of days and the time within which the person attacked would have an opportunity to reply was known to be so limited.

Another case involved attacks on county and state officials, accusing them of using their offices for personal gain and charging that their administration employed procedures similar to political methods of dictators. The persons attacked were invited several times to use the station to discuss the matter. At license-renewal time, those attacked in the broadcasts said that the station was used for selfish purposes, and to vent personal spite. But the Commission renewed the license, saying that although the broadcast attacks were highly personal and impugned the character and honesty of named individuals, those attacked were told of the attacks and were aware of the opportunities afforded them to reply.<sup>15</sup>

Another case involving repeated attacks by a commentator on California's Governor Pat Brown, a candidate for reelection, illustrates a further rule in personal attack on political candidates under the fairness doctrine. This rule is that in affording the opportunity for response, the station may insist that an appropriate spokesman for the attacked candidate deliver the response rather than the candidate himself. If the candidate were permitted to respond, this would bring into operation the "equal opportunities" provision of Section 315 of the Communications Act, and the candidate's opponents could then insist on equal time. In the case involving Governor Brown, the FCC held that while the station could require that a spokesman rather than Brown make the response, "The candidate should \* \* \* be given a substantial voice in the selection of the spokesman \* \* \*."<sup>16</sup>

The strength and reach of the fairness doctrine are great. Broadcasters' attacks upon it as burdensome and unconstitutional have been rejected by the Supreme Court. And the application of the

<sup>14</sup> Billings Bctg. Co., 23 R.R. 951 (1962).

<sup>15</sup> Clayton W. Mapoles, 23 R.R. 586 (1962).

<sup>16</sup> Times-Mirror Bctg. Co., 24 R.R. 404, 406 (1962).



principle has been expanded, in decisions since 1969, to certain kinds of advertising.<sup>17</sup>

*Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*<sup>18</sup> produced a unanimous endorsement of the doctrine's personal attack rule by the court, and the flat declaration that the central First Amendment interest in free speech by broadcasting is the public's, not the broadcaster's. The case rose in *Red Lion, Pa.*, after the company refused Fred J. Cook free time to answer attacks on him by the Rev. Billy James Hargis, a program moderator for its station, who associated Cook with left-wing activities. Cook took the case to the FCC which directed *Red Lion* to provide free time for Cook to reply, and *Red Lion* went to the courts, claiming the fairness doctrine unconstitutional. Meanwhile, Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n. (RTNDA), Columbia Broadcasting System and National Broadcasting Co. were bringing a separate action on constitutional grounds, claiming that the notification process of the personal attack—political editorial rules was expensive and burdensome, discouraging broadcasters from airing controversial issues.<sup>19</sup> The Supreme Court decided the two cases together in a decision since known as *Red Lion*.

Congress had ratified the long-standing fairness requirement of the FCC in positive legislation of 1959, when in amending Sec. 315 it said specifically that stations must "operate in the public interest and \* \* \* afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." While Congress had not spoken precisely to the personal attack—political editorial rules, the Court found no reason to consider that these rules were out of joint with the "controversial issues of public importance" rule. As implementation of the statutory "public interest, convenience or necessity" provision, the fairness doctrine was within the FCC's function and not an unconstitutional exercise of power delegated by Congress.<sup>20</sup>

Then the Supreme Court considered the broadcasters' contention that the First Amendment protects their wish to use their allotted frequencies to broadcast whatever they choose and to exclude from the frequency whomever they choose. As other "new media," it said, broadcasting had to live with certain special standards under the First Amendment: Not everyone who wanted to could broadcast, or each would drown the other out because of the limited

<sup>17</sup> Steven J. Simmons, "The FCC's Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules Reconsidered," 125 Pa.Law Rev. 990, 1002-1006 (Fall, 1977) for refinements in the fairness doctrine during the 1970's. Hereinafter cited as Simmons, Personal Attack Rule.

<sup>18</sup> 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794 (1969).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 385.

number of frequencies. “[I]t is idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish.”<sup>21</sup>

The Court laid out its interpretation of whose First Amendment right is primarily at stake in free speech by broadcasting: the public’s, not the licensee’s.<sup>22</sup>

But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. \* \* \* It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. \* \* \* It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.

Yet endorsed though they are by the Supreme Court in *Red Lion*, the fairness doctrine and its personal attack rule live under barrage. One attack says that consistent results are not to be had in the FCC’s adjudication of fairness doctrine cases. When “\* \* \* the rulings are read together, the decisions seem haphazard, and they hopelessly confuse any effort to figure out what general principles delineate the scope of the personal attack rules.”<sup>23</sup> This is the case, says Attorney Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., even though when the single FCC personal attack decision is studied, it may not seem unreasonable.

There is also the position that the personal attack rules do not serve the claimed FCC objectives of the airing of issues in the crucial work of informing the public. Instead, the reasoning goes, it is precisely when issues retreat and name-calling comes to the fore that the personal attack rules require reply opportunity. “To a large extent, the personal attack rules generate name calling exercises, allowing those parties whose personalities are criticized to rebut the charges without requiring rebuttal opportunities on the more substantive issues.”<sup>24</sup>

The constitutional question, furthermore, dies hard among journalists, for many of whom the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 388.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 390.

<sup>23</sup> Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., *Freedom of the Press vs. Public Access* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1976), p. 171.

<sup>24</sup> Simmons, *Personal Attack Rules*, p. 1016.

stated a simple truth in *RTNDA v. FCC*: The personal attack and political editorial rules “collide with the free speech and free press guarantees contained in the First Amendment \* \* \*.”<sup>25</sup>

On one occasion since *Red Lion*, the FCC has relied on the fairness doctrine to refuse to renew a license and found its reliance rejected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The case involved Faith Theological Seminary of Elkins Park, Pa., and the Rev. Carl McIntire, one of its directors.<sup>26</sup> The Seminary was approved for transfer of WXUR (Brandywine-Main Line Radio) licenses after the FCC had carefully stressed to it the requirements of balance under the fairness doctrine; many groups had opposed the transfer on grounds that McIntire’s previous record as radio commentator was evidence that he could not bring about a fair and balanced presentation of controversial public issues. Less than a year after the transfer, WXUR’s licenses came up for renewal. The FCC found that the company had plunged into controversial-issue programming immediately after the transfer, had not provided opposing views a reasonable chance, and had engaged in much personal attack without observing the notification rules. All this was violation of the fairness doctrine so flagrant that license renewal was not warranted, the Commission ruled; and furthermore, the licensee had misrepresented its real programming intent when it had applied for the transfer of license.

Brandywine appealed to the courts. Of three judges at the Court of Appeals, one favored refusal to renew on grounds of both misrepresentation and violating the fairness doctrine, and one joined him only on the ground of misrepresentation. The third judge dissented, finding the misrepresentation grounds infected with aspects and overtones of the fairness doctrine, which, he said, while unquestioned for 50 years, now needed its values, purposes and effects re-examined. In silencing WXUR, Judge David Bazelon said, the Commission had dealt a death blow to the licensee’s freedom of speech and press, and also denied the public access to many controversial issues. Bazelon said that licensing and regulating radio and television come down in the end to an assumption of technical scarcity—limited frequencies to which all cannot have access; but the viewer now has the prospect in a few years of 400 television channels, and the enormous capacity of cable television to carry communication is now a technical reality. “I fear that ancient assumptions and crystallized rules have blinded all of us to the depth of the First Amendment issues involved here,”<sup>27</sup> he said. Does

<sup>25</sup> 400 F.2d 1002, 1021 (7th Cir. 1968).

<sup>26</sup> Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970).

<sup>27</sup> Brandywine-Main Radio, Inc., 25 R.R.2d 2010, 2076; *Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC*, 473 F.2d 16, 63-4 (D.C.Cir.1972).

silencing WXUR in the name of the fairness doctrine violate the First Amendment? he asked.

### SEC. 81. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: ADVERTISING

**The fairness doctrine applies to commercials devoted in an obvious and meaningful way to the discussion of public issues, but not to ordinary product commercials.**

While the fairness doctrine was receiving its test in *Red Lion* and *RTNDA*, a new application of its reach was being asserted—to advertising. This is treated in detail herein in Chapter 14. Crusaders against tobacco looked with anger at the flood of cigarette ads on television for years. Finally an action was brought, and the Commission required response time under the fairness doctrine to commercials for cigarettes, and for that product only.<sup>27a</sup> Reasoning that Congress had urged people to stop smoking and that the health question was uncomplicated in the case of cigarettes, it later refused to extend the requirement to cars, although it agreed that health problems inhered in exhaust. It was overruled, in its refusal to extend the doctrine, by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.<sup>28</sup> Knowing a hornet's nest when it saw one, the FCC beat a retreat from the confrontation that thus lay ahead in the unbounded world of product commercials that might warrant fairness responses. In its 1974 Fairness Report, the Commission simply reversed its cigarette ruling, and said that henceforth no product ads would generate fairness doctrine treatment, because they merely discuss the desirability of the product and make no meaningful contribution to public debate. It said that in the future it would apply the fairness doctrine to commercials "which are devoted in an obvious and meaningful way to the discussion of public issues."<sup>29</sup>

"Editorial advertisements," however, have been found by the Supreme Court to be outside the reach of the fairness doctrine. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM), a nationwide group of 2,700 owners and executives, prepared radio spot ads urging immediate withdrawal of American forces from overseas military installations. WTOP, Washington, refused to sell time to BEM. The station said its long-established policy was not to sell time for spot announcements to groups or individuals who wished to set forth their views on controversial issues. The FCC upheld WTOP's policy of rejecting all editorial advertisements, saying that stations have wide leeway in the format they choose for airing

<sup>27a</sup> *WCBS-TV*, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967); sustained *Banzhaf v. FCC*, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C.Cir.1968), certiorari denied 396 U.S. 842, 90 S.Ct. 50 (1969).

<sup>28</sup> *Friends of the Earth*, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970); *Friends of the Earth v. FCC*, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C.Cir.1971).

<sup>29</sup> 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 26 (1974); *Complaint of Energy Action Committee, Inc.*, 2 Med.L.Rptr. 1623 (Apr. 26, 1977).

controversial issues.<sup>30</sup> The Supreme Court, in a decision joining BEM to Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,<sup>31</sup> upheld the FCC.

## SEC. 82. CABLE TELEVISION

**The FCC has general authority over cable television, but leaves much control to municipalities and states under its rules of February 1972 and subsequent revisions.**

A new technology burst from its small-town environment in the late 1950s and swept the Federal Communications Commission into an unmapped sphere of regulation of communications systems. Known as CATV (Community Antenna Television), the system picked up distant and near-by television stations' signals with a powerful antenna, and fed them by cable into the sets of people in towns where television reception was weak or absent. It could be done for a \$20 installation fee and \$5.00 a month; and "the cable" as delighted set owners called it, had the capacity to carry multiple channels—five in early years, then 12, 20 and many more in prospect. Systems spread in the 1950s through small-town America, and then in the 1960s began moving into major cities with programs from afar to supplement the several television channels already operating. By 1976, there were approximately 3,450 operating systems with 10,800,000 subscribers. Most systems had fewer than 3,500 subscribers, but a few had 20,000 or more.<sup>32</sup>

It was plain by the early 1960s that CATV was in direct competition with existing television stations, and was entering FCC ground. Moreover, CATV's capacity to carry a vast variety of non-broadcasting communication suggested that its reach would transcend television considerations in the future.

The potential for profit spurred businessmen, financiers, and investors, many of them innocent of experience with television. The concept of the "wired nation" in which the cable would be strung in city after city to scores of millions of households, and service sold, frequently in situations without competition, was as awesome to the beholder as exciting to the entrepreneur.

And the potential for a new public service that would link people, groups and communities in new ways was equally challenging. It spurred the public-spirited to the possibilities of moving information in quantities never dreamed of by television; of two-way communication that would some day bring the traditional "receiver" of media messages into an interchange with the traditional "source"; of

<sup>30</sup> Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1971).

<sup>31</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080 (1973).

<sup>32</sup> Jones, *Electronic Mass Media*, pp. 319, 320.

establishing some of the many available channels as "common carrier" services by which anyone who had the money and some who did not could claim time on a channel to say his say, speak his piece, reach his group.

As always with communication by wire or airwaves, the FCC was in the position of mediating agency. While the cable was neither telegraph nor telephone wire, neither radio nor television, its relationship to the facilities traditionally regulated by the FCC was plain. The Commission moved by steps to assert its authority over cable television and by 1966 had done so successfully,<sup>33</sup> the Supreme Court of the United States confirming its power by 1968 in *U. S. v. Southwestern Cable Co.*<sup>34</sup>

By early 1972 the contending commercial and organizational forces of broadcasting and cable, copyright owners, public interest groups, congressional inquirers, the President's Office of Telecommunications Policy, state and municipal representatives, and concerned individuals had been heard and taken into account. The courts had ruled on a few phases of cable. The FCC in early February 1972 issued its long-awaited general and basic rules for cable in 500 pages, *Cable Television Service, Part 76, Rules and Regulations*.<sup>35</sup> They describe the framework within which cable is to operate, and they reflect the Commission's resolution of competing demands: growth for cable, protection for television and copyright holders, and service for the public.

"The law" of cable as it stands and develops is a product of extended, agitated debate lasting for years. The Commission itself was far from unanimous in adopting the 1972 Rules and Regulations<sup>36</sup> to say nothing of the commercial, congressional and public spokesmen and groups.<sup>37</sup> But the debate over what the federal rules should be<sup>38</sup> or should have been stands outside the scope of the

<sup>33</sup> Federal Communications Commission, Second Report and Order, Docket Nos. 14895, 15233, 15971, 6 R.R.2d 1717 (1966).

<sup>34</sup> 392 U.S. 157, 88 S.Ct. 1994 (1968).

<sup>35</sup> Federal Communications Commission, CATV Rules (Docket 18397 et al.), 37 Fed.Reg. 3252, 24 R.R.2d 1501, 1579-1615 (1972). Of various changes in the basic rules, a major one, Channel Capacity and Access Rules, is at 36 R.R.2d 213 (1976). For many other changes, well into 1977, see Jones, *Electronic Mass Media Supplement 1977*, pp. 37-42.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 1579-1615.

<sup>37</sup> For industry reaction, see Anon., "Nays Have Their Say on Cable," *Broadcasting*, March 21, 1972, pp. 23-24.

<sup>38</sup> For major treatments of values and issues involved, see, e. g., R. L. Smith, *The Wired Nation*, Nation, May 18, 1970; Walter S. Baer, *Cable Television: Handbook for Decisionmaking* (Santa Monica, Cal., 1973); Don R. LeDuc, *Cable Television and the FCC; a Crisis in Media Control* (Phila., 1973); *On the Cable: the Television of Abundance*, Report of Sloan Commission on Cable Communications (New York 1972). The FCC's rationale and explanation is at 24 R.R.2d 1501-79; 37 Fed.Reg. 3252, Feb. 12, 1972.

present treatment, which describes in digest major aspects of the law as the Commission states it.

Running through the 1972 document is the plain implication that cable must operate without destroying or severely damaging television—a service available to the public without charge, and to all set owners within range of its signal rather than only to those who obtain a paid-for cable connection. This position had been taken in the FCC's First Report and Order on cable in 1965 in the context of preventing unfair competition,<sup>39</sup> and its rules at intervals since have assumed this. Also taken for granted was the fact that large regulatory scope would be left for states and municipalities, which would issue franchises to cable systems as they had from the early years.

The Supreme Court had furnished one "given" for FCC rules, in the decision in *Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.*<sup>40</sup> This went to copyright law: Might CATV, which paid nothing and got no one's permission in receiving signals of television stations and transmitting them by wire, be violating copyright? If, indeed, copyright law applied to CATV and required permission and payment for carrying others' copyrighted programs, its threat particularly to ultra high frequency television (largely, the independent stations served little by the networks) might be reduced. Congress was mired in the complexities of revising the 50-year-old copyright law when in 1968 the *Fortnightly* decision came down.

The Court ruled that CATV is not a "performer" and is thus not subject to the copyright act's provisions: copyright to movies held by United Artists was not infringed by *Fortnightly* CATV's receiving and transmitting these movies. The Court said:<sup>41</sup>

\* \* \* a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the viewer's television. It is true that a CATV system plays an "active" role in making reception possible, but so do ordinary television sets and antennas.

Congress finally revised the copyright law in 1976.<sup>42</sup> The FCC and television interests had considered a revised law essential, in the long run, to the success of the 1972 Rules and Regulations.<sup>43</sup>

Digesting important elements of the FCC product of 1972 may be done under several headings:

<sup>39</sup> Federal Communications Commission, Docket Nos. 14895 and 15233, 4 R.R.2d 1725 (1965).

<sup>40</sup> 392 U.S. 390, 88 S.Ct. 2084 (1968).

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 2089.

<sup>42</sup> See Chapter 7 herein. Provisions of the new law that affect cable are in Jones, 1977 Supplement, pp. 43–54, with explanation at 55–71.

<sup>43</sup> The FCC delivers on Cable, Broadcasting, Feb. 7, 1972, p. 18.

*Federal-State/Local Regulatory Relationships.* Almost all regulation of radio and television has been in the authority of the FCC, but not so cable. Franchises by local and state authority would be the givers of specific rules, within the framework of general FCC policy. Cable systems—natural monopolies within localities—would face questions of quality of service and repair, rates, technical standards. Local authorities would need to exercise “public interest judgment” about such matters as legal, financial, character and technical qualifications of the franchise applicants. They would need to deal with the area served, plans and arrangements for attachments with a public utility, details of channels for public or municipal use.

The new rules said that a “reasonable” fee would be charged the franchisee by the local authority, and named three to five per cent of gross subscriber revenue per year as reasonable. The franchising authority would grant the franchise only upon determination of capability based on public proceedings; it would approve initial rates charged subscribers for installation and service, and permit rate changes only after appropriate public proceedings. The franchise would be granted for a period of “reasonable duration” (15 years’ maximum has been mentioned). The franchise would specify procedures for investigating and resolving complaints about quality of service.

While the local franchising authority would be the municipality, there was nothing in the 1972 Rules and Regulations that forbid state governments from establishing statutes or rules within which franchises would be shaped.

*Origination Cablecasting.* This is programming provided by and subject to the exclusive control of the cable operator; it does not include television signals received and transmitted by the cable. Every cable system having 3,500 or more subscribers was at first required to operate “to a significant extent” as a local outlet by origination cablecasting. If it did not do so, it was not permitted to carry television stations’ broadcasts. Cable owners objected that compulsory cablecasting put them into a highly expensive endeavor wholly different from the transmission of signals. They contested the rule in the courts, and the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, upheld the FCC rule, saying it was “reasonable ancillary to the effective performance of [the Commission’s] various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting.”<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, the Commission rescinded the origination requirement in 1974, finding that the results had been disappointing from the standpoints of costs and revenues, and that unwilling system operators were unlikely to do a good job.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> U. S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 662–663, 92 S.Ct. 1860 (1972).

<sup>45</sup> Jones, *Electronic Mass Media*, p. 372.



Origination cablecasting must be conducted within the terms of various rules. The fairness doctrine of radio and television applies to this programming. So do the provisions of the equal opportunities rule for public office. Information about lotteries is barred from origination cablecasting. Material that is "obscene or indecent" may not be cablecast.

*Carriage of Television Broadcasts.* CATV systems in the "top-50" markets may carry three networks and three independent stations, while the next-50 may carry three network and two independent stations. In addition, the systems in these 100 markets are permitted to carry two distant signals. Cable systems in markets below the top-100 may carry three network signals and one independent. All must carry all local educational stations.

*Program Exclusivity.* Television broadcasting is protected through rules that require cable systems to refrain for varying periods of time from carrying syndicated programming—generally, programs sold or distributed to television stations in more than one market for non-network television use. Cable systems in the top-50 markets may not carry syndicated programming for one year after its first appearance in any market, and not during the life of the contract under which a local station buys it. In the next-50 markets, periods of time up to two years provide exclusivity for television stations in carrying syndicated programming.

*Diversification of Control.* No cable system that carries television broadcast signals may own, operate, control, or have an interest in a national television network, or a television station whose Grade B contour signal reaches into the service area of the cable system.

*Channel Capacity and Access Channels.*<sup>46</sup> Each cable system with 3,500 or more subscribers is required to have the equivalent of 20 broadcast channels ("120 MHz of bandwidth"), available for immediate or potential use. And, in language terse and spare, perhaps the most extraordinary capability of cable is required to be built into each system: "Each [such] \* \* \* system shall maintain a plant having technical capacity for nonvoice return communications \* \* \*" <sup>47</sup>—the two-way communication capacity by which audiences of a mass communication medium will some day participate in the process instead of acting as receivers only.

<sup>46</sup> FCC, "Channel Capacity and Access Rules," 36 R.R.2d 213 (1976). As this book was being printed, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled that the FCC channel capacity regulations and those mandating access to cable for public, government, education, and leasers, exceeded the Commission's jurisdiction. The court made it plain, however, that cable operators might voluntarily continue to provide access, and that local franchising authorities also might impose access requirements: *Midwest Video v. FCC*, 3 Med.L.Rptr. 1817 (8th Cir. 1978, # 76-1839).

<sup>47</sup> Federal Communications Commission, *CATV Rules (Docket 18397 et al.)*, 24 R.R.2d 1501, # 76.251(3). And see 36 R.R.2d 213, paragraph 51 (1976).

The Commission ordered in the 1972 rules that four “dedicated access channels” be provided by systems in major markets: One channel each for free public access, free government access, free educational access, and leased use. The first of these was to be available on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis. Further, the system was to make available for public use, at least minimal program-production equipment and facilities, and could charge production costs for live studio presentations more than five minutes long.

In its Channel Capacity and Access Rules<sup>48</sup> of 1976, however, the requirements for dedicated access channels were revised downward. Comments filed with the FCC, and its general experience as well, made it appear that the use of access channels was growing, but “in the vast majority of communities presently providing multiple channels for access use, these channels are at best sporadically programmed.”<sup>49</sup> Since the Commission believed that in most cases, all access needs could be met by providing one access channel, it modified the rules to say that systems with 3,500 or more subscribers provide “at least one designated access channel for shared use among public, educational, local government and leased users.”<sup>50</sup>

Through these rules and others in the 500-page 1972 document of the FCC ran the underlying basic theme of access to a communication technology: Who would have access to franchises for public communication, and under what conditions would he retain it? Who would have access to the channels of the franchisee? Much was provided for industry, bitted and bridled though it was by the rules; something was provided for the public in the letter of the rules—more than had been provided where radio and television had been concerned.

<sup>48</sup> 36 R.R.2d 213.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 62.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 64.

## Chapter 14

### REGULATION OF ADVERTISING

Sec.

83. From *Caveat Emptor* to Consumer Protection.
84. Federal Administrative Controls: The Federal Trade Commission.
85. Literal Truth Is Not Enough.
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87. Corrective Advertising Orders of the FTC.
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92. The Right to Refuse Service.
93. Broadcast Advertising and the Fairness Doctrine.
94. Advertising and the Constitution.

#### SEC. 83. FROM CAVEAT EMPTOR TO CONSUMER PROTECTION

**The history of advertising in the United States has seen a gradual change away from the motto of *caveat emptor* ("let the buyer beware").**

It is hardly news that advertising is both a necessity and a nuisance in American society. It encourages and advances the nation's economy by providing information to the public about goods and services. Although its economic rule in supporting the news media has been criticized, advertising has footed the bill for most of the news and vicarious entertainment which we receive. Historically, we owe advertising another debt. The rise of advertising in the 19th Century did much to free the press from excessive reliance on political parties or government printing contracts which tended to color news columns with their bias.

Despite advertising's undeniably worthwhile contributions, this chapter unavoidably must emphasize the seamy side of American salesmanship. We will concentrate to a great extent upon issues raised by cheats and rascals. There can be little question that all too much advertising has been—and is—inexact, if not spurious and deceitful. Better units of the communications media now operate their advertising as a business with a definite obligation to the public. The realization evidently is dawning that unless advertising is both truthful and useful, the public may react unfavorably.

Advertising in the United States has a colorful if sometimes sordid past. From the first days of the nation throughout the

Nineteenth Century, the philosophy motivating advertising was largely *laissez faire*. Too much advertising, in spirit if not to the letter, resembled this 1777 plug for "Dr. RYAN'S *incomparable* WORM *destroying* SUGAR PLUMBS, *Necessary to be kept in all FAMILIES:*"<sup>1</sup>

The plumb is a great diuretic, cleaning the veins of slime; it expels wind, and is a sovereign medicine in the cholic and griping of the guts. It allays and carries off vapours which occasion many disorders of the head. It opens all obstructions in the stomach, lungs, liver, veins, and bladder; causes a good appetite, and helps digestion.

About two years later, some new advertising copy made claims for Dr. Ryan's Sugar Plumbs which were even more graphic. The plumbs were said to be a remedy for<sup>2</sup>

PALENESS of the Face, Itching of the Nose, Hollowness of the Eyes, Grating of the teeth when asleep, Dullness, Pains, and Heaviness in the Head, a dry Cough, an Itching in the Fundament, white and thick Urine, unquiet Sleep, often starting, lost appetite, swell'd Belly, Gnawing and Biting about the Stomach, frightful Dreams, extreme Thirsts, the Body decay'd lean, Fits, often Vomiting, stinking Breath.

Such exploitation of the *laissez faire* philosophy went unpunished for more than a century of this nation's existence. There was little or no regulation; what would be termed unreliable or even fraudulent advertising was published by some of the most respectable newspapers and periodicals. The general principle seemed to be that advertising columns were an open business forum with space for sale to all who applied.

Before 1900, advertising had little established ethical basis. The liar and the cheat capitalized on glorious claims for dishonest, shoddy merchandise. The faker lured the ill and suffering to build hopes on pills and tonics of questionable composition. Cures were promised by the bottle. Fortunes were painted for those who invested in mining companies of dubious reliability. Foods were frequently adulterated. Fifteen dollar suits were offered as being worth \$25. Faked testimonials praised dishonest or unproved wares. Manufacturers of these products were able to buy advertising space in reputable journals.

Exposés of frauds and fraud promoters who were using advertising to ensnare new prospects were important early in the Twentieth Century. (Mark Sullivan exposed medical fakes and frauds in the *Ladies Home Journal* in 1904.) Upton Sinclair's novel, *The Jungle*,

<sup>1</sup> Pennsylvania Gazette, March 12, 1777.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, March 31, 1779.

revolted readers with its description of filthy conditions in meat-packing plants. Spurred by such exposés, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906. Despite being a truth-in-labeling measure the 1906 statute did nothing to insure truth in advertising.<sup>3</sup>

Campaigning against advertising and promotional chicanery many magazines and newspapers exposed fraudulent practices.<sup>4</sup> Some newspapers of this period, including the Cleveland Press and other Scripps-McRae League papers, monitored advertisements, refusing those which appeared to be fraudulent or misleading. A Scripps-McRae official asserted that the newspaper group turned away approximately \$500,000 in advertising revenue in one year by rejecting advertisements.

Such self-regulation has grown considerably over the years, but legal restraints and constraints have grown even more. People working in advertising come under all the laws which affect other branches of mass communications, including libel, invasion of privacy, copyright infringement, and obscenity. In addition, there are batteries of statutes and regulatory powers aimed at advertising *in addition to* the legal bonds which affect, for example, the editorial side of a newspaper. There's the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and quite an alphabet soup of other federal agencies which gets into the advertising regulation act. Beyond that, there is increasing activity at the state level to attempt to control false or deceptive advertising. This chapter, then, can be only a sparse survey of advertising regulation.

#### SEC. 84. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

**The most important governmental controls over advertising are exercised by the Federal Trade Commission.**

##### Federal Trade Commission Act

The Federal Trade Commission is more important than all other official controls over advertising combined. The FTC Act was passed in 1914 to supplement sanctions over unfair competition which had been provided by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and by the Clayton Act of 1914.<sup>5</sup> Gradually, the FTC law has thrown an important light upon the business picture of the country.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> H. J. Kenner, *The Fight for Truth in Advertising* (1936) pp. 13-14; Alfred McClung Lee, *The Daily Newspaper in America* (1937) p. 328.

<sup>5</sup> Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1964); Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914); 15 U.S.C.A. § 12.

While the FTC Act was conceived to prevent monopoly and restraint of trade, checking of the burgeoning menace of dishonest advertising has become a principal activity of the Commission.

This change of emphasis, created partly by criticisms of advertising, has not been without major opposition on the part of American business. There was fear that the government would so shackle advertising and sales efforts that business enterprise and even freedom of the press would be hampered.

The Federal Trade Commission is a major example of administrative rule and law-making authority delegated by Congress. Five Federal Trade Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. No more than three of the five commissioners may be from the same political party.

The Federal Trade Commission has come under increasing attack in recent years as the tides of "consumerism" mounted; the FTC's critics, to borrow adman Stan Freberg's phrase, could be counted on the fingers of the Mormon Tabernacle Choir. One of the persons who led the charge against the FTC was Consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Such critics have not only denigrated its effectiveness, they have even questioned its right to continue to exist.<sup>6</sup> In addition to such "self-appointed" critics, the American Bar Association weighed in in 1969 with a harshly critical evaluation of FTC performance. The ABA study concluded that FTC activity had been declining while FTC staff and budget increased. The report contended that the FTC had mismanaged its resources, and that it had failed to set goals and provide necessary guidance for its staff.<sup>7</sup>

Turning to specific areas of FTC efforts, we find, first, that in the field of consumer protection, the agency has been preoccupied with technical labeling and advertising practices of the most inconsequential sort. This failing derives in large part from a detection technique which relies almost exclusively on the receipt of outside complaints.

At the same time, the FTC has exercised little leadership in the prevention of retail marketing frauds. \* \* \* Unjustified doubts within the FTC as to its power or

<sup>6</sup> See Report of "Nader's Raiders," *The Consumer and the Federal Trade Commission—A Critique of the Consumer Protection Record of the FTC*, published in 115 Congressional Record 1539 (1969); William F. Lemke, Jr., "Souped Up Affirmative Disclosure Orders of the Federal Trade Commission," 4 *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* (Winter, 1970), p. 193. See also Charles McCarry, *Citizen Nader* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972).

<sup>7</sup> American Bar Association, *Report of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission*, reprinted as Appendix II, pp. 123-244, "Federal Trade Commission Procedures," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, First Session, Ninety-First Congress, Part I (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

effectiveness in dealing with local frauds have caused it to remain largely passive in this area of enforcement.

We recommend a new and vigorous approach to consumer fraud. The FTC should establish task forces in major cities to concentrate exclusively on this problem.

After the ABA study, a far-reaching reorganization of the FTC was carried out under Chairman Caspar W. Weinberger, and went into effect on July 1, 1970. Until that time, major responsibility for inhibiting delusory advertising rested with the FTC's Bureau of Deceptive Practices, which had five units:

- (1) Food and Drug Advertising.
- (2) General Practices—restrained deceptive selling practices concerning products other than foods and drugs.
- (3) Scientific Opinions—investigated through scientific analysis truth or falsity of the increasingly complicated claims made for products.
- (4) Special projects—did research in special consumer protection areas.
- (5) Division of compliance—was responsible for enforcement when violations of laws or FTC rules were found.<sup>8</sup>

Extensive reorganizations of the FTC were carried out after the ABA study. A Bureau of Consumer Protection was created to handle consumer protection activities. The Bureau's responsibility extends not only to the enforcement of consumer protection statutes but also to the development of Trade Regulation Rules, of industry guidelines, and of consumer protection programs.

As of early 1978, the Bureau of Consumer Protection had seven divisions, including:

- (1) The Marketing Practices Division—It is responsible for enforcement of the FTC Act where deceptive or unfair marketing practices which are national in scope are concerned.<sup>9</sup>
- (2) "The National Advertising Division is responsible for enforcing those provisions of the FTC Act which forbid misrepresentation and unfairness in national advertising, particularly food, drug and cosmetic advertising."<sup>10</sup>
- (3) Compliance—"This division is responsible for obtaining and maintaining compliance with Trade Regulation Rules and all cease and desist orders prohibiting false and deceptive trade practices under Sections 5 and 12 of the FTC Act, the Wool Products Labeling Act, The Textile Fiber Products Identifi-

<sup>8</sup> See Federal Trade Commission, "Here is Your Federal Trade Commission," Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.

<sup>9</sup> Federal Trade Commission, "Your FTC: What It Is and What It Does,"

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

cation Act and other statutes for which the FTC has enforcement responsibilities." Regional offices—in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle in addition to Washington, D. C.—handle compliance matters in cases begun in their geographical areas.<sup>11</sup>

- (4) "The Special Projects Division has primary responsibility for developing and implementing the 'unfairness' doctrine announced in 1972 by the Supreme Court in the *Sperry and Hutchinson* decision to combat a broad spectrum of abusive practices." (In *FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson*, the "unfairness doctrine" was defined in this fashion: it refers to "the principle that the Commission has the power to attack business practices which have an unfair impact on consumers, regardless of whether the practice is deceptive to consumers or anti-competitive in the traditional antitrust sense.")<sup>12</sup>
- (5) "The Special Statutes Division undertakes special non-litigative assignments from the Commission or the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. The division also enforces the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Additionally, the division has enforcement responsibility for the Wool Products Labeling Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, the Fur Products Labeling Act, and all other special legislation within the Commission's jurisdiction. It has specific responsibility for developing rules relating to warranties."<sup>13</sup>
- (6) "The Evaluation Division is responsible for advising the Bureau Director and the Commission on how resources should be allocated to most effectively remedy consumer losses."<sup>14</sup>
- (7) Rulemaking—The FTC has the power to issue Trade Regulation Rules which have the force of law. A Trade Regulation Rule may be nationwide in application, or it may apply only to certain geographic areas or markets. Industry guides do not have legal force, but they are meant to give guidance to alert various industries to advertising practices which may be considered to be deceptive or illegal.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* See also Gerry Thain, "Advertising Regulation," 1 *Fordham Urban Law Journal* (1973), pp. 351n, 367–381, discussing *FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.*, 405 U.S. 233, 92 S.Ct. 898 (1972).

<sup>13</sup> Federal Trade Commission, "Your FTC: What It Is and What It Does," p. 15.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*



This complicated bureaucratic structure is just part of the FTC machinery which attempts to enforce Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which says: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."<sup>16</sup>

Early FTC cases which came before the courts cast doubt on the Commission's powers over advertising.<sup>17</sup> However, in 1921, something as mundane as partly wool underwear masquerading as real woolies gave the FTC the case it needed to establish its authority. For many years the Winsted Hosiery Company had been selling its underwear in cartons branded with labels such as "Natural Merino," "Natural Wool," or "Australian Wool." In fact, none of this company's underwear was all wool, and, some of its products had as little as 10 per cent wool.

The FTC complaint against Winsted Hosiery asked the company to show cause why the use of its brands and labels which seemed deceptive should not be discontinued. After hearings, the FTC issued a cease and desist order against the company. On appeal, the FTC lost, with a United States Circuit Court saying: "Conscientious manufacturers may prefer not to use a label which is capable of misleading, and it may be that it will be desirable to prevent the use of the particular labels, but it is in our opinion not within the province of the Federal Trade Commission to do so."<sup>18</sup>

In 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the FTC in language broad enough to support the Commission's power to control false labeling and advertising as unfair methods of competition. Speaking for the Court, Justice Brandeis declared that the Commission was justified in its conclusions that the hosiery company's practices were unfair methods of competition. He authorized the Commission to halt such practices. Brandeis said, "when misbranded goods attract customers by means of the fraud which they perpetrate, trade is diverted from the producer of truthfully marked goods."<sup>19</sup>

Despite the efforts of the Federal Trade Commission, the idea of consumer protection had little support from the Courts during the early 1930s. In 1931, the *Raladam* case, for example, cut sharply into the FTC's attempts to defeat the ancient, amoral doctrine of *caveat emptor*, "let the buyer beware." The Raladam Company manufactured an "obesity cure" containing "dессicated thyroid."

<sup>16</sup> 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1).

<sup>17</sup> Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 40 S.Ct. 572 (1920); L. B. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 F. 985 (6th Cir. 1923).

<sup>18</sup> Winsted Hosiery Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 F. 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1921).

<sup>19</sup> Federal Trade Commission v. Winstead Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493-494, 42 S.Ct. 384, 385-386 (1922).

This preparation, sold under the name of "Marmola," was advertised in newspapers and on printed labels as being the result of scientific research. It was claimed that "Marmola" was "safe and effective and may be used without discomfort, inconvenience, or danger of harmful results to health."

The FTC complained that the ingredient known as "'dissicated thyroid' could not be presumed to act with reasonable uniformity upon the bodies of all users, or without impairing the health of a substantial portion of them \* \* \* or with safety \* \* \*" without continued competent medical advice.<sup>20</sup>

The FTC complaint focused upon the likelihood of actual physical harm to consumers who used Marmola believing it safe as claimed. The Supreme Court, however, disallowed the FTC's order that the Raladam Corporation cease such advertising. Speaking for the Court, Justice George Sutherland ruled that Section 5 of the FTC Act did not forbid the deception of consumers unless the advertising injured competing businesses in some way. Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Court said, provided the Commission only with authority to halt "unfair methods of competition in commerce."<sup>21</sup> Accordingly, the FTC was not allowed to work directly for consumer protection.<sup>22</sup>

The FTC's authority over advertising had a slow and tortuous growth. As late as 1936—when the FTC had been in operation for some 22 years—the famed Judge Learned Hand of a U.S. Circuit Court decided a case against the FTC and in favor of an advertising scheme for encyclopedias which involved false representation. The publisher of the encyclopedias tried to lure customers into believing that the company gave them a set of encyclopedias "free," and that the customer's payment of \$69.50 was only for a loose leaf supplement to the encyclopedia. The \$69.50 was actually the combined regular price for *both* books and supplements.<sup>23</sup> Despite this, Judge Hand could declare:<sup>24</sup>

We cannot take too seriously the suggestion that a man who is buying a set of books and a ten years' 'extension service' will be fatuous enough to be misled by the mere statement that the first are given away, and that he is paying only for the second. \* \* \* Such trivial niceties are too impalpable for practical affairs, they are will-o'-the-wisps, which divert attention from substantial evils.

<sup>20</sup> Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587, 589 (1931).

<sup>21</sup> 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587, 589 (1931).

<sup>22</sup> 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587, 589 (1931).

<sup>23</sup> 52 Stat. 111 (1938).

<sup>24</sup> 302 U.S. 112, 116, 58 S.Ct. 113, 115 (1937), quoting Judge Hand's opinion in the same case in the Circuit Court, 86 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1936).

When this case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Hugo L. Black reacted indignantly, noting that the sales method used to peddle the encyclopedia “successfully deceived and deluded its victims.”<sup>25</sup> In overturning Judge Hand’s “let the buyer beware” ruling in the lower court, Justice Black added:<sup>26</sup>

The fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less experienced. There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business. Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best element of business has long since decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that the rule of *caveat emptor* [let the buyer beware] should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception.

In 1938, the year after the Supreme Court endorsed the concept of consumer protection from advertising excesses, Congress acted to give the FTC greater authority over deceptive advertising. The 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment changed Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to read: “Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and *unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce*, are hereby declared unlawful.”<sup>27</sup> Note the italicized phrase. These words were added by the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, and this seemingly minor change in phrasing proved to be of great importance. The italicized words removed the limits on FTC authority imposed by the *Raladam* decision. No longer would the FTC have to prove that a misleading advertisement harmed a competing business. Now, if an advertisement deceived *consumers*, the FTC’s enforcement powers could be put into effect.<sup>28</sup>

Aiming at false advertising, the Wheeler-Lea Amendment also inserted Sections 12 and 15(a) into the Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 12 provides:<sup>29</sup>

It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement—(1) by United States mails, or in [interstate] commerce by any means, for the purpose of induc-

<sup>25</sup> 302 U.S. 112, 117, 58 S.Ct. 113, 115 (1937).

<sup>26</sup> 302 U.S. 112, 116, 58 S.Ct. 113, 115 (1937).

<sup>27</sup> 52 Stat. 111 (1938); 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1964). Italics added.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*; Earl W. Kintner, “Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising,” *Michigan Law Review* Vol. 64:7 (May, 1966) pp. 1269–1284, at pp. 1275–1276, 1276n.

<sup>29</sup> Section 12, 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1964); Section 15(a), 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C.A. § 55(a) (1964).

ing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase in commerce of food, drugs, devices or cosmetics.

Section 15(a) of the FTC Act says:

The term 'false advertising' means an advertisement, other than labeling, which is misleading in a material respect; and in determining whether any advertisement is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences which may result from the use of the commodity to which the advertisement relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual.

Such statutory changes gave the FTC some of the power it sought to protect consumers. As FTC Commissioners Everette MacIntyre and Paul Rand Dixon wrote in the 1960s, the Wheeler-Lea "amendment put the consumer on a par with the businessman from the standpoint of deceptive practices."<sup>30</sup> With the tremendous volume of interstate commerce in this nation, the FTC has an impossible task in trying to regulate advertising. The FTC's annual budget is nearing \$40 million, but that is an insignificant amount if what is really intended is to regulate a \$30 billion-a-year industry. It is akin to asking the smallest little-league football team you've ever seen to take on the entire National Football League. That budget, which provides for roughly 1,700 employees, is far larger than the FTC of, say, a decade earlier.

Even so, some people contended—back in the 1960s—that the FTC had compiled an impressive record. Professor Glenn E. Weston wrote in 1964, on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the FTC, that the Commission's accomplishments "probably dwarf that of any other administrative agency, state or federal." Up to 1964, the FTC had accepted more than 12,000 stipulations from advertisers that they would halt certain practices, and had also obtained "countless" promises to discontinue false advertising claims. At a more formal level of enforcement, the FTC had issued "several thousand" complaints and cease-and-desist orders against advertisers, and had inspected millions of ads.<sup>31</sup>

As noted earlier, not everyone took such a cheery view of the FTC. This commission was often called "toothless" and other less

<sup>30</sup> Everette MacIntyre and Paul Rand Dixon, "The Federal Trade Commission After 50 Years," *Federal Bar Journal* Vol. 24:4 (Fall, 1964) pp. 377–424, at p. 416.

<sup>31</sup> Glenn E. Weston, "Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission," *Federal Bar Journal* 24:4 (Fall, 1964) pp. 548–578, at p. 548.

flattering things. The delays which have attended FTC enforcement procedures—especially those involved in lengthy court battles—became legendary. An often cited example was the famed “Carter’s Little Liver Pills” case. In 1943, the FTC decided that the word “liver” was misleading, and a classic and lengthy battle was on. Carter’s Little Liver Pills had been a well known laxative product for 75 years. It took the FTC a total of 16 years—from 1943 to 1959—to win its point before the courts and get “liver” deleted.<sup>32</sup>

In addition, the FTC could not hope to regulate all advertising in interstate commerce—it could merely regulate by example, by pursuing a relatively small number of advertisers who appeared to operate in a deceptive fashion, in hopes that this would encourage others to tone down their advertising claims. It has been objected that during most of the FTC’s history, it has tended to go after “little guys” or unimportant issues, too often ignoring misdeeds by big and powerful corporations which tied into important issues.

Beyond that, the FTC’s enforcement machinery, for the most part, is creaky and slow. If an advertising campaign on television is deemed “deceptive” or “false and misleading” by the FTC, the ad campaign may have run its course (generally three months, six months, or nine months) before the FTC can have any impact. In lawyer’s jargon, such cases are moot, essentially. That is, all the FTC can say is, after the fact, “don’t do that any more.” So what? The advertising campaign complained of will have been replaced with another campaign.

The FTC has five weapons to use against misleading advertising:

- (1) *Letters of Compliance*—The FTC may be satisfied with an informal promise that the advertiser will cease certain practices. Such a procedure can often be effective from an FTC standpoint, and is less costly in both time and money than would be a more formal procedure.
- (2) *Stipulations*—The advertiser agrees in writing to cease and desist from practices which the FTC has investigated and found misleading. With both letters of compliance and the more formal stipulation agreements, the FTC reserves the right to prosecute the advertiser at a later date should it then appear that the advertising practices involved have done real harm.<sup>33</sup>
- (3) *Consent Orders*—These may be handed down by the FTC after a formal complaint has been issued by the Commission.

<sup>32</sup> Carter Products v. Federal Trade Commission, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959), certiorari denied 361 U.S. 884, 80 S.Ct. 155 (1959).

<sup>33</sup> See Rock v. Federal Trade Commission, 117 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1941); Note, “The Regulation of Advertising,” Columbia Law Review Vol. 56:7 (Nov. 1956) pp. 1019–1111, at p. 1034.

As is also true with the Letter of Compliance and Stipulation procedures, Consent Orders do not mean that advertisers are admitting guilt for engaging in an illegal, fraudulent advertising practice. The advertiser is merely agreeing not to continue a certain practice.<sup>34</sup>

- (4) *Cease and Desist Orders*—These are findings of “guilty” by the Commission after formal hearings have been held. Such orders may be appealed through the Federal Courts. Unless a cease and desist order of the FTC is appealed within 60 days after it is issued, the order becomes self-executing.<sup>35</sup>

The Federal statutes ruling this procedure have a built-in 60-day delay. If an advertiser decides not to appeal a cease-and-desist order of the FTC, he may continue to use the advertisement for 60 days, or until the cease-and-desist order goes into effect with the force of law. However, if the advertiser does appeal during the 60-day period, courts may then issue an injunction to prohibit further use of the advertising until the Federal courts have completed adjudicating the advertiser’s appeal.<sup>36</sup>

- (5) *Publicity*—The FTC publicizes the complaints and cease-and-desist orders which it promulgates. News releases on such subjects are regularly issued to the press, and publicity has proven to be a strong weapon at the Commission’s disposal.

It can be seen from the foregoing list of FTC activities that it is not solely dependent on harsh actions such as cease-and-desist orders or court procedures. The Commission also takes positive steps to attempt to clarify its view of fair advertising practices. The Commission has four major programs which attempt to secure voluntary compliance. These are:

1. **TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCES.** Since 1926, the FTC has held conferences tailored to the needs of specific industries to attempt to formulate clear rules for the application of federal laws regulating advertising. Following conferences with interested persons, public hearings are held on proposed rules. After the Commission adopts the rules, they are published in the Federal Register and members of the industry are invited to become signatories to the rules.

<sup>34</sup> Note, “Developments in the Law—Deceptive Advertising,” Harvard Law Review Vol. 80:5 (March, 1967), pp. 1005–1163, at p. 1072. For a list of federal and state statutes on advertising, see Note, “The Regulation of Advertising,” *op. cit.*, pp. 1097–1111.

<sup>35</sup> 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(c) (1964).

<sup>36</sup> 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. Article 45(c) (1964).

2. **INDUSTRY GUIDES.** This program involves issuing interpretations of the rules of the Commission to its staff. These guides are made available to the public, and are aimed at certain significant practices of a particular industry, especially those involved in advertising and labeling. The guides can be issued by the Commission as its interpretation of the law without a conference or hearings, and, therefore, in a minimum of time.
3. **ADVISORY OPINIONS.** In 1962, the FTC began giving advisory opinions in response to industry questions about the legality of a proposed industry action. Advisory opinions generally predict the FTC's response, although the Commission reserves the right to reconsider its advice if the public interest so requires.
4. **TRADE REGULATION RULES.** The FTC publishes a notice before issuing a Trade Regulation Rule on a specific practice. Industry representatives may then comment on the proposed Trade Regulation before the rule is adopted and put into effect.<sup>37</sup>

Unfortunately, voluntary compliance with laws and FTC rules is not always forthcoming. The FTC frequently is compelled to begin a case against an advertiser. Cases most often open after a complaint from an aggrieved citizen or a competitor who has suffered a loss because of what he believes to be illegal activity. The FTC also screens advertisements, looking for false or misleading statements. When a suspicious advertisement is found, a questionnaire is sent to the advertiser. The FTC may also request samples of the product advertised, if practicable. If the product is a compound, its formula may be requested. Copies of all advertisements published or broadcast during a specified period are requested, together with copies of supplementary information such as booklets, folders, or form letters.

Product samples may be inspected by the FTC or referred to another appropriate government agency for scientific analysis. If false or misleading advertising claims are indicated by such an examination, the advertiser is advised of the scientific opinions of the Commission's experts. The advertiser is allowed to submit evidence in support of his advertisement.

If the advertising is found truthful, the case is closed. However, if the Commission feels that the advertisement is false or misleading, a complaint may be issued. At this point it is also possible for the Commission to negotiate an agreement in which the advertiser agrees to "cease and desist" from practices which the FTC finds legally objectionable. Thus the Federal Trade Commission gives businessmen an opportunity to settle without the necessity of formal adversary proceedings.

<sup>37</sup> Federal Trade Commission, "Here is Your Federal Trade Commission," (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964) pp. 17-21.

If the advertiser ignores a cease and desist order, he is subject to a civil penalty of \$5,000 for each violation. If there is a violation of the Wheeler-Lea provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act involving false or misleading advertising of "food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics," the Commission may sue in U. S. District Court to enjoin temporarily the dissemination of the advertising. If such an injunction is granted, it will remain in force during court consideration of the FTC's complaint. Continued circulation of the advertising of a commodity which may be harmful to health or which is intended to defraud constitutes a misdemeanor. Convicted offenders may be fined up to \$5,000, sentenced to up to six months in jail, or both. Succeeding violations call for a fine of up to \$10,000, imprisonment for up to a year, or both.

The six "basic ground rules" described some years ago by former FTC Chairman Earl Kintner are useful in understanding just how the Commission approaches problems of controlling advertising.

1. *Tendency to deceive.* The Commission is empowered to act when representations have only a *tendency* to mislead or deceive. Proof of *actual* deception is not essential, although evidence of actual deception is apparently conclusive as to the deceptive quality of the advertisement in question.
2. *Immateriality of knowledge of falsity.* Since the purpose of the FTC act is consumer protection, the Government does not have to prove knowledge of falsity on the part of the advertiser; the businessman acts at his own peril.
3. *Immateriality of intent.* The intent of the advertiser is also entirely immaterial. An advertiser may have a wholly innocent intent and still violate the law.
4. *General public's understanding controls.* Since the purpose of the act is to protect the consumers, and since some consumers are "ignorant, unthinking and credulous," nothing less than "the most literal truthfulness" is tolerated. As the Supreme Court has stated, "laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious." Thus it is immaterial that an expert reader might be able to decipher the advertisement in question so as to avoid being misled.
5. *Literal truth sometimes insufficient.* Advertisements are not intended to be carefully dissected with a dictionary at hand, but rather are intended to produce an overall impression on the ordinary purchaser. An advertiser cannot present one overall impression and yet protect himself by pointing to a contrary impression which appears in a small and inconspicuous portion of the advertisement. Even though every sentence considered separately is true, the advertisement as a whole may be misleading because the message is composed in such a way as to mislead.



6. *Ambiguous advertisements interpreted to effect purposes of the law.* Since the purpose of the FTC Act is the prohibition of advertising which has a tendency and capacity to mislead, an advertisement which can be read to have two meanings is illegal if one of them is false or misleading.<sup>38</sup>

Strengthening of the FTC's regulatory powers came in 1973 in a stealthy fashion. While an energy crisis absorbed attention of Congress and of the public in 1973, a rider to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act gave the FTC powers which it had sought for years.<sup>39</sup> Thanks to that rider, the FTC was given the power to go to a federal court and ask for an injunction against an advertisement which is—in the eyes of the Commission—clearly in violation of federal law prohibiting false or misleading advertising. This injunctive sanction is not likely to be much used because it is so drastic. However, an injunction could—in critical instances—put a stop to ads which might otherwise continue to run through their campaign cycle, be it three months or six months or nine months, before the FTC could act.

More help was on the way for the FTC. In January, 1975, the "Consumer Product Warranties and Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act"—hereafter referred to as the Moss-Magnuson Act—was signed into law by President Gerald R. Ford.<sup>40</sup> One part of this measure was designed to provide minimum disclosure standards for written consumer product warranties. The standards of disclosure provide a challenge for those writing warranty statements analogous to trying to make a hit musical out of the instructions for filling out I.R.S. Form 1040. More important for this discussion is the FTC Improvements portion of this legislation.

Before the Moss-Magnuson Act, jurisdiction of the FTC was limited to advertising *in* interstate commerce. In 1941, the Supreme Court held that an Illinois company which limited its sales to wholesalers located only in Illinois was not "in [interstate] commerce,"<sup>41</sup> and was thus beyond the reach of FTC control. Now, under the new statute, the FTC can regulate advertising *affecting* commerce. A small change, on the surface, but not in actuality. This wording change gives the FTC the power, in effect, to say that *all* commerce affects interstate commerce, and therefore is under FTC jurisdiction.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Earl W. Kintner, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 64:7 (May, 1966), pp. 1269-1284, at pp. 1280-1281. Reprinted by permission.

<sup>39</sup> 15 U.S.C.A. § 53. See Note, " 'Corrective Advertising' Orders of the Federal Trade Commission," 85 Harvard Law Review (Dec. 1971), pp. 485-486. The FTC already had injunctive powers to deal with advertising for products which could pose an immediate health threat to consumers: medical devices, foods, drugs, and cosmetics.

<sup>40</sup> Pub.L. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).

<sup>41</sup> Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 61 S.Ct. 580 (1941).

<sup>42</sup> Moss-Magnuson Act, Pub.L. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).

Also, the Moss-Magnuson Act has given the power to the Commission to get beyond of "regulation by example"—that is, to do more than let a shave cream manufacturer know with a cease-and-desist order that an advertising campaign was considered misleading by the FTC. Now, the FTC is able to issue Trade Regulation Rules which can apply to an entire product type or industry. Trade Regulation Rules—when formally issued by the FTC—have the force of law. Fines for violation of a Trade Regulation Rule through misleading advertising can draw fines of up to \$10,000 a day, so the FTC now has the clout to get advertisers to pay attention.<sup>43</sup>

### SEC. 85. LITERAL TRUTH IS NOT ENOUGH

**Even literally true statements may cause an advertiser difficulty if those statements are part of a misleading advertisement.**

Sometimes even the *literal truth* can be misleading. When truth misleads in an advertisement, the FTC is able to issue a "cease and desist" order and make it stick. A photo album sales scheme offers a case in point. Door-to-door salesmen told customers that for \$39.95, they could take advantage of a "once in a lifetime combination offer" and receive a "free" album by purchasing 10 photographic portraits at the "regular price" of the photographs alone.

The FTC ordered the company selling the photo albums to stop suggesting that its albums were given away free, when in fact the albums were part of a \$39.95 package deal. The company was also ordered to stop claiming that it sold only to "selected persons" and that a special price was involved. The photo album company retorted that its sales pitch was the literal truth, and that the FTC's cease and desist order should, therefore, be set aside by the courts.<sup>44</sup> The company argued that its customers actually were "selected;" that the word "few" is a relative term which is very elastic, and that the \$39.95 price was in fact "promotional" because it tended to support the sale of the albums.

A U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the FTC's cease and desist order. The Circuit Court announced that there should be a presumption of validity when courts reviewed FTC orders involving advertising. Tendencies of advertisements to mislead or deceive were held to be factual questions which would be determined by the FTC. Finally, the Circuit Court vigorously upheld the idea that even literal truthfulness of statement cannot protect an advertisement if it is misleading. A statement may be deceptive even if the constituent

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> *Kalwajtys v. Federal Trade Commission*, 237 F.2d 654, 655-656 (7th Cir. 1957).

words may be literally or technically construed so as not to constitute a misrepresentation.<sup>45</sup>

Other courts' decisions have supported FTC contentions that literal truth of an advertisement is not enough to prevent it from being misleading, as illustrated in the case of *P. Lorillard Co. v. Federal Trade Commission* (1950). An advertisement for Old Gold cigarettes during the late 1940s urged readers to see an issue of *Reader's Digest* magazine which reported tests on the tar and nicotine content of various brands of cigarettes. True, Old Golds, among six leading cigarette brands, had been found by scientific tests to have less—infinitesimally less—nicotine and tar than the other brands. This led to advertising blurbs that Old Golds were “lowest in throat-irritating tars and resins.”

The FTC issued a cease and desist order, saying that it was false and misleading advertising. In upholding the FTC order, a United States Court of Appeals quoted from the *Reader's Digest* article: “The laboratory's general conclusion will be bad news for the advertising copy writers but good news for the smoker, who need no longer worry as to which cigarette can most effectively nail down his coffin. For one nail is just about as good as another.”<sup>46</sup> The court denounced the advertisement saying:<sup>47</sup>

An examination of the advertisements \* \* \* shows a perversion of the meaning of the *Readers Digest* article which does little credit to the company's advertising department,—a perversion which results in the use of the truth in such a way as to cause the reader to believe the exact opposite of what was intended by the writer of the article  
\* \* \*

A more recent case involved the seemingly endless advertising battles among manufacturers of aspirin and competing analgesic products. An FTC attempt to get a temporary injunction against advertising by the makers of Bayer Aspirin failed in 1963 after a strenuous court battle. Bayer Aspirin's tribulations with the FTC in this case originated from an article published late in 1962 in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*. Two medical doctors had studied pain-relieving effectiveness of five leading analgesics: Bayer Aspirin, St. Joseph's Aspirin, Bufferin, Anacin, and Excedrin. The doctor's study “failed to show any statistically significant difference among the drugs” as far as pain-relieving capabilities were concerned. However, the doctors' study did have some findings which advertising copywriters for Bayer Aspirin seized upon:

<sup>45</sup> 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1957).

<sup>46</sup> *P. Lorillard Co. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 186 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1950).

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

Excedrin and Anacin form a group for which the incidence of upset stomach is significantly greater than is the incidence after [taking] Bayer Aspirin, St. Joseph's Aspirin, [or] Bufferin \* \* \*.

This study was supported by a grant from the Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

The U.S. Court of Appeals was sympathetic to Sterling Drug, makers of Bayer, noting that one of its competitors had boasted that its product "works twice as fast as aspirin" and "protects you against stomach distress you can get from aspirin alone."<sup>48</sup> The court commented on the Bayer advertising:

Believing that the Judgment Day has finally arrived and seeking to counteract the many years of hard sell by what it now believed to be the hard facts, Sterling and its co-defendants prepared and disseminated advertising of which the following, appearing in Life magazine and numerous newspapers throughout the country, is representative:

"GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED MEDICAL TEAM COMPARES BAYER ASPIRIN AND FOUR OTHER POPULAR PAIN RELIEVERS."

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"FINDINGS REPORTED IN THE HIGHLY AUTHORITATIVE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION REVEAL THAT THE HIGHER PRICED COMBINATION-OF-INGREDIENTS PAIN RELIEVERS UPSET THE STOMACH WITH SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER FREQUENCY THAN ANY OF THE OTHER PRODUCTS TESTED, WHILE BAYER ASPIRIN BRINGS RELIEF THAT IS AS FAST, AS STRONG, AND AS GENTLE TO THE STOMACH AS YOU CAN GET."

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The court denied the FTC's application for a temporary injunction against the advertising. The Commission had objected that the Bayer Aspirin advertisements had "falsely represented, directly and by implication," the findings of the medical researchers who were endorsed by the United States Government and also by the American Medical Association and by the medical profession. This injunction the FTC had argued to be in the public interest, "since the consuming public would otherwise unwarrantedly rely upon the advertising to their [sic] 'irreparable injury' \* \* \*".<sup>49</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Federal Trade Commission v. Sterling Drug Co., 317 F.2d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1963).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., pp. 673-674.

The court, however, stated that the Commission had not shown grounds for a reasonable belief that the public would be misled by the Sterling Drug Company's advertisements. The court added:

Our affirmance of the order of the District Court [refusing the FTC's application for a temporary injunction to halt use of the Bayer advertisement] should not, however, be thought to render fruitless the Commission's activities in its pending administrative proceeding against Sterling Drug, Inc. Should further evidence be adduced, a cease and desist order may well be had \* \* \*.<sup>50</sup>

A famous case in which the FTC—supported by the courts—held an advertiser responsible for the *literal* meaning of his words is the 1944 decision in *Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission*.<sup>51</sup> A cosmetics firm was using the trademark "Rejuvenescence" for a face cream. This trademark, in the view of the FTC, was utilized in such a manner that the cream promised a youthful complexion to the user regardless of her age. In upholding the FTC's cease and desist order against the Charles of the Ritz Corporation, a United States Circuit Court of Appeals said that "[t]he important criterion is the impression which the advertisement is likely to make upon the general populace \* \* \*," although experts or knowledgeable persons would not be deceived by such a statement. The court defended the right of the FTC to protect the gullible:<sup>52</sup>

And, while the wise and the worldly may well realize the falsity of any representations that the present product can roll back the years, there remains "that vast multitude" of others who, like Ponce de Leon, still seek a perpetual fountain of youth. As the Commission's expert further testified, the average woman, conditioned by talk in magazines and over the radio of "vitamins, hormones, and God knows what," might take "rejuvenescence" to mean that this \* \* \* is "something which would actually cause her youth to be restored." It is for this reason that the Commission may "insist upon the most literal truthfulness," in advertisements \* \* \* so that, in the words of the

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 678.

<sup>51</sup> 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 680; see also *Gelb v. Federal Trade Commission*, 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944), where a claim that a compound could color hair "permanently" was taken literally by the FTC and the courts and held to be misleading. If an ad's statement is sufficiently sweeping so that no one should believe it, it becomes "puffery," a form of legalized lying. See Ivan L. Preston, "The FTC's Handling of Puffery \* \* \*," 5 *Journal of Business Research* (June, 1977) pp. 155-181.

prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein'."

## SEC. 86. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE "SANDPAPER SHAVE" CASE

**In the famed 1965 decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Colgate Palmolive Company, the Supreme Court attempted to define which kinds of "mock-up" demonstrations were permissible in television commercials.**

Advertising—especially television advertising—can be frivolous even if not amusing. There were some entertaining features behind a 1965 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court sometimes termed "The Great Sandpaper Shave" case.<sup>53</sup> Kyle Rote and Frank Gifford—both professional football players more recently well known as sports commentators—figured prominently in this story. In 1959 Rote and Gifford, both rugged males with heavy "sandpaper beards," appeared in advertisements for a Colgate-Palmolive Co. product, Rapid Shave aerosol shaving cream.

The televised commercials showed both Rote and Gifford shaving easily and unconcernedly with Rapid Shave.<sup>54</sup> The advertising firm of Ted Bates & Company, Inc. prepared commercials to demonstrate that "Rapid Shave out-shaves them all." The commercials showed that Rapid Shave not only worked well on heavy beards, but could soften even coarse sandpaper. An announcer smoothly told the audience that, "To prove RAPID SHAVE'S super-moisturizing power, we put it right from the can onto this tough, dry sandpaper. It was apply \* \* \* soak \* \* \* and off in a stroke.'" As the announcer spoke, Rapid Shave was applied to a substance that appeared to be sandpaper, and immediately thereafter a razor was shown shaving the substance clean, removing every abrasive grain in its path.<sup>55</sup>

By the time the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint against Colgate and Bates, the "sandpaper shave" commercial was old-hat to television viewers. An FTC hearing examiner took testimony after the FTC's complaint that the commercial was deceptive. Evidence showed that sandpaper of the kind used in the commercial could not be "shaved" immediately after the Rapid Shave had been applied, but needed a lengthy soaking period of about 80 minutes. The FTC examiner also found that the substance shaved in the Ted

<sup>53</sup> Federal Trade Commission v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 85 S.Ct. 1035 (1965). For an amusing account of this case, see Daniel Seligman, "The Great Sandpaper Shave: A Real-Life Story of Truth in Advertising," *Fortune* (Dec. 1964) pp. 131-133ff.

<sup>54</sup> Seligman, *ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>55</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 376, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1038 (1965).

Bates-produced commercial was in fact a simulated prop or “mock-up” made of plexiglas to which sand had been applied. The examiner *did* find, however, that Rapid Shave could shave sandpaper, even if a much longer time was needed than represented by the commercials. As a result, the examiner dismissed the FTC complaint, because in his opinion there had been no material deception that would mislead the public.<sup>56</sup>

The Federal Trade Commission was of a different mind and overturned the ruling of the hearing examiner late in 1961. The Commission reasoned that the undisclosed use of plexiglas as a substitute for sandpaper—plus the fact that Rapid Shave could not shave sandpaper within the time depicted in commercials—amounted to materially deceptive acts. Furthermore, even if sandpaper could be shaved just as the commercials showed, the Commission decided that viewers had been tricked into believing that they had seen, with their own eyes, the actual shaving being done. The Commission issued a cease-and-desist order against Colgate and Bates, forbidding them from taking these actions:<sup>57</sup>

Representing, directly or by implication, *in describing, explaining, or purporting to prove the quality or merits of any products, that pictures, depictions, or demonstrations \* \* \* are genuine or accurate representations \* \* \* of, or prove the quality or merits of, any product, when such pictures, depictions, or demonstrations are not in fact genuine or accurate representations \* \* \* of, or do not prove the quality or merits of, any such product.*

This inclusive Federal Trade Commission order of December 29, 1961, set off protracted litigation. When a Court of Appeals considered the FTC order, it expressed concern that the flexible Article 5 of the FTC Act was being used in a hitherto unexplored area. Article 5 provides:

Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.<sup>58</sup>

The Supreme Court of the United States noted:<sup>59</sup>

The breadth of the Commission’s order was potentially limitless, apparently establishing a per se rule prohibiting the use of simulated props in all television commercials since commercials by definition describe “the qualities or

<sup>56</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 376–377, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1038 (1965).

<sup>57</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 380, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1040 (1965), quoting 59 F.T.C. 1452, 1477–1478. Emphasis the Court’s.

<sup>58</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 376n, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1038n, quoting 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 52 Stat. 111, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (1958 ed.).

<sup>59</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 380, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1040 (1965).

merits" of products. The court's impression that the order was "quite ambiguous" was not alleviated when in oral argument counsel for the Commission stated that if a prominent person appeared on television saying "I love Lipsom's ice tea," while drinking something that appeared to be tea but in fact was not the commercial would be a deceptive practice.

The Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the FTC was going too far in declaring all mock-ups illegal. The court declared, "where the only untruth is that the substance [the viewer] sees on the screen is artificial, and the visual appearance is otherwise a correct and accurate representation of the product itself, he is not injured."<sup>60</sup>

Following this ruling by the Circuit Court, the FTC entered a new "proposed final order" on February 18, 1963, attempting to answer the court's criticisms of its earlier order to Colgate and Bates. The Commission explained that it did not intend to prohibit all undisclosed simulated props in commercials, but merely wanted to prohibit Colgate and Bates from misrepresenting to the public that it was actually seeing for itself a test, experiment or demonstration which purportedly proved a product claim. The Commission argued that the "sandpaper shave" commercial's demonstration left a misleading impression that a demonstration or experiment had actually been performed. On May 7, 1963, the Commission issued its final order that Colgate and Bates cease and desist from:<sup>61</sup>

Unfairly or deceptively advertising any \* \* \* product by presenting a test, experiment or demonstration that (1) is represented to the public as actual proof of a claim made for the product which is material to inducing a sale, and (2) is not in fact a genuine test, experiment or demonstration being conducted as represented and does not in fact constitute actual proof of the claim, because of the undisclosed use and substitution of a mock-up or prop instead of the product, article, or substance represented to be used therein.

Although Colgate and Bates also challenged the 1963 FTC order, the Supreme Court of the United States made the order stick. Note that the use of *all* mock-ups in televised commercials was not

<sup>60</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 381, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1040 (1968), quoting 310 F.2d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 1962).

<sup>61</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 382, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1041 (1965), quoting Colgate Palmolive Co., No. 7736, FTC, May 7, 1963. This clause was added by the FTC for the benefit of Ted Bates & Co., because advertising agencies do not always have all the information about a product that a manufacturer has. The clause said, "provided, however, that respondent [Bates] neither knew nor had reason to know that the product, article or substance used in the test, experiment, or demonstration was a mock-up or a prop."



forbidden as deceptive. The Court found that “the undisclosed use of plexiglas” in the Rapid Shave commercials was “a material deceptive practice.”<sup>62</sup> But there is a fine line between the forbidden kind of “demonstration” in the Rapid Shave commercial and an acceptable “commercial which extolled the goodness of ice cream while giving viewers a picture of a scoop of mashed potatoes appearing to be ice cream.” The Court was able to draw such a distinction, stating:<sup>63</sup>

In the ice cream case the mashed potato prop is not being used for additional proof of the product claim, while the purpose of the Rapid Shave commercial is to give the viewer objective proof of the claims made. If in the ice cream hypothetical the focus of the commercial becomes the undisclosed potato prop and the viewer is invited, explicitly or by implication, to see for himself the truth of the claims about the ice cream’s rich texture and full color, and perhaps compare it to a “rival product,” then the commercial has become similar \* \* \* [to the Rapid Shave commercial.] Clearly, however, a commercial which depicts happy actors delightedly eating ice cream that is in fact mashed potatoes or drinking a product appearing to be coffee but which is in fact some other substance is not covered by the present order.

### SEC. 87. CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING ORDERS OF THE FTC

**The Federal Trade Commission has attempted to enforce truth in advertising by requiring some advertisers to correct past misstatements.**

After being roughly handled by critics ranging from Ralph Nader to the American Bar Association during the late 1960’s, the Federal Trade Commission of the 1970’s became much more active than in previous years. Symptomatic of this increased activity was an FTC complaint against Standard Oil Company of California. The company’s advertising had been claiming that its Chevron gasoline, thanks to an additive called F-310, could significantly decrease harmful substances in auto exhaust emissions, thus helping to reduce air pollution. This sort of corporate “we’re good for the environment” advertising has been termed “Eco-Porn” (ecological pornography) by some cynical critics of advertising.

<sup>62</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 390, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1045 (1965).

<sup>63</sup> 380 U.S. 374, 390, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1047 (1965). See also *Campbell Soup Co.*, 3 Trade Reg.Rep. Para. 19,261 (FTC, 1970); the Campbell Soup Co. consented to stop the practice of putting marbles in soup bowls to force solid chunks of meat and vegetables up to the surface of the soup so as to be visible to viewers of television ads.

In any event, the FTC proposed a cease and desist order to put a halt to allegedly misleading F-310 advertising claims, but the matter did not end there. The FTC also demanded that Standard Oil Company run "corrective" ads for a year, disclosing that its earlier advertising campaign had included false and deceptive statements. The FTC proposed that 25 per cent of the advertising for Chevron—either published space or broadcast time—be devoted to making "affirmative disclosure" about the earlier, misleading advertising.<sup>64</sup> FTC Administrative Judge Eldon Shrup later dismissed charges that the F-310 advertising claims were false "for failure of proof."<sup>65</sup>

Other corporate defendants in cases where the FTC has sought to obtain corrective advertising include Coca Cola, for claims made about nutrient and vitamin content of its Hi-C fruit drinks,<sup>66</sup> and ITT Continental Baking Company, for ads implying that eating Profile Bread could help people to lose weight. The FTC charged that Profile was different from other bread only in being more thinly sliced, meaning that there were seven fewer calories per slice. ITT Continental Baking Company consented to a cease and desist order which does two things: first, it prohibits all further claims of weight-reducing attributes for Profile Bread, and second, the company has to devote 25 per cent of its Profile advertising for one year to disclosing that the bread is not effective for weight reduction.<sup>67</sup> Television commercials indeed appeared, with an actress saying sweetly:<sup>68</sup>

I'd like to clear up any misunderstandings you may have about Profile Bread from its advertising or even its name. Does Profile have fewer calories than other breads? No, Profile has about the same per ounce as other breads. To be exact Profile has 7 fewer calories per slice. That's because it's sliced thinner. But eating Profile will not cause you to lose weight. A reduction of 7 calories is insignificant. \* \* \*

Law Professor William F. Lemke, Jr. contended that such "affirmative disclosure" orders as part of cease and desist orders mean that the FTC is exceeding its authority. He has suggested that courts

<sup>64</sup> 3 Trade Reg.Rep. Para. 19,428 (FTC Complaint issued, Dec. 29, 1970). See also William F. Lemke, Jr., "Souped Up Affirmative Disclosure Orders of the Federal Trade Commission," 4 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform (Winter, 1970) pp. 180-181; Note, "'Corrective Advertising' Orders of the Federal Trade Commission," 85 Harvard Law Review (December, 1971) pp. 477-478.

<sup>65</sup> Federal Trade Commission News, "FTC Administrative Law Judge Dismisses 'Chevron' Complaint," release date May 9, 1973.

<sup>66</sup> 3 Trade Reg.Rep. Para. 19,351 (FTC, 1970).

<sup>67</sup> 3 Trade Reg.Rep. Para. 19,780 (FTC, Aug. 17, 1971); Note, "'Corrective Advertising' Orders of the Federal Trade Commission," 85 Harvard Law Review (December, 1971), p. 478.

<sup>68</sup> *Newsweek*, Sept. 27, 1971, p. 98.

reviewing the appropriateness of such orders may regard them as punitive rather than regulatory.<sup>69</sup> Other legal scholars, however, regard “corrective advertising” orders of the FTC as legitimate and potentially useful additions to the regulation of advertising.<sup>70</sup>

Such orders, however, are mere palliatives, and do nothing to solve the FTC’s great problems with delays. Delays of from three to five years between issuance of an FTC complaint and final issuance of a cease and desist order are commonplace. Meanwhile, the advertiser is free to continue his advertising campaign: “By the time the order has become final, the particular campaign has probably been squeezed dry, if not already discarded in favor of a fresh one.”<sup>71</sup>

The FTC—as if to confound some of its earlier critics—has shown increasing willingness to move against advertising campaigns by big-name firms or products. “Listerine Antiseptic Mouthwash,” a product of the Warner-Lambert Company had advertised its product for years as preventing or alleviating the common cold. The FTC ordered in 1972 that Warner-Lambert disclose in future advertisements that: “Contrary to prior advertising, Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity.” Hearing the case on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the order, but dropped the phrase “Contrary to Prior Advertising.”<sup>72</sup> Writing for the court in 1977, Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright found persuasive scientific testimony that gargling Listerine could not help a sore throat because its active ingredients could not penetrate tissue cells to reach viruses. “[T]he Commission found that the ability of Listerine to kill germs by millions on contact is of no medical significance in the treatment of colds or sore throats. Expert testimony showed that bacteria in the oral cavity, the ‘germs’ which Listerine purports to kill, do not cause colds and play no role in cold symptoms.”<sup>73</sup>

The makers of Listerine had told an FTC Administrative Law Judge that the FTC evidence against the mouthwash was contradicted by a study done by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which had termed Listerine “likely to be effective” as an over-the-counter cold remedy. Circuit Judge Wright, however said that the “likely to be effective” language did not accurately reflect the FDA study, which, in any case, was based on less extensive data than the FTC study.<sup>74</sup> In this case the Warner-Lambert Company was not playing for small monetary stakes. The FTC required the corrective

<sup>69</sup> Lemke, *op. cit.*, pp. 180, 191.

<sup>70</sup> Note, “‘Corrective Advertising’ Orders of the Federal Trade Commission,” 85 *Harvard Law Review* (December, 1971) p. 506.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 482–483.

<sup>72</sup> *Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC*, 562 F.2d 749, 762 (C.A.D.C.1977).

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 754.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 755.

advertising statement to appear in Listerine advertising until about \$10 million had been spent on touting the mouthwash.

The Warner-Lambert Company also played for high legal stakes in this suit, challenging the very authority of the FTC to issue "corrective advertising" orders. The Commission contended, on the other hand, that the affirmative disclosure that Listerine will not prevent colds or lessen their severity is needed to give effect to a cease and desist order which would remove the misleading claim from the mouthwash's ads.<sup>75</sup>

Delving into the legislative history of the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act, the Wheeler-Lea amendments of 1938, and the 1975 amendments to the FTC Act, the court held that corrective advertising had not been removed from the Commission's remedies. The Circuit Court also rejected arguments that mandatory corrective advertising is unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment:<sup>76</sup>

A careful reading of *Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council* compels rejection of this argument. For the Supreme Court expressly noted that the First Amendment presents "no obstacle" to government regulation of false or misleading advertising. The First Amendment, the Court said,

as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely.<sup>77</sup>

In a footnote the Court went on to delineate several differences between commercial speech and other forms which may suggest "that a different degree of protection is necessary \* \* \*." For example, the Court said, they may

make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.<sup>78</sup>

Having concluded that the First Amendment did not preclude corrective advertising orders and that the FTC has the power to issue such orders, the Court then turned to the question whether the remedy used against Listerine was warranted and equitable.<sup>79</sup>

Our role in reviewing the remedy is limited. The Supreme Court has set forth the standard:

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 756.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 758-759.

<sup>77</sup> 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (1976).

<sup>78</sup> 425 U.S. 748, 772, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1831 (1976). See also *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona*, 431 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 762.

The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.<sup>80</sup>

The Commission has adopted the following standard for the imposition of corrective advertising:

[I]f a deceptive advertisement has played a substantial role in creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false and material belief which lives on after the false advertising ceases, there is clear and continuing injury to competition and to the consuming public as consumers continue to make purchasing decisions based on the false belief. Since this injury cannot be averted by merely requiring respondent to cease disseminating the advertisement, we may appropriately order respondent to take affirmative action designed to terminate the otherwise continuing ill effects of the advertisement.

We think this standard is entirely reasonable. It dictates two factual inquiries: (1) did Listerine's advertisements play a substantial role in creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false belief about the product? and (2) would this belief linger on after the false advertising ceases? It strikes us that if the answer to both questions is not yes, companies everywhere may be wasting their massive advertising budgets. Indeed, it is more than a little peculiar to hear petitioner assert that its commercials really have no effect on consumer belief.

The court next turned to the specific disclosure required ("Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity.") and the duration of the FTC's disclosure requirement. The disclosure "must be displayed in type size at least as large as that in which the principal portion of the text of the advertisement appears and it must be separated from the text so that it can be readily noticed." On television, the disclosure must be presented via both audio and video. Those specifications, the court said, "are well calculated to assure that the disclosure will reach the public."<sup>81</sup> As for the duration of the corrective disclosure—which would amount to about one year if Listerine continued to advertise at its 1977 rate—the Court said it was not an unreasonably long time in which

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, quoting *Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC*, 327 U.S. 608, 612–613, 66 S.Ct. 758, 760 (1946).

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 763–764.

to correct a hundred years of cold claims. Therefore, the corrective order of the FTC against Listerine was upheld.

## SEC. 88. OTHER FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

**In addition to the Federal Trade Commission, many other federal agencies—including the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Post Office Department—exert controls over advertising in interstate commerce.**

Although of paramount importance as a control over advertising, the FTC does not stand alone among federal agencies in its fight against suspect advertising. Federal agencies which have powers over advertising include:

- (1) The Food and Drug Administration
- (2) The Federal Communications Commission
- (3) The Post Office Department
- (4) The Securities and Exchange Commission
- (5) The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service

Such a list by no means exhausts the number of federal agencies which, tangentially at least, can exert some form of control over advertising. Bodies such as the Federal Aeronautics Authority and perhaps the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Power Commission have power to curtail advertising abuses connected with matters under each agency's jurisdiction.<sup>82</sup>

### 1. Food and Drug Administration

The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) activities in controlling labelling and misbranding overlap the powers of the FTC to a considerable degree. The Pure Food and Drug Act gives the FDA jurisdiction over misbranding and mislabelling of foods, drugs, and cosmetics.<sup>83</sup> The FTC, however, was likewise given jurisdiction over foods, drugs, and cosmetics by the Wheeler-Lea Amendment.<sup>84</sup> The FTC and the FDA have agreed upon a division of labor whereby FTC concentrates on false advertising and the FDA focuses attention on false labelling.<sup>85</sup> However, this division of labor is quite

<sup>82</sup> See Note, "The Regulation of Advertising," *Columbia Law Review* Vol. 56:7 (Nov. 1956) pp. 1019-1111, at p. 1054, citing 24 Stat. 378 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1952) (ICC); 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C.A. § 791(a) (1952) (FTC); 52 Stat. 1003 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 491 (1952).

<sup>83</sup> 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1964).

<sup>84</sup> See "The Wheeler Lea Amendment" to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (1964).

<sup>85</sup> See, for example, 2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.), Paragraph 8540, p. 17,081 (1954).

inexact. Pamphlets or literature distributed with a product have been held to be "labels" for purposes of FDA enforcement.<sup>86</sup>

## 2. The Federal Communications Commission

The Federal Communications Commission has been endowed by Congress with licensing and regulatory powers over broadcasting.<sup>87</sup> Although prohibited from exercising censorship over broadcasting stations, the FCC does have the power to judge overall performance when considering renewal of a station's license every three years. According to the Communications Act of 1934, broadcast licenses are granted or renewed if it is judged that a station operating in "the public interest, convenience, and necessity."<sup>88</sup> Occasionally, the FCC has looked at the merits and demerits of advertising broadcast by a station as it considered license renewal.<sup>89</sup>

FCC powers over advertising, however, were long regarded as potential and indirect rather than actual and direct.<sup>90</sup>

The FCC became more directly concerned with advertising in the mid-1960s. The Commission was drawn more heavily into this area by the troubled interrelationship between advertising and the issues which surfaced during the controversy over cigarette smoking and its harmful effects. The FCC's involvement began, with a letter in 1966 from John F. Banzhaf III, a young New York lawyer. Banzhaf complained that a network-owned station in New York, WCBS-TV had broadcast many cigarette commercials without allowing time for spokesmen to rebut the ads with information about smoking's harmful effects. WCBS-TV replied that it had telecast numerous programs, from 1962 to 1966, about the hazards cigarettes present to health.<sup>90a</sup>

In his letter, Banzhaf urged that the FCC's long-standing "Fairness Doctrine" be invoked to allow replies to the many cigarette advertisements broadcast every day.<sup>91</sup> The Fairness Doctrine, in the

<sup>86</sup> See *U. S. v. Kordel*, 164 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1947); *U. S. v. Article of Device Labeled in Part "110 V Vapozone"*, 194 F.Supp. 332 (D.C.Cal.1961).

<sup>87</sup> Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1964). See Appendix E, *The Federal Communications Commission and Cigarette Advertising*.

<sup>88</sup> 48 Stat. 1083, 1091 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 307, 326 (1964).

<sup>89</sup> See, e. g., a case involving advertisements by a physician, *Farmers & Bankers Life Insurance Co.*, 2 F.C.C. 455 (1936); for a case involving a lottery, *WRBL Radio Station, Inc.*, 2 F.C.C. 687 (1936).

<sup>90</sup> See Note, "The Regulation of Advertising," *Columbia Law Review* Vol. 56 (1956) pp. 1019-1111, at pp. 1045-1046.

<sup>90a</sup> "Fairness, Freedom, and Cigarette Advertising, A Defense of the Federal Communications Commission," *Columbia Law Review* Vol. 67 (1967) pp. 1470-1489; Norman P. Leventhal, "Caution: Cigarette Commercials May Be Hazardous to Your License—The New Aspect of Fairness," *Federal Communications Bar Journal* Vol. 22:1 (1968) pp. 55-124, at pp. 92-93.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

past, has dealt primarily with the presentation of news or editorial matter. As articulated by the FCC in its 1949 report, *Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees*, the Fairness Doctrine—before Banzhaf—meant this: Issues of public significance should be broadcast in such a manner that the public will hear important—if not all—sides of such matters.<sup>92</sup> This FCC doctrine became a United States statute in a 1959 amendment to the Communications Act.<sup>93</sup> The 1959 amendment said:<sup>94</sup>

Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford a reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.

On June 2, 1967, the FCC sent a letter to WCBS-TV, holding that the Fairness Doctrine was applicable to cigarette advertising, and that a station broadcasting cigarette advertising must give responsible voices opposing smoking an opportunity to be heard.<sup>95</sup>

That decision of the FCC—and the viability of the entire Fairness Doctrine as well—were in doubt for some time: the Fairness Doctrine was under attack in a case in the federal court system.<sup>96</sup> In the spring of 1969, however, the Supreme Court, in deciding two cases which did not involve advertising, upheld the Fairness Doctrine. The Court's language was broad enough to include not only the right to answer personal attacks and political editorializing but also seemed to have enough scope to provide opportunity for answers to be broadcast to advertising which dealt with controversial political or social issues.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>92</sup> 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949), also published in 25 Pike & Fischer Radio Regulations 1901 (1963).

<sup>93</sup> 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(a) (1964); see also Note, "Administrative Law—FCC Fairness Doctrine—Applicability to Advertising," Iowa Law Review Vol. 53:2 (Oct.1967) pp. 480-491, at pp. 481-482.

<sup>94</sup> 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(a).

<sup>95</sup> WCBS-TV Case, 9 Pike & Fischer Radio Regulations 2d 1423 (1967); Leventhal, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

<sup>96</sup> See *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 381 F.2d 908 (1967), which upheld the Fairness Doctrine as 1) a constitutional delegation of Congress' legislative power; 2) sufficiently explicit to avoid being unconstitutionally vague; 3) not in violation of the 9th and 10th amendments to the Constitution, and 4) not an abrogation of broadcasting station licensees' rights under the 1st and 5th amendments.

<sup>97</sup> See *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794 (1969), discussed Chapter 13.



The Court declared:<sup>98</sup>

Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. \* \* \* "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private license. \* \* \* [S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression, it is the essence of self government. \* \* \* It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.

\* \* \*

In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the regulations and ruling at issue are both authorized by statute and constitutional.

For further discussion of the FCC and the Fairness Doctrine in relation to advertising, see Section 93 later in this chapter.

### 3. The Post Office Department

Postal controls over advertising can be very severe. Congress was provided with lawmaking power to operate the postal system under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. This power has been delegated by Congress to a Postmaster General and his Post Office Department. It has long been established that the mails could not be used to carry things which, in the judgment of Congress, were socially harmful.<sup>99</sup> The Postmaster General has the power to exclude articles or substances which Congress has proscribed as non-mailable. With non-advertising written or pictorial matter, however, Post Office Department actions limiting freedom of expression have been kept in careful check by the courts. If it appears that the

<sup>98</sup> 395 U.S. 367, 390, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1806, 1812 (1969).

<sup>99</sup> See, for example, early federal laws on obscenity discussed in Chapter 11, or see *Public Clearing House v. Coyne*, 194 U.S. 497, 24 S.Ct. 789 (1904).

Postmaster General's denial of the mails to a publication has been arbitrary, the courts have not allowed such decisions to stand.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps the Post Office's greatest deterrent to false advertising is contained in the Postmaster General's administrative power to issue "fraud orders." Suppose that postal inspectors find that the Zilch Merchandising Corporation of Chillblain Falls, Minnesota, has been engaged in a mail fraud scheme based upon dishonest advertising promises. The Post Office Department, by issuing a fraud order, will halt all mail addressed to Zilch Merchandising in Chillblain Falls. Such mail will be labeled "FRAUDULENT," and returned it to senders. Therefore, the person or company sending false advertising through the mail cannot profit from it once the administrative fraud order has been issued.<sup>2</sup>

Such cases are heard by Hearings Examiners, who can recommend issuance of a fraud order. This decision may be appealed to the Post Office Department's judicial officer, who issues decisions under authority of the Postmaster General. The Judicial Officer's decision may be appealed to a United States District Court.<sup>3</sup>

The administrative fraud order is not the only kind of mail fraud action available to the Post Office Department. Instead of administrative procedure through the Department, a *criminal* mail fraud case may be started. Criminal cases are prosecuted by a U.S. attorney in a United States District Court. Conviction under the federal mail fraud statute can result in a fine of up to \$1,000, imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both.<sup>4</sup> Criminal fraud orders are used when the Post Office Department wishes to operate in a punitive fashion. The administrative fraud orders, on the other hand, are more preventive in nature.

#### 4. The Securities and Exchange Commission

Securities markets are attractive to fast-buck artists, so the sale and publicizing of securities are kept under a watchful governmental eye. Most states have "Blue Sky" laws which enable a state agency to halt the circulation of false or misleading information about the sale of stocks, bonds or the like.<sup>5</sup> The work of the Securities and Exchange Commission, however, is far more important in protecting the public.

<sup>1</sup> Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 66 S.Ct. 456 (1946).

<sup>2</sup> Or, if a lottery is involved, the mail will be stamped "lottery mail" and returned to its senders. See the discussion of lotteries later in this chapter. 74 Stat. 654 (1960), 39 U.S.C.A. § 4005 (1965).

<sup>3</sup> See Robert M. Ague, Jr., "Intent to Defraud in Postal Fraud Order Cases," Temple Law Quarterly Vol. 38:1 (Fall, 1964) at p. 62.

<sup>4</sup> 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1964); Ague, *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>5</sup> See Note, "The Regulation of Advertising," Columbia Law Review *op. cit.* p. 1065.

After the stock market debacle of 1929, strong regulations were instituted at the federal level to prevent deceptive statements about securities. Taken together, the Securities Act of 1933<sup>6</sup> and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934<sup>7</sup> gave the S.E.C. great power over the sale and issuance of securities.

Sale of securities to investors cannot proceed until complete and accurate information has been given, registering the certificates with the S.E.C.<sup>8</sup> A briefer version of the registration statement is used in the "prospectus" circulated among prospective investors before the stock or bond can be offered for sale.<sup>9</sup> If misleading statements have been made about a security "in any material respect" in either registration documents or in the prospectus, the Commission may issue a "stop order" which removes the right to sell the security.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, unless a security is properly registered and its prospectus accurate, it is a criminal offense to use the mails to sell it or to advertise it for sale.<sup>11</sup>

An unscrupulous seller of securities has more to fear than just the S.E.C. Under a provision of the United States Code, a person who has lost money because he was tricked by a misleading prospectus may sue a number of individuals, including persons who signed the S.E.C. registration statement and every director, officer, or partner in the firm issuing the security.<sup>12</sup>

### 5. The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, Internal Revenue Service

Ever since this nation's unsuccessful experiment with prohibition, the federal government has kept a close eye on liquor advertising. The responsible agency is the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service.<sup>13</sup> Liquor advertising may not include false or misleading statements, and may not disparage competing products. False statements may include misrepresenting the age of a liquor, or claiming that its alcoholic content is higher than it is in reality.<sup>14</sup>

The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division has harsh sanctions at its disposal. If an advertiser violates a regulation of the Division, he is

<sup>6</sup> 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 (1964).

<sup>7</sup> 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78(a)–78jj (1964).

<sup>8</sup> 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(f) (1964).

<sup>9</sup> 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(j) (1964).

<sup>10</sup> 48 Stat. 79 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(h)(b) and (d) (1964).

<sup>11</sup> 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(e) (1964).

<sup>12</sup> 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(k) (1964).

<sup>13</sup> 49 Stat. 981 (1936), as amended, 27 U.S.C.A. § 205 (1965).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

subject to a fine, and could even be put out of business if his federal liquor license is revoked.<sup>15</sup>

The FTC and other federal agencies by no means provide the whole picture of controls over advertising. There are many state regulations affecting political advertising and legal advertising by government bodies, but they cannot be treated here. States also regulate the size and location of billboards, but space does not permit discussion of these statutes. We now turn to consideration of some of the ways in which states have commercial advertising in the mass media.

### SEC. 89. THE PRINTERS' INK STATUTE

**Most states have adopted some version of the model statute which makes fraudulent and misleading advertising a misdemeanor.**

One of the best known restraints upon advertising exists at the state level in the various forms of the Printers' Ink statute adopted in 45 states. *Printers' Ink* magazine, in 1911, advocated that states adopt a model statute which would make false advertising a misdemeanor. Leaders in the advertising and publishing world realized the difficulty in securing prosecutions for false advertising under the usual state fraud statutes. Considerable initiative in gaining state enactment of Printers' Ink statutes was generated through the Better Business Bureau and through various advertising clubs and associations.

The model statute, as revised in 1945 and approved by the National Association of Better Business Bureaus, says:<sup>16</sup>

Any person, firm, corporation or association or agent or employee thereof, who, with intent to sell, purchase or in any wise dispose of, or to contract with reference to merchandise, real estate, service, employment, or anything offered by such person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or employee thereof, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale, purchase, distribution, or the hire of personal services, or with intent to increase the consumption of or to contract with reference to any merchandise, real estate, securities, service, or employment, or to induce the public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or to acquire title thereto, or an interest therein, or to make any loan, makes, publishes, disseminates, circulates, or places before the public, or causes, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in this state, in a newspaper, magazine or

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> "Basis for State Laws on Truth in Publishing—The Printers' Ink Model Statute," Reprint, Printers' Ink Publishing Corp., 1959.

other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, circular, pamphlet, letter, handbill, poster, bill, sign, placard, card, label, or over any radio or television station or other medium of wireless communication, or in any other way similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, an advertisement, announcement, or statement of any sort regarding merchandise, securities, service, employment, or anything so offered for use, purchase or sale, or the interest, terms or conditions upon which such loan will be made to the public, which advertisement contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

All but three states—Arkansas, Delaware, and New Mexico—have some version of the Printers' Ink statute on their books.<sup>17</sup> Although the Printers' Ink statute is famous, its fame is perhaps greater than its present-day usefulness as a control over advertising. Relatively few relevant cases exist which indicate that the statute has seen little use in bringing cheating advertisers to court. The Printers' Ink statute may still be useful as a guideline, or in providing a sanction which local Better Business Bureaus may threaten to invoke even if they seldom do so.<sup>18</sup>

The Printers' Ink statute is aimed and enforced primarily against advertisers rather than against units of the mass media which may have no knowledge that an ad is false or misleading.<sup>19</sup> This statute was widely adopted, apparently because the common law simply did not provide adequate remedies against false advertising, especially in an economy which has grown so explosively.

The model statute is more flexible than common law prosecutions or fraud statutes. It does not make *scienter*, guilty knowledge or intent to publish false advertisements, an element of the offense. A number of states, however, have variants of the Printers' Ink statute which are not as comprehensive as the model law in that some element of *scienter* must be shown for conviction. Seventeen such states with less rigorous versions of the model statute are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Vermont.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Note, "Developments in the Law—Deceptive Advertising," *Harvard Law Review*, op. cit., p. 1122.

<sup>18</sup> Note, "The Regulation of Advertising," op. cit., p. 1057.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1059–1060; *State v. Beacon Publishing Co.*, 141 Kan. 734, 42 P.2d 960 (1935).

<sup>20</sup> Note, "Developments in the Law of Deceptive Advertising," *Harvard Law Review* loc. cit.

A major and obvious difficulty with the Printers' Ink statute—and with all attempts to control advertising—is that concepts of “truth” and “falsity” tend to elude definition. What is misleading, deceptive, or untrue is not defined in the model statute. The problem of making such a determination is left up to the jury. A state of Washington case in 1917 is in point. J. J. Massey had published this advertisement:

### **Pre-opening sale of Used Pianos**

These pianos must be closed out to make room for carload of new pianos coming from the east. Every piano fully guaranteed two years; exchange privilege; unheard of easy terms. All look like new.

Smith & Barnes, oak case, was \$400; now \$200.

Schilling & Sons, beautiful case, was \$375; now \$167.

Brinkerhoff, art case, was \$400; now \$218.

Free delivery and stool.

J. J. Massey.

It was charged that the Smith & Barnes and the Schilling pianos never had market values of \$400 and \$375. In the trial, the defendant was convicted of fraudulent advertising. A higher court reversed the conviction, saying that the advertisement referred to the retail selling price, not to the true market value of the pianos.<sup>21</sup>

## **SEC. 90. LOTTERIES**

**Advertising or publicizing of lotteries is prohibited by both federal and state laws.**

Many journalists, be they newsmen or admen, pay little attention to federal and state statutes which forbid publicizing of lotteries. The theory of such laws is that the public needs to be protected from gambling. In practice, many cities have church bingo socials or merchants' promotional lottery schemes which are rarely if ever prosecuted. As a result, journalists often ignore lottery laws because they are ignored by law enforcement officials at the state or local level.

When interstate commerce or use of the United States mails is involved, however, journalists should be especially careful to heed the laws forbidding lotteries. Advertising a lottery, for example,

<sup>21</sup> State v. Massey, 95 Wash., 163 P. 7 (1917).

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could result in having a publication's second-class mailing privilege lifted. Also, the persons responsible for publicizing or advertising the lottery could be prosecuted for committing a crime punishable by a fine of up to \$1,000, imprisonment of up to two years, or both.

Often, journalists have difficulty in recognizing a lottery. There are three elements in a lottery:

- (1) *Consideration*: Commonly, consideration means money paid to purchase a lottery ticket or a chance on a sewing machine or automobile which some service organization, for example, is "giving away" in a fund-raising effort. However, one should know the laws of his individual state concerning "consideration." In some states, the consideration need not be money paid. Instead, the effort required to enter a contest, such as having to go to a certain store to get an entry blank or having to mail a product's label, might be deemed to be "consideration."<sup>22</sup>
- (2) *Prize*—A prize in a lottery is something of value, generally of greater value or worth than the consideration invested.<sup>23</sup>
- (3) *Chance*—The element of chance—the gambling element—is what led Victorian-era Congressmen to pass the first federal statutes against lotteries in 1890.<sup>24</sup> There can, however, be an element of certainty accompanying the element of chance in a lottery. For example, if a person buys a newspaper subscription he is certain to receive the newspaper which includes a chance in a prize contest, this kind of promotion has been held to be a lottery.<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, a scheme for the sale of bonds in which the purchaser gets investments, and also participates in a prize drawing, is a lottery.<sup>26</sup>

A well known federal court decision from 1893, *United States v. Wallis*, portrays a kind of situation sometimes found in American

<sup>22</sup> *Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies*, 181 F. 579 (D.C.N.Y.1910).

<sup>23</sup> *U. S. v. Wallis*, 58 F. 942, 943 (D.C.Idaho 1893).

<sup>24</sup> *State ex inf. McKittrick v. Globe-Democrat Co.*, 341 Mo. 862, 110 S.W.2d 705 (1937).

<sup>25</sup> *Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star*, 72 Ohio St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058 (1905).

<sup>26</sup> *Horner v. U. S.*, 147 U.S. 449, 13 S.Ct. 409 (1893).

newspapers. This advertisement resulted in a lottery charge against James H. Wallis:<sup>27</sup>

## FIVE MORE DAYS

### Arrangements Completed for Thursday's Event

#### The Participants of the Drawing

#### LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS ENTITLED TO PARTICIPATE

##### Five More Days Left for Delinquents to Pay Up

Next Thursday the grand drawing for the elegant Eldridge sewing machine to be given away to subscribers to the Post will take place at noon that day at this office. The play upon which the drawing will be conducted will be as follows: Tickets, upon which will be printed numbers corresponding with the numbers on the coupons held by the paid-up subscribers, will be placed in a covered box. The fifteenth number drawn from the box will be the lucky number, the subscriber holding which will be entitled to the machine. The person drawing the numbers from the box will be blindfolded, so as not to permit of any partiality, were such a thing possible. As the numbers are drawn from the box they will be called out, and then recorded. To make the drawing more interesting, the subscribers holding the last fifteen numbers taken from the box will each receive a copy of the World's Almanac. People indebted to the Post can receive a chance to the drawing any time between now and noon next Thursday by paying up their indebtedness.

The object of this contest, was to increase the circulation of the newspaper. Each participant paid the announced price for the subscription and was given a numbered ticket. The inducement was the chance that a subscriber's numbered ticket might be the lucky one. The court held that all the elements of a lottery were present: tickets, prizes, and a drawing. The chance of winning a prize was the inducement rather than the appeal of the publication alone.<sup>28</sup>

Lotteries are forbidden in the electronic media as well as in the print media. Sections 1301 through 1305 of Title 18 of the United

<sup>27</sup> U. S. v. Wallis, 58 F. 942, 943 (D.C. Idaho 1893).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.



States Code all use identical terminology. Section 1301 forbids the importing or transporting of lottery tickets; Section 1302 forbids the mailing of lottery tickets or related materials; Section 1303 prohibits participation in lottery schemes by postmasters and postal employees, and Section 1304 forbids the broadcasting of lottery information. All four sections contain the same phrase forbidding “any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance.”<sup>29</sup> Section 1307, however, states that a station may broadcast information about lotteries in its circulation area as long as the station’s own state has a legalized lottery scheme.

## SEC. 91. SELF-REGULATION

### **Leading newspapers have developed tough standards to govern their acceptance or rejection of advertising.**

Publishers and broadcasters must know the legal status of advertising. If it can be proved that they know that an advertisement is fraudulent, they may be held responsible for that ad along with the person or company who placed it in the publication. Advertising departments on many newspapers, moreover, often serve as a kind of advertising agency. In this capacity, the advertising staff must be able to give knowledgeable counsel and technical advice to advertisers.

Publishers are not liable to the individual consumer for advertising which causes financial loss or other damage unless the publisher or his employees knew that such advertising was fraudulent or misleading. The absence of liability for damage, however, does not mean that there is an absence of responsibility to the public generally and to individual readers of a publication.

The newspaper or broadcast station which permits dishonest or fraudulent advertising hurts its standing with both its readers and its advertisers. Publishers and broadcasters, who perceive psychological and economic advantages in refusing dishonest advertising, also appear to be becoming more cognizant that they have a moral duty to protect the public.

Responsible media units go to great lengths to ensure that advertising which they print is honest. An excellent example of this is the *New York Times*’ pamphlet, *Standards of Advertising Acceptability*, which is reprinted below. For excerpts from The National

<sup>29</sup> 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301–1307.

Association of Broadcasters, *The Television Code*, Nineteenth Edition, June, 1976, see Appendix D.

### STANDARDS OF ADVERTISING ACCEPTABILITY FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES<sup>30</sup>

The success of advertising depends upon its credibility. No matter how technically brilliant or compelling an advertisement may be, unless readers believe it, it fails in its purpose.

Likewise, the confidence of readers in a newspaper, its news and editorial columns as well as its advertising columns, depends upon the integrity of those columns.

This is why it is the policy of The New York Times to protect its readers as well as its advertisers by making every effort to bar from its columns commercial advertising that is misleading, inaccurate or fraudulent; that makes unfair competitive statements; or that fails to comply with its standards of decency and dignity.

The Times maintains a Department of Advertising Acceptability whose function is to examine advertisements before they are published. All advertising submitted to The Times is carefully read to see whether it meets the standards of acceptability The Times has developed throughout the years.

If the advertising contains statements or illustrations which are not acceptable, and which The Times thinks should be changed or eliminated, the advertiser or its advertising agency is notified. If an advertiser refuses to make changes, the advertisement is declined.

Frequently the Advertising Acceptability Department will conduct an investigation to get further information about statements in an advertisement and thus help determine their accuracy. Recognized agencies of investigation, such as the Better Business Bureaus, are consulted. Reports of commercial fact-finding organizations are used to get background information.

In some classifications, advertisers are required to fill out questionnaires before their advertising is considered. These include Financial, Book Exchange and Business Opportunities.

The Advertising Acceptability Department investigates all complaints from readers about advertising in The Times. If investigation proves the complaints to be valid and shows

<sup>30</sup> Standards of Advertising Acceptability of The New York Times, pamphlet dated November, 1975. Reprinted by permission.

that the business practices of the advertiser are unfair, The Times declines further advertising from that advertiser.

Advertising must sometimes be changed or declined because of the applicability of laws dealing with such matters as libel, copyright and trademark, the right of privacy, the sale of securities, the sale of real estate (particularly subdivided vacant lands, cooperative apartments and condominiums), and political advertising.

*The following describes some of the kinds of advertising which The Times will not accept:*

1. *Generally*

- Advertisements which contain fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading statements or illustrations.
- Attacks of a personal character.
- Matrimonial offers.
- Unwarranted promises of employment in school advertising.
- Advertisements that are overly competitive or that refer abusively to the goods or services of others.

2. *Investments*

Advertisements holding out the prospect of large guaranteed dividends or excessive profits, or which solicit investments in nonproducing mining or oil property, oil royalties or pyramid sales operations.

3. *Fortune Telling*

Advertisements for fortune telling, dream interpretations and individual horoscopes.

4. *Foreign Languages*

Advertisements in a foreign language (unless an English translation is included) except in special circumstances and when a summary of the advertisement in English is included.

5. *Salespersons*

Advertisements for salespersons stating that specific sales volume or income will be achieved within a given period of time. Advertisements which do not include the type of compensation to be paid to salespersons such as salary, commission, etc., or which do not describe the articles and/or services to be sold.

6. *Discrimination*

Advertisements which discriminate on grounds of race, religion, national origin, sex or age.

### 7. *Offensive to Good Taste*

Indecent, vulgar, suggestive or other advertising that, in the opinion of The Times, may be offensive to good taste.

This list is not intended to include all the types of advertisements unacceptable to The Times. Generally speaking, any other advertising that may cause financial loss to the reader, or injury to his health or morals, or loss of his confidence in reputable advertising and ethical business practices is likewise unacceptable.

## RETAIL ADVERTISING

### 1. *Competitive Claims*

- A. Statements or representations which disparage the goods, price, service, business methods or advertising of any competitor by name, category or trading location are not acceptable.
- B. Statements which make or imply unsupportable claims that an advertiser will undersell competitors are not acceptable.

### 2. *"Bait" Offers*

"Bait" offers of merchandise wherein the customer is denied a fair opportunity to purchase at the advertised price are not acceptable.

## MAIL ORDER ADVERTISING

Mail order advertising is accepted subject to the following conditions:

1. Only merchandise of which delivery within thirty days is assured may be advertised.
2. If delivery is not made within thirty days, customers must be offered an opportunity to cancel their orders with full refund.
3. Full and prompt refunds will be issued to customers who mail back unused merchandise within ten days from the date of receipt. Personalized merchandise is not covered by this rule.
4. Substitution of items without the customer's prior consent is not allowed.
5. The Times may require prospective advertisers to submit samples for inspection.

## MEDICAL ADVERTISING

All medical advertising, even of acceptable preparations is carefully scrutinized.

Before accepting the advertising of any preparation, medication or treatment, The Times seeks the opinion of medical authorities. These include members of its own Medical Department and the recognized local and national medical information bureaus.

These medical consultants do not exercise censorship over The Times' columns. The Times applies its own judgment to their information and advice and makes its own decisions.

The Times does not accept the advertising of any preparations which might be habit-forming or contain dangerous drugs or which might lead to self-diagnosis or self-medication of any serious condition or illness.

The Times does not accept medical advertising which contains testimonials, questionable "before and after" illustrations, or copy which goes too far in indicating that doctors "prescribe" or recommend any preparation for a stated illness or condition.

In addition, offers of free medical treatment or exaggerated remedial, relief or curative claims are not accepted.

The Times does not accept the advertising of preparations which may be harmless in themselves but which make grossly exaggerated claims in their advertising or on their labels or in their descriptive pamphlets.

### OPINION ADVERTISING

In support of free expression in the realm of ideas, The Times keeps its columns open to those who wish to express divergent points of view. Under this policy The Times often accepts opinion advertisements with which it vigorously disagrees.

It requires that opinion advertisers stay within the bounds of decency and good taste.

It expects opinion advertisers to avoid inaccurate or misleading statements of purported facts. The volume of opinion advertising is such that The Times cannot check all statements that are purportedly factual. The Times does not vouch for the accuracy of such statements. However, it reserves the right to require opinion advertisers to document factual assertions.

Adequate identification of the sponsors of an opinion advertisement is required. Where the sponsors are not a known organization, as in the case of "ad hoc" committees, a mailing address and the name of at least one responsible representative of the sponsoring group shall appear in the advertisement. Where needed, in the opinion of The Times,

to avoid the possibility of misleading its readers, a statement identifying the sponsorship and source of the funds used to pay for the advertisement may be required.

All legal requirements must be met by political advertisers.

If names or pictures of people are to appear in the advertisement, the advertiser must certify that all such persons have granted permission for the use of their names or pictures.

#### TYPOGRAPHY, FORMAT AND USE OF NEW YORK TIMES MATERIAL

The New York Times maintains a clear separation between news and editorial matter and advertisements. Accordingly, advertisements that might be confused with news or editorial matter will not be accepted.

The Times reserves the right to designate any advertisement as such when, in its opinion, this is necessary to make clear the separation between news and editorial material and advertising.

Other than as specified below the use of New York Times news or editorial content in advertising is not permitted:

1. The use, in whole or in part, of critical reviews written by members of The New York Times staff is permitted. Such material, if reproduced in full, must contain a copyright credit line (© The New York Times Co., 197\_\_ ) and clearly disclose the identity of the advertiser. The advertisement will be designated as such and a distinctive border will be placed around it.
2. Restaurant reviews may be used as above but must carry the date on which the review appeared.
3. The use of critical reviews written by other than members of The New York Times staff is permitted only if permission is obtained from The New York Times Office of Rights and Permissions.
4. The use, in whole or in part, of New York Times editorials and Op-Ed Page columns written by Times staff members in advertising for charitable or non-profit public service organizations and in political or opinion advertising is permitted. Such material, if reproduced in full, must contain a copyright credit line, as above, and clearly disclose the identity of the advertiser. The advertisement will be designated as such and a distinctive border will be placed around it.

5. Use of texts of speeches or documents as published in *The Times* is permitted if such texts are not copyrighted.
6. *New York Times* news reports may be cited in political or opinion advertisements but not in a way that suggests that *The Times* is taking sides.

Two other newspapers which tend carefully to their advertising policies are *The Louisville Courier-Journal* and *The Louisville Times*. A copy of these newspapers advertising guidelines for 1977 shows an awareness of both fair play and existing laws. *The Courier-Journal* and *Times* make the following **Help Wanted Ads** policy statement:<sup>31</sup>

Federal, state and local law prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or age between 40 and 65. **Help Wanted** ads are subject to the requirements of these laws.

Indicating these newspapers' concern with sex discrimination is the following list of discriminatory terms with suggested substitutes.<sup>32</sup>

<u>Discriminatory Terms</u>	<u>Suggested Substitutes</u>
Attractive, Pretty, Handsome	Well-Groomed, Presentable
Auto Partsman	Auto Parts Work
Barmaid	Bar Help, * Bar Waiter/Waitress
Bell Boy	Bell Hop, * Bell Man or Woman
Body Man	Body Work
Busboy, Tray Girl	Busser, Dish Bussing, Cafeteria Work
Camera Man	Camera Technician, Camera Sales
Cleaning Woman, Cleaning Lady	Cleaning
Corpsman	Paramedic; Medical Assistant
Counter Girl, Counter Boy	Counter Work
Credit Girl	Credit, * Credit Man or Woman
Doorman	Doorman-Male or Female; Door Attendant
Draftsman	Drafting, * Draftsman-Male or Female
Farm Man	Farm Hand, Farm Work
Foreman	Foreman-Male or Female
Girl Friday	General Office M/W
Handyman	Handyman or Woman; Misc. Repair
Host, Hostess	Host/Hostess
Housewife, Mother	Part-Time—School Hours
Janitor, Janitress	Janitor/Janitress/Custodian
Journeyman	Journeyman—Male or Female
Leadman	Crew Leader; Shift Leader
Masseur, Masseuse	* Masseur/Masseuse

<sup>31</sup> *The Louisville Courier Journal and Times*, Guidelines for Classified Advertising. Quoted with permission.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<u>Discriminatory Terms</u>	<u>Suggested Substitutes</u>
Maid .....	Domestic Help, Housekeeping
Maintenance Man .....	Maintenance Work
Man, Woman, Girl, Boy, Male, .....	Person, Individual, Applicant-Man or
Female, Lady, Gal, Gentlemen	Woman, Male or Female
Nurse .....	Nurse (M/W)
Partsman .....	Parts Work
Phone Girls .....	Phone Work; Phone Sales
Playboy .....	* Playboy/Playgirl
Pressman .....	Pressman/Presswoman
Repairman .....	Repairs, Repairwork
Salad Girl .....	Salad Preparation
Salesman, Saleslady, Saleswoman	Salesperson, Sales Clerk, Sales
Sheet Metal Man .....	Sheet Metal Worker
Stewardess .....	Steward/Stewardess, Cabin
	Attendant
Tailor, Seamstress .....	* Tailor/Seamstress
Usher, Usherette .....	* Usher/Usherette

NOTE: Where a neutral substitute is not available for a discriminatory term (such as Foreman) such term may be used if the heading or the body of the ad specifies both Males and Females will be considered.

The fact that a term does not appear in the above partial list does not mean that such term is acceptable.

\* Permitted only when used together, as here or similar.

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## SEC. 92. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE SERVICE

**A newspaper or magazine is not a public utility and therefore may choose those with whom it cares to do business.**

A newspaper or magazine is a private enterprise and as such may carry on business transactions with whom it pleases. If its managers so desire they may refuse to sell newspapers to individuals or news agents, or to publish news stories about any particular event or on any opinion. By weight of legal authority, a newspaper is not a public utility.

There is pressure to create a "right of access" to news and advertising columns of the media. Arguments heard with increasing frequency run something like this:<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See, e. g., Jerome A. Barron, "Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right," *Harvard Law Review* Vol. 80 (1967), p. 1641; Willard H. Pedrick, "Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel," *Cornell Law Quarterly* Vol. 49 (1964) p. 581; Report of the 1968 Biennial Conference of the American Civil



The free marketplace of ideas is not working at all well during the latter third of the 20th Century. Competition among newspapers, magazines, and the electronic media is so diminished that only ideas acceptable to the nation's establishment can gain a hearing. *Laissez faire* in the media has come to mean, as John P. Roche once said in another context, "Every man for himself—as the elephant said, dancing among the chickens." Government has an affirmative obligation to stop the discriminatory refusal of advertisements and notices in publications.

Such arguments, at this writing, not succeeding. If a change does come which affects the right to refuse advertising, it would seem that advertising with a political or otherwise socially significant message might first be forced upon publishers before the right to refuse ordinary commercial advertising would be affected. An old but important case decided in 1931 arose when a man sought a mandatory injunction, declaring:<sup>34</sup>

The newspaper business is an ordinary business. It is a business essentially private in nature—as private as that of the baker, grocer, or milkman, all of whom perform a service on which, to a greater or less extent, the communities depend, but which bears no such relation to the public as to warrant its inclusion in the category of businesses charged with the public use. If a newspaper were required to accept an advertisement, it could be compelled to publish a news item. If some good lady gave a tea, and submitted to the newspaper a proper account of the tea, and the editor of the newspaper, believing that it had no news value, refused to publish it, she, it seems to us, would have as much right to compel the newspaper to publish the account as would a person engaged in business to compel a newspaper to publish an advertisement of the business that the person is conducting.

Thus, as a newspaper is strictly a private enterprise, the publishers thereof have a right to publish whatever advertisements they desire and to refuse to publish whatever advertisements they do not desire to publish.

Non-private entities, however—such as transit authorities or state-owned publications—can not refuse advertising with impunity.

Liberties Union, New York, Sept., 1968; Gilbert Cranberg, "New Look at the First Amendment," *Saturday Review*, Sept. 14, 1968, pp. 136-137; Simon Lazarus, "The Right of Reply," *New Republic*, Oct. 5, 1968, p. 17.

<sup>34</sup> *Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald*, 215 Iowa 1276, 1281, 247 N.W. 813, 815, 87 A.L.R. 975 (1933). See also *Friedenberg v. Times Publishing Co.*, 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930); *In re Wohl, Inc.*, 50 F.2d 254 (D.C.Mich.1931). See also *Miami Herald v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831 (1974).

Consider the 1967 case, *Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority*, which originated from actions of members of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). SDS attempted to buy space on subway walls and in subway trains for posters protesting the Vietnam War. The posters showed a little girl who was reported to have been burned by napalm. The SDS request was refused by an advertising agency which sold space for posters for the Transit Authority. Arguing that the poster copy was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and saying that the Transit Authority had to accept all advertisements submitted to it, SDS brought suit in a United States District Court. SDS sought a declaratory judgment which would force the Transit Authority to accept its posters.<sup>35</sup>

The U. S. District Court was sympathetic up to a point, ruling that the First and Fourteenth Amendments extended to the posters. Additionally, the advertising agency could not arbitrarily accept some posters and reject others. The posters were neither obscene nor profane, and expressed political opinions. The court said that the Transit Authority could not "refuse to accept the posters for display because they are 'entirely too controversial' and would be objectionable to large segments of our population."<sup>36</sup>

Although the court gave the above language to SDS, it gave the decision to the Transit Authority and its advertising agency. The court held that questions of whether the posters could be refused because they presented a "clear and present danger" or posed a "threat to public safety" could be determined only by a jury trial. Thus the court denied the SDS motion for a summary judgment which would have required the Transit Authority to accept the posters.<sup>37</sup>

A California case involved a group called Women for Peace. In 1964, Women for Peace sought to place advertising placards in buses owned by the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District. The placards said:

"Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind." President John F. Kennedy.

Write to President Johnson: Negotiate Vietnam. Women for Peace, P. O. Box 944, Berkeley.<sup>38</sup>

The private advertising agency which managed advertising for the transit district rejected the placards. It was declared that "political advertising and advertising on controversial subjects are not acceptable unless approved by the [transit] district, and that

<sup>35</sup> *Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority*, 274 F.Supp. 438, 441 (D.C.N.Y.1967).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 443.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District*, 64 Cal.Rptr. 430, 434 P.2d 982, 984 (1967).

advertising objectionable to the district shall be removed  
\* \* \* ”<sup>39</sup>

The Women for Peace replied that the refusal of the advertising placards was an “unconstitutional abridgement of their right of free speech and that the exclusion of advertisements not connected with a political campaign constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws.”<sup>40</sup>

After a trial and two appeals, the Women for Peace finally won their case in 1967 before the California Supreme Court. The court said that the ad was protected by the First Amendment and that once a public facility is opened for use of the general public, arbitrary conditions cannot be imposed upon the use of that facility.<sup>41</sup>

The California Supreme Court declared:<sup>42</sup>

We conclude that defendants, having opened a forum for the expression of ideas by providing facilities for advertisements on its buses, cannot for reasons of administrative convenience decline to accept advertising expressing opinions and beliefs within the ambit of First Amendment protection.

In 1969, a college newspaper was told it could not refuse political advertising. A number of non-students wished to place political ads in the *Royal Purple*, the official campus newspaper at Wisconsin State University-Whitewater. Their requests for advertising space were denied on the ground that the newspaper had a policy against accepting “editorial advertisements”—those advertisements expressing political views. Refusal of the advertisements led to suits charging that the plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by Wisconsin, acting through the regents of the state colleges, and by the university itself. This refusal, it was claimed, amounted to “state action” because the board of regents—a state agency—had delegated policy-setting powers to the president of the university and to the student publications board.<sup>43</sup>

The defendant regents and university contended that they had no knowledge of the newspaper’s advertising policy, and that the newspaper itself was not even a real newspaper; it was, they said, a mere “journalistic experiment” or an “educational exercise.”<sup>44</sup> In addition, it was argued that persons who were refused advertising

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> 64 Cal.Rptr. 430, 434 P.2d 982, 985 (1967), citing *Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District*, 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).

<sup>42</sup> 64 Cal.Rptr. 430, 432, 434 P.2d 982, 984 (1967).

<sup>43</sup> *Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges*, 306 F.Supp. 1097 (D.C.Wis.1969).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 1100.

space could ventilate their views in other ways through the *Royal Purple*, such as in letters to the editor.

U. S. District Judge James Doyle ruled that the *Royal Purple* should have accepted the advertisements:<sup>45</sup>

Defendant's acceptance of commercial advertisements and of those public service advertisements that do not "attack an institution, group, person or product" and their rejection of editorial advertisements constitutes an impermissible form of censorship.

There can be no doubt that defendants' restrictive advertising policy—a policy enforced under color of state law—is a denial of free speech and expression.

En route to that holding Judge Doyle found that the *Royal Purple* was indeed a newspaper, and that letters to the editor—even if accepted for publication—would not be a proper substitute for a paid advertisement. Advertisements offered certain advantages in presentation, including options for large type, photographic display, and repeated publication as "some of the modes of expression available in an editorial advertisement that might not be available in a letter to the editor."<sup>46</sup>

Note that the theme of state action runs through all of the cases in which courts have listened with sympathy to demands that advertisements be accepted. That is, the agency refusing to accept an advertisement was either a transit authority funded by public moneys<sup>47</sup> or an official campus newspaper on a tax-supported campus which had advertising acceptance rules set up under delegated state authority.<sup>48</sup> In the absence of a strong showing of state action, however, the general rule is that advertisements may be refused by the print media.

### The Resident Participation Case

One of the most eloquent pleas for forced access to advertising space can be found in an air pollution dispute in Denver, Colorado. The setting in Denver should be idyllic—a city ringed by the magnificent Rocky Mountains, close to some of the American continent's most spectacular scenery. But not all was well in Denver during the late 1960's: on some days, Denver residents suffered from an eyeburning smog which would seem more at home in Los Angeles, California, roughly 950 miles away.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 1101, affirmed 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1101.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority*, 274 F.Supp. 438, 441 (D.C.N.Y.1967); *Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District*, 68 Cal.2d 51, 64 Cal.Rptr. 430, 434 P.2d 982, 984 (1967).

<sup>48</sup> *Lee v. Board of Regents*, 441 F.2d 1257 (1971), affirming 306 F.Supp. 1097 (D.C.Wis.1969).

When word got out that Pepcol, Inc.—a subsidiary of the giant conglomerate Beatrice Foods, Inc.—was going to build a rendering plant within the city limits of Denver, a protest resulted. A citizens group calling itself Resident Participation of Denver, spurred by visions of a malodorous plant processing “dead animals, guts, and blood” and producing “disgusting” garbage,<sup>49</sup> attempted to place advertisements in Denver’s two competing daily newspapers, the *Denver Post* and the *Rocky Mountain News*. The newspapers rejected the ads on the ground that the proposed wording called for a boycott of Beatrice Foods products, and boycott advertising is forbidden by Colorado statute.<sup>50</sup>

Undaunted, the Resident Participation group re-worded its advertising copy to avoid any reference to boycott, but listed such Beatrice Foods products as Meadow Gold milk, cheese, and ice cream, and Zooper Dooper fruit drinks and ice cream. The advertisement, as re-written, included suggested letters: readers were to be asked to clip out, sign, and mail the letters, thereby protesting the rendering plant project to city and state officials. Both newspapers again refused to print the advertisements.<sup>51</sup>

Resident Participation then sought a court order under the First Amendment to force the newspapers to publish the advertisements. The newspapers countered with arguments that the First Amendment forbids only official abridgments of free speech and press, not merely private ones, and this was an argument the ecology group was unable to overcome. Nevertheless, Resident Participation argued strenuously to have the court consider the newspapers refusals to publish the advertisements as a kind of official or state action. The citizens’ group argued:<sup>52</sup>

\* \* \* state action is present in this case because defendant newspapers enjoy a special relationship with the State of Colorado and City of Denver which involves those governments in the newspaper business and because the papers “enjoy monopoly control in an area of vital public concern.”

Resident Participation also contended that the state and city are involved in the newspaper business because of sections of the Colorado Revised Statutes which require that legal notices be published in newspapers of general circulation.<sup>53</sup> Other provisions

<sup>49</sup> Plaintiffs Exhibit “A,” Resident Participation, Inc. Newsletter quoted in brief in *Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love*, 322 F.Supp. 1100 (D.C.Colo. 1971). The authors wish to thank Thomas A. Stacey, graduate student in journalism at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, for his assistance.

<sup>50</sup> Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 80-11-12.

<sup>51</sup> *Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love*, 322 F.Supp. 1100, 1101 (D.C.Colo.1971).

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 1102.

<sup>53</sup> Colorado Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 49-10-3, 49-8-1, 49-22-5, 49-22-11 (1963).

which were said to make newspapers a public business included a statute which exempts editors and reporters from jury service,<sup>54</sup> and a Denver ordinance which allows newspaper vending machines on public property, including sidewalks.<sup>55</sup>

A three-judge federal district court rejected these arguments with dispatch, saying it could find nothing "remotely suggesting that these measures are sufficient to justify labeling the newspapers conduct state action."<sup>56</sup> Chief Circuit Judge Alfred A. Arraj said that where private conduct is concerned, there has to be great justification for concluding that the private party serves as an alter ego for government, either because officialdom has in some important way become involved with the private party, or because the private party performs a function of a governmental nature. Circuit Judge Arraj discussed some problems of access to the media for advertisers, and how the law should be applied to such problems.<sup>57</sup>

Plaintiffs have made no allegations which would suggest a marriage among these parties, and the historic function of newspapers, like the pamphlets of a prior day, has been to oppose government, to be its critic not its accomplice. While few newspapers may live up to that idea, plaintiffs do not allege that either the Rocky Mountain News or Denver Post is the lackey of a city or state administration or in any other way in the grip of official power.

We are aware that lack of access to those media which reach large audiences has, some believe, given birth to a frustration which compels otherwise peaceful citizens to engage in violence to get their views to the nation. A cause of this frustration, one critic maintains, is that, although the courts have been vigorous in protecting free speech, they have been indifferent to creating opportunities for expression. Barron, *Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right*, 80 Harv.L.R. 1641 (1967). We note, however, that while Professor Barron spends considerable space exploring a statutory solution to this problem, he devotes much less attention to constitutional arguments and but one paragraph to the problem of state action, which we find insurmountable. Professor Barron simply concludes, without noticeable explanation, that newspapers can be subjected to the "constitutional restrictions which quasi-public status invites." *Id.* at 1169. As desirable as this result might be, we are unable in good faith to reach it.

<sup>54</sup> Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann., § 7801-3 (1963).

<sup>55</sup> Denver Municipal Code, §§ 339G, 334.1-2.

<sup>56</sup> 322 F.Supp. 1100, 1103 (D.C.Colo.1971).

<sup>57</sup> 322 F.Supp. 1100, 1105 (D.C.Colo.1971).

Our conclusion that newspapers' conduct cannot be considered state action agrees with the conclusion arrived at by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in *Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Chicago Tribune Co.*, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), the only other case we have discovered which raises issues identical to those presented in this litigation.

As the Resident Participation case showed, general circulation newspapers cannot be compelled to accept and publish controversial advertisements. Some newspapers, however, publish controversial political advertisements as a matter of responsibility to the public. In the spring of 1972, for example, the *New York Times* published two advertisements which drew considerable protest from readers. The first advertisement, signed by a group of citizens calling themselves "The National Committee for Impeachment," demanded the removal from office of President Richard M. Nixon, alleging violations of law and the Constitution in his prosecution of the Vietnam war. A second advertisement, an open letter to President Nixon signed by Norman F. Dacey, inveighed against the President for a Middle East policy termed "blind support" for Israel.<sup>58</sup>

Readers responded to these advertisements with hundreds of letters, and many of those letters criticized *The Times* for publishing such emotionally loaded and politically heated ads, opinions with which neither *The Times*—nor a large part of its readership agreed. That criticism of *The Times* was expressed so frequently and with such obvious sincerity that *The Times* published an editorial, "Freedom to Advertise," stating the principles which guide *The Times* in accepting controversial advertising on topics of political or social importance. The editorial declared:<sup>59</sup>

\* \* \*

As we see it, the issue goes to the very heart of the freedom and responsibility of the press. *The Times* believes it has an obligation to afford maximum reasonable opportunity to the public to express its views, however much opposed to our own, through various outlets in this newspaper including the advertising columns.

*The Times* does, of course, make every attempt to insure that the advertisements it carries are truthful and in good taste. Such standards are relatively easy to enforce in respect to commercial products—though even here sharp differences of opinion frequently arise over the precise applicability of our rules. But political advertising—the presentation of a point of view of an individual or a group

<sup>58</sup> See *New York Times*, May 31 and June 6, 1972.

<sup>59</sup> *New York Times*, June 16, 1972. © 1972 by The *New York Times* Company. Reprinted by Permission.

through a paid announcement in our columns—presents a more difficult problem than the advertising of a commercial product. Here we feel that the widest possible latitude must be given the public to express what from our point of view may be even the most objectionable of opinions. There are indeed limits; we would not knowingly publish an advertisement containing a direct incitement to violence or other illegal action, or a clear misstatement of fact or a distorted quotation.

While *The Times* makes every effort to detect such violations and to eliminate them from the political advertising that it does accept, our screening process does fail us on occasion when, usually due to the pressures of time and deadlines, human error manages to nullify even the most carefully conceived administrative controls. Just such a regrettable lapse occurred in connection with the Dacey advertisement; in any event, it was the general tenor of this diatribe, rather than any of its specific charges, that gave offense to so many of our readers.

*Times* policy in this important question is not new. On this page nearly three years ago (Aug. 29, 1969) we stated: "We at *The New York Times* have always felt an obligation to keep our advertising columns open to all comers, refusing ads only on the grounds of fraud or deception, vulgarity or obscenity and incitement to lawbreaking or to racial or religious hatred. In pursuit of that policy, *The Times* has printed many advertisements setting forth ideas we abhor but feel no right to censor."

It has long been held by American courts that a newspaper or magazine is a private enterprise, and that it may choose to omit certain news items or to refuse certain advertising. In recent years, and in part because of the thrust given to a "new right of access" by Professor Jerome Barron, the old "right to refuse ads" has undergone considerable challenge. Nevertheless, this generalization may still be made: unless the publication or agency which is to carry an advertisement is clearly some sort of a public entity because of some kind of "state action," an advertisement lawfully may be refused.

Take the case of a film exhibitor who was angered because the *Los Angeles Times* altered advertising copy for a movie, *The Killing of Sister George*, slightly changing a drawing of a female figure and omitting a reference to "deviate sexual conduct". *The Times*, by virtue of its enormous advertising revenues, was said by the film distributor to have attained a "substantial monopoly in Southern California." It was further argued that the *Times's* "semi-monopoly and quasi-public position" amounted to state action. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit rejected the film



distributors arguments, saying: "Unlike broadcasting, the publication of a newspaper is not a government conferred privilege. As we have said, the press and the government have had a history of disassociation."<sup>60</sup>

### SEC. 93. BROADCAST ADVERTISING AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

**The Supreme Court has limited the sweep of the Fairness Doctrine, confirming in broadcasters a right to refuse editorial advertising on public issues such as war and politics.**

Late in May of 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that broadcasters are not obligated to accept paid advertisements dealing with controversial political or social issues. Thus, by a 7-2 vote, the Court constructed a right to refuse advertisements for broadcasters which is analogous at some points with the print media's "right to refuse service."<sup>61</sup> The case, known as *Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee*,<sup>62</sup> dealt with efforts of a political party and an anti-war group to get air time for their respective viewpoints. This decision is important, for it seems to have effectively blunted a number of efforts to have courts construct a "right of access" under the First Amendment and the Federal Communications Commission's "Fairness Doctrine."<sup>63</sup> Under such a right of access, broadcasters could have been forced to accept paid commercials dealing with public issues.

This section will discuss *Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee* at some length, but will first provide some background, briefly describing cases which intermixed broadcast advertising and the Fairness Doctrine.

The Fairness Doctrine stems from a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decision in 1949, saying that broadcasters could editorialize over their licensed facilities so long as they also provided a fair opportunity for differing views to be heard.<sup>64</sup> Until 1967, the Fairness Doctrine was applied only to the airing of major social and political issues.<sup>65</sup> John Banzhaf, III, then appeared on the scene.

<sup>60</sup> *Associates and Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co.*, 440 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1971).

<sup>61</sup> See Section 92 of this chapter, "The Right to Refuse Service."

<sup>62</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080 (1973).

<sup>63</sup> The Fairness Doctrine is discussed in Chief Justice Burger's opinion, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2086-2092 (1973), and is written of at greater length in *Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC*, 395 U.S. at 375-386, 89 S.Ct. at 1798-1805 (1969).

<sup>64</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, at 2090 (1973).

<sup>65</sup> Lee Loevinger, "The Politics of Advertising," address given before the International Radio and Television Society, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, January 4, 1973. Speech copy courtesy of Television Information Office, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10022.

Banzhaf, then an unknown young New York lawyer, wrote a letter to the FCC urging extension of the Fairness Doctrine to cigarette commercials.<sup>66</sup> Banzhaf jarred the relationship between the FCC and broadcast advertising with that letter. In response, the FCC ruled in 1967 that the Fairness Doctrine did apply, which meant that licensees who broadcast cigarette commercials were thereafter forced to make available free time for messages warning viewers not to smoke.<sup>67</sup> The FCC declared that after U.S. government reports spelled out dangers of cigarette smoking, a controversial issue allowing reply under the Fairness Doctrine was raised when commercials portrayed cigarette puffing as “socially acceptable and desirable, manly, and a necessary part of a rich, full life.”<sup>68</sup>

Initially, a majority of the FCC wished to treat cigarettes as a distinct or unique product, raising unique issues, not stretching the Fairness Doctrine to the point where it would open other commercial advertising channels. As Ira Mark Ellman has noted, the “unique product” distinction did not last long, although the FCC tried hard to prevent extending the Fairness Doctrine’s reach into commercial advertising beyond cigarette spots.<sup>69</sup>

A test case came when an environmental protection organization—Friends of the Earth—asked the FCC for time under the Fairness Doctrine to respond to commercials for cars with large engines, cars which created sizable air pollution problems. The FCC had wanted to ban cigarette advertising, but it was not similarly committed to curtailing advertising for large-engined automobiles, nor did it want “answers” being broadcast to such ads. A majority of the FCC ruled that the Fairness Doctrine did not apply to such auto advertising, but Friends of the Earth appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with the environmentalists, finding an exact parallel between the dangers of cigarette advertising and the dangers of advertising big autos:<sup>70</sup>

<sup>66</sup> “Fairness Freedom, and Cigarette Advertising, A Defense of the Federal Trade Commission,” *Columbia Law Review* (1967) pp. 1470–1489; Norman P. Leventhal, “Caution: Cigarette Commercials May Be Hazardous to Your License—the New Aspect of Fairness,” *Federal Communications Bar Journal* 22:1 (1968) pp. 55–124, at pp. 92–93.

<sup>67</sup> “CBS–TV Case, 9 Pike & Fischer Radio Regulations 2d 1423 (1967). Cigarette advertising was banned from television by Congress, effective January 2, 1971. See 15 U.S.C.A. Section 1335.

<sup>68</sup> Ira Mark Ellman, “And Now a Word Against Our Sponsor: Extending the Fairness Doctrine to Advertising,” 60 *California Law Review* No. 4 (June, 1972), p. 1423.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1424.

<sup>70</sup> *Friends of the Earth v. FCC*, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 449 F.2d 1164, 1169 (1971), reversing and remanding 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970). See also a case involving environmentalists’ efforts to answer Standard Oil of New Jersey ads pushing construction of a pipeline across the Alaskan wilderness; *In re Wilderness Society*, 30 F.C.C.2d 643, 729 (1971). The FCC ruled that licensees must insure that such advertisements were countered or “balanced” by material opposing construction of the pipeline.

Commercials which continue to insinuate that the human personality finds greater fulfillment in the large car with the quick getaway \* \* \* ventilate a point of view which not only has become controversial but involves an issue of public importance. When there is undisputed evidence, as there is here, that the hazards to health implicit in air pollution are enlarged and aggravated by such products, then the parallel with cigarette advertising is exact and the relevance of *Banzhaf* is inescapable.

The Court of Appeals then sent the *Friends of the Earth* case back to the FCC for determination of whether the broadcasting station had met Fairness Doctrine requirements through other programming dealing with environmental concerns.

Both the *Banzhaf* and *Friends of the Earth* cases involved health claims established by scientists. Although war is even healthier than cigarette smoke or polluted air, the Vietnam conflict was an enormously political issue. Two antiwar organizations, a servicemen's group and a Quaker group, had been refused their requests that broadcasting stations in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco donate time to allow these groups to broadcast messages opposing military service or informing the public of alternatives to military service.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the antiwar groups had not successfully shown that the broadcast licensees' refusals to provide air time was an unreasonable exercise of judgment under the Fairness Doctrine. The Court of Appeals reached this judgment even though the stations had broadcast recruiting announcements in behalf of the armed services. These messages were treated as public service announcements by the stations and air time for them had been donated.<sup>71</sup> As Ira Mark Ellman has suggested, the political sensitivity of this issue may well have affected the decisions of both the FCC and the Court of Appeals.<sup>72</sup>

In another kind of issue—a labor dispute—a labor union in 1970 won access for its advertising messages. Local 880 of the Retail Store Employees Union challenged the FCC's renewal of the license of Radio Station WREO, Ashtabula, Ohio. The union complained that the station's license was renewed without a hearing despite the union's protest. The issue involved here was the contention that the radio station could not carry advertising for Hill's Department Store of Ashtabula without allowing the union to buy ads to tell its side of

<sup>71</sup> *Green v. FCC*; *G. I. Association v. FCC*, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 447 F.2d 323 (1971).

<sup>72</sup> Ellman, *op. cit.*, p. 1433.

the labor dispute.<sup>73</sup> In 1973, however, the Supreme Court of the United States denied access for controversial political advertising announcements.

### CBS vs. Democratic National Committee

This case started when Business Executives' Move for a Vietnam Peace (BEM) filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission in January, 1970, contending that radio station WTOP in Washington, D. C., had refused to sell time to broadcast a series of one-minute spot announcements against the Vietnam War. WTOP refused, saying it had already presented full and fair coverage on important public issues, including the Vietnam War and the viewpoints of critics of U.S. policy.<sup>74</sup>

Four months later, in May, 1970, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) sought a declaratory ruling on this statement:<sup>75</sup>

“That under the First Amendment to the Constitution and the Communications Act, a broadcaster may not, as a general policy, refuse to sell time to responsible entities, such as DNC, for the solicitation of funds and for comment on public issues.”

DNC, unlike BEM, did not object to policies of any particular broadcasters but claimed that its prior experiences made it clear that it would encounter great difficulty—if not total frustration—in purchasing time to present views of the Democratic party and to solicit funds. After reviewing the history of the Fairness Doctrine, and of the Communications Act of 1934—as well as the problems inherent in administering a right of access—the Commission rejected the demands of both DNC and BEM.<sup>76</sup> By a 2–1 vote, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the FCC. Writing the Court's decision, Judge J. Skelly Wright declared:<sup>77</sup>

The principle at stake here is one of fundamental importance: it concerns the people's right to engage in and to hear vigorous public debate on the broadcast media. More specifically, it concerns the application of that right to the substantial portion of the broadcast day which is sold to

<sup>73</sup> Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO v. FCC, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 94, 436 F.2d 248 (1970).

<sup>74</sup> Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2084 (1973).

<sup>75</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2084 (1973).

<sup>76</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2085 (1973).

<sup>77</sup> Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, Democratic National Committee v. FCC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 181, 450 F.2d 642 (1971), overturning Business Executives, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970), and Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).

advertising. For too long advertising has been considered a virtual free fire zone, largely ungoverned by regulatory guidelines. As a result, a cloying blandness and commercialism—sometimes said to be characteristic of radio and television as a whole—have found an especially effective outlet. We are convinced that the time has come for the Commission to cease abdicating responsibility over the uses of advertising time. Indeed, we are convinced that broadcast advertising has great potential for enlivening and enriching debate on public issues, rather than drugging it with an overdose of non-ideas and non-issues as is now the case.

\* \* \*

We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid public issue announcements is in violation of the First Amendment, at least when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted. We do not hold, however, that the planned announcements of the petitioners—or, for that matter, of any other particular applicant for air time—must necessarily be accepted by broadcast licensees. Rather, we confine ourselves to invalidating the flat ban alone, leaving it up to the licensees and the Commission to develop and administer reasonable procedures and regulations determining which and how many “editorial advertisements” will be put on the air.

\* \* \*

Even if broadcasters were to succeed in presenting a full spectrum of viewpoints and partisan spokesmen on nonadvertising time, their retention of *total* initiative and editorial control is inimical to the First Amendment.

\* \* \*

We come now to the aspect of the broadcasters’ policy which, petitioners say, trenches on the First Amendment interest in editorial advertising. The constitutional defect of that policy is somewhat ironic. The *New York Times* Court [New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964)] made clear that the fact distinguishing fully protected editorial advertising from less fully protected commercial advertising is that the former deals with controversial public issues. Indeed, the political nature of editorial advertising places it near the core of the First Amendment.

The Circuit Court then remanded the DNC and BEM matters to the Commission, with directions that the FCC develop “reasonable procedures and regulations determining which and how many ‘editorial advertisements’ will be put on the air.” Judge Wright’s vigorous opinion did not win over the Supreme Court, which voted against the DNC and BEM positions by a margin of 7 to 2.

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger quoted approvingly from Judge McGowan, who had dissented to Judge Wright's Circuit Court opinion. Judge McGowan had said:<sup>78</sup>

"It is presently the obligation of a licensee to advance the public's right to know by devoting a substantial amount of time to the presentation of controversial views on issues of public importance, striking a balance which is always subject to redress by reference to the fairness doctrine. Failure to do so puts continuation of the license at risk—a sanction of tremendous potency, the one which the Commission is under increasing pressure to employ.

"This is the system which Congress has, wisely or not, provided as the alternative to public ownership and operation of radio and television communications facilities. This approach has never been thought to be other than within the permissible limits of constitutional choice."

Chief Justice Burger noted Judge McGowan's conclusion that remanding the DNC and BEM matters to the Commission for development of a constitutional right of access put the Commission in a "constitutional strait jacket" on a highly complex and far-reaching issue. Burger covered some familiar ground, saying that because the broadcast media used a valuable and limited public resource, there is present "an unusual order of First Amendment values."<sup>79</sup> The Chief Justice declared that the Court must give great weight to the decisions of Congress and to the experience of the FCC:<sup>80</sup>

Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in the broadcast media and determining what best serves the public's right to be informed is a task of great delicacy and difficulty. The process must necessarily be undertaken within the framework of the regulatory scheme that has evolved over the course of the past half-century.  
\* \* \* The problems of regulation are rendered more difficult because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence.

Chief Justice Burger then turned to the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, and declared that the intent of Congress was to leave "broad journalistic discretion with the licensee."<sup>81</sup> Further, Congress rejected a propos-

<sup>78</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, at 2085 (1973) quoting 450 F.2d at 666 (1971).

<sup>79</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2086 (1973).

<sup>80</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2086 (1973).

<sup>81</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2088 (1973).

al which would have placed a limited obligation on persons wishing to speak out on certain public issues. Instead, Congress enacted a section of the Communications Act of 1934 which specifically provides that “a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.”<sup>82</sup> Burger also noted that although broadcasters were to receive renewable three-year licenses from the FCC, which would make rules for broadcasters consistent with “public interest, convenience and necessity,” Section 326 of the Act specifically provides that:<sup>83</sup>

Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.

Burger paid particular attention, in light of Congress’ refusal to make broadcasting stations into common carriers for all who wished to speak on public issues, to the Commission’s development of its Fairness Doctrine. Under this doctrine, broadcasters are responsible for providing the public with access to balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance.<sup>84</sup> He added:<sup>85</sup>

The basic principle underlying that responsibility is “the right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own particular views on any matter. \* \* \* Consistent with that philosophy, the Commission on several occasions has ruled that no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities. \* \* \* Congress has not seen fit yet to alter that policy.

The Court compared a newspaper’s freedom to that of a broadcast licensee, finding that a broadcaster has a large measure of freedom, but not as much as that exercised by a newspaper. Broadcasters are supervised—and periodically licensed—by the FCC, which must “oversee without censoring.” Yet the government control over broadcasting licensees is not sufficiently close to make “common carriers” or “public utilities” of broadcasting station.<sup>86</sup> Common

<sup>82</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2089 (1973). See also Section 3(h), Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1065, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(h).

<sup>83</sup> 47 U.S.C.A. § 326 quoted at 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2090 (1973).

<sup>84</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2090, citing *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 395 U.S. at 378, 89 S.Ct. at 1800 (1969).

<sup>85</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2091–2092 (1973).

<sup>86</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2094 (1973).

carrier status could allow virtually unlimited access to the broadcast media, and the Court chose another path.<sup>87</sup>

Thus, it cannot be said that the government is a “partner” to the action of broadcast licensee complained of here, nor is it engaged in a “symbiotic relationship” with the licensee, profiting from the invidious discrimination of its proxy. \* \* \* The First Amendment does not reach acts of private parties in every instance where the Congress or the Commission has merely permitted or failed to permit such acts.

\* \* \*

The concept of private, independent broadcast journalism, regulated by government to assure protection of the public interest, has evolved slowly and has been nurtured by processes of adjudication. That concept of journalistic independence could not co-exist with a reading of the challenged conduct of the licensee as governmental action. Nor could it exist without administrative flexibility to meet changing needs and the swift technological developments. We therefore conclude that the policies do not constitute government action violative of the First Amendment.

The Court turned to the question whether the “public interest” standard of the Communications Act requires broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements. Saying he was considering both the Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, Chief Justice Burger found no error on the part of the FCC in turning down the DNC and BEM demands that they be sold time for their editorial advertisements.<sup>88</sup>

The Commission was justified in concluding that the public interest in providing access to the marketplace of “ideas and experiences” would scarcely be served by a system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent \* \* \*. \* \* \* Moreover, there is the substantial danger \* \* \* that the time allotted for editorial advertising could be monopolized by those of one political persuasion.

\* \* \*

If the Fairness Doctrine were applied to editorial advertising, there is also the substantial danger that the effective operation of that doctrine would be jeopardized. To minimize financial hardship and to comply fully with its public responsibilities a broadcaster might well be forced to make regular programming time available to those holding a

<sup>87</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2094–2095, 2096 (1973). Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist joined with Chief Justice Burger in writing Section III of the Court’s opinion; the quoted excerpts here are taken from that section.

<sup>88</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2096–2097 (1973).



view different from that expressed in an editorial advertisement \* \* \*. The result would be a further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the coverage of public issues, and a transfer of control over the treatment of public issues from the licensees who are accountable for broadcast performance to private individuals who are not. The public interest would no longer be “paramount,” but rather subordinate to private whim \* \* \*.

\* \* \*

For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of material. That editors—newspaper or broadcast—can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is not reason to deny the discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values.

The Court expressed concern that a “right of access” as sought by DNC and BEM would cause too much supervision by the Federal Communications Commission. Chief Justice Burger said that the Commission would have to oversee much more of the day-to-day operation of broadcasters’ conduct, “deciding such questions as whether a particular group has had sufficient opportunity to present its viewpoint \* \* \*.” He added: “Regimenting broadcasters is too radical a therapy for the ailment respondents complain of.”<sup>89</sup>

Justice William O. Douglas concurred with the Court, but for quite different reasons. He declared that TV and radio stand in the same protected position under the First Amendment as do newspapers and magazines.<sup>90</sup>

The philosophy of the First Amendment requires that result, for the fear that Madison and Jefferson had of government intrusion is perhaps even more relevant to TV and radio than it is to newspapers and other publications. That fear was founded not only on the spectre of a lawless government but of government under the control of a fraction that desired to foist its views of the common good on the people.

Both Justice Douglas and Justice Potter Stewart, who also concurred separately in the judgment of the Court, had scathing things to say about the “right of access” as applied to the media. Douglas wrote:<sup>91</sup>

<sup>89</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2098. Chief Justice Burger noted that study of the Fairness Doctrine was underway, in hearings by the FCC. He added: “Conceivably, at some future date Congress or the Commission—or the broadcasters—may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable.” 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2100 (1973).

<sup>90</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2109 (1973).

<sup>91</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2117, 2118 (1973).

We have allowed ominous inroads to be made on the historic freedom of the newspapers. The effort to suppress the publication of the Pentagon Papers failed only by a narrow margin and actually succeeded for a brief spell in imposing prior restraint on our press for the first time in our history.

\* \* \*

These growing restraints on newspapers have the same ominous message that the overtones of the present opinion has on TV and radio licenses.

The growing spectre of governmental control and surveillance over all activities of people makes ominous the threat to liberty by those who hold the executive power. Over and again attempts have been made to use the Commission as a political weapon against the opposition, whether to the left or to the right.

Justice Stewart concurred similarly.<sup>92</sup>

The First Amendment prohibits the Government from imposing controls upon the press. Private broadcasters are surely part of the press. \* \* \* Yet here the Court of Appeals held, and the dissenters today agree, that the First Amendment *requires* the Government to impose controls upon private broadcasters—in order to preserve First Amendment “values.” The appellate court accomplished this strange convolution by holding that private broadcasters *are* Government. This is a step along a path that could eventually lead to the proposition that private *newspapers* “are” Government. Freedom of the press would then be gone. In its place we would have such governmental controls upon the press as a majority of this Court at any particular moment might consider First Amendment “values” to require. It is a frightening spectre.

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. He complained that the cases of DNC and BEM, as decided by the Court’s majority, meant that broadcasters, in effect, can get away with airing nothing more than bland non-controversial mediocrities.<sup>93</sup>

These cases require us to consider whether radio and television broadcast licensees may, with the approval of the Federal Communications Commission, refuse *absolutely* to sell any part of their advertising time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance. In practical effect, the broadcaster policy here under attack permits airing of only those paid presentations

<sup>92</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2101 (1973).

<sup>93</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2120, 2121 (1973).

which advertise products or deal with “non-controversial” matters, while relegating the discussion of controversial public issues to formats such as documentaries, the news, or panel shows, which are tightly controlled and edited by the broadcaster.

\* \* \*

\* \* \* I can only conclude that the exclusionary policy upheld today can serve only to inhibit, rather than to further, “our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. \* \* \* I would therefore affirm the determination of the Court of Appeals that the challenged broadcaster policy is violative of the First Amendment.

Furthermore, Justice Brennan found much greater government action involved in broadcasting than did the Court’s majority. Both radio and television use a natural resource—the electromagnetic spectrum—that is part of the public domain. He termed public ownership of the spectrum “an important and established indicium of ‘government involvement.’” In addition, he argued, broadcasters are dependent upon government for licenses, for their “right to operate broadcasting frequencies, and they are also regulated by the FCC.<sup>94</sup> Such government action meant, to Justice Brennan, that broadcasting is essentially a government activity, and that citizens and groups should have greater access to the media. Access under the Fairness Doctrine, Brennan contended, is inadequate.<sup>95</sup>

Under the Fairness Doctrine, the broadcaster is required to present only “*representative* community views and voices on controversial issues” of public importance. Thus, by definition, the Fairness Doctrine tends to perpetuate coverage of those “views and voices” that are already established, while failing to provide for exposure of the public to those “views and voices” that are novel, unorthodox or unrepresentative of prevailing opinion.

Justice Brennan had scant patience with his brethren who raised “the spectre of administrative apocalypse” in projecting difficulties that the FCC would have in administering a right of access. Quoting Judge J. Skelly Wright’s opinion in the court below, Justice Brennan’s dissent concluded:<sup>96</sup>

For the present, however, and until such time as these assertedly “overriding” administrative difficulties actually materialize, if ever, I must agree with the conclusion of the

<sup>94</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2122, 2123–2124 (1973).

<sup>95</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2130 (1973).

<sup>96</sup> 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2138 (1973).

Court of Appeals that although “it may unsettle some of us to see an antiwar message or a political party message in the accustomed place of a soap or beer commercial—we must not equate what is habitual with what is right—or what is constitutional. A society already so saturated with commercialism can well afford another outlet for speech on public issues. All that we may lose is some of our apathy.”

## SEC. 94. ADVERTISING AND THE CONSTITUTION

### **Beginning in 1975, some commercial advertising began to receive protection under the First Amendment.**

Commercial speech customarily has been a poor stepchild where the First Amendment is concerned. Advertising, over the years, has been denied freedoms of speech and press which the courts have granted to unconventional religious minorities,<sup>97</sup> to persons accused of blasphemy,<sup>98</sup> to free-love advocates,<sup>99</sup> and to persons sued for defaming a public official or public figure.<sup>1</sup> During the 1970s, however, a number of court rulings held that just because a message is disseminated in the form of commercial advertising does not withdraw First Amendment protection.<sup>2</sup>

The leading case in denying First Amendment protection to advertising is the 1942 Supreme Court decision in *Valentine v. Chrestensen*. F. J. Chrestensen was incensed when New York City officials refused to allow him to distribute handbills advertising the exhibit of a former U.S. submarine which Chrestensen owned. Police Commissioner Lewis J. Valentine told Chrestensen that he could not distribute handbills asking people to visit the submarine, where an admission fee would be charged. Meanwhile, Chrestensen's submarine was moored at a pier in the East River. No matter, said Police Commissioner Valentine. New York City's Sanitary Code forbade distribution of commercial and business advertising matter in the streets.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>97</sup> *Minersville School District v. Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010 (1940).

<sup>98</sup> *Burstyn v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952).

<sup>99</sup> *Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents*, 360 U.S. 684, 688–689, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 1365 (1959).

<sup>1</sup> See *New York Times v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964) and subsequent cases, including *Rosenblatt v. Baer*, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669 (1966); *Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts*, *Associated Press v. Edwin A. Walker*, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967), and *St. Amant v. Thompson*, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323 (1968).

<sup>2</sup> See, e. g., *Bigelow v. Virginia*, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222 (1975); *Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (1976).

<sup>3</sup> 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920 (1942).

Chrestensen then altered his handbill. One side consisted of commercial advertising (with the deletion of the statement about the admission fee). The other side was a protest against an action of the City Dock Department refusing Chrestensen wharfage for his submarine. Police officials told Chrestensen that he could distribute a handbill criticizing the City Dock Department, but that the commercial advertising would have to go. Two years later, in 1942, Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts spoke for a unanimous Supreme Court in saying that Chrestensen's advertising was not entitled to Constitutional protection.<sup>4</sup>

This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercises of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.

The Court's decision in *Valentine v. Chrestensen* was brief, amounting to only five pages in the official *United States Reports*. Mr. Justice Roberts' statement that commercial advertising is not entitled to Constitutional protections was slipped into the opinion unsupported by a number of relevant cases which he might have cited.<sup>5</sup>

In 1959, Mr. Justice Douglas authored a concurring opinion in *Cammarano v. United States* in which he expressed concern over the rule laid down in *Valentine v. Chrestensen*. William R. Cammarano and his wife owned an interest in a beer distributorship in Washington state. They had paid nearly \$900 into a trust fund which with other contributions, ultimately added up to over \$50,000. This trust fund was being collected by persons opposed to a 1948 ballot measure which would have placed all wine and beer sales in Washington exclusively in the hands of the State. The trust fund was used for advertising which urged, and may well have helped secure, defeat of the ballot measure.

The Cammaranos sued the Department of Internal Revenue because they were not allowed to deduct their contribution to the trust fund as a "business expense." Writing for the Supreme Court,

<sup>4</sup> 316 U.S. 52, 54, 62 S.Ct. 920, 921 (1942).

<sup>5</sup> See Mr. Justice William O. Douglas's concurring opinion in *Cammarano v. United States*, 358 U.S. 498, 513-515, 79 S.Ct. 524, 533-535 (1959), which listed two cases prior to the Chrestensen case which approved broad control over commercial advertising: *Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York*, 221 U.S. 467, 31 S.Ct. 709 (1911), and *Packer Corp. v. Utah*, 285 U.S. 105, 52 S.Ct. 273 (1932). In the latter case, Justice Douglas noted, the First Amendment problem was never raised.

Justice John Marshall Harlan upheld a finding against the Cammaranos' contentions. He wrote:<sup>6</sup>

Nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross income to sums expended to promote or defeat legislation is plainly not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas." Rather, it appears to us that since purchased publicity can influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the community should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as the Treasury of the United States is concerned.

Although Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the Court's decision, he expressed grave worries about the rule of *Valentine v. Chrestensen* that business advertisements and commercial matters do not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. Douglas wrote:<sup>7</sup>

The ruling [in *Valentine v. Chrestensen*] was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection. That "freedom of speech or of the press," directly guaranteed against encroachment by the Federal Government and safeguarded against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is not in terms or by implication confined to discourse of a particular kind and nature. It has often been stressed as essential to the exposition and exchange of political ideas, to the expression of philosophical attitudes, to the flowering of the letters. Important as the First Amendment is to all those cultural ends, it has not been restricted to them. Individual or group protests against action which results in monetary injuries are certainly not beyond the reach of the First Amendment \* \* \*. A protest against government action that affects a business occupies as high a place. The profit motive should make no difference, for that is an element inherent in the very conception of a press under our system of free enterprise. Those who make their living through exercise of First Amendment rights are no less entitled to its protection than those whose advocacy or promotion is not hitched to a profit motive.

\* \* \*

\* \* \* I find it impossible to say that the owners of the present business who were fighting for their lives in opposing these initiative measures were not exercising First Amendment rights.

\* \* \*

<sup>6</sup> 358 U.S. 498, 79 S.Ct. 524, 533 (1959).

<sup>7</sup> 358 U.S. 498, 513-515, 79 S.Ct. 524, 533-535 (1959).

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Deductions are a matter of grace, not of right. \* \* \*  
 To hold that this item of expense must be allowed as a deduction would be to give impetus to the view favored in some quarters that First Amendment rights must be protected by tax exemptions. But that proposition savors of the notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State. Such a notion runs counter to our decisions \* \* \* and may indeed conflict with the underlying premise that a complete hands-off policy on the part of government is at times the only course consistent with First Amendment rights.

The landmark 1964 libel decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in *New York Times v. Sullivan* did not endorse completely Justice Douglas's demand for a governmental policy of "hands off" where expression is involved. Nevertheless, the Court did grant constitutional protection for advertisements which deal with important or social matters. The *Sullivan* case, discussed fully in libel chapters earlier in this book, carefully distinguished the kind of advertising involved in the *Valentine v. Chrestensen* case from the advertising involved in *New York Times v. Sullivan*. It had been contended in the *Sullivan* case that "the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press are inapplicable \* \* \* at least so far as the *Times* is concerned, because the allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid, 'commercial' advertisement." The Court rejected this argument, saying:<sup>8</sup>

The argument relies on *Valentine v. Chrestensen* \* \* \* where the Court held that a city ordinance forbidding street distribution of commercial and business advertising matter did not abridge the First Amendment freedoms, even as applied to a handbill having a commercial message on one side but a protest against certain official action on the other. The reliance is wholly misplaced. The Court in *Chrestensen* reaffirmed the constitutional protection for "the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion;" its holding was based upon the factual conclusions that the handbill was "purely commercial advertising" and that the protest against official action had been added only to evade the ordinance.

The publication here [in *New York Times v. Sullivan*] was not a "commercial" advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in *Chrestensen*. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a [civil rights] movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern. \* \* \*

<sup>8</sup> *New York Times v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 265-266, 84 S.Ct. 710, 718 (1964).

That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold. \* \* \* Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying "editorial advertisements" of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities—who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. \* \* \* The effect would be to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." To avoid placing such a handicap upon the freedoms of expression, we hold that if the allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be constitutionally protected \* \* \* they do not forfeit that protection because they were published in the form of a paid advertisement.

What advertising, then, was protected by the First Amendment after *Times v. Sullivan* (1964)? Not all advertising, said the Supreme Court in *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations* (1973). A Pittsburgh ordinance empowered the city's human relations commission to issue cease and desist orders against discriminatory hiring practices. The Pittsburgh Press ran "Help Wanted" ads in columns labeled "Jobs—Male Interest," and "Jobs—Female Interest." The city commission issued a cease and desist order.<sup>9</sup>

Arguing for the Pittsburgh Press, attorneys contended that the order against the newspaper violated the First Amendment because it tampered with the newspaper's editorial judgment in accepting and placing ads. The newspaper, then, was told that it could not have greater protection than the firms placing advertisements; the firms were forbidden to discriminate, and the newspaper could not run discriminatory ads. Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis Powell said discrimination in employment is illegal commercial activity under the city's ordinance. "We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes." The Court's five-member majority added:<sup>10</sup>

\* \* \* [A]ny First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which arguably might outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.

<sup>9</sup> 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2556 (1973).

<sup>10</sup> 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2560 (1973).



Dissenting in *Pittsburgh Press*, Chief Justice Burger declared that the cease and desist order was in fact prior restraint on publication, and Justice Stewart said that no court has the power to tell a newspaper, before publication, what it can print and what it cannot.<sup>11</sup>

It should be remembered that the Court, in *New York Times v. Sullivan*, drew a distinction between “commercial” advertising which attempted to sell products or services and other kinds of expression.<sup>12</sup> This distinction, however, was too oversimplified for the mid-1970s. Some products or services—by their very nature—may be matters of public debate or controversy, and advertisements for those products or services may have the characteristics and importance of political speech. A 1975 Virginia case involving advertising about the availability and legality of abortions in New York—the case called *Bigelow v. Virginia*—has shown that “commercial speech” does have at least some constitutional protection.

An advertisement was published in *The Virginia Weekly*, a newspaper which focuses its coverage on the University of Virginia campus there. Jeffrey C. Bigelow was a director of and the managing editor of the newspaper, which published the following advertisement on February 7, 1971:<sup>13</sup>

“UNWANTED PREGNANCY  
LET US HELP YOU  
Abortions are now legal in New York  
There are no residency requirements.  
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN  
ACCREDITED HOSPITALS AND  
CLINICS AT LOW COST  
Contact  
WOMEN’S PAVILION  
515 Madison Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10022  
or call any time  
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650  
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will  
make all arrangements for you and help  
you with information and counseling.”

On May 13, 1971, Bigelow was charged with violating a section of the Virginia Code which read:<sup>14</sup> “If any person, by publication,

<sup>11</sup> 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2563 (1973).

<sup>12</sup> *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).

<sup>13</sup> *Bigelow v. Virginia*, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2227 (1975).

<sup>14</sup> Code Va.1950, § 18.1-63, quoted at 421 U.S. 809, 815, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2228 (1975). That statute was amended by Va.Acts, 1972, c. 725, and the amended statute is quoted in *Bigelow’s* majority opinion, at footnote 3. Justice Black-

lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Bigelow was tried and convicted in two courts in Virginia, and was sentenced to pay a \$500 fine, with \$350 suspended “conditioned upon no further violation” of the statute.<sup>15</sup> The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Bigelow’s conviction by a vote of 4–2,<sup>16</sup> declaring that because the advertisement involved was a “commercial advertisement,” Bigelow’s First Amendment claim was not valid. Such an advertisement, said the Virginia Supreme Court, “may be constitutionally prohibited by the state, particularly where, as here, the advertising relates to the medical-health field.”<sup>17</sup>

Writing for the seven-member majority of the Court, Justice Blackmun distinguished the Virginia case from *Chrestensen*.<sup>18</sup> He said that the handbill advertisement involved in *Chrestensen* did no more than propose a purely commercial transaction, while The Virginia Weekly’s advertisement about abortions “contained factual material of clear ‘public interest.’” Justice Blackmun added:<sup>19</sup>

Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience—not only to readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or general interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State and its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.

The very existence of the Women’s Pavilion in New York City was “not unnewsworthy” and also pertained to constitutional privacy interests.<sup>20</sup> Virginia, moreover, had no authority to regulate services offered in New York. A State, Justice Blackmun wrote, “may not \* \* \* bar a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that State.” Although advertising “may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest,” some commercial speech is still worthy of constitutional protection.<sup>21</sup> Advertising is not stripped of all First

mun, writing for the Court, refused to take up the question of “overbreadth” of the statute in 1971, because the 1972 statutory amendment meant that “the issue of overbreadth has become moot for the future.” 421 U.S. 809, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2230 (1975).

<sup>15</sup> 421 U.S. 809, 814, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2228 (1975).

<sup>16</sup> 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972).

<sup>17</sup> 421 U.S. 809, 814, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2229 (1975), quoting 213 Va. 191, 193–195, 191 S.E.2d at 174–176 (1972).

<sup>18</sup> *Valentine v. Chrestensen*, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920 (1942).

<sup>19</sup> 421 U.S. 809, 822, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2233 (1975).

<sup>20</sup> 421 U.S. 809, 821, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2233 (1975), citing *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113, 95 S.Ct. 705 (1973), and *Doe v. Bolton*, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739 (1973).

<sup>21</sup> 421 U.S. 809, 826, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2234, 2235 (1975).

Amendment protection: "The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas." Justice Blackmun continued,<sup>22</sup>

—a court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation. The diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech "commercial" in widely varying degrees. We need not decide here the extent to which constitutional protection is afforded commercial advertising under all circumstances and in the face of all kinds of regulation.

Justice Blackmun and a majority of the Court, concluded, however, that Virginia courts erred in assuming that advertising was entitled to no First Amendment protection.<sup>23</sup> What Justice Blackmun's majority opinion called for, of course, is a balancing of interests—with the courts, and most especially the Supreme Court—to have final say in deciding what is "merely" commercial speech and what is advertising which is "newsworthy" or anointed with the "public interest." More custard pies, in other words, to be nailed to more walls.

#### **Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976)**

What *Bigelow v. Virginia* started, the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case continued when it was decided in May of 1976.<sup>24</sup> A Virginia statute forbade the "advertising of the price for any prescription drug," and was challenged in a lawsuit.<sup>25</sup> The plaintiffs in *Pharmacy* were two non-profit organizations and a Virginia citizen who had to take prescription drugs on a daily basis. These people claimed that the First Amendment entitled users of prescription drugs to receive information from pharmacists—through advertisements or other promotional means—about the price of such drugs.<sup>26</sup>

Writing for a 7–1 majority of the Supreme Court Justice Blackmun said that information about drug prices may be of value to the public. He noted, for example, that the litigants on both sides of this lawsuit had stipulated that there was a striking variance in the price of prescription drugs: " \* \* \* in the Newport News-Hamp-

<sup>22</sup> 421 U.S. 809, 826, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2235 (1975).

<sup>23</sup> 421 U.S. 809, 825, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2234 (1975).

<sup>24</sup> *Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (1976).

<sup>25</sup> 425 U.S. 748, 752, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1820–21 (1976), citing Code Va.1974, § 54–524.35.

<sup>26</sup> 425 U.S. 748, 754, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1821 (1976).

ton area the cost of tetracycline ranges from \$1.20 to \$9.00, a difference of 650%.”<sup>27</sup>

Last term, in *Bigelow v. Virginia*, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222 (1975), the notion of unprotected “commercial speech” all but passed from the scene. \* \* \* We rejected the contention that the publication was unprotected because it was commercial. *Chrestensen’s* continued validity [see pages 590–591, Nelson and Teeter, 2nd ed.] was questioned, and its holding was described as “distinctly a limited one” that merely upheld “a reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed.” \* \* \* [W]e observed that the “relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.” 421 U.S. 809, 826–827, 95 S.Ct., at 2235 (1975). \* \* \* We concluded that “the Virginia courts erred in their assumption that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection \* \* \*”.

\* \* \*

Here, in contrast, the question whether there is a First Amendment exception for ‘commercial speech’ is squarely before us. Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about commercial matters. The “idea” he wishes to communicate is simply this: “I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.” Our question, then, is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.<sup>28</sup>

The Supreme Court of the United States declared that the consumer had a great interest in the free flow of commercial information—perhaps a greater interest than in the day’s most important political debate. The individuals hardest hit, said Blackmun, by the suppression of prescription drug price information are the poor, the sick and the old.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, despite the State of Virginia’s admittedly valid interest in protection of professionalism among pharmacists, it was concluded that the Virginia statute was invalid.

Subsequent cases indicate that commercial speech now will often be protected by the Constitution. See, for example, *Horner-Rausch Optical Company*, decided in 1976 in Tennessee. There, a state administrative regulation forbidding price advertising of eyeglasses was declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Tennessee

<sup>27</sup> 425 U.S. 748, 754, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1821 (1976).

<sup>28</sup> 425 U.S. 748, 759–761, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1824–1825 (1976).

<sup>29</sup> 425 U.S. 748, 763, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1826 (1976).

said that a state can no longer “ \* \* \* completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of the information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.”<sup>30</sup> Even more recently, on June 27, 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled—by a 5-4 margin—that lawyers have a constitutional right to advertise their prices for various services. Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion said, “[I]t is entirely possible that advertising will serve to reduce, not advance, the cost of legal services to the consumer.” In this case, the consumer’s need for information about the cost of various legal services was held to outweigh the legal profession’s interest in having a self-regulated restraint against virtually all kinds of advertising by attorneys. The opinion added that the time, place and manner of advertising may still be regulated, and that false and misleading advertising by lawyers will be forbidden.<sup>31</sup>

In holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression, and that the advertisement at issue is protected, we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way. We mention some of the clearly permissible limitations on advertising not foreclosed by our holding. Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to restraint. See *Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Council*, 425 U.S. at 771-772, and n. 24.

\* \* \*

The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants’ truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services. We rule simply that the flow of such information may not be restrained, and we therefore hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against appellants to be violative of the First Amendment.

With these words, the Supreme Court showed that it is concerned with freedom of advertising as well as with the control of its abuses. A notable eighteenth-century Englishman, Dr. Samuel Johnson, directed his attention to advertising and turned this neat phrase:

<sup>30</sup> *Horner-Rausch Optical Co. et al. v. R. A. Ashley et al.*, 547 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn.1976), quoting *Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council*, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1831 (1976).

<sup>31</sup> *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona*, 431 U.S. 350, 377, 383, 384, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2706, 2708, 2709 (1977).

“Promise, large promise, is the soul of an advertisement.”<sup>32</sup> To keep advertising’s promises within socially manageable bounds is the task, worthy of Sisyphus, which falls upon the Federal Trade Commission and other federal and state agencies, as well as upon the profession of advertising and the mass media. It is a fearfully complex job. As Attorney Ira M. Millstein has written about the FTC, “most complicated, from the Commission’s standpoint, are questions raised by critics as to the false social value of advertising. The line between false value and actionable false promise may sometimes be hard to draw.”<sup>33</sup> The drawing of such a line is the continuing job of the advertising profession, of the media, and of various government agencies, including legislatures, courts, and commissions. This elusive line is still being sought as more law is made dealing with the control of advertising and the freedom of the marketplace.

<sup>32</sup> Statement attributed to Dr. Johnson quoted by Ira M. Millstein, “The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising,” *Columbia Law Review* Vol. 64:3 (March, 1964) pp. 439–499, at p. 439, from David Ogilvy, *Confessions of an Advertising Man* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1963 p. 116.

<sup>33</sup> Millstein, *op. cit.*, at 447.

## Chapter 15

### ANTITRUST LAW AND THE MASS MEDIA

Sec.

95. Concentration or Diversity?
96. Associated Press v. United States (1945).
97. Lorain Journal Company v. United States (1951).
98. Times-Picayune v. United States (1953).
99. United States v. Kansas City Star (1957).
100. United States v. Times-Mirror Corporation (1967).
101. United States v. Citizen Publishing Company (1968).
102. The Newspaper Preservation Act.
103. Consent Decrees.

#### SEC. 95. CONCENTRATION OR DIVERSITY?

**The media of mass communications are subject to antitrust laws which affect other businesses.**

“Concentration of newspaper ownership” \* \* \* “problems of bigness and fewness” \* \* \* “fewer voices in the marketplace of ideas:” these are some of the phrases which typify relationships between the mass media and the area of law known as “antitrust and restraint of trade.” Because they are businesses, units of the mass media come under antitrust laws with which government seeks to discourage monopolization and unreasonable restraint of trade.

Back in 1947, the premier scholar of the law of mass communications asked to what extent antitrust laws should be used to prevent the concentration of media units from hindering the free interchange of news and ideas. This scholar, the late Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. of Harvard Law School, declared antitrust law problems to be the most important facing the press and also the most difficult.<sup>1</sup>

Professor Chafee’s concern was prophetic. Antitrust law is a field which from time to time causes considerable fright among many publishers and broadcasters. A 1970 Federal Communications Commission proposal to force broadcast station owners to cut their mass media operations in any community to either broadcast properties or newspaper ownership is an example in point. That FCC “proposed rule making” was enough to cause a considerable number of local cross-ownerships to be split up by their owners. The FCC backed down from its own proposal in 1975, issuing a ruling which grandfa-

<sup>1</sup> Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Government and Mass Communications*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947) I, p. 537.

thered most existing local cross-ownerships of broadcast and newspaper properties. A March, 1977, United States Court of Appeals decision—*National Citizens Commission for Broadcasting v. FCC*—declared that such cross-ownerships should be broken up unless affirmative showings are made that such ownership patterns are in the public interest. That case, which was appealed to the Supreme Court, was pending there early in 1978, and is discussed at some length in Sec. 77 of Chapter 13. Involved in this case are 60 television stations, 135 AM radio stations, and 96 FM stations—operations which, taken together, are worth billions of dollars.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter will not look at the entire range of antitrust activities affecting the mass media. It is aimed, instead, at the newspaper ownership picture, and does not take up such matters as exclusive syndication or newspaper distribution problems.<sup>3</sup>

Consider the following facts and figures, which sum up many years of concentration of ownership and declining competition among America's newspapers:<sup>4</sup>

- In 1914, there were, 2,580 dailies published in the United States.
- By the late 1970s, there were roughly 1,760 dailies published in this country.
- By 1977, 71 per cent of daily newspaper circulation in the United States was controlled by 168 multiple ownerships.
- There are now less than 50 cities with competing newspapers. As Ben Bagdikian has said, “[t]he reader has no choice even of absentee owners.”

Bagdikian, now a Professor of Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley, also fretted about media conglomerates:<sup>5</sup>

In broadcasting \* \* \* concentration of control over the news function by networks means control by conglomerates, whose nonjournalistic subsidiaries represent potential conflicts with independent news.

<sup>2</sup> 555 F.2d 938 (D.C.Cir. 1977); William H. Jones and Laird Anderson, “Newspapers: Just Another Business?,” *Washington Post* study reprinted in *The Corpus Christi Caller*, Section B, pp. 1ff, August 7, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> Exclusive syndication problems involve features such as columns or comic strips. Such features are offered to major newspapers under an agreement that no other newspaper within a certain region could publish that feature. For a discussion of territorial exclusivity problems and distribution problems involving newspaper racks, see Marc A. Franklin, *The First Amendment and the Fourth Estate* (Mineola, N. Y.: Foundation Press, 1977.), pp. 106–108.

<sup>4</sup> See, e. g., Ben H. Bagdikian, “The Myth of Newspaper Poverty,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, March/April, 1973, p. 20; Arnold B. Barach, “Newspaper Mergers,” *Mergers and Acquisitions* (Vol. 1) (Summer, 1966) p. 20; Robert L. Bishop, “The Rush to Chain Ownership,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, November/December 1972, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> Bagdikian, “Newspaper Mergers—The Final Phase,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, March/April 1977, p. 20.



The RCA Corporation, for example, owns NBC. The parent corporation does more than \$5 billion of business a year of which NBC represents less than 20 per cent. RCA owns Random House, the book publisher, together with its subsidiaries, which include Ballantine Books, Alfred A. Knopf, Pantheon, Vintage, and Modern Library. It owns the Hertz Corporation. It is a major defense industry, producing military radar, electronic-warfare equipment, laser systems, instruments that guide aerial bombs to targets, hardware that does intelligence processing, guidance to surface to air missiles, and it has wholly owned subsidiaries around the world. It controls telecommunications among 200 nation states through its RCA Global Communications, Inc. RCA is also a subcontractor on the Alaska pipeline, and it has produced guidance systems for Apollo and Skylab spacecraft. One wonders what might have been lost to RCA in its multimillion-dollar Apollo and Skylab space contracts if its wholly-owned broadcasting arm, NBC, had produced a convincing documentary against spending all that money on space exploration.

Bagdikian is not merely a lonely alarmist. A 1977 study by The Washington Post concluded that within 20 years, almost all daily newspapers in America may be owned by fewer than two dozen major communications conglomerates. Indeed, newspaper mergers have proceeded at more than 50 a year, with 72 in 1976. While the Justice Department's Antitrust Division has mouthed old homilies about diversity in the marketplace of ideas and opinion, newspaper mergers continue largely unabated.<sup>6</sup>

The communications media are businesses, and as such, are ringed about by federal and state laws which regulate businesses. Congress has enacted several statutes—most commonly called antitrust laws—which attempt to preserve competition. The most important statements of national antitrust policy are found in the Sherman<sup>7</sup> and Clayton<sup>8</sup> Acts.

The Sherman Act of 1890 begins: "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."<sup>9</sup> Every person who acts to restrain trade, as mentioned generally above, is guilty of a crime. The Sherman Act prohibits "contracts, combinations \* \* \* or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce" and makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire \* \* to monopolize \* \* \* trade or commerce."

<sup>6</sup> William H. Jones and Laird Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 6B.

<sup>7</sup> 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7; P.L. No. 190, 51st Congress (1890).

<sup>8</sup> 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12ff (1964); P.L. No. 201, 63rd Congress (1914).

<sup>9</sup> 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1964).

Criminal prosecution—with penalties of fines, imprisonment, or both—is provided for in the Sherman Act. The Act also enables the government to bring suits in equity to get injunctions against violations of the statute. As Chafee observed in 1947, suits in equity are “preferred because it is not always easy for businessmen to know in advance whether their transactions are illegal or not.”<sup>10</sup> Also, a person (or business) who has suffered damages because a competitor has violated the Sherman Act may sue the competitor for *treble damages*.

Treble damage lawsuits work in this way: suppose that the Fluke Manufacturing Company has violated the Sherman Act. The United States Department of Justice takes Fluke Manufacturing to court and gets an order to make it stop certain monopolistic or trade-restraining practices. An interested spectator, meanwhile, is Fluke’s competitor, whom we shall call the Flimsy Manufacturing Company. Flimsy Manufacturing then begins a treble damage antitrust suit, and is able to prove in court that Fluke Manufacturing’s illegal business practices cost Flimsy \$100,000 in business. However, since this would be a *treble damage* lawsuit, Flimsy Manufacturing would actually collect \$300,000 from the competing Fluke company.

The Clayton Act of 1914 added to the government’s antitrust enforcement powers, enumerating many acts as illegal when “they tend to lessen competition or to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”<sup>11</sup> Section 7 of the Clayton Act—more commonly called the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950—is the most important section of the Clayton Act where newspapers are concerned.<sup>12</sup> The “Celler-Kefauver Act” forbids corporations to acquire stock or assets of a competing corporation “where \* \* \* the effect \* \* \* may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.”

Upon such vaguely worded provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is built federal antitrust policy. As Professor Lorry Rytting of the University of Utah has declared, the vagueness of the statutory provisions make antitrust one of the most perplexing branches of public law, especially where newspapers and other units of the communications media are involved.

Although decided just after the end of World War II, the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Associated Press v. United States*<sup>13</sup> still ranks as a leading case in antitrust law affecting the media. The Justice Department had brought suit under the Sherman Act to get an injunction which would prevent the AP from continuing to operate under some of its by-laws. These by-laws prevented AP

<sup>10</sup> Chafee, *op. cit.*, p. 538.

<sup>11</sup> 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1964 ed.)

<sup>12</sup> 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1964), P.L. 899, 81st Congress (1950).

<sup>13</sup> 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945).

members from selling news to non-members. Other by-law provisions also gave a newspaper which had an AP membership virtual veto power over competing newspapers' attempts to get AP membership.<sup>14</sup>

One of several cases combined under the decision with the general heading *Associated Press v. United States* involved publisher Marshall Field's attempt to get an AP membership for his *Chicago Sun*, a new newspaper in competition with the redoubtable Col. Robert R. McCormick's powerful *Chicago Tribune*.

#### SEC. 96. ASSOCIATED PRESS v. UNITED STATES (1945)

**Antitrust statutes, as applied to the press, are not in violation of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.**

When a newspaper applied for AP membership and an existing member protested the application—as the *Tribune* protested the *Sun's* application—the AP by-laws then required a majority vote of all AP members before the new applicant could be admitted to the club.<sup>15</sup> Thus Marshall Field's *Chicago Sun* could not become an AP member without Col. McCormick's consent, unless the government intervened—in the public interest—to use antitrust laws to force an amendment of the AP by-laws.

In 1943, the Justice Department charged that the conduct of the AP, of the *Chicago Tribune*, and other defendants constituted “(1) a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in news among the states, and (2) an attempt to monopolize a part of that trade.”<sup>16</sup> In finding that the AP by-laws did in fact violate the Sherman Act, Justice Hugo L. Black described the effect of exclusion from the AP:<sup>17</sup>

These By-Laws, for a violation of which members may be \* \* \* fined, suspended, or expelled, require that each newspaper member publish the AP news regularly in whole or in part, and that each shall “promptly furnish to the corporation, through its agents or employees, all the news of such member's district, the area of which shall be determined by the Board of Directors.” All members are prohibited from selling or furnishing their spontaneous news to any agency or publisher except to AP. Other By-Laws require each newspaper member to conduct his or its busi-

<sup>14</sup> Chafee, *op. cit.*, pp. 542–543; *Associated Press v. United States*, 326 U.S. 1, 9–10, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1419 (1945).

<sup>15</sup> Chafee, p. 543; *Associated Press v. United States*, *loc. cit.* Another newspaper which like the *Chicago Sun* had applied for AP membership and had been turned down by a 2–1 vote of AP members, was the *Washington Times-Herald*.

<sup>16</sup> 326 U.S. 1, 4, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1417 (1945).

<sup>17</sup> 326 U.S. 1, 8–10, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1419 (1945).

ness in such manner that the news furnished by the corporations shall not be made available to any non-member in advance of publication. The joint effect of these By-Laws is to block all newspaper non-members from any opportunity to buy news from AP or any of its publisher members. Admission to membership in AP thereby becomes a prerequisite to obtaining AP news or buying news from any one of its more than twelve hundred publishers. The erection of obstacles to the acquisition of membership consequently can make it difficult, if not impossible, for non-members to get any of the news furnished by AP or any of the individual members of this combination of American newspaper publishers.

The By-Laws provide a very simple and non-burdensome road for admission of a non-competing applicant. The Board of Directors in such case can elect the applicant without payment of money or the imposition of other onerous terms. In striking contrast are the By-Laws which govern admission of new members who do compete. [Applicants in a competing field could be admitted only on payment of 10 per cent of the total assessments of that AP in that field since Oct. 1, 1900.] Historically, as well as presently, applicants who would offer competition to old members have a hard road to travel.

The Associated Press and the Chicago Tribune and other media defendants argued that the application of the Sherman Act in this case would be a violation of freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First Amendment. A majority of the Supreme Court was not impressed by this argument. Justice Black replied,<sup>18</sup>

Member publishers of AP are engaged in business for profit exactly as are other businessmen who sell food, steel, aluminum, or anything else people need or want \* \* \*. All are alike covered by the Sherman Act. The fact that the publisher handles news while others handle goods does not, as we shall later point out, afford the publisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in which he can with impunity violate laws regulating his business practices.

Finally, Justice Black answered the assertion that the Sherman Act's application to the Associated Press abridged the AP's First Amendment freedom. He declared that it would be strange if the concern for press freedom underlying the First Amendment should be read "as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom." Black continued,<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> 326 U.S. 1, 7, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1418 (1945).

<sup>19</sup> 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424-1425 (1945).

The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations as a refuge if they impose restraints on that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.

Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity.

Justice Frankfurter added other arguments in favor of government action under the Sherman Act to attempt to control media activities which tended to restrain trade. To Frankfurter, the press was a business, but it was also much more: "in addition to being a commercial enterprise, it [the press] has a relation to the public interest unlike that of any other enterprise pursued for profit." Following this premise, Justice Frankfurter then quoted words written by America's most famous United States District Court judge. The oft-quoted words below came from Judge Learned Hand's opinion at the Court of Appeals level in this same case of *Associated Press v. United States*.<sup>20</sup>

\* \* \* that [the newspaper] industry serves one of the most vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.

To Frankfurter, the By-Laws of the Associated Press were a clear restriction of commerce. Such a restriction was unreasonable because it subverted the function of a constitutionally guaranteed free press.

<sup>20</sup> 326 U.S. 1, 28, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1428 (1945), quoting Judge Hand, *Associated Press v. United States*, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (D.C.N.Y.1943).

Dissents from Justices Owen J. Roberts and Frank Murphy took a traditional libertarian view: in general, government should leave the press alone. Justice Murphy wrote:<sup>21</sup>

Today is \* \* \* the first time that the Sherman Act has been used as a vehicle for affirmative intervention by the Government in the realm of dissemination of information. As the Government states, this is an attempt to remove “barriers erected by private combination against access to reports of world news.” That newspapers and news agencies are engaged in business for profit is beyond dispute. And it is undeniable that the Associated Press and other associations can claim no immunity from the application of the general laws or of the Sherman Act in particular \* \* \*. [The press associations] are engaged in collecting and distributing news and information rather than in manufacturing automobiles, aluminum or gasoline. We cannot avoid that fact. Nor can we escape the fact that governmental action directly aimed at the methods or conditions of such collection or distribution is an interference with the press, however differing in degree it may be from governmental restraints on written or spoken utterances themselves \* \* \*. We should therefore be particularly vigilant in reviewing a case of this nature, a vigilance that apparently is not shared by the Court today.

#### SEC. 97. LORAIN JOURNAL COMPANY v. UNITED STATES (1951)

The 1951 case of *Lorain Journal Co. et al. v. United States*<sup>22</sup> dealt with a straightforward instance of a newspaper’s attempting to restrain trade by cutting into a radio station’s advertising revenues. It seems safe to say that the newspaper company involved here placed its competitive practices in an even more unfavorable light before the courts because it previously had tried—and failed—to get a license to operate a radio station in *Lorain*.<sup>23</sup>

From 1933 until 1948, the publisher of the *Lorain Journal* in Lorain, Ohio, had enjoyed a “substantial monopoly in Lorain of the mass dissemination of news and advertising, both of a local and national character.” This idyllic situation ended in 1948, however, when the Elyira-Lorain Broadcasting Company, a corporation independent of the newspaper publisher, was licensed by the Federal Communications Commission. The radio station—WEOL—was lo-

<sup>21</sup> 326 U.S. 1, 51–52, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1439 (1945).

<sup>22</sup> 342 U.S. 143, 72 S.Ct. 181 (1951).

<sup>23</sup> See 92 F.Supp. 794, 796 (D.C.Ohio 1950). See also *Lorain Journal Co. v. Federal Communications Commission*, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 180 F.2d 28 (1950).

cated in Elyria, just eight miles from Lorain, and also opened a branch studio in Lorain.<sup>24</sup>

The publishers of the *Lorain Journal* did not welcome this new competitor for advertising dollars, and set about trying to drive the radio station out of business. The newspaper refused to accept local advertising from Lorain merchants who also bought advertising time from the radio station. Because of the *Lorain Journal's* coverage of 99 per cent of Lorain's families this forced many advertisers to avoid buying time from WEOL.

The United States government brought a civil antitrust suit against the Lorain Journal Company, charging an attempt to monopolize commerce under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The government sought an injunction against the publisher's business practices. In reply, the newspaper company argued that it had the right to select its customers and to refuse or accept advertising from whom-ever it pleases. Furthermore, the Journal Company declared that an injunction which would prevent the newspaper from refusing to print advertisements of persons or businesses who advertised over WEOL would restrict freedom of the press. That is, the newspaper publisher argued that such an injunction would amount to a prior restraint on what a newspaper may publish.<sup>25</sup>

In a trial in a United States district court, the Lorain Journal Company was found to be attempting to monopolize commerce. The court issued an injunction to prevent the newspaper's continuing the attempt.<sup>26</sup> The Lorain Journal Company appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States but to no avail. By a 7-0 vote, the Court held that the District Court's injunction was justified.<sup>27</sup>

The Supreme Court, in fact, was quite unkind in its description of the Lorain Journal Company's business practices. It quoted the District Court's statement that the newspaper was guilty of "bold, relentless, and predatory commercial behavior."<sup>28</sup> The Court, through Mr. Justice Harold H. Burton's opinion, turned aside the newspaper's defense arguments one by one.

First, on the newspaper's right to do business with whomever it wished, Justice Burton wrote:<sup>29</sup>

The right claimed by the publisher is neither absolute nor exempt from regulation. [The refusal to accept advertising] \* \* \* as a purposeful means of monopolizing inter-

<sup>24</sup> 342 U.S. 143, 147, 72 S.Ct. 181, 183 (1951).

<sup>25</sup> 342 U.S. 143, 148-156, 72 S.Ct. 181, 184-187 (1951).

<sup>26</sup> 342 U.S. 143, 145, 72 S.Ct. 181, 182 (1951).

<sup>27</sup> 342 U.S. 143, 144, 72 S.Ct. 181, 182 (1951).

<sup>28</sup> 92 F.Supp. 794, 796 (1950), quoted at 342 U.S. 143, 72 S.Ct. 181, 184 (1951).

<sup>29</sup> 342 U.S. 143, 155, 72 S.Ct. 181, 187 (1951), quoting *United States v. Colgate & Co.*, 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S.Ct. 465, 468 (1919). Emphasis the Court's.

state commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act. The operator of the radio station, equally with the publisher of the newspaper, is entitled to the protection of that Act. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."

Second, the court rejected the argument that the injunction to force the newspaper to cease its policy of discriminatory refusal of advertising to merchants who bought time from WEOL was an infringement of the newspaper's First Amendment rights.<sup>30</sup>

We find [the injunction] \* \* \* no restriction upon any guaranteed freedom of the press. The injunction applies to a publisher what the law applies to others. The publisher may not accept or deny advertisements in an "attempt to monopolize \* \* \* any part of the trade or commerce among the several States \* \* \*." Injunctive relief under § 4 of the Sherman Act is as appropriate a means of enforcing the Act against newspapers as it is against others.

With this decision, the Supreme Court forced the Lorain Journal Company to conform its business policies with the rugged conditions set forth by the injunction issued in the case by the United States District Court. These conditions in the injunction were not only onerous, they were downright embarrassing. The injunction ordered the *Lorain Journal* not to discriminatorily refuse advertisements—or to attach discriminatory conditions in accepting advertisements—against persons or businesses who advertised in other media.<sup>31</sup>

The District Court retained jurisdiction over the case so that any of the parties to the judgment could ask for further orders or directions. In this way, the pressure was kept on the newspaper, because the District Court left itself in a position to step in quickly to clarify or amend the injunction, to enforce compliance, or to punish violations of the order.

All of this was doubtless bad enough, from the newspaper's point of view. But the injunction also forced the newspaper to publish

<sup>30</sup> 342 U.S. 143, 156–157, 72 S.Ct. 181, 187–188 (1951).

<sup>31</sup> "Final Judgment," quoted at 342 U.S. 143, 157–159, 72 S.Ct. 181, 188–189 (1951). The newspaper was forbidden to discriminate as to acceptance for publication, plus "price, space, arrangement, location, commencement or period of insertion or any other terms or conditions of publication of advertisement or advertisements where the reason for such refusal or discrimination is in whole or in part, express or implied, that the person, firm or corporation submitting the advertisement or advertisements has advertised, advertises, has proposed or proposes to advertise in or through another medium."



notices admitting its violation of the Sherman Act for 26 consecutive weeks. The court's order said:<sup>32</sup>

Commencing fifteen (15) days after the entry of this judgment and at least once a week for a period of twenty-five weeks thereafter the corporate defendant shall insert in the newspaper published by it a notice which shall fairly and fully apprise the readers thereof of the substantive terms of this judgment and which notice shall be placed in a conspicuous location.

The Lorain Journal Company's troubles were not finished, however. In antitrust law, as noted earlier, the findings of fact in a civil or criminal suit brought by the government may be used as a springboard for a private *treble damage* lawsuit. In 1961 came the decision in the case of *Elyria Lorain Broadcasting v. Lorain Journal*. There it was held that the newspaper was liable to treble damages for lost revenue caused the radio station by the newspaper's illegal business practices.<sup>33</sup>

#### SEC. 98. *TIMES-PICAYUNE v. UNITED STATES* (1953)

**Where business practices do not produce a demonstrably harmful effect, the antitrust laws will not be enforced.**

Although the United States government won its antitrust case against the Lorain Journal in 1950, it was not successful in proving violation of the Sherman Act in *Times-Picayune v. United States* in 1953. From the outset, the government side of this case must have looked like a sure victory for the antitrust lawyers employed by the United States. It appeared simply that two New Orleans newspapers owned by one publisher were ganging up on an independent, competing newspaper, trying to drive it out of business through illegal advertising contracts. However, for reasons which will be described below, the Supreme Court held that the government had presented insufficient evidence to show a violation of the Sherman Act.

At issue was the legality under the Sherman Act of the Times-Picayune Company's contracts for the sale of newspaper classified and general display (national) advertising. The company owned and published two New Orleans newspapers: the morning Times-Picayune (188,402 daily average circulation in 1950) and the evening States (105,235 daily average circulation in 1950). The Times-Picayune Company's two newspapers were competing with the evening New Orleans Item (114,660 daily average circulation in 1950).

<sup>32</sup> Quoted at 342 U.S. 143, 158, 72 S.Ct. 181, 189 (1951).

<sup>33</sup> 298 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1961).

The United States government filed a civil antitrust suit against the Times-Picayune Company because of the company's "unit" or "forced combination" contracts with its advertisers. That is, anyone wishing to buy classified advertising or local display advertising in either the morning Times Picayune or the evening States had to purchase space in *both* the morning and afternoon newspapers. The United States challenged these "forced combination" contracts with advertisers as unreasonable restraints of interstate trade and as part of an attempt to monopolize a segment of interstate commerce.<sup>34</sup> A United States District Court in Louisiana found violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and issued an injunction against further use of the Times-Picayune Company's advertising contracts.

Involved here was the complicated notion of "illegal tying" under the anti-trust laws. "Tying" is unlawful when a business with a dominant position in its industry coerces its customers to buy an unwanted product along with the desired product.<sup>35</sup> The United States government case rested upon the belief that the morning Times-Picayune, with its circulation of 188,402, was such a "desired product" for advertisers. However, to be able to buy space in the Times-Picayune, the advertisers were forced to also buy space in its sister newspaper, the evening States, which had a circulation of only 105,235. This, of course, must have operated to take some advertising revenue away from the States' competitor, the afternoon Item, which had a circulation of 114,660. The government even contended that the Times-Picayune Company had deliberately operated its afternoon newspaper at a loss—with low advertising rates—in order to attract revenue away from the competing afternoon Item and drive it out of business.<sup>36</sup>

A majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, however, found that there had been no unlawful "tying." The Times-Picayune was not regarded as the "dominant" product, nor was the States seen as an "inferior" product. Instead, Justice Tom C. Clark's majority opinion held that the two newspapers—owned by one publisher—were selling identical products: advertising space in a newspaper.<sup>37</sup>

Although the Supreme Court's decision left the Times-Picayune Company's combined unit advertising contracts in operation, the Court may well have had some real misgivings. Many actions of the Times-Picayune Company which were charged by the government to be unlawful restraints of trade or monopolistic practices seemed to the Supreme Court to be defensible as legitimate business practices.

<sup>34</sup> 345 U.S. 594, 597, 73 S.Ct. 872, 874 (1953). See the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 and 2.

<sup>35</sup> 105 F.Supp. 670 (D.C.La.1952).

<sup>36</sup> 345 U.S. 594, 627, 73 S.Ct. 872, 890 (1953).

<sup>37</sup> 345 U.S. 594, 614, 73 S.Ct. 872, 883 (1953).

The government's evidence was simply not strong enough, according to a majority of the Court, to support a finding that the Sherman Act had been violated. Justice Clark's majority opinion concluded with these words of caution:<sup>38</sup>

We conclude, therefore, that this record does not establish the charged violations of § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act. We do not determine that unit advertising arrangements are lawful in other circumstances or in other proceedings. Our decision adjudicates solely that this record cannot substantiate the Government's view of this case. Accordingly, the District Court's judgment must be reversed.

An important part of Justice Tom C. Clark's majority opinion was his discussion of the relationship between freedom of expression and the economics of the newspaper business in the middle of the 20th century:<sup>39</sup>

The daily newspaper, though essential to the effective functioning of our political system, has in recent years suffered drastic economic decline. A vigorous and dauntless press is a chief source feeding the flow of democratic expression and controversy which maintains the institutions of a free society. \* \* \* By interpreting to the citizen the policies of his government and vigilantly scrutinizing the official conduct of those who administer the state, an independent press stimulates free discussion and focuses public opinion on issues and officials as a potent check on arbitrary action or abuse. \* \* \* Yet today, despite the vital task that in our society the press performs, the number of daily newspapers in the United States is at its lowest point since the century's turn: in 1951, 1,773 daily newspapers served 1,443 American cities, compared with 2,600 dailies published in 1,207 cities in the year 1909. Moreover, while 598 new dailies braved the field between 1929 and 1950, 373 of these suspended publication during that period—less than half of the new entrants survived. Concurrently, daily newspaper competition within individual cities has grown nearly extinct: in 1951, 81% of all daily newspaper cities had only one daily paper; 11% more had two or more publications, but a single publisher controlled both or all. In that year, therefore, only 8% of daily newspaper cities enjoyed the clash of opinion which competition among publishers of their daily press could provide.

Despite this statement by the Justice Clark, he later declared in his decision that the *New Orleans Item*—the newspaper in competi-

<sup>38</sup> 345 U.S. 594, 627–628, 73 S.Ct. 872, 890–891 (1953).

<sup>39</sup> 345 U.S. 594, 602–604, 73 S.Ct. 872, 877–878 (1953).

tion with the *Times-Picayune* and its sister paper, the *States*—was flourishing. He noted that between 1946 and 1950, the *Item* had increased its general display advertising volume by nearly 25 per cent. This local display lineage, he added, was twice the equivalent lineage in the *States*. Clark asserted: “The record in this case thus does not disclose evidence from which demonstrably deleterious effects on competition may be inferred.”<sup>40</sup> One ironic footnote should be added: the only afternoon newspaper now published in New Orleans is published by the *Times-Picayune Company*. The name of this afternoon newspaper, thanks to a 1958 merger, is the *New Orleans States Item*.

### SEC. 99. UNITED STATES v. KANSAS CITY STAR (1957)

#### Restraining the circulation of news and views has no constitutional immunity under the First Amendment.

After the setback in the *Times-Picayune* case, the government turned to a *criminal* antitrust prosecution against the powerful *Kansas City Star*. The criminal prosecution, however, was by no means the whole story in the *Kansas City Star* case. The justice department also brought a concurrent *civil* antitrust action against the *Star*, which was later dropped when the *Star* signed a consent decree agreeing to cease and desist from certain business practices.<sup>41</sup> Thus the case of *United States v. Kansas City Star* runs the gamut of antitrust activity, including a criminal prosecution, a civil antitrust action brought by the government, the signing of a consent decree, and finally, a welter of treble damage antitrust lawsuits brought against the *Star* by persons, publications, and firms who claimed that they had been injured by the *Star*'s tough competitive practices.<sup>42</sup>

The Federal government brought a criminal antitrust action against the *Kansas City Star* and its advertising manager, Emil Sees, under the section of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act providing that every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize interstate commerce shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.<sup>43</sup> The *Kansas City Star Company* had been making the best of a favorable competitive situation. The corporation was in an essentially monopolistic situation, owning the *Kansas City Times*, a morning newspaper with more than 350,000 circulation, and the *Kansas*

<sup>40</sup> 345 U.S. 594, 620, 73 S.Ct. 872, 887 (1953).

<sup>41</sup> Editor & Publisher, Nov. 23, 1957, p. 9.

<sup>42</sup> Consent decrees, discussed later in this chapter, are negotiated settlements reached between the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and a defendant. In such a decree the defendant agrees to stop certain business or to divest himself of certain holdings, but without admitting violation of any law.

<sup>43</sup> *United States v. Kansas City Star*, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957); 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1964 ed.).

*City Star*, an afternoon paper with more than 360,000 circulation. The circulation of the *Sunday Star* amounted to more than 378,000. In addition, the Kansas City Star Corporation owned WDAF radio and WDAF-TV.

The *Times* and *Star* were delivered to 96 per cent of all homes in Kansas City each day. In order to get one of the Star Company's three newspapers, residents of Kansas City had to subscribe to all three. Classified advertisers and general advertisers were required to run their advertisements in both the *Star* and the *Times*, regardless of the desire of some advertisers to use only one of the papers.

The facts of the *Kansas City Star* operation differed markedly from that which faced Federal antitrust attorneys in the Times-Picayune case. First, unlike the New Orleans situation, the morning, afternoon, and Sunday newspapers were *forced* upon readers. Persons who wished to place general or classified advertising were forced to buy space in all three newspapers as a condition of having their advertising accepted. Second, and also unlike New Orleans, the *Star's* daily competition, the *Journal-Post*, was bankrupt and had ceased publication. Third, the Kansas City Star Corporation, thanks to its newspaper-radio-television enterprises, accounted for nearly 85 per cent of all mass media income in the Kansas City area in 1952. On facts such as these, the government built a strong antitrust case.<sup>44</sup>

In prosecuting its case, the government showed that the *Star's* dominant position in the Kansas City area gave it the power to exclude competition. The government also assembled evidence that the power had been used in rather ruthless fashion. For example, the manager of three Kansas City theatres testified that he had been told, several years earlier, to take his advertising out of the then-competing newspaper, the *Kansas City Journal-Post*. If not, he said, he was told that his advertisements would be left out of the *Kansas City Star* and *Times*.<sup>45</sup> Other evidence was found of threats and coercion by the *Star* Corporation to attempt to hamper competition. It was even charged that the dissemination of news was used to control advertising. Consider the instance of a big league baseball player who was a partner in a florist's shop in Kansas City.<sup>46</sup>

The florist shop also advertised in the [competing newspaper, the] *Journal-Post*. A *Star* solicitor informed one of the partners that The *Star* would discontinue publicizing the baseball player if the florist shop continued using the *Journal-Post* for advertising, Sees [the *Star's* advertising

<sup>44</sup> United States v. Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1957).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 654.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 655.

manager] instructing a *Star* solicitor to tell them, “ \* \* \* to get out of the *Journal-Post* or he wouldn’t get any sports, that he wouldn’t get any cooperation from the sports desk on anything that he did in organized baseball.”

Evidence was also presented that television and radio advertising on the stations owned by the Star Company went only to advertisers who were favored. In 1952, the *Star* refused time on its WDAF-TV station to a furniture company. A *Star* advertising salesman then called the furniture company’s attention to the fact that the company did not advertise in the *Star* Company’s newspapers. When the salesman was told that the furniture company had no need for newspaper advertising, the salesman replied that if that were the case, the furniture company likewise had no need for television.<sup>47</sup>

Also involved was the issue whether the *Kansas City Star* and the *Kansas City Times* were one and the same newspaper since they were published by the same firm. The Star corporation argued that the *Star* and *Times* were one newspaper, published in 13 different editions each week. The government retorted that the *Times* and *Star* were in fact two separate and distinct newspapers owned by the *Star* company, and that this was a “forced combination” perpetrated upon subscribers and advertisers to exclude competition. The District Court trial jury found the *Times* and the *Star* to be separate newspapers, illegally tied together to restrain trade.<sup>48</sup>

Finally the courts were faced with the argument by the *Star* corporation that the government’s anti-monopoly prosecution endangered freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First Amendment. It was argued that “ \* \* \* A newspaper is intimidated if it is subject at any moment to prosecution under the Sherman Act whenever it opposes or antagonizes those public officials in power.”<sup>49</sup> The United States Court of Appeals, however, disposed of this argument by quoting Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black’s majority opinion in *Associated Press v. United States*:<sup>50</sup>

Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the con-

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 656.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 656–657.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 665.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 666, quoting 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424 (1945).

tion that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity.

The United States Court of Appeals concluded:<sup>51</sup>

Publishers of newspapers must answer for their actions in the same manner as anyone else. A monopolistic press could attain in tremendous measure the evils sought to be prevented by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Freedom to print does not mean freedom to destroy. To use the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment to destroy competition would defeat its own ends, for freedom to print news and express opinions as one chooses is not tantamount to having freedom to monopolize. To monopolize freedom is to destroy it.

By upholding the District Court conviction of the Kansas City Star and its advertising manager, Emil Sees, the Circuit Court approved fines of \$5,000 against the newspaper corporation and of \$2,500 against Sees. But the Kansas City Star's tribulations, even after the lengthy trial and the criminal antitrust conviction, were just beginning. While the *criminal* antitrust prosecution was underway, the government had also brought a *civil* antitrust action against the Star company. On November 15, 1957, ten months after the Circuit Court affirmed the criminal conviction and fines, the Kansas City Star Corporation settled the civil suit by agreeing to the terms of a consent decree.<sup>52</sup>

This decree, like other consent decrees between an antitrust defendant and the government, was a negotiated settlement. In return for getting government agreement to drop the action, the Kansas City Star Company agreed to a tough settlement. The Star agreed to sell its television and radio stations, and was forever prohibited from buying any Kansas City broadcasting or publishing operation without first receiving government approval. Government approval of such a purchase could be secured only upon a showing that it would not tend to restrain competition. The consent decree also forbade forcing advertisers to buy advertising space in both the Star and the Times in order to get an ad published. Furthermore, the Star was forbidden to discriminate among advertisers.<sup>53</sup>

Even the consent decree did not end the Star's problems. The criminal antitrust conviction was used repeatedly as *prima facie* evidence by would be competitors who brought treble-damage antitrust suits. Defending against such lawsuits is an expensive propo-

<sup>51</sup> 240 F.2d 643, 666 (8th Cir. 1957).

<sup>52</sup> See Editor and Publisher, Nov. 23, 1957, p. 9.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

sition, and a number of such actions apparently were settled out of court.<sup>54</sup>

### SEC. 100. UNITED STATES v. TIMES-MIRROR CORPORATION (1967)

**Mergers which eliminate actual or potential competition in a newspaper market area were forbidden.**

Mergers between newspapers which lessen competition in a region were forbidden by the 1967 decision in *United States v. Times-Mirror Corporation*. That decision rescinded the \$15 million purchase of The San Bernardino [California] Sun by the Times-Mirror Corporation of Los Angeles, California. The San Bernardino *Sun* is a profitable daily located about 40 miles from Los Angeles. In 1964, the Pulitzer Corporation of St. Louis offered \$15 million to buy the *Sun*. Instead of accepting Pulitzer's offer, *Sun* publisher James A. Guthrie offered to sell to a long-time friend, Norman Chandler, chief executive of the Times-Mirror Corporation, for the same amount.

Mr. Guthrie evidently believed that the Times-Mirror Corporation had a greater interest in the development of the West than would a Missouri-based company such as the Pulitzer Corporation. Mr. Chandler, it has been noted, was on the board of directors of three of the largest corporations in San Bernardino County, Kaiser Steel Corporation, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad, and Safeway Stores, Inc. In any event, the Chandler family accepted Guthrie's offer and purchased the *Sun* in 1964.<sup>55</sup>

Acquisition of the *Sun* by the Times-Mirror Corporation was challenged by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in 1965. The government complained that the merger meant that the publisher of California's largest daily newspaper, The Los Angeles *Times*, had gained control of the largest independent daily publisher in Southern California. The government contended:<sup>56</sup>

<sup>54</sup> See, e. g., *M. Robert Goodfriend and J. S. Levinson v. Kansas City Star Co.*, 158 F.Supp. 531 (D.C.Mo.1958); *Ernie M. Duff v. Kansas City Star Co.*, 299 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1962), and *Craig Siegfried v. Kansas City Star Co.*, 193 F.Supp. 427 (D.C.Mo.1961).

<sup>55</sup> *United States v. Times-Mirror Corp.*, 274 F.Supp. 606, 609-611 (D.C.Cal. 1967), affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States without opinion, 390 U.S. 712, 88 S.Ct. 1411 (1968).

<sup>56</sup> 274 F.Supp. 606, 609 (D.C.Cal.1967), Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of [interstate] trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal \* \* \*." Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18, provides in pertinent part: "No corporation engaged in [interstate] commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital \* \* \* of another corporation engaged in [interstate] commerce in any section of the country the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."



Times-Mirror's acquisition and ownership of the stock of the Sun Company constitutes an unlawful control and combination which unreasonably restrains interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, and that the effect of the acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18.

The Times-Mirror Corporation, indeed, is a financial powerhouse. Between 1960 and 1964, its total assets including newspaper publishing, book publishing, and commercial printing as well as other holdings—more than doubled, rising from \$81 million to \$165 million. Times-Mirror's principal enterprise, *The Los Angeles Times*, in 1964 had daily circulation figures of 790,255 and Sunday circulation of 1,122,143. Since 1955, the Times has led all of the nation's newspapers in total annual daily and Sunday advertising lineage, and in total annual editorial and feature matter lineage since 1951. The Times also operates the Los Angeles Times Syndicate, which sells approximately 35 newspaper features to more than 1,000 publications throughout the world. Through the Los Angeles Times—Washington Post News Service, news material is provided to about 90 newspapers. Moreover, the Times-Mirror Corporation also published, through a wholly owned subsidiary located near San Bernardino, an evening daily newspaper, *The Orange Coast Daily Pilot*.<sup>57</sup>

The Sun Company of San Bernardino, less than one-twentieth as large as the Times-Mirror Corporation, was likewise in excellent financial condition at the time of its sale in 1964. Then, it had assets of roughly \$4.5 million, with the net income for newspaper operations in 1964 exceeding \$1 million. With its three newspapers the morning Sun (1964 daily circulation 53,802), evening Telegram, and the Sunday Sun-Telegram (1964 circulation of 70,664). These newspapers were the only ones, other than the Los Angeles papers, which offered home delivery throughout San Bernardino County.<sup>58</sup>

After hearing the Federal government's complaint against the merger, U. S. District Court Judge Warren J. Ferguson traced diminishing patterns of newspaper competition in San Bernardino County in particular and in Southern California in general.<sup>59</sup>

There has been a steady decline of independent ownership of newspapers in Southern California. A newspaper is independently owned when its owners do not publish another newspaper at another locality. In San Bernardino County as of January 1, 1962, six of the seven daily newspapers were independently owned. On December 31, 1966, only three of the eight dailies published there remained independent.

<sup>57</sup> 274 F.Supp. 606, 609 (D.C.Cal.1967).

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 610.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 621.

In the Greater Los Angeles five-county market (Los Angeles and four surrounding counties) from January 1, 1952, through December 31, 1966, while the number of daily newspapers increased from 52 to 64, the number of independent dailies decreased from 33 to 14. In 1952, 63% of all daily newspapers in this five-county area were independent; in 1966, only 22% were independent.

In the ten-county area of Southern California in the same period of time, the number of daily newspapers increased from 66 to 82, but the number independently owned decreased from 39 to 20. In 1952, 59% of Southern California dailies were independent; in 1966, only 24% were independent.

Judge Ferguson declared the acquisition of The Sun Company to be particularly "anticompetitive." The merger, he said, eliminated one of the few independent newspapers which had been able to operate successfully in the morning and Sunday fields in Southern California in the face of strong Los Angeles Times circulation.<sup>60</sup> In addition, Judge Ferguson found that the San Bernardino newspapers were in direct competition with the Times for advertising. The Sun's largest competitor for national advertising was the Times. The Times even ran promotional ads to convince national advertisers that advertisements placed in the Los Angeles Times were "a better buy than a carefully selected group of Southern California dailies." The "carefully selected group" included the Sun papers of San Bernardino.<sup>61</sup>

The impact of the merger may have been considerable upon a number of smaller Southern California dailies. Judge Ferguson noted:<sup>62</sup>

In San Bernardino County the following events have taken place since the acquisition:

1. On March 31, 1965, the Richardson Newspapers, publishers of the Pomona Progress Bulletin purchased the Ontario-Upland Report.
2. On October 1, 1965, the Colton [adjacent to San Bernardino] Courier ceased daily publication.
3. On April 1, 1966, the Rialto Record-News quit the daily newspaper field.
4. On May 9, 1967, the Lake Union Publishing Company, partially owned by the Scripps League, acquired the Fontana Herald-News, theretofore an independent daily. The Fontana and Ontario-Up-

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 622.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 618.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 622.

land newspapers were the next two largest independent dailies after the Sun.

The acquisition has raised a barrier to entry of newspapers in the San Bernardino County market that is almost impossible to overcome. The evidence discloses the market has now been closed tight and no publisher will risk the expense of unilaterally starting a new daily newspaper there.

Judge Ferguson ruled that the purchase of The Sun Company by Times-Mirror violated the anti-merger provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. As a result, the Times-Mirror Company was directed to divest itself of the stock of The Sun Company. The judge ordered that the Times-Mirror had only 60 days in which to present to the court "a plan for divestiture which shall provide for the continuation of The Sun Company as a strong and viable company." To make sure that its orders were carried out, the court retained jurisdiction over the case, and also ruled that the Times-Mirror Corporation would have to pay the government's costs in bringing the anti-trust suit.<sup>63</sup>

The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice regarded its victory in the Times-Mirror case as greatly significant. One of the government's leading antitrust lawyers, Charles D. Mahaffie, Jr., wrote that the Antitrust Division is "and will continue to be particularly concerned with mergers which may eliminate the actual and potential competition afforded by the suburban, small city and community papers."<sup>64</sup>

Underlying such a statement, of course, is the basic philosophy of antitrust law as applied to the communications media. The idea is that many voices in the marketplace of information and opinion—"diversified, quarrelsome, and competitive"—are in the public interest.<sup>65</sup>

The San Bernardino Sun newspapers have since been acquired by the Gannett Corporation, a newspaper group headquartered in Rochester, New York. If the Times-Mirror Corporation's purchase had been allowed, the absentee ownership of the Sun papers would have been only about 40 miles from San Bernardino, as compared to the Gannett headquarters some two thousand miles away. Under Gannett ownership, will the San Bernardino newspapers be of as high

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 624.

<sup>64</sup> Charles D. Mahaffie, Jr., "Mergers and Diversification in the Newspaper, Broadcasting and Information Industries," *The Antitrust Bulletin* Vol. 13 (Fall, 1968) pp. 927-935, at p. 928.

<sup>65</sup> See the classic statement by Judge Learned Hand in *Associated Press v. United States*, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (D.C.N.Y.1943), quoted at 326 U.S. 1, 28, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1428 (1945), and printed in the text to footnote 21 in this chapter. See also Keith Roberts, "Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry," *Harvard Law Review* Vol. 82:2 (December, 1968) pp. 319-366, at p. 322.

quality as they would under ownership of the Times-Mirror Corporation? This is an unanswerable but nevertheless important question.

### SEC. 101. UNITED STATES v. CITIZEN PUBLISHING COMPANY (1968)

**The government challenged as an antitrust violation a “joint operating agreement” which merged two newspapers’ printing, circulation, and advertising operations.**

In 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a case of great importance to the daily newspaper industry: “The Tucson case.” That decision declared “joint operating agreements” to be illegal, and such agreements are important to the profit margins if not to the survival of competing newspapers in some 22 communities.<sup>66</sup> The Court-declared stigma of illegality of joint operations, however, did not last long: The Supreme Court’s ruling brought a wave of protests from publishers whose newspapers are involved in joint operating agreements. On March 12, 1969—just two days after the Tucson decision—a number of bills were offered in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to legalize joint operating agreements between two newspapers. Those bills tied in with lengthy hearings held by the preceding Congress on the so-called “Failing Newspaper Act.”<sup>67</sup> The “Failing Newspaper Act” was given the more euphemistic label, “Newspaper Preservation Act,” and was passed by both houses of Congress.<sup>68</sup> President Nixon signed the bill—called the Crybaby Publishers Bill by some—into law on July 24, 1970. This legislation is discussed in detail in Section 110 of this chapter.<sup>69</sup>

Joint operating agreements work in this fashion: two competing newspapers in one town combine their printing, advertising, circulation and business operations. The news and editorial operations of the two newspapers retain their identities. Then, the two newspapers—one appearing in the morning and the other published in the afternoon—can use the same publishing and business facilities, resulting in marked economies in operation. To say that the Tucson case caused a number of publishers concern would be a grave understatement. Arguments before the U. S. Supreme Court in the Tucson case early in 1969 included an *amicus curiae* brief filed on behalf of publishers of newspapers in 16 cities. In this brief,

<sup>66</sup> Editor & Publisher, Jan. 18, 1969, p. 9. Such communities include Tucson, San Francisco, Madison, Wis., El Paso, Tex., and Honolulu.

<sup>67</sup> See Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 90th Congress, First Session, on S. 1312, The Failing Newspaper Act, Part 1, July 12–14, 18–19, 25–26, 1967, at p. 2.

<sup>68</sup> 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1804.

<sup>69</sup> For a judicial interpretation of the Newspaper Preservation Act, see *Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.*, 344 F.Supp. 1155 (D.C.Cal., 1972).

Chicago attorney Robert L. Stern asserted that “ ‘a joint operating plant is the only feasible way to preserve competition in cities which cannot support two completely separate newspapers.’ ”<sup>70</sup>

However, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice disagreed, and so did a Federal district court in Arizona in the Tucson case, more formally known as *United States v. Citizen Publishing Co.*<sup>71</sup> The Tucson case included this rather complicated list of parties:<sup>72</sup>

- The Citizen Publishing Company, publishers of *The Tucson Daily Citizen*, the city's only evening daily newspaper of general circulation. William A. Small, Jr., is the Citizen's publisher.
- The Star Publishing Company, publishers of *The Arizona Daily Star*, the only general circulation morning daily and the only general circulation Sunday newspaper in Tucson.
- Tucson Newspaper, Inc., the acting agent for advertising, printing, and circulation of the Tucson Citizen and the Arizona Star. Tucson Newspapers, Inc., was wholly owned by the Star Publishing Co. and the Citizen Publishing Co.
- Arden Publishing Company, with William A. Small, Jr., as the sole stockholder. This company was incorporated on December 21, 1964, by the stockholders of the Citizen Publishing Company to acquire the stock of the Star Publishing Company. On January 5, 1965, Arden Publishing Company purchased Star Publishing's stock, for \$9,999,790, and on March 31, 1966, Star Publishing Company was liquidated.

This cast of characters had quite a history in Tucson. In March, 1940, the Citizen Publishing Company owed debts of more than \$109,000. But on July 1, 1940, Citizen Publishing entered into a joint operating agreement with Star Publishing.<sup>73</sup> This agreement provided that the news and editorial departments of the Tucson Citizen and the Arizona Star would remain separate, but that all other operating departments would be merged. The joint operating agreement also provided for the formation of Tucson Newspapers, Inc., an agency designed to reduce costs and to distribute the profits for the two newspapers.

<sup>70</sup> Editor & Publisher, Dec. 21, 1968, p. 9.

<sup>71</sup> *United States v. Citizen Publishing Company, Tucson Newspapers, Inc., Arden Publishing Company, and William A. Small, Jr.*, 280 F.Supp. 978 (D.C. Ariz.1968), U. S. appeal pending, see 89 S.Ct. 234 (1968); case decided, 394 U.S. 131, 89 S.Ct. 927 (1969).

<sup>72</sup> 280 F.Supp. 978, 979 (D.C.Ariz.1968).

<sup>73</sup> Despite the indebtedness of the Citizen Publishing Company in 1940, U. S. District Court Judge James A. Walsh ruled that there was no serious likelihood that the company would go out of business at the time it entered the joint operating agreement. 280 F.Supp. 978, 980 (D.C.Ariz.1968).

The joint operating agreement was started because the publishers of the two newspapers believed that there could not be successful operation of two competing dailies in a city with a population of less than 100,000.<sup>74</sup> The agreement, by the mid-1960s, had proved itself financially successful, as these figures show:<sup>75</sup>

	<u>1940</u>	<u>1964</u>
Combined Revenues, Star and Citizen	\$519,168	\$8,654,127 <sup>75</sup>
Before-tax profits, combined	27,531	1,727,217

In bringing the antitrust action against the Tucson Citizen and the Arizona Star, the government raised two issues:

- (1) Whether the joint operating agreement between the Tucson Daily Citizen and the Arizona Daily Star was a conspiracy to suppress competition in violation of the Sherman Act.
- (2) Whether the acquisition of the Arizona Star by the Arden Publishing Company, whose sole stockholder is William A. Small, Jr., publisher of the Tucson Citizen, is an anticompetitive merger in violation of the Clayton Act.

The second issue added problems over and above those connected with the joint operating agreement. The Arizona Star received an offer of approximately \$10 million to sell to the Brush-Moore Newspaper Group of Ohio. In order to prevent Brush-Moore from buying the Star, members of The Citizen Publishing Company then organized the Arden Publishing Company and purchased the Star. In Chief Judge James A. Walsh's words, "As a result of the acquisition of the Star Publishing Company by Arden, the news department of the Star, previously independent, is now controlled by owners of [the] Citizen." This purchase was held to be in violation of the anti-merger provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Defendants were directed by the court to divest themselves of The Arizona Star.<sup>76</sup>

Even without the purchase, which placed both of Tucson's newspapers' news departments under one ownership, the joint operation problem would remain. After lengthy findings of fact, Chief Judge Walsh declared Tucson's joint operating agreement to be illegal under the Sherman Act because it provided for "price fixing, profit pooling, and market allocations by the parties to the agreement."<sup>77</sup>

At the District Court level, arguments for the Tucson newspapers that their joint operating agreement was not anticompetitive were

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 981.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 982.

<sup>76</sup> 280 F.Supp. 978, 983-984, 994 (D.C.Ariz.1968).

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 993-994.

not sufficiently persuasive to avoid defeat. In arguments to the Supreme Court, the Tucson newspapers then insisted that joint operating agreements are necessary in a number of cities to allow newspapers to survive and maintain competing news and editorial voices in such communities. There are 22 cities with a total of 44 newspapers involved in joint operating agreements similar to the situation in Tucson before the 1964 purchase of *The Arizona Star* by the Arden Publishing Company. It was feared that the Justice Department, should it win the Tucson case, would begin antitrust actions against other newspapers' joint operating agreements.

The District Court's judgment, it should be noted, did not destroy all of the joint operating agreement. However, it could be seen that if the Supreme Court upheld Chief Judge Walsh's order against the Tucson papers, it would mean that "price fixing and profit pooling" arrangements between the *Star* and the *Citizen* would be broken up. This would mean that Tucson Newspapers, Inc., could no longer operate single advertising and circulation departments serving both newspapers.<sup>78</sup>

On March 10, 1969, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Tucson case did indeed find the joint operating agreement between the *Citizen* and the *Star* to be illegal. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas ruled that the agreement was for the purpose of ending competition between the two newspapers. In order to implement that purpose, Douglas declared, three controls were exerted by Tucson Newspapers, Inc., the advertising-circulation-business facility set up by the joint operating agreement. He listed these three controls as price fixing, profit pooling, and market control: all illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act.

The Supreme Court thus affirmed the orders issued by the U. S. District Court in the Tucson case. This meant that the Tucson newspapers must "submit a plan for divestiture and re-establishment of the *Star* as an independent competitor and for modification of the joint operating agreement so as to eliminate the price-fixing, market control, and profit pooling provisions."

It should be noted that Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized the "failing company doctrine" as he wrote the majority opinion in the Tucson case. Douglas declared the "only real defense of appellants [the *Citizen Publishing Company* and its co-defendants] was the failing company defense—a judicially created doctrine." The failing company doctrine means that acquisition of a company by a competitor does not illegally lessen competition if the firm which has been purchased is in grave danger of business failure. Justice Douglas, however, found that the *Citizen* had not been a failing newspaper in

<sup>78</sup> See *Editor & Publisher*, Jan. 18, 1969, p. 9; 280 F.Supp. 978, 993-994 (D.C.Ariz.1968); *Editor & Publisher*, loc. cit.

1940 when it entered the joint operating agreement with the Star, despite the fact that the Citizen was then losing money.<sup>79</sup>

The Supreme Court, as Justice Douglas put it, found that “beyond peradventure of doubt” the joint operating agreement between Tucson’s two daily newspapers violated antitrust laws. Douglas said that the only real defense for the *Arizona Daily Star* and the *Tucson Daily Citizen* was the failing company defense. However, “the requirements of the failing company doctrine were not met.” As noted in Section 101 of Chapter 15, the failing company doctrine can be a defense against antitrust charges under some circumstances. In general, the doctrine means that acquisition of a company by a competitor does not illegally lessen competition if the firm which has been purchased is in grave danger of business failure.

However, Douglas cited *International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission*,<sup>80</sup> where the failing company doctrine had operated to make an otherwise illegal merger legal. In that case, “the resources of one company were so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that ‘it faced the grave probability of a business failure.’”<sup>81</sup>

Douglas added that in the *International Shoe Company* case there had been “no other prospective purchaser.” In that setting, the acquisition of one shoe company by another was held by the Court to be legal because it “did not substantially lessen competition within the meaning of § 7 [of the Clayton Act].”<sup>82</sup> Douglas then wrote:

In the present case the District Court found:

“At the time Star Publishing and Citizen Publishing entered into the operating agreement, and at the time the agreement became effective, Citizen Publishing was not then on the verge of going out of business, nor was there a serious probability at that time that Citizen Publishing would terminate its business and liquidate its assets unless Star Publishing and Citizen Publishing entered into the operating agreement.”

The evidence sustains that finding. There is no indication that the owners of Citizen were contemplating a liqui-

<sup>79</sup> 394 U.S. 131, 89 S.Ct. 927 (1969); *United States Law Week*, Vol. 37, pp. 4208–4212 (March 11, 1969); Barry Schweid, “Newspapers Want Congress to Legalize Joint Operations,” *Associated Press* dispatch in Madison, Wis., *Capital Times*, March 11, 1969; “Publishers seek relief in Congress,” *Editor & Publisher*, March 15, 1969, p. 9ff.

<sup>80</sup> 280 U.S. 291, 50 S.Ct. 89, 74 L.Ed. 431 (1930).

<sup>81</sup> *Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States*, 394 U.S. 131, 89 S.Ct. 927, 930 (1969); *United States Law Week*, Vol. 37, at p. 4209 (1969); *Editor & Publisher*, March 15, 1969, pp. 10–11, quoting *International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 280 U.S. 291, 302, 50 S.Ct. 89, 93, 74 L.Ed. 431 (1930).

<sup>82</sup> *Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States*, 394 U.S. 131, 89 S.Ct. 927, 930 (1969); *United States Law Week*, loc. cit.; *Editor & Publisher*, op. cit., p. 11.



dation. They never sought to sell the Citizen and there is no evidence that the joint operating agreement was the last straw at which Citizen grasped. Indeed, the Citizen continued to be a significant threat to the Star. How otherwise is one to explain Star's willingness to enter into an agreement to share its profits with Citizen? Would that be true if as now claimed the Citizen was on the brink of collapse?

The failing company doctrine plainly cannot be applied in a merger or in any other case unless it is established that the company that acquired it or brings it under dominion is the only available purchaser. For if another person or group could be interested, a unit in the competitive system would be preserved and not lost to monopoly power. So even if we assume *arguendo* that in 1940 the then owners of Citizen could not long keep the enterprise afloat, no effort was made to sell the Citizen; its properties and franchise were not put in the hands of a broker; and the record is silent on what the market, if any, for Citizen might have been.<sup>83</sup>

## SEC. 102. THE NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION ACT

**Congressional legislation created exemption to antitrust laws for newspapers which are tied together by "joint operating agreements" in more than twenty cities.**

The Supreme Court's Tucson ruling<sup>84</sup> brought howls of protest from publishers whose newspapers are involved in joint operating agreements. On March 12, 1969, only two days after the Tucson decision, eight bills were introduced into Congress with the aim of pulling the teeth from the Supreme Court's condemnation of joint operating agreements. Loud cries arose from publishers, who saw that as *Editor & Publisher* magazine reported, "[u]nless Congress acts to nullify the Supreme Court's Tucson ruling, the Justice Department's antitrust division will be free to proceed under the antitrust laws against the other [21] newspapers which are parties to joint agreements."<sup>85</sup>

The bills were filed so rapidly after the Supreme Court's decision because they were largely identical to an earlier version of "The Failing Newspaper Act" which was the subject of protracted hear-

<sup>83</sup> Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, United States Law Week, op. cit., pp. 4209-4210; *Editor & Publisher*, March 15, 1969, p. 11. Justices John Marshall Harlan and Potter Stewart dissented. Mr. Justice Abe Fortas took no part in this decision.

<sup>84</sup> Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 89 S.Ct. 927 (1969).

<sup>85</sup> See, e. g., *Editor & Publisher*, March 15, 1969, p. 9.

ings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in 1967 and 1968.<sup>86</sup> If the judgment of the Court in the *Tucson* case were allowed to stand, it would mean that two separately owned newspapers in one city could no longer share single advertising, business, and circulation departments.

In sum, the “Failing Newspaper Bill” was given the sweeter-sounding label, “Newspaper Preservation Act,” and was ultimately signed into law in mid-summer of 1970 by President Richard M. Nixon. How one views the Newspaper Preservation Act depends on one’s individual view of what is rhetoric and what is reality. The problem here, in part, is that everyone says similar things, but evidently says them with quite different objects in mind. The United States Department of Justice, which brought the antitrust case against *Tucson’s* Citizen Publishing Company, spoke out against illegal combinations in restraint of trade in the news business. So did Justice Douglas’s opinion deciding the *Tucson* case. But then, publishers and members of Congress argued that the *Tucson* decision could not be allowed to stand; without an antitrust exemption, 44 newspapers in 22 cities could no longer continue to gain economies through their joint operating agreements, and some of these newspapers, losing such savings in operating costs, might be forced out of existence. So it was that both the proponents and the opponents of the Newspaper Preservation Act argued that they were in favor of preserving “an independent and competitive press.”<sup>87</sup>

The Newspaper Preservation Act says:

## NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION ACT

(15 U.S.C.A. Sections 1801–1804)

### Section 1801. Congressional declaration of policy.

In the public interest of maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially independent and competitive in

<sup>86</sup> For text of Senate Bill 1312, see Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 90th Congress, First Session, *The Failing Newspaper Act*, Part 1, July 12–14, 18–19, 25–26, 1967, at p. 2. These extensive hearings are a valuable storehouse of information on antitrust law and lore affecting the mass media. The original Failing Newspaper Bill was introduced by the late Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona. Despite opposition from Senator Philip A. Hart of Michigan, chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, a revised bill was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee. However, this bill came out of committee too late to receive action on the Senate floor; hearings on a similar measure (H.R. 19123) in the House of Representatives had not been completed when the 90th Congress adjourned. There the matter rested until the 91st Congress was galvanized into action by publishers’ complaints following the March 10, 1969, Supreme Court decision in *Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States*.

<sup>87</sup> Cities with daily newspapers in joint operating agreements include: Albuquerque, N. M.; Bristol, Tenn.-Va.; Charleston, W. Va.; Columbus, Ohio; El Paso, Tex.; Evansville, Ind.; Fort Wayne, Ind.; Franklin-Oil City, Pa.; Honolulu,

all parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the United States to preserve the publication of newspapers in any city, community, or metropolitan area where a joint operating arrangement has been heretofore entered into because of economic distress or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

### Section 1802. Definitions.

As used in this chapter—

(1) The term “antitrust law” means the Federal Trade Commission Act and each statute defined by section 44 of this title as “Antitrust Acts” and all amendments to such Act and such statutes and any other Acts in *pari materia*.<sup>88</sup>

(2) The term “joint newspaper operating arrangement” means any contract, agreement, joint venture (whether or not incorporated), or other arrangement entered into by two or more newspaper owners for the publication of two or more newspaper publications, pursuant to which joint or common production facilities are established or operated and joint or unified action is taken or agreed to be taken with respect to any one or more of the following: printing; time, method, and field of publication, allocation of production facilities; distribution; advertising solicitation; circulation solicitation; business department; establishment of advertising rates; establishment of circulation rates and revenue distribution: *Provided*, That there is no merger, combination, or amalgamation of editorial or reportorial staffs, and that editorial policies be independently determined.

(3) The term “newspaper owner” means any person who owns or controls directly, or indirectly through separate or subsidiary corporations, one or more newspaper publications.

(4) The term “newspaper publication” means a publication produced on newsprint paper which is published in one or more issues weekly (including as one publication any daily newspaper and any Sunday newspaper published by the same owner in the same city, community, or metropolitan area), and in which a substantial portion of the content is devoted to the dissemination of news and editorial opinion.

Hawaii; Knoxville, Tenn.; Lincoln, Neb.; Madison, Wis.; Miami, Fla.; Nashville, Tenn.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Saint Louis, Mo.; Salt Lake City, Utah; San Francisco, Calif.; Shreveport, La.; Tucson, Ariz., and Tulsa, Okla.

<sup>88</sup> “*In pari materia*” means “upon the same matter or subject;” Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Rev.Ed., p. 898. Statutes *in pari materia* are to be construed together.

(5) The term “failing newspaper” means a newspaper publication which, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, is in probable danger of financial failure.

(6) The term “person” means any individual, and any partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity existing under or authorized by the law of the United States, any State or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any foreign country.

#### **Section 1803. Antitrust exemption.**

(a) It shall not be unlawful under any antitrust law for any person to perform, enforce, renew, or amend any joint newspaper operating arrangement entered into prior to July 24, 1970, if at the time at which such arrangement was first entered into, regardless of ownership or affiliations, not more than one of the newspaper publications involved in the performance of such arrangement was likely to remain or become a financially sound publication: *Provided*, That the terms of a renewal or amendment to a joint operating arrangement must be filed with the Department of Justice and that the amendment does not add a newspaper publication or newspaper publications to such arrangement.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to enter into, perform, or enforce a joint operating arrangement, not already in effect, except with the prior written consent of the Attorney General of the United States. Prior to granting such approval, the Attorney General shall determine that not more than one of the newspaper publications involved in the arrangement is a publication other than a failing newspaper, and that approval of such arrangement would effectuate the policy and purpose of this chapter.

(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to exempt from any antitrust law any predatory pricing, any predatory practice, or any other conduct in the otherwise lawful operations of a joint newspaper operating arrangement which would be unlawful under any antitrust law if engaged in by a single entity. Except as provided in this chapter, no joint newspaper operating arrangement or any party thereto shall be exempt from any antitrust law.

#### **Section 1804. Reinstatement of joint operating arrangements previously judged unlawful under antitrust laws.**

(a) Notwithstanding any final judgment rendered in any action brought by the United States under which a joint operating arrangement has been held to be unlawful under any antitrust law, any party to such final judgment may

reinstate said joint newspaper operating arrangement to the extent permissible under section 1803(a) of this title.

(b) The provisions of section 1803 of this title shall apply to the determination of any civil or criminal action pending in any district court of the United States on July 24, 1970, in which it is alleged that any such joint operating agreement is unlawful under any antitrust law.

The Newspaper Preservation Act was passed despite strenuous objections from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. The governments' attorneys expressed fear that if profit pooling or price fixing laws were relaxed to aid newspapers, "many publishers will opt for that way [joint operating agreements] even though they might be capable of remaining fully independent, or of finding other solutions to the difficulties which preserve competition."<sup>89</sup> Weekly newspapers, small dailies, and the American Newspaper Guild strongly and repeatedly urged against passage of a failing newspaper act, often complaining that joint advertising rates provide newspapers in a joint operation situation with an advantage which competitors simply cannot overcome.<sup>90</sup> Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, chairman of the subcommittee which held hearings on the bill, declared that propping up a failing large or middle-sized newspaper might put competing small dailies or weeklies in the same area at an insuperable disadvantage.<sup>91</sup>

John H. Carlson, writing in the *Indiana Law Journal*, expressed dismay about the antitrust exemption for so-called failing newspapers.<sup>92</sup>

The Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, while purporting to advance the public interest of "maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially independent \* \* \*" is another step toward the disturbing trend of special legislation following governmental antitrust victories.

Carlson contended that the Newspaper Preservation Act's antitrust exemption is justifiable only when there is a clear showing that such exemption is "essential to the preservation of an independent and competitive press." However, he declared that the News-

<sup>89</sup> Statement of Donald F. Turner, assistant attorney general, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, on S. 1312, April 1968, p. 18.

<sup>90</sup> See, e. g., *The Guild Reporter*, Sept. 8, 1967, p. 8; "Failing Newspaper Bill Assailed," Associated Press dispatch in *Wisconsin State Journal*, Madison, Sec. 1, p. 8, April 17, 1968.

<sup>91</sup> *Wisconsin State Journal*, loc. cit.

<sup>92</sup> John T. Carlson, "Newspaper Preservation Act: A Critique," *Indiana Law Journal* 46:392 (Spring, 1971).

paper Preservation Act, which legalized the *Tucson* arrangement as well as similar operations elsewhere, allowed newspapers which were nowhere close to failing financially to dodge antitrust laws.<sup>93</sup>

Newspaper chains participate in fifteen out of the twenty two present joint newspaper operating agreements, wherein recent transactions by those chains indicated considerable financial strength. An example of profits earned by newspaper chains is provided by two joint operating agreement newspapers: Madison Newspapers, Inc., in Madison, Wisconsin, and the Journal-Star Publishing Co. in Lincoln, Nebraska. These two arrangements earned a 22 and a 16.4 per cent return on owners' equity respectively in 1968.

\* \* \*

In terms of antitrust policy, it is incumbent upon those seeking antitrust exemption to clearly establish the necessity. Since the proponents of the NPA have not shown a clear economic need for this exemption, having failed to demonstrate that a substantial number of newspapers would fail without it, the Congressional conclusion that the antitrust exemption embodied in the NPA is necessary for the preservation of independent and competing sources of news is unwarranted.

\* \* \*

Joint operations enable the participating newspapers to eliminate the costly duplication of printing facilities, distribution points, delivery vehicles, circulation departments, advertising departments, and business departments. Cost savings from these joint arrangements make the establishment of competing newspapers difficult since they must duplicate these facilities, thus bearing proportionately higher costs.

Just as Carlson's critique of the Newspaper Preservation Act first appeared in print in the spring of 1971, publisher Bruce Brugman of the *San Francisco Bay Guardian* offered his own critique in the form of a challenge to the Act's constitutionality. *The Bay Guardian*, a monthly with a circulation of 17,000, saw itself in a tough competitive situation. *San Francisco's Chronicle and Examiner* had tied themselves into a joint newspaper operating agreement some years before, in September of 1965. Under that agreement, one newspaper—*The News-Call-Bulletin*—was put to death, and the two remaining dailies carved up the morning (*Chronicle*) and evening (*Examiner*) markets. Printing for the *Chronicle* and the *Examiner* is

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 397–399, 400.

done by a jointly owned subsidiary, the San Francisco Newspaper Printing Company. The two remaining daily papers' editorial staffs are kept independent, although the two newspapers jointly publish a unified Sunday edition. Profits from all operations are shared half-and-half. As a result, the *Chronicle* and *Examiner* have achieved a highly profitable monopoly position in San Francisco's daily newspaper market.<sup>94</sup>

Publisher Brugman and the *Bay Guardian* contended that the Newspaper Preservation Act is unconstitutional because it unfairly encourages such a journalistic monopoly. The effect of the Act, they contended, causes it to violate the press freedom guarantee of the First Amendment.

Chief Judge Oliver J. Carter summed up the *Bay Guardian's* arguments:<sup>95</sup>

The plaintiffs are the owners and publishers of a small paper that has been a bimonthly paper and is now monthly. They contend that the defendants' monopoly position in the San Francisco market enables the defendants to destroy or weaken any potential competition. They contend that the profit sharing, joint ad rates, and other cooperative aspects of the joint operating agreement enable the defendants to establish and perpetuate a stranglehold on the San Francisco newspaper market. The plaintiffs contend that the Act is unconstitutional because it unfairly encourages this journalistic monopoly.

Judge Carter, however, was not persuaded by such arguments. He ruled that the simple answer to the plaintiffs' contention is that the Act does not authorize any conduct. He added that the Newspaper Preservation Act is a narrow exception to the antitrust laws for newspapers in danger of failing, and that the Act is "in many respects merely a codification of the judicially created 'failing company' doctrine."<sup>96</sup> Although he upheld the Act's constitutionality, Judge Carter's words were not particularly kind to the legislation:<sup>97</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.*, 344 F.Supp. 1155, 1157 (D.C.Cal.1972). This court confrontation did not represent a full-dress trial. The plaintiffs originally sought a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional, but "such an action could not be maintained for technical jurisdictional reasons." See 340 F.Supp. 76 (Feb. 24, 1972). Then, the defendants—including the *Examiner* and the *Chronicle*—"answered the antitrust portions of the complaint by asserting the Act in two affirmative defenses to those claims." Plaintiffs—*Bay Guardian Co.*—then moved to strike those defenses on grounds that the Newspaper Preservation Act is unconstitutional on its face.

<sup>95</sup> 344 F.Supp. 1155, 1157 (D.C.Cal.1972).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1158.

\* \* \* [T]he Act was designed to preserve independent editorial voices. Regardless of the economic or social wisdom of such a course, it does not violate the freedom of the press. Rather it is merely a selective repeal of the antitrust laws. It merely looses the same shady market forces which existed before the passage of the Sherman, Clayton and other antitrust laws.

John H. Carlson, writing about San Francisco's joint-operation newspapers after passage of the Newspaper Preservation Act but before the *Bay Guardian* lawsuit reached the courtroom, was even more scathing in his remarks about the Act:<sup>96</sup>

\* \* \* [I]t is the policy of the Newspaper Preservation Act to preserve the editorial and news reporting independence of the newspaper publications participating in joint operations. It is questionable whether in fact the NPA [Newspaper Preservation Act] achieves this objective. In San Francisco, the performance of the *Examiner* in reporting the *Chronicle's* struggle to obtain renewal of its broadcasting license reveals that little editorial independence can be expected on issues in which either of the participating newspapers have [sic] a vested interest. The *Examiner's* coverage of this controversy, culminating in the FCC's announcement to withhold renewal of the *Chronicle's* license, was delayed and minimal.<sup>98</sup>

The *Bay Guardian* Company lawsuit, however, contained another wrinkle. It was contended that the *Chronicle* and the *Examiner* were not truly "failing newspapers" and that the *News-Call-Bulletin* should not have been shut down as part of the merger. A \$1,350,000 out-of-court settlement was awarded to a number of parties, including the *Bay Guardian* Company.

Such recriminations aside, the importance of the Newspaper Preservation Act should not be overestimated. As Professor Paul Jess of the University of Michigan has noted, the Act did little more than legalize the 22 joint operating agreements already in existence at the time the Act was passed. There has been no scramble to add to the number of joint operating agreements as such agreements are outlined by the act. The text of the Newspaper Preservation Act indicates that to enter a joint operating agreement now requires that at least one of the two newspapers must be "failing", or "in probable danger of financial failure." Any new joint operating agreement, furthermore, must be undertaken only after receiving written consent from the Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General must determine that at least one of the

<sup>96</sup> Carlson, *op. cit.*, p. 409; for information on the out-of-court settlement in this case, see Marc A. Franklin, *Mass Media Law* (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1977) p. 83, quoting Editor & Publisher, May 31, 1975, p. 7.



newspapers applying for joint operation is “failing” or “in probable danger of financial failure.”

### SEC. 103. CONSENT DECREES

**Negotiated settlements, which settle antitrust proceedings without a formal trial, are coming into increasing use in cases affecting the mass media.**

Court decisions, however, are only a part of the antitrust story affecting the communications media. In fact, court-adjudicated cases may be becoming less important in antitrust law than the instrument which is now receiving much use: *consent decrees*. Consent decrees—also sometimes called consent judgments—are negotiated final legal settlements between the government and a business. Consent decrees have the force of law once they have been approved by a judge. Such consent decree settlements can take place in civil, but not criminal, antitrust cases.<sup>1</sup>

Where a newspaper or broadcasting station is concerned, an antitrust consent decree works in the following fashion. First, civil antitrust suit is filed by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department against the owners of a newspaper or broadcasting station. In the opinion of the Justice Department, the communications medium involved may have been engaging in anti-competitive business practices. Or, a certain ownership may, in the eyes of the Justice Department, have acquired too many media units—newspaper and broadcasting—in one market, according to the antitrust laws as they have been interpreted by the courts.

Second, the owners may decide that it will do them no good to fight the antitrust suit. The owners' attorneys may see that a court battle is almost certain to result in defeat. So, in order to avoid lengthy and expensive trial, attorneys for the owner will sit down with attorneys from the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. Once a consent agreement is worked out, it means that the owners have promised to stop certain business practices or to divest themselves of certain media units. After the agreement is reached, it is made final by being formalized before a federal district judge.

Consent decrees have the advantage of allowing a defendant to settle a suit without admitting a violation of law. An example of this was the sale, late in 1968, of WREX-TV in Rockford, Ill., by the Gannett Company of Rochester, New York. In that year, the

<sup>99</sup> Telephone interview with Dr. Paul Jess, Department of Journalism, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., March 22, 1973. See also Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1802(5) and 1803(b).

<sup>1</sup> As Prof. Lorry Rytting of the University of Utah has said, the Justice Department is sensitive to charges that criminal antitrust suits might be filed, in effect, to force the signing of civil consent decrees. Current justice department policy discourages the use of concurrent criminal and civil antitrust complaints. Rytting, “Antitrust Consent Decrees: A Threat to Freedom of the Press?”, unpublished paper, School Of Journalism, University of Wisconsin, 1967.

Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has filed a civil antitrust suit against the Gannett Company, which owned, in addition to WREX-TV, also owned the Rockford Newspaper, the Morning Star and the Register-Republic. Gannett had acquired the two newspapers in 1967, and had purchased WREX-TV in 1963 for \$3,500,000. Under the consent decree, the Gannett Company agreed to divest itself of the television station to James S. Gilmore, Jr., president of Gilmore Broadcasting Co., for \$6,850,000.<sup>2</sup>

Earl A. Jinkinson, formerly chief of the Midwest Office in Chicago of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division, has summarized some of the differing ways consent decrees are viewed.<sup>3</sup>

The term "consent decree" has been defined in a number of ways. Judge Igoe, when faced with the necessity of finding the meaning of a consent decree after a lengthy trial \* \* \* finally observed that one of his greatest difficulties was that consent decrees are "all things to all men." His observation was somewhat accurate, depending of course on the viewpoint. To the Government attorneys the consent decree is an act of grace granted in order to give the attorneys and the entire staff more time to attend to other ever-pressing and sometimes more important matters. On the other hand, many defense counsel at least profess to believe, erroneously I might add, that the consent decree is a governmental device for winning cases, thrust upon an unwilling defendant which, to adopt the words of Seth Dabney, is like "Bryon's maiden who strove and repented, but ultimately consented." To attorneys for private parties injured because of the violation [of antitrust statutes], the consent decree is an abrogation of the duty of the Department of Justice to protect their client's rights. As a matter of fact the wails of anguish from the lips of plaintiff counsel in treble damage suits barely falls short of accusing Government counsel of a complete sell-out to defense counsel.

In 1947, Zechariah Chafee warned that consent decrees could increase the danger to press freedom through heavy use of the antitrust laws. Consent decrees are reached without trials, after secret proceedings. Evidence presented in reaching these decrees is not made public. Furthermore, such decrees are as legally binding as the decision of a federal court, and may be enforced with contempt-of-court sanctions if they are not obeyed.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The Gannetteer, magazine of the Gannett Co., January 1969, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Earl A. Jinkinson, "Negotiation of Consent Decrees," Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 9: Nos. 5-6 (Sept.-Dec., 1964), pp. 673-690, at pp. 676-677.

<sup>4</sup> Chafee, op. cit. Vol. 2, p. 670.

It has been suggested that the government, which has begun—or which has indicated that it soon may begin—an antitrust action is very much in the driver's seat against the defendant, which may feel compelled to "settle" by way of a consent decree. True, if an owner decides that the terms insisted on by the Antitrust Division violate his rights, he may halt the negotiations for a consent decree and demand a full trial. Trials, however, are expensive, lengthy, and may carry with them publicity which the media owners find damaging.<sup>5</sup>

Whether consent decrees are a threat to press freedom or a boon to media owners which allows them to avoid full-dress antitrust trials, the fact remains that such decrees affecting the mass media have been issued with increasing frequency in recent years.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Rytting, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> See, e. g., *United States v. Wichita Eagle Publishing Co., Inc.*, 1959 Trade Cases, Para. 69,400; *United States v. Western Newspaper Union*, 1960 Trade Cases, Para. 69,709; *United States v. Stamps Conhaim Whitehead, Inc.*, 1963 Trade Cases, Para. 70,857; *United States v. Metro Associated Services, Inc.*, 1964 Trade Cases, Para. 71,078; *United States v. Greater Buffalo Press*, 1965 Trade Cases, Para. 71,479; *United States v. Lima News*, 244 F.Supp. 592 (1965), and *United States v. Lindsay-Schaub Newspapers, Inc.*, 1967 Trade Cases, Para. 72,085.

## Chapter 16

### TAXATION AND LICENSING

Sec.

104. Taxation.

105. Licensing.

#### SEC. 104. TAXATION

**The mass media are constitutionally protected from discriminatory or punitive taxation.**

Taxation has long been a fighting word to the press. Taxes on the press instituted in England in 1712 were called "taxes on knowledge," because they raised the purchase price of pamphlets or other printed materials beyond the means of most persons. In American history, taxation of the press has long been hated and feared. The Stamp Act of 1765 imposed great hardships on printers, taxing newspapers, advertisements, and pamphlets, as well as many legal documents<sup>1</sup> and became a great rallying cry for colonists who resisted British authority. Such a storm of protest arose in the colonies through both newspapers and pamphlets, to say nothing of mobs which forced British stamp agents to resign, that Parliament repealed the Stamp Act taxes as they affected printer-editors.

If American colonists hated the Stamp Act taxes because they infringed on "the liberty of the press" and "free inquiry," American memories were also very short. In 1785, only two short years after the War of Independence officially ended, the state of Massachusetts passed a newspaper stamp tax. If the Massachusetts legislature had a short memory, printers and publishers did not. Howls of protest reminiscent of the Stamp Act disturbances of 1765 soon echoed from the columns of Massachusetts newspapers. One writer who called himself "Lucius" declared that the tax on newspapers was a "*stab to the freedom of the people.*" He acknowledged that Massachusetts newspapers were full of scurrilous articles, and admitted that the tax of a penny on each copy seemed small. But "Lucius" added that "tyranny begins small," and that the tax of even a half-penny on each newspaper copy could be a precedent for a tax of £ 100 on each issue.<sup>2</sup> Protests such as these led to the repeal of the Massachusetts stamp tax on newspapers later in 1785, although the Massachusetts legislature shortly thereafter enacted a

<sup>1</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1763-1776* (New York: Knopf, 1958) p. 68.

<sup>2</sup> Massachusetts Centinel, May 28, 1785.

tax upon newspaper advertisements.<sup>3</sup> The tax on advertisements was not repealed until 1788.<sup>4</sup>

Newspapers and other units of the mass media of communications are businesses. As such, the media are not immune from taxation just like other business enterprises, as long as the taxes fall with a more or less even hand upon the press as well as other businesses. *Discriminatory or punitive* taxation, however, raises quite different issues. The classic case in United States constitutional law occurred during the 1930s and involved the flamboyant Huey “Kingfish” Long, the political boss and governor of Louisiana who entertained dreams of someday becoming President. The Supreme Court decision in *Grosjean, Supervisor of Accounts of Louisiana, v. American Press Co., Inc.*<sup>5</sup> effectively halted a Huey Long-instigated attempt to use a punitive tax to injure newspapers which opposed Long’s political regime.

During the 1930s, Louisiana’s larger daily newspapers were increasingly expressing opposition to Long’s political machine. Louisiana’s larger newspapers’ sniping at Governor Long’s dictatorial posturings soon brought about retaliation. The Louisiana legislature passed a special two per cent license tax on the gross receipts of all newspapers, magazines, or periodicals having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.<sup>6</sup> Of Louisiana’s 163 newspapers, only 13 had circulations of more than 20,000 per week. Of these 13 newspapers to which the tax applied, 12 were opponents of Long’s political machine.<sup>7</sup> This transparent attempt to silence newspaper critics was challenged in the courts by nine Louisiana newspaper publishers who produced the 13 newspapers then appearing in the state which had circulations of more than 20,000 copies a week.

Newspapers subject to the gross receipts tax were required to file a report every three months showing the amount of the tax and the gross receipts. When such reports were filed, the tax for each three month period was to be due and payable. Failure to report or to pay the tax was made a misdemeanor, subject to a \$500 fine. In addition, an officer of a publishing company which failed to file a report and pay the gross receipts tax could be sentenced to not more than six months in jail.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, July 6, July 30, 1785.

<sup>4</sup> Clyde Augustus Duniway, *Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts* (New York, 1906) p. 137.

<sup>5</sup> 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936).

<sup>6</sup> 297 U.S. 233, 240, 56 S.Ct. 444, 445 (1936).

<sup>7</sup> J. Edward Gerald, *The Press and the Constitution 1931–1947* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1948) p. 100; William A. Hachten, *The Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press: Decisions and Dissents* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press 1968) p. 77; 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 445 (1936).

In declaring the Louisiana tax unconstitutional, a noted conservative—Justice George Sutherland—spoke for a unanimous Supreme Court. Justice Sutherland, a man not revered for his felicity of expression, may indeed have had some able assistance in writing what has come to be known as “Sutherland’s great opinion in *Grosjean*.” It has been asserted that Sutherland’s opinion included a proposed concurring opinion which had been drafted by the famed liberal Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, and which the Court wished to add into Justice Sutherland’s opinion.<sup>8</sup>

Whether assisted by Cardozo or not, the Sutherland opinion in *Grosjean* remains noteworthy. Justice Sutherland began with a historical overview of government-imposed dangers to freedom of expression, including reference to John Milton’s 1644 “Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing” and to the end of the licensing of the press in England in 1695. As Sutherland noted, “mere exemption from previous censorship was soon recognized as too narrow a view of the liberty of the press.” Sutherland wrote:<sup>9</sup>

In 1712, in response to a message from Queen Anne (Hansard’s Parliamentary History of England, vol. 6, p. 1063), Parliament imposed a tax upon all newspapers and upon advertisements. \* \* \* That the main purpose of these taxes was to suppress the publication of comments and criticisms objectionable to the Crown does not admit of doubt. \* \* \* There followed more than a century of resistance to, and evasion of, the taxes, and of agitation for their repeal. \* \* \* [T]hese taxes constituted one of the factors that aroused the American colonist to protest against taxation for the purposes of the home government; and that the revolution really began when, in 1765, that government sent stamps for newspaper duties to the American colonies.

These duties were quite commonly characterized as “taxes on knowledge,” a phrase used for the purpose of describing the effect of the exactions and at the same time condemning them. That the taxes had, and were intended to have, the effect of curtailing the circulation of newspapers, and particularly the cheaper ones whose readers were generally found among the masses of the people, went almost without question, even on the part of those who defended the act. May (Constitutional History of England, 7th ed., vol. 2, p. 245), after discussing the control by “previous censure” [licensing and prior restraint], says: \* \* \* a new restraint was devised in the form of a stamp duty

<sup>8</sup> Irving Brant, *The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) pp. 403–404.

<sup>9</sup> 297 U.S. 233, 249, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449 (1936).

upon newspapers and advertisements,—avowedly for the purpose of repressing libels. This policy, being found effectual in limiting the circulation of cheap papers, was improved upon in the two following reigns, and continued in high esteem until our own time.” Collett [History of the Taxes on Knowledge] (vol. I, p. 14), says: “Any man who carried on printing or publishing for a livelihood was actually at the mercy of the Commissioners of Stamps, when they chose to exert their powers.”

Sutherland quoted Thomas Erskine’s great speech in defense of Thomas Paine, when Erskine said: “The liberty of opinion keeps governments themselves in due subjection to their duties.” The Justice asserted that if taxes had been the only issue, many of England’s best men would not have risked their careers and their lives to fight against them. The issue in England for many years, however, involved discriminatory taxation designed to control the press and silence criticism of government. The *Grosjean* opinion added:<sup>10</sup>

The framers of the First Amendment were familiar with the English struggle, which had then continued for nearly eighty years and was destined to go on for another sixty-five years, at the end of which time it culminated in a lasting abandonment of the obnoxious taxes. The framers were likewise with the then recent [1785–1788] Massachusetts [stamp tax] episode; and while that occurrence did much to bring about the adoption of the amendment, the predominant influence must have come from the English experience.

Justice Sutherland rejected the State of Louisiana’s argument that the English common law in force when the Constitution was adopted forbade only prior restraints on the press and said nothing about forbidding taxation.<sup>11</sup> In reply, Sutherland quoted from a great 19th century American constitutional scholar, Judge Thomas Cooley, and declared that Cooley had laid down the test to be applied.<sup>12</sup>

The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.

<sup>10</sup> 297 U.S. 233, 247–248, 56 S.Ct. 444, 448 (1936).

<sup>11</sup> 297 U.S. 233, 249, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449 (1936).

<sup>12</sup> 297 U.S. 233, 249, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449 (1936), quoting 2 Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.) p. 886.

Application of this test led Justice Sutherland to rule that the Louisiana gross receipts tax on its larger newspapers was an unconstitutional abridgement of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Sutherland declared:<sup>13</sup>

It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government. But this is not an ordinary form of tax, but one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press.

The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an untrammelled press as a vital source of public information. The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would be presented. It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.

In view of the persistent search for new subjects of taxation, it is not without significance that, with the single exception of the Louisiana statute, so far as we can discover no state during the one hundred fifty years of our national existence has undertaken to impose a tax like that now in question.

The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the volume of advertisements. It is measured alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the pub-

<sup>13</sup> 297 U.S. 233, 250-251, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449 (1936). Accord: See *City of Baltimore v. A. S. Abell Co.*, 218 Md. 273, 145 A.2d 111, 119 (1958). It was held that Baltimore city ordinances imposing taxes on advertising media were unconstitutional in that they discriminatorily taxed newspapers and radio and television stations. About 90 per cent of the impact of the taxes was on those businesses.



lishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers.

Despite these ringing words, it should be noted again that the communications media are not exempt from paying non-discriminatory general business taxes. A case in point involved *The Corona Daily Independent*, a California newspaper which challenged a \$32-a-year business license tax imposed by the City of Corona. The newspaper, which had paid the tax in a number of previous years, in 1951 refused to pay the tax. The newspaper went to court, arguing that the tax violated freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the California Appellate Court ruled:<sup>14</sup>

There is ample authority to the effect that newspapers and the business of newspaper publication are not made exempt from the ordinary forms of taxes for the support of local government by the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

\* \* \*

In *Tampa Times Co. v. City of Tampa* \* \* \* an ordinance imposed an annual business license tax upon newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals or publications, based upon gross receipts, with a minimum tax of \$10 per annum upon receipts from all sales and advertising, both wholesale and retail. The tax was applied equally to all lines of business. There was no claim that the ordinance was arbitrary or harsh in nature. There the court held that the ordinance was one for revenue; that the question was one of whether or not a newspaper was immune from the burden of taxation to maintain government; and declared that it had no knowledge of any case where a newspaper had been held immune from all forms of taxation. The court stated that a tax in any form is a burden, yet that alone does not impair freedom of the press any more than an *ad valorem* tax will destroy freedom of speech. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the action was dismissed for want of a substantial Federal question.

The phrase "power to tax is the power to destroy" is without application to the issue here presented. There is no allegation or showing by defendant that the amount levied was arbitrary or harsh in nature, or oppressive or confisca-

<sup>14</sup> *City of Corona v. Corona Daily Independent*, 115 Cal.App.2d 382, 252 P.2d 56 (1953), cert. den. 343 U.S. 833, 74 S.Ct. 2 (1953). See also *Giragi v. Moore*, 48 Ariz. 33, 64 P.2d 819 (1937) (general sales tax law placing a one per cent tax upon businesses' sales or gross income not unconstitutional as applied to newspapers); *Arizona Publishing Co. v. O'Neil*, 22 F.Supp. 117 (D.C.Ariz.1938), affirmed 304 U.S. 543, 58 S.Ct. 950 (1938).

tory, or that defendant's freedom to disseminate news and comment has been actually curtailed or abridged by the requirement that it shall pay a tax of \$8 per quarter for publishing its newspaper. Nor is there any showing that the imposition of the tax was for the purpose of regulating defendant's business.

\* \* \*

We conclude that a nondiscriminatory tax levied upon the doing of business, for the sole purpose of maintaining the municipal government, without whose municipal services and protection the press could neither exist nor function, must be sustained as being within the purview and necessary implications of the Constitution and its amendments.

The general rule to be drawn from cases such as *Grosjean v. American Press Co.* and *Corona Daily Independent v. City of Corona* seems to be this: the media are not exempt from nondiscriminatory taxation. More broadly, the media are businesses and are subject to general laws which regulate business. As it was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1939 in *Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board*:<sup>15</sup>

The business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privileges or immunities to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. He is subject to the anti-trust laws. Like others

<sup>15</sup> *Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board*, 301 U.S. 103, 132-133, 57 S.Ct. 650, 656 (1937). See *Lee Enterprises v. Iowa State Tax Commission*, 162 N.W.2d 730, 734, 754-755 (Iowa 1969). Ten corporations, including newspapers, radio and television broadcasters, advertising agencies and firms engaged in retail merchandising and in the auto business challenged an Iowa tax law known as Section 25 of Division VII, Iowa House File 702. With that measure, the Iowa General Assembly had amended the state's revenue statutes, including as taxable "the gross receipts of \* \* \* "directories, shoppers guides and newspapers whether or not circulated free or without charge to the public, magazine, radio and television advertising \* \* \*". The Iowa Supreme Court held that the tax does not violate freedom of the press as guaranteed in either the United States or Iowa Constitutions because the law was of general application and not discriminatory.

A number of states, including Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas and Arkansas, exempt newspapers from paying taxes on consumable materials used in printing and processing operations. Interview with Lyndell Williams, executive vice president, Texas Press Association, May 16, 1978. In 1977, Texas passed a measure exempting newspapers from a sales tax on circulation income. See Vernon's *Anno.Tex.Stat.Tax.-Gen.*, Title 122A, § 20.04(BB)(1)(b) and § 20.04(BB)(4).

he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business.

### SEC. 105. LICENSING

**When licensing power over expression amounts to prior censorship, it is constitutionally forbidden.**

Older than discriminatory taxation (although often closely related to it) is the ignoble control over the press known as licensing. Licensing, to journalists and legal scholars, calls up visions of that most hated of all controls over the press: prior censorship. Licensing in England in the 16th and 17th centuries, for example, meant that only licensed printers—persons who had the approval of government or of powerful persons closely tied to the establishment—were allowed to print.

England's authoritarian licensing system was allowed to expire in 1695,<sup>16</sup> but battles for freedom are never really won once and for all. The recurring battles for free expression by Jehovah's Witnesses were waged in large measure against municipal ordinances which involved license taxes. The struggles of the Jehovah's Witnesses during the 1930s and 1940s were noteworthy: time and again, they fought their cases all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States and ultimately succeeded. This religious sect, as Professor William A. Hachten has noted, endured great suffering. The American Civil Liberties Union reported, for example, that in one six-month period of 1940, "1,488 men, women and children in the sect were victims of mob violence in 355 communities in 44 states."<sup>17</sup> As Professor J. Edward Gerald has pointed out, the Jehovah's Witnesses made themselves unpopular with their refusal to salute the American flag; their contempt for most if not all organized religion, and with their denunciations of the Catholic Church. Likewise, their persistent street sales of literature and doorbell ringings for their cause often raised hackles among non-believers.<sup>18</sup>

The Jehovah's Witness cases are useful reminders that the right of freedom of expression belongs not only to media corporations but also to the people. Furthermore, the landmark case of *Lovell v. City of Griffin* is crucially important, as Professor Hachten has emphasized, because it explicitly gives constitutional protection to distribution of literature as well as to publication.<sup>19</sup>

Alma Lovell, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted in a municipal court in Griffin, Ga., and sentenced to 50 days in jail when she

<sup>16</sup> Fredrick S. Siebert, *Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1952) pp. 260-263.

<sup>17</sup> Hachten, *op. cit.*, p. 73; see also Gerald, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.

<sup>18</sup> Gerald, p. 137.

<sup>19</sup> 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938); Hachten, p. 74.

refused to pay a \$50 fine. Her crime? She had not received written permission from the City Manager of Griffin to distribute her religious tracts. The city ordinance provided:<sup>20</sup>

That the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin.

Alma Lovell simply could not be bothered with such "technicalities." She regarded herself as a messenger sent by Jehovah, and believed that applying to the City Manager for permission would have "been 'an act of disobedience to His commandments.'" The Supreme Court, however, regarded the City of Griffin's ordinance as far more than a mere technicality. Speaking for an undivided court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes denounced the ordinance:<sup>21</sup>

We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his "Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." And the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish "without a license what formerly could be published only *with one*." While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision. \* \* \* Legislation of the type of the ordinance in question would restore the system of license and censorship in its baldest form.

The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion. \* \* \*

<sup>20</sup> Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 447, 58 S.Ct. 666, 667 (1938).

<sup>21</sup> 303 U.S. 444, 451-452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669 (1938). Mr. Justice Cardozo took no part in this decision.

The ordinance cannot be saved because it relates to distribution and not to publication. "Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without circulation, the publication would be of little value." *Ex parte Jackson*, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877.

Since the ordinance of the City of Griffin was not limited to "'literature' that is obscene or offensive to public morals or that advocates unlawful conduct," the ordinance could not be upheld.<sup>22</sup> In *Schneider v. New Jersey*, the Supreme Court reviewed four cities' ordinances. Three of these anti-littering ordinances in effect punished distributors should the recipient of a leaflet throw it to the ground. The Supreme Court held that such ordinances were unconstitutional.

Referring to its opinion in *Lovell v. Griffin*, the Court handed down this ruling in *Schneider*:<sup>23</sup>

[W]hatever the motive [behind the ordinance at issue in *Lovell v. City of Griffin*], the ordinance was bad because it imposed penalties for the distribution of pamphlets, which had become historical weapons in the defense of liberty, by subjecting such distribution to license and censorship; and that the ordinance was void on its face, because it abridged the freedom of the press. Similarly in *Hague v. C. I. O.*, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 [1939], an ordinance was held void on its face because it provided for previous administrative censorship for the exercise of the right of speech and assembly in appropriate public places.

The Los Angeles, the Milwaukee, and the Worcester ordinances under review do not purport to license distribution but all of them absolutely prohibit it in the streets, and, one of them, in other public places as well.

\* \* \*

We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it. Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press. This constitutional protection does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street littering. There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets.

<sup>22</sup> 303 U.S. 444, 451, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668 (1938).

<sup>23</sup> *Schneider v. State of New Jersey (Town of Irvington)*, 308 U.S. 147, 161-162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151 (1939).

In this same decision, the Supreme Court also dealt with an ordinance of the Town of Irvington, New Jersey, which denied street distribution or house-to-house calls to anyone who did not have written permission from the chief of police. The Irvington ordinance also required that any person distributing circulars or seeking contributions had to restrict his canvassing to hours between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Also, the canvasser had to have with him a permit, including a photograph of himself, which had to be shown to a police officer or other person upon request.<sup>24</sup>

In declaring the Irvington ordinance unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Owen Roberts wrote:<sup>25</sup>

If it [the ordinance] covers the petitioner's activities [in making house-to-house calls], it equally applies to one who wishes to present his views on political, social or economic questions. The ordinance is not limited to those who canvass for private profit; nor is it merely the common type of ordinance requiring some form of registration or license of hawkers, or peddlers. It is not a general ordinance to prohibit trespassing. It bans unlicensed communication of any views or the advocacy of any cause from door to door, and permits canvassing only subject to the power of a police officer to determine, as a censor, what literature may be distributed from house to house and who may distribute it. The applicant must submit to that officer's judgment evidence as to his good character and as to the absence of fraud in the "project" he proposes to promote or the literature he intends to distribute, and must undergo a burdensome and inquisitorial examination, including photographing and fingerprinting. In the end, his liberty to communicate with the residents of the town at their homes depends upon the exercise of the officer's discretion.

As said in *Lovell v. City of Griffin*, *supra*, pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of the people. On this method of communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees.

<sup>24</sup> 308 U.S. 147, 157-158, 60 S.Ct. 146, 149 (1939).

<sup>25</sup> 308 U.S. 147, 163-165, 60 S.Ct. 146, 152 (1939).

Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the name of charity and religion, we hold a municipality cannot, for this reason, require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say some ideas may, while others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens; some persons may, while others may not, disseminate information from house to house. Frauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law. Trespasses may similarly be forbidden. If it is said that these means are less efficient and convenient than bestowal of power on police authorities to decide what information may be disseminated from house to house, and who may impart the information the answer is that considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press. We are not to be taken as holding that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as the ordinance requires. Nor do we hold that the town may not fix reasonable hours when canvassing may be done by persons having such objects as the petitioner. Doubtless there are other features of such activities which may be regulated in the public interest without prior licensing or other invasion of constitutional liberty. We do hold, however, that the ordinance in question, as applied to the petitioner's conduct, is void, and she cannot be punished for acting without a permit.

Jehovah's Witnesses were to have many other days in court, defending the freedoms of religion, speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment and protected from state encroachment by the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though the Court's 1938 *Lovell v. Griffin* decision had overturned a license tax, the case of *Jones v. City of Opelika, Alabama*, brought the issue back to the Court in slightly different form. In some respects, the Opelika ordinance looked quite innocuous: a \$10 per annum license fee for engaging in business as a "Book Agent."<sup>26</sup> Although he gave some stirring judicial language to the concept of freedom of expression, Justice Stanley Reed, writing for the majority in this 5-4 decision, upheld the Opelika ordinance. Reed wrote:<sup>27</sup>

One man, with views contrary to the rest of his compatriots, is entitled to the privilege of expressing his ideas by speech or broadside to anyone willing to listen or read. Too many settled beliefs have in time been rejected to justify this generation in refusing a hearing to its own dissentients. But that hearing may be limited by action of the

<sup>26</sup> *Jones v. City of Opelika*, 316 U.S. 584, 586, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 1234 (1942).

<sup>27</sup> 316 U.S. 584, 594-595, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 1238 (1942).

proper legislative body to times, places and methods for the enlightenment of the community which, in view of existing social and economic conditions, are not at odds with the preservation of peace and good order.

This means that the proponents of ideas cannot determine entirely for themselves the time and place and manner for the diffusion of knowledge or for their evangelism, any more than the civil authorities may hamper or suppress the public dissemination of facts and principles to the people. The ordinary requirements of civilized life compel this adjustment of interests.

In 1942, Justice Reed thus held that nothing in the collection of *nondiscriminatory* license fees—from persons selling Bibles, books, or papers—abridged freedom of worship, speech or press.<sup>28</sup> Justice Reed's opinion dismissed as unsubstantial the Jehovah's Witness complaint that the license tax of Opelika could be a dangerous weapon of censorship because the license could be revoked at will by city officials.<sup>29</sup>

Some eleven months later, however, after more Jehovah's Witness cases had been heard, the Supreme Court reversed itself and vacated its ruling that the Opelika ordinance was constitutional.<sup>30</sup> By this action, the Court adopted, as its majority position, the 1942 dissent in *Jones v. Opelika* written by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.<sup>31</sup> Stone's opinion held:

The ordinance in the Opelika case should be held invalid  
 \* \* \* the requirement of a license for dissemination of ideas, when as here the license is revocable at will without cause and in the unrestrained discretion of administrative officers, is likewise an unconstitutional restraint on those freedoms.

Chief Justice Stone insisted that speech and religion are freedoms which hold a "preferred position" in the framework of constitutional values. He wrote:<sup>32</sup>

The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary the Constitution, by virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position.

<sup>28</sup> 316 U.S. 584, 598, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 1240 (1942).

<sup>29</sup> 316 U.S. 584, 599, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 1240 (1942).

<sup>30</sup> 319 U.S. 103, 63 S.Ct. 890 (1943). See also other Jehovah's Witness cases, *Martin v. City of Struthers*, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943); *Douglas v. City of Jeannette*, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943); *Murdock v. Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943), all decided May 3, 1943.

<sup>31</sup> 316 U.S. 584, 600, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 1240-1241 (1942).

<sup>32</sup> 316 U.S. 584, 608, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 1244 (1942).



Their commands are not restricted to cases where the protected privilege is sought out for attack. They extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of being used to control or suppress it.

The victories of the Jehovah's Witnesses before the Supreme Court in cases such as *Lovell v. City of Griffin* and *Jones v. City of Opelika* are still worth savoring. A relatively small—and often unpopular—religious sect fought hard to defend freedoms guaranteed to all Americans. In so doing, Jehovah's Witnesses helped greatly to fend off ancient threats to the press revived in modern times: licensing and taxation.

## Appendix A

### ABBREVIATIONS

<b>A.</b>	Atlantic Reporter.
<b>A.2d</b>	Atlantic Reporter, Second Series.
<b>A.C.</b>	Appeal Cases.
<b>A.L.R.</b>	American Law Reports.
<b>Aff.</b>	Affirmed; affirming.
<b>Ala.</b>	Alabama;—Alabama Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Am.Dec.</b>	American Decisions.
<b>Am.Jur.</b>	American Jurisprudence, a legal encyclopedia.
<b>Am.Rep.</b>	American Reports.
<b>Am.St.Rep.</b>	American State Reports.
<b>Ann.Cas.</b>	American Annotated Cases.
<b>App.D.C.</b>	Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.
<b>App.Div.</b>	New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divisions, Reports.
<b>Ariz.</b>	Arizona; Arizona Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ark.</b>	Arkansas; Arkansas Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Bing.</b>	Bingham, New Cases, Common Pleas (England).
<b>C.D.</b>	Copyright Decisions.
<b>C.J.</b>	Corpus Juris, a legal encyclopedia.
<b>C.J.S.</b>	Corpus Juris Secundum, a legal encyclopedia.
<b>Cal.</b>	California; California Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Can.Sup.Ct.</b>	Canada Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Cert.</b>	Certiorari, a legal writ by which a cause is removed from an inferior to a superior court.
<b>C.F.R.</b>	Code of Federal Regulations.
<b>Colo.</b>	Colorado; Colorado Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Conn.</b>	Connecticut; Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors Reports.
<b>Cranch</b>	Cranch, United States Supreme Court Reports; United States Circuit Court Reports.
<b>Cush.</b>	Cushing (Massachusetts).
<b>D.C.App.</b>	District of Columbia Court of Appeals Reports.
<b>Dall, Dal.</b>	Dallas, United States Supreme Court Reports; Pennsylvania Reports.
<b>Del.</b>	Delaware; Delaware Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Edw.</b>	Edward; refers to a particular king of England; which king of that name is indicated by the date; used to identify an act of Parliament.
<b>Eng.Rep.</b>	English Reports (reprint).
<b>F.</b>	Federal Reporter.
<b>F.2d</b>	Federal Reporter, Second Series.
<b>F.C.C.</b>	Federal Communications Commission Reports.
<b>F.R.D.</b>	Federal Rules Decisions.

<b>F.Supp.</b>	Federal Supplement.
<b>Fed. Cases, Fed.Cas.</b> or <b>F.Cas.</b>	Reports of United States Circuit and District Courts, 1789-1879.
<b>Fla.</b>	Florida; Florida Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ga.</b>	Georgia; Georgia Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ga.App.</b>	Georgia Appeals Reports.
<b>How.St.Tr.</b>	Howell's State Trials.
<b>Hun</b>	Hun, New York Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ibid.</b>	Ibidem, the same, in the same volume, or on the same page.
<b>Ill.</b>	Illinois; Illinois Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ill.App.</b>	Illinois Appellate Court Reports.
<b>Ind.</b>	Indiana; Indiana Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ind.App.</b>	Indiana Appellate Court Reports.
<b>Johns.Cas.</b>	Johnson's Cases (New York).
<b>K.B.</b>	King's Bench Reports (England).
<b>Kan.</b>	Kansas; Kansas Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ky.</b>	Kentucky; Kentucky Court of Appeals Reports.
<b>L.J.</b>	Law Journal (England).
<b>L.R.Q.B.</b>	Law Reports, Queen's Bench (England).
<b>L.R.A.</b>	Lawyers Reports Annotated.
<b>L.R.A.,N.S.,</b>	Lawyers Reports Annotated, New Series.
<b>L.R.Ex.</b>	Law Reports, Exchequer (England).
<b>L.T.</b>	The Law Times (England).
<b>La.</b>	Louisiana; Louisiana Supreme Court Reports.
<b>La.Ann.</b>	Louisiana Annual Reports.
<b>Mass.</b>	Massachusetts; Massachusetts Supreme Judi- cial Court Reports.
<b>Md.</b>	Maryland; Maryland Court of Appeals Reports.
<b>Me.</b>	Maine; Maine Supreme Judicial Court Reports.
<b>Mich.</b>	Michigan; Michigan Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Minn.</b>	Minnesota; Minnesota Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Miss.</b>	Mississippi; Mississippi Supreme Court Re- ports.
<b>Mo.</b>	Missouri; Missouri Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Mo.App.</b>	Missouri Appeals Reports.
<b>Mont.</b>	Montana; Montana Supreme Court Reports.
<b>N.C.</b>	North Carolina; North Carolina Supreme Court Reports.
<b>N.D.</b>	North Dakota; North Dakota Supreme Court Reports.
<b>N.E.</b>	Northeastern Reporter.
<b>N.E.2d</b>	Northeastern Reporter, Second Series.
<b>N.H.</b>	New Hampshire; New Hampshire Supreme Court Reports.
<b>N.J.</b>	New Jersey; New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals Reports.
<b>N.J.L.</b>	New Jersey Law Reports.

<b>N.M.</b> .....	New Mexico; New Mexico Supreme Court Reports.
<b>N.W.</b> .....	Northwestern Reporter.
<b>N.W.2d</b> .....	Northwestern Reporter, Second Series.
<b>N.Y.</b> .....	New York; New York Court of Appeals Reports.
<b>N.Y.S.</b> .....	New York Supplement Reports.
<b>Neb.</b> .....	Nebraska; Nebraska Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Nev.</b> .....	Nevada; Nevada Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ohio App.</b> .....	Ohio Appeals Reports.
<b>Ohio St.</b> .....	Ohio State Reports.
<b>Okl.</b> .....	Oklahoma; Oklahoma Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Ops.</b> .....	Opinions, as of Attorney General of the United States, or a state.
<b>Or., Ore., Oreg.</b> .....	Oregon; Oregon Supreme Court Reports.
<b>P.</b> .....	Pacific Reporter.
<b>P.2d</b> .....	Pacific Reporter, Second Series.
<b>P.L. &amp; R.</b> .....	Postal Laws and Regulations (1948 ed.)
<b>Pa.</b> .....	Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reports; Pennsylvania State Reports.
<b>Pa.D. &amp; C.</b> .....	Pennsylvania District and County Court Reports.
<b>Pa.Super.</b> .....	Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports.
<b>Paige</b> .....	Paige, New York Chancery Reports.
<b>per se</b> .....	In itself or by itself; used in connection with words actionable <i>per se</i> , libelous <i>per se</i> , or slanderous <i>per se</i> .
<b>Phila. (Pa.)</b> .....	Philadelphia Reports.
<b>Pick.</b> .....	Pickering, Massachusetts Reports.
<b>Q.B.</b> .....	Queen's Bench.
<b>R.</b> .....	Rex king; regina, queen.
<b>R.C.L.</b> .....	Ruling Case Law.
<b>R.C.P.</b> .....	Rules of Civil Procedure.
<b>R.I.</b> .....	Rhode Island; Rhode Island Supreme Court Reports.
<b>R.R.</b> .....	Pike & Fischer Radio Regulations.
<b>S.C.</b> .....	South Carolina; South Carolina Supreme Court Reports.
<b>S.D.</b> .....	South Dakota; South Dakota Supreme Court Reports.
<b>S.E.</b> .....	Southeastern Reporter.
<b>S.E.2d</b> .....	Southeastern Reporter, Second Series.
<b>S.W.</b> .....	Southwestern Reporter.
<b>S.W.2d</b> .....	Southwestern Reporter, Second Series.
<b>Sandf.</b> .....	Sandford, New York Superior Court Reports.
<b>Sec.</b> .....	Section.
<b>So.</b> .....	Southern Reporter.
<b>So.2d</b> .....	Southern Reporter, Second Series.
<b>Stark.</b> .....	Starkie, English Reports.
<b>S.Ct.</b> .....	Supreme Court Reporter.
<b>T.L.R.</b> .....	Times Law Reports (England).

<b>Tenn.</b> .....	Tennessee; Tennessee Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Tex.</b> .....	Texas; Texas Supreme Court (and the Commission of Appeals) Reports.
<b>Tex.Civ.App.</b> .....	Texas Civil Appeals Reports.
<b>Tex.Cr.R.</b> .....	Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Reports.
<b>U.S.C.</b> .....	United States Code.
<b>U.S.C.A.</b> .....	United States Code Annotated.
<b>U.S.P.Q.</b> .....	United States Patents Quarterly.
<b>V.</b> .....	Volume.
<b>Va.</b> .....	Virginia; Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Reports.
<b>Vt.</b> .....	Vermont; Vermont Supreme Court Reports.
<b>W.Va.</b> .....	West Virginia; West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Reports.
<b>Wash.</b> .....	Washington; Washington Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Wash.L.Rep.</b> .....	Washington Law Reporter, Washington, D. C.
<b>Whart.</b> .....	Wharton (Pa.)
<b>Wheat.</b> .....	Wheaton (U.S.)
<b>Wis.</b> .....	Wisconsin; Wisconsin Supreme Court Reports.
<b>Wyo.</b> .....	Wyoming; Wyoming Supreme Court Reports.

## Appendix B

### SELECTED COURT AND PLEADING TERMS

**Action**

A formal legal demand of one's rights made in a court of law.

**Action in personam**

An action against a person, founded on a personal liability.

**Action in rem**

An action for a thing, or for the recovery of a thing possessed by another person.

**Actionable per quod**

Words not actionable in themselves may be defamatory when special damages are proved.

**Actionable per se**

Words that need no explanation in order to determine their defamatory effect.

**Amicus Curiae**

A friend of the court or one who interposes and volunteers information upon some matter of law.

**Answer**

The pleading of a defendant against whom a complaint has been filed.

**Appeal**

An application by an appellant to a higher court to change the order or judgment of the court below.

**Appellant**

The person or party appealing a decision or judgment to a higher court.

**Appellee**

The party against whom an appeal is taken.

**Banc**

Bench, or the place where a court sits. A "sitting in banc" means the meeting of all the judges of a court, as distinguished from the sitting of a single judge.

**Bind over**

To hold on bail for trial.

**Brief**

A written or printed document prepared by counsel to file in court, normally providing both facts and law in support of the case.

**Cause of action**

The particular facts on which an action is based.

**Certiorari**

A writ commanding judges of a lower court to transfer to a higher court records of a case so that judicial review may take place.

**Change of venue**

Removing a civil suit or criminal action from one county or district to another county or district for trial.

**Code**

A compilation or system of laws, arranged into chapters, and promulgated by legislative authority.

**Common law**

The law of the decided cases, derived from the judgments and decrees of courts. Also called "case law." Originally, meant law which derived its authority from the ancient usages or customs of England.

**Complaint**

The initial proceeding by a complainant, or plaintiff, in a civil action.

**Contempt of court**

Any act calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or calculated to lessen its dignity or authority. Contempts are of two kinds: direct and indirect. Direct contempts are those committed in the immediate presence of the court. Indirect contempts refer to the failure or refusal to obey a lawful order, or otherwise obstruct the court's work outside its presence.

**Courts of record**

Those whose proceedings are permanently recorded, and which have the power to fine or imprison for contempt. Courts not of record are those of lesser authority whose proceedings are not permanently recorded.

**Damages**

Monetary compensation which may be recovered in court by a person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury to his person, property, rights, or business, through the unlawful or negligent act of another person or party.

**De Novo**

Anew, afresh. A trial de novo is a retrial of a case.

**Due Process**

Law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice. The guarantee of due process requires that every man have the protection of a fair trial.

**Equity**

That system of jurisprudence which gives relief when there is no full, complete and adequate remedy at law; based originally upon the custom of appealing to the King or chancellor when the formality of the common law did not give means for relief.

**Estoppel**

An admission which prevents a person from using evidence which proves or tends to prove the contrary.

**Ex parte**

By or concerning only one party. This implies an examination in the presence of one party in a proceeding and the absence of the opposing party.

**Ex post facto**

After the fact.

**Habeas corpus**

Latin for "you have the body." A writ issued to an officer holding a person in detention or under arrest to bring that person before a court to determine the legality of the detention.

**Indictment**

A written accusation of a crime prepared by a prosecuting attorney and presented for the consideration of a grand jury.

**Information**

A formal, written accusation of a crime prepared by a competent law officer of the government, such as a district or prosecuting attorney.

**Injunction**

A judicial order in equity directed against a person or organization directing that an act be performed or that the person or organization refrain from doing a particular act.

**Judgment**

The decision of a court of law.



**Jury**

A group of a certain number of persons, selected according to law and sworn to inquire into certain matters of fact, and to declare the truth from evidence brought before them. A *grand jury* hears complaints and accusations in criminal cases, and issues bills of indictment in cases where the jurors believe that there is enough evidence to bring a case to trial. A *petit jury* consists of 12 (or fewer) persons who hear the trial of a civil or criminal case.

**Mandamus**

An extraordinary legal writ issued from a court to a corporation or its officers, to a public official, or to an inferior court commanding the doing of an act which the person, corporation, or lower court is under a duty to perform. A writ of mandamus may also demand the restoration of some right or privilege which is being denied to a complainant.

**Motion to dismiss**

A formal application by a litigant or his counsel addressed to the court for an order to dismiss the case.

**Nol pros, nolle prosequi**

A formal notification of unwillingness to prosecute which is entered upon the court record.

**Obiter dictum; plural, obiter dicta**

An opinion by the court given aside from the main issue, or a saying by the way.

**Plaintiff**

The person (including an organization or business) who initiates a legal action.

**Pleading**

The process in which parties to a lawsuit or legal action alternately file with a court written statements of their contentions. By this process of statement and counterstatement, legal issues are framed and narrowed. These statements are often termed "pleadings."

**Preliminary hearing, preliminary examination**

A person charged with a crime is given a preliminary examination or hearing before a magistrate or judge to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to hold that person for trial.

**Reply**

The pleading of the plaintiff in response to the "answer" of the defendant.

**Res adjudicata or res judicata**

A thing decided.

**Respondent**

A party who gives an answer to a bill in equity; also, one who opposes a party who has taken a case to a higher court.

**Stare decisis**

To stand by the decisions, or to maintain precedent. This legal doctrine holds that settled points of law will not be disturbed.

**Summary**

Connoting "without a full trial." A summary judgment is a judge's rule that one party in a lawsuit wins before the conclusion of a full trial.

**Venue**

The particular county, city, or geographical area in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and decide a case.

**Verdict**

The decision of a jury as reported to the court.

**Writ**

A legal instrument in the judicial process to enforce compliance with orders and sentences of a court.

## Appendix C

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### Additional Resources

**American Digest System, Decennial Digests**, valuable for lists of cases and points adjudicated.

**American Jurisprudence**, a legal encyclopedia.

**Annotated Report System**, selected reports and annotations, with summaries of arguments of counsel.

**Compilations of Laws Affecting Publications**, particularly those put out by various states. Consult managers of various state press associations.

**Corpus Juris Secundum**, a legal encyclopedia.

**Freedom of Information Center**, University of Missouri, issues frequent Reports, the FOI Digest (bi-monthly newsletter), and occasional studies covering a wide variety of media-and-law subjects. Invaluable for state laws on meetings and records.

**Law Dictionaries**, including Black's, Ballentine's, and Bouvier's.

**Law Reviews**. Among the outstanding law reviews published under the direction of law schools are Columbia Law Review, Cornell Law Quarterly, Harvard Law Review, Illinois Law Review, Michigan Law Review, Wisconsin Law Review, and Yale Law Journal.

**Media Law Reporter**. Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D. C. This looseleaf service provides up-to-date coverage of court decisions (full texts) and news notes in communication law, beginning in 1976.

**National Reporter System**, giving texts of appellate court decisions in various jurisdictions of the nation.

**News Media and the Law**, publication of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (formerly Press Censorship Newsletter). Washington, D. C.

**Words and Phrases**, a legal encyclopedia based on definitions of terms as used in statutes and by the courts.

## Appendix D

### ADVERTISING STANDARDS FROM THE TELEVISION CODE

National Association of Broadcasters, Nineteenth Edition, June 1976.

#### ADVERTISING STANDARDS

##### IX. General Advertising Standards

1. This Code establishes basic standards for all television broadcasting. The principles of acceptability and good taste within the Program Standards section govern the presentation of advertising where applicable. In addition, the Code establishes in this section special standards which apply to television advertising.

2. Commercial television broadcasters make their facilities available for the advertising of products and services and accept commercial presentations for such advertising. However, television broadcasters should, in recognition of their responsibility to the public, refuse the facilities of their stations to an advertiser where they have good reason to doubt the integrity of the advertiser, the truth of the advertising representations, or the compliance of the advertiser with the spirit and purpose of all applicable legal requirements.

3. Identification of sponsorship must be made in all sponsored programs in accordance with the requirements of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and the Rules and Regulations of the Federal Communications Commission.

4. Representations which disregard normal safety precautions shall be avoided.

Children shall not be represented, except under proper adult supervision, as being in contact with or demonstrating a product recognized as potentially dangerous to them.

5. In consideration of the customs and attitudes of the communities served, each television broadcaster should refuse his/her facilities to the advertisement of products and services, or the use of advertising scripts, which the station has good reason to believe would be objectionable to a substantial and responsible segment of the community. These standards should be applied with judgment and flexibility, taking into consideration the characteristics of the medium, its home and family audience, and the form and content of the particular presentation.

6. The advertising of hard liquor (distilled spirits) is not acceptable.

7. The advertising of beer and wines is acceptable only when presented in the best of good taste and discretion, and is acceptable only subject to federal and local laws. (*See Television Code Interpretation No. 4*)

8. Advertising by institutions or enterprises which in their offers of instruction imply promises of employment or make exaggerated claims for the opportunities awaiting those who enroll for courses is generally unacceptable.

9. The advertising of firearms/ammunition is acceptable provided it promotes the product only as sporting equipment and conforms to recognized standards of safety as well as all applicable laws and regulations. Advertisements of firearms/ammunition by mail order are unacceptable. The advertising of fireworks is unacceptable.

10. The advertising of fortune-telling, occultism, astrology, phrenology, palm-reading, numerology, mind-reading, character-reading or subjects of a like nature is not permitted.

11. Because all products of a personal nature create special problems, acceptability of such products should be determined with especial emphasis on ethics and the canons of good taste. Such advertising of personal products as is accepted must be presented in a restrained and obviously inoffensive manner.

12. The advertising of tip sheets and other publications seeking to advertise for the purpose of giving odds or promoting betting is unacceptable.

The lawful advertising of government organizations which conduct legalized lotteries is acceptable provided such advertising does not unduly exhort the public to bet.

The advertising of private or governmental organizations which conduct legalized betting on sporting contests is acceptable provided such advertising is limited to institutional type announcements which do not exhort the public to bet.

13. An advertiser who markets more than one product should not be permitted to use advertising copy devoted to an acceptable product for purposes of publicizing the brand name or other identification of a product which is not acceptable.

14. "Bait-switch" advertising, whereby goods or services which the advertiser has no intention of selling are offered merely to lure the customer into purchasing higher-priced substitutes, is not acceptable.

15. Personal endorsements (testimonials) shall be genuine and reflect personal experience. They shall contain no statement that cannot be supported if presented in the advertiser's own words.

#### **X. Presentation of Advertising**

1. Advertising messages should be presented with courtesy and good taste; disturbing or annoying material should be avoided; every effort should be made to keep the advertising message in harmony with the content and general tone of the program in which it appears.

2. The role and capability of television to market sponsors' products are well recognized. In turn, this fact dictates that great care be exercised by the broadcaster to prevent the presentation of false, misleading or deceptive advertising. While it is entirely appropriate to present a product in a favorable light and atmosphere, the presentation must not, by copy or demonstration, involve a material deception as to the characteristics, performance or appearance of the product.

Broadcast advertisers are responsible for making available, at the request of the Code Authority, documentation adequate to support the validity and truthfulness of claims, demonstrations and testimonials contained in their commercial messages.



3. The broadcaster and the advertiser should exercise special caution with the content and presentation of television commercials placed in or near programs designed for children. Exploitation of children should be avoided. Commercials directed to children should in no way mislead as to the product's performance and usefulness.

Commercials, whether live, film or tape, within programs initially designed primarily for children under 12 years of age shall be clearly separated from program material by an appropriate device.

Trade name identification or other merchandising practices involving the gratuitous naming of products is discouraged in programs designed primarily for children.

Appeals involving matters of health which should be determined by physicians should not be directed primarily to children.

4. No children's program personality or cartoon character shall be utilized to deliver commercial messages within or adjacent to the programs in which such a personality or cartoon character regularly appears. This provision shall also apply to lead-ins to commercials when such lead-ins contain sell copy or imply endorsement of the product by program personalities or cartoon characters.

5. Appeals to help fictitious characters in television programs by purchasing the advertiser's product or service or sending for a premium should not be permitted, and such fictitious characters should not be introduced into the advertising message for such purposes.

6. Commercials for services or over-the-counter products involving health considerations are of intimate and far-reaching importance to the consumer. The following principles should apply to such advertising:

a. Physicians, dentists or nurses or actors representing physicians, dentists or nurses, shall not be employed directly or by implication. These restrictions also apply to persons professionally engaged in medical services (e. g., physical therapists, pharmacists, dental assistants, nurses' aides).

b. Visual representations of laboratory settings may be employed, provided they bear a direct relationship to bona fide research which has been conducted for the product or service. (*See Television Code, X, 11*) In such cases, laboratory technicians shall be identified as such and shall not be employed as spokespersons or in any other way speak on behalf of the product.

c. Institutional announcements not intended to sell a specific product or service to the consumer and public service announcements by non-profit organizations may be presented by accredited physicians, dentists or nurses, subject to approval by the broadcaster. An accredited professional is one who has met required qualifications and has been licensed in his/her resident state.

7. Advertising should offer a product or service on its positive merits and refrain from discrediting, disparaging or unfairly attacking competitors, competing products, other industries, professions or institutions.

8. A sponsor's advertising messages should be confined within the framework of the sponsor's program structure. A television broadcaster should avoid the use of commercial announcements which are divorced from

the program either by preceding the introduction of the program (as in the case of so-called "cow-catcher" announcements) or by following the apparent sign-off of the program (as in the case of so-called trailer or "hitch-hike" announcements). To this end, the program itself should be announced and clearly identified, both audio and video, before the sponsor's advertising material is first used, and should be signed off, both audio and video, after the sponsor's advertising material is last used.

9. Since advertising by television is a dynamic technique, a television broadcaster should keep under surveillance new advertising devices so that the spirit and purpose of these standards are fulfilled.

10. A charge for television time to churches and religious bodies is not recommended.

11. Reference to the results of bona fide research, surveys or tests relating to the product to be advertised shall not be presented in a manner so as to create an impression of fact beyond that established by the work that has been conducted.

#### **XI. Advertising of Medical Products**

1. The advertising of medical products presents considerations of intimate and far-reaching importance to consumers because of the direct bearing on their health.

2. Because of the personal nature of the advertising of medical products, claims that a product will effect a cure and the indiscriminate use of such words as "safe," "without risk," "harmless," or terms of similar meaning should not be accepted in the advertising of medical products on television stations.

3. A television broadcaster should not accept advertising material which in his/her opinion offensively describes or dramatizes distress or morbid situations involving ailments, by spoken word, sound or visual effects.

#### **XII. Contests**

1. Contests shall be conducted with fairness to all entrants, and shall comply with all pertinent laws and regulations. Care should be taken to avoid the concurrent use of the three elements which together constitute a lottery—prize, chance and consideration.

2. All contest details, including rules, eligibility requirements, opening and termination dates should be clearly and completely announced and/or shown, or easily accessible to the viewing public, and the winners' names should be released and prizes awarded as soon as possible after the close of the contest.

3. When advertising is accepted which requests contestants to submit items of product identification or other evidence of purchase of products, reasonable facsimiles thereof should be made acceptable unless the award is based upon skill and not upon chance.

4. All copy pertaining to any contest (except that which is required by law) associated with the exploitation or sale of the sponsor's product or service, and all references to prizes or gifts offered in such connection should be considered a part of and included in the total time allowances as herein provided. (See *Television Code, XIV*)

**XIII. Premiums and Offers**

1. Full details of proposed offers should be required by the television broadcaster for investigation and approved before the first announcement of the offer is made to the public.

2. A final date for the termination of an offer should be announced as far in advance as possible.

3. Before accepting for telecast offers involving a monetary consideration, a television broadcaster should be satisfied as to the integrity of the advertiser and the advertiser's willingness to honor complaints indicating dissatisfaction with the premium by returning the monetary consideration.

4. There should be no misleading descriptions or visual representations of any premiums or gifts which would distort or enlarge their value in the minds of the viewers.

5. Assurances should be obtained from the advertiser that premiums offered are not harmful to person or property.

6. Premiums should not be approved which appeal to superstition on the basis of "luck-bearing" powers or otherwise.

**XIV. Time Standards for Non-Program Material**

"(1) Non-Program Material Definition:

"Non-program material, in both prime and all other time, includes billboards, commercials and promotional announcements.

"Non-program material also includes:

"a. In programs of 90 minutes in length or less, credits in excess of 30 seconds per program, except in feature films, shall be counted against the allowable time for non-program material. In no event should credits exceed 40 seconds in such programs.

"The 40 second limitation on credits shall not apply, however, in any situation governed by a contract entered into before October 1, 1971.

"b. In programs longer than 90 minutes, credits in excess of 50 seconds per program, except in feature films, shall be counted against the allowable time for non-program material. In no event should credits exceed 60 seconds in such programs.

"Public service announcements and promotional announcements for the same program are excluded from this definition."

*(Ratified by the NAB Television Board of Directors on June 29, 1977; recommended by the Television Code Review Board)*

Prime time is a continuous period of not less than three consecutive hours per broadcast day as designated by the station between the hours of 6:00 PM and midnight.

b. In all other time, non-program material shall not exceed 16 minutes in any 60-minute period.

c. Children's Programming Time—Defined as those hours other than prime time in which programs initially designed primarily for children under 12 years of age are scheduled.

Within this time period on Saturday and Sunday, non-program material shall not exceed nine minutes 30 seconds in any 60-minute period.

Within this time period on Monday through Friday, non-program material shall not exceed 12 minutes in any 60-minute period.

3. Program Interruptions:

a. Definition: A program interruption is any occurrence of non-program material within the main body of the program.

b. In prime time, the number of program interruptions shall not exceed two within any 30-minute program, or four within any 60-minute program.

Programs longer than 60 minutes shall be prorated at two interruptions per half-hour.

The number of interruptions in 60-minute variety shows shall not exceed five.

c. In all other time, the number of interruptions shall not exceed four within any 30-minute program period.

d. In children's weekend programming time, as above defined in 2c, the number of program interruptions shall not exceed two within any 30-minute program or four within any 60-minute program.

e. In both prime time and all other time, the following interruption standard shall apply within programs of 15 minutes or less in length:

5-minute program—1 interruption;

10-minute program—2 interruptions;

15-minute program—2 interruptions.

f. News, weather, sports and special events programs are exempt from the interruption standard because of the nature of such programs.

4. No more than four non-program material announcements shall be scheduled consecutively within programs, and no more than three non-program material announcements shall be scheduled consecutively during station breaks. The consecutive non-program material limitation shall not apply to a single sponsor who wishes to further reduce the number of interruptions in the program.

5. A multiple product announcement is one in which two or more products or services are presented within the framework of a single announcement. A multiple product announcement shall not be scheduled in a unit of time less than 60 seconds, except where integrated so as to appear to the viewer as a single message. A multiple product announcement shall be considered integrated and counted as a single announcement if:

a. the products or services are related and interwoven within the framework of the announcement (related products or services shall be defined as those having a common character, purpose and use); and

b. the voice(s), setting, background and continuity are used consistently throughout so as to appear to the viewer as a single message.

Multiple product announcements of 60 seconds in length or longer not meeting this definition of integration shall be counted as two or more announcements under this section of the Code. This provision shall not apply to retail or service establishments.

6. Reasonable and limited identification of prizes and donors' names where the presentation of contest awards or prizes is a necessary part of program content shall not be included as non-program material as defined above.

7. Programs presenting women's/men's service features, shopping guides, fashion shows, demonstrations and similar material provide a special service to the public in which certain material normally classified as non-program is an informative and necessary part of the program content. Because of this, the time standards may be waived by the Code Authority to a reasonable extent on a case-by-case basis.

8. Gratuitous references in a program to a non-sponsor's product or service should be avoided except for normal guest identification.

9. Stationary backdrops or properties in television presentations showing the sponsor's name or product, the name of the sponsor's product, trademark or slogan should be used only incidentally and should not obtrude on program interest or entertainment.

*Note: From time to time the Code Authority issues advertising guidelines and clarifications expanding on provisions of the Code. Among areas covered are acne, alcoholic beverages, arthritis and rheumatism remedies, bronchitis, comparative advertising, children's premiums and offers, children's TV advertising, disparagement, hallucinogens, hypnosis, lotteries, men-in-white, non-prescription medications, personal products, testimonials, time standards, toys, vegetable oils and margarines, and weight reducing products/services. Copies may be obtained from any NAB Code Authority office.*

## Appendix E

### ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY: A RIGHT TO RUMMAGE?

Early in June, 1978, Herbert Block (“Herblock”) of the Washington *Post* drew a cartoon showing former President Richard M. Nixon standing behind five members of the Supreme Court of the United States. Nixon was making his familiar “V for Victory” gesture. Members of the Court shown in the cartoon were Chief Justice Warren Burger, Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William Rehnquist—all Nixon appointees—and Justice Byron White. Those five men made up the majority in *Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, a search and seizure case which involved a campus newspaper. This case has serious implications not only for the press but also for all citizens. The cartoon was labeled “Decision Giving Officials the Right to Go Through Anybody’s Private Papers;”<sup>1</sup> its outraged tone symbolized the reactions of the news media and of civil libertarians to the outcome of the *Zurcher* case.<sup>2</sup>

By a 5–3 margin,<sup>3</sup> the Court said in *Zurcher* that newspapers (and all citizens, for that matter) may be the subjects of unannounced searches as long as those searches are approved beforehand by a court’s issuance of a search warrant.<sup>4</sup> A particular issue in this case was a question of how to interpret the words of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. That amendment says:<sup>5</sup>

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-

<sup>1</sup> Cartoon reprinted with “A Right to Rummage,” *Time*, June 12, 1978, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; see also “Searching the Press,” *Newsweek*, June 12, 1978, pp. 105–106; “The Right to Rummage,” *The Washington Post*, June 1, 1978, p. A22, and James Reston, “A Letter to the Whizzer,” *The New York Times*, June 2, 1978, p. A23.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. was recovering from surgery and took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

<sup>4</sup> *Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily* (No. 76–1484); *Louis P. Bergna, District Attorney and Craig Brown v. The Stanford Daily* (No. 76–1600), hereafter cited as *Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The *Zurcher* case arose during violent demonstrations at Stanford University on April 9, 1971. Protesting students took control of the Stanford University Hospital administrative offices and an adjoining corridor. Students barricaded both ends of that corridor, but police forced their way through one barricade. A group of nine police officers stationed in the hallway was attacked by club-wielding demonstrators and all nine policemen were injured.<sup>6</sup>

On April 11, 1971, the *Stanford Daily* carried articles and photographs about the clash between demonstrators and police. It appeared to authorities from that coverage that a *Daily* photographer who had been in the hospital corridor had been in a position to photograph the fighting between students and police. As a result, a search warrant was secured from a municipal court. The warrant was issued<sup>7</sup>

on a finding of “just, probable and reasonable cause for believing that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material and relevant to the identification of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with a Deadly Weapon, will be located [on the premises of the *Daily*].”

Later that day, the newspaper office was searched by four police officers, with some newspaper staffers present. The search turned up only the photographs already published in the *Daily*, so no materials were removed from the newspaper’s office.<sup>8</sup> In May of 1971, the *Daily* and some of its staffers sued James Zurcher, the Palo Alto chief of police, the officers who conducted the search, and the county’s district attorney. The complaint declared that the students’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution had been violated.<sup>9</sup>

A federal district court held that the search was illegal. It declared that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbade the issuance of a warrant to search for materials in possession of a person not suspected of a crime unless there was probable cause to believe, based on a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena *duces tecum* would be impractical.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

Some translation is needed here. As New York *Times* reporter Warren Weaver, Jr. noted, a subpoena *duces tecum* (that's Latin for "bring it with you") "can be enforced by a judge only after a hearing in which the holder of the evidence has the opportunity to present arguments why the material should not be given to the government." That process means, of course, that the holder of the documents sought would have some warning and a chance to "clean up" files. If investigators have a search warrant, on the other hand, the holder of the documents "has no more warning than a knock on the door."<sup>11</sup> In finding in favor of the Stanford Daily, District Judge Robert F. Peckham wrote:<sup>12</sup>

It should be apparent that means less drastic than a search warrant do exist for obtaining materials from a third party. A subpoena *duces tecum*, obviously, is much less intrusive than a search warrant: the police do not go rummaging through one's house, office, or desk armed only with a subpoena. And, perhaps equally important, there is no opportunity to challenge the search warrant prior to the intrusion, whereas one can always move to quash the subpoena before producing the sought-after materials. \* \* \* In view of the difference in degree of intrusion and the opportunity to challenge possible mistakes, the subpoena should always be preferred to the search warrant, for non-suspects.

The Stanford daily's lawsuit thus was upheld by a U. S. district court and, five years later, by a U. S. Court of Appeals.<sup>13</sup> The Supreme Court of the United States, however, in a decision announced by Justice White, declared that newspapers are subject to such unannounced "third party" searches as the one involving The Stanford Daily. As Warren Weaver, Jr. summed up one important aspect of *Zurcher*, "a person who is not involved in a crime \* \* \* has no more right that a strongly implicated subject to resist search of a building he owns or occupies for evidence of a crime."<sup>14</sup> Justice White's majority opinion said:<sup>15</sup>

It is an understatement to say that there is no direct authority in this or any other federal court for the District

<sup>11</sup> Warren Weaver, Jr., "High Court Bars Newspaper Plea Against Search," June 1, 1978, pp. A1 ff, at p. B6.

<sup>12</sup> The Stanford Daily v. James Zurcher, 353 F.Supp. 124 (N.D.Cal., 1972) at p. 130.

<sup>13</sup> 550 F.2d 464 (CA, 9th Cir., 1977).

<sup>14</sup> Weaver, at p. A1.

<sup>15</sup> Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.



Court's sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment. Under existing law, valid warrants may be issued to search *any* property, whether or not occupied by a third party, at which there is probable reason to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime will be found.

\* \* \*

As the Fourth Amendment has been construed and applied by this Court, "when the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy is justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue." *Fisher v. United States*, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1576 (1976).

\* \* \*

The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of a crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific "things" to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.

The Court's majority opinion said that "the net gain to privacy interests by the District Court's new rule would be worth the candle." The Court also enumerated—and rejected—the following arguments that additional First Amendment factors would forbid use of search warrants and permitting only the subpoena *duces tecum*. Those arguments said:<sup>16</sup>

The general submission is that searches of newspaper offices for evidence of crime reasonably believed to be on the premises will seriously threaten the ability of the press to gather, analyze, and disseminate news. This is said to be true for several reasons: first, searches will be physically disruptive to such an extent that timely publication will be impeded. Second, confidential sources of information will dry up, and the press will also lose opportunities to cover various events because of fears of the participants that press files will be readily available to the authorities. Third, reporters will be deterred from recording and preserving their recollections for future use if such information is subject to seizure. Fourth, the processing of news and its dissemination will be chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose internal editorial deliberations. Fifth, the press will resort to self-censorship to conceal its possession of information of potential interest to the police.

Justice White's majority opinion brushed aside such arguments and expressed confidence that judges could guard against

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

searches which would be so intrusive as to interfere with publishing newspapers.

Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, dissented.<sup>17</sup>

It seems to be self-evident that police searches of newspaper offices burden the freedom of the press. The most immediate and obvious First Amendment injury caused by such a visitation by police is physical disruption of the operation of the newspaper. Policemen occupying a newsroom and searching it thoroughly for what may be an extended period of time<sup>18</sup> will inevitably interrupt its normal operations \* \* \* By contrast, a subpoena would afford the newspaper itself an opportunity to locate whatever material might be requested and produce it.

But there is another and more serious burden on a free press imposed by an unannounced police search of a newspaper office: the possibility of disclosure of information received from confidential sources, or of the identity of the sources themselves. Protection of those sources is necessary to ensure that the press can fulfill its constitutionally designated function of informing the public, because important information can often be obtained only by an assurance that the source will not be revealed.

\* \* \*

Today, the Court does not question the existence of this constitutional protection, but says only that it is not convinced \* \* \* that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted searches." This facile conclusion seems to me to ignore common experience. It requires no blind leap of faith to understand that a person who gives information to a journalist only on condition that his identity will not be revealed will be less likely to give that information if he knows that, despite the journalist's assurance, his identity may in fact be disclosed. And it cannot be denied that confidential information may be exposed to the eyes of police officers who execute a search warrant by rummaging through the files, cabinets, desks and wastebaskets of a newsroom. Since the indisputable effect of such searches will thus be to prevent a newsman from being able to promise confidentiality to his potential sources, it seems obvious

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> At footnote 2 in his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart noted that a search of a Los Angeles radio station took more than eight hours.

to me that a journalist's access to information, and thus the public's, will thereby be impaired.

\* \* \*

Perhaps as a matter of abstract policy a newspaper office should receive no more protection from unannounced police searches than, say, the office of a doctor or the office of a bank. But we are here to uphold a Constitution. And our Constitution does not explicitly protect the practice of medicine or the business of banking from all abridgment by government. It does explicitly protect the freedom of the press.

Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent focused not on First Amendment matters, but on the justification needed to issue a search warrant without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Stevens wrote: <sup>19</sup>

The only conceivable justification for an unannounced search of an innocent citizen is the fear that if notice were given, he would conceal or destroy the object of the search. Probable cause to believe that the custodian is a criminal, or that he holds a criminal's weapons, spoils, or the like, justifies that fear, and therefore such a showing complies with the clause [of the Fourth Amendment saying that warrants shall issue only upon "probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation"]. But if nothing said under oath in the warrant application demonstrates the need for an unannounced search by force, the probable cause requirement is not satisfied. In the absence of some other showing of reasonableness, the ensuing search violates the Fourth Amendment.

News media reactions to the decision in *Zurcher* were heated. Howard K. Smith of ABC News termed it "the most dangerous ruling the court has made in memory." <sup>20</sup> Columnist James Reston of *The New York Times* asserted that such a ruling, had it been in effect a few years ago, would have made it possible for government to raid newspaper offices and to stop publication of the Pentagon Papers and Watergate exposés. Reston wrote: <sup>21</sup>

The troubling thing to us in the press is what may now happen as a result of this Supreme Court decision, Mr. Justice. It is not really that you have said that the press is

<sup>19</sup> Stevens' dissent, *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Quoted in *Time*, June 12, 1978, p. 101.

<sup>21</sup> *The New York Times*, June 2, 1978, p. A23.

the same as everybody else, but that you have said also that our efforts to get at the truth, in private conversations, are subject to Government inquiry on demand by Government officials.

This makes a fundamental difference. If the police can demand access to newspaper files, under court orders which the Government can easily demand, then anybody who differs with the Government will hesitate to tell the truth.

In an editorial, the *Washington Post* declared that the decision "upholding the power of government to search a newspaper office for documentary evidence of someone else's crime is a staggering blow to freedom of the press." In addition, the *Zurcher* decision affects the rights of all citizens. The *Post* editorial continued:<sup>22</sup>

What the court has said is that if the police can convince a judge there is probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is contained in your private files—a crime not committed by you but by anyone, anytime, anywhere—they can rummage through your papers and premises until they find it, or choose to abandon the search.

Jack C. Landau, a trustee of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, termed the ruling "a constitutional outrage to the First Amendment rights of every news organization and to the citizens they serve." Landau warned that the search of *The Stanford Daily* is not an isolated incident; there have been 10 similar newsroom searches in California alone. He added that the Carter Administration must share the blame for "this landmark injury to the First Amendment because its Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court to uphold the broad authority of police to obtain the kind of search warrant involved" in the *Zurcher* case.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> The *Washington Post*, June 1, 1978, p. A22.

<sup>23</sup> Quoted in Morton Mintz, "Court Backs Eased Rule on Searches," *The Washington Post*, pp. A1 ff, at p. A7.

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