

JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING

SUMMER 1959

ASSOCIATION FOR PROFESSIONAL BROADCASTING EDUCATION

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A TIME FOR REFLECTION

Certainly one function of a professional publication is to provide a forum for discussion of professional problems. Since the *Journal of Broadcasting* was intended primarily to be a research publication, this discussion function has received only nominal consideration except insofar as it could be served through documented, research reports.

Among teachers of broadcasting, however, a variety of questions involving teaching philosophy seem to crop up repeatedly at regional meetings across the country. And philosophy of any kind is difficult to document.

Yet such questions remain, and constitute issues of concern to all students of broadcasting. What is the proper role of broadcasting in an academic curriculum? To what extent can or should *professionalism* be fostered in the broadcasting curriculi? Is education *for* broadcasting properly *vocational* in orientation or should it be more concerned with the problem of cultural values in the classical liberal arts tradition? In a period of dramatic change in the character of broadcasting, should more concern be given to *content* courses and less to *technique* areas (which are more subject to change)?

Now that the glamor of television has dimmed to some degree and enrollments in broadcasting coursework in many institutions have levelled off somewhat, it seems only logical to commence a certain stock-taking, to devote some time and attention to reflection and reevaluation of teaching aims and objectives. This, in the opinion of the Editor, is what Milo Ryan has sought to do in the article selected to "lead off" this issue of the *Journal.*

While there may be considerable disagreement with the position he expresses, the fact that he has taken a position, and expressed it in logical, forceful fashion, should encourage others to pause and consider their own "philosophies." If through publication of this and similar articles, the *Journal* can help stimulate nationwide discussion of teaching philosophy education *for* broadcasting will have moved a big step forward.

In consequence, the Editor considers publication of Professor Ryan's article less a departure from the general publication policy of the *Journal* than a somewhat belated fulfillment of the well-rounded functions of a truly professional publication.

Without doubt, the particular issue raised by Professor Ryan is but one of many confronted by the teacher of broadcasting. If there is sufficient interest in further discussion of teaching problems or of instructional philosophy, the Editor of the *Journal* will be pleased to consider making such discussion a regular feature in subsequent issues.

—The Editor

TRADES, TECHNIQUES—AND A FABLE

By Milo Ryan

Do "technique" courses make a trade school of the broadcast curriculum? In staunch support of the merits of technique courses in furthering the liberal arts position of radio-tv offerings, Milo Ryan answers the critics of professional training for broadcasting.

Prof. Ryan is Professor of Journalism and Radio-Television in the Division of Communications at the University of Washington. He has many years of experience teaching both "technique" and "theory" courses in broadcasting behind him, plus a year with the Educational Television Center at Ann Arbor.

ONCE upon a time there was a young man who decided that more than anything else he wanted to be a musician. He wanted to understand music so he could perform it on the piano.

So he went to his State University. He talked to the Dean of Music. That seemed to be a sensible first step.

"I want to be a musician," he told the Dean. "I want to play the piano, and I want to understand music so I can play it well on the piano. Maybe, someday, I might even want to write music for the piano."

The Dean was understandably pleased. He studied the young man. He gave him aptitude tests. He dug into his background, he tested his ear and his sense of rhythm. The young man seemed qualified in every determinable way to undertake the study he so earnestly yearned for.

The young man even had the money to pay his tuition, AND MORE WHERE THAT CAME FROM.

There was no doubt in the Dean's mind when all these preliminaries were over, and so the young man was accepted as a student. The Dean then outlined his program.

The first year the young man took English composition, so he could spell, punctuate, parse and command a scholarly vocabulary. He also took a course in biology, because every young man should have a touch of science. He took history and French. He took physical education.

At the end of the first year, the young man was very happy about it all; his grades were good; he'd earned lots of honor points.

The second year he took more English, more language, mathematics, more science, some sociology and some psychology. His happiness when June came around hadn't lessened a bit. He was getting a broad education, and he knew it. No objections from the young man. Soon he would study to become a musician and play the piano.

Came the third year, and Dean said it was time now to begin his music. So he registered the young man in a survey of the history of music, a course in harmony (which made the young man happy he'd taken mathematics) and a course in theory, a course in philosophy and a course in economics.

The young man looked at the schedule he'd been given.

"These look like valuable courses all right," he said, "but when do I learn to play the piano?"

The Dean drew himself up to full indignation.

"We don't teach you to play the piano," he said. "What do you think this is, a trade school?"

In due time the young man finished his course of studies. He knew the history of music, the principles of harmony, the theory of music; he knew the difference between Beethoven and Bartok; he could define a sonata. He knew how to write a sentence, and all the other things a well-educated music student should know, including statistics, the significance and principles of empirical research. He even had an inkling of what aesthetics and abnormal psychology are all about.

But he wasn't a musician, or even on the way to being one. And that's what he'd wanted all along—to be a musician, like Rachmaninoff, Cortot, Mozart, Bach, Chopin, Schnabel, Rubenstein and the rest of those tradesmen. He'd wanted to create music, he'd wanted to communicate through music to audiences the things he knew and the things he felt about sound.

He wasn't a musician. But at least he hadn't gone to a trade school.

The day the Dean signed his diploma he went, as usual to lunch at the faculty club, able to hold up his head among his colleagues in the University. The Dean lunched with a professor of history, a professor of physics, a professor of English, a professor of botany, a professor of political science, and a professor of speech correction. They nodded to a professor of forestry management but didn't invite him to sit down with them, because the professor of forestry management couldn't possibly be a scholar. No, he taught a trade.

II

I write as a teacher of radio and television, in a School of Communications, at a State University. My courses involve some of the techniques of broadcasting, among other things. As time goes on I find, as I am sure other teachers of radio and television have found, that such teaching is smeared with the undeserved epithet of "trade school stuff."

The smear comes at us from teachers of standard academic subjects; it comes at us from those halls of ivy where the media of communications aren't touched on at all except possibly in sociology; it comes at us from the graduates of elegant private institutions who have had the good fortune—and sometimes the necessary antecedents—to have moved early into upper bohemia by virtue of success in the business of broadcasting; it comes at us from numerous other directions.

It is when it comes at us from teachers of radio and television themselves that the smear word is least tolerable; for any teacher of broadcasting who thinks that the technical aspects of the subject are mere trades must either be scared out of his academic wits by his campus colleagues or unaware of the relation of "know-how" to the process of communication and the nature of art.

True, as the volume of academic bullying that resorts to smear techniques increases, one does become timorous. One sees in his imagination, and sometimes even more tangibly than that, a threat to departmental budgets, a growing unlikelihood of promotion, and the onset of some form of ostracism on campus such as that suffered by our professor of forestry management in the fable with which this article began. The response to the smear does not appear to be a courageous one if it says to the name-caller, "Yes, I guess you're right, and I really don't know what I'm talking about, and I'm sorry, and I'll never do it again."

On the other hand, it is all right, I suppose, to knuckle under and abandon the teaching of techniques if one really believes he has been doing wrong. If he does so believe, it seems that he'd better quit calling himself a teacher of radio and television, and his department had better quit accepting students who think they're going to take radio and television.

It is far more realistic to let the bully scream, from whatever corner, face up to what the teaching of techniques is all about, see to it that one teaches them as well as it is humanly possible to do, and teaches them out of a philosophy that is academically as noble as the teaching of composition, the teaching of language, or art or speech or music, or anthropology. "Et," as the saying goes, "cetera."

It is certainly not realistic to abandon all we have ever learned about labels, name-calling, guilt by association and the other anti-intellectual pressure drives that force men of one faith to bow to the will of men of another point of view. If we can't argue our cause as reasonable men with men of reason, then we've got to admit that radio and television are nothing but toys after all, not worthy of serious consideration in our culture, incapable of bettering themselves and fit only for the mountebanks, the hucksters and the teen-agers who, as a class, are despised anyway.

I for one am not ready to admit anything of the sort, and I pray I never will be.

III

Just what is the trouble many of us face on our campuses?

Perhaps it arises out of something schizophrenic in the universities of America. Many of us have as our classical model an admirable institution in Cambridge, Massachusetts, from which have come a number of great principles and a number of great men. Another Harvard is what many faculty members in other universities would like their institutions to be called. Harvard is a symbol; it is also a place difficult to get into, academically and financially, difficult to remain in, academically and financially, and difficult to get out of with a degree. The forces that caused her to be—and a few other institutions somewhat comparable—were not, however, the forces that caused many another university to be; nor are the forces that cause each to persist. At least, not entirely the same forces. And the differences, which appear upon analysis to be differences in kind, are not necessarily differences in degree.

One university may be able, through the strength of the hypothesis at the base of its philosophy of education, to establish a posture that remains more or less undisturbed by the dynamics of an evolving culture; another university may be, through *its* hypothesis, sensitive to those dynamics to a point where the tissue-growth of its curriculum is constant. Birmingham is not Cambridge, and Cambridge is not Oxford—nor, for that matter, is Harvard.

The architects who wrought Notre Dame de Paris created a masterpiece; the architects who wrought St. Peter's in Rome also created a masterpiece: the points of similarity are few, as architecture. The philosophy of Christendom has produced one of the world's great religion; so has the philosophy of Judaism. Each has its own enduring strength. The classical composers developed a kind of music quite different from that of their predecessors but no less worthy of being called music; and the romantics developed a music that differed in turn from the classical. In our own time, composers, recognizing that most of what can be sounded out of classicism and romanticism has been sounded, and that the forces of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth are no longer the forces of the twentieth in completeness, are seeking new ways of recognizing in tone, harmony and rhythm the spirit and the experiences of a new era. Our culture being what it is, it would be idle to try to mould every university to one classical form.

Our newer universities can, and should of course, take from whatever model they choose those elements that have really been at the basis of its greatness: as in the case of Harvard, its freedom and courage of inquiry, its independence of thought, its diligence in study—in short its *modus operandi,* not merely its course of studies. For as many a great teacher has witnessed in his own career, the evanescent part is the subject he has taught; what lasts is the spirit he has passed along to those who will succeed him and to those who carry that spirit into the market place.

The university in America truly need not apologize for recognizing that among the dynamics of our age must be included the phenomenon of mass communications, nor that among the evolving arts are those of the microphone and the camera, as long as that university applies to their study the inquiry, the independence, the diligence, the creativeness and the utmost skill that characterize all honest study.

There is no real intellectual honesty in smearing as a "trade school" any attempt to develop in a student a skill in the grammar, the linguistic and the symbology of the television camera, provided the motives in developing that skill are properly oriented in an educational philosophy that is defensible.

IV

But indignation gets one nowhere, as any academician who has ever attended a faculty meeting well knows.

It seems to be far more purposeful to take an honest look at the teaching of techniques—in the present case the techniques of broadcasting as distinct from the techniques of broadcast engineering—and understand it for what it is, or at least what it can be.

Recently, discussing this subject, a member of one of the academic departments on our campus said that, in his opinion, to teach the techniques of production—"button-pushing" he called it—is comparable to teaching how to operate an adding machine or a soldering iron. The analogy is, of course, absurd. True, the pushing of a button, insofar as finger-movement is concerned, is mechanistic; but the impulses behind the movement lie on quite a different plane and in a far different dimension from those that impel the total key on the adding machine. The point need not be labored.

Of the several ways of teaching techniques—or rather the several objectives in so doing—two come readily to mind.

One, exemplified by the short-term schools operated for profit, has as its objective to teach enrollees how to be a cameraman or how to write a script, frankly to equip them to get a job and, hopefully, to hold on to it. Under this training program, technique tends to be taught as an end. Frequently these schools do train good cameramen or good audio men or good disc-jockeys or good announcers. But the training is still in technique for the sake of knowing how to do a piece of work.

At the opposite pole is the school, the department, the division or whatever, which teaches techniques, indeed insists on the student developing a high degree of skill, not as an end in themselves but as a means to an end. The end, of course, as in the case of the music student who does develop a skill as a pianist, being a command of his art sufficient to enable the student eventually to function as a free man, to the fullest of his creative ability when at last he does become a broadcaster, or a producer, or a writer of drama. One recalls at this point the experience of Eugene O'Neill during his days at Provincetown Playhouse, when he learned every inch and every tiniest function of the apparatus of the stage, in order that someday he might write for it with truth and vigor. One recalls the message of Martha Graham that, in the studio and at the barre, the dancer learns control of his instrument, the human body, disciplines himself in the technical demands of his art, that someday he may be free to express the deep feelings of the human heart.

Or to place broadcasting techniques on another level, the level of informational "communication," to think of attempting to produce a "Small World" without knowing anything of the principles or the problems of editing, or the conducting of purposeful discussion, seems comparable to putting a violin in the hands of an untrained man and expecting him to perform a Beethoven sonata. In a sense it took twenty years or more of Murrow's life to develop the techniques that have culminated in "Small World." Not to teach techniques is to say to another embryo Murrow, "You too should become a traveling agent for an International Youth Movement, find yourself accidentally in a Vienna during an Anschluss, go to a Munich, become head of a network's new foreign service that is groping for a way to do a job, become a vice president and resign, meet a man named Friendly, fight through a 'See It Now,' and a 'Person to Person,' and then in twenty or twenty-five years you too may be able to produce a 'Small World.' " Instead, one can telescope the essentials of what technique has been developed up to now, communicate it to a group of eager minds in more or less of a capsule form, see that they handle with skill what has been the experience of others and point their way to—if I may borrow an expression from a discredited type of television program—the next plateau.

By wise guidance through what is significant and meaningful in the clutter of techniques that his profession will demand, the student should be able to move faster, if he will, to that point where he can by-pass the admittedly primitive techniques developed so far and find newer, fresher, more expressive ways of transmitting the ideas that make up the substance of his work. In spite of attitudes to the contrary on the part of some practicing broadcasters, a young man can be advanced faster and more effectively through a good school program than he can in the shop. The most the shop has time to teach a recruit is that shop's way of doing a job. There is little time for critical analysis of the product, little time for on-the-line experimentation; and, most certainly, little capacity in one shop to equip a man to move into someone else's shop and there function readily and with ease.

Nor is on-the-job training always as efficient as the broadcaster would like to think. A television production manager of my acquaintance likes to say, "It takes you four years in college to turn out a floor director for me; I can do it in my studio in two weeks." The answer is not difficult. In the first place, in the program at our University at any rate, floor directing is a by-product of a television production course lasting one quarter, not four years. Assuming my professional acquaintance means two 40-hour weeks, a total of 80 hours, I think he should be apprehensive about his efficiency in teaching. In our production course a student spends 60 working hours a quarter, as compared to 80. In that time, he learns how to use the camera, how to handle audio, film clips, switching, staging, lighting and, of course, floor-directing. To all these skills he addresses himself during the first 24 hours of the quarter. In the remaining 36 hours, he applies these skills to the development of his own and his fellow-students' program ideas, just as the student of English composition applies his knowledge of vocabulary, spelling, punctuation and related techniques to the writing of an essay or a poem.

He may still get a first job as a floor director if he's lucky; but he's far more ready to move to the director's desk than is the man who has been trained only to be a floor director.

Something important remains to be said about the cause of the radio-television graduate who becomes a floor director and someday moves to the director's desk.

No one who defends technical training insists or even assumes that the department of broadcasting gives the student nothing else. A mere technician certainly does no credit to a university. If our young man is to push beyond established techniques into new ones, it is likely to be because as a communicator he wishes to push beyond the limitations of what those old techniques have been able to say. When his technical studies have been kept in their proper proportion, he has been allowed time for and been directed into study of the content of at least a portion of the things that have affected man throughout time—polemics, political philosophy, literature, social organization and social disorganization, the chasms of the mind that philosophy and psychology peer into, and the arts—"human perfection socially possessed." He has learned all he can in the time allowed about the nature of the social phenomenon known as "mass communications." It is from these things that his drive will come, when it comes; and it is from this cumulative drive that the media of mass communications will, as they must, justify the will that led the mind of man to create them.

V

Is there anything undignified in presenting techniques in this context and from this point of view? If so, is it any more dignified to teach spelling, punctuation and grammar; or the methodology of statistical research? Is this approach to the development of facility in communications degrading to the academic green, deserving the smear of "trade school"?

Hailing the announcement of the Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania, Gilbert Seldes wrote in the *Saturday Review* of January 24, 1959, "Those who, like myself, have been urging their own colleges to establish at least a chair in this field can be grateful to the academic pedantry that defeated us. Because this school is coming into existence at a time when the major problems of communication, always urgent, have defined themselves and a faculty, coming together in a new field, will not have to waste time on inessentials.

"Among inessentials," Seldes continues, "I emphatically do *not* list the techniques of broadcasting, the movies and the other mass arts. There have been composers, some of them of the first order, who have not known the capacities of all the instruments of their orchestras, but none, I think, unable to play their scales. The complexities of lights, lenses, and the processes of the control room or editing are the basic grammar of television and the movies. A good school should teach them if only to show how they can be ignored without disaster."

Instead of cringing before our academic colleagues for fear that what we are doing might be smeared as "trade school stuff," we'd better be sure our objectives square with our own consciences as communicators, gear up to teach even better than we have been doing, and go somewhere other than the facuty club for lunch.

It may be that the degree of intensity in applying the smear word is an environmental thing. The arguments in this article were submitted to a contemporary teaching at a radio-television department in a distant part of the country, with a question.

"How," I asked, "do you defend your teaching of techniques when your campus colleagues call you a tradesman?"

His answer was frank.

"You must remember," he replied, "that I teach television in a University that includes an institute of packaging technology and a school of hotel management. On my campus I'm among the elite."

VI

Incidentally, and just to set matters straight, many universities do teach students how to play the piano, and to compose. Sometimes even professors of sociology and linguistics, speech, languages, mathematics, physics, literature, philosophy, law and chemistry attend the student recitals—and applaud, too.

It's all very acceptable. Music's been around a long time.

MEMORANDUM TO A STUDENT OF BROADCASTING

By Harold E. Fellows

The following is an extract from an address by Harold E. Fellows, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Association of Broadcasters, at the annual banquet of the Radio and Television Department, Indiana University, May 7, 1959.

Student:

Thirty-eight years ago there was no such thing as broadcasting. This was two decades before you were born, and radio had served only a limited usefulness in World War I as an experimental means of point-to-point communications.

Broadcasting was born in a laboratory, but it was not (as in the case of the Salk vaccine) a result of a purposeful search. On the contrary . . . it was intended to be a wireless method of communicating between two fixed locations. Its early expansion was a hapzard development with many engineers who had put stations on the air as avocational toys suddenly finding (through audience response by letter and telephone calls and personal contact) that they were in the public-medium business. This means that only a couple of years this side of four decades ago, broadcasting as an art was launched from what amounted to a standing start. Its only advantage (in consideration of its subsequent informational function) was the precedent that could be taken from the longer history of publishing business which dates from the invention of movable type by Johann Gutenberg.

But broadcasting was different then, as it is different now, in that its very physical nature required legislation and regulation that would permit it to develop without chaotic interference that would interrupt its broad service to the listening audience.

Therefore, Student, one of the first lessons to be learned about broadcasting is that which is implicit in its very beginning. The time between that birth date of broadcasting (over thirty years ago) and now has been spent by many good people—in commerce, in programming, in sales, in education, and in purely informational functions and in entertainment—in constructing out of this maze of tubes and wires that enabled sound to be cast over long distances an organized system that would bring something of value to the citizens of the United States. Fifteen years before broadcasting was tried on any measurable scale, the first automobiles were manufactured in America; eighteen years before, the Wright brothers managed to fly a heavier-than-air aircraft at Kitty Hawk; one hundred eighteen years before, the principle of the steam drive was developed. We see about us today, in the skies and on the land and on the seas, the refinements in all of these fields of transportation that have been brought out of these modest beginnings. We also see and hear, daily (in our homes and elsewhere), the refinements that have grown out of that time when broadcasting was a single crystal microphone in a black-draped side-room, usually located in the garret of a hotel or the rear section of a music store. It is good to remember, then (if you are a student of such matters), that broadcasting in the purely physical sense of transmission and capability of service has come a long way.

But, Student, this is not everything that broadcasting is or should be.

I mentioned that broadcasting lives (and, of course, must) under the regulatory surveillance of the Federal Government. It is a licensed medium—licensed principally because the absence of license would create such a traffic jam among the frequencies allocated for both radio and television that clear and intelligible reception would be impossible in most parts of the country.

There could be an alternative to license, and it is practiced in some nations. This alternative would be to permit the existence of maybe a dozen very high-powered radio stations, and as many television stations, interconnected in a network but owned by the Government itself. The danger of such a system as this is obvious, for control of communications is one of the basic instruments of the Communist Manifesto and thus is distasteful to free-born and individualistic Americans.

We have chosen in this country, therefore, to establish a system of broadcasting that permits the development of as many facilities as possible, for use both by commercial licensees and by educators, even though such a system (like democracy itself) frequently may appear to be cumbersome and frequently may appear to be too heterogeneous and misdirected. But the fact that we have been able to do this, that we have been able to preserve (in a great and vastly complex public medium) not only the meaning, but the spirit, of the Bill of Rights (which reserves freedom of speech as a basic right of the people) represents one of the great demonstrations of the strength and the flexibility of this system we call democracy. This existence of freedom under license (if one can use such anomalous terms in context) has created a continuing atmosphere of strife between the private licensees of broadcasting stations and the Government, which betimes made them licensees.

There has always been a temptation (and always will be) on the part of Government to dominate and dictate; this fact is recognized in the very checks and balances and limitations that have been written in to the charter of this free country. Therefore, if you are to become a broadcaster, you must assume the responsibility of a licensee under a law and regulation you understand; but you must assume also the responsibility of a citizen who will not permit that law or that regulation to be used to intrude even one inch upon the rights of the people in the area of free speech and free press.

It follows, of course, that every student should understand the meaning of these laws and these regulations. There exists in the Communications Act of 1934 (which was passed twenty-five years ago this year and which established a Federal Communications Commission) one phrase that is a favorite of the drafters of legislation. This phrase is: "in the public interest, convenience and necessity." In its context in broadcasting, it is used as a condition under which a broadcaster is granted the license—that condition being that he proposes (in effect, promises) that he will operate "in the public interest."

Now, Student, this phrase has created many problems for broadcasters in the past, and introduced some confusion in the actions of the regulatory body, the FCC. For the phrase, as a term of law, is subject to various interpretations, depending upon the conditions that might prevail at any given time in any given place. It is conceivable, for example, that what may be in the public interest when a great catastrophe takes place might not be in the public interest a thousand miles away, in another community. It is even imaginable that one station may have ninety-nine per cent of its time sold and be doing a superlative job in the public interest, while another—an economic cripple because it does not have enough time sold—may be programming its facilities in such a way that the public interest is not served.

One of the common errors in this connection is an interpretation of the regulations to the effect that the law requires broadcasters to give away a certain percentage of their time, making it available to altruistic or public-service organizations. This is not true. The contributions of time and talent made by broadcasters to public-service organizations (and you hear and see such messages broadcast all the time over stations throughout the nation) represents a *voluntary* effort on the part of the broadcaster to perform adequately, at least, under this requirement that he operate in the public interest—for, patently, it is in the public interest to support most of these efforts. Yet it is true that there is the ever-present peril to the individual broadcaster that his license may be suspended, fail of renewal, or may even be revoked, should there be an independent judgment by the Commission (and subsequently by the Courts, on appeal) that he is not operating in the public interest. This is an unlikely development, and there have been few specific examples of such revocation or suspension in the history of broadcasting.

However, since those earlier days of the so-called "wire fuzzers," broadcasting has taken on the aspects and the responsibilities of a profession; and, as in the case of other professions such as law and medicine, the broadcasters over the years have come to recognize that they cannot operate in a climate of abandoning sensitivity to the interests of the public which they serve. Therefore, they have promulgated codes of ethics (both in radio and in television) intended to establish basic considerations for good performance in programming and advertising.

One of these codes is The Television Code, developed and administered by the National Association of Broadcasters; the other (and, obviously, an older instrument) is the Standards of Good Practice for Radio Broadcasters. Years of intensive study and modification of these documents have provided, at the present time, "rules of the road" which suggest to broadcasters methods by which they may better serve the public interest but, at the same time, recognize the practical aspects of developing a profit that will permit expansion and improvement.

In this respect, our position as broadcasters is not unlike that of educators. We resist the idea of laws abridging our freedom to select programming material and advertising material but we acknowledge that the licensee of such a powerful instrument as ours (comparable to the platform upon which the public educator stands when he voices his opinion) should be determined to operate in good conscience and in full recognition of the public's right. Therefore, it is a system of *self* regulation—and the student aspiring to a career in broadcasting should inform himself thoroughly on the development of these codes and standards, on their meaning, and on the historic evidence of their application . . . .

In the final analysis, the most critically important challenge that broadcasting has is to inform people; I do not mean to educate the people in a formal sense, but to inform them through the regular and accurate reporting of current events, through the scheduling of discussions that will provoke thought and thus illuminate decision, and through the presentation of special features in all of the arts and sciences that will make the great lessons of life palatable and understandable to all of us.

It was during World War II that radio emerged most dramatically as a fundamental system of news and special events reporting serving the American people. Television (in the ten years of its growth in the United States) has performed magnificently in this area, I believe most of us would admit.

Now, in most sections of the country, we see an increasing trend among broadcasters to editorialize on the air about issues of interest to the audiences they serve. This step into the field of public expression of opinion is not being made in a faltering way, but certainly it is attended by a great deal of single-minded purpose on the part of many broadcasters. Some believe editorials should be in the form of one-minute spot announcements; others believe that an issue cannot even be clarified in that much time, let alone interpreted.

Whatever final form editorializing does take on the air, Student, it represents a great new challenge to you—for this instrument in all of its powerful implications of persuasion should never be used to mislead or to reflect only the selfish opinion of a licensee. There is greater need now, therefore, than ever before in the history of broadcasting, for thoughtful, intelligent, and unbiased individuals who will perform their tasks with a high sense of public duty. In turn, this means that the great universities of this nation, in their efforts to prepare young people for broadcasting careers, should be giving full attention to the liberal arts and to the humanities in their curricula; for the successful young person who will emerge as the broadcaster of tomorrow must have a broad, basic knowledge of the affairs of the world, of the complexities of society, and of the ideals toward which free nations throughout the world continue to struggle. . . .

I am presuming that it is a fundamental function of the university to inculcate on the students an appreciation of what we broadly term "the finer things in life." It becomes, therefore, a responsibility of that student (upon graduation and acceptance of a career) to convey some sense of that learning to those with whom he comes in contact in his daily business or professional life.

At the same time, Student, it is well to remember—and those of us among your elders in the broadcasting business should practice it more assiduously—that culture can come to the people through a process of infiltration. For example, if the Bolshoi Ballet were to be performed between the halves of a football game, I don't believe anybody would leave the stadium. . . .

In all of these considerations of the broad problems of American broadcasting, I have left until last the one which, to me, proves the most important and the most compelling. To date, those who have been engaged in broadcasting, in four short decades, have managed to build a billion-dollar industry that consists of over four thousand AM and FM radio stations, over five hundred television stations, seven national radio and television networks, and innumerable regional networks. They have managed to build an industry that has a direct and intimate appeal, almost on a saturation basis, to the American family.

The necessity of their product has been established. Last year eighty-six per cent of the new automobiles manufactured were equipped with radios.

The astounding challenge of the future—implicit in the very size and impact of radio and television—can be only a matter of great and abiding concern for those who, to me, represent the most important people in this pattern of tomorrow, the educators and the students. If we are, in future generations, to win the struggle for freedom and to assure the dignity of man, we must be prepared not only to produce young people who are better educated in the sciences; but we must be prepared also to produce young people who are better qualified to manage and to direct our systems of communication. What you are learning, therefore, Student, at this great university and others, large and small, throughout this nation, must prepare you for the practical problem (if you are going into broadcasting) of being catalysts who may translate the events of the world for the people of this nation in such a fashion that they will understand those events and thus be prepared to make sober judgment. . . .

We need in broadcasting (in a very desperate way) well-trained young people who will take up the burdens—and they will be exciting burdens to assume—of managing the future development and expansion and improvement of American broadcasting.

COMMERCIAL TELEVISION IN JAPAN

By Richard Friedman

Broadcasting trade papers in recent months have devoted an increasing amount of attention to the rapid strides being made by commercial television in various nations abroad. In this issue of the Journal, Richard Friedman presents an intensive analysis of commercial television in Japan, the result of several months' research in that country recently.

Mr. Friedman was a Fulbright scholar studying television in Germany this past year and returned to the United States via Japan in order to learn from first-hand observation what has been transpiring in Japanese television.

UNTIL the end of the Second World War, broadcasting in Japan had always been a state monopoly. The post-war years, however, saw the rise of commercial radio on a large scale, and with this precedent firmly established, there was not much philosophical argument attending the subsequent birth of commercial television in 1952 when Nippon Television Network Co. was granted the first commercial license. The entire industry was created, and is still operated by Japan's four powerful press groups, who alone had the radio-journalistic experience, and the capital necessary for such an enterprise. Although the coexistent national network (Nippon Hoso Kyokai) actually was the first to begin telecasting operations in February of 1953, the Nippon commercial network followed NHK onto the air six months later and started a phenomenon which is still taking place. Six years later, the 93 million inhabitants of this mountainous, California-sized island-chain are supporting 58 national and 44 commercial television stations with an estimated additional 18 stations to commence operations within the coming year. Production of receiving sets also began in 1953, but 1958 production (1,215,859 units) exceeded the combined totals of the five preceding years (1,139,000 units). Because of the reluctance of many set owners to register and pay their state receiver-fees, the exact number of sets in use is not known, but experts place the figure at well over two million. The national advertising budget for last year was as follows:

1 million yen = $2,777.78

TV	10	billion yen
Radio	16	“ “
Newspapers	55	“ “
Magazines	5	“ “
Others	24	“ “
Total	110	billion yen

The estimated budget for this coming year will be:

TV	16	billion yen
Radio	14	“ “
Newspapers	Same	
Magazines	Same	
Others	Will lose	

Estimated total increase of 2.5 billion yen

Because of the increasing number of stations, this considerable increase in television's share of advertising is not as significant as it would appear. Many executives are privately expressing fear that the market is dangerously nearing the saturation point, and foresee an impending era of fierce competition within the medium. In order to understand this fascinating world with its immature advertising agencies, its lack of standard talent agreements, and its ever increasing competition, it would perhaps be well to select and examine a small group of stations which are representative of all the varied network affiliations, philosophies, and regions, and each of which illustrates some unique problems and accomplishments. Before doing so, however, let us establish the common dominator.

Physically, all of the Japanese television stations are well-planned, well-built, efficient, and decidedly attractive. Within these modern structures is the very latest in technical equipment, most of it built by Japanese firms—under American license when necessary. Most, if not all, of the top executives and engineers have received training in the United States, and have consequently been strongly influenced by the American medium. In regard to personnel, the average key or big-city station has around 600 employees. Upon going into operation, the new stations hired a large "cadre" from established stations, and completed their staffs with recent university graduates. New personnel are continually procured from among the newly graduated, particularly those who major in Journalism or an allied field. Broadcasting courses are offered by many Journalism departments, but there is to date still no department of Broadcasting as such. There are also no university stations as yet. Although armed with a degree, the applicant for employment must pass a station-administered examination to determine his ability and aptitudes. Following this eminently fair procedure, he is questioned as to his particular interests, and an attempt is actually made to place him in his area of preference. The successful applicant is then sent to the key network station for two to three months of on-the-job training. When he returns, he joins the company union—each station has its own—and can pursue his career without fear of arbitrary discharge. On occasion, a station will go to great lengths to place an employee where he will be most content. Tokyo's largest station, discovering that one of its young men had extraordinary aptitude and love for plants, tacitly allowed him to assume command of the station greenhouse and the supply, care, and arrangement of all plantlife in both office and set. Everyone was quite satisfied with the results; in the words of his division chief, "he has a real feel for it, and does an excellent job." Chuckle as one might, the atmosphere within these stations is one of relaxed alertness, competence, purposefulness, courtesy, and self-discipline.

The telecast day, while not uniform, begins at various hours in the morning and ends before midnight, with a mid-afternoon pause which key stations utilize for testing their color television equipment. The stations also share a common programing problem arising from the government's currency control policy. According to this policy, each network is allowed to import, at a fixed price, only nine syndicated half-hour weekly series per year. This policy is not entirely motivated by currency considerations, but also by an understandable desire to encourage the still infant Japanese television film industry. However, because the domestic films are still prohibitively expensive, and the foreign films limited, the result has been that with a variation of only 5% in either direction, *all* Japanese station carry 75% of their programs "live."

Now let us consider six sample key stations, each with its own problems, specialties, alliances, and competitive tactics. In so doing, we might also examine some of the more pertinent divisions or departments in each case.

One begins, of course, in Tokyo; as is the case with Paris, it is the governmental, financial, cultural, and entertainment capital of the country. In this metropolis of nine million, the six available channels have been allocated and are all operating. In addition to three key commercial stations, there is a national entertainment channel, a national educational channel, and a private *commercial* educational station. Largest of the commercial stations is Radio Tokyo's JOKR-TV, which is jointly owned by the Asahi and Mainichi press groups, with Asahi having the controlling interest. This company, incidentally, was the first in Japan to engage in simulcasting. Somewhere around 80% of the country's top performing talent is centered in Tokyo, and not surprisingly, this "flagship" station specializes in drama. Its exclusive favorable contracts with the best performers give its entire network an almost inassailable position in this respect. As might be expected, the resultant demands and high rate of turnover have called for an extremely well-organized and highly standardized art-set-prop department. All set panels are fully interchangeable, and only greys between 3 and 4 on the scale are used in painting them. The department's craftsmen are particularly skilled at creating extremely realistic miniature and masking sets, in record time and without the aid of drawings. The department chief estimates that he operates on one-fifth of the budget allowed his American colleagues.

Also located in Tokyo is the Nippon Television Network's flagship station JOAX-TV, holder of Japan's first telecasting license. The network is owned by the Yomiuri Press, which enjoys exclusive rights in the giant Tokyo stadium. This means that the station and its network have a virtual monopoly on all major sporting events, particularly on Japan's national and favorite sport, baseball. This powerful competitive asset is quite naturally exploited to the utmost, and the rival networks freely concede superiority in this respect. The station's greatest rival has commenced a long-term stadium building project of its own in hopes of at least breaking the monopoly, but it will be several years before it is in any position even to challenge it. JOAX-TV is earning higher profits than JOKR-TV, and attributes this to its *not* being a simulcasting operation. Another of the station's strong points is its news service; it maintains four remote units in Tokyo, permanent field-crews in all parts of the country, and also has newsreel exchange agreements with other nations. The large, newspaper-style "city-room" produces six newcasts per day, so planned that the affiliates can add their own local coverage.

345 miles southwest of Tokyo, in the heart of Japan's industrial "Midlands," lies the nation's second city of Osaka with its 2,700,000 inhabitants. Osaka dominates not only the industrial and commercial center of Japan, but also a good portion of the great central agricultural plain and the northern reaches of the Inland Sea fishery.

JOBX-TV is operated by Osaka Television Broadcasting Corporation, and belongs to the Asahi-Mainichi network. Like its sister station in Tokyo, JOKR-TV, it is dominated by the larger controlling Asahi interest. The relationship between the two stations is, however, not quite comparable to the network-affiliate relationship as it exists in the United States. It must be borne in mind that the Osaka station enjoys tremendous financial backing, and that the great press groups themselves had their origins in this city. The station is large, enterprising, anything but a passive affiliate; it is interesting to note that it even beat Tokyo in acquiring Japan's first Ampex videotape recorder. What makes JOBX-TV dependent on Tokyo to a high degree, however, is the previously mentioned talent situation. The facts are these; the strength of the entire network lies in its drama monopoly, and the Tokyo area is a Mecca to *four* times as much talent as is Osaka. This means that JOBX-TV must take *two thirds* of its programing from Tokyo. For the Osaka situation, this is not the most pleasing arrangement, and it is endeavoring to solve the problem by cultivating its own local stock.

Like Tokyo's JOAX-TV, Osaka's JOIX-TV belongs to the Yomiuri network and shares its sport monopoly. It has deliberately kept its staff quite small, each of the 230 employees performing two or even three functions. The station shares the same talent problem which plagues all Osaka stations, but the general manager has proposed to the network a plan for a "talent-pool" from which all members can draw. As a representative "sports" station, it is significant that JOIX-TV feels a pressing need for really good television sportscasters. Most of those presently employed came from radio, many from the national network, and they themselves acknowledge some difficulty in converting. An interesting division is that of "Administration, Management, and Accounting," an extremely powerful and complex organ. It either handles or must finally approve *all* financial affairs, and most general matters as well, ranging from operating expenses to employee welfare. The executive in charge of this division was formerly managing director of the Yomiuri Press, but even this most able and experienced man finds himself dealing with "too many different kinds of tasks." Then too, because the station is relatively new, he must prepare and submit a budget every three months. Another highly developed division is that of Research, its chief a veteran of thirty years with Japan's biggest investment firm. His staff is composed of university graduates holding degres in economics, psychology, and even literature, and includes six individuals who do nothing but monitor all transmissions and sign the logs. The division is divided into three departments: 1) Research, 2) Sales Projects, 3) Monitoring. Audience research is the division's major task, and surveys are made quarterly using the "telephone," "door-to-door," and "test audience" methods. The resultant survey includes all the competition in the area, but the figures remain secret. The Sales Projects department is faced with the problems of determining what sort of sponsor should be solicited for a given program. Because of the immaturity of the advertising agencies, this, together with audience research, devolves upon the individual situation. JOIX-TV has even more problems than average, in that it was assigned the area's "semi-educational" channel, meaning that it must devote 20%

and 30% of its programing to "education" and "culture" respectively. Here, of course, one encounters the old and familiar problem of definition. What differentiates the "educational" from the "cultural," or either from the "entertaining"? And assuming one has roughly classified them, how does one *sell* them? "Sales Projects" tries, and with some degree of success. The morning educational programs intended for a schoolroom audience, is sponsored by leading book shops, while programs of a similar nature but intended for home consumption are supported by a confectionary company.

Osaka's third and newest station is JODX-TV, belonging to the Kansai Telecasting Corporation. Here we find a development which is unique in several ways. A member of Japan's newest networks, JODX-TV went into operation several months *before* its Tokyo "parent" JOCX-TV (Fuji Telecasting Co. Ltd.). The network itself is unique in that it represents the first capital participation in television on the part of the Japanese motion picture industry. Up to this point the film producers had displayed only fear and emnity in their attitude toward the rival medium. In this enterprise, the Sankei Press was joined by the Daiei and Toei motion picture companies and the powerful Hankyu theater chain. The advantages inherent in such a relationship are quite obvious; the network has exclusive rights to much theatrical and television film, and the motion picture industry has an assured outlet for its product. Furthermore, the theater interest provides a monopoly on the great spectaculars (Kabuki, etc.) which are telecast direct from the stage. This combination of the best in films with the best from the stage represents a truly formidable competitive asset.

Fukuoka, at the opposite end of the island-studded Inland Sea is located on the south-westernmost island of Kyushu. It is as far again from Osaka as Osaka from Tokyo. The area is heavily industrial and commercial, but the ownership and top management is almost exclusively Tokyo or Osaka centered. Up to the moment, there has been only one commercial television station in the area, but two other networks are preparing to move in very shortly. This station, JOFR-TV, belongs to the Mainichi network which was established by the press group in order to offset its minority interest in the Asahi-Mainichi operation. Although, as in the previously mentioned case of JOIX-TV Osaka, there are individual "semi-educational" stations, the Mainichi is the only example of an entire network being allocated such a burden. Here then is a station operating under such restrictions in an area of only 150,000 sets in use (it will double this year), and facing competition from two rivals in this relatively small market. The problem is further complicated by the absentee advertising accounts. Let us see how JOFR-TV and its enterprising general manager are meeting these challenges.

Technically, the station is armed with the best and latest equipment, with a relay station at Kanmon (JOFO-TV), and with an excellent micro-wave linkage to the main island. The four major stations on the central island of Shikoku all joined the Yomiuri network out of micro-wave considerations. Then too, as a simulcasting operation JOFR-TV is well established, and exerts considerable influence over a wide area. Because of its technical and financial connections to Asahi-Mainichi's Tokyo station, the Fukuoka station enjoys the same superior dramatic programing. The second programing strength lies in sports, and can be attributed to the fact that one of the three immensely popular annual "Sumo" wrestling tournaments are held in this city. On these occasions, JOFR-TV feeds into the network. The material taken from the network, however, constitutes 60% of its total programing, while "local-live" and film each account for another 20%. It is apparent that this station employs a comparatively well-balanced, strong, yet flexible program policy. Nevertheless, only 75% of this programing is commercially sponsored, the other 25% being for the most part educational in nature and rather difficult to sell. This is not to say, however, that all the educational programing is sustaining; sponsorship has been found for some, although at present the strongest support comes from the giant Yawata Iron Works, incidentally one of the station's largest shareholders. With Yawata in the breach, JOFR-TV is exploring every possible method of closing the gap. In the opinion of management, the key to this problem as well as to the problems of absentee accounts and forthcoming keen competition lies in research and public-relations. For this reason, the two departments occupy a position of high importance, and are becoming increasingly active. All survey methods are used, and a monthly report is prepared and sent to each sponsor, of whom only 10% are located in the Fukuoka area. Furthermore, upon the request of any sponsor, the research department will make a special report on particular audience segments. In addition to this, a big survey is made quarterly using 500 sample television families chosen from among the area's 22,000. The sample families are changed quarterly. Management is not content with a mere "rating" system, but is now venturing into difficult and little-known waters, with an attempt to assess advertising effect. The first report of this sort is in the process of completion. Another powerful competitive tactic is the station's rate card which, with the cooperation of the entire network, is prepared to offer some very attractive packages. Here is an example:

TIME: 5 stations, class "A" time, 4 half-hours per week, *one month* (8 hrs.)

ALSO: All production costs, talent fees, *everything included.*

PRICE: (in dollars) $21,333.35 per month

Most unique of all Japanese commercial operations is Tokyo's JOEX-TV, the first commercial television station in the world to place exclusive emphasis on *educational* and *cultural* programing. Prior to its formal opening on February first of this year, the only existing station with a similar type of programing was one of the national network's two Tokyo channels (JOAB-TV). JOEX-TV is operated by the Nippon Educational Television Company which is capitalized at 600 million yen, much of it furnished by three large motion picture corporations. The telecasts are transmitted from the new Tokyo TV Tower (highest in the world) with a video output of 10 kilowatts and an audio output of 5 kilowatts, and cover the entire central (Kanto) area of the nation. NET's motto is: "Enjoyable, educational, and cultural programs and sound recreational programs." During the morning hours the station transmits special school programs, and in the afternoon, recreational programs are telecast for housewives. Children programs are presented during the evening and recreational programs at night. Occupational training and correspondence courses are shown after 10 p. m. Educational programing comprises 50 percent of the total air time: cultural programing, 30 percent, and news and miscellaneous, 20 percent. JOEX-TV faces stiff competition from the established commercial channels, and it plans to meet this by presenting recreational programs during the peak class "A" hours. Will this interesting experiment be financially successful? Sponsors are still uncertain about its reception by the public, but have nevertheless bought 80 percent of the initial schedule.

As this article goes to press, it has already become an historical account. The present phase of rapid development and explosive physical expansion is drawing to a close as the available channels are filled, and will be followed by a period of intense competition within the medium. The advertising agencies will come of age and will assume most of the market and audience research, and a talent pool can also be expected in the near future. Japanese television film will undoubtedly improve in quality, but if the government lifts the monetary controls, there will be a considerable, if more selective, demand for the American product. There are also excellent indications that the Japanese industry will be among the leaders in the forthcoming era of international television, and that the finest in Japanese production will shortly begin to appear on American television screens.

BROADCASTING IN THE 1956 OREGON SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN

By Duane E. Tucker

Broadcasting figured prominently in the key senatorial race of 1956 which determined the control of the United State Senate. This became the subject of investigation by Professor Tucker for his doctoral dissertation. The following article was based upon his research findings, especially edited for the Journal.

Dr. Tucker received his Ph.D in 1958 while on the staff of Oregon State University and is now on the regular faculty of the Department of Speech at Bowling Green State University.

THE 1956 Oregon senatorial battle between incumbent Democratic Senator Wayne Morse and Republican Douglas McKay excited interest from Portland, Oregon, to Portland, Maine. One national news magazine rated it "next only to the presidential contest as the fight of the year."[1]

The race had the elements for a dramatic event. Wayne Morse was acknowledged the nation's chief critic of the nation's most popular candidate, President Dwight Eisenhower. The national GOP was anxious to blunt his nettlesome needle. In addition, the Republicans were concerned over the possibility that Eisenhower might fail to carry a Congressional majority with him into Washington for his second term. The Morse-McKay contest was one of several key Senate races which the GOP were determined to win in order to capture control of the Senate. With Wayne Morse's defection to the Democratic Party and Oregon's Richard Neuberger's 1954 victory over Republican incumbent Guy Cordon the Democratic majority in the Senate was 49 to 47.

The drama of the race was intensified in Oregon where certain Republican leaders had developed a distaste for Morse's liberal views during his first term in the Senate. His defection from the party in 1952, dramatized by his vituperous attack on Eisenhower, and his later charges against Douglas McKay's administration of the Department of the Interior, crystallized their bitterness toward him. The Oregon Republican Party set the retirement of Wayne Morse from the Senate as their first order of business in 1956.

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[1] *Time*, March 19, 1956, p. 25.

For Senator Morse this was the crucial campaign of his career. It would answer the question politically-minded citizens had been asking since his renunciation of Republicanism: Can Wayne Morse recoup his political fortunes which he seemed to squander with such profligacy? The energy with which he waged his 1956 campaign suggested he, too, was anxious about the answer. His advertising counsel, Earl Heims of Portland, told the writer the Senator was "running scared."

This, then, was an intense election contest, an expensive contest. One of the most expensive Senate races in the nation, it cost McKay and his backers some $229,800 and the Morse forces $264,167.[2] With funds of this size available, one might assume the candidates' relative reliance on the various media of persuasion would be determined more by estimated effectiveness of each than by their costs. Thus, the Morse-McKay campaign offers the student of political broadcasting a useful case study of the relative estimates two experienced and successful major politicians and their advisers made of television's and radio's power to win votes.

While television had been a strong factor for the first time in the national elections of 1952, it was not recognized as a significant campaign instrument in Oregon until the elections of 1956. The reason is simple. Television was late coming to Oregon. Portland, its major city with 409,420 of the state's million and a half people, gained its first station (the first ultra-high frequency station in the nation) September 17, 1952. Its first very high facility arrived in October, 1953. By general election time in 1956 six stations and one satellite were on the air—three in Portland, one each in Medford, Klamath Falls and Eugene, with the Eugene station's satellite in Roseburg, all except the Klamath Falls station in the western one-third of Oregon.

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[2] Figures provided the writer by Freeman Holmer, then director of the Oregon State Bureau of Elections, Sept., 1958.

Some use had been made of television in the 1954 U.S. Senate election campaign by state senator Richard Neuberger and incumbent Senator Guy Cordon. But greater emphasis was placed on radio which had virtually complete penetration of the state with a high percentage of set ownership and a lower rate card. Television was still somewhat of a novelty at that time. The number of television families was still relatively small. At the end of 1952 only 44,457 TV sets had been shipped to Oregon dealers. That number was nearly doubled in 1953 and again in 1954. By the end of the first quarter of 1956 total sets shipped to Oregon dealers had reached 331,388.[3]

Both the Morse and McKay staffs rejected Republican National Chairman Leonard Hall's enthusiasm for political television. "TV has changed the course of campaigns,"[4] Hall declared, and announced that the President's 1956 campaign would be waged on the picture tube.

"As far as I'm concerned we are still going on the basis that he will make five or six TV appearances. Nothing more is expected of him." With some deference to the need for regional appearances by Mr. Eisenhower he further announced that some of these television addresses would originate in "different parts of the country."[5]

William Harlan Hale reported:

> In the presidential campaign . . . the apostles of victory through air power are the strategists of the Republican party, wedded to electronic missiles as their primary weapons.[6]

The national Democratic Party, meanwhile, was reluctant to risk everything on television. "Television alone can't do the job," said the chief of the party's National Committee TV branch, Jack Christie. He claimed that "there's no substitute for the candidate's going around meeting people face to face and discussing the regional issues."[7]

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[3] Radio-Electronics-Television Manufacturers Association figures in *Television Factbook*, No. 23, Fall and Winter, 1956, p. 425.

[4] Charles A. H. Thomson, *Television and Presidential Politics*, 1956, p. 137.

[5] Portland *Oregonian*, May 2, 1956.

[6] William Harlan Hales, "The Politicians Try Victory Through Air

Morse and McKay would have agreed with Christie. While they and their advisers welcomed television as "a very powerful and politically compensative campaign medium,"[8] it did not significantly alter their traditional methods. Senator Morse said:

> The availability of television in 1956 did not in any way cause me to campaign differently than I did in 1944 or 1950, except that I also campaigned through the medium of television as well.[9]

Indeed, as the Senator said, he gave "many more so-called stump speeches in 1956" than in 1944 or 1950.

Interior Secretary McKay and his advisers believed that political television had been over-rated as to size of audience. And McKay claimed that television was not an adequate substitute for face-to-face campaigning. He told the writer:

> Eisenhower, for example, is a thousand times better in the flesh. On TV he never looks as good as first hand. Just seeing him drive down the street, as about 100,000 people did in Portland (October 18, 1956) stimulates people, makes them feel good and smile and talk about him.[10]

Hence, in the Morse-McKay campaign the broadcast media were used as part of the total arsenal of presuasive weapons, taking their places with public speeches, coffee hours and handshaking tours, newspapers, billboards, and the other paraphenalia of the all-out campaign—lapel buttons, pamphlets, speech and statement reprints, and the prize-winning angel food cake recipe of Mrs. McKay.

In translating his theory of the political effectiveness of television and radio into practice, Senator Morse approved the following expenditures for broadcast time:

Power," *The Reporter*, Sept. 6, 1956, p. 16.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Wayne Morse in a letter to the writer, Washington, D.C., Jan. 22, 1958.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Douglas McKay in an interview with the writer, Salem, Oregon, Dec. 4, 1956.

Approximate television total	$38,000
Programs	12,000
Spot announcements	26,000
Approximate radio total	$32,000
Programs	9,000
Spot announcements	23,000
Total time cost	$70,000[11]

A larger sum was spent for McKay's broadcast campaign, but with significantly different allocations for programs and spot announcements:

Television time total	$37,537
Programs	7,160
Spot announcements	30,377
Radio time total	$45,487
Programs	4,847
Spot announcements	40,640
Total time cost	$83,024.[12]

In addition, the Joseph R. Gerber agency listed $5,808 for television production cost and $5,123 for radio production, both these production costs being assigned only to spot announcements. The Heims agency provided no estimate of production charges for the Morse campaign, but an informed guess would place them as high as McKay's, for while Morse's use of spot announcements was less extensive than his opponent's, he would have incurred considerable expense in the production of certain television programs such as a half-hour color film documentary.

An interpretation of the meaning of the relative reliance on programs and spot announcements by the two candidates is included in the ensuing discussion of their broadcast strategies.

While Wayne Morse stayed in Washington, D.C., throughout virtually all the primary election campaign, Douglas McKay and his chief contender for the Republican senatorial nomination, Phil Hitchcock, both loosed the force of their rhetoric upon him. By the end of the primary the McKay strategy for the big battle in the Fall was clear: (1) put Morse on the defensive by attacking his "political morality" and Senate record and making it the number one issue and (2) give McKay a firm seat on the Eisenhower coat-tail by capitalizing on the President's warm endorsement of him as a Senate candidate and identifying him with the "successes" of the Eisenhower administration in such matters as foreign policy, prosperity, economy in government, lower taxes, and restriction of federal interference in state government and in private enterprise. McKay was presented to the voters as an effective member of Eisenhower's "team" who, as a U. S. Senator, would help assure the continued success of the President's programs. Referring to Senator Morse, Secretary McKay announced in Washington before returning to Oregon for the primary campaign:

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[11] Photostatic copy of a letter from Earl Heims advertising agency, Portland, to Senator Morse, Feb. 17, 1958.

[12] Figures released to the writer by the Joseph R. Gerber advertising agency, Portland.

> I am coming back home to bring to a showdown in Oregon the question of whether the president's program is to be jeopardized in the future by those seeking personal gratification and notoriety at the expense of the national welfare.[13]

A sizzling attack on Morse helped make the Senator himself the prime issue of the McKay general election campaign.

The primary had given Senator Morse a vivid preview of Republican tactics he must contend with from July until November. He patterned his strategy, however, not so much in reaction to McKay's as after the manner of his campaigning throughout his senatorial career. Not accustomed to slipping onto the defensive, he avoided that awkward position in this campaign. He chose his own issues to argue as he had always done, and he had a faculty for divining the problems that disturbed his constituents: price supports for eastern Oregon wheat ranchers and western Oregon dairymen; forest access roads, an adequate boxcar supply, and new timber inventories for lumbering men; better port facilities for coastal shippers; fiscal advantages for small businessmen; easier credit for construction tradesmen and farmers; more cheap hydro-electric power for industrialists. He rounded out his issue repertoire with the more universal problems of social security, federal aid to education, taxes, foreign policy, national defense.

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[13] *Oregon Voter*, March 17, 1956, p. 4.

Summing up this strategy in the first public speech of his campaign August 4, he declared:

> From now on to November 6, Wayne Morse is going to talk issues . . . . I intend to take the issues to the opposition from this opening day of my campaign right through November 6.

This is not to say that Senator Morse ignored his opponent. He had long believed the public likes a scrapper, and at the hustings he gave them some of what they liked, indeed, what they expected of him. But his jabs at Mr. McKay were in terms of the issues throughout most of the campaign, and they did not dominate his public speeches.

On radio and television he seemed virtually oblivious of his adversary, choosing rather to do battle with the Eisenhower administration on major domestic and foreign policy issues. Two and a half weeks before election day, however, he responded to Republican attacks, devoting a five-minute telecast in Portland to a counter-attack on Douglas McKay, his first broadcast of the campaign aimed exclusively at the Secretary.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the Morse broadcast campaign was its variety of approach to the voter. It ranged from an elaborately-produced thirty-minute documentary film, "Wayne Morse of Oregon," to the simple five-minute talk and spot announcement.

Heart of the air campaign was the five-minute speech on both radio and television. Morse gave these reasons for devoting "a considerable proportion" of his television broadcasts to these short speeches:

> . . . in my opinion the average voter will give careful attention and consideration to a 5-minute campaign appeal, but will frequently turn to an entertainment program in place of any longer political program . . . . it is my opinion that only a relatively small number of longer speeches should be given and the television medium should be used for short, concise, and condensed

> statements of a candidate's position on a single issue at a time.

Furthermore, he said:

> It was much easier to obtain from the television stations a 5-minute period at a good program time than it was to schedule a 15 or 30-minute program at an hour that would reach a large number of people.[14]

Among the assortment of program types with which Senator Morse campaigned were: "Reporters' Roundup," half-hour filmed press interview program for Facts Forum by Washington Video Productions for weekly release on 125 television stations coast-to-coast; a forty-minute address on all national television and radio networks from the Democratic National Convention in Chicago; a quarter-hour dialogue taped and filmed for radio and television between Morse and Robert Holmes, Democratic candidate for governor of Oregon; a live fifteen-minute conversation on a Portland television station with Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt; a ten-minute telecast in which he was joined by Mrs. Morse in an interview by an announcer; a half-hour filmed panel discussion with Edith Green, incumbent U.S. Representative from Oregon, Robert Holmes, and a Portland PTA leader; half-hour question-and-answer telecasts in which Morse accepted queries telephoned to the studios by viewers; a fifteen-minute extemporaneous speech broadcast live on television. Final telecast was a documentary film summing up the Morse campaign and ending with a live appearance by the Senator and his wife.

While Senator Morse concentrated on public issues, supporters took the air both to praise him and blame McKay. Clinton Anderson, U.S. Senator from New Mexico, made a fifteen-minute television film defending his colleague against McKay charges of ineffectiveness and excessive garrulity in Washington. Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee defended Morse's tax policies affecting the logging business in a taped radio talk distributed around the state. Richard Neuberger, junior U.S. Senator from Oregon, roamed the state as a sort of political paladin defending Democratic candidates and slashing at the Eisenhower administration and Douglas McKay.

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[14] Letter from Senator Morse to the Writer, Washington, D.C., Jan. 22, 1958.

Perhaps the most effective defense of Morse's political morality (while the Senator remainded aloof from the caterwauling) was an *apologia* by former Oregon State Democratic chairman Howard Morgan. His television and radio talk, "One Man . . . . Two Parties," was advertised in the press as "The engrossing story of how a liberal senator experienced gradual disillusionment with the private interest leanings of his party leaders . . . . how finally, out of loyalty to his principles, he left the Republicans and found fulfillment in the Democratic ranks."

Time purchases for television were concentrated primarily in the early evening segments between 5:55 and 8:00 and the late evening periods between 10:15 and 11:15. Radio broadcasts were scheduled during the noon hour and through the early evening hours. In February Morse had promised to buy his broadcast time through the state Democratic Party, co-operating in pool buying with all Democratic candidates to get cheaper rates. The Morse staff reserved more air time than they used. Because of a lack of funds they cancelled a good deal of radio time early in October, but during the last two weeks of the campaign they increased radio and TV time purchase "in order to offset the political 'blitzkrieg' that the Middle East crisis had created nationwide." As a result, the Senator ended the campaign with a "substantial deficit." [15]

To carry on his extensive public speaking schedule he was forced to film certain television programs and record many radio programs. He would have preferred live broadcasts on television and radio, partly because filmed telecasts tended to be of inferior technical quality.

While much of his radio campaign consisted of tape recordings of television speeches and interviews, one important type of radio broadcast was not duplicated on television. Some of his public addresses in such towns as Corvallis and Eugene were recorded in their entirety for later broadcast on a local station. On at least one occasion the forum period following the address was also aired.

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[15] *Ibid.* Israel had invaded Egypt, followed by British and French invasion forces.

The strategy of the McKay broadcast campaign was influenced by certain of his advertisers' evaluation of him as a television personality of limited effectiveness. In the first place it influenced the relative expenditures for broadcast time and for other advertising media. The approach to the use of radio and television was somewhat conservative, with time and production costs for television constituting fifty percent of the amount spent in newspapers and costs for radio amounting to fifty-nine per cent of newspaper costs. Had McKay been a more skillful and appealing television performer a higher proportion of total campaign funds would been used for program time, according to political experts of the Gerber agency. Lack of confidence in McKay on the picture tube influenced them to place greater reliance on spot announcements in comparison with programs than did the Morse staff. Also, after their experience with Mr. McKay in fifteen-minute speech telecasts during the primary campaign, they concluded that he would be more effective if limited to five-minute appearances. One of them told the writer that McKay could not sustain his affable, likeable maner for fifteen minutes, that after about five minutes on the air he got tense, losing his more ingratiating traits. The McKay campaign, then, like Morse's, was waged in large part in five-minute segments, partly to adapt to the nature of the candidate and partly because the McKay strategists also believed that straight political talk could not compete wih entertainment for more than five minutes at a time.

Somewhat less varied in program type than Morse's, McKay's television campaign stayed in the studio almost exclusively and trained its live cameras on people talking, singly and in combination. He began the television phase of his campaign to unseat Wayne Morse on July 31, more than a month before the Senator started his formal broadcast schedule. The radio series was held until September 10. Phil Hitchcock, the man McKay defeated in the primary, opened the television offensive with a five-minute talk offering a picture of Republican unity to the split party. The next four of these capsule addresses renewed the attack of the primary campaign on Senator Morse. Three of them were given by McKay, who then turned the burden of the case against the Senator over to his spokesmen, while he concentrated primarily on Eisenhower as guarantor of world peace, on smaller government, and on lower taxes for the remainder of the broadcast campaign.

Part of the McKay strategy was to reinforce his own appearances with broadcasts by his supporters who were selected from several major sections of Oregon life—working men, farmers, conservationists, government figures, sportsmen, journalists, women and youth. Representatives from these groups lauded McKay and castigated Morse. And both they and the Secretary pressed the loud pedal on the theme that a vote for Morse would be a vote against Eisenhower.

McKay appeared on less than half the television programs broadcast in Portland. Of these thirty-two broadcasts he was seen on fourteen. In nine of these he appeared alone; in one Paul Ewing, his press secretary, joined him as interlocutor. In the remainder he was featured with partisans.

Besides the five-minute talks, the McKay staff used two types of fifteen-minute talk programs: one in which McKay appeared with supporters and the other in which his supporters appeared in discussion panels without him.

Typical of the former was a telecast featuring the newly-appointed Secretary of the Interior, Fred Seaton, and Bob Mautz, Republican National Committeeman from Oregon, who moderated the scripted "discussion." Mr. Seaton's task was to scotch the argument that: 1) Douglas McKay had failed as Secretary, and 2) Seaton's appointment was a repudiation of resource policies instituted by the Eisenhower administration.

Attempting to capitalize on his overwhelming Oregon newspaper support, McKay's strategists scheduled two quarter-hour television panel discussions featuring such editors as Bernard Mainwaring of the Salem *Capital Journal*. Only partially scripted, the programs let the editors express freely their estimates of the Senatorial candidates and read from selected editorials in other papers. The broadcasts offered an impressive marshalling of journalistic opinion which held little brief for the incumbent Senator.

Mr. McKay tried one question-and-answer program, a type which Senator Morse had used effectively. Instead of taking his questions from a battery of telephones, as the Senator did, he took them from letters. Instead of extemporizing his answers, he read them from the teleprompter. Paul Ewing was moderator.

McKay's advisers feared an unscripted broadcast by Mr. McKay. Hence, whether speaking alone or with associates he read his lines. Most of his programs and speeches were written by his anonymous chief campaign strategist, a veteran public relations counsel whose avocation for many years was political campaign management.

Sole use of a television documentary by the McKay forces was a quarter-hour film prepared for the national Republican Party. "Decision for Tomorrow," a film on Republican "progress and prosperity" with narration by the voice of the "March of Time," Westbrook Van Voorhies, was presented on television stations in Portland, Eugene, Medford, and Klamath Falls. McKay made a film insert for inclusion in the last three minutes of the program.

One major television production show ended the McKay campaign. Taking the last twenty-five minutes before the national Republican Party's hour-long election eve production, the McKay strategists made the same appeal as it did—a strong bandwagon appeal impressing voters with the tremendous number of persons enthusiastically supporting their candidate. A large studio was fitted out as a campaign nerve center with a wall-size map of Oregon on which young women fastened rectangles of paper bearing names and addresses of McKay supporters who telephoned or telegraphed their wishes for a McKay victory throughout the telecast. The scene was sur-charged with activity as the emcee, Jennings Pierce, former West Coast NBC executive, interviewed partisans (who supposedly "just dropped in" to urge Mr. McKay to victory) and introduced film clips featuring McKay supporters in various areas of the state reporting to him on his chances for election.

In attempting to place the two broadcast campaigns on a comparative scale of effectiveness we consider three principal aspects of them: 1) the grand strategy; 2) the use of the media to communicate it; and 3) the performances of the candidates on the air with emphasis on television.

Informed observers of the campaigns generally agreed that Senator Morse's overall strategy was the more effective. Political experts were backed by evidence produced by a study of voter opinion in their belief that the main issue was the candidates themselves and the non-personal issues were secondary in the minds of Oregon voters.[16] Morse made the more astute appeal both as a political personality and in his choice of vital non-personal issues. His skill in choosing issues was noted by persons who believed he caught the mood of the people in the campaign by appealing to their dissatisfactions. Furthermore, he exhibited considerable percipience in using these dissatisfactions to focus attention on himself. He won the interests of his audiences with vital issues; he won their confidence in him as their representative by putting himself in the middle of every issue, by offering voters a *person* to have faith in and a personal program to relieve their disquieting circumstances. In a Morse speech there was always a clear explanation of the problem and a positive, clear-cut course of action to solve it. While many would perhaps disagree with his solution, they visualized him as a leader of courage and ability who would guarantee the ultimate triumph of the people's welfare. As Wendell Wyatt, chairman of the Oregon Republican Party, commented after the campaign:

> . . . it would appear to me that Senator Morse was successful in selling the illusion that he was a man of great political independence and courage and that therefore a

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[16] Wilbur R. Hubbard, Attitude Research and Development, Portland. This firm made a state-wide voter opinion study for Senator Morse during the summer preceding the election.

> number of people voted for him in spite of whether they agreed with him.[17]

Wayne Morse thus gave further evidence that an election could be won using serious issues as the medium by which the right image of a candidate could be drawn, an image that would conform to the public image of a desirable political personality.

On the other hand, the concensus was that McKay's strategy was faulty because its transcendent tone was negative, so far as McKay as a political personality was concerned. True, he attacked Morse effectively, creating doubts in many minds about his political integrity and effectiveness. Irvin Adams, manager of radio station KGON, Oregon City, could not understand why the attack failed.[18] Others offered reasons why it did. One Portland advertising agency man said: "The attacks upon Morse continued too long and too heavily."[19] A Republican citizen believed the attacks were making a martyr of the Senator.[20] And a woman radio listener in The Dalles wrote her editor after hearing McKay's first broadcast of the primary campaign: "Why do the politicians want to harp on their opponents? Why not speak for themselves?"[21]

Where it was successful the campaign against Morse as a person may have created a vacuum for many voters which McKay failed to fill. If Morse should be eliminated, who should take his place? If his solutions to the farm problem, the slump in the lumber industry, the recession among certain small businesses could not and should not be effected by Morse, what would McKay substitute for them? He offered faith in the Eisenhower administration, faith that present "peace, progress, and prosperity" would continue and improve if Morse were not allowed to thwart the Eisenhower program. McKay did not offer the voters adequate proof that he had the stature to replace Morse nor a personal program to take the place of Morse's. As the political advertising specialist quoted above said: "The attempt to build up McKay as a personality and as senatorial material foundered until too late. The latter was weak even at best." He went on to say: "As proved true nationally, there was too much of hanging onto the President's coat-tails. Voters like a man who will stand by himself and for himself."

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[17] Personal letter to the writer from Wendall Wyatt, Portland, Jan. 7, 1957.

[18] Interview with the writer, Salem, Dec., 1956.

[19] Personal letter to the writer, Dec. 5, 1956.

[20] Jim Corwin, letter to the editor, Corvallis *Gazette-Times*, Oct. 16, 1956.

[21] Mrs. Bearl Stewart, letter to the editor, *Oregon Journal*, Portland, May 5, 1956.

The weakness in the McKay campaign was well stated in the Jim Corwin letter:

> In spite of my affection for McKay, I have the impression that the mass of voters are being mesmerized by the vitriolic controversy about Senator Morse, while Mr. McKay wanders around in the afterglow.

As for the second item in the evaluation of the two campaigns—the overall use of the broadcast media—the Morse staff apparently staged a better show on the whole. Bill McCready, general manager of KVAL-TV, Eugene, thought they did a smarter job of time buying film production, and general management of their air campaign than the McKay staff.[22]

In certain respects, however, the two campaigns were similar. Both staffs put the burden on persuasion on the five-minute talk program. Both used supporters talking for the candidates.

But in reliance on the power of the candidate himself to attract votes the Morse campaign exceeded McKay's. The Senator appeared on more radio and television programs and in a greater variety of situations than McKay. In showmanship Morse's air campaign generally surpassed his opponent's.

However, if the Morse broadcast campaign was more versatile and magnetic, it was not because of any widely differing theory of the use of radio and television in political persuasion between the two campaign staffs. The McKay staff used the media as they thought they could with the talent available, not in all cases as they would have liked. From McKay down the Republican speakers were less articulate than Morse and his spokesmen. One top Republican strategist would have liked to run some special television productions, but the McKay staff had no writers and directors to handle them. He believed short speeches, a saturation of spots plus special productions constituted the best television campaign. Of the Morse productions he said the "Wayne Morse of Oregon" documentary was effective and that Morse has no equal in the country on question-and-answer broadcasts.

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[22] Interview with the writer, Salem, Dec., 1956.

We turn finally to the broadcast speaking of the candidates, with emphasis upon television.

In the eyes of friend and foe alike Douglas McKay is not in the same rank with Wayne Morse as a public speaker. Morse at his best is an orator both feared and respected for his persuasive powers, albeit there have been times when some have found him platitudinous and dull. McKay, conversely, is simply not thought of as an orator.

On the air as well, the concensus of critics places Morse above McKay as a speaker. Frank Coffin, Portland television executive, believed McKay was less effective than Morse on the air and holding him back was all they could do.[23] Dr. Robert Fuquay, political scientist at Oregon State College, thought Morse more effective on television—more poised, more polished, more impresive.[24]

But while Senator Morse was conceded the more persuasive speaker on the whole, these qualifications seem justified by close observation of their broadcast programs:

1) Neither candidate was as effective on the air as in the public speaking situation, particularly when placed in the mold of the five-minute scripted talk. 2) The principal advantage Morse held was his ability to extemporize certain programs thereby more nearly reaching his platform power than when reading a speech, and also making possible a variety of program opportunities the script prisoner could not utilize. 3) When the candidates are compared on five-minute, written television talks, it is primarily the vocal and visual attributes

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[23] Interview with the writer, Salem, Dec., 1956.
[24] Interview with the writer, Corvallis, Oct. 1, 1956.

of delivery that give Morse superiority, the quality of composition of the speeches being roughly equal.

These conclusions lead to three more which are perhaps the major implications of the 1956 Oregon senatorial campaign for political broadcasting:

1) As the strategists of the Republican Party in Oregon concluded, the successful use of television demands the "ready-made" television personality or one who can feasibly be trained for the medium. 2) Where the candidate has television potential but a background of public speaking experience, his talents must be adapted to the television campaign and the campaign designed to fit the nature and extent of his adaptation. In other words, the campaign should be tailor-made for the individual candidate; it should exploit his strengths in public communication and minimize his weaknesses. 3) As long as political broadcasting must compromise serious content for the sake of appeal to an entertainment-minded audience it can never substitute for the stump speaking campaign in developing any but a superficially-informed electorate.

In considering the "ready-made" television personality requirement, it is apparent that Douglas McKay was found wanting on two counts. He could not successfully adapt to the demand for versatile extemporaneous and impromptu speaking skill made by television, nor could he make the most of the verbatim manuscript as an oral reader. He was not sufficiently trainable. Nor could his public speaking skills exhibited in the discursive talk unbound by precise time limits be exploited on the air.

Morse, on the other hand, while not an especially skillful oral interpreter, possessed outstanding ability in extemporaneus and impromptu speaking developed through his years of experience on the public platform, in the Senate, and on radio and television panel programs. He was almost the "ready-made" television personality. He adapted his extemporaneous speaking talents to the medium effectively in such broadcasts as the question-and-answer programs. He was less successful in adapting his public speaking abilities to the five-minute talk program on the whole. His powers as an orator were vitiated on it, and he could not compensate for this loss by becoming truly able in the intimate, conversational, living-room approach to the home viewer. His greatest persuasive strength, which lies in his public speaking, was not completely exploited on the air.

Regarding the third point, the campaigns by Morse and McKay reinforce the criticism of broadcasting that it tends to educate superficially. In answer to a question on how successfully a campaign based on serious issues can be waged on radio and television, Senator Richard Neuberger replied:

> Radio and television are satisfactory for the presentation of issues, but only in extremely simple and terse form. When a speaker goes into any great detail the thread is often lost. This is not true of personal appearances where the full impact of the speaker may be felt.[25]

One of the outstanding qualities of Senator Morse's public speaking is his ability to teach, to develop background and trace the development of his subject, to clarify with illustrations, examples, and analogies. He cannot do this in a five-minute talk or a question-and-answer program, yet the trend established by Oregon advertising agencies, campaign managers, and candidates is to sacrifice the political speech of serious length for the capsule one. As long as showmanship outranks subject matter on the air, the serious-minded voter will have to repair to the hustings and the printed media to satisfy his desire for more than a superficial treatment of public problems by the candidates.

One wave length of hope for such a person appeared, however, in the Morse campaign. It appeared in the form of those few full-length public addresses which were aired on local radio stations. Perhaps radio, with its lower time and production costs, may help candidates provide a richer food for thought for the citizen who dislikes the bland diet on television, assuming they would find it politically advantageous to do so.

In conclusion, both the Morse and McKay broadcasts strategists followed current trends in television techniques, making no significant contributions to the art of political broadcasting. However, in using conventional program formats and techniques they often adapted them effectively to state and local situations. One might compare, in this regard, the appeal to Oregon voters in the national Republican Party's final documentary, "Decisions for Tomorrow," with the direct, immediate, vital appeal in Morse's "Wayne Morse of Oregon" documentary, filmed in Oregon, picturing Oregon people, scenes, and problems.

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[25] Personal letter from Senator Neuberger, Portland, Dec. 8, 1956.

Wayne Morse demonstrated that with broadcasting techniques and program ideas already in use a dynamic, intelligent, articulate candidate can stage some exciting political broadcasts, i.e., his major documentary, his question-and-answer programs, and certain extemporized talks in which he shot the emotional sparks of his best public speaking.

Regarding the question of whether or not television is changing significantly the nature of campaigning at the statewide level, the Morse-McKay campaign suggests that it is not, that the candidate who fears his opponent will use every avenue to the voters he can finance, however high he rates the power of television to inform and persuade. The problem, then, becomes not so much one of deciding which medium to de-emphasize or eliminate in favor of it, but how best to exploit its great potential.

ANALYSIS OF BROADCAST LITERATURE: THE JOURNALISM QUARTERLY, 1948-1958

An annotated bibliography of articles on broadcasting and related subjects published in JQ during the past decade

ALTHOUGH the Journalism Quarterly has published articles on the mass media for over 35 years, there are several reasons for preparing this special 10-years index to articles on broadcasting.

1. During this period television came into its own and radio proved its survival ability.

2. JQ published as many articles on broadcasting in this last decade as appeared in it during all the previous 25 years.

3. JQ provided an Index to all its articles, including radio and television, for the period 1924-49, in its supplement to Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 1948). One may refer to this 1948 Index for material predating the period considered here.

Thus this compilation offers readers of the *Journal of Broadcasting* a ready-reference for broadcast articles in JQ for the last 10 years. Omitted are reviews and selected bibliographies which are regular features of JQ. Special bibligraphies in JQ referring to radio and television are included.

The author is indebted to Stuart Cooney, University of Southern California, for the form and style which he instituted in his analyses in previous issues of the *Journal of Broadcasting.*

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San Jose State College

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

AMERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR. Edited by Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Broadbeck. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959. 475 pp. $7.50.

Those interested in the relation of the mass media to American voting behavior will be tempted to turn at once to chapters contributed by Ithiel Pool, Kurt and Gladys Lang, and Herbert Blumer. Such readers will be well advised, however, to begin their reading of this stimulating book with the Peter Rossi chapter on the four landmarks in voting research.

The empirical studies examined are, of course, *The People's Choice*, *Voting*, and *The Voter Decides*, and also Stuart Rice's *Quantitative Methods in Politics*. Rossi does an invaluable service in placing these monumental studies within an historical context. His assessment of their strengths and weaknesses in design and execution was completed after personal interviews with some of the authors.

The general problem of this and the remainder of the twenty-two chapters is where do we go from here toward a better understanding of the voting process. The editors have chosen to call an "open season" on this problem, and sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, marketing forecasters, political theorists, economists, and humanists have all taken careful aim. As a result, the book is not limited to a single uniform perspective, but serves to stimulate further thought about voting behavior through a far larger frame of reference.

Ithiel Pool reports that television may mark a new dimension in American politics. Analysis of data collected among college students during the 1952 campaign suggests that television served the major purpose of highlighting Eisenhower's human qualities, which the respondents had not expected in a military man, and of making Stevenson, relatively unknown previously, nationally recognized as a man of outstanding political statute. The data also suggest that respondents who heard Stevenson only on radio were more favorable toward him than respondents who viewed him primarily on television.

Kurt and Gladys Lang point out that one reason why *The People's Choice* and *Voting* appeared to show how little mass media determined votes is because they focus on short-range influences operating during the period of active electioneering. They suggest that the great impact of the media may operate during the period between the official campaigns, through the content of political messages and through the fact that politics for most individuals has become a matter of remote participation as a member of the mass.

Herbert Blumer suggests that the three major studies have actually contributed relatively little to the understanding of mass media effects upon voting. There are three reasons for this. First, since each of the mass media carry "both sides" of the campaign, it is unrealistic to ascribe a swing to the Republicans or Democrats to mass media in general, or even one medium. Second, two of these studies failed to ascertain the various ways in which certain groups of the audience may respond to the content as presented by the medium. Third, in the "real world" the effects of all the media are interlaced, with the result that a message in one medium may subsequently affect how a message in another medium is received.

This book is commended to everyone vitally concerned with voting as an important aspect of modern American society. It will be of particular value to those active in politics, social science research, and any of the mass media.

Irving R. Merrill
Michigan State University

FREEDOM OF SPEECH BY RADIO AND TELEVISION. By Elmer E. Smead. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959. 182 pp. $4.50.

Perhaps an interesting new era in communication has arrived. Recently a Michigan judge wrote a best selling mystery story while at the same time communicating much of the flavor of the law to the reader. Now a Professor of Government has written a very understandable book about the complex areas of government regulation and broadcasting.

Smead's purpose in writing this book is simply to describe "the long history behind these problems (of government control in broadcasting) —their origins and development—and the current difficulties involved in their solution." The author indicates that the book should demonstrate the "complexity of the interrelations of Congress, FCC, courts and the broadcasters which are unavoidable in the attempt to solve each problem." Purpose and demonstration have been accomplished as the author threads the maze of statutes, FCC actions, precedental decisions and ordinary opinions with a minimum of legal jargon and a maximum of communication.

The underlying thesis seems to be that we should all understand that broadcasting is a product, in terms of regulation, of the political world in which we live. In the concluding chapter Smead states that "neither the regulators nor the regulated can ignore the political environment within which they must work."

The seven chapters deal with problems related to programming in the public interest, to news (principally editorializing, section 315, and canon 35 issues), and to the conflict of the inherent problems of regulation represented in "government vs private broadcaster." An appendix of chapter length contains a discussion of the important engineering problems—the TV spectrum, clear channels, and audio power. In all cases, each problem is traced from its beginning to the events of the present.

The history of broadcasting is relatively short, but many current problems are inexorably woven from the decisions and regulations of yesterday. This volume presents the issues, the well-known cases, and scores of lesser known citations drawn from the author's extensive research—enough to gladden the heart of other research people.

Thus, in the discussion of public interest, we again meet Schuler of KGEF, Duncan of KVEP, and Brinkley of Kansas. In the section on editorializing we read of the Richards case and the first and second Mayflower. But these are framed in a perspective provided by quotations and paraphrasing from lesser known reports or decisions which provide an opportunity for greater understanding. In particular, the discussion on section 315 provides excellent background for an understanding of the current legislative and regulatory struggle.

Smead demonstrates an ability to paraphrase from the sometimes torturous legal jargon, *vis a vis* this sample, relating to a House of Representatives challenge of FCC authority to regulate lotteries (in 1948). "(The FCC) . . . issued an opinion holding its authority to rest upon the statutory duty to pass on licenses in the public interest. Lotteries were contrary to the public interest and repeal of Section 316 had not denied this. In fact, Congress was reiterating its previous declaration to this effect by re-enacting its prohibition against lotteries in the Criminal Code. The fact that the prohibition was not formally a part of the Communications Act was immaterial because in defining public interest the FCC was bound to observe Congressional declarations of public policy in whatever statutes they were made."

In reporting the history of broadcasting regulation, Smead has purposely left out extended discussion of the *milieu.* But if there is no discussion, say, from a sociological point of view, there is excellent interpretation from a legal point of view. The chapters on "Conflicting Freedoms" and "Conclusions: The Politics of Regulation" are especially notable.

At times this reader found himself hungering for just of a bit of this wider view. Yet, the lack of opinion and conjecture is what makes this book unique. Here is a translation of the legal information, done as succinctly as possible.

There are some minor criticisms. An occasional statement may bring a raised eyebrow or two. Thus it seems that the author was too busy with his writing to notice current movie trends, for he reports that "the fact is that radio and TV must follow the example of the movie industry which has traditionally maintained the illusion that people never swear." The short treatment of ETV does not indicate growth which was very evident at the time the book was written. The appendix material deserves chapter status.

Certainly Professor Smead has made a scholarly and communicative contribution to our understanding of the tangled issues of regulation vs freedom in broadcasting. It should be read by all students of broadcasting, be they station manager, professor, or student.

Bruce A. Linton
The University of Kansas

MOTIVATION RESEARCH. By Harry Henry. New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Company, 1958. 240 pp. $5.00.

The author of this book is director of research at McCann-Erickson Advertising Limited, London, and chairman of McCann-Erickson's European Research Committee. In the introduction to his book Mr. Henry explains that there will be an absence of footnotes and references in the volume. "This is a practical handbook," he wrote, "not a doctoral thesis: its aims are vulgarly commercial rather than scholarly." Mr. Henry is a man of his word. There are exactly two formal footnotes and several rather informal references in the book. Aside from these, the book is comprised in the main of the author's opinions concerning the relatively new field of motivational research. The author does, however, dip deeply into his own rather varied experiences and case histories to illustrate his beliefs.

The volume fits into no known textbook classification, nor, as has been pointed out, is it a scholarly work. The book, however, would make interesting supplemental reading for a course in station management or one in radio and television advertising.

Some of the British spellings in the book, such as *odour*, *connexion*, and *favourable* may appear a bit strange to American eyes as well as references to unfamiliar British brand names and to *petrol* instead of to gasoline. This should not detract from the overall worth of the contents, however.

Mr. Henry shows considerable concern throughout the volume for the scientific validity of some of the studies that have been made in the field. He argues that too frequently clinical psychologists or psychiatrists are employed for motivational research. These specialists fail, he points out, because they are too concerned with the behavior of individuals as individuals, and "those aspects of human behaviour which have to be studied in order to cure neurotic complaint are not the same as those which are important to the manufacturing or marketing problem."

Mr. Henry spends one of his ten chapters in the book discussing the various points of controversy that have arisen in the field. He is a persuasive writer, but one gets the feeling that the book is largely a defense of his own philosophies of motivational research. Since no mention is made in the book itself or on the book jacket of Mr. Henry's training and background, other than his previously mentioned association with a distinguished advertising agency, the reader may want more information about the author before choosing sides in the controversy.

The book is rather loosely organized, starting out with the reasons for motivation research, delving into an explanation of the author's interpretation of the field, and then explaining the basic techniques recommended by Mr. Henry. In the latter part of the book, the author seeks to show actual application of his philosophies. The first half of the book uses numerous interesting case histories and seems more substantial in content than the second part of the volume.

Motivation Research should spark considerable discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, it is bound to cause other books to be written in the field. *Motivation Research* should be read by everyone in or interested in this challenging new field, even though there may be disagreement on the part of some with Mr. Henry's views.

Edward C. Lambert
University of Missouri

WHAT MAKES WOMEN BUY. By Janet L. Wolff. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958. 294 pp. $6.00.

The McGraw-Hill Series in Advertising and Selling turns its attention in this book to the buying behavior of the modern American woman. The author has not only posed an interesting question, but has provided many interesting and practical answers to that question. No one will doubt the importance of effective salesmanship aimed at women who control or influence the majority of family purchases. What many may doubt is that one author, in one volume, can cover the subject.

Mrs. Wolff bases her discussion of the "new woman of today" and of her buying habits on a foundation built in the first two sections of her book titled: "Influences on Today's Women" and "Why Women Think the Way They Do." Since these two broad subjects cover but slightly more than a hundred pages, it can be seen that the treatment is a general one, and one which may evoke criticism from sociologists and psychologists. Mrs. Wolff is not writing for such an audience however. Her aim is to provide information for business and sales people, information which may be used as a guide to increasing sales through understanding what motivates today's female buyer.

The final two sections of the volume deal with "What Do Women Really Want?" and "What Puts Women in the Buying Frame of Mind?" In these final chapters Mrs. Wolff makes some of her most cogent observations. These chapters will be of particular help to those in the advertising busines and those learning how to prepare advertising copy and appeals. Among the most interesting chapters in the book are those titles: "How to Communicate to Today's Woman" and "How to Talk to Five Important Groups of Women Consumers." The reader cannot help but be struck by the difference between Mrs. Wolff's advice on how to appeal to women and the daytime programming methods employed by today's "modern radio" stations. "Communicating with women involves a sensitive approach and the establishment of a feminine atmosphere in the means of communication . . . They (women) are sensitive and affected by the general atmosphere and tone of approach." One wonders how today's radio stations with their top-forty records programming and their generally strident, fast-paced tone of approach reach today's woman.

The masculine reader may find himself talking back to the author as did this reviewer. Many of her statements concerning women are not exclusively feminine. Some of her points are labored and too much is made of them. But in overview her central purpose is excellently accomplished—to establish the fact that to advertise to women, to sell to women, one must understand women and how they are motivated.

Erling S. Jorgensen
Montana State University

RADIO FREE EUROPE. By Robert T. Holt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959. 249 pp. $5.00.

The private propaganda organization known as Radio Free Europe is actually an outgrowth of the Free Europe Committee, which was organized in 1949, in New York and in Europe. The redoubtable former Ambassador to Japan and former Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew was its first President. This book discusses its large scale radio campaigns in Europe from 1953 to 1957. It, therefore, includes the Hungarian uprising of November 1956 and its immediate aftermath. It was popular at that time to accuse Radio Free Europe with its powerful network of stations, directed from Munich, of pushing the Hungarians into revolt against their Communist masters. This factual account of the whole matter clears Radio Free Europe of any such charge.

The book tells of the origin of Radio Free Europe, its basic purpose and policies, its organization both in New York and Munich, its news sources and manner of checking information and lays particular stress upon both the uprisings in Poland and in Hungary. The final chapter discusses RFE as a "non-official instrument of American foreign policy."

The author is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and has long been an expert in the field of evaluative propaganda having served during World War II on the staff of the Psychological Warfare Branch of the Army. His return to Europe to study the work of RFE must have been an exhilarating experience.

Professor Holt has concluded his remarkable study with some trenchant words, "It is the considered opinion of this writer that the policy analysts of RFE have not been unaware of events and changes behind the Iron Curtain (as some of the critics maintain) but they have been more aware of developments, more skilled and sophisticated in their analysis and more diligent in the development of strategies thaan those responsible for the official policy of the United States Government." If this is a criticism of our Department of State, one can easily say that State has borne up bravely under other criticisms. This reviewer would to fit the back that must bear it.

We close this review with a quotation from Herbert Brucker, as we remember it, in the introduction to his book *Freedom of Communication*, —"There are two worlds in which we live, one is the world we are told about and the other is the world as it really is. It is the purpose of good communication to bring these two worlds closer together."

All of us in broadcasting could profit by this reminder.

Franklin Dunham
Chief of Radio-Television
U. S. Office of Education

ARE YOU LISTENING? By Ralph G. Nichols and Leonard A. Stevens.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957. 235 pp. $3.75.

Listening can no longer be considered the poor relation of the communications skills family. With the publication of *Are You Listening*, recognition is given to *listening* as a member in good standing of that circle which has long included reading, writing, and speaking. Such general recognition is long overdue. Listening, as the authors point out, yields to no other communication skill in its lineage or significance. It is only that it has been neglected so long by those who make the greatest use of it.

Dr. Nichols, presently Professor of Speech and Chairman of the Department of Rhetoric at the University of Minnesota, has earned the title of "Mr. Listening" for his research and dedication to this field for more than a decade. His work (at Iowa, at Minnesota, and as Chairman of the Listening Comprehension Committee of the National Society for the Study of Communication) has been the major force in elevating listening to its rightful place in our communication hierarchy.

This volume is distinguished both by its wealth of evidence and by its breadth of application. The authors rely equally upon solid research findings and upon pointed anecdotal materials. In addition to considering the central processes which influence good and bad listening behaviors, the authors devote chapters to the problems of listenings to persuasion, listening by business executives, listening by salesman, listening in conferences, listening in the family, and listening at school.

As Nichols and Stevens indicate, the advent of mass radio and television broadcasting has enormously increased the listening opportunities of our citizens in this mid-twentieth century. Yet only in the past twenty years have we come close to a real understanding of listening as a skill. Among the significant points made by the authors are these:

(1) We spend more of our daily lives in listening than in any other phase of communication—sometimes more than in reading, writing, and speaking combined.

(2) For the most part we tend to listen poorly—at about 25 per cent efficiency on the average.

(3) Lack of awareness of the importance and nature of our listening is probably the greatest barrier to good listening.

(4) We tend to make false assumptions about listening—believing mistakenly that listening quality is tied directly to intelligence, to hearing acuity, to mere amount of practice, to reading ability, etc.

(5) Listening is a skill. It responds to training. Understanding and intelligent practice can yield substantial improvement.

(6) Listening is an active process. It is more than being present when someone else is talking. It requires expenditure of energy.

The book is rich in prescriptions for better listening. Lists of poor listening habits are provided for personal inventory. Specific recommendations are made for developing desirable listening habits. A short but select bibliography of further readings on listening is provided by the authors.

Experts on communication have tended to focus too much on the transmission of ideas. Emphasis on the responsibilities of reception has been too long delayed. Nichols and Stevens have provided an invaluable resources for stimulating further thinking and doing in this field.

William A. Conboy
The University of Kansas

MASS LEISURE. Edited by Eric Larrabee and Rolf Meyersohn. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958. 429 pp. $6.00.

"On the uses and misuses of leisure will hinge much that is good and evil in coming years," declare editors Eric Larrabee and Rolf Meyersohn in their introduction to *Mass Leisure*, a symposium of 41 articles designed as a companion volume to *Mass Culture*, previously issued by the same publishers.

Little more than a century ago, leisure was a privilege of the few. Today, a radically curtailed work week and extended life span have provided so much leisure in this country for the ordinary worker that there is a growing concern with how this "time that one can spend as one pleases" should be spent. Obviously we broadcasters exhibit this concern in our competition for audiences. So do salesmen as they try to push the recreational market beyond the $30 billion mark that already makes leisure a dominant factor in the national economy.

So do the sociologists who worry that the average man does not know how to spend his spare time either for his own satisfaction or for the social good. Trained to work but not to live, this victim of restlessness and boredom regards his leisure only as a respite from work, to be spent in excitements and distractions that require a minimum of mental exertion and provide a maximum of escape from reality.

Some individuals, however, are beginning to accord a more positive value to leisure. It begins to seem wrong, for instance, to work so hard as to affect one's family life and to fail to get fun out of life's experiences. In time, some persons may develop the capacity to utilize their leisure with wisdom and with art. It is important that it be done, for only through leisure, some think, can man develop the insights and cultivate the humane values upon which a peaceful and rewarding civilization depends.

Such is at least one line of argument that may be derived from *Mass Leisure*. But a volume with such a variety of authors and subjects may easily mean something different to different readers. One of the book clubs sees it as "a wickedly revealing study of America after hours—from 'togetherness' and do-it-yourself to the rituals of drinking, spectator sports, and sex as a form of play." But others may find it nowhere near as breezy as this blurb suggests.

Certainly it is not the kind of book that one is apt to read without stopping from cover to cover. Every few pages, one experiences a shift of author, subject, attitude, style, and treatment. One is obliged to adjust from ponderous scholarship to graceful essays, from wishful thinking to objective analysis, from one topic to another that may bear little relationship. Despite the grouping of articles into four major sections, each with its own brief introduction, the book is a conglomeration, appealing through the variety of approaches that it provides to the subject.

The editors have selected a most interesting assortment of material, some of it by authors as familiar as David Riesman, Clive Bell, Bertrand Russell, Aldous Huxley, Russell Lynes, and Margaret Mead.

While the whole subject of *Mass Leisure* is of obvious concern to the broadcaster, the book does not contain too many direct references to radio and television *per se*. Some of the most interesting references are to be found in Alfred C. Clarke's study, "Leisure and Occupational Prestige," which compares the leisure patterns of five levels of occupational prestige. This reveals, for example, that the majority of respondents at each level devoted most of their leisure time to non-spectator activities, and that even though commercialized recreation has become one of the nation's largest business enterprises, it still does not occupy a large share of the leisure time of the adult population. When asked "What would you do with an extra two hours in your day?" the percentage of persons who stated they would watch television increased as occupational level decreased. "Interestingly, no one in the higher group would use this time to watch television."

COLBY LEWIS
Michigan State University

FILMS IN REVIEW

LIGHTING GUIDEPOSTS (TEST #146. Kinescope produced by Paul Wittlig and committee, narrated by Carleton Winkler: CBS television. 30 min. Obtainable from CBS Television. $10 rental.

This kinescope starts with an effective demonstration of key, back, and fill light, using a simple cube as a model; the concepts are then further elaborated with a multi-faceted figure, a doll, and finally live actors.

The role of the kinescope tube in producing unwanted effects when presented with excessive or insufficient light information is simply but clearly explained with diagrams and examples. Other topics covered are the effect of lens stop and depth of field as related to definition of backgrounds, set lighting and the reasons for keeping action and furniture away from the set, microphone shadows, use of barn doors, functions of basic lighting instruments.

Although produced by a network, the information is well suited to the needs of the smallest and simplest production facilities, even to describing how common window screen can be used as a light-filter when dimmers are not available.

Script and narration are smooth and easily followed, without technical jargon but at the same time without condescending oversimplification. The impact of the major points is clinched by cutting from the miniature set to a matching full-scale set with live actors.

This film will be a useful aid in television production courses.

Sydney Head
University of Miami

THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION ON THE CONTROL OF BROADCASTING IN CANADA

By Benjamin V. Mast

Recently the Canadian government made a variety of changes in its system of broadcasting control. To many American students of broadcasting, the changes and the reasons for them could have little significance without an understanding of the peculiar problems which have confronted the Canadian people with respect to broadcasting.

In this Special Report, the JOURNAL is privileged to present a most intriguing and well-documented analysis of the Canadian situation, one which ably presents the background necessary to understand and to correctly interpret the meaning of the current developments in the Canadian pattern of control.

Benjamin Mast wrote this article as a chapter in a more comprehensive study of the effect of television upon systems of control in all of the English-Commonwealth nations. The complete work comprised an M.A. thesis completed last year at the University of North Carolina. Mr. Mast is currently serving as a member of the armed forces.

THE first licenses for sound broadcasting in Canada were granted in 1922 and were for commercial broadcasting stations.[1] Early growth of Canadian broadcasting was similar to the development of radio in the United States. Between 1922 and 1929 broadcasting was developed entirely by private enterprise, and there was no broadcast regulation to speak of.[2] Radio grew rapidly in this period, both in the number of receiving and transmitting licenses. By 1930 there were seventy private commercial broadcasting licenses, and approximately 530,000 set licenses.[3]

But problems arose quite early. One was the fact that private enterprise broadcasters, because they quite naturally wished profitable markets, concentrated in the more thickly populated areas. This meant that persons living in remote areas could not get adequate radio service.

The United States did not have adequate technical regulation of broadcasting until 1927, and the resultant chaos of the airwaves prior to that year made Canadians as well as their southern neighbors miserable.[4] Interference came not only from competing Canadian stations, but also from United States and Mexican broadcasters.

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[1] Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, which was experimenting with the idea of a broadcasting service in Britain from 1920 to 1922, obtained the first license specifically granted for sound broadcasting in Canada in 1919. The company broadcast programs experimentally over a Montreal station. *Report of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting*, March 15, 1957 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), (hereafter cited as the Fowler Report), p. 297.

[2] The Department of the Naval Service first handled wireless problems, but the early responsibility was interpreted only in terms of ship-to-shore communication. In 1922 the Department of Marine and Fisheries undertook to handle radio problems. D. B. Sumner, "The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation: A Dissertation on the Operation of the Public Corporation in Canadian Government." Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1949, p. 7.

[3] Listener licenses were issued from 1922 until 1953. The 1922 fee was $1.00 per annum. License fee figures have been secured from various sources, the most readily available source being: *Fowler Report*, p. 298.

[4] There were negotiations held between Canada and the United States in 1923, but at this conference the United States alloted every wave length in the broadcast spectrum, including those frequencies occupied by Canada, to its stations. Negotiations from 1926 resulted in Canada being offered only six clear and twelve shared channels by the United States. Both conferences failed, for Canada felt that her needs were not being recognized. At the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement of 1937, Canada, Cuba, Mexico, and the United States agreed to more equitable arrangements. Subsequent agreements, however, have not always been unanimous. Mexican stations hampered the early development of Canadian broadcasting by causing serious interference. *Fowler Report*, pp. 298-299.

Program content was another problem. About 80 per cent of the Canadian population lives within 100 miles of the United States-Canada border. Canadian stations tended to affiliate with United States broadcasters, who offered profitable programs, and who were described as experiencing the "first flush of broadcasting" in the Twenties.[5] "The United States cultural invasion was on," said one writer, "wearing the seven-league boots of radio's wave lengths."[6] The Canadian public feared cultural assimilation.

Faced with such political and technical problems, the government appointed a royal commission[7] on December 6, 1928. Known as the Aird Commission, it was to examine the broadcasting situation in the Dominion of Canada and to make recommendations to the government as to the future administration, management, control and financing of radio. After a thorough investigation, the commission recommended that there should be radio stations established to provide coverage for the entire country; that there should be programs of high standard produced from Canadian sources; and that broadcasting should stimulate the national consciousness and cultural growth of Canada.

How were these proposals to be brought about? A "Canadian Broadcasting Company" was advocated, to be financed by indirect advertising, license fees, and government subsidy. The proposed company would be publicly owned.[8]

Since nationalization of broadcasting was proposed by the Aird Commission, things were looking dark for private broadcasters. Economic depression had descended upon the country, the political complexion of the government had changed, and in the 1929-1932 period, when the spectre of assimilation was hanging over them, some station proprietors withdrew from the business. This was the nadir of Canadian commercial broadcasting. Private enterprise advocates claimed that such restraints impeded the growth of radio.[9]

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[5] Giraud Chester and Garnet Garrison, *Radio and Television* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950), p. 22.

[6] Charles A. Siepmann, *Radio, Television and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 156.

[7] The commission issued results of its findings: *Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1929).

[8] It is significant that members of the Aird Commission visited Britain's B.B.C. before making up their minds for a similar organization for Canada. For a discussion of Canadian government radio as a public corporation, see: D. B. Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-69.

In 1932 the government appointed a Parliamentary committee on broadcasting. The committee rejected the independent corporation idea of the Aird Commission and submitted a plan for a commission which would regulate and control all broadcasting and furnish a national radio service. But it treated nationalization with a "go slow" attitude.[10]

The committee's findings were agreed upon, and a bill was passed establishing the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission in 1932.[11] In the beginning this was primarily a program production body. It produced programs and also distributed these and programs produced by still existing non-government stations.

Nonetheless the Broadcasting Act of 1932 had given the new body power to acquire any existing non-government broadcasting stations. While the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission seemed to prefer concentrating on the production of program fare, the mere fact that it had such power taken together with the recommendations of the Aird Commission led to an understandable reluctance on the part of private citizens to invest their money in the broadcasting business. General economic conditions in this period were not encouraging. Moreover, the civil service status and financial dependency on the government of the C.R.B.C. was stifling.[12]

These factors played their part in the next major development which was substantial amendment to the Broadcasting Act in 1936. This act created the present Broadcasting Corporation.[13] It contained in it some of the major features of the 1932 act. The corporation was charged with maintaining and operating broadcasting stations, establishing from time to time new stations, making agreements with private stations for broadcasting programs, publishing and distributing periodicals, and carrying out activities as required to build a national program service. Advertising was allowed, but on a very limited basis.[14]

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[9] In that period the total number of broadcasting stations dropped from eighty to seventy; only three new licenses were issued. *The Fowler Report* ("Brief of the Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters to the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957," p. 2).

[10] Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14.

[11] *Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act, 1932.* 22-23, George V, Chapter 51. The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission is also referred to as "C.R.B.C."

[12] Under Section 4 of the *Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act of 1932* personnel employed by the C.R.B.C. were regarded as civil servants, which made for difficulty in classifying salaries on a corporation basis. This situation was rectified later. For a discussion on how the C.R.B.C. was dependent on the government, see: Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[13] *Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1936*, 1 Edward VIII, Chapter 24. Broadcasting has functioned under this act ever since. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is also called the "C.B.C."

Administratively the C.B.C. is similar to Britain's B.B.C. The C.B.C. is run by a board of nine governors who are appointed by the governor in council. The C.B.C.'s general manager, like the B.B.C.'s director-general, does the day-to-day activities such as internal management, finances, staff, and technical operations. Moreover, the C.B.C. is "alone yet not alone":[15] it is independent of the government, yet subject to periodic parliamentary investigation, and therefore is accountable to the public.

The C.B.C., with the approving scrutiny of various parliamentary committees,[16] constructed over the years several high-power radio stations and established in cooperation with the private stations three networks, the Trans-Canada, the Dominion, and the French.

The Trans-Canada network, English, by 1956 was made up of seventeen stations owned and operated by the C.B.C.; thirteen privately-owned stations which received the basic network service; twelve "supplementary A" privately-owned stations, and three "supplementary B" privately-owned stations.[17]

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[14] The C.B.C. deals mostly with national advertisers through advertising agencies in the heavily populated towns. Local advertising, except for some C.B.C. television endeavors, is deliberately left to private stations. The Aird Commission envisioned eventual elimination of all broadcast advertising, and as late as 1938 the C.B.C. was regarded as eventually becoming non-commercial. See: *Standing Committee on Radio Broadcasting* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1938).

[15] A description made in the House of Commons. Canada, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), III (1933), 2574.

[16] As in Britain, where the B.B.C. has been repeatedly investigated by government committees, Canadian government groups have investigated the public broadcasting agency in Canada. In their final reports the committees have been unanimous in supporting the principles of the public corporation broadcasting idea since 1938. See: *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Radio Broadcasting,* 1938) Ottawa: King's Printer, 1938). Other such committees were called in 1939, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1946, and 1947.

[17] The "supplementary" stations, ranked according to coverage prominence, may be required by the C.B.C. to carry a certain program if the sponsor wills it.

The Dominion network, offered as an alternative network service to the Trans-Canada network, has had only one C.B.C. station, which is the key member. The rest are thirty basic and nineteen supplementary private stations.

The French radio network serves the French section of the Canadian population in six provinces. It is made up of four C.B.C. stations and twenty private stations.

In 1949 a royal commission (the Massey Commission) was appointed by the government to examine and make recommendations as to the principles upon which the policy of Canada should be based in the fields of radio and television broadcasting.[18] It concluded that broadcasting should continue much as it was, although it was concerned over post-war financial problems of the C.B.C.[19] It took a more favorable attitude toward private broadcasters than did the Aird Commission. A parliamentary committee appointed in 1951 approved the Massey Commission's recommendation that the privilege of broadcasting remain under the control of the government.[20]

In 1955 another royal commission on broadcasting (the Fowler Commission) met and made a thorough study of Canadian broadcasting problems. It recommended the continuance of a "single system" of public broadcasting supplemented by private broadcasting. It recommended an independent regulatory board for broadcasting. It, like the Massey Commission, was concerned over the financial shakiness of the C.B.C. in the face of large television expenditure.[21]

Television came to Canada in 1952. Not until the C.B.C. had built program centers in Toronto and Montreal; not until it had secured for itself a television monopoly for most of Canada's big cities—Montreal, Halifax, Toronto, Ottawa, Winnipeg, and Vancouver; not until the United States had decided what to do with respect to its television frequency problem; not until then did Canadian television make its debut. For as the Massey Commission warned, television should not be "precipitate," but rather should "be carefully planned to avoid costly experiment which our country can scarcely afford."[22]

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[18] The Massey Commission issued its findings in the following document: *Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951).

[19] Rising costs plus expenditure for expansion caused a paper deficit for the C.B.C. from 1944. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

[20] *Fowler Report*, p. 311.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

The plan for establishing one C.B.C. television station in each of the major cities meant that private stations would have to go ahead and develop television in the less populous regions.

The government announced: 'Canada is very large and it will require a good many stations before television can be brought to the people in most parts of the country. It is desirable to have one station in as many areas as possible before there are two in any one area."[23] This "single station" arrangement was never intended to be permanent. In 1953 it was announced in Commons:

> The principal television system is developed. At the rate that applications are now being received it may not be long before there is a sufficient degree of national coverage to justify the Government and the CBC in giving consideration to permiting two or perhaps in some cases more than two stations in certain areas.[24]

In 1952, when television commenced, the announced objective was to make television available to 75 per cent of the population. The realization of this goal, now accomplished, was to mean an end to the "single station" policy.[25] By December of 1955 there were 29 private television stations operating outside the choice markets held by the nine C.B.C. stations. Despite their initial loud protests against the "single station" policy, private broadcasters did develop in other areas.

Two television networks, the English and the French, have been inaugurated by the C.B.C., and are growing. The English network hoped to extend its service coast-to-coast sometime in 1958. At present the English television network is made up of six C.B.C. stations and 24 private stations. The French television network is comprised of two C.B.C. stations and three private stations.[26] As a result of the "single station" policy, every newcomer television station, whether private or public, must be affiliated to one or another of the television networks, in order to speed the development of Canadian television. At this stage, therefore, every station is an affiliate. And the C.B.C. is a "democratic" monopolist, as one writer put it, in the single station areas.[27] When a coast-to-coast television network is completed, the "single station" policy will probably be dropped.

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

[23] Canada, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), I (1952-1953), 409.

[24] Canada, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), IV (1952-1953), 3393.

[25] *Fowler Report*, pp. 221-229.

What has been the effect of television on the broadcasting structure of Canada? Television has been spectacularly welcomed by the Canadian public as seen in the rapid accumulation of sets. By 1955 Canadians had purchased over two million sets. It was a fact that many Canadians bought their television sets under the stimulus of robust television activity in the United States, long before Canadian television went on the air. The classic saying, "our minds are being constantly pulled to the south," received new meaning, as Canadians not only heard American culture but saw it as well via television. Television-aggravated problems of Canadian broadcasting were scrutinized by the Fowler Commission which recommended no major changes in the system but which urged small adjustments here and there. The Fowler Commission's report's proposals will be dealt with in this study in more detail below.

What has been the audience allegiance to Canadian programming?

Public opinion has reacted in various ways to the program policies of the C.B.C., in both radio and television. The figures listed here are merely indicative, not comprehensive. Canadian audience surveys on a systematic continuing basis were begun in 1940.[28] The responsible public, such as the various parliamentary committees, has endorsed the service consistently. This so-called "responsible public" has always supported the basis of public broadcasting in Canada. But what of the listening and viewing public?

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[26] *Fowler Report* (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Organization, Functions and Management: Exhibit 12 to the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1957," p. 9).

[27] Robert B. Glynn, "The Canadian System," in *Television's Impact on American Culture*, William Y. Elliott, ed. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1956), p. 118. Such a term was applied to the C.B.C. because Robert Glynn, the writer quoted, felt that the corporation was compelled to program that for which the public clamored: light entertainment.

Many Canadians use both radio and television. It is estimated that there are more than five million radio sets in use in Canadian homes or about 1.3 sets per home; 96 per cent of the households have a radio set; and 25 per cent of the households have two or more radio sets.[29] The fact that television set saturation has been rather wide in Canada is borne out by the information in Table I.

Radio and television sets are widespread among the Canadian people. These listeners and viewers may hear and see portions of C.B.C., private Canadian, and United States station program fare. Because of the availability of programs of the culture-minded C.B.C. on the one hand, and the commercial-minded Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters and United States stations on the other, it will be of help to see how viewers and listeners apportion their preferences.

The Allegiance of the Canadian Audience

An analysis of the Trans-Canada and Dominion radio program schedules for the twelve month period, ending July 31st, 1956, indicated that 83.9 per cent of the program time was devoted to C.B.C.-produced programs, 79.3 per cent of the time being news and other non-commercial programs; and 4.6 per cent being Canadian commercial programs. According to this survey, these C.B.C.-produced, non-commercial programs obtained an average of only 19.2 per cent of the total Canadian radio sets-in-use at the time they were broadcast. The total radio listening to these non-commercial programs was 15.2 per cent.[30]

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[28] Siepmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161. Elliott-Haynes, Ltd., set up the first continuing measurement of Canadian radio audiences in 1940, and now covers with its telephone coincidental method 46 Canadian radio markets and 25 Canadian television markets. *Fowler Report* ("Supplement No. 17 to the Brief of the Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters"). The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll) does periodic studies. The Bureau of Broadcast Measurement is a nonprofit, cooperative organization which conducts two surveys per year and supplies the figures to radio and television stations, advertisers, agencies, and station representatives. The C.B.C. more recently has expanded its Bureau of Audience Research and has experimented with the influence of broadcasting on society, qualitatively. Because many Canadians listen to American programs, and because many American border stations beam Canadian advertisers' messages northward, the United States program rating services such as Nielson, Hooper, etc., in the United States have often included Canadian listeners in their surveys.

[29] Figures came from the Audience Research Division, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Such a figure is low, of course, but it must be remembered that radio audiences in most cases have many preferences, and the United States stations get a share of the listeners.

TABLE I

THE GROWTH OF TELEVISION OWNERSHIP IN CANADA[a]

Date	Total Television Homes (000's)	Percentage of Total Households	Percentage of Households in TV Coverage Area
September, 1952	130	4	12
March 31, 1954	650	17	37
March 31, 1956	1,980	51	63
January 1, 1958	2,800	68	76

[a] Source: Audience Research Division, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

The importance of this point is demonstrated by the information in Table II. This table, in addition to pointing out that Canadian audiences do tune in to American stations a great deal, also shows that a larger total share of the radio audience goes to the local stations when more than one station is operating in the same market. This has been the case in the development of Canadian television. Table III shows how the "single station" policy has resulted in Canadian audiences turning to American television stations.

Plattsburg, New York (opposite Montreal), and other American areas are taking advantage of the "single station" rule by luring Canadian audiences.[31]

The fact that Canadians view American commercial stations more than they do the C.B.C. stations means that a majority of Canadians do not endorse the "single station" idea.[32] The form which they want the additional stations to take is more interesting. In a Gallup Poll taken in six cities[33] across Canada, the respondent was approached this way: "As you probably know, there is only the one—a CBC television station in (Name of City) at present. A suggestion has been made that a second station to be set up. Would you prefer to

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[30] This is based on a recapitulation of all regular Elliott-Haynes semi-monthly surveys conducted in 44 key cities comprising 75 per cent of the total Canadian population.

[31] *Maclean's Magazine*, LXX (December 21, 1957), 3.

TABLE II

A COMPARISON OF SHARE AUDIENCE TUNED TO LOCAL CANADIAN STATIONS[a]

Cities	Share of Audience Tuned to Local Station(s) (%)	Share of Audience Tuned to Outside Stations (%)
IN VICTORIA:		
(a) With one station	38.9	61.1
(b) With two stations	73.5	26.5
IN WINDSOR:		
(a) With one station	38.2	61.8
(b) With two stations	53.6	46.4
IN KINGSTON:		
(a) With one station	84.6	15.4
(b) With two stations	92.2	7.8

[a] Source: *Fowler Report* ("Supplement No. 17 to the Brief of the Canadian Association of Radio Television Broadcasters").

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[32] In May, 1955, a survey in Toronto, Canada, of the comparative popularity of the C.B.C. program "Plouffe Family" with American-produced "Topper" and "Life of Riley," which were shown at the same hour, revealed the following results. "Topper" received over half the Canadian audience; "Life of Riley" received just one third; and "Plouffe Family" received 19 per cent. Glynn, *op. cit.*, p. 123. Nielson studies show that Canadians are very similar in their program preferences to Americans. "Canadian TV Viewing Parallels U. S.: Comparison of Daily and Seasonal Data in Both Countries," *Printers' Ink*, CCLVIII (January 18, 1957), 74-75.

[33] Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, and Halifax—which were all "single station" cities. The survey was from July 8 to 16, 1956.

TABLE III

PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL AUDIENCE IN THE VANCOUVER-VICTORIA AREA, BETWEEN CBUT AND AMERICAN STATIONS[a]

Day	CBUT (C.B.C.-Vancouver)	KVOS-TV (Bellingham, Washington)	KTNT-TV (Tacoma, Washington)	KOMO-TV (Seattle, Washington)	KING-TV (Seattle, Washngton)
Sunday	50	22	6	9	13
Monday	28	48	3	10	11
Tuesday	27	48	4	8	13
Wednesday	38	28	2	8	24
Thursday	29	40	4	15	12
Friday	34	31	3	16	16
Saturday	40	33	3	12	12
Average Week	36	35	4	11	14

[a] Source: Audience Research Division, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

have this second station owned and operated by the CBC or a private organization?" The result was as follows:

Total		C.B.C.		Private Organization		Other		No Opinion	
No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
675	100	143	21.2	386	57.2	2	0.3	144	21.3

[34]

The findings show that 57.2 per cent favored private competition. Like the British, the Canadians want competition in television. The British did not necessarily desire commercial competition initially. The Canadians, on the other hand, requested not only competition, but the alternative (if the figures can be assumed to be valid) should be private, therefore entirely dependent on commercial revenue, they said.

C.B.C. Policies and Television

When television was in its beginning stage in Canada, and radio was full grown, the latter was well interspersed with those cultural programs that were intended to serve minorities. A C.B.C. official defined the Aird-inspired C.B.C. policy to a parliamentary committee in 1946 this way:

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[34] *Fowler Report* ("Supplement No. 17 to the Brief of the Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters").

> CBS does not try to obtain a mass audience all the time. We must recognize the the existence of minority groups whose tastes must be taken into account. The easy and profitable way of doing this is to put programs that are not supposed to be big audience builders into periods outside peak listening time. This we have resolutely refused to do. If you care to check our program schedules, you will find what are often supposed to be selected audience programs occupying the very best listening periods. . . . As a matter of fact many people are inclined to underestimate the general standards of public taste.[35]

This was similar to the program pyramid envisaged by Sir William Haley as applying to the B.B.C. The C.B.C. "Wednesday Night" schedule contains programs of high cultural content, which have for a number of years won the C.B.C. a large number of awards at the annual Ohio State Institute on Radio Education.[36] Also, the C.B.C. has always imported the best of United States programs to satisfy the demand for American name stars and popular American network programs. This has resulted in a mixture of the desired Canadian talent with imported United States talent to give a rich bill of fare.[37]

In television the "lead not follow" formula has been worked for. "Despite some divergent views tenaciously held," wrote the Fowler Commission, "there is general commendation for the nature and quality of the corporation's broadcasts."[38]

There were indications that the C.B.C., because of new challenges from television, was not repeating the cultural pattern it promulgated for radio. As Robert Glynn phrased it:

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[35] E. L. Bushnell, quoted by Siepmann, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[36] Siepmann, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[37] Sumner, *op cit.*, p. 70. There is the possibility that such choice imports from America will spoil the Canadians. Wrote the Fowler Commission: "The problem of the influence on Canada from the United States is not mainly that American television programmes are too bad, but many of them are, in a special sense, too good. . . . The great artistic wealth of the United States is able to produce programmes of great variety and interest. . . . To match such American programmes is a difficult but essential task of Canadian Television." *Fowler Report*, p: 66.

[38] *Fowler Report*, p. 41. At a recent exhibition of television programs in Columbus, Ohio (the aforementioned Ohio State Institute on Radio Education), Canadian television got one first-place award, and three honorable mentions. "TV Spreads North," *America*, XCIV (December 24, 1955), 348.

> In radio, the CBC has developed a satisfactory compromise between the demand for entertainment and the necessity for culture. In television, while the announced policy is to continue this approach, the results are actually quite different. . . .[39]

Another writer who also found that television compared unfavorably with radio said that, when radio was ascendent, the C.B.C. was second to none:

> Our guilt in Canada has been a lack of boldness. In radio we had a giant in the . . . producer Andrew Allan. He was daring, and he had the talent and backing of the CBC brass, to provide what is universally acknowledged as the best radio drama series in the world. . . . [Now American television executives] look across the border and smile at pale carbon copies of their worst programs.[40]

Although this is exaggerated criticism, it indicates that television is developing program trends different from the pattern of radio. Even the Fowler Commission conceded that "there was virtually no complaint that CBC programming was too high brow; indeed there was some demand for a greater proportion of the more serious types of broadcasts."[41]

When television was first inaugurated, there were not too many commercials, and a lot of sustaining programs were furnished by the C.B.C. to private stations as they went on the air.[42] In 1956 A. Davidson, Dunton, chairman of the C.B.C. board of governors, said: "No large amount in commercial revenues for the corporation during the year can be forseseen."[43] Now the situation is different. Sponsors are clamoring for advertising time, and each year the C.B.C. increases its advertising. Gross commercial revenue for television advertising jumped 32.9 per cent from 1956 to 1957.[44]

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[39] Glynn, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[40] "Television's March to Nowhere," *Saturday Night*, LXXII (January 5, 1957), 9.

[41] *Fowler Report*, p. 41.

[42] It is contended by some that the private stations might have gone into bankruptcy while still young, had it not been for this supply of C.B.C. programs. See: William Brennan, "Canadian Agency Creativity, Stymied by Sponsorship," *Advertising Agency Magazine*, XLIX (May, 1956), 52.

[43] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report, 1955-1956* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956), 2.

[44] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *Annual Report, 1956-1957* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), 51. Radio's gross commercial revenue from advertising dropped 26.6 per cent in the same time period.

In proposing some specific instances wherein the corporation might gain increased revenue from advertising, the Fowler Commission said:

> . . . We should guard against the impression that we are recommending some abandonment of basic CBC policies or the sudden expansion of commercial activities. We have no desire to see the CBC become more commercial or to have its programme production slanted to attract greater advertising support. We have simply tried to say that the CBC is to continue to be engaged in some commercial activities, and when it is so engaged it should do so with skill and vigour.[45]

Private Broadcasters and the C.B.C.

In Canada radio and television advertising is highly developed by the private stations which are sensitive about their status and security. When the C.B.C. expanded its commercial operations, the commercial stations became wary and voiced their opinions. The C.B.C. does not like to regard private stations as competitors:

> It will be seen that, while there is a great deal of essential mutual co-operation between public and private elements of the system, there is little or no competition. Except for some minor overlapping, all stations are serving different audiences.[46]

This feeling is backed by official declarations. The private broadcasters were told by the Massey Commission, for example, that they were not regarded as competitors with public enterprise broadcasting, but rather as ancillary operators supplementing the C.B.C.'s services.[47]

The Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, representing most of the private stations, has disagreed with this by saying:

> The only commodity which a broadcasting station has for sale to the advertising public is audience. Surveys indicate fairly accurately the listening habits of any given audience. The advertising public knows what it is buying when it contracts for time on a station. Therefore the element of audi-

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[45] *Fowler Report*, pp. 185-186.

[46] *Fowler Report* (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Brief to the Fowler Commission," p. 13).

[47] "Canada Looks at TV," *Economist*, CLXXVII (September 17, 1955), 952. Charles A. Siepmann described the private stations as "vestigial organs . . . surviving from a past era in which neither of Canada's paramount requirements—that it should be widespread and predominantly native in its cultural accent and emphasis—was satisfactorily met." Siepmann, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

> ence competition immediately creates competition between Corporation and private stations for business.[48]

It further stated that "Competition occurs regularly at the national level. When a national advertiser contracts for network business on the CBC, its advertising budget is diverted from individual placements on private stations."[49]

Even individual C.B.S. television stations are in direct competition with private stations, claimed the Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters. "A national or a local advertiser placing business on the Corporation's television station in the Maritime area is reducing his appropriation for purchase of time on private radio and television stations in that area," it deduced.[50]

However, after such laboring of the point, the association admitted to the Fowler Commission: "We are quite happy to welcome wide open competition of the CBC." The Fowler Commission in effect agreed with this by saying: "Where the CBC and private stations are, or should be, engaged in the same type of operation, competition should be open and vigorous." But it cautioned: "This is not to say that competition should apply over the whole area of CBC operations, or that there are not functions which the CBC should undertake at public cost which private operators cannot be expected to undertake."[51]

But the private broadcasters are not satisfied to compete as suggested until the body with which they compete ceases to govern them and regulate them. They fear the C.B.C. as a "judge, jury, policeman, competitor, prosecutor, hangman all in one."[52] They complain that they are "bound in the web of a power-hungry Corporation more interested in empire-building than in programming," and were engaged in a "potato sack race with the State broadcasting agency."[53] If by this they meant they were financially hamstrung by the C.B.C. regulations, then this can be partially tested by the following figures.

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[48] *Fowler Report* (Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, "Supplement No. 16, Part I," pp. 3-4).

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *Fowler Report*, p. 177.

[52] Alfred Jaffe, "Canadian Radio and Television: 1955," *Sponsor*, IX (August 22, 1955), 56-57.

[53] *Fowler Report*, p. 148.

Of 144 Canadian private stations surveyed in 1955, it was found that 111 operated at a profit and 33 at a loss. Of those making a profit, three made over one million dollars profit. Of fourteen television stations which had been operating for only a year, nine were operating at a profit, and five showed a loss.[54] With nearly a third of the private radio stations and more than a third of the private television stations operating at a loss, the pleas of the commercial broadcasters take on a new light.

Although private stations have specific "local service" duty to themselves, they can rightly call broadcasting in Canada monopolistic. As one writer said:

> It is true that the CBC has, for all practical purposes, a monopoly, since the conditions under which the independent stations operate are largely determined by CBC regulations. . . . In any event this quasi-monopolistic position naturally draws certain criticism, as does any monopoly.[55]

The Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters' demands for an independent regulatory body have had a long history and that history has been replete with refusals by the succeeding governments to take the regulatory power away from the C.B.C. The writer of this thesis agrees with one comment: "The advent of television seems to have intensified this basic disagreement."[56]

The Fowler Commission has acknowledged that the issue of a separate regulatory body has come to a head.[57] Public opinion seemed to be aroused.[58] There has always been newspaper sniping at the C.B.C., and there were press statements, definitely anti-C.B.C., submitted to the Fowler Commission.[59] Answering what it felt to be genuine public demand, the Fowler Commission proposed a "Board of Broadcast Governors," replacing the C.B.C. Board of Governors, but responsive to Parliament and public opinion, and regulating both public and private stations as integral parts of "only one broadcasting system in Canada."[60]

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[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 148-152.

[55] Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 70

[56] Lloyd Mussolf, "Canadian Public Enterprise: A Character Study," *American Political Science Review*, L (June, 1956), 415.

[57] "Outside of Parliament there has been an almost constant atmosphere of debate and criticism, fomented and fostered to some extent by the public activities of the private broadcasters," said the Commission. *Fowler Report*, p. 127.

[58] See: "Television and Freedom," *The Canadian Forum*, XXXII (May, 1953), 27. This discusses how the public has been propaganized by the Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters.

Although the Fowler Commission's suggestions were quite different from those of the Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, its calling for an independent regulatory board represented an official recognition of the growth of the validity of the association's argument. One observer wrote:

> There was some scattered editorial comment in the press which made it appear that the Commission's recommendations to eliminate the present Board of Governors in favor of a Board of Broadcasting Governors, was a concession to CARTB, which all along urged the creation of a separate regulatory body.[61]

But the long standing philosophy of Canadian broadcasting remains intact—a system in which both C.B.C. and private stations are combined, integral parts and such a system regulated by a single board, responsible to Parliament and sensitive to the public interest.

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[59] The newspapers earlier attacked the C.B.C. and recommended a separate independent board because they felt that the C.B.C. would control facsimile broadcasting (Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 74). Now, however, newspapers have figured heavily in the ownership of television stations in Canada, and would therefore campaign as members of the Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters for less C.B.C. power. For example, Southam Newspapers (publisher of *Calgary Herald*), owns 33⅓ per cent of CHCT-TV; 33⅓ per cent of CHCH-TV, Hamilton; it also figures in the ownership of seven radio stations. (*Television Factbook, No. 21, Fall-Winter, 1955*, p. 57.) See: *Broadcasting-Telecasting, Yearbook-Marketbook, 1957-58*, pp. 277-285 for information as to ownership; also, *International Television Almanac, 1955*, pp. 639-641. It is interesting that *Calgary Herald* editorials, anti-C.B.C., were submitted to the Fowler Commission by the Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, in a pamphlet titled "Freedom of the Air."

[60] The private broadcasters desired a regulatory agency separate from one which would remain to regulate the C.B.C. Further, they specified that it should be "unresponsive to Parliament." (*Fowler Report*, p. 132.) This was designed to give the private stations a great deal more freedom than the Fowler Commission was willing to grant them. The commission also felt that "the presence of private elements in our broadcasting system should be clearly accepted as valuable and permanent, but that the performance level of private stations should be a high one to justify the grant to them of valuable public rights—higher in fact than it has been, with some notable exceptions, in the past." *Fowler Report*, p. 133; pp. 144-145. An analysis of Canadian television and sound radio programs was prepared by Professor Dallas W. Smythe for the Commission, and is published in a separate volume to the *Fowler Report*, and listed as "Appendix XIV."

[61] Miriam Waddington, *Canadian Forum*, XXXVI (May, 1957), 37.

Such a concept, as agreed to by the Fowler Commission, has not yet been implemented. That remains for political parties and the government to decide. What have been the attitudes of the major Canadian political parties?

The Political Parties and Television

The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, forerunner of the C.B.C., was created in 1932 by the Conservatives. As was the case in Britain, Conservatives in Canada nurtured a public corporation-type broadcasting service. The Conservatives were motivated more by considerations of nationalism than by party philosophy. Prime Minister Bennett told the House:

> First of all, this country must be assured of complete Canadian control of broadcasting from Canadian sources, free from foreign interference or influence . . . so that national consciousness may be fostered and sustained and national unity still further strengthened.[62]

At that time private stations were at best being considered as ancillary and unimportant. Gradually, however, commercial radio lobbying developed, and the private stations found more members of the Conservative Party supporting their cause as time went by.

In 1948, at the Conservative Party Convention, a resolution was passed on behalf of the Canadian private broadcasters, in favor of (1) establishing a separate regulatory body, (2) allowing private stations to operate their own networks, and (3) abolishing the license fee.[63] This indicated that some phases of broadcasting were becoming a political issue.

The private stations and the Conservatives criticized the license fee because both knew that it was high unpopular.[64] Consequently, the Liberal-dominated Parliament, fearing the issue, cancelled the fee in 1953. While this was a procedure of practical politics, it demonstrated nonetheless that commercial radio lobbyists were becoming articulate and politically powerful.

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[62] Canada, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), III (1932), 3035-3036.

[63] Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

[64] The *Fowler Report* states (p. 275): "The experience with the small /$2.50/ radio license fee was not satisfactory, collection was expensive, evasions were high and nobody liked it. In the circumstances, whatever the theoretical merits of a license fee on receiving sets may be, we think the reimposition of such a tax in Canada is impracticable and we recommend against it."

The Canadian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters was dissatisfied with the Fowler Commission idea of an independent board. The association had in mind a private body along the lines of the United States Federal Reserve Board. Some Conservatives had argued this point in Parliamentary debate,[65] and there were expectations that they might make it a political issue in the 1957 elections.[66] This did not develop.

In summary, there exists some polarity in the major parties over broadcasting. Because of such difference, it may be that minor changes in broadcasting have been suggested, but probably not significant ones. Why? Both parties are agreed on the principle of keeping the finger in the Canadian cultural dike, as it were. As one Canadian stated:

> We are, as a nation, addicts of Tin Pan Alley, of Hollywood, and of American radio and T.V. Over increasing pressure we maintain the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, but there can be little doubt that, if the C.B.C. is not substantially maintained and subsidized, our radio and T.V. stations will increasingly seek the comparatively easy money to be found in affiliation with the United States Networks.[67]

On the other hand, only a few leaders, such as one lesser M.P., are willing to make a statement such as this:

> On the broad principles I am not so worried as some people seem to be with respect to American influence in this country as far as radio and television are concerned. As a matter of fact, we are having it now; we have always had it; and some of the best and most popular programs over our networks, and this will probably be the case with our television networks for years to come, are American productions.[68]

Finances and Television

Until 1953, the revenues of the corporation were obtained from license fees collected from Canadian set owners, the proceeds from commercial broadcasts, and an annual statutory grant. The government announced abolition of the license fee in 1953, thus ending its seventeen-year unpopular life. C.B.C. income from this source was to be supplanted by the proceeds from a 15 per cent excise tax levied on radio and television sets and tubes.[69]

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[65] See: Canada, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), VI (1953-54), 5815.

[66] "Canada Maps New Plan for Its Radio and TV Network," *Business Week* (April 6, 1957), 73.

[67] George Victor Ferguson, "Likely Trends in Canadian-American Political Relations," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXII (November, 1956), 445.

[68] Canada, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), V (1953-54), 5525.

The early television development was financed through loans from the government; smaller loans have since been secured in connection with additional construction.

Television has, as in Britain, brought a reappraisal of the broadcasting objectives. The London *Economist,* with benefit of an "overseas" perspective, observed of Canadian television:

> The real reason for the new /Fowler/ inquiry is not that CBC's present television programmes are proving contentious, nor that the commercial interests are campaigning against it, nor even that the Conservative opposition likes to make a whipping boy of the CBC. All these things are true, and they have something to do with the government's dilemma. But none of them would have been enough to prompt a new major inquiry into television and broadcasting policy. What makes this inevitable is that television is proving so very costly that the government do not know how to go about financing it.[70]

Constructing a nationwide television system has precipitated a crisis in C.B.C. financing. Although the corporation experienced postwar financial difficulties because of rising costs of labor and materials,[71] it was not until television came into being that the expense of maintaining a somewhat idealistic broadcasting system was regarded as serious.

It will be noted in Table IV that television set sales provided sufficient revenue for the C.B.C. for the first two years. But the near-saturation point was reached by 1957, at which time it was reported that approximately 2.5 million sets had been sold, and 62 per cent of Canadian households had sets.[72] The excise tax after saturation would not be expected to keep up with rising expenditure. Midway through the 1955-1956 fiscal year the C.B.C. slipped from surplus to deficit

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[69] *Fowler Report,* p. 255.

[70] "Canada Looks at TV," *Economist,* CLXXVII (September 17, 1955), 952.

[71] Prior to television the C.B.C. experienced deficits in 1945, 1946, 1947, 1949, 1950, and 1951. Because of government loans and a surplus built up during the war, as late as 1949 "the financial status of the CBC in spite of a paper deficit . . . gave no serious cause for alarm." Sumner, *op. cit.,* p. 51.

[72] Figures are from the Audience Research Division, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and are in the present possession of the writer.

TABLE IV

SUMMARY OF RADIO-TELEVISION INCOME AND EXPENSE OF THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 1952-1956[a]

INCOME (Thousands of Dollars)

Year	Excise Tax (on sale of radio and television sets and parts)	Commercial Broadcasting	Total Income (including other sources)
1952		$2,456	$14,814
1953		3,032	15,359
1954	$16,760	3,806	27,431
1955	21,470	6,263	34,736
1956	22,800	9,134	38,942

EXPENSE

Year	Total Expense	Surplus or (Deficit)
1952	$11,491	$3,323
1953	14,982	377
1954	20,863	6,568
1955	30,468	4,268
1956	40,301	(1,359)

[a] Source: *Fowler Report*, p. 452. Both income and expense reports here omit detailed breakdowns contained in the original financial sheets.

TABLE V

A FORECAST OF NET OPERATING EXPENDITURE FOR THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION.[a]

(Thousands of Dollars)

Year ending March 31	Radio	Television	Radio and Television
1958	$13,515	$30,723	$44,238
1959	13,960	36,170	50,130
1960	14,496	41,266	55,762
1961	15,099	46,743	61,842
1962	15,763	51,749	67,512
1963	16,519	57,390	73,909

[a] Source: *Fowler Report*, pp. 262-263.

status, and has remained in such a position ever since. The corporation is now spending the reserve accumulated in the earlier plush years. It had to ask Parliament for a twelve million dollar special grant to last it until March of 1957.

A forecast of the future expenses of the C.B.C., as shown in Table V, shows that the corporation's television expenses will not level off before 1963, but will climb steadily.

The forecast in Table V shows more than 11 per cent increase per year. The rise in C.B.C. expenditure is substantial, but it must be treated with reservations. The period between 1950 and 1955 was one of development and it may well be therefore that the rate of increase would decline. Indeed, the Fowler Commission found that of its predicted increase of $26.66 million between 1958 and 1963, $18.75 million are not for three items which are outside any normal television growth in step with Canadian economic growth.[73] This means that new television expenses temporarily would make the C.B.C. appear to be expanding faster than the rate of national economic expansion. The three items are (a) extension of hours of television broadcasting;[74] (b) introduction of color television;[75] and (c) increasing television coverage to serve about 10 per cent more Canadians.[76] All three of these the commission regards as certain to come and necessary.

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[73] *Fowler Report*, p. 264. The commission was at once curious to know why the predicted rate of increase in broadcasting expenditures was at 11 per cent each year, when the Parliamentary report of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects estimated that expansion in constant dollars would be a little over 4 per cent each year for the Canadian economy as a whole.

[74] This is discussed in the *Fowler Report*, pp. 218-225. "Above all, the Canadian television service was still behind the ever-present and always apparent example of American Television." (*Fowler Report*, p. 264.) It compared the average Canadian broadcasting week of 62 hours to that of two United States television stations, who each broadcast 116 hours per week.

Can the C.B.C sustain itself through commercial revenue? Canadian television homes are so widely scattered over vast distances as to require 35 stations to serve them. Thus the cost of distributing any television program to the 2.5 million television sets must include not only operating expenses of each of 35 stations, but also the operating costs of thousands of miles of cable or microwave links.[77] The station operating costs and line charges are much the same in the United States and Canada, yet the expense of distributing a television program to all Canadian set owners is much higher than the United States on a per-set figure.

United States networks, which only recently began to make profit, claim that thirty million sets must be reached through 55 affiliates. That is the minimum "buy" offered a sponsor.[78]

The close relationship of advertising to sales indicates that any significant television advertising increases for the C.B.C. can result only from growth of the nation's economy. This is so for two major reasons.

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[75] ". . . We fear that Canada has very little choice in the matter /of color television/," stated the Fowler Commission. See: *Fowler Report*, pp. 191-194.

[76] In stating, "In theory, since all Canadians pay taxes directly or indirectly, they should receive the same service. In practice, such perfect equity . . . cannot be achieved . . .", the commission recommended that television be extended from the present 80 per cent coverage to 90 per cent. *Ibid.*, pp. 221-225.

[77] According to the 1956-1957 C.B.C. annual report, total network service expenditure ran around three million dollars for the year ended at March, 1957. Line charges for networking are especially expensive because of the great expanse of Canada geographically. Private stations affiliated with the C.B.C. network get 50 per cent of their rate card if they carry sponsored shows (American affiliates get approximately 30 per cent); they pay no line charge or commission; furthermore, they may carry C.B.C. sustaining shows. Advertisers benefit too, since the C.B.C. pays 30 to 50 per cent of program production cost. See: Glynn, *op. cit.*, p. 114. Comparatively high expense is involved in C.B.C. program production also. Roger Lemelin, writer for the "Plouffe Family," gets $75,000 a year. Frank Rasky, "Canada's TV Writers: Timid but Slick," *Saturday Night*, LXXII (October 27, 1956) 10-12. The C.B.C. must offer handsome salaries for talent and producers because: (1) there is unionization of C.B.C. workers; (2) there is always the lure of United States fame and riches with which to compete.

[78] *Fowler Report* ("Brief submitted to the Fowler Commission by Zenith Radio Corporation"). Canadian advertising agencies are not agreed on whether C.B.C. network rates are reasonable. The ones who do not think so always compare costs with those in the more populous United States. See: *Sponsor*, Section 2, X (August 20, 1956), 19-20.

The C.B.C. will not realize very much more revenue in the "single station" areas, for it is rather predictable that the second station, when it comes, will be private—and competing for advertising.[79]

Secondly, the new markets which the C.B.C. might serve have less than 25,000 people. With other advertising media competing in those areas, it is difficult to see how advertising from such markets would outweigh distribution and station costs for the C.B.C.[80]

The C.B.C., then, must turn to the government to provide what expenses it cannot meet from advertising. Will Canadians pay for their broadcasting, rendered so expensive by television?

National policy in Canada, at least in broadcasting, has a big price. Responsible Canadians will support such determinism, apparently. This position, which has been made abundantly clear by political spokesmen, was reiterated forcefully by Professor A. A. M. Lower of Queen's University, who concluded that

> . . . the continued existence of Canada as a significant nation depends to a much larger degree than most people assume upon the continuance of a public broadcasting and television service of the widest scope and with ample financial resources, that the country must be prepared to pay for this essential sevice just as it is prepared to pay for its transcontinental railways and its national tariff policy, that private persons or organizations who would weaken the public are very close to being disloyal citizens and that any public body, such as the Government, which fails to make clear the necessity of the public medium to the people of Canada is failing in its duty to that people and further, that I cannot, in my most pessimistic moments, imagine the public authorities deliberately selling out the public broadcasting service, either directly or indirectly and thereby at the same time selling out the nation whose interest they have been elected to guard and protect.[81]

The Fowler Commission, feeling much the same way, favored a plan of financing based on one of the recognized "measurements of national economic activity," the index of which would guide annual statutory payments from the government over an arbitrary period of five years.[82] By assuring such long-term subsidization (in addition to increased advertising revenue), the Commission felt that the C.B.C. could operate a broadcasting service with a "clearly defined objective and an assured revenue adequate to discharge that duty—and no more." For more revenue the commission also recommended continuing the excise tax, increasing program exports to other countries, and increasing C.B.C. advertising.[83]

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[79] The Fowler Commission recommended that the new stations be private and unaffiliated, and admitted that "there will be the pressure to take as much advertising as possible." *Fowler Report*, p. 230. This is understandable, for sponsors are clamoring for time in the monopoly areas.

[80] *Fowler Report* ("Brief submitted to the Fowler Commission by Zenith Radio Corporation").

[81] *Fowler Report* ("Brief submitted by Professor A. R. M. Lower of Queen's University to the Royal Commission").

Is there a future for television in Canada? The Fowler Commission, speaking representatively for the government and people of Canada, and also voicing the national sensitivity, stated:

> The Canadian answer, irrespective of party or race, has been uniformly the same for nearly a century. We are prepared, by measures of assistance, financial aid and a conscious stimulation, to compensate for our disabilities of geography, sparse population and vast distances, and we have accepted this as a legitimate role of government in Canada.[84]

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[82] An M.P. objected to this plan later, saying: "I would deplore and oppose anything that is likely to make any less clear and vital and strong the contrast between the corporation and this house." Canada, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), VI (1956), 6602-6603.

[83] *Fowler Report,* p. 278.

[84] *Ibid.,* p. 9.

PURPOSE OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR PROFESSIONAL BROADCASTING EDUCATION

The purpose of this organization is to secure mutual advantages that flow from a continuing relationship between broadcasters and institutions of higher learning which offer a high standard of training and guidance for those who plan to enter the profession of broadcasting.

These are the fundamental objectives of the Association:

To improve the services of broadcasting.

To facilitate exchange of information on broadcasting.

To bring together to their mutual advantage those in broadcasting and those in institutions of higher learning.

To facilitate employment at maximum effectiveness for those who meet the standards of institutions of higher learning and of broadcasting.