

94th Congress }
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ON THE
EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107, THE
SPORTS ANTIBLACKOUT LAW, ON THE
BROADCASTING OF SOLD-OUT HOME
GAMES OF PROFESSIONAL FOOT-
BALL, BASEBALL, BASKETBALL,
AND HOCKEY

—
SUBMITTED TO


HON. WARREN G. MAGNUSON, *Chairman*

FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE



JUNE 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce,
United States Senate



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WASHINGTON : 1976

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1976.

HON. WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
*Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to transmit herewith the Third Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the Effect of P.L. 93-107, the sports anti-blackout law, on professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey.

I trust this report will be useful to your committee.

Sincerely,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

Enclosure.

(III)

Effect of the Sports Anti- Blackout Law

Prepared by
The Federal Communications Commission



3rd Annual Report
June 1976

THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
ON THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107,
THE SPORTS ANTI-BLACKOUT LAW,
ON THE BROADCASTING OF SOLD-OUT HOME GAMES OF
PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, BASEBALL, BASKETBALL, AND HOCKEY

June, 1976

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INTRODUCTION

In 1961, the United States Congress granted owners of professional football, baseball, basketball and hockey teams an exemption from the sanction of the antitrust laws, authorizing joint agreements to pool and sell package rights to telecasts of professional sporting events.^{1/} The legislation also provided protection for intercollegiate football games from the telecasts of professional football games. When the American and National Football leagues merged in 1966, further protection for non-professional contests from professional telecasts was added to the law.^{2/}

The primary premise for permitting owners to prohibit telecasts in their home areas -- popularly referred to as a "blackout" -- was to assist clubs in achieving financial stability. By the early 1970's, many members of Congress were convinced that financial stability among professional sports franchise holders had been achieved.

Legislation passed in 1973 (Public Law 93-107) amended the Communications Act of 1934.^{3/} Known as the "Sports Anti-Blackout Law", P.L. 93-107 provided that if any game of a professional baseball, basketball, football, or hockey club was to be televised on a network pursuant to a league contract and all tickets for seats made available 120 hours (five days) or more before the scheduled beginning time of the game had been sold 72 hours

^{1/} This exemption was a qualified one, however, applying only to agreements which limited blackouts to the home territory of a member when that club was playing at home. See Public Law 87-331 § 1, Sept. 30, 1961, 75 Stat. 732.

^{2/} Public Law 89-800, § 6(b)(3), Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1515

^{3/} See Philip R. Hochberg, "Congress Tackles Sports and Broadcasting", Western State University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring, 1976), pp 223-249

(three days) or more before, no so-called local blackout agreement preventing the televising of the game at the same time and in the area in which the game was to be played would have any force or effect.^{4/} Before the enactment of the anti-blackout law, local television blackouts had been imposed by the various leagues on the theory that they were necessary to preserve and promote the live game attendance. The rationale for the legislation, however, was that professional sports had benefited from previous antitrust exemptions. It seemed justifiable that in return for such benefits, the public should be given the opportunity to view sold-out games of the local team on television. Congress did acknowledge that the legislation might cause some financial loss to professional sports business from decreased revenues of parking franchises and concessionaires due to possible additional "no shows"^{5/} at locally televised games. It was believed, however, that the benefits from local telecasts of home games would outweigh any potential detrimental effects.^{6/}

The anti-blackout law was adopted on a three-year trial basis during which the Federal Communications Commission was to report annually on the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional sports. The two preceding annual reports of the FCC have failed to show any significant injury to pro-

^{4/} Public Law 93-107, Sept. 14, 1973, 87 Stat. 350

^{5/} "No shows" are defined as patrons who have already purchased tickets for an event but choose not to attend.

^{6/} House Report 93-483, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 11, 1973)
Senate Report 93-347, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (July 26, 1973)

fessional sports from telecasts of sold-out home games.^{7/}

The following is the Third Annual FCC report to Congress on the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional football, baseball, basketball and hockey.

^{7/} Report of the Federal Communications Commission: The Effect of Public Law 93-107, the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, on the Broadcasting of Sold-out Home Games of Professional Football, Baseball, Basketball and Hockey. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April, 1974.

Second Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the Effect of Public Law 93-107, the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, on the Broadcasting of Sold-out Home Games of Professional Football, Baseball, Basketball and Hockey. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April, 1975.

I. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 ON PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, BASEBALL,
BASKETBALL AND HOCKEY: GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

In a letter dated March 22, 1976, the Honorable John O. Pastore, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Communications, requested that the Federal Communications Commission provide an "analysis of the effects of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law during the past full three year period on all four professional sports which were included in the law."^{1/} The results of this analysis are summarized below. The reader will note that most of the discussion pertains to professional football. This is simply due to the fact that Public Law 93-107 has had a relatively greater applicability to this sport, than to professional baseball, basketball or hockey, due primarily to the higher incident of televised professional football games. Additionally, the National Football League has provided the Commission with an extensive amount of information on the number of televised games, ticket sales, live gate attendance and concession revenues, all of which were necessary to thoroughly assess the effect of the legislation. A lesser amount of information was available for the other three professional sports. Consequently, the analysis on each was less extensive.

B. Professional Football

An effort was made to assess the impact of Public Law 93-107 on each of the 26 member clubs of the National Football League, as well as on the League as a whole. Four different issues were addressed in the study concerning the effect of Public Law 93-107 on; (1) the number of locally televised games and ticket sales; (2) the number of "no shows" at NFL games; (3) revenues earned

^{1/} Letter from Senator John O. Pastore to Richard E. Wiley, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, March 22, 1976.

from the sale of concessions, stadium parking, and "PRO" magazine; and, (4) local television audience ratings for NFL games. Summaries of the findings are provided below.

1. Locally Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Public Law 93-107 has resulted in an increase in local television coverage of the home games of all but two NFL teams, the New Orleans Saints and the San Diego Chargers. All other teams have locally televised one or more home games since the enactment of Public Law 93-107 in 1973.

Prior to that year, member clubs of the NFL blacked out all regular season home games regardless of whether or not those contests were sold out. During 1973, the first year in which Public Law 93-107 was in effect, 109 of the NFL's 182 regular season games were sold out 72 hours in advance and locally televised, as required by the law. A total of 86 home games was locally televised in 1974. Last year, that number declined to 75.

Between 1972 and 1973, total tickets sold to all NFL regular season games increased by three percent. However, in 1974, the NFL experienced its first season decrease in ticket sales since 1968, when total sales fell to 10,236,322 which was about five percent below the number of tickets sold to regular season games in 1973. Last year, ticket sales decreased again, although by less than one percent.

Lower ticket sales experienced in 1974 and 1975 can largely be attributed to a decline in season ticket sales during both of those years. For example, the total number of season tickets sold fell by 6.1 percent in 1974 and decreased again last year by 5.3 percent.

The NFL believes that the downturn in season ticket sales was a direct result of locally televised games. The league has consistently argued that fans are less inclined to purchase season tickets if given the opportunity to watch home games on television. However, the results of an analysis of season ticket sales (see Appendix A of this report) indicate that the NFL's fear in this respect is unfounded. Specifically, the findings demonstrate that the average number of season tickets sold by NFL teams increased when the number of home games locally televised during the preceding season also increased as a result of Public Law 93-107.^{2/} Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the NFL's total ticket sales have not been seriously affected by the Sports Anti-Blackout Law.

2. "No Shows"

Given the NFL's concern that Public Law 93-107 has proven detrimental to live gate attendance, an effort was made to analyze those factors which influenced the number of "no shows" experienced by each of the 26 member clubs of the NFL over the past four seasons. Specifically, the statistical technique employed in this study permits one to assess whether and to what extent "no shows" were dependent upon: (1) locally televised games, (2) temperature, (3) the presence of some form of precipitation, (4) the won-loss records or divisional standings of both home and visiting teams, and (5) other factors which influenced "no shows" and which were also peculiar to any of the four seasons under consideration. It should also be noted, however, that these factors or variables did not account for or "explain" the total number of "no shows" experienced by each of the teams. However, in most instances they did account for a relatively large proportion of the variation in the live gate attendance at a team's home games.

The results of the empirical analyses of the live gate attendance at games of each of the 26 NFL clubs indicate that four teams -- the Atlanta Falcons, the

^{2/} The analysis further demonstrated that season ticket sales were influenced by the teams' won-loss records in the preceding season as well as the size of the population of the market in which the franchises are located. That is, teams which won more games in the preceding year, sold more season tickets. Additionally, teams which played in relatively large cities, generally sold more season tickets than did teams playing in cities with smaller populations.

Dallas Cowboys, the Miami Dolphins, and the Los Angeles Rams -- experienced a significant increase in the number of "no shows" when their games were locally televised. Furthermore, the analyses show that these increases were principally attributable to Public Law 93-107. However, it should also be noted that locally televised games do not account for all "no shows" experienced by these teams. With the exception of Los Angeles, attendance was also influenced by the weather -- that is, a larger number of ticket holders stayed home when the weather was bad, regardless of whether or not those games were carried on local television stations.

The relationship between Public Law 93-107 and "no shows" is particularly notable in the cases of Miami and Atlanta. During the 1973 season when all seven of the Dolphins' home games were locally televised, 21 percent of all ticket holders failed to attend games. In 1974, three games were locally televised. About 21 percent of all ticket holders failed to attend the three televised games while 13 percent did not attend the four non-televised contests. Last year, none of the team's home games was telecast locally and the percentage of ticket holders who chose not to attend those games fell to 8.5 percent. Atlanta "no shows" also increased when home games were locally televised. The blackout was lifted on all seven home games in both 1973 and 1974. "No shows" were equivalent to 15.8 percent of total tickets sold in 1973 and 35.7 percent in 1974. Although no home games were locally televised last year, 19 percent of all tickets sold went unused. It is not readily apparent why these two particular teams were affected by Public Law 93-107 in this manner and to this degree.

Although Public Law 93-107 has also influenced "no shows" at Dallas and Los Angeles, the problem has been of lesser significance in both instances. For example, the Cowboys lifted the blackout on only four home games; televising three in 1973 and one last year. During the 1973 season, 8.9 percent of all tickets sold for Dallas' locally televised home games were not used, while 4.9 percent of all ticket holders failed to attend blacked-out games. In 1975, 5.3 percent of the tickets sold to

Dallas' single televised home game were not used, whereas 2.4 percent failed to attend the six non-televised contests. All of these percentages were below the league averages of 9.7 percent in 1973 and 8.6 percent in 1975. Los Angeles has locally televised only one home game since 1973. Over 21,000 ticket holders, or 24 percent of the total, failed to attend the game. The analysis, however, suggested that less than half of the total number of "no shows" was apparently due to the game being locally televised. While attendance at other locally televised games could be similarly affected, it is unlikely that the Rams will be able to sell all 91,000 available seats in the L.A. Coliseum for many home games. Hence, Public Law 93-107 does not appear to pose a serious threat to the live gate attendance of this particular franchise.

The number of "no shows" experienced by eight additional NFL teams -- Chicago, Denver, Green Bay, New England, Oakland, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and St. Louis -- appear to have been indirectly affected by locally televised games. In each instance, "no shows" significantly increased when the weather was cold and/or wet. It is conceivable that the fans' unwillingness to attend games under these conditions could have been influenced by local telecasts. Specifically, fans appeared to be less inclined to attend games in bad weather when given the opportunity to see those games on television, than when those contests were not locally televised. Unfortunately, there is no way to differentiate the effect of weather from that of locally televised games, since that relationship depends on the fans' preferences to watch the game in person, as opposed to their unwillingness to sit in a cold and/or wet stadium. An assessment of this type was beyond the scope of the study.

Nevertheless, with the exception of Chicago and Philadelphia (in 1973), these teams enjoyed relatively high gate attendance - that is, the percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend all home games of these seven teams was

below the league average.^{3/} Again, the high number of "no shows" at Chicago is probably not entirely due to the locally televised games. Many fans would probably have stayed home in bad weather regardless of whether or not the game was locally televised. This was particularly evident last year when the average number of "no shows" at locally televised Bears' games was lower than the number of "no shows" at blacked-out home games. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that Public Law 93-107 has not posed a serious threat to the live gate attendance of those teams which appear to have been indirectly affected by the legislation.

It should be pointed out that the league has made a greater effort to accurately record the number of "no shows" subsequent to the enactment of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law. The 1972 "no shows" figures, therefore, may be less precise than those figures compiled in subsequent years. If so, the impact of locally televised games on these teams may be of lesser consequence than the figures indicate.

3/

Team	Percentage of Tickets Sold to All Home Games Which Were Not Used		
	1973	1974	1975
Chicago	(7) 18.4%	(6) 25.9%	(2) 16.5%
Denver	(7) 1.6%	(7) 4 %	(7) 7.6%
Green Bay*	(7) 3 %	(7) 4.5%	(7) 8 %
New England	(2) 1.5%	(5) 6.8%	(2) 3.4%
Oakland	(5) 8.1%	(4) 7.3%	(5) 8.5%
Philadelphia	(7) 9.8%	(7) 9.2%	(7) 7.3%
Pittsburgh	(8) 6.4%	(7) 7.6%	(6) 3.3%
St. Louis	(1) 5.9%	(4) 5.9%	(3) 5.2%
League Average	9.7%	11 %	8.6%

The figures in parentheses indicate the number of locally televised home games.

* These figures represent the average percentages of "no shows" for at home games played in Green Bay and Milwaukee.

Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that the Sports Anti-Blackout Law has significantly affected the live gate attendance of the remaining 14 NFL clubs. This is further evidenced by the fact that the percentage of ticket holders who, in 1975, failed to attend blacked-out games (i.e., 9.6 percent) exceeded the percentage who failed to attend locally televised contests (i.e., 7.1 percent).

3. Revenues Earned from Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine Sales

To the extent that locally televised games have adversely affected a team's live gate attendance, Public Law 93-107 has also resulted in a diminution of revenues earned from concessions and "PRO" magazine sales. However, on the basis of the results discussed above, these losses do not appear to have been substantial except in the cases of Miami and Atlanta, during the 1973 and 1974 seasons.

Parking revenues which usually accrue to Municipal authorities and are used to finance the operation of stadiums have not been adversely affected by Public Law 93-107. This is simply because the parking capacity at nearly all NFL stadia is not large enough to handle all the fans' automobiles who wish to drive to the game. Even if a team experienced a large number of "no shows," the demand for stadium parking spaces would very likely exceed the available supply.

4. Audience Ratings

NFL telecasts are one of the most, if not the single most, popular type of programming on television today. On the average, about 30 percent of all households in markets which support NFL franchises watch their home team's

televised games. It is further apparent that most fans clearly prefer to watch the home team's televised games as opposed to games involving other NFL teams. This is particularly true when viewers are able to choose between the two. To illustrate, games involving other teams which were televised at the same time as were the home team games, but on a different network, were viewed in only 6 or 7 percent of all households in the market as compared with an average 30 percent who watched the home team's televised games. Games of other NFL teams which were not broadcast at the same time as the home team's games, were viewed by about 19 percent of all households in all 25 markets which support an NFL franchise.

These findings are further indicative of the enormous popularity of professional football when compared to the ratings of other programs. Most NFL games, of course, are played on Sunday afternoons. Other types of programming aired by network affiliated television stations during this time are usually viewed by only 6 or 7 percent of all television households. Prime time programming (excluding Monday Night Football) attracts larger audiences. But even here, the audience tuned into a particular network affiliated station between 7:00 and 11:00 p.m. generally averages out to only 20 percent of all households in the market. In light of the wide audience appeal of telecasts of home team football games, it can be concluded that Public Law 93-107 has had a substantial public interest benefit in making significantly more of these games available to television viewers.

C. Professional Baseball

Public Law 93-107 has had no effect on professional baseball even though games are televised pursuant to a television contract with the

National Broadcasting Company. NBC carries the Saturday afternoon "Game of the Week," 15 mid-season Monday night games, the All Star Game, the National and American League playoff games and the World Series. That contract requires NBC to locally televise the World Series and the All Star games regardless of whether or not those games were sold out. Moreover, all of the League's championship series was locally televised, even though some games were apparently not sold out 72 hours in advance. As required by the terms of the network contract, all regular season Saturday afternoon and Monday night televised games were blacked out in the markets of both home and visiting teams. Public Law 93-107 has not applied to televised regular season games.

D. Professional Basketball

The impact of Public Law 93-107 on professional basketball has also been minimal. Member clubs of the National Basketball Association play about 780 games during the course of the season. During the 1973-74 season, 40 games were televised pursuant to a network contract. Of these, 14 were broadcast in home team territories, although only four were sold out 72 hours in advance and locally televised as required under Public Law 93-107. During the 1974-75 season, a total of 40 games was again televised, with 20 being aired in the home team's market. However, only seven of the 20 local telecasts were required under the provisions of the legislation. Information provided on the 1975-76 season indicated that 22 regular season NBA games were televised, of which eight were broadcast in home territories. Only four of these 22 games were sold out 72 hours in advance and locally televised in accordance with the legislation.

In conclusion, a very small percentage of NBA games were televised pursuant to a network contract. Although less one half of these televised

games were carried in the home team's market, even fewer (about 13 percent) were required to be locally televised. Moreover, locally televised NBA games have not resulted in substantial increases in "no shows." For example, "no shows" at locally televised games during the 1974-75 season averaged out to about 4 to 5 percent of all tickets sold as compared with 3 percent for non-televised games. The percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend nationally televised NBA games during the 1975-76 season averaged out to 5 percent for blacked-out home games but only 1 percent for telecasts as a result of Public Law 93-107.

Since the enactment of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, member clubs of the American Basketball Association have never locally televised a home game pursuant to the requirements of the law.

E. Professional Hockey

Previous FCC reports have concluded that Public Law 93-107 has had minimal impact on the National Hockey League. In preparing this year's report, the Commission again requested information on: (1) the total number of NHL games played during the 1975-76 season; (2) the number televised pursuant to a network contract; (3) the number locally televised either voluntarily or as required by law; (4) the number of "no shows;" and, (5) concession and parking revenues. The League did not provide data on "no shows" or concession revenues, nor did the NHL specify which of the games were locally televised in accordance with Public Law 93-107 and which were voluntarily televised.

The Commission has received no information from the NHL to change its original conclusion concerning the minimal economic impact of Public Law 93-107 on the National Hockey League. (Telecasts of World Hockey Association games

are handled through local arrangements and, therefore, Public Law 93-107 does not apply to the WHA.)

F. Complaints and Inquiries

The Commission received 14 letters from April, 1975 to April, 1976 alleging violations of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law or raising questions as to its applicability. From April, 1974 to April 1975, there were 39 letters and from September, 1973 to April, 1974, there were 20 letters. No records were kept of complaints and inquiries received by telephone, but there were not a great number of these and, for the most part, they did not warrant Commission inquiry or action. The most common type of complaint concerned the territorial extent of the permissible blackout at football games.

Prior to the enactment of the law, the Commission received over 100 complaints regarding blackouts of professional football games. This year, as well as last, the Commission failed to receive one letter of complaint regarding the law's unfairness to the fan or to any team or league. Not one letter requested that the law be allowed to expire at the end of its three-year life. Instead, most of the complaints received by the Commission dealt with subjects to which the law did not apply, i.e., the territorial extent of the blackout, the number of football games at home. In addition, all of the letters which showed dissatisfaction with the law's application requested changes to allow additional home games to be broadcast within the home territory.

II. PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL

A. INTRODUCTION

The objections of the various sports leagues to anti-blackout legislation have centered on the effect of an increase in "no shows" that is believed to accompany televised home games. The National Football League (NFL) is especially concerned that the continued psychological and financial vitality of their industry depends on live attendance. Additional television exposure, the NFL argued, would 1) oversaturate the sport and lead to a decline in its popularity; 2) result in financial losses to municipal stadiums that require tax compensation from concessions, etc., as well as direct losses to the parking and concession owners themselves (due to "no shows"); and, 3) cause a loss of radio revenues to the teams as well as an audience loss to the stations involved.

The prospect of oversaturation of professional football on television audiences is a major NFL criticism of Public Law 93-107. The League believes that enactment of the law has distorted its previously balanced TV policy which favored restricted exposure of the home team on the local audiences. Since league-wide network contracts were initiated in 1961, the NFL guaranteed home telecasts of every away game of the local team. In 1966, other telecasts as replacement games were brought to the local audience if the team was playing at home. Such a policy "doubled the amount of professional football on network television and resulted in a greater variety of NFL games being made available to the television

viewing public."^{1/} The present average of 74 football telecasts per season, as well as increased coverage of other sports, is believed by the NFL to produce an environment of oversaturation. Declining attendance at pre-season NFL games is blamed on the steady supply of home telecasts now available to National Football League cities.

The fear of a decline in the popularity of professional football emanates from conclusions the NFL has reached about fewer sold-out games and the fear of an increasing number of "no shows." According to the National Football League, Public Law 93-107's effect in 1975 was to create the fewest number of sold-out games since 1970, whereas prior to 1973 the trend was in the opposite direction. This reduction in the number of sellouts is due to the prospect that the game will be televised, according to the NFL, and this is progressively eroding fan interest in buying season tickets.

The NFL believes that the possibility of an increasing number of "no shows" might result in such "no shows" becoming "non-fans". A decline in season ticket sales in 1974-75 is given as an example of the creation of "non-fans." Weather conditions and team standings do not sufficiently account for "no shows" according to the NFL. As proof of the increase in "no shows" from home televised games, the NFL refers to a 100 percent increase in "no shows" from 1972 with 624,686 (when the League was not required to conduct an accurate count of "no shows") to 1,124,162 in 1974. Thirty-eight percent of these "no shows" resulted from games involving 14 teams that the NFL considers

^{1/} "Statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, NFL" in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9566. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 22, Oct. 29-31, 1975) p:72

to have been in playoff contention in 1974-75.^{2/}

Furthermore, the financial losses which the National Football League sees as a possible effect of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law arise from concession sales and parking fees and revenues from the sale of radio broadcast rights. The NFL believes that a decline in concession sales is detrimental to potential revenues of member clubs and also of public stadium owners who require tax compensation from concessions, as well as causing threatened employment losses to vendors and others.^{3/}

Finally, a "substantial" impact of the law is viewed on the sale of radio broadcasting rights. According to the NFL, a two-year loss of \$500,000 in radio revenue as well as an alleged \$1.2 million decrease in advertising to the individual stations is not being offset by increased television revenues as had earlier been predicted.^{4/} The NFL says that local telecasts of games have not greatly increased television ratings since 1973.^{5/}

In summary, while the arguments of the National Football League are substantially the same as in 1973, the NFL believes that it has experienced the most harm from the enactment of Public Law 93-107. The past three seasons, moreover, are not considered by the NFL to be sufficient time to determine the full long-range impact of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law on professional football.

^{2/} Ibid. pp. 70-71

^{3/} Ibid. p. 69

^{4/} Ibid. p. 73

^{5/} Ibid. p. 74

These NFL claims of injury from the effects of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law will be analysed in the sections that follow. The subsequent section will present an overview of locally televised games, ticket sales, general concession revenues, and television audience ratings of NFL games played since the enactment of Public Law 93-107 in September of 1973.

Section C will provide analyses of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on each of the 26 member clubs of the NFL. This will be followed by a brief summary of the Commission's findings and a discussion of the conclusions based thereon.

B. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC-LAW 93-107 ON PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL: AN OVERVIEW OF NFL TELEVISED GAMES, TICKET SALES, "NO SHOWS," CONCESSION REVENUES AND 1973-1975 AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR LOCALLY TELEVISED GAMES.

1. Televised Games: An Overview 1973-1975

In 1973, the first season affected by Public Law 93-107, 109 of the 182 regular season games, or 59.9 percent, were locally televised in home team territories. Since then, the number of home games locally televised pursuant to the legislation has declined. For example, of the 182 regular season games played in 1974, local blackout provisions were lifted on 86 games,^{1/} or 47.3 percent of the total. Last year only 75 games were locally televised which represents 41.2 percent of the total number of regular season games played.^{2/}

Additionally, 11 of the 26 NFL teams, or 42 percent, televised fewer games in 1975 than in 1973. Conversely four teams or 15 percent, televised more games in 1975 than in 1973 while the remaining 11 teams, or 42 percent of the total, televised the same number of home games in 1975 as they did in 1973.

^{1/} Two additional games were sold out 72 hours in advance but not locally televised. The first involved a Cincinnati home game which conflicted with a World Series game in which the Cincinnati Reds were involved. The second involved a Jets game which the local station declined to carry, apparently due to its belief that telecasting a different game would attract a larger audience.

^{2/} In 1975, three of the New York Giants' games were sold out 72 hours in advance but were not locally televised. The first two were played on Saturday afternoons in Shea stadium and were not carried by a network because both contests conflicted with local college football games. Consequently, Public Law 93-107 did not apply. In the third instance, WCBS which normally carries the Giants' home games, televised a Jets game instead. The station was able to do so because WNBC, which normally televises the Jets' games, opted to carry the World Series.

Comparing the 1974 and 1975 seasons, the figures in Table 1 shows that eight teams televised more games in 1975 than in 1974 while eight teams televised fewer. Ten teams televised the same number of home games in 1974 as in 1975.

The total number of home games televised by each of the 26 NFL teams are summarized in Table 1 below. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of NFL teams televising none, one, two, three, four, five, six or all seven home games during each of the past three seasons.

The figures in Table 1 indicate that four teams - Denver, Green Bay, Philadelphia, and Washington televised all 21 home games played during home games played during the same three-year period. Pittsburgh, which had an extra home game in 1973, televised 21 of 22 home games played during the three years. Two other teams, Minnesota and Cincinnati, televised 19 and 18 of each of their 21 games, since the Sports Anti-Blackout Law went into effect.

A total of four teams - Atlanta, Chicago, the New York Jets and Oakland televised between 51 and 75 percent of all home games played during the 1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons. Seven teams - Buffalo, Detroit, Kansas City, Miami, New England, the New York Giants, and Saint Louis televised more than 25 percent but fewer than 50 percent of all 21 home games, while the remaining eight teams - Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, San Diego and San Francisco - televised fewer than 25 percent of all home games played between 1973 and 1975. Additionally two of these eight teams, New Orleans and San Diego, did not televise a single home game while Baltimore and Los Angeles televised only one home game between 1973 and 1975.

Table 2 below gives some indication of the extent to which televised coverage of NFL home games has changed since 1973. The figures reflect a downward trend in the number of locally televised home games. For example, five teams (19.2 percent) did not televise a single home game in 1973, while

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nine (34.6 percent) and six (23.1 percent) teams failed to do so in 1974 and 1975 respectively. Additionally, a total of six teams (23.1 percent) televised only one, two or three home games in 1973 compared with three teams (11.5 percent) in 1974 and 11 (42.6 percent) in 1975. During the past three-year period the number of teams televising between four and six home games stood at six (23 percent) in 1973, increased to seven (27 percent) in 1974 and decreased to four (15 percent) in 1975. Finally, a total of nine teams (35 percent) sold all and subsequently televised all home games in 1973 while only seven (27 percent) and five teams (19 percent) did so in 1974 and 1975 respectively.

While there has been a definite downward trend in the number of locally televised games over the past three seasons, it must be remembered that NFL home games were not televised locally prior to the adoption of Public Law 93-107. As will be demonstrated in a later part of this report, locally televised home games tend to be far more popular than games not involving the home team (see Section 5). Thus, Public Law 93-107 has proven beneficial to professional football fans.

Whether or not the continuation of the Sports Anti-Blackout Legislation proves to be beneficial remains to be seen. If, as the National Football League argues, mandatorily televised home games oversaturate the sport, general interest in football may decline.

However, information provided by the NFL on ticket sales and "no shows" does not conclusively demonstrate a depreciation of interest in professional football. As will be shown later, the analysis of audience ratings for televised professional football games further indicates the sport is one of the most popular types of program on television today. Moreover, there is no evidence that its popularity has diminished since the adoption of Public Law 93-107.

TABLE 1

Summary of the Number of Home Games
Televised by Individual NFL Teams During
the 1973, 1974 and 1975 Seasons

<u>TEAM</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Atlanta	7	7	0
Baltimore	0	0	1
Buffalo	3	4	2
Chicago	7	6	2
Cincinnati	6	7	5
Cleveland	2	1	1
Dallas	3	0	1
Denver	7	7	7
Detroit	3	0	3
Green Bay	7	7	7
Houston	0	1	2
Kansas City	6	0	0
Los Angeles	0	0	1
Miami	7	3	0
Minnesota	7	5	7
New England	2	5	2
New Orleans	0	0	0
NY Giants	6	0	2
NY Jets	4	4	4
Oakland	5	4	5
Philadelphia	7	7	7
Pittsburgh	8	7	6
St. Louis	1	4	3
San Diego	0	0	0
San Francisco	4	0	0
Washington	7	7	7
TOTAL	<u>109</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>75</u>

TABLE 2

Summary of the Number of NFL
Home Games Televised Locally
Between 1973-1975

<u>Home Games Televised</u>	<u>Number of Teams</u>		
	1973	1974	1975
None	5 (19.2%)	9 (34.6%)	6 (23.1%)
One	1 (3.8%)	2 (7.7%)	4 (15.4%)
Two	2 (7.7%)	0 (0%)	5 (19.2%)
Three	3 (11.5%)	1 (3.8%)	2 (7.7%)
Four	2 (7.7%)	4 (15.4%)	1 (3.8%)
Five	1 (3.8%)	2 (7.7%)	1 (3.8%)
Six	3 (11.5%)	1 (3.8%)	2 (7.7%)
Seven	8 (30.8%)	7 (26.9%)	5 (19.2%)
*Eight	1 (3.8%)	---	---
Total Teams	26	26	26
Total Number of Televised Home Games	109	86	75

*In 1973, the Pittsburgh Steelers played 8 home games, all of which were televised.

NOTE: The figures in parentheses denote the percentage of all 26 NFL clubs which televised the specified number of home games during each of the three years. The percentage may not add to 100% due to rounding.

2. Ticket Sales: An Overview 1972-1975

Even though fewer NFL games have been sold out since 1973, total ticket sales for the League's 26 member clubs have remained relatively stable over the four-year period under consideration. Indeed, as the figures in the table below indicate, total ticket sales increased by 3 percent during 1973, the first year of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, when 109 of the 182 regular season games were sold out and subsequently televised in home team territories. In that same year, season ticket sales also increased by 3.8 percent. Even so, NFL clubs sold a lower percentage of available seats in 1973 than in 1972. As the figures indicate, this occurred because the average seating capacity for all stadia increased.

In 1974 the NFL experienced its first decline in annual ticket sales since 1968 when total sales fell by 4.6 percent. Nevertheless, the 10,236,322 tickets sold was still equivalent to approximately 90 percent of all available seats. Moreover, the drop in total ticket sales is largely attributable to a 6.1 percent decline in season ticket sales.

Similar circumstances characterized 1975's ticket sales. Again, the total number of tickets sold decreased, but this time by only .3 percent. On the other hand, season ticket sales fell by 5.3 percent. It is therefore likely that total ticket sales in both 1974 and 1975 would not have declined had the sale of season tickets remained constant.

As noted earlier, the NFL has consistently argued that locally televised games have adversely affected the number of "no shows." The League is also fearful that "no shows" eventually become non-fans and as a consequence do not buy season tickets. Taking this argument one step further, it would follow that Public Law 93-107 is responsible for the recent decline in NFL season ticket sales.

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Summary of Ticket Sales
For All NFL Teams: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total Tickets Sold (percentage change from previous season)	10,455,827	10,730,933	10,236,322	10,207,041
		(3%)	(-4.6%)	(-.3%)
2. Average Stadium Capacity	58,355	62,135	62,453	63,249
3. Average Tickets Sold Per Game				
a) All games	56,964*	58,946	56,255	56,083
b) Locally televised games	-	59,522	57,023	57,087
c) Non-televised games	56,964*	58,089	55,567	55,379
4. Percentage of Stadium Capacity Sold				
a) All games	97.6%*	94.9%	90.1%	88.7%
b) Non-televised games	97.6%*	89.9%	83.6%	83.0%
5. Total Season Tickets Sold (percentage change from previous season)	1,314,485	1,364,780	1,282,218	1,214,106
		(3.8%)	(-6.1%)	(-5.3%)
6. Average Number of Season Tickets Sold Per Team	50,557	52,491	49,316	46,695
7. Number of Televised Games	0	109	86	75

* Excludes ticket sales of the Dallas Cowboys and New Orleans Saints.

Fortunately, the League's argument lends itself to an empirical analysis which has been performed. A thorough discussion of the manner in which this was done can be found in Appendix A. Briefly, the analysis of season ticket sales indicated that Public Law 93-107 has not adversely affected season tickets sold by all 26 NFL teams. Contrary to the NFL's position on this issue, the results indicate that season ticket sales actually increased significantly when fans were able to see locally televised home games played during the preceding season.

This is not particularly surprising. The more television exposure a team receives, the greater the interest on the part of the fans. Moreover, since many people prefer to watch games live, that growing interest is translated into increased season ticket sales.

As expected, season ticket sales were also influenced by the teams won-loss record during the preceding season. Fans are more likely to purchase season tickets when the team is winning. The demand for season tickets was also higher in large cities such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. However, season ticket sales did not prove to be particularly sensitive to changes in price and/or household income. Again, a more thorough explanation of the season ticket sales analysis is provided in Appendix A. Given these findings, it must be concluded that Public Law 93-107 has not adversely affected the sale of season tickets to professional football games. Indeed, the results indicate that the availability of locally televised home games has increased season ticket sales. Total ticket sales were not subjected to rigorous empirical analysis. Consequently, is not possible to assess the impact of the legislation on total sales. However given that a large proportion of a team's tickets are sold on a seasonal basis, it is unlikely that total ticket sales of most NFL clubs have been seriously affected by Public Law 93-107.

3. "No Shows: An Overview 1972-1975

The National Football League has consistently argued that Public Law 93-107 has and will continue to adversely affect the live gate attendance at NFL home games. The league believes that ticket holders are less inclined to attend games when those contests are televised in the team's home territory. This is thought to be particularly true in those cities where fans experience difficulties in getting to the stadium.

At first glance, it appears that there is some merit in this proposition. The number of "no shows" at NFL home games has increased since the adoption of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law. For example, in 1972, the "no shows" total for all games (excluding those of the Dallas Cowboys and New Orleans Saints) was 579,294 or an average of 3,447 per game. This was equivalent to 6.1 percent of all seats sold. No home games were locally televised that year.

The adoption of Public Law 93-107 coincided with a large increase in "no shows" in 1973. As noted previously, the law triggered a lifting of the blackout on 109 of the NFL's 182 regular season games played in 1973. "No shows" increased to 1,035,831 ^{1/}, averaging out to 5,691 per game during the year or 9.7 percent of all tickets sold, which was somewhat higher than the 1972 averages. However, since no law was in effect in 1972 which had any bearing on "no shows," the 1972 figure may be less accurate than the figures for the three years under the legislation.

^{1/} This figure includes "no shows" recorded by Dallas and New Orleans teams which did not submit attendance information for 1972.

Moreover, "no shows" at locally televised games averaged out to 5,911 in 1973, as compared to an average of 5,363 for non-televised games. The percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend home games was also higher for locally televised contests than for those games which were not locally televised (i.e., 9.9 percent for locally televised as compared with 9.2 percent for non-televised games).

Live gate attendance at NFL games did not improve in 1974 even though the number of locally televised games decreased from 109 in 1973 to 86 in 1974. "No shows", including those recorded by Dallas and New Orleans, increased to 1,124,879 which was equivalent to an 8.6 percent increase from 1973 and a 94 percent increase from 1972 when Dallas and New Orleans were not included.

The average number of "no shows" at all locally televised home games played in 1974 was 6,411 per game. This was slightly higher than the 5,974 ticket holders who, on the average, failed to attend games which were blacked out in the teams' home territories. There was a negligible difference, however, in the percentages of ticket holders who failed to attend locally televised and non-televised home games (i.e., 11.2 percent for locally televised games as compared to 10.8 percent for non-televised games).

In 1975, live gate attendance at NFL home games increased, as did the number of blacked-out games. The total number of NFL "no shows" fell to 874,733 which was approximately 22 percent below the 1974 level but 51 percent above the total number of "no shows" recorded in 1972.

On the average, 4,806 ticket holders failed to attend the 182 regular season NFL games played during the 1975 season. This was equivalent to 8.6

percent of all seats sold. Attendance at locally televised games also improved. In fact, there were fewer "no shows" for televised games than for games which were blacked out. On the average, only 4,069 (7.1 percent) of all ticket holders failed to attend locally televised games, while 5,323 (9.6 percent of the ticket holders) chose not to attend blacked-out games.

To summarize, the figures reported in the table at the end of this section indicate that "no shows" have increased substantially since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. On the other hand, last year's live gate attendance at NFL home games was higher than in the two previous years.

The National Football League believes that both phenomena can be explained by Public Law 93-107. Specifically, the NFL and its member clubs contend that decreases in live gate attendance since 1973 can be attributed to locally televised games. Following the same line of reasoning, the NFL has pointed out that improved attendance during last year's season simply reflects the fact that fewer games were locally televised in 1975 than in 1973 or 1974.

Even though "no shows" have increased since the adoption of Public Law 93-107, it would not be appropriate to attribute those increases solely to locally televised games. As will be explained in a later section of this report, live gate attendance at NFL games may be subject to a number of different factors. For example, if the weather was cold and wet, one would reasonably expect a decline in attendance, regardless of whether or not the game was locally televised.

The figures in the table below further indicate that other factors may have a more influential impact on attendance than does local television coverage of home games. This would certainly appear to be true with regard to attendance at last year's games, where the average number of "no shows" at non-televised games exceeded the average number of "no shows" at locally televised games. Additionally, there were virtually no differences in the percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend games during the 1973 and 1974 seasons. Both of these findings suggest that live gate attendance is subject to influential factors other than Public Law 93-107.

The subsequent section will provide a detailed empirical analysis of the live gate attendance over the past four years for each of the 26 NFL teams and should provide an accurate assessment of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on professional football.

Summary of "No Shows"
For All NFL Teams: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total Tickets Sold	9,569,988*	10,728,351	10,237,952	10,207,041
(percentage change from previous season)	10,445,827+	10,730,933+ (2.7%)	10,236,322+ (-4.6%)	10,213,193+ (-.3%)
2. Total "No Shows"	579,294*	1,035,831	1,124,879	874,733
(percentage change from previous season)		(78.8%)	(8.6%)	(-22.2%)
3. Average Stadium Capacity	58,355	62,135	62,453	63,249
4. Average Tickets Sold Per Game				
a) All games	56,964*	58,946	56,252	56,083
b) Locally televised games	-	59,521	57,023	57,087
c) Blacked-out games	56,964*	58,089	55,563	55,379
5. Average "No Shows" Per Game				
a) All games	3,447*	5,691	6,181	4,806
b) Locally televised games	-	5,911	6,411	4,069
c) Blacked-out games	3,447*	5,363	5,974	5,323
6. Percentage of Seats Sold Not Showing				
a) All games	6.1%*	9.7%	11%	8.6%
b) Locally televised games	-	9.9%	11.2%	7.1%
c) Blacked-out games	6.1%*	9.2%	10.8%	9.6%
7. Number of Televised Games	-	109	86	75

* Excludes Dallas and New Orleans

+ Indicates figure given in NFL annual reports

4. Revenues From the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine: An Overview 1972-1975

Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide a meaningful summary of revenues earned on the sale of concessions, parking and "PRO" magazine. 1/ Much of the information necessary to do so was not made available either by the National Football League or companies which handle the concession franchises for the individual teams. 2/

Moreover, much of the data that was available from some teams reflects revenues earned from concession sales at pre-season games as well as regular season games, whereas other teams reported revenues for regular season games only. Consequently, meaningful comparisons between seasons - for all 26 teams - is virtually impossible. However, information on these revenues reported by NFL clubs is reviewed in a later part of this section which provides an analysis of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on individual teams.

The Commission also requested that the NFL specify those member clubs which do and do not share in revenues earned from the sale of concessions and stadium parking. This information was provided and is reported in the tables below.

1/ "PRO" magazine is an NFL publication that contains the scorecard for the particular game, stories and pictures highlighting players and activities, and local advertisements.

2/ Letters from concessionaires who did respond to the Commission's Inquiry are contained in Appendix E.

CLUB REVENUE SHARING FROM CONCESSIONS

<u>CLUB</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>YES</u>		
		<u>FOOD</u>	<u>BEVERAGE</u>	<u>PARKING</u>
Baltimore Colts		X 20%	X 20% <u>1/</u>	X
Buffalo Bills		X 13 1/2%	X 13 1/2%	X
Cincinnati Bengals		X	X <u>2/</u>	NO
Cleveland Browns		X approx. 20%	X approx. 20% <u>3/</u>	NO
Denver Broncos	X			
Houston Oilers	X			
Kansas City Chiefs		X 42%	X 42%	X 100%
Miami Dolphins		X	X <u>4/</u>	NO
New England Patriots		X 12 1/2%	X 12 1/2%	NO
New York Jets	X			
Oakland Raiders	X			
Pittsburgh Steelers	X			
San Diego Chargers		X 10%	X 10%	X 10%

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- 1/ May be 30% if lease negotiation makes this retroactive to 1975.
- 2/ 33.2% of gross receipts on sale of food and beverages; 33.6% of gross receipts on sale of alcoholic beverages; 13.2% of gross receipts on tobacco sales and vending machine sales; 32.2% of gross receipts on sales or rental of all other products; less 10% this total amount retained by City of Cincinnati.
- 3/ Cleveland Browns, Inc. does not have any ownership interest in the concession operation. Concessions, however, are operated by Cleveland Stadium Corp., which is owned and controlled by Arthur B. Modell who also owns Cleveland Browns, Inc.
- 4/ City of Miami receives 30.5% of the gross revenues from concessions. The concessionaire, Restaurant Associates, participates in 50% of the profit after payment to the City of Miami and amortization of equipment. The Dolphins keep the remainder.

CLUB REVENUE SHARING FROM CONCESSIONS

<u>CLUB</u>	<u>NONE</u>	<u>YES</u>		
		<u>FOOD</u>	<u>BEVERAGE</u>	<u>PARKING</u>
Atlanta Falcons	X			
Chicago Bears	X			
Dallas Cowboys		X 16 2/3%	X 16 2/3%	NO
Detroit Lions	X			
Green Bay Packers	X			
Los Angeles Rams		X 16 2/3%	X 16 2/3%	X 16 2/3%
Minnesota Vikings	X			
New Orleans Saints	X			
New York Giants <u>1/</u>	X			
Philadelphia Eagles		X 15%	X 15%	NO
St. Louis Cardinals	X			
San Francisco 49ers	X			
Washington Redskins	X			

1/The Giants will share in concession revenues (50/50) once they move to Giants Stadium. Previously, however, they have not participated in concessions revenues.

5. Audience Ratings: An Overview 1973-1975

In a recent report on the extension of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, the Senate Committee on Commerce requested that the FCC study and report on the impact of Public Law 93-107 on local television audiences and the potential for greater NFL revenues resulting from future television contracts.^{1/} An analysis of audience ratings for local telecasts of NFL games was, therefore, carried out. Specifically, this analysis compared audience ratings of telecasts involving home teams with televised games involving other NFL clubs.

An audience rating refers to the percent of all television households which are tuned to a given TV station at a given time. Overall, audience ratings vary depending on the popularity of the program, the time of day, the day of the week, and the season in which the rating is taken. Typically, the highest audience ratings occur in the winter during the evening or prime time hours (i.e., 7:00-11:00 p.m.) in the middle of the week. Moreover, ratings tend to be somewhat lower on Sunday afternoons, since fewer people watch television at that time.

To illustrate, prime time audience ratings for network affiliated stations located in cities which support NFL franchises generally acquire an average audience rating of about 20 during the prime time hours in the winter months. This simply means that about 20 out of every 100 households in a particular market are watching one of the three network affiliated stations licensed to that market. Similarly, an average of about six or seven out of

^{1/}Senate Report 94-510, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.(Dec. 5, 1975) p. 5.

every 100 households watch programs aired by a network affiliated station on any given Sunday afternoon. 2/ Of course the actual audience figures will fluctuate with the popularity of different programs. The average ratings quoted above are simply provided as an indication of the general popularity of various types of programs other than professional football, which are broadcast in prime time and on Sunday afternoon.

The figures in the tables below indicate that professional football games are substantially more popular than other types of television programs. Furthermore, locally televised home games were also more popular than televised games involving other NFL teams.

On the average, a home team's locally televised games were viewed by 30 to 35 percent of all households in the team's home territory. 3/

Moreover when required to choose between watching the home team play as opposed to televised games involving other NFL clubs, local viewers - by an average margin of about five to one - watched the home team. 4/

2/ See Arbitron Television Market Summary, New York: American Research Bureau, Inc. February - March, 1975.

3/ These percentages are based on local audience ratings for NFL games collected from the Arbitron Corporation's four-week Fall audience sweeps of 1973, 1974 and 1975. Audience ratings for 25 NFL markets were analyzed. This number does not coincide with the number of teams because the New York Jets and Giants as well as the San Francisco Forty-Niners and Oakland Raiders share markets, while the Green Bay Packers play home games in Green Bay and Milwaukee both of which represent separate television markets. The figures presented in the subsequent tables represent average audience ratings for home and away games played by the home team during each of the four week periods.

Specific dates for Arbitron's Oct. - Nov. audience sweeps are as follows:

Oct. 24 - Nov. 20, 1973

Oct. 24 - Nov. 19, 1974

Oct. 29 - Nov. 25, 1975

Because ARB ratings are recorded in half-hour segments, it was necessary to compute an average game figure by summing these half-hour periods and dividing

(3/ continued and 4/ on following pages)

The home club also attracted substantially larger local audiences than other teams when their games were televised at different times. In those instances, the average audience ratings for the home team's games exceeded those of other "non-competing games" by about 50 percent.

Moreover, there is no evidence of oversaturation of the sport. If this were a problem, it should be reflected in a decline in average audience ratings particularly for those teams which have locally televised all or nearly all of their home games. However, this has not been the case. Indeed, as will be seen in a later part of the analysis, teams which have televised most of their games tend to achieve higher than normal audience ratings. This further indicates that a significantly larger number of people watch televised NFL games when those contests involve a team of local interest.

Finally, it is apparent that NFL football is one of the most—if not the most-popular type of program on television today. Audience ratings for Sunday afternoon football games, particularly those involving the home team, are generally five to six times larger than audience ratings for other types of programming televised at that time. Differences in audience size also appear when ratings for prime time programs (excluding Monday night football) are compared to NFL telecasts, although the magnitude of these differences is smaller.

3/ continued

by six or seven (depending on perceived length of the game). It was assumed that most games would run three hours and any doubleheaders were split accordingly, after the first six ratings segments. All ratings were counted from an on-the-hour origin point with any pre-game segment (e.g. a 12:30 p.m. rating) excluded. Average figures were computed for each home and away game involving the local team. Next an average for all the home and average for all of the away games of the team were calculated. It was further assumed that American Football Conference teams have their games carried on NBC while National Football Conference games are broadcast on CBS. In the case of an interconference game, the visiting team's network would broadcast the contest.

Consequently, it must be assumed that Public Law 93-107 has proved to be beneficial to professional football fans in those markets which support NFL franchises - at least to the extent that the legislation has triggered a lifting of blackouts on sold out home games.

4/ This is reflected in the differences in audience ratings for the home team's games and those of competing games involving other NFL clubs. If another NFL game started at the same time as a home team telecast but was aired on a different station or had ratings for more than half of the segments during which the local team's telecast occurred, then those other games were defined as competing games. All other games not involving the local team were defined as non-competing games. Again, this distinction was made in order to assess the magnitude of the local viewers' preferences for watching their home team play as opposed to other NFL clubs.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES
October 24 - November 20, 1973

HOME MARKET	HOME TEAM				OTHER TEAMS			
	#	HOME RATING	#	AWAY RATING	#	COMPETING RATING	#	OTHER TIMES RATING
<u>AFC</u>								
Baltimore	-	-	2	23.1	2	4.2	10	16.8
Buffalo	2	45.5	1	30.7	2	10.1	8	22.4
Cincinnati	1	19.1	3	28.6	2	4.9	9	16.1
Cleveland	-	-	3	32.3	3	7.8	8	24.5
Denver	1	36.8	3	36.6	3	4.8	7	27.4
Houston	-	-	3	17.1	3	17.1	9	23.4
Kansas City	2	34.6	2	37.8	2	7.6	9	19.3
Miami	1	35.7	3	41.0	3	6.4	8	22.9
New England	2	21.0	2	20.3	3	5.6	7	16.9
NY Jets	3	11.6	1	17.9	2	15.9	6	16.8
Oakland	3	20.1*	1	9.8	2	18.9	6	18.2
Pittsburgh	3	36.3	1	40.7	0	-	10	18.6
San Diego	-	-	2	27.6	1	17.2	11	22.0
Conference Average		29		28		10		20.4
<u>NFC</u>								
Atlanta	2	36.3	2	30.3	2	5.8	9	18.6
Chicago	2	19.2	2	27.0	2	6.4	8	15.2
Dallas	-	-	2	41.3	2	2.5	10	25.5
Detroit	-	-	2	27.5	1	4.0	11	17.6
Green Bay	2	41.2	2	45.4	3	4.4	7	22.7
Milwaukee	2	44.3	2	38.3	4	5.6	8	22.0
Los Angeles	-	-	2	31.4	2	6.3	10	20.1
Minnesota	3	37.4	1	45.8	0	-	9	17.2
New Orleans	-	-	2	47.2	1	4.8	11	25.9
NY Giants	1	14.8	2	17.1	2	8.9	7	17.0
Philadelphia	3	28.6	1	35.7	1	6.7	8	24.4
St. Louis	-	-	2	20.4	2	6.5	10	16.7
San Francisco	-	-	3	22.7*	2	13.9	7	21.4
Washington	2	34.1	3	44.0	1	4.3	9	22.8
Conference Average		32		33.9		6.2		20.5
League Totals:	33	30.5	53	30.9	49	8.1	224	20.5

*Includes one simulcast game carried on CBS November 4, 1973 with Oakland and San Francisco sharing average rating.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES
October 24 - November 19, 1974

1974		HOME TEAM		OTHER TEAMS				
HOME MARKET	#	HOME RATING	#	AWAY RATING	COMPETING #	RATING	OTHER TIMES #	RATING
<u>AFC</u>								
Baltimore	-	-	2	25.7	2	6.6	10	14.0
Buffalo	1	41.3	2	48.4	2	1.3	9	20.1
Cincinnati	2	30.4	2	29.4	3	5.2	7	12.7
Cleveland	1	29.5	2	35.8	2	5.0	9	20.2
Denver	2	41.4	2	35.0	2	3.4	9	22.0
Houston	-	-	3	25.1	3	13.5	9	21.7
Kansas City	-	-	2	33.6	1	11.0	11	15.6
Miami	1	34.7	1	35.2	0	-	11	17.0
New England	3	38.4	1	32.8	1	2.2	8	12.0
NY Jets	-	-	1	11.7	1	10.7	11	14.6
Oakland	-	-	1	19.8	1	3.4	10	17.1
Pittsburgh	2	33.3	2	31.6	1	5.8	10	17.8
San Diego	-	-	2	23.7	2	6.5	10	20.3
Conference Average		35.6		29.8		6.2		17.3
<u>NFC</u>								
Atlanta	1	34.4	3	25.3	1	5.5	11	15.2
Chicago	2	24.3	2	23.9	3	6.1	7	15.2
Dallas	-	-	2	40.1	1	10.2	11	22.2
Detroit	-	-	1	25.2	1	5.8	11	15.9
Green Bay	2	48.3	2	46.0	3	6.7	8	22.2
Milwaukee	2	37.4	2	38.1	3	6.6	8	18.2
Los Angeles	-	-	3	25.6	2	5.1	10	16.6
Minnesota	2	32.8	2	38.6	3	8.3	7	16.6
New Orleans	-	-	1	39.8	1	2.5	11	22.3
NY Giants	-	-	2	18.5	0	-	11	13.3
Philadelphia	2	28.7	2	23.0	3	4.6	7	18.2
St. Louis	2	32.2	2	34.0	2	3.9	9	16.0
San Francisco	-	-	2	19.6	1	10.0	9	16.2
Washington	1	45.3	3	38.3	3	3.8	7	19.6
Conference Average		35.4		31.1		6.1		17.7
League Totals: 24		35.5	50	30.5	45	6.2	243	17.5

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES
October 29 - November 25, 1975

1975 HOME MARKET	HOME TEAM				OTHER TEAMS			
	#	RATING	#	RATING	#	RATING	#	RATING
<u>AFC</u>								
Baltimore	-	-	2	37.0	2	2.7	9	13.1
Buffalo	-	-	2	39.7	1	4.0	11	20.3
Cincinnati	2	34.2	2	34.8	1	.3	10	14.5
Cleveland	-	-	3	24.7	3	6.2	9	19.8
Denver	2	37.6	2	37.1	2	3.6	8	26.6
Houston	2	39.8	2	35.5	2	8.2	9	25.2
Kansas City	-	-	2	30.0	1	2.3	11	16.0
Miami	-	-	2	37.3	2	6.8	10	19.4
New England	1	18.1	3	20.0	2	7.7	9	11.9
NY Jets	1	18.1	1	17.8	0	-	10	14.6
Oakland	1	23.1	2	24.8	1	2.8	10	19.0
Pittsburgh	2	32.7	2	39.0	1	5.5	9	20.3
San Diego	-	-	2	16.5	1	5.8	11	15.8
Conference Average		29.1		30.3		4.7		18.2
<u>NFC</u>								
Atlanta	-	-	2	21.9	2	8.2	10	17.6
Chicago	1	28.8	2	18.1	1	14.5	10	14.4
Dallas	-	-	2	50.5	2	3.3	10	26.3
Detroit	-	-	2	29.0	1	3.6	11	15.1
Green Bay	2	44.8	2	45.6	4	4.6	7	21.4
Milwaukee	2	41.7	2	38.7	3	4.2	8	19.7
Los Angeles	-	-	2	23.4	1	3.0	10	15.8
Minnesota	2	37.1	2	40.7	2	5.1	8	18.8
New Orleans	-	-	1	31.0	1	8.3	11	23.4
NY Giants	2	17.0	1	15.4	1	7.3	8	15.7
Philadelphia	2	26.3	2	21.9	2	6.8	9	17.6
St. Louis	1	29.1	2	25.0	2	3.8	9	18.4
San Francisco	-	-	2	15.9	1	8.3	11	20.5
Washington	2	44.4	2	38.6	0	-	10	16.7
Conference Average		33.7		29.7		6.2		18.7
League Totals: 23		31.4	51	30	39	5.5	250	18.4

C. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107 ON MEMBER CLUBS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

1. Introduction

Past analyses of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law have generally concluded that mandatory local television coverage of sold-out home games has not proved harmful to professional football. The Federal Communications Commission's First Annual Report on the Sports Anti-Blackout Issue noted that the legislation appeared "to have a minimal economic impact on the 26 member teams of the National Football League in its first year of operation." The Report also maintained that professional football was in no danger of becoming a TV spectator sport. According to the Commission's First Annual Report, radio stations were the only parties to be adversely affected by Public Law 93-107. This, of course, was due to the fact that football fans, when given the opportunity, preferred to watch a game on television than listen to it on radio. Consequently, the Commission's First Annual Report concluded that:

the Law's overall effect on the NFL member clubs was minimal in the first year and this must be weighed against what many believe to be the substantial benefit to the public of having available 109 home games that were locally telecast. 1/

The Commission's Second Annual Report on the effect of Public Law 93-107 provided a far more detailed analysis but, generally, came to the same conclusions with regard to professional football. Specifically, the Second Annual Report maintained that mandatory local telecasts of sold-out home games

1/ Federal Communications Commission, First Annual FCC Report on the Effect of Public Law 93-107, op. cit. p. 35.

did not appear to affect materially live attendance and concession sales, although it did have an adverse impact on the audience ratings of radio stations broadcasting televised home games. While attendance, concession sales, and subsequent revenues earned by NFL teams did decline during the 1974 season, this was attributable in large part to the players' strike, which preceded the 1974 season and presumably alienated fans, and to the generally poor state of the economy during the fall of 1974.

A third analysis of the impact of Public Law 93-107 was recently performed by Professors C. Elton Hinshaw and John Siegfried, both of Vanderbilt University. Their study assessed the effect of the locally televised home games on "no shows" (i.e., ticket holders who did not attend the game). Their results indicated that the Sports Anti-Blackout Law did not significantly effect the number of "no shows" during the 1973 and 1974 seasons. The authors went on to conclude that live gate attendance was for the most part determined by weather conditions (i.e. temperature and precipitation), the team's divisional standing, and to some extent the city in which the home team played. 2/

Unfortunately, each of the previous studies was done with a scarcity of data on individual NFL teams. As a consequence, the analyses were constrained to requiring the assessment of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on all 26 NFL teams as a whole rather than assessing the impact of the law on individual clubs. This is troublesome in that the previously reported results were based on the

2/ C. Elton Hinshaw and John J. Siegfried, "No-Shows" and the Anti-Blackout Law: An Assessment. Paper to be delivered at Western Economic Association Conference, June 27, 1976, San Francisco, CA.

assumption that all home team football fans react similarly to such factors as weather, temperature, precipitation and the home team's divisional standing when deciding to purchase a ticket and attend home games. If this assumption is not true, then subsequent results based thereon will be inaccurate.

For a fair and thorough assessment of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on professional football, each team must be examined separately. While mandatory local telecasts of home games may not affect the financial and/or psychological vitality of professional football in general, it may adversely effect certain teams. The benefits accruing to the public as a result of locally televised home games, then, must be weighed against the actual and/or potential harm to selected NFL teams as a consequence of the Sports Anti-Blackout legislation.

The subsequent section provides a team-by-team analysis of the impact of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law on locally televised games. Ticket sales, "no shows", revenues earned from the sale of concessions, parking, and "PRO" magazine, and television ratings for home and away games, as opposed to audience ratings for games not involving a team of local interest, will be analyzed. Before discussing the results of the analyses, however, an explanation of the research methodology employed in the "no shows" analysis is in order. This entails a discussion of the model used to estimate the impact of Public Law 93-107 and other factors on the proportion of ticket holders who, for one reason or another, did not attend NFL games.

2. Methodology: The Model Used to Assess the Impact of Public Law 93-107 on the Number of "No Shows" Experienced by Individual NFL Teams between 1972 and 1975

The Variables.

While there may be a number of factors which influence a ticket holder's decision on whether or not to attend an NFL game, it is likely that most decisions will be influenced by a relatively small number of factors. Specifically, it can be assumed that the number of "no shows" will be sensitive to the following considerations:

- a. Televised games: According to the NFL, mandatory local telecasts of home games increase the number of "no shows". A variable indicating whether or not a game was televised was incorporated into the model to test the validity of this argument.
- b. Temperature: Ticket holders are assumed to be less inclined to attend games on a cold day than they would be if the weather was mild. The variable employed in the analysis reflects the temperature during the game.
- c. Precipitation: Ticket holders are also assumed to be less inclined to attend a game where it is raining, sleeting or snowing. The variable utilized in the analysis indicates the presence or absence of some form of precipitation during the game.
- d. Attractiveness of the home game: Whether or not ticket holders attend NFL games is expected to depend on the

perceived attractiveness or "importance" of the game. For example, fans are expected to be more inclined to attend games if the home team is having a winning season or is in contention for the divisional championship. The same could be true if the visiting team is having a "good" year. The attractiveness of the game is measured by both the won-loss records and the divisional standings of the contestants. 3/

3/ Consequently, three separate analyses were done on the "no shows" of each of the 26 NFL teams. The first analysis utilizes the "won-loss" percentage of the home and visiting team as a measure of the attractiveness of the game. "No shows" are expected to decrease as the percentage "won-loss" record of the home team and/or the visiting teams increases.

The attractiveness of individual NFL games could also be reflected in the divisional standing of the home and/or the visiting team. If one team, particularly the home team, is in contention for the divisional championship, then "no shows" would be expected to be lower than if one or both teams had no chance of getting into the playoffs. The second analysis of "no shows" utilizes the divisional standings of both teams as a surrogate for the attractiveness of the game.

A third measure of the attractiveness of particular games was also defined. This was done by simply multiplying the "won-loss" percentages of both home and visiting teams and incorporating that variable into the model. This particular measure yields an overall indication of the quality of the game by reflecting the combined success of both teams. This measure of the quality of the game was used in the third analysis of the number of "no shows" experienced by each NFL team.

It was thought necessary to do the three separate analyses since attendance fluctuations may be more sensitive to divisional standings than to "won-loss" records. This is particularly true if a team in one division ranks higher in the divisional standings but has a poorer "won-loss" record than a team in another division. Additionally, fans in other markets may be more sensitive to the measure of overall attractiveness of the game than they are to the home team's or the visiting team's prior victories. If so, this "quality of the game" variable (i.e., the product of the "won-loss" percentages of both teams) should prove to be the more relevant determinant of "no shows".

- e. Season effects: Keeping in mind that subsequent analyses performed on individual NFL teams are based on home games played during 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 seasons, it is important to account for variations in "no shows" which can be attributed to individual seasons. As a result, each analysis incorporates variables designating whether or not a game was played in 1973, 1974 or 1975. Inclusion of these variables allows one to test whether or not "no shows" were significantly greater, all other things being equal, during any of the past three seasons than they were in 1972, the year prior to the implementation of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law.

Finally, "no shows" were computed as the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold. This measure was used instead of the absolute number of "no shows," since it accounts for relative ticket sales differences and, as a result, better reflects the relative importance of "no shows" to individual teams. To illustrate, suppose one team sells 70,000 tickets to a game while another only sells 35,000. If 5,000 of those ticket holders fail to attend both games, the number of "no shows" will be of greater consequence to the team selling 35,000 seats than to the team selling 70,000. By defining "no shows" as a percentage of tickets sold, we are able to measure the relative importance of the impact of Public Law 93-107

3/ Continued

The "won-loss" percentages and divisional standings for games played during the first three weeks of the season used in the analysis are the final "won-loss" percentages and divisional standings from the previous season. The rationale for those measures is based on the assumption that the fans' perceptions of expected team success are determined to a large extent by the teams previous season record, at least for the first three weeks. It was assumed further that after that time, fans would have a good idea of actual or potential team performance for the current season and would, accordingly, make their game attendance decisions.

on teams which have different seating capacities and which subsequently sell different numbers of tickets to their home games.

It should be understood that "no shows" will also likely be influenced by factors other than those defined in the model. For example, if a team has been eliminated from the playoffs during the latter part of the season, "no shows" could increase. Attendance may also depend on the month, day and/or time of the game. Fans may be more inclined to attend games during the early part of the season. They may also be more willing to attend games which are played in the early afternoon (i.e. 1:00 p.m.) instead of later in the day (i.e., 4:00 p.m.). "No shows" could also depend on whether the game is played on a Monday night.

Strong rivalries or the appearance of superstars such as O. J. Simpson, Joe Namath, or Larry Czonka could also affect attendance. Similarly, "no shows" may depend on how well the team has done in the past. The NFL, for example, believes that attendance is subject to a certain degree of fan loyalty which generally results from outstanding performances by the team and/or selected players in past years.

The situation in Green Bay is illustrative. The Packers under Coach Vince Lombardi built a virtual dynasty in the NFL during the mid-to late 1960's. While the team's performance has deteriorated since that time, ticket sales and attendance remain high which in all probability reflects a certain degree of loyalty.

Finally, "no shows" could depend on the availability of other types of entertainment, including other professional sports. Professional baseball,

basketball and hockey seasons overlap with the professional football season. Consequently, attendance at football games may be affected by attendance at other sporting events. Similarly, fans residing in certain cities may have more recreational opportunities and, as a consequence, could be less inclined to attend NFL games.

Unfortunately, most of these factors are highly qualitative in nature. As a result, they could not be quantitatively measured and were therefore not incorporated into the model. Even so, the methodology employed in the "no shows" analysis should provide an accurate assessment of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on live gate attendance at NFL games.

The Data

Data on the number of "no shows", tickets sold, and whether or not the game was televised were obtained from the National Football League. Data on temperature and precipitation were also obtained from the NFL. When weather conditions were not reported by teams, this information was obtained from the National Weather Service. Data on divisional standings and "won-loss" percentages were obtained from The Sporting News, The New York Times, and The Washington Post.

The Statistical Technique

Multivariate regression analysis was employed to measure the extent to which each of these factors influence the percentages of ticket holders who do not attend games. Briefly, this particular statistical technique permits one to ascertain whether and to what extent a change in one variable - "no shows" in this instance - is influenced by changes in any or all of the other variables

(.e., temperature, precipitation, "won-loss" records, etc.) which are included in the model. The analyses empirically assess the impact the Sports Anti-Blackout Law has had on the number of "no shows" experienced by each of the 26 NFL clubs over the three-year duration of the initial legislation.

AMERICAN FOOTBALL CONFERENCE

BALTIMORE COLTS

BUFFALO BILLS

CINCINNATI BENGALS

CLEVELAND BROWNS

DENVER BRONCOS

HOUSTON OILERS

KANSAS CITY CHIEFS

MIAMI DOLPHINS

NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS

NEW YORK JETS

OAKLAND RAIDERS

PITTSBURGH STEELERS

SAN DIEGO CHARGERS

3. The Results of the "No Shows" Analysis for Individual NFL Teams

The American Football Conference

The Baltimore Colts

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have significantly affected the Baltimore Colts. During the three seasons in which the law has been in effect, only one home game has been locally televised. This, of course, is attributable to the Colts' failure to sell out home games at least 72 hours in advance.

The Baltimore Stadium seats 60,000 fans. A summary of the Colts' ticket sales and "no shows" over the past four seasons is provided below. Public Law 93-107 was not in effect during the 1972 season. That year was included for the sake of a comparison.

Summary of Baltimore Colts'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	392,320	375,572 (-4.3%)	269,806 (-28.2%)	328,394 (21.5%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	56,046	53,653	38,544	46,913
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	48,315	47,233 (-2%)	32,593 (-31%)	27,377 (-16%)
5. Percentage of games won	.357	.286	.143	.714
6. Divisional standing	3	4	5	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	0	0	1

It appears that Colts' ticket sales are sensitive to the team's performance. Specifically, the downturn in ticket sales experienced during the 1973 and 1974 seasons coincides with lower divisional standings and poorer won-loss records. This probably explains the 22 percent increase in ticket sales during the 1975 season when the Colts finished first in their division with a record of 10 wins and 4 losses. 1975 ticket sales would probably have been higher if the Baltimore fans had more rapidly come to appreciate the team's improvement over the previous three seasons. This is reflected in the fact that total ticket sales increased by 22 percent in 1975, even though season ticket sales decreased by 16 percent. The Colts were only able to sell an average of 39,949 tickets for each of their first three home games played during the initial 7 weeks of the 1975 season. However, the average number of tickets sold for the following four home games during the latter half of the season increased to 52,137. Again, this increase is illustrative of fans willingness to buy tickets if their team is winning.

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Given that only one of the Colts' home games was televised locally during the past three seasons, it is unlikely that Public Law 93-107 has had an effect on the number of "no shows" at Colt games. Nevertheless, an effort has been made to determine the factors which influenced the number of "no shows."

The figures in the summary table below indicate that the total number of "no shows" increased from 37,062 in 1972 to 56,977 in 1973 while decreasing to 36,018 in 1974. Baltimore experienced a precipitous decline in "no shows" during the 1975 season when only 9,623 ticket holders failed to attend home games during the entire year.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
Baltimore Colts: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	37,062	56,977 (53.7%)	36,018 (-36.8%)	9,623 (-73.3%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	5,295	8,140	5,145	1,375
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	56,046	53,653	38,544	46,913
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	9.5%	15.2%	13.3%	2.9%
5. Number of televised games	0	0	0	1
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	-	-	-	1,141
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	5,295	8,140	5,145	1,415
8. Percentage of games won	.357	.286	.143	.715
9. Divisional standing	3	4	5	1

The detailed statistical analysis presented in the subsequent tables reveals that all variables in the model explained approximately 79 percent of the variation in Baltimore's "no shows" during the past four seasons. However, only two variables proved to have a significant impact on the Colts live gate attendance. Specifically, "no shows" increased significantly in the presence of some form of precipitation. Additionally, the results indicate that attendance was significantly lower when fans expected to see a good game (i.e. when both the home and visiting team were playing well).

Finally the results indicate that attendance was significantly higher in 1975 than in 1972, when all other factors defined in the model were controlled for. This particular finding probably reflects dramatic improvements in the team's performance. All other factors, including that which indicated

whether or not the game was televised locally, did not significantly influence "no shows."

On the basis of this analysis, Baltimore ticket holders are more likely to attend games if it is not raining and if both teams are having good seasons. They are not likely to be influenced by whether or not the game is televised. Thus, on the basis of data supplied to the Commission by the NFL, Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have had an impact on the Baltimore franchise.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
BALTIMORE "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .79012$ $F(8, 19) = 8.94088^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.01749	.123
Temperature	-.00087	1.701
Precipitation	.13422	16.734*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00010	2.867
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00006	2.572
1973	-.00542	.046
1974	-.00773	.086
1975	-.06706	8.359*
Constant	.22470	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .77476$ $F(7, 20) = 9.82756^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02156	.163
Temperature	-.00071	1.016
Precipitation	.13207	17.104*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01100	1.448
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01271	2.570
1973	.00673	.114
1974 ^a	-	-
1975	-.07158	10.460*
Constant	.06997	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .79405$ $F(6, 21) = 13.49447^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.04557	.747
Temperature	-.00091	2.141
Precipitation	.13007	21.584*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.21003	4.959*
1973 ^a	-	-
1974	-.00413	.049
1975	-.06847	12.003*
Constant	.19272	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The Baltimore franchise receives approximately 20 percent of total revenues earned from the sale of concessions and stadium parking. All income from "PRO" magazine sales also accrues to the club.

The Colts have locally televised only one home game during the past three years. Hence, Public Law 93-107 could have had only a minimal adverse impact on these revenues. Moreover, concession sales have increased every year since 1972, even though live gate attendance declined in both 1973 and 1974. "PRO" sales fell in 1974 and then increased in 1975 as live gate attendance improved.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Baltimore Colts: 1972-1975 1/

	1972 (7 games)	1973 (7 games)	1974 (9 games)	1975 (7 games)
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)**	\$ 38,397	\$ 47,929 (24.8%)	\$ 54,794	\$ 83,841
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)**	56,935	43,597 (-23.4%)	40,371	51,422
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)**	NA	3,925	5,164	6,165
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	392,320	375,572 (-4.3%)	269,806* (-28.2%)	328,394 (21.5%)
5. "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	37,062	56,977 (53.7%)	36,018* (-36.8%)	9,623 (-73.3%)
6. *Number of televised home games	0	0	0	1

NA - Information was Not Available

* - Seven regular season home games only

** - Where no percentage changes appear, data compared is for
different number of games. Therefore, no valid comparison
can be made between seasons.

1/ The figures in the Table represent the Colts' share of concession and parking
revenues which is approximately 20 percent of the gross.

4. Audience Ratings

Football fans in Baltimore, as in the case in nearly all cities which have NFL franchises, appear to have strong preferences for games involving the home team as opposed to games which do not. The table below lists audience rating for Colt games during the 1973, 1974 and 1975 seasons. The ratings used in this analysis were computed by the Arbitron Corporation and reported in their annual four week periods running from the latter part of October through the latter part of November 1/ during each of the three seasons.

Ratings are used to measure the size of the audience watching a particular program. The figures reported in the subsequent table denote average audience ratings for the number of games televised during each of the three measurement periods. For example during the 1973 four week rating period the Colts played two away games both of which were televised. The average rating for both games in the Baltimore market was 23.1. Consequently, it can be inferred that about 23 percent of all households with television sets were watching these games. Even though the Colts did not have particularly good seasons in 1973 and 1974, Baltimore's away games attracted a substantially larger audience than did games not involving the Colts. Additionally, the differences in ratings between Baltimore's away games and other games televised at the same time on other channels is a further indication of the preferences of Baltimore fans.

1/ Specific dates for the Arbitron's Oct-Nov. Audience sweeps are as follows:

Oct. 24-Nov. 29, 1973
Oct. 24-Nov. 19, 1974
Oct. 29-Nov. 25, 1975

The figures in the table below also suggest that the popularity of games involving the home team is sensitive to the club's success. Again the Colts had a very good year in 1975, finishing the season with a 10-4 won-loss record and a divisional championship. This probably explains why audience ratings for the Colts away games (played during the audience rating period) increased from an average of 25.7 in 1974 to 37.0 in 1975. Additionally, Baltimore's success in 1975 should also account for the decline in audience ratings (from 6.6 in 1974 to 2.7 in 1975) of games involving other teams which compete with televised away games. It must therefore be concluded that the Colts' games are significantly more popular with Baltimore fans than are games involving other teams.

Audience Ratings for Baltimore Colts: 1973-1975

	<u>Colts</u>		<u>Ratings For Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(0)* -	(2) 23.1	(2) 4.2		(10) 16.8	
1974	(0) -	(2) 25.7	(2) 6.6		(10) 14.0	
1975	<u>(0) -</u>	<u>(2) 37.0</u>	<u>(2) 2.7</u>		<u>(9) 13.1</u>	
Avg. Ratings		(6) 28.6	(6) 4.5		(29) 14.6	

*The figures in parentheses represent the number of games played during ARB sweep.

The Buffalo Bills

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since the adoption of Public Law 93-107 in 1973, nine of Buffalo's 21 home games, or 43 percent of the total, have been televised in the team's home territory. Three of the nine games were televised during the 1973 season, four in 1974 and two in 1975. In some respects it is surprising that the Bills were able to sell out this many games 72 hours in advance.

In 1973, the Buffalo franchise moved to a new 80,000-seat stadium, which by NFL standards is relatively large. Additionally, the population of the Buffalo metropolitan area is somewhat smaller than populations of other cities which support NFL franchises.

Nevertheless, the new stadium enabled the Bills to increase total ticket sales from 309,814 in 1972 to 544,722 in 1973 which is equivalent to a 76 percent gain. Ticket sales increased another 2 percent in 1974 before decreasing by 3 percent in 1975. Season ticket sales reflected a similar trend, increasing by 113 percent in 1973 and by 3 percent in 1974. Last year season ticket sales fell off by 20 percent. Nevertheless, the Bills were still able to sell 96 percent of their available seats during the 1975 season.

The intensity of demand for football tickets to the Bills' games is also unusual in that the team has never won a divisional championship, although the Bills did make the playoffs in 1974. In any event the figures below indicate that the financial vitality of professional football in Buffalo, New York is in danger from Public Law 93-107.

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Summary of Buffalo Bills'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973*</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	45,748	80,000	80,020	80,193
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	309,814	544,772 (75.8%)	555,496 (2.0%)	537,619 (-3.2%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	44,259	77,825	79,357	76,803
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	24,700	52,474 (112.5%)	54,182 (3.3%)	43,184 (-20.3%)
5. Percentage of games won	.286	.643	.643	.571
6. Division standing	4	2	2	3
7. Number of televised home games	0	3	4	2

*Buffalo moved to a new larger stadium in 1973

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Not surprisingly, the total number of "no shows" at Buffalo games has increased since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. Again, much of this can be attributed to the new stadium which nearly doubled the Bills' seating capacity. For example, even though the total number of "no shows" increased from 8,310 in 1972 to 17,964 in 1973, the percentage of ticket holders who did not attend games increased only marginally, from 2.7 percent in 1972 to 3.3 percent in 1973. Even during 1975, the Bills worst year in terms of "no shows", the percentage of ticket holders who chose not to attend games amounted to only 5 percent.

Summary of "No Shows" For The
Buffalo Bills: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	8,310	17,964 (116%)	12,047 (-32.9%)	27,137 (125.3%)
2. Average "No Shows" per game	1,187	2,566	1,721	3,877
3. Average number of seats sold per game	44,259	77,825	79,357	76,803
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	2.7%	3.3%	2.2%	5%
5. Number of televised game	0	3	4	2
6. Average "No Shows" per televised game	-	2,813	1,723	1,502
7. Average "No Shows" per non-televised game	1,187	2,381	1,719	4,827
8. Percentage of games won	.286	.643	.643	.571
9. Divisional standing	4	2	2	3

The results of our statistical analysis of the team's live gate attendance further indicate that Public Law 93-107 did not have a significant impact on Buffalo's "no shows." That is, the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold did not increase significantly when the Bills' home games were locally televised. However "no shows" were influenced by temperature and the divisional standings of both home and visiting teams. Neither result is surprising. Buffalo fans are simply more likely to stay at home when the weather is cold. Additionally, the fans are more sensitive to divisional standings than to won-loss records since the standings have better reflected the Bills' chances of getting into the playoffs. As noted above, Buffalo

was able to make the playoffs in 1974 while winning only nine games. This also explains why more ticket holders attended games when the visiting team was also in contention for the divisional championship. Buffalo fans appear to be more interested in seeing their team get into the playoffs than they are in the team's chances of winning a particular game.

All three seasonal variables were also significant when divisional standings of the home and visiting teams were used to measure the attractiveness or quality of the game. This suggests that "no shows" were significantly higher during the three years in which Public Law 93-107 was in effect than in 1972 when it was not.

However, this does not necessarily indicate that the Sports Anti-Blackout Law had an adverse impact on attendance. "No shows" were not significantly higher when home games were locally televised. The seasonal differences in "no shows" must therefore be attributed to other influential factors which are not specifically defined in the model. The team's move into the new stadium in 1973 could afford one possible explanation. That is, if the Buffalo fans experienced more problems in getting to the new stadium, as opposed to the old one, then this could account for the higher ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold which the team has experienced since 1973. Again this is simply a hypothesized explanation. We have no evidence to support or refute its accuracy. However we are reasonably certain that Public Law 93-107 has not had a deleterious affect on Buffalo live gate attendance.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
BUFFALO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .51476$
 $F(8, 19) = 2.51945^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.02714	1.764
Temperature	-.00134	4.507*
Precipitation	.02658	1.649
Home Team's win-loss %	-.08801	2.839
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	.01291	.109
1973	.03840	1.489
1974	.04789	1.690
1975	.07776	5.142*
Constant	.10199	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .62154$
 $F(8, 19) = 3.900^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.02554	2.329
Temperature	-.00151	7.331*
Precipitation	.01934	.976
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02815	8.619*
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-.00499	.704
1973	.06341	4.922*
1974	.06941	4.960*
1975	.09869	11.153*
Constant	-.00699	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
 $R^2 = .44350$
 $F(5, 22) = 3.50653^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.01498	.675
Temperature	-.00127	4.324*
Precipitation	.03095	2.402
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.02443	.244
1973 ^a	-	-
1974 ^a	-	-
1975	.03618	3.691
Constant	.08870	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The Buffalo Bills share in revenues of concessions, "PRO" magazine and parking though the exact percent of such shares varies (e.g., in 1973, concession revenues per game ranged from 56 to 84 percent of the gross receipts). Because of such variations in the franchise's shares as well as different figures submitted by the club for the same years (see note 1/), an analysis of the effect of Public Law 93-107 is particularly difficult. Moreover, the Bills feel that comparisons between the 1972 and 1973 seasons would be inaccurate given that the team moved to a larger stadium in 1973. Figures for the 1972 season, therefore, have not been made available by the Bills.

There is no readily explainable relationship, moreover, between telecasts as a result of Public Law 93-107 and revenue trends. For example, while gross revenues for concessions declined from 1973 to 1974 when the largest number of games (four out of seven) were televised, revenues from parking and "PRO" magazine sales increased. 1975 concession revenues have increased even though total "no shows" have also risen for the season and other revenues have declined.

The impact of Public Law 93-107, therefore, has not been to directly cause decreases in concessions, parking or "PRO" magazine revenues especially since the number of telecasts has varied each year.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Buffalo Bills: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u> (10 games)	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions* (percentage change from previous season)	\$ NA	\$582,966	\$516,593 <u>1/</u> (-11.4%)	\$672,133 <u>2/</u> (30.1%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	NA	64,616	74,075 (14.6%)	70,430 (-4.9%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	NA	194,887	200,310 (2.8%)	NA
4. Total tickets sold <u>3/</u> (percentage change from previous season)	309,814	544,722 (75.8%)	554,496 (2.0%)	537,619 (-3.2%)
5. "No Shows" <u>3/</u> (percentage change from previous season)	8,310	17,964 (116%)	12,047 (-32.9%)	27,137 (125.3%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	3	4	2

NA - Information was Not Available

* - Gross receipts

1/ The Commission's Second Annual Report to Congress on the Effect of P.L. 93-107 states that concession revenues for 1974 were \$375,261. However, the Buffalo Bills state that concession revenues for that year were \$516,593.

2/ There was a substantial increase in the number of higher priced items newly available in 1975.

3/ Total based on seven home games.

4. Audience Ratings

As noted earlier, professional football appears to be very popular in Buffalo. This phenomenon is further reflected in audience ratings for the Bills' televised games. Over the past three years, locally televised home games have achieved an average audience rating of 44.1 while away games attracted an average rating of 41.4. Once again, this indicates that, on the average, over 40 percent of all households in the Buffalo television market watched the Bills play when the team's games were televised during the past three NFL seasons. The magnitude of the Bills' popularity among local viewers can be appreciated further by comparing these ratings with other types of entertainment programs. Even the most popular prime time programs usually achieve audience ratings of only 25 to 30, in the Buffalo.^{1/} Consequently, professional football appears to be the single most popular type of program among Buffalo viewers.

The figures below further indicate that the Bills' games are significantly more popular than games involving other teams. The intensity of demand for the Bills' games is well reflected in the extremely large differences between the home team's average audience rating and an average rating of 5.5 for other televised games which were competing (i.e. televised at the same time but on another station) with televised Buffalo games for the local audience.

Non-competing games involving other teams achieved a much higher average audience than did competing games (20.8), but this was still well below the enormous ratings which accrued to Buffalo's televised home and

^{1/} For ratings of other programs in Buffalo market, see: Arbitron Television Market Summary, Book 3 (New York: American Research Bureau, Inc. November, 1975) Section 1.

away games. It must therefore be concluded that citizens in Buffalo and the surrounding area have benefited greatly by Public Law 93-107. Furthermore, there is no indication that this situation will change should the Sports Anti-Blackout Law be reenacted.

Audience Ratings for Buffalo Bills' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Buffalo</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(2) 45.5	(1) 30.7	(2) 10.1	(8)	22.4	
1974	(1) 41.3	(2) 48.4	(2) 1.3	(9)	20.1	
1975	(0) -	(2) 39.7	(1) 4.0	(11)	20.3	
Avg. Rating	(3) 44.1	(5) 41.4	(5) 5.5	(28)	20.8	

The Cincinnati Bengals

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Eighteen of the 21 Bengal home games (86 percent) played during the three seasons since the adoption of Public Law 93-107 have been televised. In this regard, Public Law 93-107 has substantially increased local television coverage of the Cincinnati team. Cincinnati's Riverfront Stadium seats approximately 59,754 fans. As the figures in the table below indicate, the Bengals have been able to consistently sell most of these seats. During the past four years, the number of tickets sold per game has never fallen below 95 percent of the stadium's seating capacity.

There was a 1.2 percent decline in total ticket sales during the 1975 season, associated with a 4.0 percent decline in season ticket sales. (This decrease in season ticket sales probably reflects the team's .500 won-loss percentage for the 1974 season. Specifically, Cincinnati fans may not have thought the Bengals would do as well in 1975 as they in fact did and, as a result, fewer people purchased season tickets before the season began). Nevertheless, the average number of tickets sold to 1975 home games was equivalent to 95 percent of the stadium's capacity. Consequently, even during 1975, the Bengals sold out and subsequently televised five of seven home games.

Generally, however, Cincinnati total ticket sales do not appear to be highly sensitive to the team's performance. The Bengals were able to sell more tickets in 1974 when they finished second in their division with a .500 won-loss record than in 1975 when the Bengals won a berth in the playoffs, albeit finishing second in the AFC Central Division.

In any event, the figures below indicate that professional football is quite popular in Cincinnati. Furthermore there is nothing in the analysis which indicates that this situation will change in the near or more distant future.

Summary of Cincinnati Bengals'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	56,000	59,754	59,754	59,754
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	403,616	407,500 (1.0%)	404,112 (-.8%)	399,166 (-1.2%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	57,659	58,214	57,730	57,024
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	53,634	53,610 (0%)	53,424 (0%)	51,310 (-4.0%)
5. Percentage of games won	.571	.714	.500	.786
6. Divisional standing	3	1	2	2
7. Number of televised games	0	6	7	5

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

The Bengals have experienced rather large increases in the number of "no shows" over the past three seasons. In 1972 prior to the adoption of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, Cincinnati had 21,789 "no shows" which amounted to 5.4 percent of all tickets sold during the season. In 1973, "no shows" increased to 26,059 or 6.4 percent of all seats sold, and increased again in 1974 to 41,084 or 10.2 percent of all tickets sold. Cincinnati had 44,669 "no shows" in 1975 which is equivalent to a 105 percent increase over the number of ticket holders failing to attend games in 1972.

The ratio of "no shows" to seats sold has also increased substantially from a low of 5.4 percent in 1972 to a high of 14.3 percent in 1975. Additionally, in 1973 the average number of "no shows" per televised game was 3,829 compared with 3,085 "no shows" for a single non-televised game. However in 1975 the average number of "no shows" at the two non-televised games was 8,109 compared with an average of 5,691 "no shows" at the five televised games.

Summary of "No Shows" For The
Cincinnati Bengals: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	21,789	26,059 (19.6%)	41,084 (57.7%)	44,669 (8.7%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	3,113	3,723	5,869	6,381
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	57,659	58,214	57,730	57,024
4. Percentage of seats sold no showing	5.4%	6.4%	10.2%	14.3%
5. Number of televised games	0	6	7	5
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	-	3,829	5,869	5,691
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised games	3,113	3,085	-	8,109
8. Percentage of games won	.571	.714	.500	.786
9. Divisional standing	3	1	2	2

The results of the detailed statistical analysis of Cincinnati "no shows" indicate that the variables in our model explain approximately 80 percent of the variation or change in the proportion of ticket holders who do not attend the games. The analysis indicates that "no shows" do not significantly increase when home games are televised locally.

The most important determinants of Cincinnati "no shows" are temperature and the presence of precipitation. In short, a larger number of ticket holders do not attend games when the weather is cold and/or wet.

The results further indicate that the number of "no shows" during each of the three years when the Sports Anti-Blackout Law was in effect were significantly greater than the number of "no shows" in 1972. But, again,

this cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107, since the seasonal variations are independent of changes in "no shows" due to locally televised home games. It must, therefore, be assumed that factors other than television account for the seasonal differences in Cincinnati "no shows." There are any number of possible explanations for this phenomenon, none of which are readily ascertainable at this time.

Finally, "no shows" did not prove to be sensitive to Cincinnati's won-loss records or divisional standings. However, the divisional standing of the visiting team as well as the multiplicative term reflecting the won-loss percentage of both teams had a significant impact on "no shows." This suggests that Cincinnati fans are rather discriminating and more prone to attend games that involve two well-matched winning teams which are vying for the divisional championship.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
CINCINATI "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .80106$
 $F(8, 19) = 9.56320^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.02910	1.256
Temperature	-.00157	7.263*
Precipitation	.09490	30.840*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00003	.256
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00004	1.790
1973	.06929	6.071*
1974	.09129	8.253*
1975	.09040	7.996*
Constant	.14295	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .82411$
 $F(8, 19) = 11.1270^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.03042	1.659
Temperature	-.00162	8.605*
Precipitation	.09962	33.898*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00407	.150
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01357	4.966*
1973	.07207	7.013*
1974	.09022	9.747*
1975	.08089	10.156*
Constant	.06283	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
 $R^2 = .80515$
 $F(7, 20) = 11.80621^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.02259	.763
Temperature	-.00158	7.878*
Precipitation	.09593	35.275*
Home W-LX x Visitor's W-LX	-.05790	2.785
1973	.06371	5.424*
1974	.08437	7.875*
1975	.08568	12.218*
Constant	.12381	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The Cincinnati franchise receives approximately one-third of all revenues earned from the sale of concessions. All parking revenues are retained by the city. In addition, stadium parking spaces are sold on a seasonal basis, but when "no shows" occur, spaces are resold after the start of the game. Therefore, "no shows" have not affected parking revenues. Indeed they may have increased those revenues, since unused spaces resulting from "no shows" are resold.

Concession sales increased between 1972 and 1973, even though live gate attendance (for regular season games) fell. However, concession sales decreased in 1974 and 1975 as did the Bengals attendance, although the percentage decline in concession sales over the past two years has been smaller than the percentage increase in "no shows". This can partially be explained by the fact that the average concession sales per person increased from \$1.08 in 1973 to \$1.22 in 1975.

With the exception of the 1973 season, there appears to be a direct relationship between the sale of "PRO" magazine and live gate attendance. Nevertheless Public Law 93-107 did not appear to be responsible for these losses. The decline may simply reflect the fans' lower propensities to buy the magazine due to its lower perceived value.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Cincinnati Bengals: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions <u>1/</u> (percentage change from previous season)	\$517,710	\$586,770 (13.3%)	\$580,853 (-1.0%)	\$558,108 (-3.9%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	81,691	86,313 (5.7%)	66,038 (-23.5%)	48,951 (-25.9%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	129,528	135,017 (4.2%)	132,104 (-2.2)	NA
4. Total tickets sold * (percentage change from previous season)	403,616	407,500 (1.0%)	404,112 (-0.8%)	399,166 (-1.2%)
5. "No Shows" * (percentage change from previous season)	21,789	26,059 (19.6%)	41,084 (57.7%)	44,669 (8.7%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	6	7	5

NA - Information was Not Available

* Total for seven home games

1/ Figure refers to gross receipts for concessions.

4. Audience Ratings

Television viewers in Cincinnati prefer to watch the Bengals play as opposed to other teams. As the figures in the table below indicate, televised Bengal games whether played at home or away attract far larger audiences than do games not involving the Cincinnati team. This is particularly true when Bengal games as well as games involving other teams are televised in the same time period by different networks.

Specifically, Bengal home and away games had average audience ratings of 27.9 and 30.9, respectively over the three year period. Other NFL games competing with televised Cincinnati games were only able to draw an average rating of 3.5. On the other hand, games not in competition with televised Bengal contests achieved an average rating of 14.4 over the three year period which is still well below the ratings for Cincinnati games.

Furthermore, there is no indication of oversaturation. The average audience ratings for Bengal games increased during each of the past three seasons. Given the preference of Cincinnati viewers for Bengal games and the fact that 18 home games have been televised locally over the past three seasons, it must be concluded that Public Law 93-107 has been very beneficial to Cincinnati residents.

Audience Ratings for Cincinnati Bengals Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Bengals</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(1) 19.1	(3) 28.6	(2) 4.9	(9)	16.1	
1974	(2) 30.4	(2) 29.4	(3) 5.2	(7)	12.7	
1975	(2) <u>34.2</u>	(2) <u>34.8</u>	(1) .3	(10)	<u>14.5</u>	
Avg. Ratings	(5) 27.9	(7) 30.9	(6) 3.5	(26)	14.4	

The Cleveland Browns

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have had a significant impact on the Cleveland Browns. Since 1973, Cleveland televised only four of 21 home games. This reflects the team's problems in selling all available seats at least 72 hours in advance of game time. For the most part, the Browns' lack of success in this area probably can be attributed to the team's relatively poor won-loss record over the past three years and to the fact that the Cleveland stadium seats a large number of fans--79,282.

The Browns, in the past, have played well, usually winning a large percentage of their games and finishing high in the divisional standing. Consequently, the past three seasons have been unusual. In 1973 the Browns won half of their games and placed third in the Central Division of the AFC. In 1974, their record deteriorated to a .286 won-loss percentage and a fourth place finish in their division. The Browns fared no better in 1975, finishing fourth again with a won-loss percentage of .214.

The team's poor showing during the past two seasons is reflected in ticket sales. During 1974 and 1975 total tickets sales decreased by 10.8 and 12.5 percent, respectively. Season ticket sales also declined by 2.3 percent in 1974 and 13.0 percent in 1975. Given that Cleveland fans have traditionally enjoyed winning seasons, the recent downturn in ticket sales is not particularly surprising. Furthermore, since the Browns have only televised four home games over the past three seasons, the team's recent lack of success in selling tickets cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107.

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Summary of Cleveland Browns'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	79,282	79,282	79,282	80,165
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	505,247	520,903 (3.1%)	464,760 (-10.8%)	406,679 (-12.5%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	72,178	74,415	66,394	58,097
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	48,901	49,670 (1.6%)	48,542 (-2.3%)	42,252 (-13%)
5. Percentage of games won	.714	.500	.286	.214
6. Divisional standing	2	3	4	4
7. Number of televised home games	0	2	1	1

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Cleveland experienced substantial increases in "no shows" in 1973 and 1974. Between 1972 and 1974 "no shows" increased from 30,094 to 52,666, or by 73.7 percent. However in 1975, the "no shows" declined to 28,177, a decrease of 46.1 percent. These variations do not appear to be reflected in changes in the number of locally televised games, won-loss records or divisional standings.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Cleveland Browns: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	30,094	38,787 (28.9%)	52,266 (34.8%)	28,177 (-46.1%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	4,299	5,541	7,467	4,025
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	72,178	74,415	66,394	58,097
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6%	7.4%	11.2%	6.9%
5. Number of televised games	0	2	1	1
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	-	9,717	2,029	6,848
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	4,299	3,871	8,373	3,555
8. Percentage of games won	.714	.500	.286	.214
9. Divisional standing	2	3	4	4

The results of the statistical analyses also indicate that Cleveland "no shows" are not particularly sensitive to variables defined in the model. Taken together, these factors accounted for approximately 37 percent of the variation of the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold. However, none of the three equations used to estimate the determinants of "no shows" was significant. The same was true of each of the variables defined in the model. Consequently, it is apparent that attendance at Browns' home games are influenced by other factors. However the results do demonstrate that Public Law 93-107 has had no apparent impact on Cleveland "no shows."

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
CLEVELAND "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .35208$
 $F(7, 20) = 1.55257$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-	-
Temperature	-.00242	1.556
Precipitation	.06350	1.738
Home Team's win-loss %	.00009	.373
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00009	1.384
1973	.04207	.649
1974	.12019	2.762
1975	.08584	1.109
Constant	.14353	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .37129$
 $F(7, 20) = 1.68728$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.04273	.630
Temperature	-.00145	.683
Precipitation	.08111	2.836
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02262	1.302
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.02741	2.742
1973	.01227	.076
1974	.04370	.794
1975 ^a	-	-
Constant	-.00580	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
 $R^2 = .30338$
 $F(7, 20) = 1.24429$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02266	.135
Temperature	-.00154	.614
Precipitation	.07817	2.220
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.10058	.364
1973	.03123	.317
1974	.05900	1.110
1975	.01063	.029
Constant	.14174	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The Cleveland Browns share approximately 20 percent of the revenues from concession sales at their home games. Since 1973, concession sales have increased while the number of televised games has been minimal. This would indicate that Public Law 93-107 has not had any adverse impact on concession sales in Cleveland. Furthermore, the 1975 decrease in total ticket sales means that concession sales are increasing because of greater consumption on the part of fans attending the games (from an individual's per game expenditure of \$.89 in 1973 to \$1.23 in 1975).

Sales of "PRO" magazine, on the other hand, have declined since 1973. No relationship between such revenue losses and televised games, however, can be determined.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Cleveland Browns: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (7 games)	<u>1973</u> (10 games)	<u>1974</u> (9 games)	<u>1975</u> (10 games)
1. Concessions <u>1/</u> (percentage change from previous season)**	\$ 43,139	\$ 64,987	\$ 93,988	\$111,019 <u>2/</u>
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)**	86,326	120,013	76,279	71,032
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)**	36,750	NA	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	505,247	520,903 (3.1%)	464,760 (-10.8%)	406,679 (-12.5%)
5. "No shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	30,094	38,787 (28.9%)	52,266 (34.8%)	28,117 (-46.1%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	2	1	1

NA - Information was Not Available

* Figures for seven home games

** - Where no percentage changes appear, data compared is for different number of games. Therefore, no valid comparison can be made between seasons.

1/ These figures reflect the Browns' share of revenues only. Total concessions were approximately five times this amount.

2/ Part of the increase in concessions revenue for 1975 is attributed to the addition of novelty sales. Prior to 1975 novelties were sold by a third party and the Browns did not share in profits or commissions. Browns' commissions for novelty sales during 1975 was \$9,165.

4. Audience Ratings

Even though the Browns have had three consecutive poor seasons, their televised games are still more popular with Cleveland viewers than are games involving other teams. As the figures below indicate, between 1972 and 1975 about 30 percent of all TV households in the Cleveland area tuned into the Browns' televised games. This compares quite favorably to the average audience rating of 6.3 for televised games which were competing with the Browns and an average 21.5 for games which did not compete against televised Cleveland games.

While 1975 proved to be Cleveland's worst season, the three televised away games still drew larger audiences than games involving other NFL teams. Hence, to the extent that Public Law 93-107 has triggered the lifting of the Browns' home game blackout policy, the legislation has clearly been beneficial to Cleveland football fans.

Audience Ratings for the Cleveland Browns: 1973-1975

	<u>Browns</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>					
	<u>Home Games</u>		<u>Away Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(0)	-	(3)	32.3	(2)	7.8	(8)	24.5
1974	(1)	29.5	(2)	35.8	(2)	5.0	(9)	20.2
1975	(0)	-	(3)	<u>24.7</u>	(3)	<u>6.2</u>	(9)	<u>19.8</u>
Avg.								
Ratings	(1)	29.5	(8)	30.9	(7)	6.3	(26)	21.5

The Denver Broncos

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

As was pointed out earlier, the Denver Broncos have televised all seven home games played during each of the past three seasons, reflecting continuous sellouts at least 72 hours in advance of game time. Indeed, between 1972 and 1974, the average number of tickets sold to each home game exceeded the stadium's capacity. The difference, of course, reflects tickets sold for standing room only. In 1975 the average number of tickets sold to home games was only 768 short of the stadium's capacity. This was partially due to the team's decision to hold back an additional 511 complimentary tickets.

As a consequence of the limited supply of seats and the popularity of professional football in the Denver area, there is an excess demand for tickets. This accounts for the small variation in ticket sales during the past four years. Indeed, marginal increases in ticket sales over each of the past three seasons reflect small increases in seats made available. The same is true of season tickets. The 2.1 percent increase in 1974 was simply due to the club's offering and subsequent sale of 1,000 additional season tickets.

Summary of Denver Broncos'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	50,000	50,000	51,706	52,702
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	355,693	356,364 (.2%)	356,494 (0%)	363,525 (2%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	50,813	50,909	50,928	51,932
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	48,000	48,000 (0%)	49,000 (2.1%)	49,000 (0%)
5. Percentage of games won	.357	.500	.500	.429
6. Divisional standing	3	2	2	2
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Denver has also experienced a relatively small number of "no shows."

Ticket holders who failed to attend the Broncos' home games in 1972 totaled 12,150, or an average of 1,736 per game. During 1973, when all seven home games were televised locally, "no shows" actually decreased to 5,615, which averaged only 802 per game or 1.6 percent of all tickets sold. However, the franchise has experienced increases in "no shows" during the past two seasons. In 1974 "no shows" increased to 14,420, or 4 percent of all tickets sold. In 1975 the total number increased again to 27,682, which was equivalent to an average of 3,955 per game or 7.6 percent of all tickets sold.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Denver Broncos: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	12,150	5,615 (-53.8%)	14,420 (156.8%)	27,682 (92.0%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	1,736	802	2,060	3,955
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	50,813	50,909	50,928	51,932
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3.4%	1.6%	4%	7.6%
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	-	802	2,060	3,955
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	1,736	0	0	0
8. Percentage of games won	.357	.500	.500	.429
9. Divisional standing	3	2	2	2

It is difficult to assess the impact of Public Law 93-107 on Denver's "no shows" due to the fact that the Broncos have locally televised all home games played during the past three seasons. Consequently there has been no variation in the number of televised games since 1973. Given this situation, the effect of televised home games on "no shows" may to a certain extent be reflected in other variables.

For example, although the analysis indicated that locally televised games did not directly affect the team's live gate attendance, the findings did conclusively demonstrate that "no shows" were influenced by temperature and precipitation. Both variables accounted for nearly 60 percent of the variation in live gate attendance. Not surprisingly, more fans failed to use their tickets

when the weather was cold and wet, than when the skies were clear and the temperature mild. This is likely to be true whether or not a home game is locally televised. However, Denver fans may have become more sensitive to adverse climate conditions. As a result of Public Law 93-107, that is, they may be more inclined to stay home when the weather is cold and/or wet if given the opportunity to watch the game on television. Consequently, Public Law 93-107 may have had an indirect effect on the Denver's live gate attendance. Nevertheless, the ratio of "no shows" to total seats sold has been lower than the league's average during each of the four seasons under consideration. Consequently, it must be assumed that if Public Law 93-107 has had an effect on the Broncos' attendance, the impact has been minimal.

Denver "no shows" also proved sensitive to the team's won-loss record. Again, more ticket holders attended games when the Broncos were winning than when they were losing. When the won-loss percentage of both teams were multiplied together and used as a surrogate for the quality or attractiveness of the game, this variable also proved to be significant, again reflecting the fans' preferences to see two winning well-matched teams play.

All other variables defined in the model were not significant. Hence, the differences in Denver's "no shows" could not be attributed to factors peculiar to any or all of the three seasons since the enactment of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
DENVER "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

$R^2 = .74675$

$F(7, 20) = 8.42461^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.01619	.319
Temperature	-.00231	29.386*
Precipitation	.05274	4.380*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00019	3.003
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00005	1.930
1973	-	-
1974	.02656	1.345
1975	.04616	4.304
Constant	.24005	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

$R^2 = .78296$

$F(7, 20) = 10.302^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.03438	.958
Temperature	-.00246	37.992*
Precipitation	.05022	4.821*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01981	1.519
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01341	5.891
1973	-.03227	2.241
1974	-	-
1975	.02634	1.604
Constant	.05597	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

$R^2 = .73011$

$F(6, 21) = 9.424^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	-.00233	29.504*
Precipitation	.05923	5.587*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.14529	4.492*
1973	-.00408	.030
1974	.01691	.455
1975	.03708	2.623
Constant	.08110	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The Denver Broncos do not receive a percentage of the revenues from concessions or parking. Since Denver has not provided sales information relating to these enterprises, it is impossible to determine Public Law 93-107's impact on them.

"PRO" magazine sales figures, however, were made available. They demonstrate an inverse relationship with the figures for "no shows". Specifically, as the number of "no shows" increased, the sale of "PRO" magazine has decreased..

It is, therefore, possible that Public Law 93-107 could have had an indirect impact on the sale of "PRO" magazine. That is, if fans are more prone to stay home in cold weather, partially as a result of the availability of local television coverage of home games, then the legislation may have contributed to the decline in "PRO" sales. Unfortunately this is impossible to measure since the exact nature of the interrelationships between temperature, "no shows" and locally televised games is equally impossible to ascertain.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Denver Broncos: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$114,024	\$ NA	\$ NA	\$ NA
2. "PRO" Magazine (percentage change from previous season)	64,545	75,346 (16.7%)	69,997 (-19.0%)	43,173 (-29.2%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	37,261	NA	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	355,693	356,364 (.2%)	356,494 (0%)	363,525 (2.0%)
5. "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	12,150	5,615 (-53.8%)	14,420 (156.8%)	27,682 (92.0%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

In addition to selling out all home games since the addition of Public Law 93-107, the Denver Broncos' have enjoyed very large television audiences. Over the three year period the average audience rating for televised home games was 39 while the team's away games captured an average rating of 36.2. Furthermore, there has not been a significant decrease in ratings since 1973, indicating that Denver viewers are not being oversaturated by weekly exposure to the team's games.

As is the case with nearly all home teams, the Broncos consistently attracted a far larger audience than did televised games involving other teams. This was particularly true of games competing for audience with Denver's televised games. In those instances, the Broncos outdrew the opposition nearly eight to one. Even when other televised games were not competing with the home team, audiences for Broncos' games were still about 60 percent larger than audiences watching other NFL games. Given the popularity of the Broncos with viewers in Denver coupled with the fact that all home games have been televised during the past three years, Public Law 93-107 has been unambiguously beneficial to the TV viewers in this area of the country.

Audience Ratings for the Denver Broncos: 1973-1975

	<u>Broncos</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>	
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>
1973	(1) 36.8	(3) 36.6	(3) 4.8	(7) 27.4
1974	(2) 41.4	(2) 35.0	(2) 3.4	(9) 22.0
1975	(2) <u>37.6</u>	(2) <u>37.1</u>	(2) <u>3.6</u>	(8) <u>26.6</u>
Avg.				
Ratings	(5) 39.0	(7) 36.3	(7) 4.1	(24) 25.3

The Houston Oilers

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since the adoption of Public Law 93-107, the Houston Oilers have televised only three home games. Given the relatively small capacity of the Houston Astrodome (55,254), the number of sellouts triggering telecasts appears unusually small. The Oilers sold less than 40,000 tickets per game during the 1972, 1973 and 1974 seasons. Houston experienced a 5.4 percent decline in ticket sales in 1973 and a 2.7 percent decrease in 1974.

Poor ticket sales in 1972 and 1973 coincided with 1-13 won-loss records and last place finishes in the AFC Central Division.

The Oilers had a much better season in 1974 finishing third in their division with a 7-7 record. The 2.7 percent decrease in total ticket sales for 1974 was less drastic than the decline in season ticket sales which fell off by nearly 20 percent. As will be shown in a later part of this report, the decline in season ticket sales can be attributed to the Oilers' very poor showing during the preceding season.

The team's improved showing in 1974 was reflected in the 7.1 percent increase in season tickets sold for the 1975 season. An excellent 1975 season record, resulted in a substantial 28.3 percent increase in total ticket sales. As is the case with most teams, Houston ticket sales appear to be quite sensitive to the won-loss record of the team.

Summary of Houston Oilers'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	50,000	50,000	50,000	55,254
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	276,291	261,472 (-5.4%)	254,519 (-2.7%)	326,467 (28.3%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	39,470	37,353	36,360	46,638
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	27,460	30,325 (10.4%)	24,435 (-19.4%)	26,179 (7.1%)
5. Percentage of games won	.071	.071	.500	.714
6. Divisional standing	4	4	3	3
7. Number of televised home games	0	0	1	2

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Houston has experienced relatively large numbers of "no shows" over the past four seasons although the team's improved performance has reversed the "no shows" trend. In 1972, 36,989 Houston ticket holders failed to attend games. "No Shows" in that year were equivalent to 13.4 percent of all tickets sold. The situation worsened in 1973 when "no shows" increased to 50,993 or 19.5 percent of all tickets sold. The situation improved, however, during the past two seasons. In 1974, "no shows" decreased to 26,666 or by 47.7 percent and declined further to a total of 20,548 "no shows" in 1975. The latter figure was equivalent to only 6.3 percent of all tickets sold.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Houston Oilers: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	36,989 -	50,993 (37.9%)	26,666 (-47.7%)	20,548 (-22.9%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	5,284	7,285	3,809	2,935
3. Avg. Number of seats sold per game	39,470	37,353	36,360	46,638
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	13.4%	19.5%	10.5%	6.3%
5. Number of televised games	0	0	1	2
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	-	-	3,050	2,257
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	5,284	7,284	3,936	3,207
8. Percentage of games won	.071	.071	.500	.714
9. Divisional standing	4	4	3	3

The average number of "no shows" at televised home games in 1974 and 1975 were actually lower than the average number of "no shows" for non-televised games. This indicates that Public Law 93-107 did not impact on the live gate attendance to Houston home games. This proposition is further supported by the results of our statistical analysis.

All variables in the model accounted for about 66 percent of the variation in "no shows." Regardless of the measure used to reflect the quality of the games, the variable indicating whether or not the game was televised locally was not significant. It must, therefore, be concluded that Public Law 93-107 did not adversely affect attendance. Indeed, when divisional

standings were used to measure the attractiveness of quality of the game, the televised game coincided with a reduction in the number of "no shows." This simply reflects the fact that "no shows" were lower for the three games televised locally during the past two seasons than for non-televised games.

The results also indicate that Oilers live gate attendance was significantly affected by the quality of the game and, surprisingly, temperature; that is, decreases in Houston "no shows" were significantly influenced by improvements in the team's performance over the four year period and by milder weather. (The latter finding is puzzling in that the Oilers play in a domed stadium which is kept at a constant 72°. However, temperature used in the analysis reflects outside conditions. Hence, the Oilers' fans appear to be less inclined to travel to the stadium when the weather is cold.) The results of two of the three equations also indicate that season ticket sales were significantly lower in 1973 than in 1972, but no significant differences were found between 1972, 1974 and 1975. Given that all of Houston's televised games were played during the past two seasons, these results lend additional credence to the conclusion that Public Law 93-107 has not adversely impacted on attendance to Houston's home games.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
HOUSTON "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = 0.66375$
 $F(8,19) = 4.68824^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.02184	0.185
Temperature	-.00342	11.906*
Precipitation	-.05832	1.777
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00037	10.348*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00001	0.056
1973	.05140	1.951
1974	.04339	1.306
1975	.11303	3.064
Constant	.43978	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = 0.53025$
 $F(6,21) = 3.95079^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.08628	3.207
Temperature	-.00223	3.920
Precipitation	.01124	0.051
Home Team's Div. Standing	.04480	4.003
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-	-
1973	.08277	5.120*
1974	.00909	0.067
1975 ^a	-	-
Constant	.11360	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
 $R^2 = .52750$
 $F(6,21) = 3.90740^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.01728	0.069
Temperature	-.00274	6.510*
Precipitation	-.05329	1.138
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.21744	3.857
1973	.07264	3.502
1974	.00935	0.070
1975 ^a	-	-
Constant	.34379	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

Decreases in revenues from the sale of concessions at Houston home games between 1973 and 1974 coincided with an increase in live gate attendance. Similarly, "PRO" magazine sales declined in 1974 and 1975 while the Oilers' live gate attendance increased. Hence, there is no apparent relationship between "no shows" and the sale of concessions and "PRO" magazine. Public Law 93-107 could not, therefore, have had an adverse impact on these sources of income. No conclusions can be drawn with regard to parking revenues to the Houston Oilers due to insufficient data.

Revenues Earned From the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine and Parking for Houston Oilers: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$ NA	\$209,571	\$195,832 (-6.6%)	\$ NA
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	NA	47,205	46,000 (-2.6%)	35,764 (-22.3%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	NA	138,977	118,772	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	276,291	261,472 (-5.4%)	254,519 (-2.7%)	326,467 (28.3%)
5. "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	36,989	50,993 (37.9%)	26,666 (-47.7%)	20,548 (-22.9%)
6. Number of televised home games	-	0	1	2

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

Televised Houston games did not prove to be substantially more popular than other televised NFL games. Over the three year period the average audience ratings for the Houston's away games was 25.9, while home games in 1975 received a 39.8 audience. Moreover, ratings for Houston games have improved since 1973. When viewers had to choose between Houston games and others aired at the same time on another channel, most preferred to watch the home team. However, other non-competing games were almost as popular as away games of the Oilers. It must therefore be concluded that while NFL football is not as popular with Houston viewers as it is with viewers in other cities, fans clearly place a higher value on the opportunity to watch the Oilers as opposed to other teams. In that sense Public Law 93-107 probably has proven beneficial to those residing in the Houston area.

Audience Ratings for Houston Oilers' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Houston</u>		<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Other Teams</u>				
	<u>Home</u>	<u>Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>			
1973	(0)	-	(3)	17.1	(3)	17.1	(9)	23.4
1974	(0)	-	(3)	25.1	(3)	13.5	(9)	21.7
1975	(2)	39.8	(2)	35.5	(2)	8.2	(9)	25.2
Avg. Ratings	(2)	39.8	(8)	25.9	(8)	12.9	(27)	23.4

The Kansas City Chiefs

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Kansas City locally televised six of seven home games during 1973, the first year of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law. Since then, all home games have been blacked-out in the Chiefs' home territory.

Kansas City's stadium seats approximately 78,000 fans. In 1972 the Chiefs sold a total of 546,124 tickets, an average of 78,017. Ticket sales have declined since then. Specifically the Chiefs sold an average of 76,984 tickets per game in 1973 and an average of 73,634 in 1974. Last year ticket sales declined 14.1 percent to an average of 63,238 per game.

Much of this can be attributed to a downward trend in season ticket sales over the past three years. Season ticket sales declined to 70,555 in 1973, or by 3.2 percent. The trend continued in 1974 when only 65,564 season tickets were sold. Finally the Chiefs experienced a more serious deterioration in season ticket sales last year when total sales fell to 47,870, a 27 percent decrease from the previous year.

Undoubtedly, the downward trend in ticket sales during the past two seasons can be attributed to the team's relatively poor showing. Kansas City has traditionally enjoyed winning seasons. Consequently, the Chiefs' third place finish in the AFC's Western Division in 1974 and 1975 may have been disappointing to the fans. Hence, they could have been less inclined to purchase tickets - especially season tickets, which for most households represents a sizable expenditure.

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At first glance, it does not appear that Public Law 93-107 has exacerbated the Chiefs' "no shows" problem. After all, 1973 was the only year in which the law triggered a lifting of the team's home territory blackout policy. Additionally, the average number of "no shows" at the televised games was substantially below the 39,314 ticket holders who failed to attend the Chief's single non-televised game in 1973.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Kansas City Chiefs: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "no shows" (percentage change from previous season)	68,363	93,910 (37.4%)	109,940 (17.1%)	27,166 (-75.3%)
2. Avg. "no shows" per game	9,766	13,416	15,706	3,881
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	78,017	76,984	73,634	63,238
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	13%	17%	21%	6.1%
5. Number of televised games	0	6	0	0
6. Avg. "no shows per televised games	-	9,099	0	0
7. Avg. "no shows" per non-televised game	9,766	39,314	15,705	3,881
8. Percentage of games won	.571	.500	.357	.357
9. Divisional standing	2	2	3	3

Summary of Kansas City
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	77,472	77,742	78,000	78,099
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	546,124	538,891 (-1.3%)	515,438 (-4.4%)	442,663 (-14.1%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	78,017	76,984	73,634	63,238
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	72,885	70,555 (-3.2%)	65,564 (7.1%)	47,870 (-27.0%)
5. Percentage of games won	.571	.500	.357	.357
6. Divisional standing	2	2	3	3
7. Number of televised games	0	6	0	0

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

With the exception of last year's season, the Chiefs have been plagued by a relatively large number of "no shows." For example, 68,363 ticket holders failed to attend home games in 1972. This was equivalent to 13 percent of all tickets sold which, incidently, was more than twice the average percentage of "no shows" to tickets sold for all 26 NFL teams in 1972.

During the first year of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, Kansas City "no shows" increased to 93,910 or to 17 percent of all tickets sold. The situation worsened in 1974 when "no shows" increased to 109,940, or 21 percent of all tickets sold. Fortunately for the Chiefs, live gate attendance picked up last year with "no shows" decreasing to 27,166 which was less than 1 percent of all seats sold.

The results of our statistical analysis indicate that Public Law 93-107 has not adversely affected Kansas City's live gate attendance. Indeed, the findings indicate that the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold was significantly lower when the games were locally televised. Again, this is indicative of relatively high live gate attendance at the first six home games in 1973 all of which were carried on local television stations. The 39,314 "no shows" at the last game of 1973 season, which was blacked out, accounted for 42 percent of the total "no shows" for that year. The lack of interest in this contest probably reflected the fact that Kansas City was then out of contention for a berth in the Playoffs.

In any event, the differences in "no shows" at the six televised and the single non-televised games played during 1973 probably account for the significant and positive relationship between live gate attendance and locally televised home games.

Weather also had a significant influence on attendance. As expected, more fans stayed home when the weather was cold or wet. The 1973 seasonal variable was also significant and positive, indicating that "no shows" rose in 1973, independent of the effect of other factors (i.e., televised games and the weather) which also had a significant impact on "no shows." Unfortunately we have no reasonable explanation for this seasonal increase in "no shows."

In any event, the analysis conclusively demonstrates that while Kansas City has experienced relatively large numbers of "no shows" since 1972, the problem cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
KANSAS CITY "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .73001$ $F(8,19) = 6.42160^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.23598	5.177*
Temperature	-.00423	14.247*
Precipitation	.05002	1.007
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00023	1.662
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	.00008	1.011
1973	.29990	8.803*
1974	.04889	.892
1975	-.06231	.846
Constant	.42131	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .73184$ $F(8,19) = 6.48170^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.23313	4.703*
Temperature	-.00454	16.787*
Precipitation	.08989	3.506
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02752	.410
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-.02912	4.005*
1973	.30017	7.366*
1974	.04466	.487
1975	-.03563	.208
Constant	.35483	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .67454$ $F(7,20) = 5.92164^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.23824	4.604*
Temperature	-.00421	13.613*
Precipitation	.06408	1.644
Home W-LX x Visitor's W-LX	.05164	.147
1973	.30842	8.163*
1974	.07605	2.050
1975	.00946	.028
Constant	.29943	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

Since 1973, the Chiefs have retained 42 percent of the concession revenues at Arrowhead Stadium. These revenues have increased since 1972 although six home games of the Chiefs have been televised during the past three seasons. The impact of Public Law 93-107, therefore, would apply only to the 1973 season when these telecasts occurred.

In 1973, revenues from concessions and parking during the Chiefs' regular season increased by 7 percent and 1 percent respectively. Thus, six televised games do not appear to have resulted in a loss of income to Kansas City from these enterprises.

Moreover, while sales of "PRO" magazine declined in the 1973 season, they have continued to decline in 1974 and 1975 when no home games were televised locally. It is therefore not possible to connect revenue losses from the sale of "PRO" magazine solely to Public Law 93-107. Rather, such declines would have to be accounted for by other factors.

Given that both parking and concession revenues have increased since 1973, while "PRO" magazine sales have fallen off steadily, the enactment of Public Law 93-107 has had no detrimental impact on these sources of revenue for the Kansas City Chiefs.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Kansas City Chiefs: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (7 games)	<u>1973</u> (7 games)	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$395,831	\$424,244 (7%)	\$563,986 (33%)	\$649,867 (15.2%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	110,130	84,242 (-24%)	59,603 (-29.3%)	54,533 (-8.5%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	200,171	201,514 (1%)	271,883 (35%)	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	546,124	538,891 (-1.3%)	515,438 (-4.4%)	442,663 (-14.1%)
5. "No Shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	68,363	93,910 (37.4%)	109,940 (17.1%)	27,166 (-75.3%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	6	0	0

NA - Information was Not Available

* - Total for seven home games

4. Audience Ratings

The figures in the subsequent table reflect an annual decline in the audience ratings for the Chiefs' televised games over the past three years. Again, this may be indicative of the fans' recent dissatisfaction with the team's performance.

Nevertheless, even with the recent decline in viewing, it is apparent that viewers in Kansas City and the surrounding area prefer to watch the Chiefs when given the opportunity. Home games locally televised in 1973 outdrew competing televised games involving other teams by a margin of nearly five to one.

Additionally the three year averages indicate that Kansas City games attract twice as many viewers as other games which are aired at different times. Here again, it is apparent that many people are interested in watching NFL games only if they involve a team of local interest. Consequently, Public Law 93-107 appears to have been beneficial to residents in the Kansas City area.

Audience Ratings for Kansas City Chiefs' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Chiefs</u>				<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>		<u>Away Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(2)	34.6	(2)	37.8	(2)	7.6	(9)	19.3
1974	(0)	-	(2)	33.6	(1)	11.0	(11)	15.6
1975	(0)	-	(2)	30.0	(1)	2.3	(11)	16.0
Avg.								
Ratings	(2)	34.6	(6)	33.8	(4)	7.0	(31)	17.0

The Miami Dolphins

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Miami televised all seven home games in 1973, the first year of the Sports Anti-Blackout Legislation. However, only three of seven home games were televised in 1974, while none was aired in 1975. Total ticket sales declined in both 1974 and 1975.

For example, the Dolphins sold 544,162 tickets in 1972, or an average of 77,737 per game (which actually was greater than the Orange Bowl's seating capacity of 75,385). In 1973, the stadium's capacity was expanded to 80,050 seats of which the Dolphins sold an average of 78,714 per game. The total ticket sales decreased to 537,418 in 1974, averaging out to 76,774 per game. The team experienced a more serious decline last year when total sales fell by 9.2 percent to 487,758, or an average of 69,680 per game.

The downturn in ticket sales in 1974 and 1975 can partially be attributed to relatively large decreases in season ticket sales. Between 1973 and 1974 season ticket sales dropped from 74,961 to 67,322 and continued to decline in 1975 when only 50,000 were sold. Consequently, the Dolphins have experienced a 28 percent decline in season ticket sales since the enactment of Public Law 93-107. This is somewhat unusual in that the Dolphins have played very well over the entire four year period, winning their division and the NFL championship in both 1972 and 1973, while placing first and second in the AFC's Eastern division during the past two seasons. Perhaps the team's losses in ticket sales can partially be explained by the loss of Larry Csonka, Paul Warfield and Jim Kiick to the World Football league in 1974.

Summary of Miami Dolphins
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	75,385	80,050	80,050	80,050
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	544,162	551,000 (1.3%)	537,418 (-2.5%)	487,758 (-9.2%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	77,737	78,714	76,774	69,680
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	69,303	74,961 (8.2%)	67,322 (-10.2%)	50,000 (-25.7%)
5. Percentage of games won	1.000	.857	.786	.714
6. Divisional standing	1	1	1	2
7. Number of televised games	0	7	3	0

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

In addition to declining ticket sales, Miami's live gate attendance has also fallen off since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. In 1972, the Dolphins had a total of 20,567 "no shows" which was equivalent to 4 percent of all tickets sold. During 1973, the first year of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, all seven home games were locally televised and "no shows" increased nearly six-fold to 117,611, or 21 percent of all tickets sold.

The situation improved somewhat in 1974 when only three of seven home games were televised. "No shows" decreased to 88,131 which was equivalent to 16.4 percent of all tickets sold. Last year none of the Dolphins' home games were locally televised and "no shows" fell again to 41,414 or 8.5 percent of all tickets sold. However, the 1975 figure was still twice the number of "no shows" experienced in 1972, prior to the adoption of Public Law 93-107.

It appears that there is a definite correlation between Miami's "no shows" and locally televised games. The Dolphins had an average of 16,802 "no shows" at home games in 1973, all of which were televised. In 1974, the average number of "no shows" at televised games was 16,742 compared with 9,476 at non-televised games. Last year, the absence of locally televised games coincided with a further decline in "no shows" to an average of 5,916 per game.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Miami Dolphins: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	20,567	117,611 (471.8%)	88,131 (-25.1%)	41,414 (-53%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per sold per game	2,938	16,802	12,590	5,916
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	77,737	78,714	76,774	69,680
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3.8%	21.3%	16.4%	8.5%
5. Number of televised games	0	7	3	0
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	0	16,802	16,742	0
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	2,938	0	9,476	5,916
8. Percentage of games won	1.000	.857	.786	.714
9. Divisional standing	1	1	1	2

The results of our statistical analyses indicate that Public Law 93-107 has adversely affected live gate attendance to the Dolphins' home games. All variables in the model account for about 80 percent of the variation in "no shows."

Miami "no shows" were influenced by locally televised games. Specifically the results suggest that local television coverage of home games resulted in a significantly larger number of "no shows" when all other factors were held constant. It is difficult to explain why the Miami franchise has been so affected. Perhaps, fans experience problems in getting to the Orange Bowl, where the Dolphins play. If so, ticket holders would be more inclined to stay at home if given the opportunity to watch the game on television. The impact of television on Miami "no shows" may also be attributable to the distance fans must drive in order to get to the game. If large numbers of Miami ticket holders live good distances from the stadium, they may be less inclined to attend games should these contests be televised. Additionally, since Miami caters to vacationers from all over the country, the area affords a plentitude of recreational opportunities which compete with professional football games. This could also account for the ticket holders' greater propensity to watch home games on television. Doing so would certainly consume less time, thereby allowing fans to partake in other recreational endeavors. Unfortunately, we have no evidence to confirm any of the above propositions. They are simply offered as possible explanations for why Public Law 93-107 has adversely affected the live gate attendance at Miami's home games.

Miami "no shows" were also influenced by the temperature, as well as the quality of the game. As expected, "no shows" increased when the weather turned cool. Fans were also more inclined to attend games, when the Dolphins

were playing a strong opponent. Each of these variables appeared to have an equal or a greater affect on Miami "no shows" as did Public Law 93-107.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
MIAMI "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = 0.80188$ $F(8,19) = 9.61246^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.10500	7.557*
Temperature	-.00368	8.490*
Precipitation	-.01068	0.093
Home Team's win-loss %	-.17001	1.594
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.10060	3.740
1973	.07123	2.083
1974	.02637	0.268
1975	.01829	0.203
Constant	.52989	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = 0.74938$ $F(8,19) = 7.10166^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.09805	4.233
Temperature	-.00433	7.647*
Precipitation	-.00426	0.015
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.01834	0.667
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00691	0.631
1973	.08750	2.350
1974	.04895	1.008
1975	.04010	1.822
Constant	.33596	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = 0.79450$ $F(6,21) = 13.53184^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.09981	7.423*
Temperature	-.00358	8.641*
Precipitation ^a	-	-
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.14299	7.262*
1973	.08811	3.945
1974	.06021	3.978
1975	.04337	3.025
Constant	.37276	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking and "PRO" Magazine

The Miami Dolphins Inc. own all of the concession revenues at the Orange Bowl stadium. Revenues from Dolphins' contests, therefore, represent only a small percent of income the team receives from such events as the Orange Bowl and college football games. At the same time, data received from the Dolphins is difficult to assess, given that each season's receipts vary as to the number of games included.

It was demonstrated earlier that the Dolphins have been adversely affected by the local televising of home games. However in 1973 when all sevenhome games were televised, revenues from concessions declined by less than 1 percent. Sales of "PRO" magazine have also declined since 1972. Since no Dolphin home games were televised in 1975 while "PRO" sales also fell, decreases in revenue from this source cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107.

A decline in parking revenues also occurred from 1972 to 1973, but the Dolphins do not share in these receipts so information on other seasons was not available.

In short, while the decline in live gate attendance experienced by the Dolphins (which has partially resulted from locally televised games) has undoubtedly resulted in lower concession and "PRO" magazine sales. The franchise is still doing reasonably well with regard to this facet of its financial operation.

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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Miami Dolphins: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (7 games)	<u>1973</u> (7 games)	<u>1974</u> (10 games)	<u>1975</u> (7 games)
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$350,835	\$347,653 (-.9%)	\$449,973	\$524,045 <u>1/</u>
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	79,249	65,521 (-17.3%)	61,858	61,555
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	12,714	12,267 (-3.5%)	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	544,162	551,000 (1.3%)	537,418 (-2.5%)	487,758 (-9.2%)
5. "No shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	20,567	117,611 (471.8%)	88,131 (-25.1%)	41,414 (-53%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	7	3	0

NA - Information was Not Available

* Total for seven home games

1/ 20 percent increase in concession prices

4. Audience Ratings

Even though Public Law 93-107 has resulted in a significant decrease in live gate attendance at Dolphins' games, Miami residents have clearly benefited by the legislation. Locally televised home games were, on the average, watched by 35.2 percent of all households in Southern Florida. Away games achieved an average rating of 38.8 over the three year period.

Miami viewers also prefer to watch the Dolphins as opposed to other teams. This is reflected in the audience levels for home and away games which were about 6 times as large as audiences watching other games which were competing with the Dolphins' telecasts. The home team also attracted far larger audiences than did games involving other teams aired at other times.

Finally, there has been no significant decrease in audience ratings for the Dolphins' home and/or away games. This suggests that there has been no oversaturation of the sport or the home team. Had that been the case, audience ratings would have decreased. It must, therefore, be concluded that Public Law 93-107 has been beneficial as far as Miami's television viewers are concerned.

Audience Ratings for Miami Dolphins' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Dolphins</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(1) 35.7	(3) 41.0	(3) 6.4	(8)	22.9	
1974	(1) 34.7	(1) 35.2	(0) -	(11)	17.0	
1975	(0) -	(2) 37.3	(2) 6.8	(2)	19.4	
Avg. Ratings	(2) 35.2	(6) 38.8	(5) 6.6	(29)	19.5	

The New England Patriots

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Nine of the 21 home games played by the Patriots since 1973 have been locally televised, which represents 43 percent of the total. Five of seven home games were televised in 1974 while two were aired in 1973 and 1975.

Schaefer Stadium in Foxboro, Massachusetts, home of the New England Patriots, seats some 61,279 fans. The Patriots have sold an average of 94 percent of the stadium's available seats during each of the past four seasons. Total ticket sales, however, have fluctuated marginally each year with a 4.1 percent decrease in 1973, a 2.8 percent increase in 1974 and a 2.5 percent decline last year. Season ticket sales, on the other hand, declined in 1973 by 12.9 percent and in 1974 by 7.6 percent before showing a 6 percent increase in 1975. While total sales decreased slightly in the 1975 season, season ticket sales rose by 6 percent. The improved won-loss record of the Patriots in 1974 probably accounted for the greater season ticket purchases by fans in anticipation of a better 1975 season.

Summary of New England Patriots
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	61,043	61,279	61,279	61,279
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	421,243	403,922 (-4.1%)	415,157 (2.8%)	404,847 (-2.5%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	60,178	57,703	59,308	57,835
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	55,007	47,938 (-12.9%)	44,319 (-7.6%)	46,967 (6%)
5. Percentage of games won	.214	.357	.500	.214
6. Divisional standing	5	3	3	5
7. Number of televised games	0	2	5	2

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

While New England "no shows" have fluctuated greatly over the past three years, the absolute number of ticket holders failing to attend the Patriots' games has been relatively small. During 1973 when two of seven home games were locally televised, "no shows" decreased to 6,232 which was 67.8 percent fewer than the number of "no shows" at games played during the previous season. In 1974 "no shows" increased to 28,396. However, this number was still less than 7 percent of all tickets sold and was also somewhat less than the 11 percent average experienced by all NFL teams in 1974. "No shows" declined again last year when only 13,892 ticket holders, or 3.4 percent of the total, failed to attend Patriot games.

The average number of Patriot "no shows" at non-televised games during the 1973 and 1974 seasons was smaller than the average number of "no shows" at televised games. In 1975 the reverse was true, although the differences between these averages was relatively small.

Summary of "No Shows" For
New England Patriots: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	19,358	6,232 (-67.8%)	28,396 (355.7%)	13,892 (-51.1%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	2,765	890	4,057	1,985
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	60,178	57,703	59,308	57,835
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	4.6%	1.5%	6.8%	3.4%
5. Number of televised games	0	2	5	2
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game		2,183	4,243	526
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	2,765	373	3,590	2,568
8. Percentage of games won	.214	.357	.500	.214
9. Divisional standing	5	3	3	5

Our statistical analysis indicates that Public Law 93-107 has had little or no impact on the live gate attendance of New England games even though the legislation has lifted the blackout on more than 40 percent of the home games played since 1973.

The analysis did indicate however, that Patriot "no shows" were significantly affected by the weather. That is, more ticket holders stayed away from the games when the weather was cold and particularly when it was wet. Here again, the fans' sensitivity to bad weather may have been increased by the opportunity to watch the game on a local television station at least during the 1973 and 1974 seasons.

Finally, the analysis indicates that there were significant changes in "no shows" between the 1972 and 1973 seasons. Specifically, the ratio of "no shows" to tickets sold proved to be significantly greater in 1972 than in 1973, when differences attributable to all other factors were taken into consideration. It is not immediately apparent why this happened.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
NEW ENGLAND "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .59661$ $F(7, 20) = 4.22568^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-	-
Temperature	-.00075	3.518
Precipitation	.06498	10.191*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00005	2.144
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00002	.804
1973	-.03585	6.011*
1974	.03313	3.826
1975	-.02223	2.405
Constant	.11230	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .58317$ $F(8, 19) = 3.32277^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.00890	.316
Temperature	-.00089	3.921
Precipitation	.05807	7.315*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00390	.417
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-.00290	.357
1973	-.03057	2.980
1974	.02916	2.484
1975	-.01793	1.099
Constant	.09115	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .58340$ $F(6, 21) = 4.90138^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	-.00084	4.571*
Precipitation	.06594	10.474*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.04943	1.918
1973	-.03203	5.234*
1974	.02531	2.924
1975	-.01980	1.982
Constant	.10061	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The New England Patriots receive 12.5 percent of concession revenues but no share of parking receipts. Concession sales have steadily risen during the past four year period.

Parking revenues, on the other hand, have fluctuated, dropping slightly in 1973, and then recording a modest rise in 1974. This corresponds to a similar fluctuation in total ticket sales during those seasons. Ticket sales dropped again in 1975 but parking data for that year was unavailable.

"PRO" magazine sales increased to \$85,983 in 1974 then fell by nearly 50 percent in 1975. "No shows" for the period fluctuated drastically, dropping in 1973, rising in 1974 and falling again in 1975.

The diminution in "PRO" sales for 1975 did not appear to be related to "no shows". Similarly, there were five televised games in 1974 but only two in 1975. It is therefore apparent that factors other than changes in the live gate attendance influenced "PRO" sales. The same conclusion is therefore warranted with regard to the impact on Public Law 93-107 on general concession sales.

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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for New England Patriots: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$444,997	\$473,062 (6.3%)	\$560,431 (18.5%)	\$587,775 (4.0%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	46,864	72,598 (54.9%)	85,983 (18.4%)	46,219 (-46.3%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	151,166	132,341 (-12.5%)	142,041 (8.2%)	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	421,243	403,922 (-4.1%)	415,157 (2.8%)	404,847 (-2.5%)
5. "No shows" (percentage change from previous season)	19,358	6,232 (-67.8%)	28,396 (355.7%)	13,892 (-51.1%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	2	5	2

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

Audience ratings for the New England Patriots reflect viewing in the Boston television market. Even though the Patriots have not played well over the past three seasons, the team's televised games have drawn sizable audiences in the Boston area. The average rating for home games played during the past three seasons was 29.2, while away games received an average rating of 22.2. This compares favorably with audiences watching other NFL games. Games which competed with the televised Patriots' contests had an average rating of only 5.7, while non-competing games involving other teams attracted an average rating of 13.4. Since Public Law 93-107 has resulted in local telecasts of nine home games, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislation has proven to be beneficial to New England residents.

Audience Ratings for New England Patriots Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Patriots</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>	
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>
1973	(2) 21.0	(2) 20.3	(3) 5.6	(7) 16.9
1974	(3) 38.4	(1) 32.8	(1) 2.2	(8) 12.0
1975	<u>(1) 18.1</u>	<u>(3) 20.0</u>	<u>(2) 7.7</u>	<u>(9) 11.9</u>
Avg. Ratings	(6) 29.2	(6) 22.2	(6) 5.7	(24) 13.4

the New York Jets

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The Jets played six instead of the usual seven home games in 1973, of which four were locally televised. In 1974 as well as last year, the Jets sold out and broadcast four home games in the New York area. The summary of the team's ticket sales indicates that they have sold no less than 98 percent of the total available seats since the adoption of Public Law 93-107.

Average seats sold per game in 1972 exceeded the stadium's capacity. Sales fell off slightly in 1973, when the Jets played only six games but the total tickets sold were still equivalent to 99 percent of capacity. Ticket sales increased in 1974, but this was probably attributable to the seventh game. When compared with 1972, ticket sales fell by about 4 percent in 1974. Last year's sales increased but by less than 1 percent.

Season ticket sales have remained relatively stable, decreasing by 2.9 percent in 1973 and by 5.3 percent last year. The latter diminution is probably attributable to the team's fourth place finish in the AFC's Eastern Division in 1974.

Summary of New York Jets
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u> (6 games)	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,416
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	430,442	355,718 (-17.4%)	411,442 (15.7%)	413,103 (.4%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	61,492	59,286	58,777	59,015
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	58,226	56,500 (-2.9%)	56,500 (0%)	53,500 (-5.3%)
5. Percentage of games won	.500	.286	.500	.214
6. Divisional standing	2	4	4	4
7. Number of televised games	0	4	4	4

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

The Jets have also experienced substantial increases in "no shows" since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. Between 1972 and 1974, "no shows" increased from 32,597 to 71,865, or from 7.6 percent to 17.5 percent of all tickets sold. However, the situation improved in 1975, when the Jets' "no shows" declined to 60,225 which was equivalent to 14.6 percent of all seats purchased.

During the 1973 and 1975 seasons, the average number of "no shows" at locally televised home games was substantially lower than the average number of ticket holders who failed to attend non-televised home games. In 1974, however, the reverse was true.

Summary of "No Shows" For
New York Jets: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u> (6 games)	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	32,597	56,836 (74.4%)	71,865 (26.4%)	60,225 (-16.2%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	4,657	9,473	10,266	8,382
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	61,492	59,286	58,777	59,015
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	7.6%	16%	17.5%	14.6%
5. Number of televised games	0	4	4	4
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	0	8,568	12,056	6,382
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	4,657	11,283	7,880	11,566
8. Percentage of games won	.500	.286	.500	.214
9. Divisional standing	2	4	4	4

The results of the statistical analysis, listed in the table below, indicate that live gate attendance at the New York Jets' home games was not affected by Public Law 93-107. Specifically, locally televised games did not result in an increase in "no shows." However, the weather did impact on attendance. "No shows" increased when the weather was wet and/or cold. Furthermore, it does not appear that locally televised games constitute an important interceding factor in the fan's decision to attend games when the weather is bad. Had that been the case, the number of "no shows" at locally televised games should have been higher than "no shows" at non-televised games. The analysis does indicate that Jets' fans are becoming more sensitive to the weather when deciding whether or not to attend games. In all probability, this can be attributed to the team's relatively poor performance over the past four years. More precisely, Jets' ticket holders are not as willing to contend with cold, wet weather when they expect the team to lose.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
NEW YORK JETS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R² = .65296

F(6,20) = 6.27180*

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.04016 ^a	1.248
Temperature	-.00538	13.418*
Precipitation	.12975	9.674*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00012	1.007
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-	-
1973	-.05343	1.262
1974	-.01860	.152
1975 ^a	-	-
Constant	.42006	-

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R² = .64912

F(8,18) = 4.16237*

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02873	.433
Temperature	-.00549	12.516*
Precipitation	.11838	6.754*
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.00291	.007
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-.00322	.067
1973	.00227	.001
1974	.03919	.182
1975	.04526	.246
Constant	.36716	-

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R² = .64854

F(7,19) = 5.00865

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.03474	.646
Temperature	-.00550	13.403*
Precipitation	.12097	7.993*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.02573	.042
1973	-.01157	.032
1974	.02620	.189
1975	.03448	.407
Constant	.36108	-

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The New York Jets do not share revenues earned from the sales of concessions, parking or "PRO" magazine. As a result, no information on parking revenues has been made available by the team.

Concession revenues increased substantially between 1973 and 1975, even allowing for one less game played in 1973. On the other hand, "PRO" sales have declined over the past three year period. In both instances, season variations in revenues did not coincide with changes in live gate attendance over the four year period. Instead, a variety of other factors, having nothing to do with Public Law 93-107 apparently contributed to seasonal changes in the sale of concessions and "PRO" magazine.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine and Parking for New York Jets: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (7 games)	<u>1973</u> (6 games)	<u>1974</u> (7 games)	<u>1975</u> (7 games)
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$ NA	\$361,854	\$432,621	\$497,224 (15.0%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	63,635	54,173 (-14.9%)	49,630 (-22.0%)	48,363 (-2.6%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	NA	NA	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	430,442	355,718 (-17.4%)	411,442 (15.7%)	413,013 (.4%)
5. "No shows" (percentage change from previous season)	32,597	56,836 (74.4%)	71,865 (26.4%)	60,225 (-16.2%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	4	4	4

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

Unlike most NFL teams, televised Jets' games have not captured a particularly large proportion of the television audience. For example, the team's televised home games over the past three years have attracted an average audience rating of 13.2. Away games on the other hand enjoyed a somewhat higher rating 15.8. Neither of these audiences are particularly large for local team telecasts.

The Jets' audience ratings are also uncharacteristic since they were not substantially larger than the audience ratings for other NFL games telecast at the same time but on different channels. However, the competing games televised in 1973 involved the New York Giants, another local team.

Audience ratings in New York are generally lower than in most other NFL cities. This occurs because the New York market supports a relatively larger number of stations. Consequently, there are more options for the viewer to select. This usually results in a higher degree of audience fragmentation and lower audience ratings.

The size of the television audience watching televised Jets' games over the past three years, probably reflects the team's poor records. New York had three consecutive fourth place finishes in the AFC's Eastern Division since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. Not surprisingly, New York viewers appear to be less inclined to watch their home team play when that team is experiencing a losing season.

Audience Ratings for New York Jets Games: 1973-1975

	<u>New York Jets</u>				<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>		<u>Away Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(3)	11.6	(1)	17.9	(2)	15.9	(10)	16.8
1974	(0)	-	(1)	11.7	(1)	10.7	(11)	14.6
1975	(1)	18.1	(1)	17.8	(0)	-	(10)	14.6
Avg.								
Ratings	(4)	13.2	(3)	15.8	(3)	13.3	(31)	15.3

The Oakland Raiders

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since the adoption of Public Law 93-107, the Oakland Raiders have locally televised 14 of their 21 home games, or 66.6 percent of the total. Of the seven home games played during each of the past three seasons, five were locally televised in 1973, four in 1974, and five in 1975.

The Raiders' ticket sales have remained consistently high over the past four seasons. Between 1972 and 1973 total ticket sales increased from 367,078 to 390,367, or by 6.3 percent. In 1973, the average number of tickets sold per game was 55,767, which exceeded the stadium's seating capacity. The difference apparently reflects tickets sold for standing room only.

Raiders' ticket sales fell by 5.4 percent in 1974 and increased by a fraction of 1 percent in 1975. However, at no time during the past four years has the number of total tickets sold fallen below 98 percent of the stadium's capacity.

Season ticket sales have slightly increased during each of the past three seasons. Last year, season tickets accounted for 97 percent of all tickets sold, which reflects the intensity of demand to see the Raiders play. This figure is not surprising given that the team has won the AFC's Western Division championship the last four years in a row. Neither is it surprising that two-thirds of the Raiders' home games have been locally televised since the adoption of Public Law 93-107, given that the Raiders have sold approximately 51,000 season tickets for each of the past three seasons.

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Summary of Oakland Raiders
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	53,800	54,041	54,041	54,037
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	367,078	390,367 (6.3%)	369,465 (-5.4%)	369,948 (0.1%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	52,440	55,767	52,781	52,850
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	50,793	50,802 (0%)	50,840 (.1%)	51,107 (.5%)
5. Percentage of games won	.714	.643	.857	.786
6. Divisional standing	1	1	1	1
7. Number of televised games	0	5	4	5

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

The Raiders' live gate attendance has fluctuated over the past four years. Total "no shows" increased from 21,507 in 1972 to 31,796 in 1973, before falling to 27,112 in 1974. Last year, "no shows" increased again to 31,598. However, at no time during the past four years, did the ratio of Oakland's "no shows" to total tickets sold exceed the league's average. Hence, the Raiders have had a better attendance record than most teams even though they locally televised two-thirds of their home games played since the adoption of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law. Given the team's excellent record, this is not surprising. Nevertheless, "no shows" have generally been higher at locally televised games than at non-televised games during each of the past three seasons.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
Oakland Raiders: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	21,507	31,796 (47.8%)	27,112 (-14.7%)	31,598 (16.6%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	3,072	4,542	3,873	4,514
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	52,440	55,767	52,781	52,850
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	5.9%	8.1%	7.3%	8.5%
5. Number of televised games	0	5	4	5
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	0	6,015	4,791	5,231
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	3,072	860	2,650	2,720
8. Percentage of games won	.714	.643	.857	.786
9. Divisional standing	1	1	1	1

The results of our statistical analysis indicate that Public Law 93-107 has not directly affected the live gate attendance at Oakland's locally televised games. The variable indicating whether or not a home game was televised was positive but not significant, indicating that attendance was no worse at locally televised games than at non-televised games, when all other factors (e.g. weather) were taken into account.

The Raiders' live gate attendance decreased when it rained. Specifically the results indicated that "no shows" increased by about 50 percent when the weather was wet.

As was the case with other teams, locally televised games could have exacerbated the adverse effect which precipitation had on "no shows." Fans may have been less inclined to attend games in wet weather, if given the opportunity to see the game on television.

All other factors defined in the model including those variables which reflected the quality of the game did not have a significant impact on attendance. The latter finding was not surprising given the consistent excellence of the team over the past four seasons.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
OAKLAND "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = 0.67727$ $F(8, 19) = 4.98419^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02854	2.040
Temperature	-.00152	1.228
Precipitation	.08487	17.284*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00021	2.665
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00006	2.352
1973	.02124	0.649
1974	.06880	3.793
1975	.05044	2.333
Constant	.27515	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = 0.65897$ $F(8, 19) = 4.58916^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.03495	3.029
Temperature	-.00140	0.936
Precipitation	.05992	5.958*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.03442	2.746
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00982	1.420
1973	.01009	0.144
1974	.02859	1.075
1975	.02670	0.837
Constant	.04279	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = 0.63713$ $F(7, 20) = 5.01667^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.03445	2.909
Temperature	-.00146	1.076
Precipitation	.08454	16.132*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.10428	4.044
1973	.02288	0.702
1974	.04113	2.103
1975	.03082	1.127
Constant	.13771	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

- a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concession, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The Oakland Raiders do not share revenues earned from the sale of concessions or stadium parking. Even though Public Law 93-107 may have indirectly affected the team's live gate attendance, subsequent losses of ancillary revenues did not appear to be serious.

For example, the Raiders experienced their largest number of "no shows" in 1973 when 31,796 ticket holders failed to attend home games. Nevertheless, the live gate attendance increased during that year since more tickets were also sold. Concession sales also increased marginally, but parking and "PRO" sales fell slightly. Comparisons between other seasons are difficult since the figures for 1974 reflect sales at 11 games and the data for the 1975 season is missing.

In conclusion, Public Law 93-107 could have resulted in lower concession and parking sales, at least to the limited possible extent that the law has adversely impacted on the live gate. However, attendance at Raiders' games has remained consistently high over the past four years. The anti-blackout legislation, therefore, has probably not imposed an undue financial hardship on Oakland's concessionaire, the local parking authority, or the Raiders' team.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Oakland Raiders: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (7 games)	<u>1973</u> (7 games)	<u>1974</u> (11 games)	<u>1975</u> (7 games)
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$411,560	\$417,149 (1.4%)	\$586,856 (13 games)	\$ NA (7 games)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	64,958	66,850 (-1.4%)	106,803 (11 games)	65,667
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	63,522	62,665 (-1.4%)	94,872	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	367,078	390,367 (6.3%)	369,465 (-5.4%)	369,948 (0.1%)
5. "No shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	21,507	31,796 (47.8%)	27,112 (-14.7%)	31,598 (16.6%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	5	4	5

NA - Information was Not Available

* Total for seven home games

4. Audience Ratings

As the figures in the table below indicate, audience ratings for Oakland games have risen during each of the past three years. The three year averages also show that about 20 percent of all homes in the Bay area, including San Francisco, watch the Raiders play when their games are televised.

It is further evident that these viewers prefer to see the home team as opposed to other NFL teams with the possible exception of the San Francisco Forty-Niners. Ratings for the two competing games televised in 1974 and 1975 averaged only 3.1 percent compared with an average rating of nearly 22 percent for Oakland games aired at the same time but on different networks. The single competing game in 1973 was unusual since it had a rating of 18.9. However, that game matched the Forty-Niners against the Rams--both of which would likely be of interest to viewers in the Bay area.

Games involving teams other than the Raiders, which were aired at different times also did quite well. However, those ratings include a number of the Forty-Niners televised contests which would explain the relatively small differences between the audience for Raiders' games and those for other NFL teams broadcast at different times.

Audience Ratings For Oakland Raiders Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Raiders</u>				<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>		<u>Away Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(3)	20.1*	(1)	9.8	(2)	18.9	(6)	18.2
1974	(0)	-	(1)	19.8	(1)	3.4	(10)	17.1
1975	(1)	23.1	(2)	24.8	(1)	2.8	(10)	19.0
Avg. Ratings	(4)	21.6	(4)	18.1	(4)	8.4	(26)	18.1

*Includes one simulcast game carried on CBS on November 4, 1973 with Oakland and San Francisco sharing average rating.

The Pittsburgh Steelers

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The Pittsburgh Steelers have consistently sold all tickets made available in their home stadium -- Three Rivers -- since the 1973 adoption of Public Law 93-107. Consequently the franchise has locally televised 21 of the 22 home games in the last three years. ^{1/} Additionally, during each of the past three seasons, the average number of seats sold per game has been equivalent to at least 99 percent of the stadium's capacity. Total ticket sales have also increased since 1973.

Season ticket sales showed their largest increase in 1973 with a 59 percent gain. The Steelers experienced a marginal decrease (0.7 percent) in season ticket sales in 1974 and an equally marginal increase (0.8 percent) for the 1975 season. Nevertheless, the rise in last year's season ticket sales resulted in the largest number of tickets sold during any of the past four seasons.

The Steelers' success in selling tickets is not surprising. Pittsburgh has had a string of four consecutive divisional championships and captured the NFL championship in both 1974 and 1975. Furthermore, the team has won at least ten of its 14 games in each of the past four years. Given this remarkable performance, it would have been unusual had the Steelers' not been able to sell as many tickets as they did.

^{1/} In 1973 Pittsburgh played eight regular season games all of which were locally televised. All seven home games were locally televised in 1974, while the blackout was lifted on six of seven games in 1975.

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Summary of Pittsburgh Steelers
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u> (8 games)	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	50,066	50,066	50,112	50,112
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous seasons)	335,335	397,299 (18.5%)	347,228 (-12.6%)	348,227 (.3%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	47,905	49,662	49,604	49,747
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	28,159	44,844 (59.3%)	44,531 (-.7%)	44,902 (.8%)
5. Percentage of games won	.786	.714	.714	.857
6. Divisional standing	1	1	1	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	8	7	6

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Pittsburgh "no shows" have increased markedly since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. Between 1972 and 1974, the number of ticket holders who did not attend games jumped from 5,011 to 26,541, although the 1974 figure was still only 7.6 percent of total seats sold. Attendance picked up in 1975 when "no shows" declined to 11,627, which was equivalent to only 3.3 percent of all tickets purchased.

Even during 1973 when the Steelers averaged 3,199 "no shows" per game, the team was still well below the average of 5,691 "no shows" for all NFL games played during the 1973 season.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
Pittsburgh Steelers: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u> (8 games)	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	5,011	25,591 (410.6%)	26,541 (3.7%)	11,627 (-56.2%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	716	3,199	3,792	1,661
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	47,905	49,662	49,604	49,747
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	1.5%	6.4%	7.6%	3.3%
5. Number of televised games	0	8	7	6
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	0	3,199	3,792	1,740
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	716	0	0	1,190
8. Percentage of games won	.786	.714	.714	.857
9. Divisional standing	1	1	1	1

Given that the Steelers have locally televised nearly all home games since 1973, it is more difficult to assess the impact Public Law 93-107 has had on the team's live gate attendance. The results of the regression analyses indicate that the legislation did not directly affect attendance. That is, attendance at televised games was not significantly lower than at non-televised games.

However, the statistical analyses show that attendance did prove to be sensitive to climatic conditions. Specifically, live gate attendance at Pittsburgh games decreased when the weather was cold and/or wet. Although this was not unexpected, weather conditions alone do not afford a reasonable explanation for seasonal increases in "no shows" during 1973 and 1974, since weather conditions for those years were not particularly more adverse than in 1972. Consequently,

it would appear that Steelers' fans may have become less inclined to attend games in bad weather. This may be partially attributable to television. That is, if the fans know the game will be broadcast on a local television station, they may be less inclined to sit in a cold and wet stadium in order to see the game live. Public Law 93-107, therefore, could have had an indirect adverse impact on the team's live gate attendance. Unfortunately, given our data, there is no reasonable way to determine the extent of that effect, nor can one be absolutely certain that it does in fact exist. Fans could be becoming less inclined to brave adverse weather conditions in order to see a game, regardless of whether or not the contest is locally televised. Additionally, the count of "no shows" could have been less accurate in 1972 than in the latter three years. If so, then the seasonal differences would probably be less acute than they now appear. This would tend to obviate the notion that Pittsburgh fans are becoming more sensitive to weather conditions.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
PITTSBURGH "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .71370$ $F(8,20) = 6.23204$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.04238	1.062
Temperature	-.00161	10.728*
Precipitation	.06501	11.080*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00025	8.678*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00003	.482
1973	.03668	.727
1974	.01731	.163
1975	.03418	.817
Constant	.27277	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .58996$ $F(7,21) = 4.31642^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.00384	.007
Temperature	-.00136	6.663*
Precipitation	.06236	7.413*
Home Team's Div. Standing ^a	-	-
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01244	2.663
1973	.02814	.315
1974	.03557	.513
1975	.02165	.243
Constant	.05918	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .61304$ $F(7,21) = 4.75271^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.00498	.013
Temperature	-.00119	5.372*
Precipitation	.06329	8.148*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.08969	4.074
1973	.03075	.398
1974	.02987	.382
1975	.02652	.385
Constant	.10886	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

A share of the revenues from concessions and parking at Three Rivers stadium is not retained by the Steelers. While these revenues have increased since 1973, moreover, all home games of the team have been televised. Thus, Public Law 93-107 has not resulted in a diminution of concessionaires' and parking income for the 1972-1974 seasons. However, if the law did have an indirect impact on attendance, concession and parking revenues may have been lower than they would have been, if all home games had been blacked out. In this sense, the concessionaire and parking authority may have suffered a loss.

Sales of "PRO" magazine, however, have declined each season (although the reported figures represent different numbers of games played each year). Despite better live gate attendance for 1975 (as compared to 1974 "no shows" figures), sales of "PRO" have also been reduced. A number of factors, perhaps including Public Law 93-107, could be responsible for this loss.

While the Sports Anti-Blackout Law may have impacted on revenues from these sources, it is not likely that the legislation has been responsible for a large percentage of the change. Indeed these sales, particularly "PRO" magazine, appear to be dependent on a number of factors other than live gate attendance.

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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Pittsburgh Steelers: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (11 games)	<u>1973</u> ^{1/} (10 games)	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$485,103	\$436,102	\$528,337 (21.1%)	\$ NA
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	97,155	81,121	75,314 (-7.2%)	56,944 (-24.4%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	86,747	98,947	100,412 (1.5%)	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	335,335	397,299 (18.5%)	347,228 (-12.6%)	348,227 (0.3%)
5. "No shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	5,011	25,591 (410.6%)	26,541 (3.7%)	11,627 (-56.2%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	8	7	6

NA - Information was Not Available

* - Total for seven home games (eight in 1973).

^{1/} Played eight regular season home games rather than typical seven home games.

4. Audience Ratings

The figures in the table below clearly indicate that residents of Pittsburgh and the surrounding area have viewed telecasts of Steeler games extensively in the last three years. As noted earlier, the legislation has triggered a lifting on the blackout of 21 of the Steelers' 22 regular season home games played during the past three seasons. On the average about 34 percent of all homes in the Pittsburgh market tuned into the Steelers' home games, while 36 percent watched the team's away games.

Exceedingly large differences between ratings for Pittsburgh games and ratings for other games aired at the same time are indicative of the fact that a very large proportion of all viewers, if given the opportunity, prefer to watch the home team play. Viewer preferences are further reflected by the fact that the Steelers outdrew other non-competing games by almost a two to one margin.

Thus, the high audience ratings for home team telecasts suggest that Public Law 93-107 has been in the Pittsburgh fans' best interests.

Audience Ratings for Pittsburgh Steelers Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Pittsburgh</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>	
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>
1973	(3) 36.3	(1) 40.7	(0) -	(10) 18.6
1974	(2) 33.3	(2) 31.6	(1) 5.8	(10) 17.8
1975	<u>(2) 32.7</u>	<u>(2) 39.0</u>	<u>(1) 5.5</u>	<u>(9) 20.3</u>
Avg. Rating	(7) 34.3	(5) 36.4	(2) 5.7	(29) 18.9

The San Diego Chargers

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The Sports Anti-Blackout Law has not affected the San Diego Chargers. Since 1973, when the law was enacted, none of the Chargers' home games has been sold out and locally televised. The table below also reflects a deterioration in ticket sales experienced by San Diego since 1972. Both total sales and season ticket sales have declined each season except for a 9.3 percent increase in season ticket sales in 1973. The nadir for the four year period was reached last year when an average of only 32,589 seats were purchased per game. Moreover, season tickets sold in 1975 declined by 24.7 percent to 22,280 which was less than half of the stadium's capacity.

Summary of San Diego Chargers'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	50,000	54,572	52,572	52,572
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	347,349	330,722 (-4.8%)	264,269 (-20.1%)	228,124 (-13.7%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	49,621	47,246	37,753	32,589
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	36,310	39,681 (9.3%)	29,595 (-25.4%)	22,280 (-24.7%)
5. Percentage of games won	.286	.143	.357	.143
6. Divisional standing	4	4	3	4
7. Number of televised home games.	0	0	0	0

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2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Even though San Diego has not been particularly successful in selling tickets in recent years, those who do purchase seats generally use them. The percentage of ticket holders who chose not to attend San Diego games has been below the league average during each of the past four seasons.

"No shows" did, however, increase substantially in 1973, the first year in which the Sports Anti-Blackout Law was in effect. However, even then only 6.7 percent of all tickets sold were not used. This represents reasonably good attendance for a team which won only two games and finished last in its division. Between 1973 and 1974 "no shows" decreased from 22,247 to 14,009 but increased again in 1975 to 15,148. Not surprisingly, these fluctuations coincide with the team's performance. The Chargers improved in 1974 finishing third in the AFC's Western Division with a 5-7 won-loss record. However, in 1975 as in 1973, the team won only two games and finished in last place.

Summary of "No Shows" For
San Diego Chargers: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	12,149	22,247 (83.1%)	14,009 (-37.0%)	15,148 (8.1%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	1,736	3,178	2,001	2,164
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	49,621	47,246	37,753	32,589
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3.5%	6.7%	5.3%	6.6%
5. Number of televised games	0	0	0	0
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	0	0	0	0
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	1,736	3,178	2,001	2,164
8. Percentage of games won	.286	.143	.357	.143
9. Divisional standing	4	4	3	4

As noted earlier, Public Law 93-107 has not effected the Chargers' live gate attendance since the blackout has never been lifted on any of the team's home games. However, attendance was influenced by the weather. "No shows" increased significantly when the temperature and/or rain fell. Additionally, ticket holders were more inclined to come to a game when the visiting team was playing well and in contention for a divisional championship. The results further indicate that attendance improved (deteriorated) as the Chargers moved up (down) in the divisional standings. Like most NFL fans, the Chargers' ticket holders preferred to see their team winning. However, even when the team was losing, a markedly higher percentage of ticket holders remained loyal and continued to attend games.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
SAN DIEGO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = 0.34021$
 $F(7, 20) = 15.02348^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	.00098	0.931
Precipitation	-.18290	59.438*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00006	5.521*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00007	12.632*
1973	.00656	0.261
1974	.00528	0.172
1975	.01288	1.138
Constant	.03096	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = 0.79093$
 $F(6, 21) = 12.24068^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-	-
Temperature	.00063	0.415
Precipitation	.18100	48.251*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01512	5.147*
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01136	8.773*
1973	-.01158	0.991
1974 ^a	-	-
1975	.01741	2.767
Constant	-.07708	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
 $R^2 = 0.79587$
 $F(6, 21) = 13.64577^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	.00067	0.384
Precipitation	.17942	47.109*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.16763	11.434*
1973	-.00707	0.255
1974	.00334	0.062
1975	.01375	1.094
Constant	.02459	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The San Diego Chargers retain one-third of concession revenues

but do not share income from stadium parking.

The figures in the table below indicate that revenues from these sources plus the revenues from "PRO" magazine which accrue to the team are directly related to attendance. The franchise's problems with both facets of their operations, however, cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107, since the Chargers have never locally televised a home game.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for San Diego Chargers: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$390,946	\$382,321 (-0.2%)	NA	NA
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	127,087	119,779 (-6.1%)	NA	20,027
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	49,809	42,080 (-18.4%)	41,192 (-2.2%)	42,824 ^{1/} (4.0%)
4. Total ticket sold (percentage change from previous season)	347,349	330,722 (-4.8%)	264,269 (-20.1%)	228,124 (-13.7%)
5. "No shows" (percentage change from previous season)	12,149	22,247 (83.1%)	14,009 (-37.0%)	15,148 (8.1%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	0	0	0

NA - Information was Not Available

^{1/} 1975 increase attributed to Monday night game.

4. Audience Ratings

As noted earlier, none of the San Diego Chargers' home games was broadcast locally. Audience interest in Charger games, therefore, can only be measured on the basis of the team's away games which received an average rating of 22.6. Again, this indicates that about 23 out of every 100 homes in the San Diego area watched the Chargers play away games.

Games involving other teams aired at different times received a comparable average audience rating of 19.4. However, when forced to choose between the Chargers and other teams, San Diego viewers clearly preferred the home team. Ratings for competing games averaged only 9.6 even though one of these games (in 1973) involved the Los Angeles Rams and attracted a rating of 17.2. However, all ratings have declined over the past three years which could indicate that professional football is becoming less popular with the San Diego television audience. However, this seemingly waning interest in professional football telecasts cannot be attributed to oversaturation since blackouts of home games have yet to be lifted in the San Diego area. Indeed, a far better explanation would be that the viewers in Southern California are becoming less inclined to watch their home team during losing seasons.

Audience Ratings for San Diego Chargers' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Chargers</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(0) --	(2) 27.6	(1) 17.2	(11)	22.0	
1974	(0) --	(2) 23.7	(2) 6.5	(10)	20.3	
1975	(0) --	(2) 16.5	(1) 5.8	(11)	15.8	
Avg. Ratings	(0) --	(6) 22.6	(4) 9.8	(32)	19.4	

NATIONAL FOOTBALL CONFERENCE

ATLANTA FALCONS

CHICAGO BEARS

DALLAS COWBOYS

DETROIT LIONS

GREEN BAY PACKERS

LOS ANGELES RAMS

MINNESOTA VIKINGS

NEW ORLEANS SAINTS

NEW YORK GIANTS

PHILADELPHIA EAGLES

SAINT LOUIS CARDINALS

SAN FRANCISCO FORTY-NINERS

WASHINGTON REDSKINS

The National Football Conference

The Atlanta Falcons

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The effect of Public Law 93-107 on the Atlanta Falcons has been limited to the 1973 and 1974 seasons since none of the team's 1975 home games was locally televised. However, all seven home games played during each of the 1973 and 1974 seasons were aired by local television stations. The legislation, therefore, triggered a lifting of the blackout on two-thirds of all Falcons' home games played since 1973.

Atlanta Stadium seats approximately 58,850 fans. Whereas the Falcons were able to sell out the stadium in 1973 and 1974 for all home games, no sellouts were recorded in 1975. Total ticket sales declined by 14.5 percent in 1975, and season ticket sales declined by 27.9 percent. It would seem that ticket purchases by Atlanta fans were particularly sensitive to the team's performance. That is, last year's decline in season ticket sales corresponded to a deterioration of the team's 1974 divisional standing and won-loss record. Consequently, all ticket sales for 1975 were only 84 percent of seating capacity while the team's 1972, 1973 and 1974 ticket sales were equivalent to at least 98 percent of the stadium's seating capacity.

Summary of Atlanta Falcons
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	58,850	58,850	58,850	58,850
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	403,678	406,624 (.7%)	402,393 (-1.0%)	343,977 (-14.5%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	57,668	58,089	57,485	49,140
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	49,872	53,037 (6.4%)	53,278 (.5%)	38,426 (-27.9%)
5. Percentage of games won	.500	.643	.214	.286
6. Divisional standing	2	2	4	3
7. Number of televised games	0	7	7	0

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Variations in Atlanta "no shows" corresponded to the number of locally televised games. For example, the Falcons had a total of 40,506 "no shows" in 1972 when, of course, no games were carried by television stations in the team's home territory. During 1973 and 1974 when all home games were locally televised, "no shows" increased to 64,631 and 143,488 respectively. The 1973 figure was 15.8 percent of all seats sold, while the 1974 figure was equivalent to 35.7 percent of total tickets purchased.

The situation improved somewhat in 1975 when "no shows" declined to 65,244, or 19 percent of all tickets sold. As noted, each of the Falcons' home games was blacked out locally last year.

The figures in the table below also indicate that the average number of "no shows" at the Falcons' locally televised games were considerably larger in 1973 and 1974 than the average number of "no shows" at non-televised games in 1972. Consequently, it appears that Public Law 93-107 could have had an adverse impact on the team's live gate attendance during 1973 and 1974.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Atlanta Falcons: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "no shows" (percentage change from previous season)	40,506	64,631 (58.9%)	143,488 (122%)	65,244 (-54.5%)
2. Avg. "no shows" per game	5,787	9,194	20,498	9,321
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	57,668	58,089	57,485	49,140
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	10%	15.8%	35.7%	19.0%
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	0
6. Avg. "no shows" per televised game	0	9,194	20,498	0
7. Avg. "no shows" per non-televised game	5,787	0	0	9,321
8. Percentage of games won	.500	.643	.214	.286
9. Divisional standing	2	2	4	3

The statistical analysis demonstrates that, Atlanta's increase in the number of "no shows" in 1973 and 1974 was partially attributable to locally televised games. When the won-loss percentages of both teams were multiplied together and used as a measure of the quality of the game, the televised game variable was positive and significant. This indicates that fewer ticket holders attended games when given the opportunity to see it on local television.

Temperature also affected the team's live gate attendance. As expected, more fans stayed home when the temperature was cold. It is possible that locally televised games may have also indirectly affected this relationship. Specifically, Atlanta fans may have been more inclined to stay at home when the weather was cold, if the game was locally televised and particularly if the team was not having a good season.

Attendance also proved sensitive to the team's won-loss record. As expected, more fans attended home games when the Falcons were winning. Finally, the number of "no shows" were significantly higher in 1974 than in 1972, when all other factors in the model were taken into account. This suggests that the 1974 seasonal increase in "no shows" was attributable to factors other than those defined in the model. The fuel crisis and the softness in the general economy during that year are two possible explanations for this result.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
ATLANTA "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .86054$ $F(7,20) = 17.6294^{**}$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	.09054	3.719
Temperature	-.01108	59.693*
Precipitation	.07559	1.570
Home Team's win-loss \bar{X}	-.35494	7.354*
Visiting Team's Win-loss \bar{X}	-.03223	.179
1973	-	-
1974	.09402	3.250
1975	-.02093	.113
Constant	.94534	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .81958$ $F(7,20) = 12.9788^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.09896	3.595
Temperature	-.01065	34.719*
Precipitation	.06513	.996
Home Team's Div. Standing	.04849	2.286
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00281	.032
1973 ^a	-	-
1974	.12127	4.022
1975	.05887	1.038
Constant	.59522	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .83028$ $F(6,21) = 17.1221^{**}$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	.11207	5.036*
Temperature	-.01115	50.819*
Precipitation	.09846	2.495
Home W-L \bar{X} x Visitor's W-L \bar{X}	-.25396	4.141
1973 ^a	-	-
1974	.12542	5.449*
1975	.05035	.996
Constant	.79531	.886

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

It is impossible to assess the impact of Public Law 93-107 on the franchise's revenues earned from the sale of concessions and parking since information for the 1973, 1974 and 1975 seasons was not available.

The sale of "PRO" magazine increased in 1973, even though live gate attendance declined. Last year, "PRO" sales decreased even though attendance improved. Consequently, there does not appear to be a consistent relationship between "PRO" sales and the Falcons' live gate attendance. It is therefore apparent that a number of factors, including locally televised games, influenced this source of revenue.

Revenues Earned From the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Atlanta Falcons: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$ 38,703	\$ NA	\$ NA	\$ NA
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	52,538	84,537 (60.9%)	55,516 (-34.3%)	44,841 (-19.2%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	27,859	NA	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	403,678	406,624 (.7%)	402,393 (-1.0%)	343,977 (-14.5%)
5. "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	40,506	64,361 (58.9%)	143,488 (122%)	65,244 (-54.5%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	0

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

Since 1973, Atlanta television viewers have consistently preferred watch Falcons' football games rather than other teams' contests. Although the 1975 ARB sweep did not include a home-game telecast, previous years' ratings indicate that the most popular football broadcasts in the Atlanta area have been the Falcons' home games. Public Law 93-107, therefore, can be seen to have attracted large audiences to Falcons' telecasts. While also popular, away game involving the Falcons have not attracted the same degree of audience interest. However, since 1973 all Atlanta home team audience ratings have decreased.

Audience interest in games involving other NFL teams has fluctuated. In 1975 interest in both competing and non-competing football broadcasts as measured by these ratings increased. Fewer broadcasts involving the Falcons coupled with the team's relatively poor showing during this period may have caused other telecasts to gain a share of the local audience.

Audience Ratings for Atlanta Falcons' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Falcons</u>				<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>		<u>Away Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(2)	36.3	(2)	30.3	(2)	5.8	(9)	18.0
1974	(1)	34.4	(3)	25.3	(1)	5.5	(11)	15.0
1975	<u>(0)</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>(2)</u>	<u>21.9</u>	<u>(2)</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>(10)</u>	<u>17.0</u>
Avg. Ratings	(3)	35.4	(7)	25.8	(5)	6.5	(30)	17.0

The Chicago Bears

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The Chicago Bears have televised 71 percent of all home games played since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. All seven home games were broadcast in the Chicago area during 1973. In 1974 six home games were carried locally while two were locally televised last year.

Ticket sales have remained almost constant over the past four years. Indeed, the difference in ticket sales between each of the past four seasons has been less than 1 percent. The Bears sold an average of 55,129 tickets per game in 1972 and 55,102 in 1973. Ticket sales exceeded the Soldiers' Field seating capacity during each of these seasons. The stadium's capacity was subsequently expanded to 55,701 seats and the Bears sold an average of 55,122 tickets per game in 1974. Last year, ticket sales averaged out to 54,589 per game.

Season ticket sales have also remained relatively stable since 1972. Sales decreased by a fraction of one percent in 1973, increased by about 5 percent in 1974 before declining 8.7 percent in 1975.

The Bears' success in selling tickets is particularly encouraging since the team has not won more than four games during any of the last four years while finishing last in the NFC's Central Division in 1972, 1973 and 1974. It is further apparent that the Sports Anti-Blackout Law has not affected ticket sales even though the Bears' have televised a relatively larger proportion of their home games than have most NFL teams.

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Summary of Chicago Bears
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	52,500	52,500	52,701	57,455
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	385,906	385,715 (0%)	385,852 (0%)	382,126 (-1%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	55,129	55,102	55,122	54,589
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	49,124	48,996 (-.3%)	51,525 (5.2%)	47,070 (-8.7%)
5. Percentage of games won	.286	.214	.286	.286
6. Divisional standing	4	4	4	3
7. Number of televised games	0	7	6	2

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Unlike ticket sales, Chicago "no shows" have fluctuated widely over the past four seasons. "No shows" totaled 24,828 in 1972 while increasing to 71,102 in 1973. Attendance fell again in 1974 when 100,056 ticket holders failed to attend home games during the course of the season. This was equivalent to nearly 26 percent of all seats sold. While "no shows" decreased to 63,020 in 1975, this figure still amounted to a relatively high proportion (16.5 percent) of all tickets sold.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
Chicago Bears: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	24,828	71,102 (186.4%)	100,056 (40.7%)	63,020 (-37%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	3,547	10,157	14,294	9,003
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	55,129	55,102	55,122	54,589
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6.4%	18.4%	25.9%	16.5%
5. Number of televised games	0	7	6	2
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	0	10,157	15,498	7,245
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	3,547	0	7,068	9,706
8. Percentage of games won	.286	.214	.286	.286
9. Divisional standing	4	4	4	3

As the figures above indicate, the average number of "no shows" at locally televised games was also higher than at non-televised games in 1973 and 1974. Last year the reverse was true. However, the statistical analysis of "no shows" indicates that these differences cannot be directly attributed to Public Law 93-107.

The statistical evaluation of the live gate attendance at the Bears' home games demonstrates that locally televised games did not result in significantly higher "no shows" when all other factors defined in the model were taken into account.

However, temperature, and the quality of the game significantly affected the number of "no shows." As expected, fewer ticket holders attended the games in colder weather. However, precipitation did not significantly

affect the number of shows. Live gate attendance also increased as the Bears moved up in the divisional standings. It is also probable that locally televised games facilitated the effect which each of these factors had on the franchise's live gate attendance. That is, ticket holders were apparently less inclined to attend games in cold weather or when the Bears were expected to lose, if given the opportunity to watch the game on television. This would at least partially account for the increase in "no shows" at locally televised games played during the 1974 and 1975 seasons.

All three season variables were also significant, which suggests that the model utilized for the analysis is not completely appropriate for evaluating the number of "no shows" at the Chicago franchise. Interpretation of these results indicate something specific to each of the past three seasons differentially affected the number of "no shows." More precisely, "no shows" were significantly greater since the adoption of Public Law 93-107 than they were in 1972. We have no definitive explanation of this phenomenon other than an apparent general decline in interest in watching the Bears play. This would appear to be a reasonable explanation given that the team has not played well over the past four seasons. If the Chicago fans come to habitually expect the team to lose, then it is reasonable that incentives to attend home games will diminish.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
CHICAGO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .52924$ $F(8, 19) = 2.66999^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.03160	.147
Temperature	-.00464	5.007*
Precipitation	.07846	1.851
Home Team's win-loss %	.00006	.024
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00003	.083
1973	.17086	2.057
1974	.22026	4.542*
1975	.20034	3.456
Constant	.24975	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .61736$ $F(8, 19) = 3.83190^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.13822	2.365
Temperature	-.00667	10.332*
Precipitation	.05695	1.201
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.12770	4.462*
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.02962	1.870
1973	.31406	7.052*
1974	.28232	9.233*
1975	.21392	9.893*
Constant	.75112	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .52708$ $F(6, 21) = 3.90075^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.03096	.156
Temperature	-.00470	5.847*
Precipitation	.07548	1.944
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-	-
1973	.16572	2.722
1974	.21923	5.600*
1975	.18787	7.078*
Constant	.26217	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking and "PRO" Magazine

Two-thirds of the concession information on the Chicago franchise was not available. It is therefore impossible to derive any conclusions concerning the impact of Public Law 93-107 on the Bears' concessions. However, since the legislation has apparently been indirectly responsible for diminutions in the Bears' live gate attendance, it is reasonable to assume that the law has resulted in slightly lower concession sales.

Similar losses are likely to be true with respect to "PRO" magazine sales, although there was no apparent correlation between the sale of "PRO" magazine and attendance. Indeed, both revenues from "PRO" sales and the number of "no shows" increased dramatically in 1973. Similarly, "PRO" sales declined in 1974 as did live gate attendance.

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Revenues Earned From the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Chicago Bears: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$ NA	\$ NA	\$ NA	\$ NA
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	25,917	112,783 (335.2%)	89,415 (-20.7%)	90,429 (1.1%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	NA	NA	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	385,906	385,715 (0%)	385,852 (0%)	382,126 (-1.0%)
5. "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	24,828	71,102 (186.4%)	100,056 (40.7%)	63,020 (-37.0%)
6. Number of televised home games	-	7	6	2

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

Audience ratings for professional football games in the Chicago area demonstrate that viewers prefer to watch Bears' games as opposed to games involving other teams. Chicago's home games have also become increasingly more popular with Chicago fans over the past three seasons. An average rating of 24.1 was recorded for home game telecasts along with an audience rating of 23 for the Bears' away games since 1973.

Both of these figures exceed audience ratings for games involving other NFL teams which were locally televised. The figures in the table below indicate that this is particularly true when the Bears' games and those involving other teams are both televised locally in the same time period but on different networks.

Be that as it may, the popularity of Bears' home games has increased since 1973. Consequently we must conclude that Public Law 93-107 has provided a public service to Chicago football fans. It is further apparent that their preferences for watching the Bears play have been accommodated by the fact that Public Law 93-107 has triggered a lifting of the blackout on a large proportion of the team's home games played over the past three seasons. In those instances, Chicago games outdrew audiences watching competing contest involving other teams by a margin of nearly three to one. The difference would have been somewhat larger had the single competing game in 1975 drawn a smaller audience. However that particular contest matched the Oakland Raiders and the Washington Redskins (both of which were in strong contention for their respective divisional championships) and ran an hour longer than the Bears' locally televised away game. Not surprisingly, many viewers switched stations to watch the remainder of the Raiders-Redskins contest which significantly increased the

average rating for that particular game.

Audience Ratings For Chicago Bears' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Bears</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>	
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>
1973	(2) 19.2	(2) 27.0	(2) 6.4	(8) 15.2
1974	(2) 24.3	(2) 23.9	(3) 6.1	(7) 15.2
1975	<u>(1) 28.8</u>	<u>(2) 18.1</u>	<u>(1) 14.5</u>	<u>(10) 14.4</u>
Avg. Ratings	(5) 24.1	(6) 23.0	(6) 9.0	(25) 14.9

The Dallas Cowboys

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since the adoption of Public Law 93-107, Dallas has locally televise a total of four home games. Three were televised in 1973 and one in 1975. Unfortunately, data on the Cowboys' total ticket sales or "no shows" for the 1972 season was not available. Consequently it is more difficult to assess the impact of Public Law 93-107 on this particular franchise.

The Dallas Stadium seats approximately 65,100 fans. The team sold an average of 60,576 tickets for each of the seven home games played in 1973. Average ticket sales declined to 54,969 in 1974 but increased to 57,803 in 1975.

Information on season ticket sales was available for 1972. The Cowboys sold a total of 35,256 season tickets during that year. Season ticket sales increased to 36,053 in 1973 and fell off to 32,297 in 1974. In 1975 the Cowboys' season ticket sales declined further to a total of 29,000. Last year's decline can, in all probability, be attributed to the Cowboys relatively poor showing in 1974 when the team placed third in its division with an 8-6 won-loss record. Expectations that the Cowboys would do no better in 1975 would account for the subsequent decline in last year's season ticket sales. Those expectations did of course prove to be unfounded; the Cowboys finished second in the NFC's Central Division and won the national Conference championship before losing to the Steelers in the Super Bowl.

Summary of Dallas Cowboys'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	65,000	65,000	65,111	65,101
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	NA	424,030	384,785 (-9.3%)	404,627 (5.2%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	NA	60,576	54,969	57,804
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	35,256	36,053 (2.3%)	32,297 (10.4%)	29,000 (-10.2%)
5. Percentage of games won	.714	.714	.571	.714
6. Divisional standing	2	1	3	2
7. Number of televised games	0	3	0	1

NA - Information was Not Available

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Dallas "no shows" have decreased since 1973. During the first year in which the Public Law 93-107 was in effect, three of the seven home games were televised locally and "no shows" totaled 28,309. All home games were blacked out in 1974, and "no shows" subsequently declined to 19,855 or by nearly 30 percent. Last year only one game was televised locally, and "no shows" numbered 11,661 for the entire season.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Dallas Cowboys: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "no shows" (percentage change from previous season)	NA	28,309	19,855 (-29.9%)	11,661 (-41.3%)
2. Avg. "no shows" per game	NA	4,044	2,836	1,666
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	NA	60,576	54,969	57,804
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	NA	6.7%	5.2%	2.9%
5. Number of televised games	-	3	0	1
6. Avg. "no shows" per televised game	NA	5,614	0	3,361
7. Avg. "no shows" per non-televised game	NA	2,867	2,836	1,383
8. Percentage of games won	.714	.714	.571	.714
9. Divisional standing	2	1	3	2

NA - Information was Not Available

Figures in the table above also indicate that the average number of "no shows" at the Cowboys' home games was somewhat higher when the games were locally televised. This of course suggests that Public Law 93-107 had a deliterious impact on live gate attendance.

Analysis of Dallas "no shows" demonstrates that this is true. Specifically, the results indicate that the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold increased significantly when the game was televised, and all other factors remained constant. Dallas ticket holders were also less inclined to attend games when the weather turned cold. Precipitation had no effect on attendance presumably due to the fact that nearly all seats are protected from the rain.

Only one other variable proved to be influential; namely the won-loss record of the visiting team. Attendance improved when the Cowboys were playing a visiting team with a good won-loss record. Again this is indicative of the fans' appreciation of good football and to some extent reflects the interest in the Cowboys' strong rivalries with teams such as the Washington Redskins.

We have no definitive evidence to explain the adverse effect which Public Law 93-107 has had on Dallas live gate attendance. Perhaps fans travel longer distances to get to the games. If so, they would be less inclined to drive if they could watch the game on television. Whatever the reason, Cowboys' attendance appeared to be sensitive to local television coverage and in that sense Cowboy fans differ with their counterparts in most of the other cities which support an NFL franchise.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
DALLAS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R² = .58958
F(6,14) = 3.35190

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.04514	4.935*
Temperature	-.00132	3.688
Precipitation	-	-
Home Team's win-loss Z	-.00016	4.741*
Visiting Team's Win-loss Z	-.00005	2.142
1973	.02538	1.451
1974 ^a	-	-
1975	-.00864	.182
Constant	.24785	-

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R² = .47091
F(7,13) = 1.65293

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.03896	2.759
Temperature	-.00155	3.784
Precipitation	.00738	.117
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00574	.230
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00262	.168
1973	.01224	.184
1974 ^a	-	-
1975	-.02948	1.757
Constant	.13383	-

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R² = .47712
F(6,14) = 2.12916

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.04529	3.354
Temperature	-.00150	3.948
Precipitation	.01035	.271
Home W-LX x Visitor's W-LX	-.03724	.455
1973	.00460	.045
1974 ^a	-	-
1975	-.03449	3.705
Constant	.16381	-

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking and "PRO" Magazine

The Dallas Cowboys retain one-sixth of concession revenues. The franchise does not share in parking revenues.

It is more difficult to assess the impact of Public Law 93-107 on the Cowboys' concession revenues since data on live gate attendance for 1972 games was not available.

However, it does not appear that the Sports Anti-Blackout Law has as seriously impacted on concessions sales. This is probably due to the fact that live gate attendance has remained high even when the team's home games were locally televised. For example, three of the four games which were locally televised pursuant to Public Law 93-107 were broadcast in 1973. However, concession sales, parking revenues and "PRO" magazine sales were all higher in 1973 than in 1972. Similarly, revenues from all three sources decreased in 1974 as did live gate attendance, even though no games were locally televised and the number of "no shows" decreased. The latter phenomenon was offset by a greater loss in total ticket sales.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Dallas Cowboys: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$524,322	\$563,384 (7.4%)	\$499,090 (-11.4%)	\$589,818 (18.2%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	73,120	111,893 (51.8%)	86,303 (-22.4%)	76,086 (-12.3%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	255,149	283,833 (9.7%)	231,685 (-18.4%)	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	NA	424,030	384,785 (-9.3%)	404,627 (5.2%)
5. "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	NA	28,309	19,855 (-29.9%)	11,661 (-41.3%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	3	0	1

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

During the last three NFL seasons, professional football has enjoyed great popularity among Dallas television viewers. Games involving the Dallas Cowboys have attracted particularly large television audiences. On the average, 44 in every 100 TV homes in the Dallas area watched the Cowboys' games. In 1975 away games involving the Dallas team were viewed by about one-half of all residents in the team's home territory. This figure represents the largest regular season average television audience rating for any professional football game since 1973.

Audiences for NFL games in which the Cowboys are not playing have not been as popular with the Dallas fans. Non-competing games received an average audience rating of 25 percent, while games broadcast during the same time period as the Cowboys' games, (i.e., competing games) captured an average rating of only 5.3. It can, therefore, be concluded that professional football is quite popular with Dallas viewers, particularly when the Cowboys' games are being televised.

It is apparent that Public Law 93-107 has proven beneficial to the citizens of Dallas and the surrounding area. Whether these benefits exceed costs associated with decreases in attendance, which can be attributed to the law, is not readily apparent from the information contained in this analysis.

Audience Ratings for Dallas Cowboys Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Cowboys</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>	
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>
1973	(0) -	(2) 41.3	(2) 2.5	(10) 25.5
1974	(0) -	(2) 40.1	(1) 10.2	(11) 22.2
1975	(0) -	(2) 50.5	(2) 3.3	(10) 26.3
Avg. Rating		(6) 44	(5) 5.3	(31) 24.7

The Detroit Lions

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since Public Law 93-107 was adopted, the Detroit Lions have locally televised six, or 28.6 percent, of the 21 games played at home over the past three seasons. There were no televised games during the 1974 season. Three games were locally televised in both the 1973 and 1975 seasons. The latter number is somewhat surprising in that the Lions moved into the new Pontiac Metropolitan Stadium in 1975 which increased the franchise's seating capacity from 52,418 to 80,638.

However, the figures in the summary table below indicate that even with additional seats, total ticket sales did not fall below an average of 94 percent of the stadium's capacity. This happened despite the fact that season ticket sales were limited to 50,000 seats in 1975, which was equivalent to a relatively low 62 percent of the stadium capacity. Season ticket sales constituted 87 percent of stadium capacity in 1973 before dropping to 76 percent in 1974. Even with the latter decrease, the Lions were still able to sell 94 percent of all available seats.

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Summary of Detroit Lions'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	54,082	52,418	52,418	80,638*
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	374,053	372,675 (-.4%)	344,977 (-7.4%)	536,662 (55.6%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	53,436	53,239	49,282	76,666
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	44,742	45,560 (1.8%)	40,019 (-12.2%)	50,000 (24.9%)
5. Percentage of games won	.571	.429	.500	.500
6. Divisional standing	2	2	2	2
7. Number of televised home games	0	3	0	3

*The Lions moved into the new Pontiac Metropolitan Stadium in 1975

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

During the first year of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law, the Lions' televised three home games in their home territory and the number of "no shows" increased by 129 percent to an average of 7,157 per game. There were, however, a greater number of "no shows" for non-televised games than for games televised locally. During 1974, none of Detroit's home games were locally televised and "no shows" fell to 32,289, or by 35.6 percent. The 1974 "no shows" figure represented 9.3 percent of total seats sold. In 1975, "no shows" increased 7.7 percent overall. However, the percentage of seats sold not showing decreased to 6.5 percent which was only .6 percent above the 1972 rate.

Furthermore, comparing the percentage of "no shows" for 1973 and 1975, both years in which the blackout was lifted on three home games, the

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average number of seats sold not showing declined from 13.4 percent to 6.5 percent of the average seats sold per game. This significant decrease took place coincidentally with the Lions' moving into their new stadium. Also, the Lions' divisional standings remained the same for both years. The 1975 season, therefore, represents the least "no shows" impact since 1972 even with three out of seven home games telecast.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Detroit Lions: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	21,895	50,102 (128.8%)	32,289 (-35.6%)	34,776 (7.7%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	3,177	7,157	4,613	4,968
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	53,436	53,239	49,282	76,666
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	5.9%	13.4%	9.3%	6.5%
5. Number of televised games	-	3	0	3
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	-	6,169	0	6,424
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	3,177	7,899	4,613	3,876
8. Percentage of games won	.571	.429	.500	.500
9. Divisional standing	2	2	2	2

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The results of the statistical analysis demonstrate that Detroit "no shows" were influenced by the weather. "No shows" increased when it rained or snowed. Precipitation was undoubtedly of lesser consequence in 1975 than in previous years because the team played in a new domed stadium. This partially accounts for the relative decline in "no shows" last year.

"No shows" were significantly higher in 1973 than in 1972, all other things being equal. Again, this difference is attributable to factors peculiar to the 1973 season which were not included in the model. The results further indicate that fans were less inclined to attend games in the rain. This appeared to be the case whether or not those games were locally televised.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
DETROIT "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .54301$ $F(6,21) = 4.15887^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.01031	.181
Temperature	-.00079	1.588
Precipitation	.05740	8.481*
Home Team's win-loss Z	-.00005	.688
Visiting Team's Win-loss Z	-	-
1973	.06462	7.673*
1974 ^a	-	-
1975	.00903	.141
Constant	.12136	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .54158$ $F(8,19) = 2.80581^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.00479	.025
Temperature	-.00079	1.146
Precipitation	.06044	7.718*
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.00233	.013
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00461	.326
1973	.07199	4.306
1974	.01199	.083
1975	.00756	.068
Constant	.08484	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .53247$ $F(7,20) = 3.25403^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-.00709	.053
Temperature	-.00077	1.352
Precipitation	.05775	7.296*
Home W-LZ x Visitor's W-LZ	-.01751	.059
1973	.06982	5.607*
1974	.00726	.072
1975	.00628	.050
Constant	.09822	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The Lions do not share in concession or stadium parking revenues.

Unfortunately, no information was available on these sales for any of the four years under consideration. Therefore, it was not possible to assess the impact which Public Law 93-107 may have had on these revenues.

The Lions did provide information on "PRO" sales, although the 1972 figure represents total sales at nine games whereas the remaining figures are for seven regular season home games only. As might be expected, "PRO" magazine sales were directly related to attendance. However, since locally televised games did not appear to influence attendance, any decreases in the sale of concessions or "PRO" magazine cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107.

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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Detroit Lions: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
	(\$ ⁹ games) NA	(\$ ⁷ games) NA	(\$ ⁷ games) NA	(\$ ⁷ games) NA <u>1/</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)				
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	102,758	74,432	61,582 (-7.3%)	111,383 (80.7%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	NA	NA	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	374,053	372,675 (-.4%)	344,977 (-7.4%)	536,662 (55.6%)
5. "No shows" * (percentage change from previous season)	21,895	50,102 (128.8%)	32,289 (-35.6%)	34,776 (7.7%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	3	0	3

NA - Information was Not Available

* Total for seven home games

1/ The team was moved to a new larger stadium in 1975. Therefore, the Lions report that concession revenues were considerably higher in 1975 than in previous years.

4. Audience Ratings

Football telecasts of games involving the Detroit Lions are considerably more popular among television viewers in the Detroit area than are other NFL games. Specifically, an average of 27 in every 100 homes in the Detroit area watched the Lions' televised away games over the past three years. The largest number of football viewers was recorded for 1975 with 29 percent of all television households watching Lions' games.

Other NFL games broadcast during the same time period as Detroit away games were the least popular NFL telecasts with a 4.5 average rating. This would indicate that the Lions audiences were about six times as large as those watching other NFL telecasts aired at the same time but on different networks.

Other NFL games broadcast at different times than the Lions' contests received an average rating of 16.2. While interest in Lions' games among Detroit viewers increased in 1975, interest in other teams' games declined overall. Although no measure of the popularity of home telecasts of Lions' games resulting from Public Law 93-107 can be shown from the ARB surveys, the ratings for away games adequately reflect the Detroit fans preferences for watching the Lions as well as benefits attributable to the legislation.

Audience Ratings for Detroit Lions: 1973-1975

	<u>Lions</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(0) -	(2) 27.5	(1) 4.0	(11) 17.6		
1974	(0) -	(1) 25.2	(1) 5.8	(11) 15.9		
1975	<u>(0) -</u>	<u>(2) 29.0</u>	<u>(1) 3.6</u>	<u>(11) 15.1</u>		
Avg. Ratings	-	(5) 27.2	(3) 4.5	(33) 16.2		

The Green Bay Packers

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since 1973, the Green Bay franchise has sold out and subsequently televised all 21 home games in its home territory. The Packers' success in selling out home games can partially be attributed to the fact that the team plays in the two stadia: one located in Green Bay with approximately 56,000 seats, the other at Milwaukee which had a capacity of 47,000 seats from 1972 to 1974, and 52,600 in 1975. ^{1/} Since the fans in Green Bay and Milwaukee have the opportunity to see only four and three home games respectively, instead of the usual seven each year, it follows that the demand for tickets would be more intense. Additionally, neither stadium is large by NFL standards and, as a result, the franchise has experienced fewer problems in selling all available tickets.

The Packers' have consistently sold out the Green Bay stadium since 1972, thus, ticket sales have been virtually constant. In 1975, the franchise experienced a 10 percent increase in ticket sales at Milwaukee as a result of expanding that stadium's capacity. Ticket sales at both stadia have averaged no less than 98 percent of the available seats during each of the past four years.

Especially strong season ticket sales have occurred since 1973. At the Green Bay stadium, 100 percent of season seats available for purchase during this period were sold. A 10 percent increase in season tickets sold at Milwaukee County Stadium resulted from the increasing number of such tickets made available to fans. Despite relatively poor won-loss records in 1972, demand for tickets to

^{1/} The Packers play four home games at Green Bay and the remaining three at Milwaukee.

Packers' games remained high throughout 1973-1975. Consequently, it does not appear that Green Bay fans are particularly sensitive to the team's performance or the prospects of local telecasts in deciding to purchase Packers' tickets. However, the fans loyalty may in part reflect the franchise's success during the late 1960's when the Packers won three consecutive NFL championships, under Coach Vince Lombardi. Nevertheless, the Packers could experience future difficulties in ticket sales should the team not improve in the years to come.

Summary of Green Bay Packers
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity <u>1/</u> at MILWAUKEE*	56,263 47,826	56,263 47,826	56,267 47,826	56,267 52,607
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season) at MILWAUKEE	220,861 140,441	220,668 (0%) 140,658 (0%)	220,623 (0%) 139,389 (-1%)	220,506 (0%) 153,904 (10%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game at MILWAUKEE	55,215 46,814	55,167 46,886	55,156 46,463	55,127 51,301
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season) at MILWAUKEE	54,155 46,699	56,267 (3.9%) 47,826 (6.9%)	56,267 (0%) 47,826 (0%)	56,257 (0%) 52,583 (10%)
5. Percentage of games won	.714	.286	.429	.286
6. Divisional standing	1	3	3	4
7. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7

*Green Bay plays three games at Milwaukee each season

1/ Unless otherwise noted, figures are for Green Bay stadium.

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

The number of "no shows" at Packers' games have consistently increased since 1972. During that year, some 8,177 ticket holders chose not to attend games. In 1973, when all seven games were locally televised "no shows" increased to 12,614 and rose again in 1974 to 16,559. Last year "no shows" reached an all time high when 31,961 ticket holders failed to attend the team's seven locally televised home games. Even so, the latter figure amounted to only 8.5 percent of all tickets sold which was less than the league's average ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold (i.e., 8.6 percent). Additionally, attendance appears to have been much better at Milwaukee than at Green Bay. For instance, in 1973 "no shows" at games played in Green Bay were equivalent to 4 percent of all tickets sold, while the ratio of "no shows" to tickets sold for Milwaukee games came to only 2 percent. Similar differences were reported in 1974. Last year, 13 percent of all ticket holders failed to attend the four locally televised games played at Green Bay, while only 3 percent failed to attend the three games played at Milwaukee which were also televised. It is not readily apparent why this situation exists.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
Green Bay Packers: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season) at MILWAUKEE	6,103 2,074	9,375 3,239 (54%) (56%)	12,190 4,369 (30%) (35%)	27,633 4,328 (127%) (-1%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game at MILWAUKEE	1,526 691	2,344 1,080	3,048 1,456	6,908 1,443
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game at MILWAUKEE	55,215 46,814	55,167 46,886	55,156 46,463	55,127 51,301
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing at MILWAUKEE	3% 1%	4% 2%	6% 3%	13% 3%
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game at MILWAUKEE	-	2,344 1,080	3,048 1,456	6,908 1,443
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game at MILWAUKEE	1,526 691	0 0	0 0	0 0
8. Percentage of games won	.714	.286	.429	.286
9. Divisional standing	1	3	3	4

However, the statistical analysis of the number of "no shows" at the Green Bay franchise did not identify a direct relationship between "no shows" and the televising of home games. Indeed, temperature appeared to be the only factor in the model which appeared to have a significant impact on "no shows." This particular variable explained about 50 percent of the variation in the team's live gate attendance. The variable indicating whether or not the games were televised was not significant, nor were the three seasonal variables. Both of these findings suggest that television has had no impact on attendance. On the other hand,

temperatures in Green Bay and Milwaukee have not dropped precipitously since the adoption of Public Law 93-107. Hence, temperature in and of itself cannot explain the rather substantial increases in "no shows" over the past three years. However, the results do indicate that fans are becoming more inclined to stay home when the weather is cold and this could be due to the fact that all of the Packers' games have been locally televised. Hence, Public Law 93-107 may well have had an indirect impact on Green Bay attendance, in the sense that the availability of TV permits fans to see the games (in the comfort of their living room) when the weather is particularly cold.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
GREEN BAY "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .61435$ $F(7,20) = 4.55159^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.01255	.231
Temperature	-.00262	14.917*
Precipitation	.00984	.176
Home Team's win-loss %	.00002	.178
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00004	.731
1973 ^a	-	-
1974	.01682	.415
1975	.04346	2.529
Constant	.15514	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .59921$ $F(6,21) = 5.23280^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.01110	.181
Temperature	-.00282	20.523*
Precipitation	.01363	.358
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.00314	.112
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-	-
1973 ^a	-	-
1974	.01711	.442
1975	.03986	2.288
Constant	.16343	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .59822$ $F(6,21) = 5.21127^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.00887	.127
Temperature	-.00291	21.755*
Precipitation	.01367	.354
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	.01762	.060
1973 ^a	-	-
1974	.01608	.387
1975	.03862	2.236
Constant	.15686	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The Green Bay franchise does not share in revenues from the sale of concessions or stadium parking.

It does not appear that increases in "no shows" at Packers' games have resulted in a serious deterioration in concession sales. For example, although "no shows" increased by 54.3 percent in 1973, "PRO" Magazine sales remained virtually constant. This was probably due to the fact that the number of "no shows" was equivalent to about 3 percent of the Packers' live gate attendance.

Decreases in "PRO" sales were more serious in 1974 and 1975 as were the number of "no shows." However, it would not necessarily follow that the fall in sales can be wholly attributed to locally televised games.

As noted previously, Public Law 93-107 may have indirectly influenced "no shows" at the Packers' home games. That is, fans may have been more inclined to stay home and watch the game on TV when the weather was cold. If so, the Sports Anti-Blackout Law could have contributed to a loss of concession and "PRO" magazine sales.

However, it is unlikely that the legislation was responsible for a large part of the change. Indeed the figures for "PRO" sales indicate that the magazine simply has become less popular in recent seasons. No definitive conclusions can be drawn with regard to the magnitude of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on concession and parking revenues due to a lack of data for the 1972 and 1975 seasons.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Green Bay Packers: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$ NA	\$348,026	\$338,092 (-2.8%)	\$ NA
"PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	118,307	117,635 (0)	108,202 (-8%)	77,635 (-78.2%)
Parking (percentage change from previous season)	NA	53,387	54,143 (1.4%)	NA
Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	361,302	361,326 (0)	360,012 (-0.4%)	374,410 (4%)
"No shows" (percentage change from previous season)	8,177	12,614 (54.3%)	16,559 (31.3%)	31,961 (93%)
Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

Since the Green Bay Packers play their home games in two cities, both the Green Bay and Milwaukee area audience ratings were measured to ascertain the popularity of Packers' games among home fans. It is readily apparent that in both these cities television viewers prefer to watch Packers' games than other NFL contests, especially when a Packers' game is telecast at the same time as another NFL game. In those instances the competing games attract an average of only five in every 100 viewers, where as about 40 to 45 percent of all households in Milwaukee and Green Bay watch the Packers play when the games were televised. NFL games involving teams other than Green Bay which did not compete with the Packers' games for television audiences received an average rating of 20 in Milwaukee and 22 in Green Bay. Furthermore, the Packers' audience ratings have remained high over the past three years indicating an absence of oversaturation. Given the popularity of the Packers televised games combined with the fact that Public Law 93-107 has triggered a lifting of the blackout on all home games played since 1973, it must be concluded that Public Law 93-107 has been highly beneficial to viewers residing in the team's home territories.

Audience Ratings for Green Bay Packers: 1973-1975

	<u>Packers</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
Green Bay						
1973	(2) 41.2	(2) 45.4	(3) 4.4	(7)	22.7	
1974	(2) 48.3	(2) 46.0	(3) 6.7	(8)	22.2	
1975	<u>(2) 44.8</u>	<u>(2) 45.6</u>	<u>(4) 4.6</u>	<u>(7)</u>	<u>21.4</u>	
Avg. Ratings	(6) 44.8	(6) 45.7	(10) 5.2	(22)	22.1	
Milwaukee						
1973	(2) 44.3	(2) 38.3	(4) 5.6	(8)	22.0	
1974	(2) 37.4	(2) 38.1	(3) 6.6	(8)	18.2	
1975	<u>(2) 41.7</u>	<u>(2) 38.7</u>	<u>(3) 4.2</u>	<u>(8)</u>	<u>19.7</u>	
Avg. Ratings	(6) 41.1	(6) 38.4	(10) 5.5	(24)	20.0	

The Los Angeles Rams

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The Los Angeles Rams televised only one home game since the adoption of Public Law 93-107 in 1973. This is not surprising considering that Los Angeles Coliseum has a larger-than-normal seating capacity. Furthermore, the Coliseum's Capacity was increased in 1974 from 79,281 to 92,000.

Ticket sales, on the other hand, have remained relatively constant, increasing from 473,919 in 1972 to 510,923 in 1973, or by 7.8 percent. Ticket sales decreased in 1974 to 501,753 while dropping to 470,867 in 1975. Hence there was less than a 1 percent difference between ticket sales in 1975 and in 1972, the year prior to the adoption of Public Law 93-107. The Rams' season ticket sales have also remained relatively stable over the past four years: 50,037 in 1972, 45,917 in 1973 and 46,251 in 1974. Although last year's season ticket sales increased to 47,413, this figure was only slightly more than half of the Coliseum's capacity.

Given the consistency in ticket sales over the past four years coupled with the expansion of the Coliseum's capacity, it is not surprising that the ratio of the average number of tickets sold per game to the total number of available seats decreased from 89 percent in 1972 to 74 percent in 1975. The latter phenomenon also explains why the Rams have been required to locally televise only one home game since 1973. Consequently it must be assumed that Public Law 93-107 has not adversely impacted on the team's total ticket sales.

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Summary of Los Angeles
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	76,000	79,281	92,000	91,038
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	473,914	510,923 (7.2%)	501,744 (-1.8%)	470,867 (-6.2%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	67,702	72,989	71,679	67,267
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	50,037	45,917 (-8.2%)	46,251 (.7%)	47,413 (2.5%)
5. Percentage of games won	.429	.857	.714	.857
6. Divisional standing	3	1	1	1
7. Number of televised games	0	0	0	1

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

With the exception of one single locally televised game in 1975, live gate attendance at Los Angeles' home games has remained relatively high. For example, 31,393, or 6.6 percent of all tickets sold during the 1972 season, were not used. In 1973 "no shows" decreased substantially to 18,950 or 3.6 percent of all tickets sold. "No shows" increased in 1974 to 34,159, or 6.8 percent of all tickets sold. However, neither of these changes in live gate attendance can be attributed to Public Law 93-107 since none of the team's home games was locally televised. The franchise experienced its largest decline in attendance last year with total "no shows" numbering 54,441 or 11.6 percent of total tickets sold.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
Los Angeles Rams: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "no shows" (percentage change from previous season)	31,397	18,457 (-41.2%)	34,159 (85.1%)	54,441 (59.4%)
2. Avg. "no shows" per game	4,485	2,636	4,880	7,777
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	67,702	72,989	71,679	67,267
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6.6%	3.6%	6.8%	11.6%
5. Number of televised games	0	0	0	1
6. Avg. "no shows" per televised game	0	0	0	21,649
7. Avg. "no shows" per non-televised game	4,485	2,656	4,880	5,465
8. Percentage of games won	.429	.857	.714	.857
9. Divisional standing	3	1	1	1

The figures in the table indicate that the increase in "no shows" for 1975 can largely be attributed to the 21,649 ticket holders who failed to attend Los Angeles' single locally televised game. The results of our analysis further demonstrate that the poor attendance of this game was partially attributable to the fact that the game was broadcast in the team's home territory. It is uncertain that attendance at other Los Angeles games would have been similarly affected had those games been locally televised. Given the enormous seating capacity of the Coliseum, however, it is unlikely that Public Law 93-107 will require the Rams to locally televise many home games in the near or distant future.

With the exception of a significant seasonal difference between 1972 and 1973, no other factors defined in the model appeared to influence Los Angeles "no shows." The absence of an effect attributable to weather is not surprising in that the autumn months in Southern California are generally warm and dry.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
LOS ANGELES "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .69467$ $F(7,20) = 6.50033^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.20121	22.093*
Temperature	-.00040	.324
Precipitation ^a	-	-
Home Team's win-loss \bar{x}	-.05123	.727
Visiting Team's Win-loss \bar{x}	-.04938	2.088
1973	-.01846	.725
1974	-.00829	.189
1975	.01742	.555
Constant	.15166	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .68308$ $F(6,21) = 7.54362^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.19704	29.781*
Temperature	-.00036	.272
Precipitation	-.00500	.019
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01315	1.687
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00892	2.742
1973	-.03687	5.788*
1974 ^a	-	-
1975 ^a	-	-
Constant	.05912	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .69786$ $F(6,21) = 8.80407^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.20900	24.009*
Temperature	-.00037	.290
Precipitation ^a	-	-
Home W-L \times Visitor's W-L \bar{x}	-.07420	3.451
1973	-.02064	1.389
1974	-.00681	.161
1975	.01299	.509
Constant	.11572	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking and "PRO" Magazine

The Los Angeles Rams retain one-sixth of the total revenues earned from the sale of concessions and stadium parking. It is difficult to analyze trends in these revenues due to the fact that the figures reflect sales for a different number of games each year.

It does not appear that Public Law 93-107 was responsible for variations in those revenues listed below, because the Rams have televised only one home game pursuant to Public Law 93-107. Moreover, given the seating capacity of the Coliseum and the subsequent likelihood that most future home games will be blacked out, an extension of the legislation does not appear to represent a serious threat to concessions, parking, or "PRO" magazine sales.

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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Los Angeles Rams: 1972-1973

	<u>1972</u> (7 games)	<u>1973</u> (10 games)	<u>1974</u> (11 games)	<u>1975</u> (10 games)
1. Concessions <u>1/</u> (percentage change from previous season)	\$516,124	\$634,232 (23%)	\$930,408	\$887,214 <u>2/</u>
2. "PRO" Magazine (percentage change from previous season)	74,292	79,024 (6%)	133,169	80,346
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	73,999	70,536 (-5%)	125,914	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	473,914	510,923 (7.2%)	501,744 (-1.8%)	470,867 (-6.2%)
5. "No shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	31,396	18,450 (-41.2%)	34,159 (85.1%)	54,441 (59.4%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	0	0	1

NA - Information was Not Available

* Total for seven home games

1/ Gross receipts

2/ An April 27, 1976 letter from the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission, indicates that rather than decreasing from 1974 to 1975, concession revenues increased by an amount similar to the increase from 1973 to 1974.

4. Audience Ratings

Television viewers in Los Angeles prefer to watch the Rams rather than other NFL teams. For example, only five in every 100 area TV households watched other games when Los Angeles games were carried at the same time. The Rams' away games included in this survey, however were seen in 27 of every 100 TV homes in the Los Angeles area. The figures in the subsequent table also indicate Los Angeles' audience ratings were higher than the ratings of other non-competing games. Finally it appears that television audiences for NFL broadcasts in the Los Angeles area have been declining since 1973. While interest in the Rams' games remains stronger than interest in other games, the magnitude of these audiences have also decreased. An explanation of this trend is not readily apparent.

Audience Ratings for Los Angeles Rams: 1973-1975

	<u>Rams</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>					
	<u>Home Games</u>		<u>Away Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(0)	-	(2)	31.4	(2)	6.3	(10)	20.1
1974	(0)	-	(3)	25.6	(2)	5.1	(10)	16.6
1975	<u>(0)</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>(2)</u>	<u>23.4</u>	<u>(1)</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>(10)</u>	<u>15.8</u>
Avg. Ratings			(7)	26.8	(5)	4.8	(30)	17.5

The Minnesota Vikings

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Public Law 93-107 has had a substantial impact on the number of locally televised Viking games. All seven home games were broadcast in the team's home territory in both 1973 and 1975. Five of seven home games were televised locally in 1974.

This, of course, reflects the Vikings' consistent success in selling all or nearly all available tickets. Minnesota's stadium seats approximately 48,000 fans which is well below the League's average. Over the past four years, Viking ticket sales have averaged out to more than 47,000 per game. This includes approximately 41,500 season tickets sold during each of the past four seasons under consideration. Both total and season ticket sales have remained almost constant since 1972 even though most home games have been televised locally since 1973.

This is not surprising in that the Vikings have won the NFC's Central Division championship during each of the past three years, finishing with a 12-2 won-loss record in 1973, a 10-4 record in 1974 and another 12-2 season last year. Given the excellence of the team's performance, the relatively small stadium seating capacity and the enthusiasm of the fans, it is understandable that Minnesota has not encountered any serious problems with regard to ticket sales.

Summary of Minnesota Vikings'
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	47,693	47,693	48,503	48,446
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	329,037	331,898 (.9%)	332,503 (.2%)	333,802 (.4%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	47,005	47,414	47,500	47,686
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	41,984	41,500 (-1.2%)	41,500 (0%)	41,500 (0%)
5. Percentage of games won	.500	.857	.714	.857
6. Divisional standing	3	1	1	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	5	7

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Minnesota has not experienced serious attendance problems since the adoption of Public Law 93-107, even though most of their games have been televised locally. Only 10,393 ticket holders (3.2 percent of all seats sold) failed to attend games in 1972. This number declined in 1973 to 8,293 and again in 1974 to 7,949. The latter figure is equivalent to 2.4 percent of total tickets sold. "No shows" did increase to a four-year high of 15,786 in 1975, but this was still less than 4.7 percent of total attendance.

The figures below further suggest that "no shows" were not particularly affected by Public Law 93-107. That is, attendance at televised games did not appear to differ markedly from attendance at non-televised games.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
MINNESOTA "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .61546$ $F(7, 20) = 4.57296^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02379	1.592
Temperature	-.00110	18.100*
Precipitation	.02795	2.306
Home Team's win-loss % ^a	-	-
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00003	2.626
1973	-.02246	1.027
1974	-.02126	1.327
1975	-.00856	.136
Constant	.09202	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .61013$ $F(8, 19) = 3.71680^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02247	1.340
Temperature	-.00117	19.683*
Precipitation	.03438	3.133
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00127	.038
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00547	1.853
1973	-.02063	.750
1974	-.01718	.635
1975	-.00508	.038
Constant	.06428	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .61537$ $F(7, 20) = 4.57124^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02232	1.422
Temperature	-.00109	17.302*
Precipitation	.02671	2.096
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.03055	2.620
1973	-.01700	.605
1974	-.01650	.859
1975	-.00204	.008
Constant	.08606	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

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Summary of "No Shows" For
Minnesota Vikings: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (previous change from previous season)	10,393	8,293 (-20.2%)	7,949 (-4.2%)	15,786 (98.6%)
2. Average "No Shows" per game	1,485	1,185	1,136	2,255
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	47,005	47,414	47,500	47,686
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3.2%	2.5%	2.4%	4.7%
5. Number of televised games	0	7	5	7
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game		1,185	1,218	2,255
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	1,485	0	930	0
8. Percentage of games won	.500	.857	.714	.857
9. Divisional standing	3	1	1	1

The conclusion was further evidenced by the statistical analysis. Specifically, the findings clearly indicate that "no shows" did not increase significantly when games were locally televised. As a result, it can be concluded that Public Law 93-107 did not directly affect live gate attendance at Minnesota's home games.

However, attendance was influenced by the weather. As expected, "no shows" increased when the temperature was cold. All other variables defined in the model did not significantly impact on the Vikings' live gate attendance. However, Viking fans may have become more inclined to stay home when the weather is cold, knowing that the game will be locally televised. Yet, this does not appear likely since attendance at nearly all of the games has remained high. Consequently, we must conclude that the impact of Public Law 93-107 on the team's live gate attendance has been very minimal, if it has had any effect

at all. Again this is probably due to the fact that television is not an ideal substitute for seeing a game in person - especially when the team has played as outstandingly as this perennial NFL powerhouse.

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concession, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The Minnesota Vikings receive no share of concession or parking revenues. Receipts from these two enterprises remained relatively constant from 1972 through 1974. The 28 percent increase in concessions from 1972 to 1973 was due to a 20 percent price increase.

During the same period, the number of "no shows" steadily decreased. However, in 1975 "no shows" jumped nearly 100 percent to 15,786. Unfortunately, concession and parking data for this year was not provided. Thus, whether this increase had an impact on revenues cannot be determined.

"PRO" magazine sales increased in 1973 to \$71,197. Since then, "PRO" sales have steadily dropped - to a low of \$54,015 in 1975. "No shows" fell in 1973 and 1974 but rose again in 1975 while total ticket sales remained constant. Thus, no significant relationship seems to exist between the number of "no shows" and "PRO" revenues. Even if this were the case, losses in all probability, could not be attributed to Public Law 93-107.

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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Minnesota Vikings: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$255,260	\$327,020 (28.1%)	\$327,733 (.2%)	\$ NA
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	60,358	71,197 (18%)	60,164 (-15.5%)	54,015 (-10.2%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	113,755	117,361 (3.2%)	117,981 (0.5%)	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	329,037	331,898 (.9%)	332,503 (.2%)	333,802 (.4%)
5. "No shows" (percentage change from previous season)	10,393	8,293 (-20.2%)	7,949 (-4.2%)	15,786 (98.6%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	7	5	7

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

The Minnesota Vikings enjoy great popularity among television viewers in the Minneapolis area. On the average, about 39 in every 100 television households have been watching Viking telecasts since 1973. Home games broadcast as a result of Public Law 93-107 have received an average audience rating of 35.8 while away games reached 42.2 percent of all television households.

Competing NFL games telecast during a locally televised Vikings' game attracted much smaller audiences, recording an average rating of only 6.7. Non-competing NFL games involving other teams attracted an average of 17.5 out of every 100 television households. 1975 ratings increased for Vikings' games as well as other teams contests (except those competing with local team broadcasts).

Professional football telecasts are maintaining their popularity in the Minneapolis area, therefore, with an expressed preference from the viewers for those games in which the Vikings participate. Thus, Public Law 93-107 would appear to be beneficial to the public in the Minneapolis area.

Audience Ratings for Minnesota Vikings: 1973-1975

	<u>Vikings</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>	
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>
1973	(3) 37.4	(1) 45.8	(0) -	(9) 17.2
1974	(2) 32.8	(2) 38.6	(3) 8.3	(7) 16.6
1975	<u>(2) 37.1</u>	<u>(2) 40.7</u>	<u>(2) 5.1</u>	<u>(8) 18.8</u>
Avg. Ratings	(7) 35.8	(5) 42.2	(5) 6.7	(24) 17.5

The New Orleans Saints

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since the adoption of Public Law 93-107, none of the Saints' home games has been locally televised. Consequently, the law has had no impact on the New Orleans franchise. The team's lack of success in selling out home games partially can be attributed to their stadium's relatively large capacities of 81,000 for the Sugar Bowl between 1972-74 and 74,700 for the Superdome in 1975.

The Saints' ticket sales have remained relatively stable over the past three years and have also exceeded the league average. Nevertheless, average tickets sold per game have fallen far short of the total available. While 1973 proved to be the Saints' best year with an average of 63,587 tickets sold per game, this number still amounted to less than 80 percent of the stadium's capacity.

Season ticket sales have also decreased during each of the past three years: from 53,319 in 1972 to only 46,000 in 1975. This is not particularly surprising since the Saints have had four consecutive losing seasons. In any event, the waning interest cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107 since the law has never triggered a lifting of the team's local television blackout policy on home games.

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Summary of New Orleans
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	80,997	80,997	80,997	74,704
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	NA	445,108	444,590 (-.1%)	389,209 (-12.5%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	NA	63,587	63,513	55,601
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	53,319	50,005 (-6.2%)	49,252 (-1.5%)	46,000 (-6.6%)
5. Percentage of games won	.143	.357	.357	.143
6. Divisional standing	4	3	3	4
7. Number of televised games	-	0	0	0

NA - Information was Not Available

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Since data on live gate attendance in 1972 was not available, we have "no shows" figures for only the past three seasons. Nevertheless, those figures indicate that an increasing number of ticketholders failed to attend home games between 1973 and 1975. However, since none of the team's home games has been locally televised, the decline in attendance cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107.

From 1973 to 1975 total "no shows" increased from 48,619 to 76,945. Last year's increase constituted the largest seasonal decline in live gate attendance when the number of "no shows" averaged out to an exceedingly high 19.8 percent of all tickets sold. The 1975 season also marked the year in which New Orleans moved into a new domed stadium.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
New Orleans Saints: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "no shows" (percentage change from previous season)	NA	48,619	59,132 (21.6%)	76,945 (30.1%)
2. Average "no shows" per game	NA	6,946	8,447	10,992
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	NA	63,587	63,513	55,601
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	-	10.9%	13.3%	19.8%
5. Number of televised games	-	0	0	0
6. Avg. "no shows" per televised game	-	-	-	-
7. Avg. "no shows" per non-televised game	-	6,946	8,447	10,992
8. Percentage of games won	.143	.357	.357	.143
9. Divisional standing	4	3	3	4

NA - Information was Not Available

Given that local telecasts have no application in the New Orleans case, other factors must have been responsible for the rise in "no shows" since 1973. The results of the statistical analyses confirm this proposition. Our findings indicate that "no shows" were particularly sensitive to temperature. Not surprisingly, "no shows" increased when the weather turned cold. Additionally, attendance increased with improvements in the team's performance, as reflected by their won-loss record. All other variables in the model did not appear to have a significant impact on the team's attendance. The model explained less than half of the variation of the Saints' "no shows." It is therefore apparent that the Saints' live gate attendance was influenced by factors other than those defined in the empirical model. We have no reasonable explanation for this phenomenon.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
NEW ORLEANS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .47458$
 $F(5, 15) = 2.7097$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	-.00378	6.459*
Precipitation ^a	-	-
Home Team's win-loss %	-.48800	4.802*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	.05811	.389
1973 ^a	-	-
1974	.02818	.375
1975	.00998	.039
Constant	.50353	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .32924$
 $F(5, 15) = 1.4725$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	-.00332	3.724
Precipitation ^a	-	-
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.01757	.318
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01954	.819
1973	-	-
1974 ^a	-.01553	.056
1975	.04606	3.724
Constant	.39529	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
 $R^2 = .38536$
 $F(3, 17) = 3.55281^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	-.00327	4.686*
Precipitation ^a	-	-
Home W-L x Visitor's W-L%	-.33987	2.508
1973	-.02928	.327
1974 ^a	-.00878	.027
1975	-	-
Constant	.45265	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

Between 1972 and 1974 the Saints retained 10 percent of concession revenues. Last year the team did not share. Furthermore New Orleans has never retained a percentage of parking revenues, although they do, of course, keep revenues earned from the sale of "PRO" magazine.

Since the enactment of Public Law 93-107 in 1973, the Saints have not locally televised any home games. The legislation, therefore, has had absolutely no effect on the sale of concessions, "PRO" magazine, or stadium parking at the New Orleans franchise.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for New Orleans Saints: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$247,330	\$284,734 (13.2%)	\$317,729 (11.6%)	\$ NA
2 "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	45,422	36,272 (-25.2%)	42,259 (-11.8%)	34,153 (-19.2%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	NA	NA	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	NA	445,108	444,590 (- .1%)	389,209 (-12.5%)
5. "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	NA	48,619	59,132 (21.6%)	76,945 (30.1%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	0	0	0

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

Even though the franchise has yet to experience a winning season, football telecasts of New Orleans Saints' games are more frequently watched by viewers in the New Orleans area than are other NFL games. Over the three-year period, an average of 39 out of every 100 television households watched Saints' televised games. However, the team's audience ratings did decrease in both 1974 and 1975. In all probability, this can be attributed to the team's poor won-loss record.

Nevertheless, the Saints' televised games outdrew audiences watching competing telecasts involving other NFL teams by a margin of nearly 8 to 1. Non-competing games acquired an average 24 rating which was also considerably below the audience ratings for the home team.

Since no blackout lifts of home games as a result of P.L. 93-107 have occurred in New Orleans, there can be no impact of the law on television audiences there. However, it is clear that residents in Southern Louisiana prefer to watch the Saints play when given the opportunity.

Audience Ratings for New Orleans Saints' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Saints</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(0) -	(2) 47.2	(1) 4.8	(11)	25.9	
1974	(0) -	(1) 39.8	(1) 2.5	(11)	22.8	
1975	(0) -	(1) 31.0	(1) 8.3	(11)	23.4	
Avg. Ratings	(0) -	(4) 39.3	(3) 5.2	(33)	24	

The New York Giants

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The New York Giants have locally televised eight of 21 home games or 38 percent, since the enactment of Public Law 93-107. Six of these games were televised in 1973 and two were televised in 1975. ^{1/} Additionally, these telecasts resulted from sellouts at three different stadia which the Giants have used since 1972.

In 1972 and for the first two games of 1973, the franchise played at Yankee Stadium which had a seating capacity of 63,350 in 1972 and 64,892 in 1973. During the latter part of 1973 and all of the 1974 season, the Giants played at the Yale Bowl in New Haven, Conn. which held approximately 70,000 fans. Shea Stadium became home base for the Giants in 1975 with a seating capacity of approximately 60,400. These changes in stadia make an analysis of the effects of Public Law 93-107 on the Giants' franchise more difficult. On the basis of available ticket data, however, lifting the blackout on home games does not appear to have adversely affected the team's ticket sales.

Average ticket sales to the Giants' home games were approximately 62,700 in 1972, 67,000 in 1973, 53,300 in 1974 and 59,300 in 1975. These figures represent at least 98 percent of their respective stadia's capacities with the exception of only 75 percent sales in 1974. Total sales increased in 1973 and 1975 while decreasing by 21 percent in 1974 when the Giants played their home games in New Haven. The latter decrease is probably indicative of greater problems in getting to the Yale Bowl.

Season ticket sales followed nearly the same pattern as total ticket sales except that the percentage changes in annual sales were somewhat larger.

^{1/} See Footnote 2 Page 19

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For example, season sales fell by 8 percent in 1973 and 24 percent in 1974 which corresponded with the team's move to the Yale Bowl. When the franchise returned to New York in 1975, season ticket sales increased 36 percent. Again, it is probable that fans experienced greater transportation problems when the Giants were playing in New Haven and as a consequence, many appeared to be less inclined to purchase season tickets in 1973 and 1974. Moreover, the absence of televised games for 1974 as compared to 1975 confirms fans' preferences to purchase tickets when the team plays in New York.

Additionally, the New York Giants have not had a winning season since the passage of Public Law 93-107. In all probability, this also contributed to the losses in season ticket and total ticket sales for 1973 and 1974. Results reported in the following section suggest that the team's performance has affected live gate attendance. Therefore, it is also likely that poor performances as well as the location of the games have affected the sale of Giants' tickets more than any effect of Public Law 93-107.

Summary of New York Giants
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	63,350	64,892* 70,200*	70,874	60,416
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	438,669	470,273 (7.2%)	373,096 (-20.7%)	414,808 (11.2%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	62,667	67,182	53,298	59,258
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	57,214	52,686 (-7.9%)	40,007 (-24.1%)	54,294 (35.7%)
5. Percentage of games won	.571	.143	.143	.357
5. Divisional standing	3	5	5	4
7. Number of televised games	0	6	0	2

*The Giants used 2 stadia in the 1973 season: Yankee and Yale.

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

The New York Giants have experienced substantial increases in the number of "no shows" since the implementation of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law. Between 1972 and 1973 "no shows" more than doubled, increasing from 26,881 to 59,991. These were equivalent to 6.1 percent and 12.8 percent of the total tickets sold during each of the respective seasons. Total "no shows" remained nearly constant in 1974 although the percentage of ticket holders who chose not to attend games increased to 16 percent. Last year, the absolute number of "no shows" increased to 62,836 while the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold fell to 15.1 percent. Again the seemingly contradictory trends in the absolute number of "no shows" and the ratio of "no shows" to ticket sales reflect the differences in seating capacities of the three stadia used by the Giants since 1972.

Moreover, it would not be appropriate to attribute increases in "no shows" experienced after 1972 to Public Law 93-107. A comparison of average "no shows" demonstrates that live gate attendance at locally televised games exceeded attendance at games which were blacked out in the team's home territory. Specifically, the Giants had an average of 7,551 "no shows" for the six locally televised 1973 contests with 14,688 "no shows" for the single blacked-out game. The result held in 1975 when about twice as many ticket holders failed to attend blacked-out home games as opposed to those which were locally televised. Hence, it does not appear that Public Law 93-107 has impacted on the live gate attendance at the Giants' home games.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
New York Giants: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	26,881	59,991 (123.2%)	59,759 (-.4%)	62,836 (5.2%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	3,840	8,570	8,537	8,977
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	62,667	67,182	53,298	59,258
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6.1%	12.8%	16.0%	15.1%
5. Number of televised games	0	6	0	2
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised games	-	7,551	0	4,930
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	3,840	14,688	8,537	10,595
8. Percentage of games won	.571	.143	.143	.357
9. Divisional standing	3	5	5	4

The statistical analysis confirms this proposition. That is, our findings indicate that the number of Giants' "no shows" did not significantly increase when home games were locally televised, all other things being equal. However, the number of "no shows" was influenced by the weather and the quality of the game. As was the case with most other teams, the number of "no shows" increased when the weather was cold and wet. Conversely, attendance improved when the fans expected a game with two well-matched teams, as reflected by the won-loss percentages of each.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
NEW YORK GIANTS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

$$R^2 = .58167$$

$$F(8, 19) = 3.30510^*$$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02124	.092
Temperature	-.00242	2.917
Precipitation	.19254	10.275*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00023	1.538
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00009	2.385
1973	.01507	.031
1974	.04394	.328
1975	.04364	.494
Constant	.33773	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

$$R^2 = .55208$$

$$F(7, 20) = 3.52160^*$$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	-.00265	4.740*
Precipitation	.17164	8.708*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02014	.385
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01837	1.833
1973	.04453	.644
1974	.07878	.952
1975	.06928	1.498
Constant	.07866	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

$$R^2 = .59679$$

$$F(7, 20) = 4.22888^*$$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.01741	.068
Temperature	-.00297	6.571*
Precipitation	.20036	11.859*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.28606	4.383*
1973	.01118	.019
1974	.06936	1.693
1975	.05696	1.182
Constant	.28269	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The New York Giants do not share in concession or parking revenues.

The figures in the table below indicate that concession sales have fluctuated widely over the past four years, decreasing by 25.5 percent in 1973 and by 33.8 percent in 1974, before increasing by 94.3% percent in 1975. The diminution in 1973 and 1975 was probably due, in part, to the rather dramatic increase in "no shows" in 1973 and falling ticket sales during the 1974 season. However, the rather dramatic recovery in concession sales last year did not coincide with a similar improvement in attendance. Additional revenues were apparently due to rising consumption and prices for concessions.

"PRO" magazine sales did not prove to do particularly sensitive to "no shows". For example "PRO" sales increased in 1973, even though live gate attendance declined. The reverse was true last year. Consequently, it does not appear that Public Law 93-107 has had a significant adverse impact on revenues earned from the sale of concessions and "PRO" magazine at the Giants' home games.

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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for New York Giants: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$488,918	\$364,045 (-25.5%)	\$240,981 (-33.8%)	\$480,172 (99.3%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	80,086	90,752 (13.3%)	73,681 (-18.8%)	69,430 (-5.8%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	42,000	NA	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	438,669	470,273 (7.2%)	373,096 (-20.7%)	414,808 (11.2%)
5. "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	26,881	59,991 (123.2%)	59,759 (-.4%)	62,836 (5.2%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	6	0	2

NA - Information was Not Available

4. Audience Ratings

The results reported in the table below indicate that professional football is relatively less popular with New Yorkers than it is with viewers in other parts of the country. On the average, local telecasts of New York Giants' games were viewed in about 16 of every 100 households in the New York area.

As others however, New Yorkers do prefer to watch their home team as opposed to other NFL clubs. Games involving other teams which were broadcast on a different channel at the same time as a Giants' telecast, received an average audience rating of 8.1. On the other hand, games which did not directly compete with the Giants received a 15.3 audience rating.

Consequently, it appears that the fans' interest in telecasts of Giants' games is not particularly acute. Average ratings for contests not involving the Giants were of similar magnitude to those for Giants' home games telecasts. This indicates that all NFL broadcasts have attracted basically the same size of audience with lower percentages for telecasts opposite Giants' games. Additionally, since the New York market offers many options for television viewers, the comparatively small football-viewing audience is not surprisingly, especially in light of the fact that the Giants have not had a winning season since 1973.

Audience Ratings For New York Giants: 1973-1975

	<u>Giants</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(1) 14.8	(2) 17.1	(2) 8.9	(7)	17.0	
1974	(0) -	(2) 18.5	(0) -	(11)	13.3	
1975	(2) 17.0	(1) 15.4	(1) 7.3	(8)	15.7	
Avg. Ratings	(3) 14.8	(5) 17.0	(3) 8.1	(26)	15.3	

The Philadelphia Eagles

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The Philadelphia Eagles have sold out and locally televised all home games since the enactment of Public Law 93-107. The average number of tickets sold for each game over the past four years has been equivalent to at least 98 percent of the stadium's capacity. Additionally, the Eagles' ticket sales have varied less than 1 percent since 1973, which again reflects the team's success in selling practically all available seats.

Season ticket sales in this period have been equally stable, fluctuating by less than 1 percent over the past three years. At the same time, yearly sales of some 64,000 season tickets guaranteed that at least 98 percent of the available seats were sold before the season began.

It is, therefore readily apparent that despite mixed performances by the Eagles since 1972, there is still a high demand for the Eagles' ticket

Summary of Philadelphia Eagles
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	65,000	65,000	65,954	66,095
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	455,013	453,082 (-.4%)	456,502 (.8%)	455,555 (-.2%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	65,002	64,726	65,215	65,079
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	64,106	64,001 (-.2%)	64,361 (.6%)	64,300 (-.1%)
5. Percentage of games won	.143	.357	.500	.286
6. Divisional standing	5	3	4	5
7. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7

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2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Like most teams, the Eagles experienced a decline in live gate attendance during the first year of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law. However, attendance improved in both 1974 and 1975. In this regard, Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have had a deleterious effect on the Philadelphia Eagles.

As of 1975, only about 7.3 percent of ticket holders to Eagles' games chose not to attend. Total "no shows" have declined from a 1973 high of 44,417 to 33,075 this past season. Average "no shows" have similarly decreased to 4,725 per game. Successful ticket sales and decreasing "no shows" have insured the Philadelphia Eagles the live attendance which the NFL considers vital.

Summary of "No Shows" For
Philadelphia Eagles: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "no shows" (percentage change from previous season)	31,000	44,417 (43.3%)	42,032 (-5.4%)	33,075 (-21.3%)
2. Avg. "no shows" per game	4,429	6,345	6,005	4,725
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	65,002	64,726	65,215	65,079
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6.8%	9.8%	9.2%	7.3%
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7
6. Avg. "no shows" per televised game	0	6,345	6,005	4,725
7. Avg. "no shows" per non-televised game	4,429	0	0	0
8. Percentage of games won	.143	.357	.500	.286
9. Divisional standing	5	3	4	5

Since all of the Philadelphia Eagles' home games were televised during the period that Public Law 93-107 has been in force, the results of the statistical analysis provided in the table below are more difficult to evaluate - at least with regard to the impact of the law. The analysis does provide, however, a representation of those factors which did and did not influence the number of "no shows" experienced by the Philadelphia franchise. Specifically, temperature and precipitation were the only variables which had a direct influence on the Eagles' live gate attendance. As expected, more ticket holders stayed home when the weather was cold and/or wet. Here again, their sensitivity to the weather may partially be attributable to television. That is, fans may be less inclined to attend games in cold weather knowing full well that the contest will be locally televised. However, the relationship between attendance and temperature may have been as equally strong had none of the games been televised. That, of course, depends solely on the individual fan's desire to see the game in person, coupled with his propensity to sit in a cold stadium. Unfortunately, an analysis of such behavior is beyond the scope of this study.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
PHILADELPHIA "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .60147$ $F(7, 20) = 4.31209^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	-.00434	7.790*
Precipitation	.17220	13.985*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00005	.145
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00008	1.075
1973	.04239	.722
1974	.03011	.279
1975	.08482	2.778
Constant	.30933	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .58689$ $F(7, 20) = 4.05900^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-	-
Temperature	-.00441	7.105*
Precipitation	.17461	12.951*
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.00522	.036
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00637	.215
1973	.04393	.744
1974	.01659	.102
1975	.08677	2.464
Constant	.26029	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .58920$ $F(6, 21) = 5.01999^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games ^a	-	-
Temperature	-.00427	7.698*
Precipitation	.17679	15.130*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.13942	.483
1973	.04744	.950
1974	.03429	.427
1975	.08385	2.773
Constant	.26658	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The Philadelphia Eagles retain 15 percent of all concession sales but do not share in stadium parking revenues. As noted, the club's live gate attendance may have been indirectly affected by Public Law 93-107. Moreover, Eagles' concession sales appear to correlate with live gate attendance. Hence, the legislation could have impacted on this source of income, although the losses which resulted from local telecasts would be relatively small. The same could be said of "PRO" magazine sales.

Parking did not appear to be particularly sensitive to live gate attendance. This probably reflects a limited number of available parking spaces at the stadium. If so, the parking authority would have no trouble selling those spaces, even if the games were not sold out.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Philadelphia Eagles: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (9 games)	<u>1973</u> (8 games)	<u>1974</u> (9 games)	<u>1975</u> (9 games)
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$432,699	\$384,373	\$342,227	\$497,386 (45.3%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	63,448	78,932	65,292	53,847 (-17.5%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	50,666	51,362	69,588	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	455,013	453,082 (- .4%)	456,502 (.8%)	455,555 (- .2%)
5. "No shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	31,000	44,417 (43.3%)	42,032 (-5.4%)	33,075 (-21.3%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7

NA - Information was Not Available

* - Total for seven home games

4. Audience Ratings

Television viewers in Philadelphia clearly prefer to watch the Eagles play as opposed to other teams. Audiences for Eagles' games have on the average consisted of approximately 27 out of every 100 homes. As in other NFL cities, when viewers are given a choice of an Eagles game or another NFL contest televised during the same time period, more people choose to watch the home team. Consequently, other NFL games which competed with the Eagles' telecasts reached audiences of only six in every 100 television homes -- less than one-fourth of the persons who chose to view the home team.

When other NFL games were broadcast in different time periods, the average audience for those games was 20.1 percent which is indicative of the popularity of professional football in the Philadelphia area.

Furthermore, the consistently high ratings for locally televised home games (27.9 average rating) suggests the absence of any degree of over-saturation in the Philadelphia market.

Audience Ratings for Philadelphia Eagles Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Eagles</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>					
	<u>Home Games</u>		<u>Away Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(3)	28.6	(1)	35.7	(1)	6.7	(8)	24.4
1974	(2)	29.7	(2)	23.0	(3)	4.6	(7)	18.2
1975	(2)	26.3	(2)	21.9	(2)	6.8	(9)	17.6
Avg. Ratings	(7)	27.9	(5)	26.9	(6)	6.0	(24)	20.1

The St. Louis Cardinals

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The St. Louis Cardinals televised only eight of 21 home games or 38 percent, since the enactment of Public Law 93-107. One home game was locally televised in 1973, four in 1974 and three in 1975. Throughout the past four years, the average number of tickets sold per game has never dropped below 92 percent of the seating capacity of Busch Stadium's -- where the Cardinals play.

Total tickets sold for the four year period remained relatively constant. On the average, 48,955 fans purchased seats to Cardinal games in 1973, the peak year. This figure ebbed in 1974 when 48,351 tickets were sold per game. Last year, an average of 47,676 seats were sold for home games, representing 92 percent of the seating capacity. The later percentage was lower than in 1973 when 98 percent of the available tickets were sold. However, this decrease was partially attributable to the increase in the seating capacity of Busch Stadium from 49,818 in 1973 to 51,342 in 1975.

Season ticket sales fell from 41,332 in 1972 to 37,516 in 1975, a drop of about 10 percent. However, as previously mentioned, total ticket sales remained constant while half of the home games played during the last two years were locally televised. This, indicates that ticket sales have probably been far more sensitive to the team's recent improvement than to Public Law 93-107.

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Summary of St. Louis Cardinals
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	49,818	49,818	51,186	51,342
2. Total seats sold (percentage change from previous season)	337,545	342,685 (1.5%)	338,459 (-1.2%)	333,521 (-1.5%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	48,221	48,955	48,351	47,646
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	41,332	40,672 (-1.6%)	39,006 (-4.1%)	37,516 (-3.8%)
5. Percentage of games won	.286	.286	.714	.786
6. Divisional standing	4	4	1	1
7. Number of televised games	0	1	4	3

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Public Law 93-107 cannot be shown to have had a negative effect on the St. Louis franchise. Indeed "no shows" at Cardinal games have continually declined since 1972, with a total of 38,808 Cardinal ticket holders who chose not to attend games. This figure dropped by 48 percent to 20,091 in 1973. The downward trend continued through 1975 when there were only 17,314 ticket holders who failed to attend games. The percentage of seats sold not showing has likewise declined from 11.5 percent in 1972 to 5 percent in 1975.

Although total "no shows" at Cardinal games have declined, average "no shows" at locally televised games have increased since 1973. Given that more games were broadcast in 1974 and 1975, prospects of television coverage could have influenced such increases.

"No shows" for non-televised games have, on the other hand, declined from 2,977 in 1973 to 1,235 in 1975. Thus, only in the first year of Public Law 93-107's existence did the number of ticket holders not attending blacked-out games exceed the number who failed to attend televised games.

Summary of "No Shows" For
St. Louis Cardinals: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	38,808	20,091 (-48.2%)	20,088 (0%)	17,314 (-13.8%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	5,544	2,870	2,830	2,473
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	48,221	48,955	48,351	47,646
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	11.5%	5.9%	5.9%	5.2%
5. Number of televised games	0	1	4	3
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	-	2,228	3,507	4,125
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	5,544	2,977	2,020	1,235
8. Percentage of games won	.286	.286	.714	.786
9. Divisional standing	4	4	1	1

However, the statistical analyses of St. Louis "no shows" indicate that Public Law 93-107 did not directly affect the number of "no shows." Indeed temperature was the only variable which significantly influenced attendance at the Cardinals' home games. While "no shows" increased in colder weather, locally televised games may have strengthened this relationship. Again, St. Louis fans could have become less inclined to attend games when the temperature fell, given the opportunity to watch the game on television. This would seem to be reflected in the fact that "no shows" at locally televised Cardinal games were generally higher than at blacked-out games. Consequently, Public Law 93-107 could have had an indirect impact on the franchise's live gate attendance. Again, it is not possible to conclusively demonstrate the extent of the impact or, for that matter, its existence, because it is uncertain whether fans take availability of home games on local television stations into consideration when deciding whether or not to attend games when the weather is cold. Perhaps they would not attend in any case. On the other hand, watching a locally televised game in the comfort of one's living room may be a perfectly adequate substitute for sitting in cold weather in order to see a game live.

Even if the inferred indirect relationship between Public Law 93-107 and "no shows" were demonstratable, the impact would in all probability be minimal. Although the Cardinals televised three home games last year, the percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend games was still below the league average. Additionally, attendance has improved since 1973 even though more home games were televised during the past two years.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
ST. LOUIS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .72670$ $F(8, 19) = 6.31505^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.06943	3.800
Temperature	-.00252	23.559*
Precipitation	.05303	1.113
Home Team's win-loss Z	-.00013	3.380
Visiting Team's Win-loss Z	-.00007	2.665
1973	-.01721	.478
1974	-.02136	.480
1975	-.02134	.609
Constant	.29536	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .73022$ $F(8, 19) = 6.42837^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.05323	3.397
Temperature	-.00265	25.896*
Precipitation	.07346	2.277
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02041	3.422
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01280	3.221
1973	-.01658	.452
1974	-.02835	.883
1975	-.02071	.546
Constant	.11209	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .70057$ $F(7, 20) = 6.68494^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.04951	2.276
Temperature	-.00257	23.581*
Precipitation	.05077	.938
Home W-LZ x Visitor's W-LZ	-.12207	2.325
1973	-.02116	.710
1974	-.03731	1.756
1975	-.03335	1.633
Constant	.24010	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The St. Louis Cardinals do not share concession or parking revenues. The figures in the table below indicate that concession sales have increased annually since 1972. "PRO" magazine sales, on the other hand, have fluctuated widely over the four year period. Unfortunately, data on parking revenues was available for 1972 and 1973 only.

It is difficult to draw any conclusions concerning the effect of "no shows" on these revenues. There does appear to be a direct relationship between concession sales and live gate attendance. The same relationship appears to be true with regard to "PRO" sales.

In any event, the number of "no shows" during each of the past three years has been substantially lower than in 1972. This, does not necessarily imply that Public Law 93-107 has had no impact on concession sales. As noted above, the legislation could have had an indirect impact on live gate attendance, although the figures suggest that the magnitude of this effect was probably minimal, if it existed at all. Consequently, the Sports Anti-Blackout Law has seemingly not resulted in serious losses in revenues to the St. Louis Cardinals from the sale of concessions, parking and "PRO" magazine.

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Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for St. Louis Cardinals: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Concessions <u>1/</u> (percentage change from previous season)	\$344,687	\$389,339 (15.6%)	\$392,057	\$432,460 (10.3%)
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	67,165	36,810 (.45%)	62,419 <u>2/</u> (70%)	52,247 (-16.3%)
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	57,796	64,613 (11.8%)	NA	NA
4. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	337,545	342,685 (1.5%)	338,459 (-1.2%)	333,521 (-1.5%)
5. "No shows" (percentage change from previous season)	38,808	20,091 (-48.2%)	20,033 (0%)	17,314 (-13.8%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	1	4	3

NA - Information was Not Available

1/ The figures used were supplied by the Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation (in charge of concessions). The Cardinals did not provide the Commission with the amount of revenues earned from the sale of concessions during 1975.

2/ The price of "PRO" magazine in St. Louis was only \$0.50 preceeding the 1974 season. It was raised to \$1.00 thereafter.

4. Audience Ratings

As in most NFL cities, television viewers in St. Louis prefer to watch the home team play as opposed to other NFL clubs. On the average, almost 29 in every 100 television households in the St. Louis area have watched broadcasts of the Cardinals' games since 1973. According to November audience figures from ARB, the Cardinals' attracted larger audiences in 1974 and 1975 than in 1973. This can probably be attributed to the team's first place finish in the NFC's Central division in 1974 and again last year. Consequently, viewer interest has increased.

Other games broadcast during the same time period as Cardinals' games received a much smaller audience (4.7 percent). When other NFL games did not conflict with Cardinals telecasts, there were on the average 17 in every 100 television households viewing. It is evident that there is considerably less interest, among St. Louis fans, in games in which the Cardinals do not participate.

Three home-game telecasts were included in this survey with an average audience rating of 30.7. Thus, Public Law 93-107 has benefited St. Louis television viewers by increasing NFL coverage to include home games.

Audience Ratings for St. Louis Cardinals: 1973-1975

	<u>Cardinals</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>					
	<u>Home Games</u>		<u>Away Games</u>		<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(0)	---	(2)	20.4	(2)	6.5	(10)	16.7
1974	(2)	32.2	(2)	34.0	(2)	3.9	(9)	16.0
1975	(1)	<u>29.1</u>	(2)	<u>25.0</u>	(2)	<u>3.8</u>	(9)	<u>18.4</u>
Avg.								
Ratings	(3)	30.7	(6)	26.5	(6)	4.7	(28)	17.0

The San Francisco Forty-Niners

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

The San Francisco Forty-Niners locally televised four of seven home games during the first year in which Public Law 93-107 was in effect. Since then, all home games have been blacked out in the Bay area, reflecting a decline in ticket sales in both 1974 and 1975, which coincided with an increase in the seating capacity of Candlestick Park from 60,000 in 1973 to 61,249 in 1974.

Total ticket sales rose by .9 percent in 1973 but declined by 10 percent in 1974 and by 11 percent in 1975. Season ticket sales followed a similar pattern, increasing by 3 percent in 1973 while declining by 14 percent in 1974 and by 13 percent in 1975. Only 68 percent of the available seats in the stadium, therefore, were being purchased on a seasonal basis in 1975. This was surprising in that despite the Forty-Niners improved won-loss record and divisional standing in 1974, total ticket sales for 1975 were reduced. Nevertheless, since no home games have been televised in either 1974 or 1975, fans were probably not anticipating the lifting of the blackout in deciding whether to buy tickets to San Francisco games. Therefore, it would probably not be appropriate to attribute the franchise's loss in ticket sales to the Sports Anti-Blackout Law.

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Summary of San Francisco Forty-Niners
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	60,000	60,000	61,249	61,252
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	410,811	414,517 (.9%)	372,432 (-10.2%)	330,430 (-11.3%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	58,687	59,217	53,205	47,204
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	53,876	55,506 (3%)	47,649 (-14.2%)	41,409 (-13.1%)
5. Percentage of games won	.571	.357	.429	.357
6. Divisional standing	1	4	2	2
7. Number of televised games	0	4	0	0

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

As noted above, Public Law 93-107 resulted in telecasts of Forty-Niners home games in the 1973 season only. With four out of seven games broadcast that year, "no shows" increased dramatically (about 204 percent). The San Francisco experience is comparable to that of most NFL teams during the first year of the law. "No shows" generally increased in 1973.

Total "no shows" for 1974, however, declined by 25 percent, representing one in every ten ticketholders. A decrease of 6.9 percent in "no shows" coupled with an 11.3 percent ticket sales decline at last year's games produced the largest relative measure of "no shows" for any of the past four seasons. That is, about 12.2 percent of all fans who purchased tickets to the Forty-Niners games decided not to attend in 1975. Given that no home games were televised in 1975, the latter increase cannot be attributed to Public Law 93-107. As the table below indicates, fewer relative "no shows" were recorded for 1973 when four games were broadcast than for 1975 with no telecasts.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
San Francisco Forty-Niners: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	16,464	49,963 (203.5%)	37,685 (-24.6%)	40,269 (6.9%)
2. Avg. "No Shows" per game	2,352	7,138	5,384	5,753
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	58,687	59,217	53,205	47,204
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	4%	12.1%	10.1%	12.2%
5. Number of televised games	0	4	0	0
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	0	7,190	0	0
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	2,352	7,068	5,384	5,753
8. Percentage of games won	.571	.357	.429	.357
9. Divisional standing	1	4	2	2

The analysis of the Forty-Niners' live gate attendance suggests the lack of a relationship between "no shows" and locally televised games. That is, live gate attendance did not decline significantly when the local blackout was lifted. However, attendance was influenced by precipitation and the quality of the game.

As expected, a larger number of ticket holders failed to attend games when it rained. Conversely, live gate attendance was generally high when the fans expected to see a good game, as reflected by the won-loss record and divisional standing of the visiting team.

Finally, the results of the analysis indicated that "no shows" were significantly higher in 1973 and 1974 than in 1972. Again, these seasonal

differences are not attributable to other factors defined in the model such as precipitation and the quality of the game. Hence, they probably reflect elements which are not identified in the statistical model but which nevertheless had a differential effect on the number of "no shows" for each of the seasons. In any event, there is nothing in the analysis which suggests that Public Law 93-107 had an adverse impact on the Forty-Niners' live gate attendance.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
SAN FRANCISCO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .65377$ $F(8, 19) = 4.48458^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02833	.657
Temperature	-.00068	.451
Precipitation	.07858	6.900*
Home Team's win-loss %	-.00003	.072
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00013	6.998*
1973	.11089	9.854*
1974	.12001	10.604*
1975	.10546	9.314*
Constant	.12200	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold

 $R^2 = .70227$ $F(8, 19) = 5.60193^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02466	.546
Temperature	-.00142	2.375
Precipitation	.05149	3.156
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00953	.960
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.03273	14.410*
1973	.10240	8.902*
1974	.12406	19.374*
1975	.12010	21.054
Constant	-.01633	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales

 $R^2 = .59072$ $F(7, 20) = 4.12368^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.02057	.316
Temperature	-.00053	.248
Precipitation	.07865	6.177*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.18868	6.942*
1973	.10107	8.389*
1974	.09919	11.758*
1975	.09210	10.271*
Constant	.08733	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value

3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking, and "PRO" Magazine

The San Francisco Forty-Niners do not share concession or parking revenues. Here again, it was difficult to evaluate the impact of live gate attendance on the ancillary sources of income because the figures reflect total sales at different numbers of games.

The Forty-Niners have lifted the blackout on only four home games, all of which were played in 1973. "No shows" increased that year as did concession sales. Parking receipts may have fallen off slightly. However, given that Public Law 93-107 did not have a significant impact on the team's live gate attendance, revenues from these two sources were not seriously affected by the legislation.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine and Parking for San Francisco Forty-Niners: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (11 games)	<u>1973</u> (10 games)	<u>1974</u> (10 games)	<u>1975</u> (7 games)
1. Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$700,369	\$750,070	\$747,472 (-0.3%)	\$ NA
2. "PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	NA	103,657	89,629 (-13.5%)	63,981
3. Parking (percentage change from previous season)	106,947	84,163	83,789 (-0.4%)	NA
4. Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	410,811	414,517 (.9%)	372,432 (-10.2%)	330,430 (-11.3%)
5. "No shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	16,464	49,963 (203.5%)	37,685 (-24.6%)	40,269 (6.9%)
6. Number of televised home games	0	4	0	0

NA - Information was Not Available

* - Total for seven home games.

4. Audience Ratings

The San Francisco-Oakland television market is similar to New York, in that two teams share the allegiance of professional football fans. This also accounts for the relatively small differences between ratings for the Forty-Niners and those for other NFL teams which of course includes the Oakland Raiders.

Since 1973, the Forty-Niners' away games have attracted an average audience rating of 19.4. Ratings for those games have also decreased during each of the past three seasons which probably reflects the fact that the team has not played well.

The Oakland Raiders, on the other hand, have won four consecutive divisional championships and have attracted large television audiences. This largely accounts for the relatively small differences between ratings for the Forty-Niners and other NFL teams. For example, two competing games in 1973 and two non-competing contests in 1975 involved the Raiders which undoubtedly increased the average rating for games in these categories.

In any event, the Forty-Niners' audiences are large when compared with audiences for other types of programming aired on a Sunday afternoon. Additionally, the figures below clearly indicate that San Francisco fans prefer to watch the Forty-Niners as opposed to other NFL teams, with the exception of the Raiders. Hence, Public Law 93-107 has been beneficial to Bay area residents since it has provided for additional locally televised games of both teams.

Audience Ratings for San Francisco Forty-Niners Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Forty-Niners</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>					
	<u>Home</u>	<u>Games</u>	<u>Away</u>	<u>Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>	<u>Non-Competing</u>		
1973	(0)	--	(3)	22.7*	(2)	13.9	(7)	21.4
1974	(0)	--	(2)	19.6	(1)	10.0	(9)	16.2
1975	<u>(0)</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>(2)</u>	<u>15.9</u>	<u>(1)</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>(11)</u>	<u>20.5</u>
Avg.								
Ratings	(0)	---	(7)	19.4	(4)	10.7	(27)	19.4

*Includes one simulcast game carried on CBS November 4, 1973 with Oakland and San Francisco sharing the average rating.

The Washington Redskins

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Since Public Law 93-107 was adopted, the Washington Redskins have sold out all tickets and subsequently televised all home games. The average number of seats sold per game and the number of season tickets sold exceeded Kennedy Stadium's seating capacity of 50,000 in both 1972 and 1973. Consequently, the Redskins increased the number of available seats to 54,380 and 55,004 in 1974 and 1975, respectively.

Total ticket sales have increased accordingly from 365,346 in 1972 to 380,527 in 1975. Season ticket sales have also increased in each of the last four years. Specifically, sales were 51,076 or 102 percent of capacity in 1972; 51,969 or 104 percent of capacity in 1973; 52,049, or 96 percent, of the enlarged capacity in 1974 and 52,400, or 95 percent, of capacity in 1975.

It would appear that Public Law 93-107 has not had a deleterious impact on Redskins ticket sales, even though the law has triggered a lifting of the blackout on all home games played since 1973. Fans in the Washington area appear to be willing to purchase tickets regardless of the likelihood of being able to watch all home games on television. The demand for seats may be partially attributable to the improved quality of the team over the past few years.

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Summary of Washington Redskins
Ticket Sales: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Stadium capacity	50,000	50,000	54,380	55,004
2. Total tickets sold (percentage change from previous season)	365,346	374,993 (2.6%)	375,003 (0%)	380,527 (1.5%)
3. Avg. seats sold per game	52,192	53,570	53,571	54,361
4. Season ticket sales (percentage change from previous season)	51,076	51,969 (1.8%)	52,049 (.2%)	52,400 (.7%)
5. Percentage of games won	.786	.714	.714	.571
6. Divisional standing	1	1	2	3
7. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

Washington has had very few "no shows" over the past four years despite the fact that all home games were televised since 1973. In 1972, before the adoption of Public Law 93-107 only 3,000 ticket holders failed to attend all seven home games. This amounted to an average of 428 "no shows" per game, which was less than 1 percent of all tickets sold.

When Public Law 93-107 was passed, Redskins "no shows" increased to 8,906, or 2.4 percent of all tickets sold. In 1974, total "no shows" fell to 3,333, or .9 percent of all tickets sold. There were 8,499 "no shows" last year which was equivalent to 2.2 percent of total ticket sales.

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Summary of "No Shows" For
Washington Redskins: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
1. Total "No Shows" (percentage change from previous season)	3,000	8,906 (196.8%)	3,333 (-62.6%)	8,499 (155%)
2. Avg. "No Shows per game	429	1,272	476	1,214
3. Avg. number of seats sold per game	52,192	53,570	53,571	54,361
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	.8%	2.4%	.9%	2.2%
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7
6. Avg. "No Shows" per televised game	0	1,272	476	1,214
7. Avg. "No Shows" per non-televised game	429	0	0	0
8. Percentage of games won	.786	.714	.714	.571
9. Divisional standing	1	1	2	3

As was the case with other teams which have televised all or nearly all of their home games, it is more difficult to assess the impact of Public Law 93-107 on Washington's live gate attendance. The results of the regression analysis do indicate, however, that "no shows" were not significantly higher when home games were locally televised. Consequently, Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have affected attendance.

Weather did have a significant influence on "no shows." Not surprisingly, fewer ticket holders were willing to attend the game in cold and/or wet weather. Moreover, their decision did not appear to be influenced by the opportunity to see the game on television, as reflected by the very small number of "no shows" at nearly all home games played since 1973. Hence, Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have had a significant effect on live gate attendance at the Redskins home games.

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RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
WASHINGTON "NO SHOWS": 1972-1975Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .81941$
 $F(7, 20) = 12.96360^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	.00765	.641
Temperature	-.00070	11.702*
Precipitation	.06666	30.043*
Home Team's win-loss %	.00003	.675
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00001	1.686
1973	.00242	.093
1974 ^a	-	-
1975	.00590	.565
Constant	.02669	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
 $R^2 = .82128$
 $F(7, 20) = 13.12931^*$

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-	-
Temperature	-.00071	12.450*
Precipitation	.06818	30.056*
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.00572	.821
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00224	1.247
1973	.00725	.851
1974	.00836	.615
1975	.01685	1.951
Constant	.04738	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
 $R^2 = .81329$
 $F(6, 21) = 15.24561^*$

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>F Values</u>
Televised Games	-	-
Temperature	-.00072	12.777*
Precipitation	.06486	29.760*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.01978	1.760
1973	.00580	.571
1974	.00091	.014
1975	.00735	.922
Constant	.05534	

*Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence

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3. Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, Parking,
and "PRO" Magazine

The Washington Redskins do not share in concession or parking revenues from RFK stadium. However, information provided by the Redskins' concessionaire indicate that revenues have increased each year while all home games have been telecast. No loss of income to these enterprises can be determined to have occurred, therefore, as a result of "no shows" at regular season games.

Analysis of "PRO" magazine revenues is made difficult due to the different number of games used in the tables. On the basis of the 1974 and 1975 seasons, however, an increase of 6.3 percent occurred despite a 155 percent increase in "no shows." It would seem, therefore, that Public Law 93-107 has not resulted in losses of these revenues to the Washington franchise.

Revenues Earned from the Sale of Concessions, "PRO" Magazine
and Parking for Washington Redskins: 1972-1975

	<u>1972</u> (10 games)	<u>1973</u> (11 games)	<u>1974</u> (7 games)	<u>1975</u> (7 games)
Concessions (percentage change from previous season)	\$461,125	\$497,125	\$372,975	\$401,881 <u>1/</u> (8%)
"PRO" magazine (percentage change from previous season)	101,002	110,613	74,345	79,012 (6.3%)
Parking (percentage change from previous season)	164,570	193,570	214,991	NA
Total tickets sold* (percentage change from previous season)	365,346	374,993 (2.6%)	375,003 (0%)	380,527 (1.5%)
"No shows"* (percentage change from previous season)	3,000	8,906 (196.8%)	3,333 (-62.6%)	8,499 (155.0%)
Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7

NA - Information was Not Available.

* - Totals for seven home games.

/ Information supplied by B&B Caterers rather than Redskins.

4. Audience Ratings

The Washington Redskins appear to be quite popular with Washington television audiences. The strength of this popularity can be seen in the difference between an average Redskin game audience of some 40 out of 100 homes and the 4.1 audience rating for other NFL games broadcast during the same hours; ten times as many people prefer to watch the home team.

At the same time, NFL contests that do not compete with Redskin telecasts have average audiences of some 20 percent of the viewing public. This indicates that all professional football is quite popular with Washington area viewers, although telecasts of the home team are still more than twice as popular as other games.

Five home games telecasts resulting from Public Law 93-107 were included in the ARB survey. These games received as large a percentage of television viewers as did Redskins' away games. The Sports Anti-Blackout Law has been beneficial to the preferences of these viewers who now enjoy more Redskins' telecasts than in the years prior to 1973.

Audience Ratings for Washington Redskins' Games: 1973-1975

	<u>Redskins</u>		<u>Other Teams</u>			
	<u>Home Games</u>	<u>Away Games</u>	<u>Competing</u>		<u>Non-Competing</u>	
1973	(2) 34.1	(3) 44.0	(1) 4.3	(9)		22.8
1974	(1) 45.3	(3) 38.3	(3) 3.8	(7)		19.6
1975	(2) 44.4	(2) 38.6	(0) ---	(10)		16.7
Avg. Ratings	(5) 41.3	(8) 40.3	(4) 4.1	(26)		19.7

4. The Effect of Public Law 93-107 on NFL Playoff Games:
1973-1975

Since the enactment of Public Law 93-107 in 1973, only four of 21, or 19 percent, of the NFL's playoff games have been blacked out in local markets. The four include Cincinnati at Miami and Los Angeles at Dallas in 1973, Washington at Los Angeles in 1974 and St. Louis at Los Angeles in 1975. All other playoff games were locally televised pursuant to Public Law 93-107 with the exception of the Super Bowl played at Miami in 1973. Although that game was not sold out, the local blackout was lifted voluntarily.

Public Law 93-107 does not appear to have had a substantial impact on attendance at the playoffs. While "no shows" were generally higher at locally televised games in 1973 and 1975, the reverse was true in 1974. However, live gate attendance at all the post-season contests has remained relatively high over the past three seasons.

For example, only 5.1 percent of all ticket holders to all the seven playoff games in 1973 failed to attend. Similarly, 1974 playoffs "no shows" were equivalent to 3.2 percent of all tickets sold, while only 3.8 percent failed to attend the 1975 playoffs.

These figures as well as those listed in the table below indicate that attendance is generally higher for divisional championship games and the Super Bowl, than it is at regular season games. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that Public Law 93-107 has not imposed an undue hardship on those teams which have made the playoffs.

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SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" AT NFL PLAYOFF GAMES: 1973-1975

1973 PLAYOFFS

<u>Conference Teams</u>	<u>Locally Televised</u>	<u>Seating Capacity</u>	<u>Seats Sold</u>	<u>"No Shows"</u>
AFC				
Pittsburgh at Oakland	YES	54,071	52,646	2,552
Cincinnati at Miami	NO	80,050	78,928	4,277
Oakland at Miami	YES	80,050	79,326	4,941
NFC				
Washington at Minnesota	YES	47,693	48,040	1,975
Los Angeles at Dallas	NO	65,000	63,272	1,191
Minnesota at Dallas	YES	65,000	64,422	4,734
SUPER BOWL				
Minnesota vs. Miami (at Miami)	YES	80,050	71,882	3,740
TOTAL:		<u>471,891</u>	<u>458,515</u>	<u>23,410</u>
<u>AVERAGE</u>				
All Games		67,412	65,502	3,344
Locally Televised Games		65,368	63,263	3,588
Blacked-out Games		72,525	71,103	2,735

1974 PLAYOFFS

<u>Conference Teams</u>	<u>Locally Televised</u>	<u>Seating Capacity</u>	<u>Seats Sold</u>	<u>"No Shows"</u>
AFC				
Buffalo at Pittsburgh	YES	50,112	49,841	1,911
Miami at Oakland	YES	54,020	53,023	1,203
Pittsburgh at Oakland	YES	54,004	53,800	489
NFC				
Washington at Los Angeles	NO	92,572	77,925	2,996
St. Louis at Minnesota	YES	48,503	48,150	3,796
Los Angeles at Minnesota	YES	48,503	48,444	1,040
SUPER BOWL				
Pittsburgh vs. Minnesota (at New Orleans)	YES	80,997	80,997	1,932
TOTAL:		<u>428,711</u>	<u>412,180</u>	<u>13,367</u>
<u>AVERAGE</u>				
All Games		61,244	58,883	1,910
Locally Televised Games		56,023	55,709	1,729
Non-Televised Games		92,572	77,925	2,996

1975 PLAYOFFS

<u>Conference Teams</u>	<u>Locally Televised</u>	<u>Seating Capacity</u>	<u>Seats Sold</u>	<u>"No Shows"</u>	
AFC					
Baltimore at Pittsburgh	YES	50,112	49,557	937	
Cincinnati at Oakland	YES	54,037	53,034	955	
Oakland at Pittsburgh	YES	50,112	50,609	1,506	
NFC					
Dallas at Minnesota	YES	48,390	48,050	1,916	
St. Louis at Los Angeles	NO	92,570	73,459	1,506	
Dallas at Los Angeles	YES	91,038	88,919	6,555	
SUPER BOWL					
Pittsburgh vs. Dallas (at Miami)	YES	80,045	80,197	3,305	
		TOTAL:	<u>466,305</u>	<u>443,825</u>	<u>16,680</u>
AVERAGE					
All Games		66,615	63,404	2,383	
Locally Televised Games		62,300	61,727	2,529	
Blacked-out Games		92,570	73,459	1,506	

D. COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES

From April of 1975 to April of 1976, the Federal Communications Commission received a total of 11 complaints and inquiries regarding the broadcast of professional football games. This number was down sharply from last year's total of 25 complaints and inquiries. The most common type of football complaint concerned the territorial extent of the permissible blackout. Last year, the Commission received a total of 16 letters regarding the territorial extent of the blackout, a majority of which (13) were from the Fort Myers/Naples, Florida area. This year the Commission received only four complaints directly dealing with the territorial extent of the blackout; one from a San Diego resident protesting the blackout of Los Angeles Rams' home games, one from a Fort Myers resident protesting the blackout of the Miami Dolphins' home games, and two from Toledo residents protesting the blackouts of the Detroit Lions' home games. All four objected to the inclusion of their respective communities in their "local team's" blackout area.

The statute to which these complaints relate is not Public Law 93-107, but rather is Public Law 87-331 (1961), which was codified in 15 U.S.C. §§1291-1295 (1970). Public Law 93-107 concerns itself only with those games which are sold out 72 hours in advance. It does not deal with the extent of the geographical area a team may blackout when its home games have not been sold out by that 72-hour mark.

As for the remainder of the complaints and inquiries received concerning Public Law 93-107's application to professional football, all of

the letters requested the broadcast of additional football games. Three letters were received from residents of the Miami area which were critical of the blackout of the Miami Dolphins' home games generally and the Dolphins' management specifically. One letter suggested that the 72-hour sellout standard be changed to 24 or 12 hours since the team owner received the same amount of money for a sellout no matter when the game became officially sold out. Two other letters questioned the fairness of applying the same standard for determining sellouts in cities with relatively large populations and modest-sized stadia (New York and Philadelphia) and smaller cities with large stadia (Miami). A similar letter was received from a resident of Buffalo, who indicated his displeasure at what he characterized as an inequitable situation which discriminated against the citizens of Buffalo. The complaint suggested that Public Law 93-107 be amended to assist fans in those medium-sized cities, like Buffalo, with comparatively large stadia by changing the standard for determining a sellout. The proposal would declare a sellout when the number of seats sold equaled the number of seats available for sale in the smallest stadium in the league.

Two letters were received from residents of the Philadelphia area who complained that they were not able to receive a 4:00 p.m. game on those dates when the Philadelphia Eagles played a televised game at home. It was explained that under present contracts between the NFL and the television networks, only one game may be broadcast by each network affiliate in the city of a league team on those days when that team is playing at home. This limitation

applies irrespective of whether the home team's game comprises one of the two games which are broadcast.

One letter was received from a Chicago Bears' fan who complained that the Bears management was attempting to avoid compliance with Public Law 93-107 by refusing to sell season tickets and by raising the seating capacity at Soldiers Field, home field of the Bears, from 55,753 to 57,453 by the addition of "poor-view seats" on the extreme corners of the stadium. An investigation of these charges revealed that there apparently had been no violation of Public Law 93-107. Soldiers Field is operated by the Chicago Park District, which must approve any addition or deletion from the seating capacity. Prior to 1970, when the Bears began playing their home games there, Soldiers Field had a seating capacity of over 87,000. However, in 1970 the stadium was refurbished. Astro turf was introduced, the playing field was moved 30 yards to the south, and portable bleachers were placed in the heretofore open north end of the stadium. Since 1970, when the seating capacity at the stadium was 55,701, it has been raised to 55,753 prior to the 1974 season, and again raised to 57,453 prior to the 1975 season. The most recent rise in seating capacity involved the sale of seats on the extreme northeast and northwest sides of the stadium. However, before offering these seats for sale the Bears had to apply to the Park District, which in turn had to approve the Bears' request. Once the Park District approved the use of these seats, the seats became available for sale by any of the stadium's tenants. No proof has been offered to show that the Bears sold those seats this season in order to avoid compliance with Public Law 93-107.

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One telephone inquiry was received from a local Washington, D.C. newspaper requesting information regarding Public Law 93-107's application to the Washington Redskins' decision to raise the seating capacity at Kennedy Stadium, home field of the Redskins, from 54,380 to 55,400 by adding spectator seats at field level. Since these seats had a partially obstructed view, it was rumored in the Washington, D. C. press that the Redskins management had added the seats purely to evade the anti-blackout law by making sell-outs more difficult. It was explained to the caller that on the basis of publicly known facts, it did not appear that the Redskins management was attempting to avoid compliance with Public Law 93-107. Kennedy Stadium is operated by the District of Columbia Armory Board which must approve any addition to the stadium's seating capacity. Kennedy Stadium is one of the smaller stadiums in the NFL, and the Redskins have a lengthy waiting list to buy season tickets to their games. Therefore, although these additional seats provided a relatively poor view of the action on the field, they were sold for every one of the Redskin 1975 home games within the required time period. As a result, all of the Redskins home games were televised in the Washington, D. C. area.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Televised Games and Ticket Sales

Public Law 93-107 has resulted in a significant increase in local television coverage of most of the 26 member clubs of the NFL. In 1973, the first year in which the Sports Anti-Blackout Law went into effect, 109 of 182 regular season games were televised in the home teams' territories. A total of 86 home games were locally televised in 1974. Last year, that number declined to 75.

The decrease in total ticket sales in 1974 and 1975 did not appear to be attributable to Public Law 93-107. Indeed, the seasonal decreases in total ticket sales were largely due to a decline in the number of season tickets sold. However, the analysis of season ticket sales demonstrated that their sales increased when the number of home games locally televised during the preceding season increased. It would appear from the analysis that Public Law 93-107 has had a positive impact on season ticket sales. The analysis further demonstrated that season ticket sales were positively influenced by the teams' won-loss records in the preceding season as well as the size of the population of the market in which the franchise was located. It is reasonable to conclude from these findings that the NFL's total ticket sales have not been seriously affected by the Sports Anti-Blackout Law.

2. "No Shows": Summary and Analysis

The results of empirical analyses of the live gate attendance at games of each of the 26 NFL clubs indicated that four teams - the Atlanta Falcons, Dallas Cowboys, Miami Dolphins and the Los Angeles Rams experienced

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significant increase in the number of "no shows" when their games were locally televised. Furthermore, these increases were independent of other factors which influenced live gate attendance, and as a result, were directly attributable to Public Law 93-107. It should also be noted, however, that other factors besides televised games also accounted for "no shows." For example, attendance was also influenced by weather. That is, a larger number of ticket holders stayed home when the weather was bad, regardless of whether or not those games were carried on local television stations.

"No shows" were particularly notable in Miami and Atlanta. During the 1973 season when all seven of the Dolphins' home games were locally televised, 21 percent of all ticket holders failed to attend games. In 1974, three games were locally televised and 16.4 percent of all ticket holders failed to attend games. Last year, none of the team's home games were telecast locally and the percentage of ticket holders who chose not to attend those games fell to 8.5 percent. Atlanta "no shows" also increased when home games were locally televised. All seven home games were locally televised in 1973 and 1974. "No shows" were equivalent to 15.8 percent of total tickets sold in 1973 and 35.7 percent in 1974. Last year no home games were locally televised, but 19 percent of all tickets sold still went unused. It is not readily apparent why these two particular teams were differentially affected by Public Law 93-107.

Although Public Law 93-107 has also adversely affected attendance at Dallas and Los Angeles, the problem has been of lesser significance in both instances. During each of the past three seasons, the percentages of Cowboy ticket holders who failed to attend games has been lower than the league average. Specifically, "no shows at televised games amounted to 8.9 percent of seats sold in 1973, and 5.3 percent of seats sold in 1975. (No home games were televised

in 1974.) Furthermore, the Cowboys have locally televised only four of 21 home games played since the enactment of Public Law 93-107.

Los Angeles has locally televised only one home game since 1973. The significant impact of Public Law 93-107 is reflected in the 21,649 fans who failed to attend that particular game. While the legislation could similarly affect attendance at other locally televised games, it is highly unlikely that the Rams will be able to sell all 91,000 available seats in the L.A. Coliseum for many games. Hence, Public Law 93-107 does not appear to pose a serious threat to live gate attendance of this particular franchise.

The results of the analyses further indicated that the live gate attendance at home games of eight additional NFL teams - Chicago, Denver, Green Bay, New England, Oakland, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and St. Louis - appear to have been indirectly affected by Public Law 93-107. In each instance, "no shows" significantly increased when the weather was cold and/or wet. It is conceivable that the fans' unwillingness to attend games under these conditions could have been influenced by local telecasts. Specifically, fans seemed less inclined to attend games in bad weather when given the opportunity to see those games on television, than when those contests were not locally televised. Unfortunately, there is no way to differentiate the effect of weather from that of locally televised games, since that relationship depends on the fans' preference to watch the game in person, as opposed to their unwillingness to sit in a cold and/or wet stadium. An assessment of this type was beyond the scope of the study.

Moreover, all of the teams, with the exception of Chicago, enjoyed relatively high gate attendance. That is, the percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend home games of the remaining seven teams was below the league

average (with the exception of Philadelphia's 1973 season). The high number of "no shows" at Chicago is probably not entirely due to the legislation. Many fans would have likely stayed home in bad weather regardless of whether or not the game was locally televised. Furthermore, "no shows" at last year's locally televised Bears' games were actually lower than the number of "no shows" at blacked-out home games. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that Public Law 93-107 has not posed a serious threat to the live gate attendance of those teams which appear to have been indirectly affected by the legislation.

Finally there is no evidence to suggest that the Sports Anti-Blackout Law has significantly affected the live gate attendance of the remaining 14 NFL clubs. This is especially evident for 1975 when the percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend blacked-out games (i.e., 9.6 percent) exceeded the percentage who failed to attend locally televised contests (i.e., 7.1 percent).

Public Law 93-107 has also resulted in a diminution of revenues earned from the sale of concessions, parking and "PRO" magazine to the extent that locally televised games may have adversely affected a team's live gate attendance. These losses do not appear to have been substantial except in the cases of Miami and Atlanta. Since the legislation has apparently had little or no effect on attendance at home games of other teams, their concession sales have also remained relatively unaffected by Public Law 93-107.

Parking revenues which usually accrue to Municipal authorities and are used to finance stadium facilities also appeared to not be adversely affected. The parking capacity at nearly all NFL stadia is generally much smaller than that which would be needed to handle all the automobiles of fans who would wish to drive to the game. Thus, even if a team experienced a large number of "no shows," the demand for stadium parking spaces would very likely exceed the available supply.

4. Audience Ratings

The analysis of the impact of Public Law 93-107 on professional football indicates that NFL telecasts are one of the most, if not the single most, popular type of programming on television today. On the average, about 30 percent of all households in markets which support NFL franchises watch their home team's televised games. It is further apparent that most fans clearly prefer to watch the home team's televised games as opposed to games involving other NFL teams. This is particularly true when viewers are able to choose between the two. To illustrate, games involving other teams which were televised at the same time as were the home team games, but on a different network, were viewed in only 6 or 7 percent of all households in the market as compared with an average 30 percent who watched the home team's televised games.

Games of other NFL teams which did not compete with the home teams' televised contests were viewed by about 19 percent of all households in all 25 markets which support an NFL franchise. It is therefore apparent that televised games of most home teams attract substantially larger audiences than do televised games involving other NFL teams.

Moreover, these findings are indicative of the enormous popularity of football. Most NFL games are, of course, played on Sunday afternoons. Other types of programming aired by network affiliated television stations during this time are usually viewed by only 6 or 7 percent of all television households. Prime time programming (excluding Monday Night Football) attracts larger audiences. But even here, the audience tuned into a particular network affiliated station between 7:00 and 11:00 p.m. generally averages out to only 20 percent of all households in the market. In light of the wide audience appeal of telecasts of home team football games, it can be concluded that Public Law 93-107 has had a substantial public interest benefit in making significantly more of these games

available to televised viewers.

Local radio stations which have purchased the rights to broadcast local games have suffered losses in listenership and subsequent advertising as a result of Public Law 93-107. This is reflected in the fact that many NFL teams have paid radio stations rebates when home games were locally televised. Moreover, these losses in revenue are largely borne by individual teams and are not recouped, at least immediately, from television royalties.

Nevertheless, it is highly probable that these losses will eventually be offset by additional revenues accruing from network television contracts with the NFL. Furthermore, all local radio stations which hold the rights to NFL games appear to be doing quite well financially. Hence, they are in no way dependent on NFL games in order to earn a reasonable return on their capital investment. In this regard, the impact of Public Law 93-107 on radio revenues is of no great consequence.

THE WORLD FOOTBALL LEAGUE

The World Football League did not recuperate from the financial losses sustained during its first year of operation. By October of 1976, the WFL folded, declared bankruptcy and released its players.

No contact was ever made by the WFL in response to this year's Commission inquiries. Given the League's lack of sellouts in 1974-75 and continuing poor ticket sales in 1976, it is unlikely that Public Law 93-107 had any effect on the World Football League during its short-lived existence.

III. PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL

A. INTRODUCTION

In his October 31, 1975 appearance before the House Subcommittee on Communications, Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball, stated that Professional Baseball's experience with Public Law 93-107 had not indicated any impact on the game. He further stressed that Baseball had no factual basis to oppose an extension of the blackout legislation. In response to a question from the subcommittee, Commissioner Kuhn indicated that Baseball approved of the legislation. However, because conditions might change materially in the future, Kuhn requested that Congress place a terminal date on any new legislation, "so that professional sports might have an opportunity in the future to present additional relevant information to the Congress." ^{1/}

The Commissioner's October 31, 1975 testimony contrasted with his testimony before the same House subcommittee two years earlier. During that 1973 appearance, Professional Baseball opposed all anti-blackout legislation "on principle". Kuhn stated that there was a potential that such legislation might undermine gate receipts in certain situations.

B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107

As in the previous years in which Public Law 93-107 was in effect, the only league television contract (as defined in Section 331 (c)(2) of the Communications Act) involving professional baseball was that with the National

^{1/} Hearings on H.R. 9566 Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, ser. 47, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 138.

Broadcasting Company, pursuant to which the World Series, the National and American League Championship Series, the All Star Game, the Saturday afternoon "Games of the Week" and 15 mid-season Monday Night Games were nationally televised. The contract required NBC to telecast the World Series and All Star games nationally without any blackouts and without regard to sell outs. In 1973, 1974 and 1975 these games were not, in fact, blacked out in any area of the country. Moreover, the 1973, 1974 and 1975 League Championship Series were televised locally although not required by the contract.^{2/} Thus, the provisions of Public Law 93-107 did not apply to any of these games during the past three seasons.

In 1974, all but one of the Monday night games and all Saturday "Games of the Week" telecast by NBC were blacked out in the home territories of both teams playing in such games, as required by the league contract. In each case, a back-up game between two other major league teams was telecast in the two cities affected. None of these games were sold-out in advance of game time. The Blackout was voluntarily lifted on the single locally televised Monday game. That game was played in Atlanta on April 8, 1974 and was of high interest to local fans hoping to see Hank Aaron hit his record breaking 715th home run.^{3/} Thus with respect to these games, there were no instances in which the provisions of Public Law 93-107 applied.

In 1975, there were also no instances in which the provisions of Public Law 93-107 applied to require a sold-out home game to be made available to a local television station. There were no sellouts of any of the network of any of the network televised Saturday "Games of the Week," or the Monday Night Games.

^{2/} "The World Series, the Playoff Games, and the All Star Game...pursuant to a long standing Baseball policy, were shown on the home team's local television stations." April 15, 1976 letter from James F. Fitzpatrick to Chairman Wiley p. 2.

^{3/} It is unclear whether Public Law 93-107 would have applied had not the Braves

C. COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES

The Commission received only two letters dealing with Public Law 93-107's application to the broadcast of baseball games as compared with four letters in the previous year. Both of the letters dealt with NBC's decision not to broadcast all of the Major League playoff games. Specifically, the letters complained that NBC had failed to carry all of the playoff games. Specifically, the letters complained that NBC had failed to carry all of the playoff games between the Boston Red Sox and Oakland A's even though the games were sold out in advance. It was explained to the complainants that there was no obligation to broadcast these particular games imposed by Public Law 93-107, since their broadcast was not prevented by any contract or agreement. Rather, it was a programming decision of the network not to televise all of the playoff games. The Commission, with very limited exception, is prohibited from directing licensees to present or refrain from presenting specific program matter.

D. SUMMARY AND COMCLUSIONS

On the basis of the information submitted by Professional Baseball, there is no indication that Public Law 93-107 had any affect upon Professional Baseball during the last three seasons or that some effect might be expected in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Commissioner Kuhn indicated during Congressional hearings that the law had no impact on the sport in the past and that the sport no longer opposed similar legislation.

3/ continued
voluntarily made the game available for telecast in Atlanta. Although the game did not officially sell-out until less than two hours before game time, the Braves, pursuant to their standard procedure, set aside 10,000 general admission tickets for sale at the gate. Under Public Law 93-107, a game televised pursuant to a league contract can only be blacked out if tickets available for purchase by the general public 120 hours before the scheduled beginning time of the game involved have not been sold 72 hours before that beginning time. In this particular case, one cannot determine from the facts whether all of the tickets available for purchase 120 hours before game time actually had been sold 72 hours before game time. However, if the only tickets which had not been sold by the 72 hour mark were those 10,000 general admission tickets saved by the team for sale at the gate, then the Braves could not legally blackout the game in Atlant.

IV. PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL

A. INTRODUCTION

The National Basketball Association bases its objections to Public Law 93-107 on the belief that a three season experience with the law has not been a long enough period to assess its full impact. It has disputed the previous findings of the FCC as to the law's minimal impact on the NBA. The total impact of the legislation cannot be decided, according to the NBA, without more complete data and a longer period of study.

What slight negative effect the NBA has experienced can be inferred from what the NBA describes as "consistently higher" "no shows" at televised games. Since turnstile counts on attendance were not always available for 1974-75, the "no shows" recorded for this season were not significantly high. A comparison of televised and non-televised contests, however, has led the National Basketball Association to conclude that "no shows" at telecasts outnumber those at blacked out games. Additional turnstile data must be obtained, according to the NBA therefore, in order to more completely document this effect on future seasons.

With regard to the new legislation to replace P.L. 93-107, the NBA opposes the change in sellout time for playoff games from 72 to 24 hours before the time of the game. A 48 hour period is preferred in order to alleviate publicity and ticket selling problems that might arise with a 24 hour deadline.

The American Basketball Association did not appear before Congress to discuss the effect of Public Law 93-107 on their teams.

Previous findings of the FCC reports have concluded that anti-blackout legislation has had little effect on the ABA. Since it is already an ABA policy to lift blackouts of games sold out 24 hours prior to game time, the proposed legislative changes in a sellout time requirement would seem not to pose any hardship to members of the American Basketball Association.

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107

Prior to the enactment of Public Law 93-107, the National Basketball Association blacked out home team games scheduled for telecast in 1972-1973 by a league contract. Information as to how many of those 26 games might have been sellouts and fallen within the law's purview is not available.

In the National Basketball Association's 1973-74 season, 14 local telecasts were provided from a total of 40 broadcast games. According to the findings of the Second Annual FCC Report, only four of these lifts were a result of P.L. 93-107. The other 10 were voluntary local decisions to broadcast games in the absence of a sellout.

Records for the NBA's 1974-75 season show that 20 games were locally telecast by the teams. Seven of these blackout lifts were a result of P.L. 93-107 while 13 were voluntary lifts according to the NBA. Four of the required blackout lifts occurred during the NBA's regular season with three lifts during the Playoffs. The total games broadcast in 1974-75 was 37.

Information on the 1975-76 National Basketball Association's regular season is included in this report. From the data provided to the Commission as of April 11, 1975, eight out of 22 telecasts were locally broadcast. The following section is an analysis of the final data for the 1974-75 season as well as that for 1975-76.

1974-75

According to an NBA contract with CBS, approximately 40 games out of 786 total games played during the 1974-75 season were eligible for telecast pursuant to a league television contract as defined in Public Law

93-107. Thirty-seven actual games were telecast with regional telecasts counted as half of a nationally televised game.

"No Shows"

Since the NEA does not have any league-wide policy for obtaining "no shows" figures, no information was available for "no shows" on 10 1/2 of the 37 telecasts in 1974-75. ^{1/}

1) Voluntary Lifting.

According to the National Basketball Association, voluntary blackout lifts are usually employed by the home team for promotional purposes. Detroit, for example, has lifted the blackout of games when in the owners' business judgment large local advertisers desired an opportunity to view the games they sponsored. Local marketing strategy, therefore, has caused home telecasts of games not otherwise required by P.L. 93-107.

Of the 13 blackouts voluntarily lifted according to the National Basketball Association, "no shows" figures were compiled on 11 of these games. The total computed "no shows" of 5,846 represented 4 percent of the total paid attendance at these 11 games.

The largest numbers of "no shows" occurred at the January 12, 1975 game with Boston at Buffalo (See Second Annual FCC Report, pp. 97-98) with 9 percent "no shows;" the May 11, 1975 game with Boston at Washington 8 percent "no shows" (1,314 out of 17,470 total paid attendance); and at the May 25, 1975 game with Golden State at Washington with 10 percent "no shows" (1,715 out of 17,411 total paid attendance). The latter two games were part of the 1974-75 season Playoffs.

^{1/}Indicates the presence of regionally televised games which the NEA counts as one-half of a nationally televised game.

In the case of the April 12, 1975 game with New York at Houston, a voluntary blackout lift occurred with only 481 tickets sold by the 72 hour deadline. Since this was a Playoff game, the owners anticipated brisk ticket sales and promotional advantages that outweighed the risks of a broadcast affecting "no shows." As a result, some 9,500 out of 10,047 tickets were sold for the game with only 62 "no shows" recorded.

2) Required Lifting

Seven games had their blackouts lifted pursuant to the NBA's interpretation of the Anti-Blackout Law. (According to submitted data, a total of 12 seats were actually available for sale 72 hours before the time of two games which does not preclude them from being called sellouts.) "No shows" figures for five of these seven games were available. The total 2,317 "no shows" were recorded for a single game, Buffalo at New York on April 6, 1975. This total represents 13 percent of the paid attendance for that game but only 4 percent of the total paid attendance for all five games with "no shows" responses.

Of these seven telecasts, three were from San Francisco, two from Milwaukee, one from Hartford (a Celtics' game) and one from New York. The three Golden State telecasts recorded no "no shows." One of the Milwaukee Bucks' games recorded no "no shows" while for the other game "no show" data was not available. For the single Boston Celtics' Hartford telecast, "no shows" records were also not available. Finally, there were 2,317 "no shows" for the April 6, 1975 Knicks' telecast. Since no other New York games were broadcast by CBS in 1974-75, it is impossible to judge whether this figure of 13 percent "no shows" differs significantly from the same figure for blacked out games in New York. The impact of Public Law 93-107 on individual NBA teams for 1974-1975, then, does not appear to have been significant.

3) Blackouts.

From the 17 blacked-out telecasts, "no shows" figures were recorded for 10½ of the games. The total "no shows" of 3,429 represented 3 percent of the total paid attendance at these games. The largest "no shows" figure for a blacked-out game was 1,330 from a February 23, 1975 contest between Portland and Washington, representing 16 percent of the paid attendance.

Conclusions: Of the 16 telecast games for which blackouts were lifted and "no shows" figures were recorded, 8,163 "no shows" represented 4 percent of the total paid attendance for these games. That is, "no shows" for games with blackouts lifted pursuant to P.L. 93-107 amounted to 4 percent of paid attendance at such games while "no shows" for games with blackouts voluntarily lifted also amounted to 4 percent of the total seats sold.

"No shows" for all blacked-out games amounted to 3 percent of the paid attendance at these games. Moreover, the largest percent of "no shows" for any one game came from a locally blacked out telecast with Portland at Washington on February 23, 1975 where some 16 percent of the total paid attendance was recorded as "no shows."

1975-76

During the 1975-76 season, the National Basketball Association teams expect to play approximately 779 games including the Playoffs. About

40 of these were scheduled for telecast pursuant to the Association's television contract with CBS. The 22 games reported on below are the total telecast games for the 1975-1976 regular season.

"No Shows"

"No shows" data was made available for all of the 22 televised regular season games through April 11, 1976 by the National Basketball Association.

1) Voluntary Lifting.

For the four games whose blackouts were voluntarily lifted (including the All Star game of February 3, 1976), the total "no shows" of 2,513 represented 5 percent of the total paid attendance for these four games. The largest number of "no shows" was 1,814 or 14 percent of the total paid attendance at the March 5, 1976 game with Golden State at Los Angeles.

2) Required Lifting.

Four games had their blackouts lifted pursuant to P.L. 93-107 as interpreted by the NBA. For three of these games, no "no shows" were recorded. Thus, the total 542 "no shows" (1 percent of the paid attendance of 53,861 for all four games) came from a contest on February 29, 1976 between Golden State and Boston. (As many as 842 of the seats sold at Boston Garden for this game, however, were obstructed seats in excess of the arena's normal seating capacity of 13,902. Thus, the 542 "no shows" are based upon the total attendance rather than stadium capacity.)

Of these four required blackout lifts, three of the telecasts were from Seattle. For these games the Supersonics recorded no "no shows."

The Boston telecast with 542 "no shows" represents fewer "no shows" than at three blacked out Boston games. Specifically, at this February 29, 1976 televised game, "no shows" amounted to 4 percent of seats sold, while the non-televised games had "no shows" amounting to 6 percent (January 25, 1976), 5 percent (March 14, 1976) and 4 percent (March 21, 1976) of seats sold. The relative impact to the Celtics from "no shows" would be greater for these blacked out games, therefore, than from the single telecast required by P.L. 93-107.

3) Blackouts

The remaining 14 blacked-out games had a total of 8,251 "no shows." This figure represents 5 percent of the paid attendance for these 14 games. Moreover, the largest "no shows" total for any of the 22 nationally televised games was 1,830 (16 percent of the paid attendance) for Christmas Day 1975 with Kansas City playing at Phoenix, and this game was locally blacked out.

Conclusions: Eight of the 22 telecast games for which blackout lifts were listed, therefore, recorded a total of 3,055 "no shows." "No shows" for games with blackouts lifted as required by P.L. 93-107 amounted to 1 percent of their paid attendance. At games with blackouts voluntarily lifted, "no shows" comprised 5 percent of the paid attendance for these games.

The 14 blacked-out games, on the other hand, recorded "no shows" figures that also amounted to 5 percent of the paid attendance.

Concessions - Collateral Revenues

Little information was available on concessions and souvenir sales, parking fees, etc., for 1974-75. While the NBA claims

that a reasonable determination of revenue losses can be made from the number of "no shows," "the available data concerning the impact of the lifting of the blackout on collateral revenues is too scant to be significant."^{2/}

In fact, from the concession revenue figures made available to the Commission on four games paired according to telecast vs. non-telecast with the same teams playing at the same stadiums, the two televised contests represented a net gain of \$10 in concession revenues even with 1,517 more "no shows" than the two games not televised.

In 1975-76, the NBA was unable to submit data on concession and souvenir sales, parking fees, etc. Since the teams have limited access to such information due to separate management and ownership of the facilities, no figures were provided for inclusion in this report.

Ticket Sales

Ticket pricing for National Basketball games is left to local team decisions. No records of season ticket sales or prices are kept by the NBA. Consequently, comparison of the effect of changes in ticket prices on the number of "no shows" is not included in this report.

Ticket Promotion

According to the National Basketball Association, home teams continuously promote ticket sales up to the time of the game. However,

^{2/}Letter from Robert Kaufman, counsel to the NBA, to Chairman Wiley, August 22, 1975, p. 4.

the specific number of unsold tickets is not publicized by home teams because they feel such a practice creates a negative response from both ticketholders, when publicity results in a sellout and the blackout is lifted, and from non-ticketholders when an expected sellout does not occur and the blackout is in effect.

C. COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES

For the second year in a row, no written complaints were received by the Commission relating to the broadcast of basketball games.

D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Based upon data made available to the Commission, the Sports Anti-Blackout law appears to have had no significant impact on the National Basketball Association or for that matter on individual NBA teams. The reason for this being that relatively few NBA games were televised in accordance with a league television contract during the 1974-75 and 1975-76 seasons. In 1974-1975, the percent of seats sold not showing at games televised pursuant to Public Law 93-107 slightly exceeded the same "no shows" ratio for those games which were blacked out. However, in 1975-76 a greater percentage of "no shows" occurred at games which were blacked out in the home team's territory than at games which were sold out and subsequently televised. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that Public Law 93-107 has adversely affected the live gate attendance at locally televised professional basketball games.

Furthermore, an examination of the individual teams having locally televised sold out games determined that "no shows" were negligible

in comparison to the number of "no shows" for blacked out games involving the same team. Consequently, it appears that Public Law 93-107 has had no impact on the individual NBA teams.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
1974 - 1976

<u>1974-1975</u>	Games Blacked Out	Blackouts Lifted by Law	Blackouts Lifted Voluntarily
Total Tickets Sold	133,440	64,826	136,116
Total "No Shows"	3,429 <u>a/</u>	2,317 <u>b/</u>	5,846 <u>c/</u>
Percent of Seats Sold Not Showing	2.6%	3.6%	4.3%
<u>1975-1976</u>			
Total Tickets Sold	152,899	53,863	54,563
Total "No Shows" <u>d/</u>	8,251	542	2,513
Percent of Seats Sold Not Showing	5.4%	1%	4.6%

a/Information on "no shows" was available for 10 1/2 of 17 games.

b/Information on "no shows" was available for five of seven games.

c/Information on "no shows" was available for 11 of 13 games.

d/"No shows" information was available on all 1975-76 games.

AMERICAN BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

The 1973-74 ABA season has been the only season during which games were televised pursuant to a league television contract. Six of 459 total games were broadcast and blacked out locally in 1973-74 since none were sold out. In 1974-75 and again in 1975-76, no league television contract was in effect. Therefore, the ABA feels that Public Law 93-107 does not apply to the league's operation at this time.

The seven member American Basketball Association teams televised a total of 127 regular season and playoff games in 1975-76. All of these were televised according to local team arrangements. Sixteen of these games, according to ABA spokesman Jim Bukata, were listed as sellouts which would have caused them to fall under the mandates of Public Law 93-107 had the league been operating under a network contract.

The ABA is optimistic that they will be televising games under a league contract in the future (especially in the event of an ABA-NBA merger). Commissioner Dave DeBusschere has expressed the view that should there be a future league television contract the ABA would not black out a team's home territory as part of their television policy.

In the absence of such a league television contract in 1975-76, therefore, Public Law 93-107 has had no impact on the American Basketball Association.

V. PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY

A. INTRODUCTION

The full impact of Public Law 93-107 has not yet been determined, according to the National Hockey League. The NHL continuously opposes anti-blackout legislation even though almost all blackouts of network telecasts have been lifted by the League. Any permanent legislation is seen as denying Congress automatic review of the impact of the law and negating the need for the FCC reporting functions. A continuation of this FCC oversight role for another trial period is preferred by the NFL.

The National Hockey League opposes a reduction in the sellout period for playoff games to 24 hours because of anticipated problems of losing standing room revenues, of setting up regional network clearance, selling advertising space, and of a last-minute ticket sales rush in the event of a blackout.^{1/}

The NHL's policy of selling standing room and obstructed view seats as part of tickets "available for purchase" is thought necessary in order to produce sufficient revenues from small arenas. Congress should not, in their view, be concerned with defining a sellout in terms of seat quality but only in terms of arena capacity.^{2/}

Finally, the NHL believes that the scope of the anti-blackout legislation should define league television contracts in terms of pooled contracts with national networks so as to permit the establishment of regional networks that would broaden fan coverage. If regional networks are set up in the

^{1/} "Statement of Don V. Ruck, Vice President, National Hockey League" in Hearings before Subcommittee on Communications, Oct. 29, 1975 op cit p. 33

^{2/} Ibid.

absence of a national contract, the NHL could then take the position that sold-out home games need not be broadcast under such non-national network arrangements.^{3/}

The World Hockey Association did not appear before Congress in 1975 to voice their position on anti-blackout legislation. As will be discussed later, past policies of the WHA on televising their teams' games have not included network contracts. Public Law 93-107, therefore, has not particularly pertained to the experiences of the World Hockey Association.

^{3/} Ibid.

NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE

B. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107

Information on the complete 1974-1975 National Hockey League season, as well as data on 1975-1976 games up to March 31, 1976 has been included in this year's report. Additional information on the 1975-1976 season was not available.

1973-74

Sixteen teams made up the National Hockey League membership in 1973-74. A total of 662 regular and post-season games were played during that season with 542 of these originating in the United States and thereby subject to the mandates of Public Law 93-107.

A league television contract was in effect during 1973-74 with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). Beginning on January 4, 1974, 15 regular season games and seven playoff games were broadcast by NBC. The 1974 All Star game was packaged and sold for telecast separately by the NHL. Prior to the 1973 passage of Public Law 93-107, it was an NHL policy to lift home market blackouts for network telecasts. Notwithstanding the continuation of this policy through early 1976, the NHL has taken the position that Public Law 93-107 precluded any change in the NHL's prior practices.^{4/} No information has been provided by the NHL to indicate how many of these 22 telecasts in 1973-74 were actually sold-out games.

1974-75

Team membership in the NHL increased in 1974-75 to 18 teams - 15 from the United States and three from Canada. The NHL continued to operate under the terms of a league television contract with NBC during this season.

^{4/} See letter from Philip R. Hochberg, Counsel to NHL, to Chairman Wiley, March 21, 1976. Appendix D.

Pursuant to that contract, 14 regular season and seven playoff games were televised. Since two of these games as well as the 1974-75 All Star Game were played in Canada, the requirements of Public Law 93-107 did not apply to these telecasts.

According to the NHL, only one of the above 19 U.S.-originated telecasts was blacked out in the home team's territory. The January 19, 1975 game with the California Golden Seals at Chicago Black Hawks was not locally televised. The game had not met the sell-out requirements of Public Law 93-107. However, neither the League nor the club requested that the game not be locally televised. That decision was apparently made by the local station and/or the network. Because the NHL did not provide information as to available tickets or total ticket sales for any of the above telecasts, however, it is impossible to determine on how many occasions actual sellouts of NHL games occurred in 1974-75.

1975-76

Six hundred regular season NHL games were scheduled to be played in the United States in 1975-76. Only 278 of these, however, are considered by the League to have come under the scope of Public Law 93-107 prior to its December 31, 1975 expiration. In addition, no national TV network contract was in effect this season for the National Hockey League. Rather, the League began an ambitious package of its own games for ad hoc network broadcast.

Eighteen teams composed the membership of the National Hockey League in 1975-76 of which 15 were United States and three were Canadian teams. A special series of eight games with two teams from the Soviet Union was included in this year's schedule. One of these games was telecast pursuant to League contract and the operation of Public Law 93-107 in 1975, while the law was voluntarily applied by the NHL to three of the US-Soviet Union games in 1976. The All Star Game of

January 20, 1976 was also locally telecast by the NHL.

Prior to the 1973-74 season, it was the policy of the NHL to voluntarily lift home market blackouts on the majority of its network telecasts. However, the existence of Public Law 93-107 has precluded any change in the League's policy. Apparently, no specific records are kept by the National Hockey League to determine which games as sellouts would have been covered by the terms of the anti-blackout legislation or how many tickets are available 120 hours before the time of a game. Records of "no shows" at regular season games were also not available.

The seating capacities for 1975-76 NHL teams in the U.S. are as follows:

Atlanta Flames	15,043	Los Angeles Kings	16,005
Boston Bruins	15,003	Minnesota North Stars	15,184
Buffalo Sabres	15,858	New York Islanders	14,865
Calif. Golden Seals	12,500	New York Rangers	17,500
Chicago Black Hawks	18,000	Philadelphia Flyers	17,077
Detroit Red Wings	16,200	Pittsburgh Penguins	13,402
Kansas City Scouts	16,500	St. Louis Blues	18,008
		Washington Capitals	18,130

Four of these teams have increased their available seats for 1975-76: Chicago from 17,100 to 18,000, Detroit from 14,200 to 16,200, Philadelphia from 17,007 to 17,077 and Washington from 17,962 to 18,130.

According to the National Hockey League, normal communications media are used to inform the public of all ticket sales.

Figures for concession revenues and other gross receipts were not provided by the NHL. The League believes that the Commission's request for such data presents both practical and philosophical problems:

"In the first place, we are uncertain as to whether the request relates to the entire season's play, or those games which are covered by the scope of Public Law 93-107 (i.e., league network telecasts). In the second place, even limitation to only the network televised games would present the problem of "breaking-out" information from season-long totals. In the third place, the National Hockey league would find the attempt to be both costly

and burdensome to the League. This information is confidential and is not even collected -- much less disseminated -- by the League. Fourthly, even if the information was available to the League, it appears that no financial information given to the Commission by a non-licensee in this proceeding will be treated in any confidential fashion... Finally -- and significantly -- the National Hockey League seriously questions the relevance of this information, given the long-standing policy of the National Hockey League with respect to the lifting of blackouts.

The National Hockey League does not feel that it is necessary to provide this information in order to make out its opposition to the concept of Public Law 93-107... Elaborate financial data is not needed for the propositions that there will be "no shows," that parking revenue, radio rights and concession, food, program and souvenir sales will decline, that significant public relations problems will occur frequently, and that there will be a weakening of single game and season ticket sales. These, we submit to you, are "givens" to the consideration of Public Law 93-107. 5/

COMPLAINTS AND INQUIRIES

The Commission received only one letter dealing with Public Law 93-107's application to the broadcast of ice hockey games. This is down sharply from the preceding year's total of 10 letters. This may have been due to the fact that during the 1975-76 ice hockey season, neither the National Hockey League nor the World Hockey Association maintained a league contract for the broadcast of regular season games. The one letter received this year by the Commission complained that the Philadelphia Flyers' home games were not being televised in Philadelphia when all of the season games were sold out by season ticket sales. It was explained to the complainant that since the games were not being broadcast pursuant to a league contract, Public Law 93-107 did not apply.

Letter from Philip R. Hochberg, Counsel to NHL, to Chairman Wiley, April 1, 1975, p. 1-2.

D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Previous FCC reports have concluded that Public Law 93-107 has had little effect on the National Hockey League. Given the NHL policies of arbitrarily lifting local blackouts, not recording figures on "no shows" and also not submitting concession revenue figures and other gross receipts, the Commission has received no information or statements from the NHL to change its original conclusions as to the minimal economic impact of Public Law 93-107 on the National Hockey League. While the NHL has expressed the belief that telecasts of the 1976 Stanley Cup playoffs "would still come under the scope of legislation such as Public Law 93-107,"^{6/} it is not known whether the NHL actually complied with the intent of Public Law 93-107 after its expiration on December 31, 1975.

^{6/} Letter from Philip R. Hochberg, Counsel to NHL, to Chairman Wiley, March 31, 1976, p. 2.

WORLD HOCKEY ASSOCIATION

Telecasts of games of World Hockey Association teams are handled through local arrangements. No network contract is involved, therefore, with the 330 regular season games held in the United States by the nine member teams during the 1975-76 season. (The January 13, 1976 All Star game was sold by the WHA to the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) network, the Global network in Canada and several independent Canadian stations. Although this game was not a sellout, the local Cleveland station did telecast the game.)

During the 1973-74 and 1974-75 hockey seasons, there was likewise no network TV contract in effect with the WHA. As a result, there has been no impact of Public Law 93-107 on the World Hockey Association. Moreover, unless the WHA were to change its present television policy, no future impact of Public Law 93-107 is likely.

APPENDIX A

SEASON TICKETS

ANALYSIS AND TABLES

SEASON TICKETS ANALYSIS

Introduction

The National Football League has asserted that Public Law 93-107 has and will continue to have a deleterious impact on live gate attendance at professional football games. The NFL has also maintained that "no shows" would eventually become "non-fans" which would result in the sale of fewer season tickets. This section of the report statistically evaluates the NFL's assertion. Statistical techniques involving the pooling of cross-sectional and time series data (covariance analysis) were employed to empirically estimate the impact of lifting the TV blackout on season ticket sales.

The impact of televised home games on season ticket sales has been positive. On the average, every home game televised in the previous season increases next year's season ticket sales by approximately 1.4 percent times the capacity of the stadium. This stimulation in sales is probably due to the increased exposure the home team experiences by having its home games televised. Televising home games apparently stimulates the interest of fans previously exposed to home games through newspaper and radio accounts. To the extent that newspaper and radio accounts do not convey the visual impact that TV provides, the televising of home games will generate a greater fan interest. Hence, the available data indicates that televising home games, contrary to NFL expectations, stimulates fan interest which in turn generates greater season ticket sales.

The subsequent sections of this appendix discuss the methodology utilized to evaluate season ticket sales, the results of the analysis, and finally the policy considerations and conclusions will be discussed.

Methodology

The variables which are expected to influence the demand for season football tickets are the price of season tickets, the per capita income of the community, the expected quality of the home team, the ease in obtaining tickets the convenience in going to the game, and the buyer's expectation of the number of home games which will be televised. Unique events such as a new coach, a big trade, or a new stadium were not explicitly considered in the analysis. (A complete list of the variables used in the analysis as well as the source of information employed in quantifying the variables is presented as Attachment 5 to this section.)

A relative measure of the demand for season ticket sales was devised which reflected different sized stadiums. The ratio of season ticket sales to stadium capacity was used to estimate relative demand for season football tickets. This measure tends to standardize the demand relative to a variable supply (stadium capacity), and allows for the application of meaningful cross-sectional comparisons. This measure understates relative demand for some teams to the extent that the entire capacity of a stadium is not available for season ticket sales. A more precise measure of the relative demand would be the ratio of season tickets sold to those offered for sale. Unfortunately, the NFL refused to provide this information.

Four years of cross-sectional observations (1972-1975) were pooled to examine the dynamic year-to-year changes in the relative demand for season ticket sales. Dummy variables for both years and teams were employed to account for year to year and team variations. In addition, where a team played home

games at more than one stadium (e.g., Green Bay/Milwaukee) observations for both locations were included. This year's cross-sectional and time series analysis allowed the examination of yearly or team variations. The expanded number of utilized observations optimized the efficiency of the overall estimation process.

A number of different methods were utilized to measure the impact of the independent variables on season ticket sales. A number of models were specified and estimated. Only those models which best fit the data and met a priori theoretical economic expectations are reported. (For a detailed presentation of the various models see Attachment 4).

A weighted average of the prices of the various types of seats in a stadium adjusted by the consumer price index was employed as the measure of the price of a season ticket. A better measure of the price of a season ticket would have been the total purchase price (including exhibition games where appropriate) of a season ticket. Unfortunately, the NFL was unable to provide the necessary data which would allow this calculation. In addition, the data on the exact number of each type of ticket sold was not available. Hence, it was impossible to estimate the marginal cost of a season ticket and to employ it in the estimation process as suggested by economic theory. Thus, due to data limitations, an average ticket price was employed in the analysis.

Real per capita income (current per capita income divided by the consumer price index of the particular metropolitan area) was employed to measure income effects of season ticket sales. A better measure for income would have been the income of people who purchase season tickets standardized

to a per seat basis. However, data on the characteristics of who buys season tickets was unavailable and, hence, it was impossible to determine the per seat income of the relevant subset of the metropolitan population.

A number of measurements of the expected quality of the home team were utilized. The more practical measures were the previous season's won-loss percentage, whether or not the home team was in the previous year's playoffs, and the previous year's divisional standing. In all of the models the previous season's results were used as a surrogate of the expected future quality of the home team. Obviously, whether or not the team's performance improved or deteriorated over past years as well as the expected quality of the home team schedule affects the number of season tickets sold. These phenomena could not be directly measured and were not used in the analysis. In addition, it was felt that to a large degree these factors would tend to be highly correlated with the other more unambiguously quantifiable measures employed in the study. To the extent that non-quantifiable variables, such as the trend of a team's performance, are related to quantifiable variables, such as the won-loss percentage, their impact will be measured through quantifiable variables. In this study, the best measure of the quality of the home team was found to be the previous season's won-loss record.

The ease of obtaining tickets to a game could be measured by using the last year's season ticket sales expressed as a percent of capacity (or by using a ratio of population to the seating capacity of the stadium). Because the analysis involved the pooling of cross-sectional and time series data with the use of dummy variables to isolate year and team effects, it was felt that the use of the previous season's ratio of sales to capacity would introduce

estimation problems.* Instead, the ratio of population to capacity was employed. This assumed that the more people vying for tickets (institutional buyers or otherwise) the more likely someone is to buy a season ticket to insure that they get to see the games they desire or those that their customers desire. The population of the entire metropolitan area was used due to the availability of this information. Total population is closely related to the number of interested fans so the estimation process will indirectly pick up this influence on season ticket sales.

The convenience of going to the game is assumed to be constant over the study period. Hence, it was measured by the dummy variable designating the team.

Two types of functions were employed to specify the demand for season tickets relative to the various independent variables. The first function involves a log-linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The second posits a straight linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable.

The use of a log-linear functional form involves taking the natural logs (logs to the base e) of all variables, dependent and independent, with the exception of the dummy variables. This yields the following general functional form:

* These estimation problems are a direct result of what the economist refers to as multicollinearity. Multicollinearity involves such a high degree of correlation between two independent variables, such as that which would exist between the number of home games broadcast and season ticket sales, that the estimation process is unable to satisfactorily isolate the separate effects of two such highly correlated variables on the dependent variable.

$$(1) \quad \ln Y = \ln a + B_1 \ln X_1 + B_2 \ln X_2 + \dots + B_n \ln X_n + C_1 Z_1 + C_2 Z_2 + \dots + C_m Z_m$$

where Y - dependent variable
 X_i - independent variable
 Z_i - dummy variable

Equation (1) in turn implies the general functional form:

$$(2) \quad Y = a_0 X_1^{B_1} X_2^{B_2} \dots X_n^{B_n} C_1 Z_1 + C_2 Z_2 + \dots + C_m Z_m$$

Thus, it is apparent that equation (2) explicitly assumes that the effects of the various independent variables on the dependent variable are interrelated.

The second functional form specified involved a linear relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. Equation (3) is a generalized example of such a relationship:

$$(3) \quad Y = a_0 + b_1 X_1 + \dots + a_n X_n + c_1 Z_1 + \dots + c_m Z_m$$

Equation (3) assumes the effect of the various independent variables on the dependent variable is additive.

Neither functional form yielded a statistically better fit. Furthermore, the results of both functional forms were consistent. Thus, in the subsequent discussion, the emphasis will be on the results of the straight linear equation since such results are more easy to interpret.

Results

The results of the best fit model, whether log-linear or straight linear, utilizing the relative demand for season ticket sales as the dependent variable, indicate that the variables which were significant in predicting season ticket sales were: (1) previous season's won-loss percentage; (2) the ratio of population to stadium capacity; (3) the number of home games televised; (4) the team dummy variables and (5) the year dummy variables. It is signifi-

cant to note that neither the price nor the income variables was found to be statistically different from zero. Improper measurement of these variables or an indication that to a large degree season ticket sales are determined by other factors such as those listed above probably causes this result.

In terms of interpreting the values of the coefficients of the various parameters, the won-loss coefficient had an estimated average value of 0.177. That is, every game a team wins (loses) will increase (decrease) season ticket sales by nearly 1.3 percent of stadium capacity. Thus, a team with a perfect record will sell about 18 percent more season tickets than if it lost all of its games.

The coefficient for the ratio of the population to seating capacity was 0.306. Every unit increase in the population relative to seating capacity increases ticket sales by 3.06 percent of stadium capacity. If the population relative to stadium capacity is increasing over time, the more difficult it will become to buy tickets to specific games and, hence, the greater the likelihood someone will buy a season ticket to insure that they have the ability to attend some or all of the home games. This effect follows from the fixed nature of stadium capacity relative to the possible demand for stadium seats.

An interesting result of the statistical analysis was the positive value of the TV game coefficient. This coefficient had a value, on the average of 0.014. Thus, for every home game televised in the previous season, next year's season ticket sales will increase by approximately 0.014 times stadium capacity. A team which televised all seven home games could expect

a 10 percent increase in season ticket sales for the following year. The positive effect of televising home games is probably due to the increased fan interest generated by TV exposure. This is hardly a surprising result. For example, the possible positive (and in some cases negative) effects of a media campaign on election results are well known.

Statistically significant team coefficient designate a significant deviation from the base team San Francisco. For example, Green Bay's attendance pattern is positively different from San Francisco's and, hence, all other things being equal, Green Bay will fill more of their stadium than will San Francisco. This difference in drawing ability is probably attributable to such intangibles as Green Bay's traditionally good teams. It may also reflect a higher interest in professional football in Green Bay relative to other activities.

The coefficients on the years 1974 and 1975 were both found to be negative and statistically different from zero. The negative values suggest that the demand curves for season ticket sales relative to 1972 have been shifting downward. This implies that fans in 1972 who were buying season tickets were not buying season tickets in 1974 and 1975. Factors such as the 1974 recession could account for this shift. However, it is important to note that while the decline from 1973 to 1974 was 7 percent of stadium capacity, the drop was only 4 percent of stadium capacity from 1974 to 1975. This suggests that the process is beginning to level off (along with the recession) and that most of the 1972 fans who are not going to buy tickets have already stopped buying them. Meanwhile, the television exposure of home games is generating interest and season ticket sales from additional fans. In 1975, the interest and season ticket sales generated by 1974 televised home games more than compensated for the loss of

"1972" fans experienced from 1974 to 1975.

A time series (1973-1975) of the ratio of season ticket sales to stadium capacity isolated seven teams which experienced a large decline in the relative demand for their season tickets from 1972 to 1975. These seven teams were Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, Kansas City, Miami, San Diego, and San Francisco. Each of these teams was individually examined to determine the probable reason for these large declines.

A large part of the Atlanta decline occurred between the 1974 and 1975 seasons. In 1974, Atlanta's season ticket sales totaled over 90 percent of stadium capacity while in 1975 season ticket sales totaled a little over 65 percent of the stadium's capacity. The single largest factor involved in this decline is the precipitous drop in Atlanta's won-loss record between the 1973 season and the 1974 season. In 1973, Atlanta had a 9-5 record while in 1974 it was 3-11. On the average according to the statistical analysis, this change in the won-loss record would produce a decline in season tickets equal to 10 percent of stadium capacity. The decline experienced in Atlanta's case was greater than expected. The decline due to poor won-loss record was probably amplified by the warm climate of Atlanta (i.e., more options for entertainment, sporting events are available in Atlanta during the winter than in most NFL cities).

Baltimore has experienced a continuous decline in relative season ticket sales from 1972 to 1975. This decline can be attributed, in large part, to a sharp decline in the quality of the football team. In 1972, Baltimore had a 10-4 record and by 1974 its record deteriorated to 2-12. Baltimore during this time never televised a home game and yet experienced a 35 percent

drop in season ticket sales between 1972 and 1975. Atlanta, which also experienced a drastic decline in the quality of the team, only experienced a 20 percent difference between 1972 and 1975. Atlanta televised all of its home games in 1974 which helped to dampen the decline in season ticket sales due to the positive effects of increased television exposure.

Detroit experienced a sharp decline in season ticket sales when the quality of the team deteriorated. Another factor that contributed to the relative decline in season ticket sales in Detroit was the large increase in stadium capacity relative to the population. Hence, in terms of absolute sales, Detroit experienced an increase of over 5,000 from 1972 to 1975, but stadium capacity increased about 16,000. This increase in stadium capacity caused the ratio of population to capacity to fall and, hence, the ratio of sales to capacity also fell when the availability of tickets increased.

Kansas City also experienced a large decline in season ticket sales as the quality of the team declined. Kansas City's record fell from 0.769 in 1972 to 0.357 in 1974. Kansas City has also been experiencing a slight decline in the population relative to stadium capacity due to a slowly shrinking metropolitan population base. This population decline could also have contributed to the relative decline in season ticket sales.

The decline in season ticket sales in Miami can, only in part, be attributed to a declining won-loss record. Miami's perfect season in 1972 was followed by records of 12-2 in 1973 and 11-3 in 1974 which were all very good seasons. The factor which has most likely affected season ticket sales has been the departure of the three name players: Larry Csonka, Paul Warfield

and Jim Kiick. Additionally, Miami raised the average price of a ticket by over 22 percent during the same season as the departure of Csonka, Warfield and Kiick. The large price increase could have provided the needed disincentives to cause a significant portion of the Miami fans to forego season tickets for the 1975 season.

In San Diego's case, a consistently poor team is probably causing increasing disinterest on the part of fans. The high quality of the San Diego State University football team probably amplifies this effect. In any event, no home games have ever been televised in San Diego.

Finally, San Francisco is another case of a team whose won-loss record has been deteriorating over time. From a 9-5 record in 1972, San Francisco had fallen to a 6-8 record in 1974. Coupled with the many alternative entertainment attractions (such as a championship basketball team) in the San Francisco area, it is hardly surprising that season ticket sales have fallen off.

Conclusions

It has been alleged by the NFL that lifting the TV blackout of home games will lead to increased "no shows" and that increased "no shows" will eventually translate into fewer season ticket sales. However, the analysis to date indicates that televising home games has the positive effect of generating new fan interest and more season ticket sales. At present, it is not possible to determine the exact cause of the downward structural shifts in demand which have occurred in the past few years. However, these shifts are becoming increasingly smaller over time and are in any case compensated by the positive stimulus of televising home games. It has also been found that the single most important factor influencing a team's season ticket sales

is the quality of the home team. Other significant variables are the ease with which one can purchase tickets and the location of the particular team.

To date, there is no indication that Public Law 93-107 has produced any negative effects on NFL ticket sales. In fact, the record to date indicates that Public Law 93-107 has been a positive stimulus to football ticket sales.

Attachment 1

Season Ticket Sales

<u>TEAM</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Atlanta	49,872	53,037	53,278	38,426
Baltimore	48,315	47,233	32,593	27,377
Buffalo	24,700	52,474	54,182	43,184
Chicago	49,124	48,996	51,525	47,070
Cincinnati	53,634	53,610	53,424	51,310
Cleveland	48,901	49,670	48,542	42,252
Dallas	35,256	36,053	32,297	29,000
Denver	48,000	48,000	49,000	49,000
Detroit	44,742	45,560	40,019	50,000
Green Bay	54,155	56,267	56,267	56,267
Milwaukee	46,699	47,826	47,826	52,583
Houston	27,460	30,325	24,435	26,179
Kansas City	72,885	70,555	65,564	47,870
Los Angeles	50,037	45,917	46,251	47,413
Miami	69,303	74,961	67,322	50,000
Minnesota	41,984	41,500	41,500	41,500
New England	55,007	47,938	44,319	46,967
New Orleans	53,319	50,005	49,252	46,000
N. Y. Giants	57,214	55,682	40,007	54,294
		49,690		
N. Y. Jets	58,226	56,500	56,500	53,500
Oakland	50,793	50,802	50,840	51,107
Philadelphia	64,106	64,001	64,361	64,300
Pittsburgh	28,159	44,844	44,531	44,902
St. Louis	41,332	40,672	39,006	37,516
San Diego	36,310	39,681	29,595	22,280
San Francisco	53,876	55,506	47,649	41,409
Washington	51,076	51,969	52,049	52,400

Attachment 2

Stadium Capacity*

<u>TEAM</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Atlanta	58,850	58,850	58,850	58,850
Baltimore	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
Buffalo	46,231	80,020	80,020	80,020
Chicago	55,701	55,701	55,701	55,701
Cincinnati	59,509	59,754	59,754	59,754
Cleveland	79,282	79,282	79,282	80,165
Dallas	65,111	65,111	65,101	65,101
Denver	51,656	51,706	51,706	52,217
Detroit	54,118	54,118	54,118	80,343
Green Bay	56,317	56,267	56,267	56,823
Milwaukee	47,826	47,826	47,826	52,583
Houston	50,254	47,754	47,754	47,754
Kansas City	79,033	78,097	78,097	78,099
Los Angeles	80,089	79,281	91,040	91,038
Miami	78,952	79,968	79,968	80,045
Minnesota	48,503	48,503	48,503	48,446
New England	61,114	61,279	61,279	61,279
New Orleans	81,023	80,958	80,958	74,203
N. Y. Giants	63,350	70,874	70,874	60,416
		63,350		
N. Y. Jets	60,405	60,418	60,416	60,415
Oakland	54,041	54,037	54,037	54,037
Philadelphia	66,011	65,954	66,052	66,026
Pittsburgh	54,041	50,112	50,112	50,112
St. Louis	50,696	51,546	51,392	51,392
San Diego	53,222	49,422	49,462	49,462
San Francisco	61,245	61,247	61,252	61,252
Washington	53,041	54,381	54,395	54,754

* These figures for stadium capacity were taken from ticket sales information provided by the NFL. Variations between these figures and the individual team tables occur due to different sources used for team tables, (i.e., Second Annual FCC Report, NFL Weekly Reporting forms).

Attachment 3Ratio of Season Ticket Sales
to Stadium Capacity

<u>TEAM</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Atlanta	.847	.901	.905	.653
Baltimore	.805	.787	.543	.456
Buffalo	.534	.656	.677	.540
Chicago	.882	.880	.925	.845
Cincinnati	.901	.897	.894	.859
Cleveland	.617	.626	.612	.527
Dallas	.542	.554	.496	.446
Denver	.929	.928	.948	.938
Detroit	.827	.837	.735	.622
Green Bay	.962	1.0	1.0	.990
Milwaukee	.977	1.0	1.0	1.000
Houston	.546	.635	.512	.548
Kansas City	.922	.903	.840	.613
Los Angeles	.625	.579	.508	.521
Miami	.878	.937	.841	.625
Minnesota	.866	.855	.855	.857
New England	.900	.782	.723	.766
New Orleans	.658	.617	.608	.616
N. Y. Giants	.903	.785	.564	.899
N. Y. Jets	.964	.935	.935	.886
Oakland	.940	.940	.940	.946
Philadelphia	.971	.970	.974	.896
Pittsburgh	.521	.894	.889	.974
St. Louis	.815	.789	.758	.730
San Diego	.682	.802	.598	.450
San Francisco	.880	.906	.778	.676
Washington	.963	.956	.957	.957

Attachment 4

Results of Season Ticket Sales Analysis

Functional Form: Linear Log-Linear
 $R^2 = .8759$ $R^2 = .8590$
 $F(33,75) = 16.03$ $F(30,78) = 15.84$

Dependent Variable: % Sales to Capacity Log (% Sales to Capacity)

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>F Value</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>F Value</u>
Previous Season's Won-loss %	0.177	12.21	0.246	11.52*
Number of Home Games Televised in Previous Year	0.013	8.80*	0.022	11.59*
Real per Capita Income	-0.001 ^a	0.001 ^a	---	---
ln (Real per Capita Income)	---	---	0.555 ^a	2.50 ^a
Real Average Ticket Price	0.008 ^a	0.11 ^a	---	---
ln (Real Average Ticket Price)	---	---	-0.066 ^a	0.146 ^a
1973 Dummy	0.018	0.76	0.012	0.178
1974 Dummy	-0.073	6.76	-0.136	12.29*
1975 Dummy	-0.115	15.82*	-0.165	18.45*
Atlanta Team Dummy	0.057	0.90	---	---
Baltimore Team Dummy	-0.076	1.39	-0.126	3.04
Buffalo Team Dummy	-0.104	2.16	-0.228	11.25*
Chicago Team Dummy	-0.141	1.97	0.047	0.42
Cincinnati Team Dummy	0.132	4.05	0.094	2.12
Cleveland Team Dummy	-0.127	3.40	-0.316	20.38*
Dallas Team Dummy	-0.293	29.51*	-0.473	56.62*
Denver Team Dummy	0.187	9.18	0.123	4.40*
Detroit Team Dummy	-0.123	4.23	-0.102	2.52
Green Bay Team Dummy	0.273	15.41*	0.206	11.89*
Houston Team Dummy	-0.171	9.14*	-0.250	13.87*
Kansas City Team Dummy	0.101	2.39	---	---
Los Angeles Team Dummy	-0.332	23.58*	-0.355	19.91*
Miami Team Dummy	0.035	0.21	-0.036	0.214
Minnesota Team Dummy	0.016	0.09	-0.020	0.106
New England Team Dummy	-0.021	0.14	0.035	0.270
New Orleans Team Dummy	-0.013	0.03	-0.110	2.19
N.Y. Giants Team Dummy	-0.305	4.14	0.040	0.20
N.Y. Jets Team Dummy	-0.222	1.70	0.211	4.84*
Oakland Team Dummy	0.060	1.25	0.072	1.28
Philadelphia Team Dummy	-0.056	0.75	-0.068	0.81
Pittsburgh Team Dummy	0.086	1.79	0.200	8.18
St. Louis Team Dummy	-0.007	0.02	0.018	0.08
San Diego Team Dummy	-0.062	0.84	-0.118	2.56
Washington Team Dummy	0.058	0.67	---	---
Constant	0.561		-1.543	

* Indicates the variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

a. The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F Value.

ATTACHMENT 5

Data Sources for Football Season Ticket Sales Analysis

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
Stadium capacity	Number of seats available	NFL
Average ticket price	Average of all ticket prices weighted by number of tickets available at each price.	Calculated from data provided by NFL
Won-Loss percent	Won-Loss percentage of home team at end of previous season.	<u>Washington Post</u> <u>New York Times</u> <u>Sporting News</u>
Number of televised home games	Number of home games televised locally in the previous season.	NFL
Play-off dummy	Value of one if team made play-offs, zero otherwise	<u>Washington Post</u> <u>New York Times</u> <u>Sporting News</u>
Metropolitan area population	Estimated population for relevant SMSA.	<u>Survey of Buying Power</u> Sales Management, Inc.
Household Income	Average effective household buying income. Personal income less taxes	_____
Consumer price index	Average annual CPI for relevant SMSA.	<u>Statistical Abstract of the United States</u>
Real Ave. ticket price	Average ticket price divided by relevant CPI.	_____
Real Per Capita income	Per Capita income divided by relevant CPI	_____
Population to capacity	Population of metropolitan area divided by relevant stadium capacity	_____
Year dummy i	Value of one if relevant year (is 1973, 1974, or 1975), zero otherwise	_____
Team dummy i	Value of one if team i, zero otherwise	_____

APPENDIX B

A WEEK-BY-WEEK SUMMARY OF
TELEVISED GAMES
1973-1975

A SUMMARY OF NFL GAMES TELEVIEWED
DURING THE 1973 SEASON

TEAM	WEEK														SEASON TOTAL OF GAMES TELEVIEWED
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	
Atlanta				TV	TV			TV		TV		TV	TV	TV	7
Baltimore	X	X	TV	X	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	0
Buffalo				X	X	X	X	X	TV	TV			X	X	3
Chicago	TV	TV			TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV		TV	TV	TV	7
Cincinnati	X	X	X	X	TV	X*	X	X	X	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	6
Cleveland	X	X	X	X	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	2
Dallas					TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	X					3
Denver	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	7
Detroit															
Green Bay	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	7
Houston				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0
Kansas City	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	6
Los Angeles	X			TV	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	0
Miami	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	7
Minnesota	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	7
New England	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	TV	TV	X	X	X	X	2
New Orleans	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0
NY Giants	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	6
NY Jets															
Oakland	X														
Phila.	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	7
Pittsburgh	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	8
St. Louis	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	1
San Diego	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0
San Francisco	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	4
Washington	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	7

Weekly Totals of
Televised Games 10 6 8 8 6 7 6 7 11 9 10 8 6 7 109

*Games conflicted with World Series in which the Cincinnati baseball team was involved.

TV - local blackout lifted

X - blackout imposed

A SUMMARY OF NFL GAMES TELEVIEWED
DURING THE 1974 SEASON

TEAM	WEEK														SEASON TOTAL OF GAMES TELEVIEWED
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	
Atlanta	TV	X			TV	TV				TV		TV		TV	7
Baltimore	X	TV	X		X	TV	X	X		TV	X	X	X	X	0
Buffalo	X	TV	TV		TV	TV				TV	X	X		X	4
Chicago	X	TV	TV	TV		TV				TV	TV	TV	TV		6
Cincinnati	TV				X	TV				TV	X	X		X	7
Cleveland	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		TV	X	X	X	X	1
Dallas	X		X	X	X	TV	TV			TV	X	X	TV		0
Denver	TV	TV			TV	TV				TV	X	X			7
Detroit	X				X	X	X			X	X	X			0
Green Bay	TV	X	TV	TV	TV		TV	TV		TV	TV				7
Houston	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	TV		X	X	1
Kansas City	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	0
Los Angeles	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	0
Miami				TV	X	X	X	X		TV	X	X	TV		3
Minnesota			TV	TV	X	TV	TV	TV		TV	TV	TV	X	X	5
New England	X		TV	X		TV	TV	TV		TV	TV	TV	X	X	5
New Orleans	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	0
NY Giants	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	0
NY Jets															0
Oakland	TV				TV	X	X	X		TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	4
Philadelphia	TV		TV	TV	TV	X	X	X		X	TV	TV	TV	TV	7
Pittsburgh	TV		TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV		TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	7
St. Louis	X		X	X	TV	TV	TV	TV		TV	TV	TV	X	X	4
San Diego	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	0
San Francisco	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	0
Washington	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	TV				TV	TV	TV	TV	TV	7

Weekly Totals Of
Televised Games

86

TV - local blackout lifted

X - blackout imposed

A SUMMARY OF NFL GAMES TELEVIEWED
DURING THE 1975 SEASON

TEAM	WEEK														SEASON TOTAL OF GAMES TELEVIEWED
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	
Atlanta		X	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X		0
Baltimore		X		X		X		X			X		TV	X	1
Buffalo	TV		X		X	TV	X		X				X	X	2
Chicago	X					X	TV			X		X			2
Cincinnati	TV			X*	TV			TV			TV			X	5
Cleveland	X	X		X	X		X		X	X	X	X			1
Dallas	X						X		X			TV	TV		1
Denver	TV	TV		TV	TV	TV	TV			TV	TV	TV	TV	X	7
Detroit			TV	X			X							TV	3
Green Bay	TV		TV		TV	TV		TV	TV				X	TV	7
Houston		X	X	X	X	X						X		X	2
Kansas City		X	X	X	X	X						X		TV	0
Los Angeles		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	TV	1
Miami	X														0
Minnesota	TV		TV	TV	TV	TV	TV		TV			TV		X	0
New England	X	TV		X	X			TV	X	X	X	X	X	X	1
New Orleans		X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0
NY Giants				X	X	X	TV	TV	TV		X	X	X	X	2
NY Jets			TV		TV	X	TV	X	X		TV	X	X	X	4
Oakland					TV	TV	X	TV			X	TV	TV	TV	5
Phila.	TV		TV	X	TV	TV, TV	TV	TV			TV	TV	TV	TV	7
Pittsburgh		TV		X	TV	X	TV	X			TV	TV	TV		6
St. Louis	X		X	X	X	X		TV			TV	TV	TV		3
San Diego	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		TV	TV	X		0
San Francisco	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		TV	X	X	X	0
Washington	TV	TV		TV		TV			TV	TV	TV		TV	TV	7

Weekly Totals of
Televised Games

7

4

6

2

5

5

8

4

7

6

7

4

5

5

8

4

7

5

6

4

7

5

4

7

*Games conflicted with World Series in which the Cincinnati baseball team was involved.

TV - local blackout lifted

X - blackout imposed

APPENDIX C

DATA ON TICKET SALES AND "NO SHOWS"

FOR 1975

(Other Years Available in Previous Reports)

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

FIRST WEEK
Sept. 21-22, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Baltimore at Chicago	NO	53,558	54,152	2,474	51,678	4.6%	Cloudy, 60
Los Angeles at Dallas	NO	49,519	50,630	1,539	49,091	3%	Showers, 70
Kansas City at Denver	YES	51,376	52,003	345	51,658	.7%	Sunny, 61
San Francisco at Minnesota	YES	47,686	48,418	1,939	46,479	4%	Overcast, Drizzles, Windy, 51
Houston at New England	NO	53,462	54,212	2,278	51,934	4.2%	Cloudy, Rain, 79
New Orleans at Washington	YES	54,390	55,004	590	54,414	1.1%	Cloudy, 71
Oakland at Miami	NO	78,805	79,765	1,021	78,744	1.3%	Clear, 83
Cleveland at Cincinnati	YES	55,077	55,838	2,964	52,874	5.3%	Partly Cloudy, 61
Pittsburgh at San Diego	NO	35,855	36,754	1,171	35,583	3.2%	Sunny, 72
New York Jets at Buffalo	YES	79,459	79,962	2,125	77,837	2.7%	Sunny, Windy
Atlanta at St. Louis	NO	42,933	43,450	1,278	42,172	2.9%	Overcast, 56
Detroit at Green Bay (Mil.)	YES	51,441	52,613	1,832	50,781	3.5%	Partly Cloudy, Early Rain, 51
New York Giants at Philadelphia	YES	64,817	65,660	4,862	60,798	7.4%	Cloudy, 65
TOTALS:		718,378	728,461	24,418	704,043	3.4%	
TOTALS: <u>1 Weeks</u>							

7 Non-Black-Out Games 404,246 409,498 14,657 394,841 3.6%

6 Black-Out Games 314,132 318,963 9,761 309,202 3.1%

SEASON TOTALS

Non-Black-Out Games

Black-Out Games

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

SECOND WEEK
Sept. 28-29, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Miami at New England	YES	59,869	60,644	677	59,967	1.1%	Sunny, Windy, 70
Philadelphia at Chicago	NO	53,794	54,392	6,321	48,071	11.6%	Sunny, 73
Oakland at Baltimore	NO	39,731	40,396	1,312	39,084	3.2%	Sunny, 70
Minnesota at Cleveland	NO	65,419	66,318	3,155	63,163	4.8%	Sunny, 63
New York Giants at Washington	YES	54,395	55,004	51	54,953	.1%	Sunny, 70
Detroit at Atlanta	NO	47,933	48,855	3,637	45,218	7.4%	Partly Cloudy, 67
St. Louis at Dallas	NO	51,365	52,645	228	52,417	.4%	79
Los Angeles at San Francisco	NO	55,377	57,141	2,069	55,072	3.6%	Sunny, 65
Buffalo at Pittsburgh	YES	49,678	50,340	992	49,348	2%	Sunny, 65
Green Bay at Denver	YES	52,102	52,739	248	52,491	.5%	Cloudy, Light Rain, 68
San Diego at Houston	NO	35,871	37,189	3,424	33,765	9.2%	Sunny, 85
New York Jets at Kansas City	NO	74,530	75,742	1,803	73,939	2.4%	Cloudy, 66
Cincinnati at New Orleans	NO	56,909	57,856	5,219	52,637	9%	Sunny
TOTALS:		696,973	709,261	29,136	680,125	4.1%	
TOTALS: <u>2 Weeks</u>		1,415,351	1,437,722	53,554	1,384,168	3.7%	
<u>4</u> Non-Blacked-Out Games		216,044	218,727	1,968	216,759	.9%	
<u>9</u> Blacked-Out Games		480,929	490,534	27,168	463,366	5.5%	
<u>SEASON TOTALS</u>							
<u>11</u> Non-Blacked-Out Games		620,290	628,225	16,625	611,600	2.6%	
<u>15</u> Blacked-Out Games		795,061	809,497	36,929	772,568	4.6%	
*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets							

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

THIRD WEEK
Oct. 5-6, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Dallas at Detroit	YES	78,923	80,062	678	79,384	.8%	Clear, 58
New England at New York Jets	YES	58,988	60,113	2,748	57,365	4.6%	Sunny, 62
Miami at Green Bay	YES	55,220	55,984	588	55,396	1.1%	Partly Cloudy Windy, 65
San Francisco at Kansas City	NO	57,197	58,386	3,896	54,490	6.7%	Sunny, Windy, 70
Cincinnati at Houston	NO	44,061	45,319	2,907	42,412	6.4%	Sunny, 74
Baltimore at Los Angeles	NO	61,977	64,150	4,139	60,011	6.5%	Sunny, 82
Chicago at Minnesota	YES	47,716	48,446	868	47,578	1.8%	Sunny, Windy, 70
New Orleans at Atlanta	NO	45,963	46,896	17,452	29,444	37.2%	Rain, 55
Oakland at San Diego	NO	31,638	32,501	1,406	31,095	4.3%	Sunny, 71
New York Giants at St. Louis	NO	45,432	45,907	988	44,919	2.2%	Sunny, 70
Pittsburgh at Cleveland	YES	79,156	80,065	6,848	73,217	8.6%	Sunny, Windy, 71
Denver at Buffalo	NO	79,478	79,954	156	79,798	.2%	Sunny, Windy, 72
Washington at Philadelphia	YES	65,247	66,089	1,692	64,397	2.6%	Clear, 73
TOTALS:		750,996	763,872	44,366	719,506	5.8%	
TOTALS: <u>3 Weeks</u>		2,166,347	2,201,594	97,920	2,103,674	4.4%	

6 Non-Blacked-Out Games

385,250

390,759

13,422

377,337

3.4%

7 Blacked-Out Games

365,746

373,113

30,944

342,169

8.3%

SEASON TOTALS

17 Non-Blacked-Out Games

1,005,540

1,018,984

30,047

988,937

2.9%

22 Blacked-Out Games

1,160,807

1,182,610

67,873

1,114,737

5.7%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

FOURTH WEEK
Oct. 12-13, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Dallas at New York Giants	NO	59,470	60,372	3,861	56,511	6.4%	Partly Cloudy, 66
Chicago at Detroit	NO	73,168	74,257	780	73,477	1.1%	Sunny, 59
St. Louis at Washington	YES	54,382	55,004	311	54,693	.6%	Clear, 61
Houston at Cleveland	NO	49,097	49,984	3,453	46,531	6.9%	Partly Cloudy, 58
Atlanta at San Francisco	NO	46,325	48,066	4,023	44,023	8.4%	Cloudy, 60
New York Jets at Minnesota	YES	47,603	48,444	705	47,739	1.5%	Sunny, Windy, 68
Philadelphia at Miami	NO	62,925	63,931	3,804	60,127	6%	Partly Cloudy, 85
Oakland at Kansas City	NO	62,684	63,870	3,445	60,425	5.4%	Sunny Windy, 88
Green Bay at New Orleans	NO	58,204	59,117	7,746	51,371	13.1%	Sunny
Los Angeles at San Diego	NO	38,226	39,153	1,771	37,382	4.5%	Partly Cloudy, 67
New England at Cincinnati	NO	55,106	55,856	4,636	51,220	8.3%	Sunny, 62
Denver at Pittsburgh	NO	49,695	50,354	1,190	49,164	2.4%	Sunny, 57
Buffalo at Baltimore	NO	43,530	44,207	300	43,907	.7%	Sunny, 70
TOTALS:		700,415	712,615	36,025	676,570	5.1%	
TOTALS: <u>4 Weeks</u>		2,866,762	2,914,209	133,945	2,780,244	4.6%	

<u>2</u> Non-Blacked-Out Games	101,985	103,448	1,016	102,432	1%
<u>11</u> Blacked-Out Games	598,430	609,167	35,009	574,138	5.7%
<u>SEASON TOTALS</u>					
<u>19</u> Non-Blacked-Out Games	1,107,525	1,122,432	31,063	1,091,369	2.8%
<u>33</u> Blacked-Out Games	1,759,237	2,305,042	102,882	1,688,875	4.5%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

FIFTH WEEK
Oct. 19-20, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Oakland at Cincinnati	YES	55,298	56,058	7,936	48,122	14.1%	Rain, 48
Washington at Houston	NO	50,442	51,907	2,341	49,566	4.5%	Sunny, 78
Cleveland at Denver	YES	52,156	52,819	279	52,540	.5%	Warm and Clear, 75
Miami at New York Jets	YES	59,209	60,348	13,157	47,191	21.8%	Windy, Rain, 49
Philadelphia at St. Louis	NO	46,089	46,559	1,317	45,242	2.8%	Sunny, Windy, 55
Atlanta at Los Angeles	NO	62,711	64,843	4,262	60,581	6.6%	Hazy, 70
Detroit at Minnesota	YES	47,703	48,446	574	47,872	1.1%	Partly Cloudy, Windy, 62
New York Giants at Buffalo	NO	79,456	79,930	502	79,428	.6%	Clear, Windy, 44
Chicago at Pittsburgh	YES	49,676	50,345	2,766	47,579	5.4%	Cloudy, 50
New Orleans at San Francisco	NO	44,318	46,046	6,056	39,990	13.1%	Sunny, 75
Kansas City at San Diego	NO	27,486	28,381	1,912	26,469	6.7%	Partly Sunny, 68
Green Bay at Dallas	NO	63,143	64,335	146	64,189	.2%	Clear, 77
Baltimore at New England	NO	55,947	56,844	5,427	51,417	9.5%	Windy, Rain, 50
TOTALS:		693,634	706,861	46,675	708,308	6.6%	
TOTALS: <u>5</u> Weeks		3,560,396	3,621,070	180,620	3,488,552	5%	

5 Non-Black-Out Games 264,042 268,016 24,712 243,304 9.2%

8 Black-Out Games 429,592 438,845 21,963 465,004 5%

SEASON TOTALS

24 Non-Black-Out Games 1,371,567 1,390,448 55,775 1,334,673 4%

41 Black-Out Games 2,188,829 2,230,622 124,845 2,153,879 5.6%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

SIXTH WEEK
Oct. 26-27, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Dallas at Philadelphia	YES	65,222	66,089	1,200	64,889	1.8%	Cloudy, 55
St. Louis at New York Giants	NO	59,289	60,277	10,679	49,598	17.7%	Rain, 66
San Francisco at New England	NO	59,802	60,691	333	60,358	.5%	Windy, 55
Washington at Cleveland	NO	58,612	59,537	2,835	56,702	4.7%	Sunny, 51
Denver at Kansas City	NO	70,435	71,608	1,565	70,043	2.1%	Windy, 61
Cincinnati at Atlanta	NO	50,848	51,758	5,947	45,811	11.5%	Overcast, 62
Miami at Buffalo	YES	79,429	79,959	879	79,080	1.1%	Clear, 53
San Diego at Oakland	YES	52,795	53,791	10,995	42,796	20.4%	Cloudy, 58
Pittsburgh at Green Bay (Mil.)	YES	51,318	52,505	247	52,258	.4%	Sunny, Windy, 57
Baltimore at New York Jets	NO	58,973	60,114	4,977	55,137	8.2%	Cloudy, 55
Minnesota at Chicago	YES	56,302	57,031	5,772	51,259	10.1%	Clear, Windy, 59
New Orleans at Los Angeles	NO	57,970	60,771	6,048	54,723	10%	Clear, 74
Detroit at Houston	NO	48,686	50,083	3,179	46,904	6.3%	
TOTALS:		769,681	784,214	54,656	729,558	6.9%	
TOTALS: 6 Weeks		4,330,077	4,405,284	235,276	4,218,110	5.3%	

5 Non-Black-Out Games	305,066	309,375	19,093	290,282	6.2%
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8 Black-Out Games	464,615	474,839	35,563	439,276	7.5%
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SEASON TOTALS

29 Non-Black-Out Games	1,676,633	1,699,823	74,868	1,624,955	4.4%
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49 Black-Out Games	2,653,444	2,705,461	160,408	2,593,155	5.9%
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*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

SEVENTH WEEK
Nov. 1-2, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
San Diego at New York Giants	NO	59,016	60,003	7,971	52,032	13.3%	Partly Cloudy
Dallas at Washington	YES	54,310	55,004	0	55,004	0%	Sunny, 67
Cleveland at Baltimore	NO	36,585	37,285	2,050	35,235	5.4%	Sunny, 71
Minnesota at Green Bay	YES	55,229	55,984	606	55,378	1%	Cloudy, 52
New England at St. Louis	NO	46,728	47,263	1,356	45,907	2.8%	Sunny, 66
Pittsburgh at Cincinnati	YES	58,840	59,616	1,198	58,418	2%	Sunny, Windy, 68
Houston at Kansas City	NO	64,255	65,449	2,460	62,989	3.7%	Cloudy, 70
Oakland at Denver	YES	52,026	52,694	364	52,330	.7%	Sunny, Clear, 65
Miami at Chicago	NO	56,577	57,455	6,157	51,298	10.7%	Partly Sunny, Windy, 59
Buffalo at New York Jets	YES	59,187	60,336	1,993	58,343	3.3%	Sunny, 68
Atlanta at New Orleans	NO	58,396	59,983	10,641	49,342	17.7%	Sunny
Detroit at San Francisco	NO	46,551	48,267	5,058	43,209	10.4%	Sunny, 75
Los Angeles at Philadelphia	YES	65,189	66,067	1,466	64,601	2.2%	Clear, 60
TOTALS:		712,889	725,406	41,320	684,086	5.7%	
TOTALS: 7 Weeks		5,042,966	5,130,690	276,596	4,902,196	5.4%	

6 Non-Blacked-Out Games	344,781	349,701	5,627	344,074	1.6%
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7 Blacked-Out Games	368,108	375,705	35,693	340,012	9.5%
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SEASON TOTALS

35 Non-Blacked-Out Games	2,021,414	2,049,524	80,495	1,969,029	3.9%
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56 Blacked-Out Games	3,021,552	3,081,166	196,101	2,933,167	6.4%
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*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

EIGHTH WEEK
Nov. 9-10, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Kansas City at Dallas	NO	63,213	64,505	966	63,539	1.5%	Clear, 59
New York Jets at Miami	NO	75,631	76,596	3,701	72,896	4.8%	80
San Francisco at Los Angeles	NO	77,646	78,995	4,931	74,064	6.2%	Clear, 75
Houston at Pittsburgh	YES	49,697	50,452	812	49,640	1.6%	Sunny, 72
Green Bay at Chicago	YES	56,808	57,455	8,717	48,738	15.2%	Rain early, Overcast, 66
Cincinnati at Denver	YES	52,022	52,652	2,950	49,702	5.6%	Sunny, Cold, 38
New Orleans at Oakland	NO	52,687	53,764	2,497	51,267	4.6%	Sunny, 60
Washington at New York Giants	YES	59,366	60,340	3,098	57,242	5.1%	Sunny, 73
St. Louis at Philadelphia	YES	65,087	66,015	5,738	60,277	8.7%	Sunny, 73
Cleveland at Detroit	NO	76,952	78,121	3,468	74,653	4.4%	Cloudy, Fog, 60
New England at San Diego	NO	26,089	27,061	2,900	24,161	10.7%	Sunny, Windy, 68
Atlanta at Minnesota	YES	47,631	48,446	4,695	43,751	9.7%	Rain, 49
Baltimore at Buffalo	NO	77,772	78,353	1,033	77,320	1.3%	Partly Cloudy, 66
TOTALS:		780,601	792,755	45,506	747,250	5.7%	
TOTALS: 8 Weeks		5,823,567	5,923,445	322,102	5,649,446	5.4%	

6 Non-Blacked-Out Games	330,611	335,360	26,010	309,350	7.8%
7 Blacked-Out Games	449,990	457,395	19,496	437,900	4.3%

SEASON TOTALS

41 Non-Blacked-Out Games	2,352,025	2,384,884	106,505	2,278,379	4.5%
63 Blacked-Out Games	3,471,542	3,538,561	215,597	3,371,067	6.1%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

NINTH WEEK
Nov. 16-17, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Buffalo at Cincinnati	YES	58,815	59,575	2,909	56,666	4.9%	Clear, 53
New York Jets at Baltimore	NO	52,895	53,693	1,596	52,097	3.0%	Sunny, 69
Chicago at San Francisco	NO	46,142	47,874	6,148	47,874	1.3%	Cloudy, Windy, 58
Green Bay at Detroit	NO	78,081	79,208	2,852	76,356	3.6%	Sunny, 58
Denver at San Diego	NO	28,308	29,296	3,248	26,048	11.1%	Partly Cloudy, 67
Cleveland at Oakland	YES	52,469	53,944	3,483	50,461	6.5%	Cloudy, Windy, 55
Dallas at New England	YES	60,392	61,279	374	60,905	.6%	Overcast, Windy, 46
Los Angeles at Atlanta	NO	52,651	53,447	8,852	44,595	16.6%	Clear, Cool, 58
Philadelphia at New York Giants	YES	59,181	60,196	6,762	53,434	11.2%	Sunny, 60
Washington at St. Louis	YES	50,756	51,342	1,423	49,919	2.8%	Sunny, Windy, 70
Kansas City at Pittsburgh	YES	49,765	50,440	1,637	48,803	5.7%	Sunny, 55
Miami at Houston	YES	50,494	51,748	2,856	48,892	5.5%	Sunny, 70
Minnesota at New Orleans	NO	60,214	61,291	8,526	52,765	13.9%	Sunny,
TOTALS:		700,163	713,333	50,666	668,815	7.1%	
TOTALS: 9 Weeks		6,523,730	6,636,778	372,768	6,318,261	5.6%	

7 Non-Blacked-Out Games	381,872	388,524	19,444	369,080	5.0%
6 Blacked-Out Games	318,291	324,809	31,222	299,735	9.6%
<u>SEASON TOTALS</u>					
48 Non-Blacked-Out Games	2,733,897	2,773,408	125,949	2,647,459	4.5%
69 Blacked-Out Games	3,789,833	3,863,370	246,819	3,670,802	6.4%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

TENTH WEEK

Nov. 23-24, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
San Diego at Minnesota	YES	47,702	48,443	4,706	43,737	9.7%	Cloudy, 28
New England at Buffalo	NO	68,634	69,207	3,552	65,655	5.1%	Cloudy, Windy, 36
New York Giants at Green Bay (Mil)	YES	51,145	52,399	2,249	50,150	4.3%	Sunny, Clear, 35
Baltimore at Miami	NO	67,029	68,043	6,075	61,968	8.9%	Clear,Windy, Cool, 70
St. Louis at New York Jets	NO	58,884	60,105	6,936	53,169	11.5%	Clear, 44
Philadelphia at Dallas	NO	57,601	58,940	1,047	57,893	1.8%	Clear, Cool, 53
Chicago at Los Angeles	NO	61,929	64,918	6,228	58,690	9.6%	Clear, 80
Denver at Atlanta	NO	43,447	44,328	15,642	28,686	35.3%	Cloudy, Early Snow, 39
Detroit at Kansas City	NO	59,481	60,691	5,530	55,161	9.1%	Windy, 43
Oakland at Washington	YES	54,370	55,004	1,422	53,582	2.6%	Cloudy, 46
Cincinnati at Cleveland	NO	58,188	59,246	2,819	56,427	4.8%	Sunny, 40
San Francisco at New Orleans	NO	51,608	52,500	12,172	40,328	23.2%	Sunny
Pittsburgh at Houston	YES	50,257	51,604	1,657	49,947	3.2%	Clear, Cool, 40
TOTALS:		730,275	745,428	70,035	675,393	9.4%	
TOTALS: 10Weeks		7,254,005	7,382,206	442,803	6,939,403	6.0%	
4 Non-Blacked-Out Games		203,474	207,450	10,034	197,416	4.8%	
9 Blacked-Out Games		526,801	537,978	60,001	477,977	11.2%	
<u>SEASON TOTALS</u>							
52 Non-Blacked-Out Games		2,937,371	2,980,858	135,983	2,844,875	4.6%	
78 Blacked-Out Games		4,316,634	4,401,348	306,820	4,148,779	7.0%	

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

ELEVENTH WEEK
Nov. 27 - Dec. 1, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Atlanta at Oakland	NO	52,822	53,804	2,944	50,860	5.5%	Sunny, 53
Minnesota at Washington	YES	54,311	55,004	506	54,498	.9%	Cloudy, 60
Buffalo at St. Louis	YES	50,708	51,210	9,311	41,899	18.2%	Cloudy, 30
Los Angeles at Detroit	YES	78,988	80,238	11,086	69,152	13.8%	Cloudy, Windy, Snow, 35
New Orleans at Cleveland	NO	47,695	48,763	4,010	44,753	8.2%	Showers, Windy, 58
San Diego at Denver	YES	51,869	52,689	7,707	44,982	14.6%	Sunny, Windy, 30
Chicago at Green Bay	YES	55,109	55,984	9,163	46,821	16.4%	Snow, Windy, 29
New York Giants at Dallas	NO	56,527	57,703	4,374	53,329	7.6%	Clear, Windy, 50
San Francisco at Philadelphia	YES	64,964	65,845	9,151	56,694	13.9%	Cloudy, 55
New England at Miami	NO	68,480	69,436	7,473	61,963	10.8%	Clear, Cool, 65
Pittsburgh at New York Jets	YES	59,057	60,247	7,629	52,618	12.7%	55
Kansas City at Baltimore	NO	43,159	43,872	1,750	42,122	4.0%	Cloudy, 50
Houston at Cincinnati	YES	58,796	59,574	13,446	46,128	22.6%	Rain, Windy, 60
TOTALS:		742,485	754,369	88,550	665,819	11.7%	
TOTALS: 11 Weeks		7,996,490	8,136,575	531,353	7,659,473	6.5%	

8 Non-Blacked-Out Games 473,802 480,791 67,999 412,792 14.1%

5 Blacked-Out Games 268,683 273,578 20,551 253,027 7.5%

SEASON TOTALS

60 Non-Blacked-Out Games 3,411,173 3,461,649 203,982 3,257,667 6.0%

83 Blacked-Out Games 4,585,317 4,674,926 327,371 4,401,806 7.0%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

TWELFTH WEEK
Dec. 7-8, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Dallas at St. Louis	YES	50,875	51,342	1,641	49,701	3.2%	Overcast, 33
Baltimore at New York Giants	NO	59,304	60,297	10,434	49,863	17.3%	Sunny, 30
Washington at Atlanta	NO	57,880	58,850	6,041	52,809	10.3%	Cloudy, Showers, 58
Green Bay at Minnesota	YES	47,761	48,446	2,299	46,147	4.7%	Overcast, 32
New York Jets at New England	NO	56,639	57,539	3,550	53,989	6.2%	Sunny, Windy, 34
San Diego at Kansas City	NO	54,081	55,355	8,467	46,888	15.3%	38
Houston at San Francisco	NO	47,873	49,603	5,588	44,015	11.3%	Sunny, 67
Los Angeles at New Orleans	NO	53,783	54,810	14,852	39,958	27.1%	Sunny
Denver at Oakland	YES	53,085	54,037	2,962	51,075	5.5%	Clear, 68
Buffalo at Miami	NO	78,701	79,765	5,192	74,573	6.5%	Partly Cloudy, 79
Cincinnati at Philadelphia	YES	65,029	65,950	8,966	56,984	13.6%	Clear, Cold, 40
Cleveland at Pittsburgh	YES	49,743	50,465	2,503	47,962	5.0%	Sunny, Windy, 30
Detroit at Chicago	NO	52,623	53,234	15,462	37,772	29.0%	Overcast, 32
TOTALS:		727,377	739,693	87,957	651,736	11.9%	
TOTALS: <u>12</u> Weeks		8,723,867	8,876,268	619,310	8,311,209	7.0%	

5 Non-Blacked-Out Games 266,493 270,240 18,371 251,869 6.8%

8 Blacked-Out Games 460,884 469,453 69,586 399,867 14.8%

SEASON TOTALS

65 Non-Blacked-Out Games 3,677,666 3,731,889 222,353 3,509,536 6.0%

91 Blacked-Out Games 5,046,201 5,144,379 396,957 4,801,673 7.7%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

THIRTEENTH WEEK
Dec. 13-14, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Green Bay at Los Angeles	NO	64,217	66,496	7,184	59,312	10.8%	Clear, 66
St. Louis at Chicago	NO	52,464	53,169	18,117	35,052	34.1%	Rain, Windy, 66
Minnesota at Detroit	YES	78,990	80,250	7,508	72,742	9.4%	Cloudy, Windy, 65
Buffalo at New England	NO	58,736	59,646	1,253	58,393	2.1%	Partly Cloudy, Windy, 57
San Francisco at Atlanta	NO	45,255	46,174	7,673	38,501	16.6%	Cloudy, Cool, 60
Washington at Dallas	YES	63,259	64,452	3,361	61,091	5.2%	Windy, Humid, 73
Cincinnati at Pittsburgh	YES	49,973	50,616	1,727	48,889	3.4%	Clear, 50
Kansas City at Cleveland	NO	48,512	49,425	5,057	44,368	10.2%	Sunny, Windy, 62
Philadelphia at Denver	YES	51,974	52,649	15,789	36,860	30.0%	Snow, 18
New York Jets at San Diego	NO	40,522	52,446	2,740	49,706	5.2%	Clear, Cool, 57
Miami at Baltimore	YES	59,808	60,539	1,141	59,398	1.9%	Cloudy, Fog, 50
Houston at Oakland	YES	53,055	54,020	3,301	50,719	6.1%	Sunny, Windy, 56 - -
New Orleans at New York Giants	NO	59,182	60,181	20,031	40,150	33.3%	Partly Cloudy, 50
TOTALS:		725,947	750,063	94,882	655,181	12.6%	
TOTALS: 13 Weeks		9,449,814	9,626,331	714,192	8,966,390	7.4%	

6 Non-Blacked-Out Games 357,059 362,526 32,827 329,699 9.1%

7 Blacked-Out Games 368,888 387,537 62,055 325,482 16.0%

SEASON TOTALS

71 Non-Blacked-Out Games 4,034,725 4,094,415 254,680 3,839,235 6.2%

98 Blacked-Out Games 5,415,089 5,531,916 459,012 5,127,155 8.3%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

NFL ATTENDANCE - WEEKLY SUMMARY

FOURTEENTH WEEK
Dec. 20-21, 1975

GAME	BLACKOUT LIFTED	PAID ATTEN.	TICKETS DISTRIB. **	NO SHOWS **	IN HOUSE ATTEN. **	PERCENT OF NO SHOWS *	WEATHER
Minnesota at Buffalo	NO	73,391	73,883	18,890	54,993	25.6%	Snow, Windy, 21
Denver at Miami	NO	56,187	57,212	14,148	43,064	24.7%	Windy, 70
Pittsburgh at Los Angeles	YES	84,417	91,038	21,649	69,389	23.8%	Clear, 60
Atlanta at Green Bay	YES	54,948	55,841	17,276	38,565	30.9%	Sunny, 12
Chicago at New Orleans	NO	50,095	51,160	17,789	33,371	34.8%	Sunny
Philadelphia at Washington	YES	54,369	55,004	5,619	49,385	10.2%	Light Snow, 37
San Diego at Cincinnati	NO	57,234	58,054	11,580	46,474	19.9%	Cloudy, Windy, 24
St. Louis at Detroit	NO	71,560	77,676	8,404	64,272	10.8%	Sunny, 25
Kansas City at Oakland	YES	53,035	54,020	5,416	48,604	10.0%	Cloudy, 54
New York Giants at San Francisco	NO	43,844	45,681	11,327	34,354	24.8%	Rain, Windy, 50
Cleveland at Houston	NO	46,656	47,954	4,184	43,770	8.7%	Sunny, 52
New England at Baltimore	NO	52,686	53,400	1,474	51,926	2.8%	Cold, Windy, 34
Dallas at New York Jets	NO	58,805	60,064	22,785	37,279	37.9%	Windy, 25
TOTALS:		757,227	780,987	160,541	615,446	20.6%	
TOTALS: 14 Weeks		10,207,041	10,407,318	874,733	9,581,836	8.4%	

4 Non-Blacked-Out Games 246,769 255,903 49,960 205,943 19.5%

9 Blacked-Out Games 510,458 525,084 110,581 409,503 21.1%

SEASON TOTALS

75 Non-Blacked-Out Games 4,281,494 4,350,318 304,640 4,045,178 7.0%

107 Blacked-Out Games 5,925,547 6,057,000 569,593 5,536,658 9.4%

*No show percentages based on tickets distributed **Includes complimentary tickets

APPENDIX D

INQUIRIES TO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

FROM THE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

AND

RESPONSES

Replies to Commission inquiries from the National Football League and the American Basketball Association were, for the most part, received by telephone and are not reflected in the letters which follow. No response was ever received from the World Football League nor was it possible to make any telephone contact with a League representative prior to the WFL's demise.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

March 1, 1976

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Timothy Grandi, Esquire
3299 MacArthur Boulevard
Newport Beach, California 92660

Dear Mr. Grandi:

The Commission is currently preparing its third annual report to Congress on the effect of Public Law 93-107 concerning the local television blackout of certain professional sports events. As part of this continuing study required by Section 331(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, we must again request your assistance, (as counsel for the World Football League), in providing information relevant to assessing the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional football's 1975 (1975-76) season.

Specifically, we would request that the following data be provided for 1975-76 season:

- (1) The total number of games played during the 1975 season (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all-star, etc.);
- (2) The number of games in the 1975 season which were scheduled for telecast pursuant to "league television contract" as defined by P.L. 93-107 and the number of games which were in fact so telecast (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all-star, etc.; please also indicate home and visiting team and date for each game, and name of party with which WFL contracted for telecast). If any games scheduled for telecast pursuant to league contract were not in fact televised, please indicate the reasons therefore;

Timothy Grandi, Esq.


- (3) Of the games specified in (2) above, please indicate the games for which a local blackout was lifted by operation of P.L. 93-107 (i.e., games for which tickets of admission for seats available 120 hours before game time were sold out 72 hours or more in advance of game time). Please indicate any other games for which a local blackout was lifted for other reasons;
- (4) For each WFL team, please indicate the seating capacity figure for its home stadium. If the stadium capacity figure differs from the base number of tickets of admission employed in determining seating ticket availabilities 120 hours pre-game time for purposes of P.L. 93-107, please also provide the latter figure. (While this information is of particular relevance with respect to those teams whose home games were telecast pursuant to "league television contract" in the 1975 season, the Commission would appreciate such statistics for all WFL teams for purposes of future season evaluation and comparison.) If any of the above games specified in (2) above were played in other than a WFL team's home stadium, please provide similar information for that stadium;
- (5) Please indicate the means used by the respective teams to inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period.

Since the Commission's report must be transmitted to the Congress by May 15, 1976, it is hoped that the requested information can be provided as soon as conveniently possible, or by March 31, 1976 at the latest, to insure time for analysis and inclusion in the report. You are, of course, welcome to provide any other information which the WFL may consider relevant to the Commission's study of the effect of Public Law 93-107 with respect to professional football.

Timothy Grandi, Esq.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy (202) 632-6312. Your continued cooperation and assistance on behalf of the WFL will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Richard E. Wiley". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

March 17, 1976

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Commissioner Pete Rozelle
National Football League
410 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022


Dear Mr. Rozelle:

Enclosed is a copy of my March 17, 1976 letter to Thomas C. Williams, Esq., NFL Washington counsel, requesting additional information relevant to the Commission's study of the effect of Public Law 93-107 with respect to professional football's 1975 season.

Both Mr. Williams' assistance and your office's cooperation have been greatly appreciated.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,



Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

Enclosure

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

March 17, 1976

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Thomas C. Williams, Esq.
Connole and O'Connell
One Farragut Square South
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Williams:

The Commission is currently preparing its third annual report to Congress on the effects of Public Law 93-107 concerning the local television blackout of certain professional sports events. As part of this continuing study required by Section 331 (d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, we must again request your assistance as counsel for the National Football League, in providing information relevant to assessing the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional football.

We are aware of the National Football League's criticism of the Commission's second annual report on the effects of Public Law 93-107. Specifically we make note of Commissioner Rozelle's testimony before the House Subcommittee on Communication on October 30, 1975. At that time he made it clear that the NFL considered the FCC's second annual report to be erroneous and inadequate. Mr. Rozelle's criticism of that report largely centered on the Commission's failure to analyze the long term impact of the sports anti-blackout legislation on the financial health of NFL clubs, stadium owners and radio stations which had contracted for the right to broadcast home games.

Hopefully we will be able to address these and related substantive criticism pertaining to Public Law 93-107 in this year's report to Congress. Indeed we are now planning a thorough analysis of the effects of the legislation over the past three (i.e. 1973-75) seasons. However, a complete evaluation of the criticisms raised by Commissioner Rozelle and others is contingent upon the provision of certain financial data on individual NFL teams which we have previously requested but have yet to receive. Specifically we would

highly appreciate obtaining the following information by individual team:

- (1) The number and dollar value of season tickets offered for sale by each member club and the dollar value of season tickets sold during the 1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons (data to date have provided only the number of season tickets actually sold);
- (2) The number of remaining tickets (including those for standing room) offered for sale and actually sold for each home game during the 1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons;
- (3) Club revenues earned from TV for game rights (pre-, regular, and post-season) during the 1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons;
- (4) Club revenues earned from radio for game rights (pre-, regular, and post-season) during the 1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons. Also include any rebates paid to stations during those years;
- (5) Concession revenues earned by individual NFL teams during the 1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons. If possible please list revenues from the sale of "Pro" magazine separately. Also designate the percentage of concession sales which accrued to individual teams during each year;
- (6) Parking revenues earned by individual NFL teams during the 1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons. Also list the percentage of total parking revenues which accrued to each team during each of the aforementioned years;
- (7) Official stadium capacities of each NFL team during the 1973, 1974, and 1975 seasons;
- (8) A financial operations (profit and loss) statement for each team for the 1973, 1974, and if possible for the 1975 season.


- 3 -

This information is essentially that which was requested by Commission Staff in their meeting with you on March 3, 1976. Again, we recognize that while the provision of this information may be burdensome, it is necessary if we are to thoroughly assess the validity of the NFL's contention that Public Law 93-107 has had an adverse impact on professional football. Since this year's report must be transmitted to Congress on or before June 15, 1976 we hope that the requested data can be provided as soon as conveniently possible or by May 1, 1976 at the latest, to ensure time for analysis and inclusion in the Report.

As in the past, you are welcome to provide any other information which the NFL may consider relevant to the Commission's study of the effect of Public Law 93-107 with respect to professional football.

Again, thank you for your continuing assistance to the Commission on behalf of the NFL.

Sincerely yours,

Handwritten signature of Richard E. Wiley in cursive script.

Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

LAW OFFICES
CONNOLE AND O'CONNELLONE FARRAGUT SQUARE SOUTH
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

202-347-8300

CABLE "CONLAW"
TELE: 89-2319WILLIAM R. CONNOLE
QUINN O'CONNELL
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EUGENE E. THREADGILL
WILLIAM B. O'CONNELL, JR.
ERNEST C. BAYNARD, III
THOMAS M. RYANJOHN W. O'CONNELL
OF COUNSEL

October 9, 1975

Mr. Robert Blau
Office of Plans and Policy
Federal Communications Commission
Room 838 - 1919 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Bob:

Enclosed is a clear copy of the list of those television stations subject to NFL home territory blackouts.

Should you have any questions, I would be please to respond.

Cordially,



Thomas C. Williams

Enclosure.

EXHIBIT ATV STATIONS SUBJECT TO LEAGUE
HOME TERRITORY BLACKOUT POLICY

<u>HOME CITY</u>	<u>IN CITY STATIONS</u>	<u>OTHERS</u>
1. Atlanta	ABC - WOXI NBC - WSB CBS - WAGA	None
2. Baltimore	ABC - WJZ NBC - WBAL CBS - WMAR	NBC - Washington, DC - WRC CBS - Washington, DC - WTOP ABC - Washington, DC - WMAL NBC - Hagerstown - WJAG NBC - Harrisburg - WGAL CBS - Harrisburg - WHP CBS - York - WSBA ABC - York - WTPA CBS - Lancaster - WLYH
3. Buffalo	ABC - WKBW NBC - WGR CBS - WDEW	ABC - Rochester - WOKR NBC - Rochester - WRCC CBS - Rochester - WNEC ABC - Erie - WJET NBC - Erie - WICU CBS - Erie - WSEE CBC - Toronto, Canada - CFTC CBC - Toronto, Canada - CELI CTV - Hamilton, Canada - CHC
4. Chicago	ABC - WLS NBC - WMAQ CBS - WBDM	South Bend - Rockford Proviso - "Bears shall retain right to re-examine the South Bend-Rockford situation in the event that Bears attendance should show a significant drop below capacity."
5. Cincinnati	ABC - WKRC NBC - WLW CBS - WCPO	ADC - Dayton - WKEF NBC - Dayton - WLWD CBS - Dayton - WHIO ABC - Lexington - WBIG NBC - Lexington - WLEX CBS - Lexington - WKYT IND - Springfield

<u>HOME CITY</u>	<u>IN CITY STATIONS</u>	<u>OTHERS</u>
6. Cleveland	ABC - WEWS NBC - WKYC CBS - WJW	ABC - Youngstown - WYTV NBC - Youngstown - WFMJ CBS - Youngstown - WKBN ABC - Akron/Canton - WAKR
7. Denver	ABC - KBTW NBC - KOA CBS - WOKR KMGH	ABC - Pueblo - KRDO NBC - Pueblo - KCAA CBS - Pueblo - KKTU
8. Dallas	ABC - WFAA NBC - WBAP CBS - KDFW	ABC/CBS - Waco - KWTU ABC/NBC - Tyler - KLTU ABC/NBC/CBS - Sherman - KXII CBS - Wichita Falls - KAUZ NBC - Wichita Falls - KFDZ
9. Detroit	ABC - WXYZ NBC - WWJ CBS - WJBK	NBC - Lansing - WILX CBS - Lansing - WJIM ABC - Toledo - WDHO NBC - Toledo - WSPD CBS - Toledo - WTOL ABC - Flint - WJRT CBS - Saginaw - WEYI NBC - Bay City - WNEH CBC - Windsor, Ontario
10. Green Bay	ABC - WLUK* NBC - WFRV* CBS - WBAY*	ABC - Wausau - WAOW* CBS - Wausau - WSAU* ABC - Milwaukee - WIWI** NBC - Milwaukee - WTLJ** CBS - Milwaukee - WIWK**
	*Not blacked out when Green Bay plays in Milwaukee	
	**Not blacked out when Green Bay plays at home	
11. Houston	ABC - KTRK NBC - KPRC CBS - KHOU	ABC/NBC - Lufkin - KTRF ABC/CBS - Bryan - KBTX ABC - Beaumont - KBMT NBC - Beaumont - KJA CBS - Beaumont - KFD-1
12. Kansas City	ABC - KMBC NBC - WDAF CBS - KCMO	NBC - Topeka - KTSB CBS - Topeka - WIBW ABC - St. Joseph - KJTV NBC - Pittsburgh - KCM

<u>HOME CITY</u>	<u>IN CITY STATIONS</u>	<u>OTHERS</u>
13. Los Angeles	ABC - KABC NBC - KNBC CBS - KXTX	ABC - San Diego - KCST NBC - San Diego - KOGO CBS - San Diego - KFMB
14. Miami	ABC - WPLG NBC - WCKT CBS - WTVJ	ABC - West Palm Beach - WEAT NBC - West Palm Beach - WPTV NBC - Fort Myers - WBBH CBS - Fort Myers - WINK ABC - WAPL <i>WXPV-OK 22</i>
15. Minneapolis/ St. Paul	ABC - KMSP NBC - KSTP CBS - WCCO	CBS - Mankato - KEYC NBC - Mason City - KGLO NBC - Alexandria - KCMT NBC - Rochester - KRCC ABC - Austin - KAUS
16. New England	CBS - WNAC NBC - WBZ ABC - WCVB	ABC - Providence - WJEW NBC - Providence - WJAR CBS - Providence - WPRI ABC - Manchester, NH - WMUR
17. New Orleans	ABC - WVUE NBC - WDSU CBS - WFL	ABC/CBS - Baton Rouge - WAFB NBC - Baton Rouge - WBRZ IND - Baton Rouge - WRDT
18. New York	ABC - WABC NBC - KNBC CBS - WCBS	None
19. Oakland	ABC - KGO NBC - KRON CBS - KPIX	ABC - Sacramento - KOVR NBC - Sacramento - KCRA CBS - Sacramento - KXTV NBC/CBS - Sacramento - KTXL NBC - Salinas/Monterey - KSEW CBS - Salinas/Monterey - KQST ABC - San Jose - KNTV
20. Philadelphia	ABC - WPVI NBC - KYW CBS - WCAU	Harrisburg/Lancaster/Lebanon ABC - WTPA NBC - WGAL CBS - WLYH Scranton-Wilkes Barre ABC - WNEP NBC - WBRU CBS - WDAU

<u>HOME CITY</u>	<u>IN CITY STATIONS</u>	<u>OTHERS</u>
21. Pittsburgh	ABC - WTAE NBC - WIIC CBS - KDKA	NBC - Altoona - WJAC CBS - Altoona - WFBG CBS - Johnstown - WARD ABC/CBS - Wheeling - WSTV NBC - Steubenville - WTRF Youngstown ABC - KYTV NBC - WFMJ CBS - WKBN Clarksburg/Weston NBC - WBOY CBS - WDTV
22. San Francisco	Same as Oakland	
23. St. Louis	ABC - KTVI NBC - KSD CBS - KMOX	None
24. San Diego	ABC - KCST NBC - KOGO CBS - KFMB	ABC - Los Angeles - KABC NBC - Los Angeles - KNEC CBS - Los Angeles - KNXT
25. Washington	ABC - WMAL NBC - WRC CBS - WTOP	ABC - Baltimore - WJZ NBC - Baltimore - WEAL CBS - Baltimore - WMAR

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Mr. Bowie Kuhn
Commissioner of Baseball
15 West 51st Street
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Kuhn:

Enclosed is a copy of my March 2, 1976 letter to James F. Fitzpatrick, Esq., Washington counsel for Major League Baseball, requesting information relevant to the Commission's study of the effect of Public Law 93-107 with respect to professional baseball's 1975 season.

Both Mr. Fitzpatrick's assistance and your office's cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

Enclosure

March 2, 1974

James F. Fitzpatrick, Esquire
 Arnold and Porter
 1229 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick:

As required under Section 331(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Commission is preparing its third annual report to the Congress on the effect of Public Law 93-107 pertaining to the local television blackout of certain professional sports events. In doing so, we must request your assistance, as counsel for Major League Baseball, in providing information relevant to assessing the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional baseball's 1975 season.

In particular, we would request that the following data for Major League Baseball's 1975 season be provided:

- (1) The total number of games played during the 1975 season (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all-star, etc.);
- (2) The number of games in the 1975 season which were scheduled for telecast pursuant to "league television contract" as defined by P.L. 93-107 and the number of games which were in fact so telecast (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all-star, etc.); please also indicate home and visiting team and date for each game, and name of party with which Major League Baseball contracted for telecast). If any games scheduled for telecast pursuant to league contract were not in fact televised, please indicate the reasons therefore;
- (3) Of the games specified in (2) above, please indicate the games for which a local blackout was lifted by operation of P.L. 93-107 (i.e., games for which tickets of admission for seats

James F. Fitzpatrick, Esq.

available 120 hours before game time were sold out 72 hours or more in advance of game time). Please indicate any other games for which a local blackout was lifted for other reasons;

- (4) For each Major League Baseball team, please in indicate the seating capacity figure for its home stadium. If the stadium capacity figure differs from the base number of tickets of admission employed in determining seating ticket availabilities 120 hours pre-game time for purposes of P.L. 93-107, please also provide the latter figure. (While this information is of particular relevance with respect to those teams whose home games were telecast pursuant to "league television contract" in the 1975 season, the Commission would appreciate such statistics for all Major League Baseball teams for purposes of future season evaluation and comparison.) If any of the games specified in (2) above were played in other than a Major League Baseball team's home stadium, please provide similar information for that stadium;
- (5) Please indicate the means used by the respective teams to inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period.
- (6) The number and dollar value of season tickets offered for sale by each member club and the dollar value of season tickets sold;
- (7) The number and dollar value of tickets offered for sale by each member club for each home game;
- (8) The number and dollar value of the tickets for seats available for sale and actually sold by each member club during the 120 to 72 hour period prior to game time for each home game;
- (9) The number of tickets offered for sale and actually sold by each member club for each home game for standing room, if any;

James F. Fitzpatrick, Esq.

- (10) Club revenues from TV for game rights (pre-, regular, and post-season) compared with 1974 season;
- (11) Club revenues from radio for game rights (pre-, regular, and post-season) compared with 1974 season, including any rebates paid for 1974 season;
- (12) Concession revenues compared with 1974 season;
- (13) Any changes in ticket prices and policies from 1974 to 1975;
- (14) Particular means employed by member clubs to inform the public of ticket availabilities during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period;
- (15) The terms of Major League Baseball network contracts governing the imposition and lifting of local blackouts;
- (16) A financial operating (profit and loss) statement for the year.

Since the Commission's report must be transmitted to the Congress by May 15, 1976, it is hoped that the requested information can be provided as soon as conveniently possible, or by March 31, 1976 at the latest, to insure time for analysis and inclusion in the report. You are, of course, welcome to provide any other information which Major League Baseball may consider relevant to the Commission's study of the effect of Public Law 93-107 with respect to professional baseball.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's staff, (202) 63296312. Your cooperation and assistance on behalf of Major League Baseball will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely, yours,

Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

cc: Mr. Bowie Kuhn

RTBlau:daf/PP/3-1-76



Office of the Commissioner

Bowie K. Kuhn
Commissioner

March 4, 1976

Dear Dick:

I will see that you have the material needed under Public-Law 93-107 promptly. It is not a very difficult compilation in our case. I wish it were.

Kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

BKK/ms

cc: James F. Fitzpatrick, Esq.

RECEIVED

MAR 10 1976

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April 15, 1976

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OF COUNSEL

The Honorable Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Re: Baseball Blackout Information

Dear Chairman Wiley:

This is in response to your letter of March 2, 1976, requesting information regarding the impact of Public Law 93-107 on Professional Baseball during its 1975 season.

We have been informed by the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball that there were no instances in which the rule took effect so as to lift the blackout in the home market of a network telecast of a sold-out home game.

Baseball games rarely sell out in advance. Confirmation of this is reflected in the data presented in Attachment A. There it is shown that the average seating capacity of the 24 major league clubs' stadia far exceeded their average attendance figures during the 1975 season. Furthermore, in comparison to some other professional sports, relatively few season tickets are sold to baseball games. Consequently, no information is maintained by the Office of the

MAR 24 1976

COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

ARNOLD & PORTER

The Honorable Richard E. Wiley
April 15, 1976
Page Two

Commissioner of Baseball tabulating sellouts, near sellouts, season ticket holders or advance sales.

Baseball's network telecasts include the World Series, the Playoff Games, and the All-Star Game -- all of which, pursuant to a long standing Baseball policy, were shown on the home teams' local television stations. There were no sellouts of any of the network televised Saturday Games of the Week or the Monday Night Games.

Therefore, in view of the nonapplicability of 93-107 to any of the games played during the 1975 baseball season and in keeping with past practice in this regard, it must be concluded that the other information requested from Baseball is not relevant to the purposes of your study.

Of course, we stand ready to cooperate fully in satisfying your need for essential data. If there is any further information that you require, we will be happy to discuss the matter further with you.

Sincerely,



James F. Fitzpatrick

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT A

ATTENDANCE AND SEATING CAPACITY FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

Team	Stadium Capacity*	1975 Attendance	Average Attendance Per Home Game
Atlanta Braves	52,744	534,675	6,601
Chicago Cubs	37,741	1,034,819	12,776
Cincinnati Reds	51,726	2,315,603	28,588
Houston Astros	45,000	858,002	10,593
Los Angeles Dodgers	56,000	2,539,349	31,350
Montreal Expos	28,000	908,292	11,214
New York Mets	55,300	1,730,566	21,365
Philadelphia Phillies	56,581	1,909,233	23,571
Pittsburgh Pirates	50,230	1,270,018	15,679
St. Louis Cardinals	50,126	1,695,270	20,929
San Diego Padres	50,000	1,281,747	15,824
San Francisco Giants	58,000	522,919	6,456
California Angels	43,204	1,058,163	13,064
Baltimore Orioles	52,137	1,002,157	12,372
Boston Red Sox	33,437	1,748,443	21,586
Chicago White Sox	44,492	770,800	9,516
Cleveland Indians	74,713	977,195	12,064
Detroit Tigers	54,226	1,058,836	13,072
Kansas City Royals	40,762	1,151,836	14,220
Milwaukee Brewers	52,198	1,213,356	14,980
Minnesota Twins	45,919	737,156	9,101
New York Yankees	54,028	1,288,045	15,902
Oakland A's	50,000	1,077,684	13,304
Texas Rangers	35,698	1,127,933	13,925
TOTAL	1,175,219	29,812,098	15,336

*As of the 1975 Season.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

March 5, 1976

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Robert H. Kaufman, Esq.
Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn
300 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr. Kaufman:

The Commission is currently preparing its third annual report to Congress on the effect of Public Law 93-107 concerning the local television blackout of certain professional sports events. As part of this continuing study required by Section 331(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, we must again request your assistance, as counsel for the National Basketball Association, in providing information relevant to assessing the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional basketball's 1975-76 season. The completed information you supplied on the 1974-75 National Basketball Association season was greatly appreciated.

Specifically, we would request that the following data be provided for the National Basketball Association's 1975-76 season:

- (1) The total number of games played during the 1975-76 season (breakdown by regular season, play-off and all-star);
- (2) The number of games in the 1975-76 season which were scheduled for telecast pursuant to "league television contract" as defined by P.L. 93-107 and the number of games which in fact were so telecast (breakdown by regular season, play-off and all-star; please also indicate home and visiting team and date for each game, and name of party with which the league contracted for telecast). If any games scheduled for telecast pursuant to league contract were not in fact televised, please indicate the reasons therefor.

Robert H. Kaufman, Esq.

- (3) Of the games specified in (2) above, please indicate the games for which a local blackout was lifted by operation of P.L. 93-107 (i.e., games for which tickets of admission for seats available for purchase 120 hours before game time were sold out 72 hours or more in advance of game time). Please indicate any other games for which a local blackout was lifted for other reasons.
- (4) For each league team, please indicate the seating capacity figure for its home arena. If the arena capacity figure differs from the base number of tickets of admission employed in determining seating ticket availabilities 120 hours pre-game time for purposes of P.L. 93-107, please also provide the latter figure. If any of the games specified in (2) above were played at other than a league team's home arena, please provide similar information for that arena.
- (5) Please indicate the means used by the respective teams to inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period.

Please feel free to provide any other information that you believe to be relevant regarding the effect of Public Law 93-107.

Since the Commission's report to Congress on the impact and effect of Public Law 93-107 is due on May 15, 1976, we would appreciate receiving this information from you by April 1, 1976. We realize that the National Basketball Association's full season of play may not be completed by this time, but hope that you will permit as much of the necessary available data as possible to be transmitted to the Commission in time for analysis and inclusion in this report.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy (202) 632-6312. Your continued cooperation and assistance on behalf of the National Basketball Association will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

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LAWRENCE J. ROTTERBERG

August 22, 1975

Honorable Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554

Re: National Basketball Association -
Commission's Study of the Effect of Public
Law 93-107, The Sports Anti-Blackout Law

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of our client, the National Basketball Association, we are pleased to provide additional information requested in your letter of November 26, 1974 in connection with Section 331(d) of the Communications Act of 1934. The following information, prepared by the staff of the National Basketball Association, reflects the completion of the 1974-1975 National Basketball Association season.

1. The total number of games played by the NBA teams during the 1974-1975 season was as follows:

Regular Season Games	738
Play-Off Games	47
All Star Game	1
Total	786

Honorable Richard E. Wiley

2

August 22, 1975

2. The number of games in the 1974-1975 season which were scheduled for telecast pursuant to the "league television contract" (as that term is defined in Public Law 93-107) was approximately 40. The number of games actually telecast was as follows:

Regular Season Games	19
Play-Off Games	17
All Star Game	1
	<hr/>
Total	37

This number was within the range of number of games which defines the NBA's broadcast obligations under the league contract.

Attached hereto is a table (Attachment 1) showing, among other things, the date, visiting team and home team for each game telecast pursuant to the league television contract. With respect to all such games, the NBA contracted with the Columbia Broadcasting System for telecast.

3. Attachment 1 shows the games for which the local blackout was lifted by operation of Public Law 93-107. This occurred with respect to a total of 7 games. In addition, the blackout of 13 games was lifted voluntarily by the home team for promotional purposes.

As in previous reports to the Commission in connection with Public Law 93-107, the National Basketball Association has characterized any blackout lifted because there was a minimal number of tickets remaining unsold 72 hours before game time as a blackout lifted by operation of law. Technically, Public Law 93-107 requires that a blackout be lifted only when all tickets for seats made available 120 hours or more before the beginning time of a game are sold out 72 hours or more before game time. In fact, when there are just a few tickets remaining unsold at the stadium 72 hours before game time, it is impracticable with present record keeping and box office procedures to determine whether those tickets were available for sale 120 hours before game time or were previously sold or unused complimentary tickets returned to the stadium box office subsequent to that cut off point. Consequently, in order to avoid violation of the law, in such situations NBA teams have involuntarily lifted the home territory blackout of the game in question.

For example, based on box office records, there were four tickets to the Portland game at Milwaukee on January 19, 1975 which

were unsold 72 hours before game time. Uncertain of the exact status of these tickets, Milwaukee concluded that it was compelled by law to lift the blackout of that game. The same practice was followed during the 1973-1974 season: for example, the blackout of the Milwaukee/Boston game at Boston played on May 3, 1974 was lifted to comply with Public Law 93-107, although there were 35 tickets (out of 10,938 tickets) unsold 72 hours before game time, because Boston could not be sure whether these few tickets were properly counted among those available 120 hours before game time.

The National Basketball Association therefore takes issue with the conclusion drawn by the Commission that blackouts the NBA has characterized as lifted by operation of law were in fact lifted voluntarily.* The NBA believes that the lifting of the home territory blackout in the kind of situation described above is required by law and should not be treated otherwise for any purpose.

4. A second table attached hereto (Attachment 2) shows the seating capacity figure for all primary and satellite stadiums used by NBA teams. As indicated in Attachment 1, two of the games televised pursuant to the league television contract during the 1974-1975 season were played at a location other than the team's primary home arena (Seattle against Boston at Hartford on 3/2/75 and Cleveland against Kansas City at Omaha on 4/6/75).

5. You will note that more complete information is provided in Attachment 1 with respect to "no-shows" than was available for the 1973-1974 season. As in the past, where such information is not available for any game, it is generally for the reason that the stadium where the game was played and the stadium turnstile are not in the home team's control. Little specific information is available with respect to the impact of the operation of the blackout law on concession and souvenir sales, parking fees, etc. because these are in most cases under management or ownership separate from that of the home team.

Based on the "no-show" and concession figures which have been made available to it, the NBA has compiled the enclosed chart, marked Attachment 3, which compares "no-show" and concession figures

* Second Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the Effect of Public Law 93-107, at p.96, fn.28; p.97, fn.31; and p.98.

PRG&M

Honorable Richard E. Wiley

4


August 22, 1975

for five pairs of games between the same teams played in the same stadium. One game in each pair of games was televised pursuant to league contract and broadcast locally, either as a result of the mandatory or voluntary lifting of the blackout, and the other game was not televised. In each case, the number of "no-shows" was larger for the locally televised game. Although the difference in the number of "no-shows" is not in each instance significant, the consistent pattern in the figures begins to demonstrate the impact of the law.*

The NBA believes that as a more complete "no-show" and collateral revenue data is made available to the individual teams, the economic injury suffered by virtue of the operation of Public Law 93-107 will clearly emerge. Further, the full impact of the law on gate revenue has probably not yet been felt. Consequently, the NBA disputes the Commission's finding that "the anti-blackout law's overall effect on NBA member clubs appears to have been minimal." (Second Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the Effect of Public Law 93-107, at p.103).

6. In its Second Annual Report, the Commission recognizes that "the collateral revenue problem may be significant for the NBA (as in the National Hockey League) where the ownership of a number of arenas . . . is affiliated with the team ownership." (p.99) It should be noted that in addition to Chicago, Cleveland and Washington (the teams named in the Report), New York is one of the teams which has such a situation.

Very truly yours,



Robert M. Kaufman

RMK:srr

* Due to the reasons described above, the available data concerning the impact of the lifting of the blackout on collateral revenues is too scant to be significant.

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April 6, 1976

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Honorable Richard E. Wiley, Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554

Re: National Basketball Association - Commission's
Inquiry under Public Law 93-107 FCC Matters

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are writing to you on behalf of our client, the National Basketball Association, in response to your letter of March 5, 1976.

The National Basketball Association is a major professional basketball league of eighteen teams playing games from coast to coast. The Association's staff has prepared the information set out below:

1. The total number of games played or to be played by National Basketball Association teams during the 1975-76 season will be as follows:

Regular season games	738
Playoff games	40 (appx)
All Star game	1
Total	779 (appx)

It is not possible to give an exact number of the game to be played since the number of playoff games depends upon the number of games required for the completion of each of the series in the playoffs. Up to March 22, 1976, the eighteen teams had played 638 games (including the All Star game) or 86% of those games scheduled for the regular season.

PRG&M

Honorable Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

-2-

April 6, 1976

2. The number of games in the 1975-76 season scheduled for telecast pursuant to the League television contract will be approximately forty consisting of the following:

Regular season games already broadcast	16
All Star game already broadcast	<u>1</u>
Subtotal	17
Additional regular sea- son games to be broad- cast	4
Playoff games to be broadcast	<u>19</u> (appx)
Total	40 (appx)

We are unable to provide you with a definitive list of the regular season games and of the playoff games still to be broadcast since the regular season games are still subject to final change and the playoff games are, of course, dependent on the results of the regular season and of each preceding playoff series.

3. The attached table shows certain information for each of the games already broadcast pursuant to the League television contract. For each of the games it shows: whether the game was blacked out; whether the blackout was lifted voluntarily; or whether the blackout was lifted by law.

As you will note, four of the blackouts were lifted voluntarily as a matter of the individual home team's local marketing strategy, even though a lifting of the blackout would not have been required under the law. This was a matter determined by the local team in the exercise of its discretion based upon the particular marketing characteristics of its home territory. In each of these cases, a substantial number of tickets remained unsold. Four blackouts were lifted by operation of law.

PRC & M

Honorable Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

-3-

April 6, 1976

4. The same table shows the searing capacity figures for each of the arenas from which one of these games was blacked out.
5. Although more teams have given data on no-shows, the figures do not follow a sufficiently consistent pattern to support any firm conclusions. For example, of the two games with the highest loss from no-shows, one was blacked out and the other was not. Information is still difficult to obtain on the effect of lifting of the blackouts on concession and souvenir sales, parking fees, etc., which are in most cases under separate management or ownership than that of the team itself.
6. Although the home team consistently and continually promotes ticket sales before, during and after the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period, it continues to be the practice of a home team appearing on network television to avoid publicizing the specific number of unsold tickets because it tends to invite a negative response from the ticketholder when the blackout is lifted and a similar response from the non-ticket-holders when the blackout is imposed.

A final report for the 1975-76 season can be prepared promptly after the end of the playoffs, which should terminate during the last week of May or early June.

Very truly yours,



Robert M. Kaufman

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PROSKAUER ROSE GOETZ & MENDELSON

MAY 13 1976
300 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

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MAY 10 1976

MAIL BRANCH

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COMPLAINTS AND
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TELEPHONE (212) 593-9000

WRITERS DIRECT DIAL NUMBER

593-9274

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(1975-1981)
JOSEPH M. PROSKAUER
(1930-1971)
WORNAN S. GOETZ
(1945-1972)
CABLE REPORT
TELEX ITT 421178
WU 125522

May 5, 1976

Ms. Mary Donnelly
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554

Re: National Basketball Association - Commission
Inquiry under Public Law 93-107 - FCC Matters

Dear Ms. Donnelly:

We are writing to you on behalf of our client, the National Basketball Association, in response to your requests for further information respecting a number of items contained in the National Basketball Association's report for the 1974-75 season and the interim report for the 1975-76 season. The information contained in this letter has been secured from the National Basketball Association.

Regarding the final report for the 1974-75 season, you have inquired as to the following matters:

- 1) Why was the blackout lifted for the April 12, 1975 game between New York and Houston, in light of the fact that at the time of the lifting of the blackout only 500 out of approximately 9,700 tickets were then sold? We are advised that the April 12, 1975 game was the first game of the playoffs and was, necessarily, scheduled on relatively short notice. Ticket sales were proceeding briskly and the owners made a business judgment that the promotional advantages of broadcasting the game outweighed the possible risks of adversely affecting ticket sales and increasing the incidence of no-shows.

PRG&M

Ms. Mary Donnelly

-2-

2) Why was the blackout voluntarily lifted in thirteen instances during the regular season? We are advised that there are a panoply of promotional considerations which have occasionally prompted the owners voluntarily to lift the blackout, as in the instance covered by question 1. For example, the owners have lifted the blackout of games in Detroit in order to allow certain large local advertisers the opportunity to view games broadcast under their sponsorship. Such a decision represents the exercise of a business judgment which is a prerogative of the owners.

With respect to the interim report on the 1975-76 season, you have inquired regarding the following matters:

1) Why have the owners occasionally voluntarily lifted the blackout during the regular season? The answer to this question is same as the answer to question 2 above. The owners have decided, on occasion, to voluntarily lift the blackout for promotional purposes in the exercise of their respective business judgments.

2) Were there any regional broadcasts during the 1975-76 season? Yes. On March 31, 1976, after the close of the period encompassed by the interim report, the Philadelphia at Boston and Houston at Seattle games were broadcast regionally.

3) Which television network holds the contract for the broadcast of the National Basketball Association 1975-76 season? The Columbia Broadcasting System has the contract for the 1975-76 season.

4) Why does the Boston team sell "obstructed-view seats" before the seats comprising the arena capacity are sold out? As a matter of team policy, obstructed-view seats are not sold until all seats included in the house capacity figure have been sold. Occasionally, when the only remaining seats are single seats, the box office will begin to sell obstructed view seats to persons requiring pairs of tickets.

PRG & M

Ms. Mary Donnelly

-3-

In measuring the capacity of the arena, it has been Boston's consistent practice to not include "obstructed view seats," because most fans do not regard these seats as desirable, although they are less expensive than other seats. The practice of excluding these seats from the computation of the capacity of the arena has been adopted in order to most fairly reflect the number of generally saleable seats. It is probable that such exclusion has the effect of increasing the likelihood of a technical "sell-out."

5) Why doesn't the report contain data pertaining to concessions and concessionaires? Item 5 on page 3 of the interim report explains that the member teams are unable to obtain complete and detailed data on concession receipts, etc., which are often derived from activities with respect to which the teams have limited access to information.

6) Do National Basketball Association member teams sell season tickets? If so, have the prices for such tickets increased since last year? The teams do sell such tickets. The league does not have league-wide data comparing the prices of season tickets. Ticket pricing has been and remains a team function, rather than a league function.

Perhaps the final report for the 1975-76 season will answer any additional questions which you might have.

Very truly yours,

Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn

AS:djq

By

Alan Stein

Alan Stein

PROSKAUER ROSE GOETZ & MENDELSON
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RONALD S. RACHBERG

May 27, 1976

Ms. Mary Donnelly
Office of Plans and Policy
Room 338
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20554

Re: National Basketball Association - Commission
Inquiry under Public Law 93-107-FCC Matters

Dear Ms. Donnelly:

We are writing to you on behalf of our client, the National Basketball Association, in response to your request for further information concerning the 1975-76 regular season. The information contained in this letter has been secured from the National Basketball Association.

You have inquired as to the following matters:

1) Does the National Basketball Association have access to figures reflecting ticket sales as of twenty-four hours before game time? We are advised that these figures are not available. We have previously provided you with the figures reflecting ticket sales as of seventy-two hours before game time.

2) In addition to the data already supplied, what are the ticket sales figures for the balance of the 1975-76 regular season? Attached is a schedule prepared by the National Basketball Association which contains the ticket sales for the balance of the 1975-76 regular season.

PRG&M

Ms. Mary Donnelly

-2-

May 27, 1976

We will send you a final report on the 1975-76 season, including the playoffs, during the summer.

Very truly yours,

Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn

AS:djq

By

Alan Stein

Alan Stein

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
SUMMARY OF ATTENDANCE AT NATIONALLY TELEVISED GAMES
1975-76 REGULAR SEASON

DATE	REGULAR SEASON GAMES	ARENA SEATING CAPACITY	LESS: TICKETS COMPS.	TICKETS ON SALE		TICKETS SOLD		TICKETS UNSOLD		TOTAL TICKETS SOLD	NO SHOWS	GAME BLACKED OUT	BLACKOUT LIFTED BY LAW	BLACKOUT LIMITED VOLUNTARILY
				HRS. BEFORE GAME TIME	GAME TIME	HRS. BEFORE GAME TIME	GAME TIME	72 HRS. BEFORE GAME	BEFORE GAME					
11/ 9/75	New York @ Portland	12,446	346	12,100	9,600	2,500	11,014	278	X	278				
11/23/75	Philadelphia @ Atlanta	15,389	1,366	14,023	1,992	12,031	3,704	766	X	766				
12/ 7/75	Golden State @ Seattle	14,096	995	13,101	13,101	0	13,101	0		13,101	0		X	
12/25/75	Kansas City @ Phoenix	13,036	1,195	11,841	7,250	4,591	11,749	1,830		11,749	1,830			
1/11/76	Detroit @ Kansas City	16,300	1,255	15,045	3,461	11,584	5,029	0	X	5,029	0			
1/25/76	Buffalo @ Boston	13,902	433	13,469	13,089	380	13,580*	778	X	13,580*	778			
1/25/76	Chicago @ Kansas City	16,300	1,129	15,171	3,525	11,646	5,728	0	X	5,728	0			
2/ 1/76	Washington @ Golden State	12,787	844	11,943	11,194	749	11,439	0		11,439	0			X
2/ 3/76	ALL STAR GAME @ Philadelphia	18,516	846	17,670	12,000	5,670	14,943	0		14,943	0			X
2/ 8/76	Buffalo @ Philadelphia	18,516	854	17,662	8,000	9,662	10,470	0		10,470	0	X		
2/15/76	Los Angeles @ Washington	17,973	859	17,114	11,156	5,958	13,431	577		13,431	577			X
2/22/76	Los Angeles @ Seattle	14,096	845	13,251	13,251	0	13,251	0		13,251	0		X	
2/29/76	Golden State @ Boston	13,902	434	13,468	13,837*	0	14,742*	542		14,742*	542		X	
3/ 5/76	Golden State @ Los Angeles	17,643	665	16,978	11,014	5,964	13,310	1,814		13,310	1,814			X
3/ 7/76	New York @ Washington	17,973	981	16,992	12,695	4,297	16,405	856		16,405	856			X
3/14/76	Washington @ Boston	13,902	436	13,466	11,802	1,664	14,871*	699		14,871*	699			X
3/21/76	Philadelphia @ Boston	13,902	420	13,482	13,075	407	12,359	533		12,359	533			X
3/21/76	Houston @ Seattle	14,096	1,327	12,769	12,769	0	12,769	0		12,769	0			X
3/28/76	Buffalo @ Washington	17,973	1,590	16,383	9,186	7,197	12,311	1,381		12,311	1,381			X
4/04/76	Buffalo @ Boston	13,902	445	13,457	11,190	2,267	12,105	0		12,105	0			X
4/10/76	New York @ Cleveland	20,128	4,031	16,097	7,765	8,332	9,970	351		9,970	351			X
4/11/76	Boston @ Washington	17,973	857	17,116	10,100	7,016	15,044	901		15,044	901			X

* Includes the sale of part or all of the 1,405 obstructed seats in excess of the arena seating capacity

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

March 19, 1976

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Mr. Jim Bukata
American Basketball Association
1700 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Bukata:

The Commission is currently preparing its third annual report to Congress on the effect of Public Law 93-107 concerning the local television blackout of certain professional sports events. As part of this continuing study required by Section 331(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, we must again request the assistance of the American Basketball Association in providing information relevant to assessing the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional basketball's 1975-76 season.

Specifically, we would request that the following data be provided for the American Basketball Association's 1975-76 season:

- (1) The total number of games played during the 1975-76 season (breakdown by regular season, play-off and all-star);
- (2) The number of games in the 1975-76 season which were scheduled for telecast pursuant to "league television contract" as defined by P.L. 93-107 and the number of games which in fact were so telecast (breakdown by regular season, play-off and all-star; please also indicate home and visiting team and date for each game, and name of party with which the league contracted for telecast). If any games scheduled for telecast pursuant to league contract were not in fact televised, please indicate the reasons therefor.

Mr. Jim Bukata

- (3) Of the games specified in (2) above, please indicate the games for which a local blackout was lifted by operation of P.L. 93-107 (i.e., games for which tickets of admission for seats available for purchase 120 hours before game time were sold out 72 hours or more in advance of game time). Please indicate any other games for which a local blackout was lifted for other reasons.
- (4) For each league team, please indicate the seating capacity figure for its home arena. If the arena capacity figure differs from the base number of tickets of admission employed in determining seating ticket availabilities 120 hours pre-game time for purposes of P.L. 93-107, please also provide the latter figure. If any of the games specified in (2) above were played at other than a league team's home arena, please provide similar information for that arena.
- (5) Please indicate the means used by the respective teams to inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period.

Please feel free to provide any other information that you believe to be relevant regarding the effect of Public Law 93-107.

Since the Commission's report to Congress on the impact and effect of Public Law 93-107 is due on May 15, 1976, we would appreciate receiving this information from you by April 15, 1976. We realize that the American Basketball Association's full season of play may not be completed by this time, but hope that you will permit as much of the necessary available data as possible to be transmitted to the Commission in time for analysis and inclusion in this report.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's

Mr. Jim Bukata

Office of Plans and Policy (202) 632-6312. Your continued cooperation and assistance on behalf of the American Basketball Association will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Richard E. Wiley
Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

March 3, 1976

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Philip R. Hochberg, Esq.
O'Connor and Hannan
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Hochberg:

The Commission is currently preparing its third annual report to Congress on the effect of Public Law 93-107 concerning the local television blackout of certain professional sports events. As part of this continuing study required by Section 331(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, we must again request your assistance, as counsel for the National Hockey League, in providing information relevant to assessing the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional hockey's 1975-76 season.

Specifically, we would request that the following data be provided for the National Hockey League's 1975-76 season:

- (1) The total number of games to be played during the 1975-76 season with breakdowns in regular season, play-off and all-star categories;
- (2) The schedule of the 1975-76 National Hockey League games to be telecast pursuant to any league contracts;
- (3) To what extent the NHL plans to apply its policy of not imposing local blackouts with respect to any of the games to be televised during the 1975-76 season;
- (4) The games for which a local blackout would have been lifted during the 1974-75 season by operation of Public Law 93-107 had the NHL not applied the policy described in subparagraph 3 above;

Philip R. Hochberg, Esq.


- (5) The seating capacities for all NHL arenas;
- (6) The extent that the seating capacity figures, sought in subparagraph 5 above, exceed the number of tickets available 120 hours before game time (for purposes of Public Law 93-107);
- (7) The means by which the respective teams inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period;
- (8) The number of "no shows" at each NHL regular season game;
- (9) The gross concession revenues for each NHL regular season game; and
- (10) All gross receipts for NHL regular season games that cannot be classed as either gate receipts or concession revenues, e.g. gross parking receipts.

Please feel free to provide any other information that you believe to be relevant regarding the effect of Public Law 93-107.

Since the Commission's report to Congress on the impact and effect of Public Law 93-107 is due on May 15, 1976, we would appreciate receiving this information from you by April 1, 1976. We realize that the National Hockey League's full season of play may not be completed by this time, but hope that you will permit as much of the necessary available data as possible to be transmitted to the Commission in time for analysis and inclusion in this report.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy (202) 632-6312. Your continued cooperation and assistance on behalf of the National Hockey League will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,


Richard E. Wiley
Chairman

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 MEMBER OF D.C. BAR

March 31, 1976

The Honorable Richard E. Wiley
 Chairman, Federal Communications
 Commission
 1919 M Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20554

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of February 24, 1975. The National Hockey League desires to cooperate with the Commission in the Commission's fulfillment of its statutory obligation.

One point not made by your letter is the expiration of Public Law 93-107 on December 31, 1975. The National Hockey League, unlike the National Football League, made no specific promise to members of Congress concerning the lifting of blackouts (after December 31) as if the statute remained in effect; nevertheless, the NHL acted in accord with the stated Congressional intent and blackouts were lifted on games televised pursuant to a league-negotiated contract as if the statute was in effect.

Additionally, please note that the NHL did not have a contract with a national network this season. Instead selected games have been televised on an ad hoc network basis, packaged by the League itself. This will be

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APR 1 1976

RICHARD E. WILEY
 CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Richard E. Wiley
 Federal Communications Commission
 Page Two.
 March 31, 1976

true of the upcoming Stanley Cup playoffs. Such telecasts however would still come under the scope of legislation such as Public Law 93-107.

Answers to Specific Inquiries

(1) During the 1975-76 season, each member team of the National Hockey League is scheduled to play 80 games, a total of 1440 regular season games; the 1440 games will obviously be 720 separate contests (since each game requires two teams). Of these 720 regular season contests, 600 were scheduled to be played in the United States and, of these, 278 were scheduled to take place before the expiration of Public Law 93-107.

At this time, it is impossible to determine the number of games or their sites for post-season playoffs.

The annual All-Star Game of the National Hockey League was played this season in Philadelphia on January 20, 1976.

In a new series, a total of eight games were played between member teams of the National Hockey League and two teams from the USSR. The schedule was as follows:

December 28	Soviet Central Army at New York Rangers
December 29	Moscow Wings at Pittsburgh Penguins
December 31	Soviet Central Army at Montreal Canadians
January 4	Moscow Wings at Buffalo Sabres
January 7	Moscow Wings at Chicago Black Hawks
January 8	Soviet Central Army at Boston Bruins
January 10	Moscow Wings at New York Islanders
January 11	Soviet Central Army at Philadelphia Flyers

The Honorable Richard E. Wiley
Federal Communications Commission
Page Three
March 31, 1976

(2) The All-Star Game on January 20 and the December 28, January 4, January 8, and January 11 games of the USSR series were televised pursuant to a League contract. (In addition, the January 10 game was commercially televised on a three-hour delayed basis by a Philadelphia station.)

Moreover, some of the upcoming Stanley Cup playoff games will be televised pursuant to a League contract. At the moment, these telecasting plans are not firm.

(3) The National Hockey League has not adopted any change in its blackout policy, except to note that Public Law 93-107 was applicable for part of this season. As has been stated in the past, in recent seasons, the National Hockey League has lifted the home market blackout in the majority of its network telecasts. In this regard, see testimony of Don V. Ruck, Vice President, National Hockey League, on July 31, 1973, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Communications and Power of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 93-40 (1973). And as stated in my letter to you of December 11, 1974,

While the operation of Public Law 93-107 [is] . . . not responsible for the lifting per se, it . . . preclude[s] any change in the NHL's policy (without regard as to whether any change [is] . . . contemplated).

Notwithstanding the expiration of Public Law 93-107, on those games taking place during the Russian series (immediately after the law's expiration), the NHL continued to operate as if Public Law 93-107 still was in effect.

The Honorable Richard E. Wiley
 Federal Communications Commission
 Page Four
 March 31, 1976

No firm decision has been reached regarding policies to be in effect during the Stanley Cup playoffs.

(4) Given the aforementioned general policy, the National Hockey League made no attempt during the 1974-75 season to determine specifically which games would have been specifically covered by the terms of Public Law 93-107.

(5) The following are the seating capacities for National Hockey League teams in the United States:

Atlanta Flames	15,043	Los Angeles Kings	16,005
Boston Bruins	15,003	Minnesota North Stars	15,184
Buffalo Sabres	15,858	New York Islanders	14,865
California Golden Seals	12,500	New York Rangers	17,500
Chicago Black Hawks	18,000	Philadelphia Flyers	17,077
Detroit Red Wings	16,200	Pittsburgh Penguins	13,402
Kansas City Scouts	16,500	St. Louis Blues	18,008
		Washington Capitals	18,130

(6) The above seating capacity figures do not exceed the number of tickets available 120 hours before game time.

(7) The National Hockey League and the member clubs use the normal communications media to inform the public of all ticket sales.

(8) No record has been kept of the number of "no-shows" at NHL regular season games.

The Honorable Richard E. Wiley
Federal Communications Commission
Page Five
March 31, 1976

(9) In these two items, the Commission has sought revenue figures for gross concessions revenues and other gross receipts. The National Hockey League again finds that it cannot provide this information. The reasons continue to be those indicated in my letter to you of April 1, 1975.

The National Hockey League continually has attempted to be cooperative on this issue. I trust you will find the foregoing to be satisfactory explanation of our position in this matter.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely,



Philip R. Hochberg

PRH/mlr

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

March 5, 1976

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Mr. Dennis A. Murphy
President, World Hockey Association
P.O. Box 2920
Newport Beach, California 92663

The Commission is currently preparing its third annual report to Congress on the effect of Public Law 93-107 concerning the local television blackout of certain professional sports events. As part of this continuing study required by Section 331(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, we must again request your assistance, in providing information relevant to assessing the effect of Public Law 93-107 on professional hockey's 1975-76 season.

Specifically, we would request that the following data be provided for the World Hockey Association's 1975-76 season:

- (1) The total number of games to be played during the 1975-76 season (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all-star, etc.);
- (2) The number of games in the 1975-76 season which are scheduled for telecast pursuant to "league television contract" as defined by P.L. 93-107 and the number of games which are in fact so telecast (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all-star, etc.; please also indicate home and visiting team and date for each game, and name of party with which WHA contracted for telecast). If any games scheduled for telecast pursuant to league contract are not in fact televised, please indicate the reasons therefor;
- (3) Of the games specified in (2) above, please indicate the games for which a local blackout is lifted by operation of P.L. 93-107 (i.e., games for which tickets of admission for seats available for purchase 120 hours before game time are sold out 72 hours or more in advance of game time). Please indicate any other games for which a local blackout was lifted for other reasons;

Dennis A. Murphy

- (4) For each WHA team, please indicate the seating capacity figure for its home arena. If the arena capacity figure differs from the base number of tickets of admission employed in determining seating ticket availabilities 120 hours pre-game time for purposes of P.L. 93-107, please also provide the latter figure. If any of the games specified in (2) above are played at other than a WHA team's home arena, please provide similar information for that arena.
- (5) Please indicate the means used by the respective teams to inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period.

Please feel free to provide any other information that you believe to be relevant regarding the effect of Public Law 93-107.

Since the Commission's report to Congress on the impact and effect of Public Law 93-107 is due on May 15, 1976, we would appreciate receiving this information from you by April 1, 1976. We realize that the World Hockey Association's full season of play may not be completed by this time, but hope that you will permit as much of the necessary available data as possible to be transmitted to the Commission in time for analysis and inclusion in this report.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy (202) 632-6312. Your continued cooperation and assistance on behalf of the World Hockey Association will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Richard E. Wiley
Chairman



**WORLD
HOCKEY
ASSOCIATION**

March 18, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Wiley:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated March 5, 1976 addressed to Mr. Dennis A. Murphy. Mr. Murphy is no longer with the World Hockey Association (WHA). In the future it would be appreciated if you addressed all correspondence to our league office at the following address:

415 Yonge Street
Suite 1611
Toronto, Ontario
M5B 2E7
Phone: 416/366-4281

Attention of:

1. Mr. Ben Hatskin
Chairman of the Board
Chief Executive Officer
2. Mr. Norman Poile
Executive Vice-President
Hockey Operations
3. Mr. Leo Ornest
Vice-President
Director of Communications.

The answers to the questions outlined in your letter are:

Mr. Richard E. Wiley

Page 2

March 18, 1976

- (1) Pre-season games: U.S.A. - 17
Canada - 8
- Regular season games: U.S.A. - 532
Canada - 202
- Post season games: U.S.A. - Minimum 20, maximum 33
Canada - Minimum 14, maximum 25
- All-Star game: 1 -- January 13, 1976 at
Cleveland, Ohio

- (2) No pre-season telecasts. Each team makes its own local television arrangements. Some of the clubs do not televise any games. No national or regional telecast of any league games, 1975-76 season. All-Star game January 13, 1976 at Cleveland, Ohio, telecast in U.S.A. on Public Broadcasting System (PBS) network (one hour delay) and in Canada live on Global network; five station French network; and on independent stations in Winnipeg, Manitoba; Calgary, Alberta; and Edmonton, Alberta. WHA contracted with networks and stations for the All-Star telecast.

Television plans for the playoffs have not been finalized.

- (3) The All-Star game in Cleveland was not sold out, but the WHA gave permission to PBS for its station in Cleveland -- WVIZ-TV, Channel 25 -- to telecast the game.

(4) TEAM	ARENA	SEATS
Cincinnati	Riverfront Coliseum	15,820
Cleveland	The Coliseum	18,661
Denver	Mc Nichols Sport Arena	16,800
Houston	The Summit	14,906
Indianapolis	Market Square Arena	15,872
Minnesota	St. Paul Civic Center	15,705
New England	Hartford Civic Center	10,507
Phoenix	Memorial Coliseum	12,600
San Diego	Sports Arena	13,039

. . . 3

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Page 2
March 18, 1987

- (5) The respective teams use all forms of media -- newspaper, television, radio, and their own ticket agencies -- to notify the public.

If we can be of any further assistance, please contact us.

Sincerely yours,



Leo Ornest
Vice-President
Director of Communications

cc: B. Hatskin
B. Poile



**WORLD
HOCKEY
ASSOCIATION**

March 19, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Wiley:

There is one correction to be made in my letter to you dated March 18, 1976.

Item (1) should read:

Regular season games:	U.S.A - 330
	Canada- <u>202</u>
Total:	532

Sincerely yours,

Leo Ornest
Vice-President
Director of Communications
/hw

cc: B. Hatskin
B. Poile

APPENDIX E

LETTERS FROM CONCESSIONAIRES

IN RESPONSE TO

FCC INQUIRIES

SPORTSERVICE CORPORATION

703 MAIN STREET, AT TUPPER
BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14203

April 27, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Re: Baltimore Colts

Dear Mr. Wiley:

This is in response to your letter of April 14, 1976 requesting information as to the concession revenues we received at the home games played by the Baltimore Colts for the 1973 - 1975 seasons.

The average game figures for total concession revenues during each of the above seasons are as follows:

1973 - \$36,952.14
1974 - 32,191.98
1975 - 47,642.02

The average sales per person figure for each of the above seasons are:

1973 - 79.5 cents
1974 - 107.4 cents
1975 - 120.4 cents

The football club is not paid a percentage of revenues directly by us. Under our Contract we pay 33% of gross revenues to the Baltimore Orioles, and the Orioles pay a percentage to the City of Baltimore for its lease of the Stadium. We understand that the City in turn pays a percentage of the receipts

RECEIVED

MAY 3 1976

RICHARD E. WILEY
CHAIRMAN

Mr. Richard E. Wiley

April 27, 1976

Page 2

it receives from football games to the Baltimore Colts.

We trust that the above information will be of assistance to you for the purpose stated in your letter.

Very truly yours,

MARYLAND SPORTSERVICE, INC.

By: 

Nelson H. Kraus
Law Department

NHK:jb

SPORTSERVICE CORPORATION

703 MAIN STREET, AT TUPPER
BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14203

April 27, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Re: Cincinnati Bengals

Dear Mr. Wiley:

This is in response to your letter of April 14, 1976 requesting information as to the concessions revenues we received at the home games played by the Cincinnati Bengals for the 1973-1975 seasons.

The average game figures for total concession revenues during each of the above seasons are as follows:

1973 - \$58,677.00
1974 - 58,085.00
1975 - 62,012.00

The average sales per person figure for each of the above seasons are:

1973 - 107.8 cents
1974 - 120.9 cents
1975 - 121.6 cents

The football club is not paid a percentage of revenues directly by us. Under our Contract we pay approximately 33% of gross revenues to the Cincinnati Reds. It is our understanding that the Reds pay a percentage to the City of Cincinnati for its lease

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MAY 3 1976

RICHARD E. WILEY
CHAIRMAN

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Re: Cincinnati Bengals
April 27, 1976


of the Stadium, and the City in turn probably pays a percentage of the receipts it receives from football games to the Cincinnati Bengals.

We trust that the above information will be of assistance to you for the purpose stated in your letter.

Very truly yours,

CINCINNATI SPORTSERVICE, INC.

By:


Nelson H. Kraus
Law Department



CLEVELAND STADIUM CORP.

CLEVELAND STADIUM · CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114

Phone: 781-5600

May 6, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Chairman Wiley:

Enclosed is a summary of concession data you requested for the Cleveland Browns football seasons 1973 through 1975.

	<u>1973</u> <u>Season</u>	<u>1974</u> <u>Season</u>	<u>1975</u> <u>Season</u>
Average Concession revenues per game	\$58,700	\$53,800	\$45,000
Average revenues per person per game	.89	.96	1.23
Percentage shared with Browns	11 1/4%	20%	20%
Average price change from prior season	---	10%	---

Should you have any further questions about this survey, please call me.

Sincerely,

CLEVELAND STADIUM CORP.

Michael G. Poplar
Controller

MGP/jms

HOME OF CLEVELAND INDIANS AND CLEVELAND BROWNS

CEBE CORPORATION

2401 Airport Freeway - Irving, Texas 75062 - (214) 438-7676

May 6, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
 Chairman
 Federal Communications Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Wiley:

The above corporation is a sister company of Texas Stadium Corporation; and is responsible for concession operations at Texas Stadium, Irving, Texas, where the Dallas Cowboys play football.

In answer to your letter of April 14 requesting information under four categories for the three previous football seasons, may I please submit the following information:


	1973	1974	1975	
includes novelties	1. \$57,028	\$49,909	\$56,267	After 5% tax
	2. 97.5¢	97.9¢	\$1.08	
	3. Food, Beverage, & Popcorn Novelty		16 2/3% 12 1/2%	Average 15%
	4. Concession prices have changed between 10 and 20% depending on the items from 1973 through 1975.			

I think a relevant and objective observation is that the "anti-blackout law" by having an effect on the size of the crowd obviously detrimentally affects the over-all concession sales with all the attending results as they affect employment, fair profitability, etc.

I hope these answers will be of assistance to you in your analysis. If there is any further information which you might need, please do not hesitate to ask.

I remain yours,

Sincerely,


 Michael B. Devine
 Executive Vice-President
 CEBE Corporation
 Texas Stadium Corporation



VOLUME SERVICE DIVISION

INTERSTATE
UNITED

May 10, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Wiley,

Enclosed are the figures, for the concession operations
at Arrowhead Stadium. Regarding the Kansas City Chiefs for
the 1973, 1974 and 1975 seasons.

Sincerely,

William Z. Lemons,
District General Manager
Volume Service, Inc. Division
Interstate United Corp.

RICHARD E. WILEY
CHAIRMAN

WZL;bd
enclosures

RECREATION SERVICES

HARRY S. TRUMAN SPORTS COMPLEX / 1 REDCOAT DRIVE / KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64129 / TELEPHONE (816) 921-4700

- 1) Average game figures for total concession revenue during:
(gross sales)

<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
\$ 63,917.90	\$ 51,271.00	\$ 58, 971.00

- 2) Per Capata sales for:

<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
.98	1.00	1.14

- 3) % of revenue shared with the football club during:

<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
42 %	42 %	42 %

- 4) Concession prices changes:

	<u>1973</u>	<u>price increase</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>increase</u>	<u>1975</u>
HOT DOGS	.50	.05	.55		.55
HAMBURGER	.85	.05	.90		.90
POPCORN	.30		.30	.05	.35
CANDY	.15	.05	.20		.20
MALTS	.45	.05	.50		.50
PEANUTS	.25	.05	.30		.30
REG. COKE	.25	.10	.35		.35
LG. COKE	.40	.10	.50		.50
REG BEER	.50	.10	.60		.60
LG. BEER	.75	.10	.85		.85
BOTTLE BEER	.60	.05	.65		.65
PIT. BEER	1.60	.15	1.75		1.75
CIGARETTES	.60	.05	.65		.65

OFFICERS

PETER F. SCHABARUM
PRESIDENT

GILBERT W. LINDSAY
VICE PRESIDENT

JAMES F. HAROT
GENERAL MANAGER

JERRY E. NIELSEN
ASSISTANT MANAGER

RONALD A. MITTINS
ASSISTANT MANAGER



LOS ANGELES MEMORIAL COLISEUM COMMISSION

COLISEUM, 3911 SO. FIGUEROA ST. • 747-7111 — SPORTS ARENA, 2939 S. FIGUEROA ST. • 748-6131
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90037

April 27, 1976

COLISEUM COMMISSION

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
STEPHEN C. RILMEIMER
ARNOLD EDDY
ERNEST J. LDEEBECKE

—
GEORGE E. KINSEY
ALTERNATE

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

JAMES A. HAYES
KENNETH HAHN
PETER SCHABARUM

—
EDMUND EDELMAN
ALTERNATE

CITY OF LOS ANGELES

GILBERT W. LINDSAY
CARL N. MEEHAN
BRAD PVE, JR.

—
JOHN FERRARO
JILL SWIFT
ALTERNATES

Mr. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

Gentlemen:

In reply to your letter of April 14, 1976 re: the Los Angeles Rams,
we submit the following information.

- | 1. <u>Total Concession Revenues</u> | <u>Regular Game Average</u> | <u>Play-off Game</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1975 Season | \$94,442.00 | \$122,210.00 |
| 1974 Season | \$88,574.00 | \$104,959.00 |
| 1973 Season | \$80,572.00 | \$ -0- |
-
- | 2. <u>Concession Sales per Person</u> | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------|---------|
| 1975 | \$1.494 | \$1.505 |
| 1974 | \$1.338 | \$1.314 |
| 1973 | \$1.178 | \$ -0- |
-
3. Coliseum received 33.3% of gross concession revenue of which 50% of 33.3% was shared with the L.A. Rams.
4. See attached list for concession price changes between 1975 and 1974 and 1973.

The "Sports Anti-Blackout Law" will have an adverse impact on our revenues. Our revenue is based on a percentage of gross ticket sales and a percentage of concession revenue. Any reduction of attendance at games due to local live TV will result in lower revenue

Mr. Richard E. Wiley

-2-

April 27, 1976

to the Coliseum. Although we are a public entity owned jointly by the State, County and City, we operate without any subsidy from governmental bodies or taxpayers. We have no authority to tax and our revenues come exclusively from the sports fan attending the game.

We have had only one regular season game sold out prior to 72 hours and that was the Rams-Pittsburgh game in December 1975. The following breakdown on attendance is significant.

<u>Seat Prices</u>	<u>Tickets Sold</u>	<u>Actual Attendance</u>	<u>No Shows</u>
\$10	34,573	28,604	5,969
\$ 8	23,637	19,776	3,861
\$ 6	15,773	13,320	2,453
\$ 4	3,555	2,977	578
\$ 2	13,500	4,712	8,788
	<u>91,038</u>	<u>69,389</u>	<u>21,649</u>

Our concession revenue was down 23.8% for this game due to the "no shows." Sales taxes paid to the State by the concessionaire were also down by 23.8%.

From this one experience it is clear to us that the "Sports Anti-Blackout Law" could have a devastating effect on our ability to function free from local governmental support or subsidy as we currently are doing.

Thank you for letting us express our views on this subject.

Sincerely,



J. R. White, Jr.,
Chief Accountant

JRWJ:kp

Enclosure

LOS ANGELES MEMORIAL COLISEUM COMMISSION
CONCESSION PRICES FOR FOOTBALL GAMES

	<u>1975</u>	<u>1974 & 1973</u>	<u>Increase</u>
Hot Dogs	.65	.60	.05
Coffee	.25	.25	
Cigarettes	.65	.60	.05
Cigars	.20	.20	
Pepsi-large	.40	.40	
Pepsi-regular	.35	.30	.05
Coke	.35	.30	.05
Beer	.80	.65	.15
Peanuts-plain	.25	.25	
Peanuts-salted	.25	.25	
Malts	.45	.40	.05
Popcorn	.30	.30	
Hershey-almond	.25	.25	



MIAMI DOLPHINS

MIAMI DOLPHINS, LTD.
330 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132
(305) 379-1851

JOSEPH ROBBIE
Managing General Partner

May 10, 1976


Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Wiley:

We will submit the report requested in your letter of April 14th on or before May 15, 1976.

The information will be prepared by our Chief Accountant, James H. Steeg, and you or Robert Blau or any member of your staff may contact him for any information you require. Mr. Steeg will be pleased to give you full cooperation.

Sincerely,



Joseph Robbie
Managing Partner

JR:pb



1972 - 1973 WORLD CHAMPIONS





MIAMI DOLPHINS

MIAMI DOLPHINS LTD
300 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132
(305) 379-1851

JOSEPH ROBBIE
Managing General Partner

May 18, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Wiley:

In response to your letter of April 14th in which you ask the Miami Dolphins to analyze the impact of the local Television Blackout Law on concessions at the Orange Bowl for 1973 through 1975 season the following answers are:

1. The average figure on total concession revenues for Dolphin games is:
1973 - \$61,660; 1974 - \$59,046; 1975 - \$60,412.
2. The average sales per person figure is: 1973 - 92.6¢; 1974 - 96.4¢; 1975 - 124.6¢.
3. You requested us to indicate the percentage of revenues shares with us for 1973, 1974 and 1975. It is impossible to allocate revenues to reflect just Dolphin games. The Miami Dolphins own 100% of the concessions at the Orange Bowl. Distributions from concession revenues reflect all Orange Bowl activities and are a percentage revenue above the cost incurred in the operation of the concessions by Restaurant Associates who are our managers. This revenue does not reflect the profit since it is to cover direct costs of the Miami Dolphins in running the Orange Bowl Concessions.

The percentage of gross revenues that we received in relation to total revenues for the seasons is as follows: 1973 - .3%; 1974 - 10.1%; 1975 - 5.6%.
4. Prices of the various concession goods have individually changed over this period of time. Among the items included under the label "concession goods" are food, beverage, cigarettes, novelties and restbacks. The selling price of each item in each category has changed over this period. Generally it could be said that prices increased in the following manner: approx. 5% in 1973; approx. 5% in 1974; approx. 20% in 1975.

We can provide you with a more detailed analysis of individual item price increases if you wish.

I hope that this information assists you in your study. If you should have any questions, please contact me at 305-379-1851.

Sincerely,

James H. Steeg

James H. Steeg
Chief Accountant

JHS:pb



1972 WORLD CHAMPIONS





VOLUME SERVICE DIVISION

INTERSTATE
UNITED

May 11, 1976.

Mr. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

Dear Mr. Wiley,

In response to your letter of April 14, 1976 concerning the "Sports Anti-Blackout Law", the information you asked for is as follows:

1. average game figure for total concession revenues

1973 -	58,057.15
1974 -	62,541.67
1975 -	67,566.05
2. average sales per person

1973 -	1.17
1974 -	1.32
1975 -	1.39
3. % of revenue shared with football club does not apply.
4. The increases in gross and per capita figures were primarily the result of price increases in every item.

The no show problem at televised games actually hurts the concessionaires and the Cities and Counties who own the Stadium rather than the teams who have already sold all tickets. For example, one game we had approximately 15,000 no shows. This means nearly \$6700 lost income to the Stadium and \$18,000 to us.

I hope that this information will help in your preparation of the report to Congress.

Sincerely,

Milton C. Zemanek
General Manager

MCZ/ga

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MAY 17 1976

RICHARD E. WILEY
CHAIRMAN

RECREATIONAL SERVICES

Harry M. Stevens, Inc.

Concessionaire • Restaurateur
Publisher

Main Offices
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10017
Telephone Area Code 212 661-0400

"FROM COAST TO COAST"

THE NEW YORK RACING ASSOCIATION INC 1955
AQUEDUCT (SINCE 1978) BELMONT PARK (SINCE 1910) SARATOGA (SINCE 1902)

NARRAGANSETT RACING ASSN.
PARTUCKET R. I.
(SINCE 1834)

THE DELAWARE RACING
ASSOCIATION
STANTON, DELAWARE

NIAGARA FALLS INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION CENTER AND PLAZA
NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

ROSECRANTZ TROTTING & PACING
ASSN.
DIXON HILL, MD

SEEA STADIUM, FLUSHING L.I., N. Y.
NEW YORK METS
NEW YORK JETS

HARRY M. STEVENS RESTAURANT
5 PENN PLAZA, NEW YORK CITY

MADISON SQUARE GARDEN CENTER
NEW YORK CITY

CONTINENTAL THOROUGHBRED RACING ASSN INC
BUCKE COUNTY, PA.

NASSAU VETERANS MEMORIAL COLISEUM
UNIONDALE, L.I., N. Y.

EXECUTIVE PARK MOTOR HOTEL
ATLANTA, GA.

FENWAY PARK, BOSTON, MASS.
BOSTON RED SOX
(SINCE 1816)

CANDLETIC PARK
SAN FRANCISCO CALIF
SAN FRANCISCO GIANTS

MONMOUTH PARK JOCKEY CLUB
OCEANPORT, N. J.

GARDEN STATE RACING ASSN.
CAMDEN, N. J.

ROOSEVELT STADIUM
JERSEY CITY, N. J.

TIDEWATER TIGERS
METROPOLITAN MEMORIAL PARK
ROFOLK, VA

LAUREL RACE COURSE
LAUREL, MARYLAND
(SINCE 1814)

LAUREL HARNESS RACING ASSN. INC.
LAUREL, MD

MARLBORO RACE TRACK
MARLBORO, MD (SINCE 1924)

ROOSEVELT RACEWAY INC
WESTBURY, L.I., N. Y.

ATLANTIC CITY RACING ASSN
ATLANTIC CITY, N. J.

ATLANTIC CITY RACEWAY
ATLANTIC CITY, N. J.

MIAMI RACE COURSE INC
MIAMI, FLORIDA
(SINCE 1928)

GULFSTREAM PARK
HALLANDALE, FLA.

VETERANS MEMORIAL ARENA
ENID, OKLAHOMA, N. T.

SUNSHINE PARK
BUENHILL, PA.

PALO ALTO RACING ASSN INC
PALO ALTO, CALIF
(SINCE 1868)

EGGERS FIELD, BROOKLYN, N. Y.
(1906-1931)

JARVIS JOCKEY CLUB, ALABAMA, MEXICO
(1816-1911)

April 28, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

Re: San Francisco 49ers
New York Jets
New York Giants

Dear Mr. Wiley:

In reply to your letters of April 14, 1976, we submit the following information:

	1973	1974	1975
(1) Average game total concession revenues:			
49ers	\$ 99,823	\$87,305	\$ 82,197
Jets	60,309	61,803	71,032
Giants - played in Shea only in 1975	RECEIVED		78,596

MAY 1 1976

RICHARD E. WILEY
CHAIRMAN

Harry M. Stevens, Inc.

	1973	1974	1975
(2) Average sales per person:			
49ers	\$ 1.85	\$ 1.75	\$ 1.91
Jets	1.17	1.25	1.38
Giants - 1975 only			1.53
(3) % & amount of revenue shared with Football Club:			
49ers share souvenirs & programs only	54.98% 93,219	58.89% 82,306	54.66% 69,195
Jets share programs & yearbooks only	46.98% 24,935	42.88% 23,529	32.79% 17,911
Giants share - programs only			11.12% 7,148
(4) Changes in concession prices:			
49ers -			
Beer - bottle	60¢	65¢	70¢
Soda	12 oz. 30¢	12 oz. 30¢	10 oz. 30¢
Snackateria	\$ 2.50	\$ 2.75	\$ 2.75
Franks - large	85¢	90¢	90¢
Franks - small	50¢	55¢	55¢
Popcorn	25¢	50¢	50¢
Peanuts	25¢	25¢	30¢
Sandwiches	60¢	70¢	70¢
Roastbeef & Cornbeef	85¢	95¢	95¢
Hamburger	65¢	75¢	75¢
Scorecard	35¢	40¢	50¢
Jets -			
Peanuts	25¢	30¢	30¢
Cigarettes	70¢	70¢	75¢
Ice Cream	30¢	35¢	35¢
Beer - small	65¢	65¢	70¢
Beer - large	85¢	85¢	90¢
Soda	30¢	35¢	35¢
Franks	45¢	50¢	55¢
Coffee	20¢	20¢	25¢

Very truly yours,



Pat Carpanzano

pc:r

OFFICERS

O. O. McCracken
President
Glennon J. Walsh
Executive Vice President
John E. Taylor, Jr.
Vice President & Secretary-Treasurer



REDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

300 STADIUM PLAZA / ST. LOUIS, MO. 63102
TELEPHONE 241-6180 (Area Code 314)

May 7, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

Dear Mr. Wiley:

This is in reply to your letter of April 14, 1976 regarding the Sports Anti-Blackout Law in which you requested information on concessions revenues. Answers to your questions are as follows:

	1973	1974	1975
Total Attendance	413,511	400,232	398,653
Concession Sales:			
Average per game	\$ 55,390	\$ 56,151	\$ 61,780
Average per person	\$ 1.21	\$ 1.26	\$ 1.39

The St. Louis Football Cardinals do not share in the concession revenues.

Although there have been some slight increases in concession prices to off-set inflationary costs, they have not been significant.

Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation has vigorously opposed the lifting of the TV blackout of home games. The position of private owners and operators of stadia, which is our case,

2. **BOARD OF DIRECTORS:** Charles J. Dougherty, Chairman • Zane E. Barnes • Donald M. Brandin • J. G. Buller • M. E. Chambers • R. Hal Dean
Oscar A. Ehrhardt • Stanley J. Goodman • Edwin S. Jones • Fred L. Kuhlmann • Donald E. Lester • O. O. McCracken • Charles H. Sumner

Mr. Richard E. Wiley
FCC


-2-

May 7, 1976

seems to have been completely forgotten in that the Anti-Blackout Law has had a deleteriously effect on the financial health of the stadiums. The financial support of our stadium comes primarily from concession and parking revenues. At best it operates at a deficit as do stadiums in most communities and any decrease in revenues, from whatever cause, is critical from the standpoint of income necessary to support the stadium.

Attached hereto is data previously furnished in opposing the legislation lifting the blackouts.

Sincerely,



John E. Taylor, Jr.
Vice President and
Treasurer

Enclosure

cc: Jim Cash, St. Louis Football Cardinals

(-)
*Stadium
Press, Radio, TV*

March 1, 1973

Mr. William V. Bidwill
President
St. Louis Football Cardinals Company
200 Stadium Plaza
St. Louis, Missouri 63102

Dear Mr. Bidwill:

You have inquired as to the probable financial impact on our stadium operations that would ensue from the lifting of the so-called television blackout of Football Cardinals home games.

As you know, this Corporation is responsible for the operation and maintenance of Busch Memorial Stadium, and the financial support of the stadium comes in great measure from our concession and parking receipts. For the calendar year 1972, the net cash flow stadium operating deficit was \$409,491. Fortunately this stadium deficit was more than made up by our income from other properties.

Some measure of the impact can be determined from our experience for the December 10 and December 17, 1972 Cardinal Football home games. There were approximately 11,400 less attendance than tickets sold for the December 10 game, and this figure was approximately 9,000 for the December 17 game because of inclement weather. The parking and concession revenue derived from these two games can be compared with two similar games in October as follows:

Mr. William V. Bidwill

-2-

March 1, 1973

Concession and Parking Revenue

<u>Date</u>	<u>Amount</u>
10/1/72	\$24,430
10/29/72	23,866
12/10/72	13,756
12/17/72	13,558

It will be seen from the above that any substantial decrease in attendance for whatever cause is critical from the standpoint of income necessary to support the stadium physical plant. Since the stadium is already a deficit operation, we believe the reduced attendance that would unquestionably result from the televising of the Football Cardinals home games would be disastrous.

Sincerely yours,

O. O. McCracken
President

JAMES W. SYMINGTON
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON OFFICE
307 CANNON BUILDING
202-223-2561

CHARLES G. HOUGHTON
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

U
Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

August 15, 1973

INTERNATIONAL
SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS
24 JOHN CUNIFF DRIVE
13 S. BRIDGE STREET, 2ND FLOOR
CLAYTON, MISSOURI 63105
314-726-1410

JAMES P. LUSWILE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Mr. James P. Mickok
Chairman of the Board
Civic Center Redevelopment Corp.
300 Stadium Plaza
St. Louis, Missouri 65102

Dear Mr. Mickok:

Thank you for your letter of July 30. I have been studying the two proposed House bills, H.R. 9420 and H.R. 9553, and the proposed Senate bill, S. 1841, which would permit home games to be broadcasted locally if they are sold out 48 hours prior to the scheduled starting time.

H.R. 9420 and H.R. 9553 were referred to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. The first day of subcommittee hearings, held in the Communications and Power subcommittee, was on July 31. As Congress is now in recess, there will be no further action until after September 5.

S. 1841 was referred to the Commerce Committee, which reported it to the Senate on July 26. In its report, the Commerce Committee took into consideration the possibility of an increase in the number of "no shows". They concluded that... "this argument is highly speculative" and that "the one year experience under this legislation should answer the question in a definitive and factual manner".

However, I am somewhat skeptical of the committee's findings and appreciate having your comments on hand when this legislation comes before the House.

Enclosed are copies of the two House bills and the Senate committee report.

With best regards,

Sincerely,


James W. Symington

JWS:lc
enclosures

1. H. R. 9420
2. file

July 30, 1973

Hon. Stuart Symington
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Stu:

I am writing you as Chairman of the Board of Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation which owns and operates Civic Center Busch Memorial Stadium in St. Louis. As you know, our primary tenants are the Cardinals football and baseball teams.

We have been advised that the Senate Commerce Committee has voted approval of a bill that would lift home area black-outs on professional football games and perhaps other events where such games are sold out 48 hours in advance. A similar bill is under consideration by the House Subcommittee on Communications.

The financial support of our stadium comes primarily from our concession and parking receipts and is thereby directly related to attendance. For the calendar year 1972, the net cash flow operating deficit was slightly in excess of \$400,000. Therefore, any significant decrease in attendance from whatever cause is critical from the standpoint of income necessary to support the stadium physical plant.

Some measure of the potential impact of the proposed legislation can be projected from our experience for the December 10 and December 17, 1972 Cardinal football home games

Hon. Stuart Symington

-2-

July 30, 1973

during inclement weather. There was approximately 11,400 less attendance than tickets sold for the December 10 game, and this figure was approximately 9,000 for the December 17 game. We believe the proposed legislation must necessarily lead to a decline in concession and parking income, that would endanger our ability to service the long-term debt that we incurred in building the stadium.

All of us at Civic Center would be most grateful to you if you would oppose the proposed legislation in any appropriate manner.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

James P. Hickok
Chairman of the Board

bcc: Mr. Wm. V. Bidwill

Same letter to:

Hon. William L. Hungate
Hon. Thomas F. Eagleton
Hon. James W. Symington
Hon. Leonor K. Sullivan
Hon. William Clay

st. louis football cardinals

September 11, 1973

The Honorable James W. Symington
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
307 Cannon Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Symington:

Your letter of August 15 to Mr. James P. Hickok, Chairman of the Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation, has been called to my attention.

I share your apparent concern that the "no-show" issue be very clearly defined and its potential consequences made known prior to the enactment of legislation now under consideration.

With your indulgence, I would address myself to this area, not only as it affects the St. Louis Cardinals football team, but, to the best of my knowledge, all member clubs of the NFL.

I would first attempt to resolve what appears to me to be a confusion in the Committee Report. Reference is made (section on "no-shows", pages 23-28) that NFL clubs listed significant numbers of "no-shows" for the 1972 season while, at the same time, listing their announced attendance as being in excess of paid attendance.

The "announced" capacity crowd for a professional football game will, in all likelihood, exceed "paid" attendance by a substantial figure since not all seats in the stadium are sold. Clubs are, by League regulation, permitted to issue up to 1,000 complimentary tickets for each regular season game. In addition, many clubs count within their "announced" figure all persons present at the stadium in a working or "official" role. This number would include concessionaires, parking personnel, maintenance and regulatory personnel, entertainers, media, players, etc. We believe a fair number that might be used to cover this area of complimentary ticket-holders and workers/officials would be 2,000 persons. As an example of this, the Minnesota Vikings announced

Minneapolis
GRC
EX. 6600 MF. ---
DO. 500 SP. ---
REC SEP 18 1973 ED
CPI --- AA 2
M.A. --- ---
ACC --- FILE

The Honorable James W. Symington
 September 11, 1973
 Page 2

capacity crowd on a mid-season sellout was 49,780. The paid attendance for this game (St. Louis vs. Minnesota, 10/8/72) was 47,287, a difference of 2,493. We do not consider the practice a deception; rather, in keeping with the philosophy of the entertainment industry at large of announcing an attendance figure of maximum attractiveness.

"Announced" attendance, then, is the optimum figure. "Paid" attendance is the working figure. It is the seats sold, the number by which division of receipts between home and visiting team is determined. A third figure of importance in this issue is the "actual" crowd. That is, the number of purchase-ticket fans present at a given game. In the instance of St. Louis vs. Minnesota cited above, as an example, the "actual" number was 46,099. Thus the "no-show" factor in that particular game was 1,188.

The Committee Report questions the validity of our "no-show" figures, citing instances of approximations and because of the apparent conflict in crowd figures mentioned earlier in this letter.

The member clubs of our League kept "no-show" figures for the 1972 regular season. As the Committee Report relates, a total of 624,686 tickets were purchased, but not used. It is our experience that determination of "no-shows" is difficult. Crowds are large and quite mobile and certain of our stadiums do not have the physical facilities to make an exact "turnstile count." Perhaps the Committee's apprehension over apparent estimated numbers is understandable. I do not suggest estimated numbers were willfully inflated, but I concede that defense of "no-show" numbers as being exact and final is next to impossible.

Accordingly, I have studied the "no-show" figures reported by our member teams for 1972. In every case, I reduced the reported number by 2,000, the figure given above for complimentary tickets and persons working in connection with the game. Such a reduction would more than remove any possible inflationary factor. My findings were interesting.

A total of 93 regular season games were played where the "no-show" number exceeded 2,000 persons. And the total figure for "no-shows" in excess of 2,000 at those 93 games was 372,767, for an average of slightly over 4,000 per game.

The Honorable James W. Symington
 September 11, 1973
 Page 3

These are, we believe, significant "no-show" numbers. Moreover, they are conservative. That they were compiled during a time when there was no imminent lifting of the local television blackout, they become even more significant projected against a season where, in fact, the blackout would be lifted in numerous cases.

The Committee Report intimates that our numbers cast an illusory light on "no-shows." We learn, for example, that poor weather does not necessarily insure poor attendance. Rather, we learn that personal schedules, illness, business, etc., and the competitive ranking of the team, also bear on the fan's decision to attend or not attend.

We agree.

But we are unable to dismiss quite so airily as does the Report, the significance of the latter . . . a team's won-lost record.

Our sport -- our game -- is cyclic in nature. A team gathers strength through acquisition of talent and experience. It advances. Eventually, it recedes because of attrition. It follows a cycle.

Simply stated: Today's fan apathy in City X eventually will become tomorrow's fan apathy in City Y.

Houston, playing within a controlled climate, listed 36,989 "no-shows" for seven home games. New Orleans, playing in warm weather, listed 45,190 "no-shows" for seven home games. Houston finished 1-13-0 in 1972, New Orleans finished 2-11-1. Los Angeles, another warm-weather city, had 31,386 "no-shows" and a 6-7-1 record.

No one is suggesting that the fan obligates himself to attend the game by purchasing a ticket. Whether due to poor weather or a poor team or for personal reasons, we do not question the fan's choice. However, as a promoter, I can assure you that we are sincerely alarmed by a trend that kept hundreds of thousands of persons away from our stadiums in 1972. The prospect of legislation which, in 1973, would encourage this trend is not comforting.

Commissioner Rozelle has said that today's "no-show" is tomorrow's lost fan. We would agree. And we would add that the thrust of regulatory legislation now under consideration might very well make professional football, as we know it, tomorrow's lost game.

Sincerely,

ST. LOUIS FOOTBALL CARDINALS

William V. Bidwill
 WILLIAM V. BIDWILL

Managing General Partner

WV:pep

James Taylor TV

September 28, 1973

National Broadcasting Company
 30 Rockefeller Plaza
 New York, New York 10020

Also
 CBS + ABC

Attention: Mr. Julian Goodman, President

Gentlemen:

As you well know, Congress recently passed a bill lifting the blackout on the televising of local professional football games, as heretofore imposed within a 75-mile radius of the stadium in which they are played, when such games are sold out 72 hours in advance. In doing so, Congress said nothing about the revenues which many stadiums throughout the country must rely upon for their support - i. e., concession and parking income. We must assume that Congress did not intend to impinge on these essential stadium support revenues, but rather intended that equitable financial arrangements would instead be worked out.

Here at Civic Center Busch Memorial Stadium we have a privately financed, constructed and operated stadium which annually suffers a substantial financial loss. That loss is partially offset by parking and concession revenues derived from patrons at stadium events. This parking and concession revenue is extremely valuable for football games, and is a factor on which we must depend to help pay for the private financing of the stadium.

With the lifting of the blackout, we conceive of circumstances and events under which there will be a stadium sellout 72

National Broadcasting Company -2- September 28, 1973

hours in advance of a football game but, at the same time, weather conditions and other intervening factors might cause a substantial amount of the sellout crowd not to attend the game. The non-attendance ("no-shows") will be almost entirely due to the fact that the game will be televised locally. This will result in a corresponding decrease in stadium parking and concession revenues.

The management of this Corporation has given serious thought to this problem, and it proposes to institute a charge of an amount equal to \$1 per capita for the difference between the sold-out stadium capacity and the actual crowd attendance by turnstile count. This charge will be imposed for the privilege of parking vehicles on the stadium property, the opening of areas to TV crews, and for the use of the stadium's power supply and other necessary facilities. We contemplate instituting this charge in the very near future and of requiring a letter agreement with the appropriate television network entity to pay such a charge before permission is granted for use of the stadium facilities.

We feel it is only fair to present to you what we feel to be a very equitable position before instituting the charge. We will be happy to receive your comments concerning this or to meet with you should you desire to do so. If you have some other suggestion on how the stadium might protect itself from the projected loss of revenue, then certainly these alternatives can be explored. If we cannot come to some amicable solution to this problem, then you may assume the charge will be instituted in the near future.

Very truly yours,

O. O. McCracken
President

cc: Mr. Ray Karpowicz
Manager, KSD-TV

bcc: Mr. Peter W. Herzog, Jr.

the designated-hitter experiment, which won increasing acceptance as the season progressed.

There is no question that the DH provided far more offensive wallop than non-hitting pitchers could have supplied. The DH furnished other pluses, too. It had to be a contributor to the A. L.'s bumper crop of 12 20-game winners, while the National could muster just one. Starting pitchers who had reservations about the DH in the beginning should have changed their minds by this time. Beyond doubt, the DH enabled many a pitcher to remain on the job and win instead of bowling out for a pinch-hitter. That's the only logical conclusion to be drawn from the A. L.'s 12 20-victory hurlers, the highest total for one major since the National produced 17 in 1899.

Impressive as the 1973 A. L. gate figures were, they still fell short of the National's. The N. L. drew 16,607,127 spectators, a healthy figure, but one the N. L. has topped three times. Still, the National League gate was up 1,077,397 over 1972, an advance of 6.9 percent. Nine N. L. clubs drew more than one million, and two of them, the Dodgers and Reds, exceeded two million. The Mets, meanwhile, fell from the two-million pinnacle after four straight years above it. All in all, though, 1973 was a mighty good year for baseball.

BACKLASH FROM BLACKOUT BAN

Club owners' worst fears appeared confirmed in the first four weeks of the National Football League season. No-shows for sold-out games totaled 140,000, not including two sellouts for which figures were not immediately available—Dallas at Washington October 8 and the New York Giants and Green Bay at New Haven, Conn., October 7. The newly legislated home blackout ban was in effect for 31 sellouts during that span (29 with no-show figures available). Some observers were predicting that the arrival of cold weather would push the no-show rate even higher.

Perhaps the biggest surprise was the preponderance of no-shows at Miami, where the Dolphins supposedly had been elevated to deity status by their adoring public. Dolphin ticket buyers accounted for 17,538 of the 32,022 no-shows for seven sellout matches September 30. Though skies were sunny and the temperature 80 in Miami, a lot of Dolphin customers declined to visit the Orange Bowl to watch their heroes play New England. Presumably they viewed Miami's 44-23 victory via TV.

Miami, in fact, was responsible for nearly 50,000 of the 140,000 ticket-holding absentees the first four weeks of the season. Some 12,000 Miamians who held tickets for the Dolphins' home opener against San Francisco September 16 failed to attend. And 16,097 didn't show October 7 for the game with the New York Jets.

At the current rate, no-shows figure to shrink parking and concessions revenues at NFL playing sites. That's bad news for city and county-operated stadiums. Their financial underpinning is pegged to a great extent on concessions and parking income.

It's unlikely that the blackout ban will go down in history as one of Congress' more enlightened bits of legislation.



SERVOMATION DUCHESS, INC.
 8998 LA MESA BOULEVARD • 714-461-7605
 P. O. BOX 411 • LA MESA, CALIFORNIA 92041

April 30, 1976

Mr. Richard E. Wiley RE: San Diego Chargers
 Chairman
 Federal Communications Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Wiley:

Answering your inquiry of April 14, we are very much in favor of continuing the local television blackout of San Diego Chargers' games. Particularly in view of the Chargers current league standing, it seems to us that televising their games would result in a definite reduction in attendance. Such a development would undermine the economic foundation of presenting the games to the public, and probably make it impossible to continue on the present basis.

Regarding your specific questions:

1. Our average sales per game declined rather substantially from 1973 to 1974. 1975 was about unchanged.
2. Average sales per person have been quite stable for the 3-year period.
3. The football team receives a royalty from us on novelties only, and the total amount paid to them per game has been less than \$1,000 for each of the three years. (The City of San Diego is the party to whom most of our concession payments go).
4. Selling prices for food and beverage items have risen 5¢ or 10¢ each from 1973 to 1975.

I trust this information will be helpful in completing your report.

Sincerely,

Earl E. Rana
 PRESIDENT

EER/ddn

cc: A. P. Lucht
 Carr Newcomer

RECEIVED

MAY 1 1976

RICHARD E. WILEY
 CHAIRMAN



7023 BLAIR ROAD, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20012 • 829-8640

CATERERS

April 16, 1976

Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554

Attn. Richard E. Wiley

Dear Sir;

I am enclosing here with a copy of your letter to my firm and with the following explanation:

- 1) and 2) are explained in attached schedule
- 3) We shared no revenues with the football club.
- 4) Our prices were as follows for major sales items:

Beer $\frac{1}{2}$ Qt.	1974 1.00	1975 1.00
Beer 12oz.	.75	.75
Soft Drinks 14oz.	.50	.50
Soft Drinks 10oz.	.35	---
Popcorn	.50	.50
Pizza	.60	.60
Peanuts	.35	.40
Barbeque	.85	.85
Giant Kosher Franks	.95	.95
Hot Dogs	.55	.60

You could probably estimate that Beer, Soft Drinks, popcorn, Peanuts, and Hot Dogs account for 90% of Income.

As you will note we have omitted 1973 inasmuch as we were not the concessionaire during that period. We believe it was Canteen Corporation. An easier Method to securing 1973 figures may possibly be through the D.C. Armory Board.

For the only comment we may offer regarding

WASHINGTON • MARYLAND • VIRGINIA

the need for blackout of games, I call your attention to the game of 12/21/75, which was listed as "cold", the attendees decreased by appr. 11% over previous game.

Sincerely,

CD Longley
Carl D. Longley
President



7023 BLAIR ROAD, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20012 • 829-8640

RFK CONCESSION

1974 SEASON

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SALES</u>	<u>SPECTATORS</u>
9/22	57,452.92	53,888
9/30	52,819.95	54,395
10/13	58,745.57	55,167
10/20	49,617.26	54,396
11/17	51,187.00	56,758
11/24	56,219.37	55,017
12/15	46,933.00	52,939

1975 SEASON

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SALES</u>	<u>SPECTATORS</u>
9/21	60,012.72	52,828
9/28	64,290.30	54,973
10/13	62,487.48	53,487
11/2	62,591.68	55,127
11/23	54,476.74	53,668
11/30	58,020.21	54,642
12/21	40,001.64	48,890

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